BATTLE OF SINGAPORE - GENERAL YAMASHITA VS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL PERCIVAL

1. The battle of Singapore, also known as the fall of Singapore, was last of

Malaya campaign fought in the south-east Asian of the World War II when the empire

of Japan invaded the British stronghold of Singapore. Singapore was the major

British military base in south-east Asia and nicknamed the “Gibraltar of the east”. The

fighting in Singapore lasted from 8thto 15thFebruary 1942. By morning of

15thFebruary, the Japanese had broken through the last line of defence; the allies

were running out of food and ammunition. The anti-aircraft guns had also run out of

ammunition and were unable to disrupt Japanese air attack which were causing

heavy casualty.

AIM

2. The aim of this battle study is to analyze the characteristics of General

Yamashita and Lieutenant General Percival in the battle of Singapore, strengths and

weaknesses and lessons learnt.

SCOPE

3. The scope of this battle study will cover as follows:

a. Analysis of Battle of Singapore.

b. Leaders’ Background.

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 c. Analysis Of The Strengths And Weaknesses Of Leadership (Tactics,

Leadership & Morale).

d. Lessons Learnt and Significance For Today’s Commanders.

e. Conclusions.

4. General Tomoyuki Yamashita was born on November 8th1885 on the island of

Shikoku. His father, a local doctor, did not believe that Yamashita had the academic

ability to succeed in a profession like law. He therefore, enrolled his son in a military

school, the Kainan Middle School. At aged 15, Yamashita joined the military

academy at Hiroshima. Here he gained a reputation as a hard worker and he was

transferred to the Central Military Academy in Tokyo in 1905.

5. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Arthur Ernest Percival was born in

AspendenLodge, Aspenden near Buntingford in Hertfordshire, England on 26 th

December 1887. He was a second son of Alfred Reginald and Edith Percival and his

father was the land agent of the Hamel’s Park estate and his mother came from

Lancashire cotton family.His military career began at comparatively late age of 20

years old, of which he joined in 1907, when Great War broke out. When first day of

war, he was 26 years old, and as a private in the Officer Training Corps of the Inns of

Court. He was promoted after underwent five weeks basic training to temporary

Second Lieutenant.

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THE ORDER OF BATTLE

The Japan ORBAT

6. The Japanese Imperial Army invaded Malaya and Thailand on 7 December

1941. The conquest of Malaya was completed in less than three months

when Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942. The Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army

under General Tomoyuki Yamashita was given the task of conquering Malaya. The

Japan ORBAT as per Annex A.

The British ORBAT

7. In November 1940, the total strength of Malaya Command was at

17 battalions. The Indian Army contingent was mainly organized as III Corps with

their HQ based in Kuala Lumpur. When Japanese forces invaded Malaya on 8

December 1941, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, the General Officer

Commanding (GOC) Malaya in charged of Malaya Command, with a force of 88,600.

The ORBAT of British Army at that time as per Annex B.

8. Strengths and WeaknessesOf Leadership (Tactics, Leadership & Morale)

a. General Tomoyuki Yamashita.

(1) From the age of 11, Yamashita the son of a Japanese village

doctor, had been trained as a soldier. He was labelled as siding with the

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young officers’ rebellion and later told himself should always in the front

line, a place to die, which made him a legendary leader 1.

(2) Yamashita never a man for paperwork, experienced the greatest

difficulty in passing his entrance exam for Tokyo War College, and was

only allowed to enrol after several attempts.

(3) He spent years of his service in 20’s and 30’s in the crucible of

war in China, Manchuria and Korea.

(4) Yamashita had widespread espionage net which consisted

Japanese fishermen, plantation and mine managers, merchants,

barbers and photographers.

(5) Four days before the surrender, Yamashita had a letter urging

immediate surrender which dropped from an aircraft. Percival sent no

answer. He was sure that reinforcements, an aircraft carrier with fighter

planes, was on the way, he still believed he could hold out until they

arrived.

(6) An outnumbered Japanese army, arriving in Malaya with

bicycles for transport, living rough on rice, stealing whatever they

needed during they advanced, had humiliated the complex Western

army.

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 (7) Yamashita trained his men on Hainan Island in conditions

approaching Malaya. They carried out so many landings, lived rough,

learned to travel with minimum of unnecessary. Yamashita provided

them with a booklet of Malaya, with reason for attacking Malaya,

valuable hints on health, care of weapons, and how to live off the land.

