Local Legislation and Administrative Investigation1

Administrative Law, Law on Local Government, and Election

Law

Group 2
JD 4201

Buño, Paul
Callejo, Jasfher
Lucion, Paolo
Mundin, Bianca
Pantaleon, Jea
Reyes, Mervynn
Tawantawan, Nor-aine

Submitted to:
Atty. Benedicto M. Gonzales, Jr.
Professor
1 Concepts and doctrines are based on BENEDICTO M. GONZALES JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND ELECTION LAW 282-361 (1st ed. 2010).
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: LOCAL LEGISLATION 3

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
1. ATIENZA V. VILLAROSA 12

2. BALACUIT V. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY 15

3. CITY OF MANILA V. LAGUIOAND MTDC 17

4. LINA V. PANO 19

5. LOPEZ V. CITY OF MANILA 22

6. MATHAY V. COURT OF APPEALS 24

7. MENZON V. PETITA 27

8. MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA V. MADRONA AND CITY OF ORMOC 30

9. PALMA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALANGAS 32

10. RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO 32

11. RURAL BANK OF MAKATI V. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI 33

12. VELASCO V. VILLEGAS 34

PART II: ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGTIONS 36

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
1. VARELA V. REVALEZ 42

2. GANZON V. COURT OF APPEALS 43

3. GALANGI V. ABAD 43

4. JOSON V. TORRES 45

5. LAPID V. COURT OF APPEALS 47

6. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. JOEL SAMANIEGO 49

7. TEVEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN 51

8. SALIMAMA V. GUINGONA 54

9. PALMA V. FORTICH 58

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 PART I: LOCAL LEGISLATION
Basis of Local Legislation
- General Rule: Legislative power of Congress may not be delegated (Potestas delegate
non delegari potest)
o Merely exercising powers delegated to them by the people
- Exception: LGUs may legislate on purely local matters
o Sanctioned by immemorial practice
o Recognition of the fact that local legislatures are more knowledgeable on
purely local matters and in a better position to enact the necessary and
appropriate legislation thereon
- Mandate of the delegation comes from the Constitution; particularly those that deal
with the authority to create their own source of revenue
o LGC expanded the coverage of the law-making power
- Separation of powers not strictly apply between legislative and executive branches
of local governments
o Section 447: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation of the
Sangguniang Bayan
o Sec 458: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod
o Section 468: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Concept of Local Legislation
- Two Significations:
1. Form of power
2. Process
- As a power: Authority of the various councils to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions, or appropriate funds
- As a process: Continuous interaction of the local legislative council with the LGUs
executive branch, constituents, civil society, NGOs, and other actors of governance

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Various Functions of the Sanggunian
- The Sanggunians are primarily tasked to
a. Enact ordinances
b. Approve resolutions
c. Appropriate funds
- Secs. 391, 447, 458, and 468 should be correlated with:
a. Section 16 (general welfare clause)
b. Section 22 (corporate powers)
c. Roles of the LGUs
- The Sanggunian’s legislative enactments must be geared towards providing for the
real “needs” of the people in their peace, security, health, safety, morals,
convenience, and the like
o Corollary function to raise the necessary funds that will support the delivery
of the basic needs and facilities
- Major functions of local councils:
1. Provide for an efficient and effective local government
2. Generate and maximize use of the resources for the development of the
LGU
3. To tax or regulate business activities and some professions, including the
grant of franchises and licenses
4. Regulate the use of the land, buildings, and structures
5. To ensure the efficient and effective delivery of basic services and
facilities
6. Perform such other functions as may be imposed by law or ordinance
Duty to Review Measures of Lower-Level LGUs
- City or municipal councils  Review ordinances promulgated by sangguniang
barangays
o Ensure that the same are in conformance with laws and city/municipal
ordinances
- Provincial councils  Review city/municipal legislative enactments and executive
issuances