(8) Yamashita’s capabilities during the military troubles in Tokyo,

however, made him some enemies on both sides, who felt that they

had lost the advantage in agreeing to sink their differences.

b. LieutenantGeneral Arthur Percival.

(1) He enlisted as a private soldier at age of 27 when the First War

began. By thirty he was a Colonel commanding a front line battalion.

(2) Percival became a distinguished student at Camberley Staff

College at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich and at the Imperial

Defence College.

(3) He lacked the ability to implement his excellence in producing

papers either on defence or attack.

(4) Percival’s service in the 20’s and 30’s was in a country at peace,

then as a battalion commander and various staff appointments.

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(5) British intelligence networks in Malaya were tragically ignored

even Intelligence Service was given up in 1940 because of the

economy.

(6) Percival called a conference with the Director General of Civil

Defence, the Inspector-General of Police and his own staff officers. He

informed he had two alternatives, either to launch a counter attack to

capture the reservoirs and the supply dumps that had fallen into

Japanese and drive the enemy off the heights of Bukit Timah from

which it fired down on Singapore or to surrender. The defenders

however were too exhausted for another counter attack which left only

the second choice, surrender.

(7) Percival was blamed of not maintaining morale of his army in

Malaya. They had no clear mission why they had been posted to

Malaya away from a war in Europe and not producing the equivalent

pamphlet of Japanese pamphlet for his army.

(8) Percival’s personel bravery was claimed not enough.

(9) Percival’s assumption that British was the first to start training in

the jungles and plantations of Malaya and discovered that not

impassable as thought.

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(10) Percival have forgotten that the Japanese were working to the

plan both sides had drawn up for the conquest of Malaya and the

capture of Singapore, land first in Thailand and then move south.

(11) Percival was first went to Malaya in the second quarter of 1936

as General Staff Officer 1st Grade, Headquarters, Malaya Command for

one and eight months.

(12) During his time with the 44th (Home Counties) Division, he was

able to get some up-to-date or modernize ideas about the lay-out and

construction of beach defences in Yorkshire in the East Coast of

England, which were to prove useful later in Malaya. In fact, he had

gained experienced theoretically in Staff College exercises.

(13) Soon after his arrival in Malaya, he decided to place the anti-

aircraft artillery, which had previously been under the Commander

Singapore fortress, directly under his own command because he

foresaw the necessary to build up a coordinated air defence scheme for

the whole of Malaya.

(14) Percival pleaded that they did not make proper use of the local

forces. Reinforcing units arriving in Malaya from overseas were badly in

need of men with local knowledge to act as guides and helpers.

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 (15) Percival was only one among many senior officers whose

judgments had not moved with the times. Indeed, when General

Wavell, the newly appointed Supreme Commander ABDA (American,

British, Dutch, Australian) Command, visited Singapore on 7-8 January

1942, he was appalled to find that no effort had then been made to

defend Singapore Island, except for the establishment of the prewar

naval guns. Percival admitted that he had not undertaken defensive

measures because he believed that ‘building defenses was bad for

morale’.

LESSONS LEARNT

9. Called by one historian ‘the greatest triumph in Japanese history’, the

conquest of Malaya and Singapore remains impressive. Modern military leaders can

learn much from this ‘forgotten campaign’. Although many lessons are woven

throughout the Malaya Campaign, the six below are particularly applicable for today's

joint force commanders. First, aggressive leadership is a force multiplier. General

Yamashita's bold and decisive leadership was instrumental in keeping his forces

constantly advancing toward their ultimate objective: Singapore. His firm control and

clear understanding of own and enemy forces capabilities, heavily contributed to the

success of his calculated risks. His positive outlook boosted morale and led to

positive results. Although some choices were risky, his confidence inspiring and

aggressive leadership allowed him to seize the initiative and reap big rewards.In any

campaign, the leadership role is significant in determining the eventual outcome. It

forms part of the fighting power which consists of conceptual component, moral

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component and physical component. The Malayan Campaign is no different in that

the personalities of the military commanders from both warring parties had indeed

influenced the strategy and the morale of the troops significantly.

10. Unquestionably, Yamashita's leadership which permeated every aspect of

operational planning and execution, was a key to victory. In contrast, Percival's timid

and indecisive leadership produced the opposite effects. By nearly all accounts,

Lieutenant General Percival was a superb administrator, but certainly not a natural

leader. He had difficulty in making firm decisions, and those made were often too

late. His desire for excessively detailed planning was partly to blame. Lieutenant

General Percival insisted on following rules and regulations to the letter, no matter

how unreasonable or bureaucratic. He was not a forward-looking thinker. For

example, he did not insist his troops train, or became knowledgeable in jungle

warfare, even though Singapore bordered dense jungle.

11. A direct result of Lieutenant General Percival's poor leadership was that

British morale plummeted when the Japanese began their marched down Malaya.

Indeed, Malaya and Singapore were well on their way toward being lost before the

first battle was fought. Although General Yamashita's aggressive leadership

produced positive battlefield results, his record after victory was less impressive.

Unquestionably, the biggest detraction from the campaign was the inability of

Japanese leaders to stop the atrocities committed by their soldiers. Control of

friendly forces and humane treatment of the vanquished remains vitally important.

Activities of military forces, both in and out of combat, will remain of high interest in

today’s media-intensive world. Political reaction, international relations, and world-

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wide public opinion will be negatively impacted by irresponsible actions of a nation’s

military personnel.

12. Second, defend only what is defendable and worth defending. Lieutenant

General Percival's desire to protect everything had the end result of protecting

nothing. Attempts to defend the entire Malaya and later, the entire 80 miles coast of

Singapore, effectively dispersed critical troops and violated the principles of mass

and economy of force. British’s combat power was unnecessarily weakened,

decisive points were exposed and concentration of force was impossible. Not

surprisingly, a crushing defeat followed. British mistakes went far in assisting their

enemy.

13. Third, acquire the best possible knowledge of the enemy through intelligence.

The intelligence aspect of Japanese operations was accomplished in a near flawless

manner. Through knowledge of the mind and capabilities of the enemy, General

Yamashita effectively used deception in his operational planning. Accurate

intelligence allowed thorough knowledge and preparation of the battlefield, which

minimized the Japanese casualties. His awareness of British’s vulnerabilities

significantly hastened their defeat. For today's commanders, accurate intelligence is

still vital. Information can range from a high-tech accounting of enemy troop’s

strength and disposition, yet critically important, insight into potentially vulnerable

enemy infrastructure, such as roads, communications systems and public utilities.

14. Fourth, recognize and incorporate the unique environmental aspects of the

battlefield into planning. The terrain of every battlefield offers potential advantages

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for exploitation of the enemy. Planners must ensure they use climate, terrain and

other environmental characteristics to their best advantage. General Yamashita had

combined the use of intelligence and the environment to crush the Allies.

15. Flexibility in planning is the fifth lesson, of whichmilitary objectives are best

achieved through flexible and dynamic application of force at the decisive point. A

commander must embrace flexibility as the key to adapt to the environment, changes

in the enemy situation, and unforeseen events on the battlefield. Rigidity is normally

only beneficial in commitment to an objective. The 25 th Army was able to respond to

unforeseen situations and overcome difficulties through innovative responses. This

flexibility during their blitzkrieg like advance, and their attack of points vital to the

defending force, made their march through Malaya unstoppable. Finally, logistics

support is vital to virtually every campaign. General Yamashita had serious logistics

concerns that, given minor changes, could have cost him the campaign, and meant a

much earlier defeat of Japan in World War II. An important historical lesson was that

logistics support was the lifeline of a campaign. A commander's point of culmination,

is extended or retracted by his logistics support capability. Logistics support is the

very base upon which combat power is built.

16. The study of Japanese military art in World War II usually tends to centre on

the more well known Pacific Theatre campaigns, and often focuses on their failures.

Yet, Japan's conquest of Malaya and Singapore was repleted with examples of

proper and successful application of the operational art. Japan's brilliantly planned

and executed ‘bicycle blitzkrieg’ remains a campaign worthy of study by today's

operational commanders.

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17. The fall of British because the lack of foresight in planning and under

estimation of Japanese capabilities. The main factors that contributed to the defeat in

Malaya were as follows:

a. Poor Appreciation. British had wrongly appreciated the ground with

conclusion that the country was not accessible by tank. whilst it is true that

tanks cannot move cross country over swamps, muddy paddy field and jungle,

but there were reasonably good roads and a network of tracks which

Japanese used to punch through the British defense.

b. Poor Communication. At the height of the battle, communications

between British headquarters and unit were frequently lost. with the result of

broke down, essential orders were not executed and commander lost

command and control of their units with serious consequences.

c. Lack of Air Support. British had only 158 aircraft of all types in Malaya

and Singapore. The serviceability ratio further reducedthe number of air

worthy aircraft to one third at any one time. Of these two, most were recall to

concentrate on the defense of Singapore. With no effective air cover, the 11 th

Division was at the mercy of the Japanese Air Force.

d. Lack of Training. Acclimation of troops and proper training in the new

environment was not given to the British force. They were particularly

susceptible to night attack by the Japanese who mastered the art through

training and maximised the attack at night to create confusion and panic

among the British troops.

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 e. Incomplete Preparation of The Defence. Units under 11th Division

were given two tasks that were to defend Jitra and Matador Operation with the

latter was given high priority. The consequence was the precious time was lost

which should have been put to better use in preparing the defence of Jitra.

Virtually, all the defence tasks such as construction of pill box were

undertaken by the soldiers, as money wa not available to utilize civilian labour.

Hence, in the little time that was available, the defence preparation was far

from adequate or completed by the time of the first Japanese on slaughter.

f. Ignorance of Basic Principles of War. The British was not sure

whether to go on the offensive or defensive until the cancellation of Matador

two days before the action of Jitra. The offensive and defensive operation

need different preparation. Even in the defence, the British forces did not think

and act offensively. The force level required for the defence was grossly

inadequate.

CONCLUSION

18. The fall of Singapore on 15 th February 1942 was a great shock to Britain and

her Allies. The shock was all the greater because the public generally had been led

to believe that Singapore was impregnable. Accusations against the leaders, both

military and civil, were made in Britain and abroad, and there were also wild stories

about the conduct of their fighting men and the civil population.General Yamashita’s

explanation of the reasons for his own success in Malaya throw light on General

Percival’s performance in Malaya in 1941 to 1942. In a report written five months

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after the fall of Singapore, Yamashita was noticeably censorious of British command

failure.

19. The British commanders were, he wrote, ‘out-generalled, outwitted, and

outfought’ by their Japanese counterparts. Yamashita concluded, in particular, that

Percival was personally responsible for a large share of the defeat. Percival, noted

the Japanese commander, was a ‘nice good man’ who was neither a dynamic leader

nor an inspiring general, and who ‘was good on paper but timid and hesitant in

making command decisions’. During the fighting on the mainland, and later on

Singapore Island, Percival held innumerable conferences with his staff, seeking

consensus, rather than giving clear, unambiguous orders.

20. Without doubt, Percival played his hand badly when dealt a bad hand.

However Percival's leadership failure was not unique among his peers in the early

part of the Second World War. British generals were simply unable to conduct fast-

moving campaigns on the frozen wastes of Norway, the fields of Flanders, in the

deserts of North Africa or thejungles in the Far East. This pattern of events indicates

that leadership failure is a necessary but insufficient explanation for the failure of the

British army to defend the Empire against its enemies.

21. Percival had come under criticism for not imposing a common doctrine and

training his men hard enough.The fault did not lay with the man on the spot but on

the organisation. Malaya Command's pre-war military training policy reflected the

British army'slaissez-faireapproach to training. General training instructions were

issued to subordinate units but it was left to individual commanders to interpret the

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instructions. It was not foreseen at that time that thelaissez-faireattitude held by

senior British commanders had an adverse effect on training.

22. Since each unit commander was free to interpret doctrine as he saw fit, an

idiosyncratic training approach developed. Thus, the quality of combat units was

uneven and overly dependent on the training regime imposed by the individual unit

commanders. The net result was that some units performed admirably while others

collapsed under the strain of combat.

23. The Japanese training system shared similarities with its British counterpart. It

also emphasised blind obedience to orders. However, the Japanese training system

was redeemed by its emphasis on developing fighting spirit (seishin). The Japanese

soldier was renowned for his adherence to a cult of sacrifice. Contemporary armies

talk about fighting to the last man.Coupled to this were Japanese standing orders

that emphasised aggressive action at all times. If conflicting orders arrived at the

same time, Japanese commanders were trained to adopt the more aggressive order

for implementation.

24. Percival and his generals did exactly what the system expected them or

trained them to do. Even though they may be rightly faulted for making poor

command decisions, the neglected and flawed organisation that they served ensured

that a successful defence of Malaya was very slim. They were the victims of the

contradictions in the British army, which alternated between a demand for blind

obedience from troops and giving commanders flexibility to interpret doctrine. For the

autocratic command and control system to work, it was crucial to have good

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communications.The generally poor morale of the troops and material shortages

compounded the problem.

Endnotes

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1
James Leasor, Singapore The Battle That Changed the World, (House of Straus, 2001), pp 7.