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Maintenance of Peace and Order
- The sanggunian is mandated to formulate measures to prevent and suppress
activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the residents
Provisions of penalties for violations of ordinances
- Coercive force to exact obedience from the populace
o Sanctions must be reasonable:
 Sangguniang Barangay.: Not exceeding Php 1000
 Sangguniang Bayan: Not exceeding Php 2500, or imprisonment for not
more than 6 mos., or both
 Sangguniang Panlungsod/Panlalawigan: Not exceeding Php 5000, or
imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both
Protection of the environment
- May prescribe penalties for acts destructive to the ecology
- Must provide for:
1. Establishment of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,
mangroves
2. Protection of the LGUs water supply
3. Efficient collection and disposal of solid waste and garbage
Creation of Local Offices
- Must determine the necessity of creating positions and fixing the salaries, wages,
allowances, and other emoluments and benefits of all officials and employees to be
paid wholly or partially from local funds
Granting of Incentives to Public Servants
- To improve the quality of public service, it may resolve to give:
a. Additional allowances or benefits to teachers, judges, or prosecutors
b. Legal assistance to barangay officials for cases related to their performance of
official functions
c. Insurance coverage benefits
Granting of Tax Exemptions
- To attract investments and stimulate businesses
- Majority vote of all its members

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 - Tax exemptions, incentives, or reliefs
Granting of Franchises
- Preference in the grant of franchises shall be given to cooperatives
- Includes the corollary duty to regulate the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of the business which were granted franchises
Granting of Licenses
- Sanggunians are now charged with the regulation of practice of professions or
occupations that are not covered by government licensing examinations
- May likewise give licenses for the building, operation, and maintenance of cockpits
Granting of Fishing Privileges
- Sanggunians must determine who may be given exclusive fishing rights and
privileges
- To promote or protect the interests of local, marginalized fishers, and conserve its
marine resources
Granting of Scholarships
Granting of Loans and Financial Assistance
- Subject to availability of funds
- Loans to other LGUs
- Financial grants to charitable, benevolent, or educational institutions
Regulation of Land Use
1. Adopt comprehensive land use plan
2. Reclassify land
3. Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved
comprehensive land use plan
Regulation of Use of Property
- May declare or abate any nuisance
- Require that buildings be kept in sanitary condition
- Regulate the establishment and operation of cafes, hotels, entertainment facilities,
etc.

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Regulation of Subdivisions
- In cases where approval by the national government is required, the period for such
approval is 30 days from receipt of the copy of the application
o If not acted upon, deemed approved
Regulation of Selling of Food Commodities
Regulation of Streets, Bridges, and Other Public Places
- Regulate the use of such places
- Establish vehicle stops and terminals
- Regulate the putting up of signs and signposts
- Regulate traffic
- Prohibit the putting up of obstacle or encroachments
Regulation of Tricycles and Pedicabs
- Subject to the guidelines issued by DoTC
- Determine who among the applicants may be grated franchises to operate
Operation of Vocational and Technical Schools
- With the approval of DepEd, reasonable fees and charges may be collected on said
institutions, subject to existing laws of tuition fess
Statutory Provisions on Local Legislation
Where Local Legislative Power is Vested
- Four entities authorized to exercise local legislative power:
1. Sangguniang Panlalawigan
2. Sangguniang Panlungsod
3. Sangguniang Bayan
4. Sangguniang Barangay
- In the Filipino context, the Sanggunian is more than just a law-making body
o Also a consultative body (because of non-legislative functions)
- Provisions on encouraging private sector participation in local governance and the
creation of multi-sector special entities to act as advisory bodies highlight the
importance of consultative dialogues and interaction between the legislature and
other sectors of the community

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Presiding Officer
- The local legislature is a collegial body
- The LGC provides that the presiding officers for the different sanggunians are as
follows:
1. Vice-Governor for Provinces
2. Vice-Mayor for Cities/Municipalities
3. Punong Barangay for Barangays
- The presiding officer shall only vote in case of a tie
- In the event of inability of the presiding officer to preside, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding
officer
o He must certify within 10 days from the passage of the ordinances and
resolutions by the sanggunian in the session over which he temporarily
presided
Internal Rules of Procedure
- Section 50
Duty to Make Full Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests
- Section 51
- Conflict of Interest has also been understood as referring generally to ethical
considerations suggesting that an interested public official should be disqualified
from performing his sworn duty on account of the clash between public interest and
private pecuniary interest or gain
- Section 51 does not disqualify an interested member from participating in the
deliberation or voting after making the required disclosure
o Leaves it to the member’s sense of delicadeza
Regular and Special Sessions
- Section 52
What Constitutes Quorum
- Section 53
- Cases of special quorum:
1. Imposing the penalty of suspension or expulsion upon an erring member

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 2. To override a veto of the LCE
o In both cases, not less than 2/3 vote is required
When Ordinances and Resolutions Deemed Approved
- Section 54
- Ordinances of provincial, city, or municipal councils shall be approved by a majority
of the members present
- Ordinances or resolutions authorizing or directing the payment of money or
creating liability shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members
- Three modes by which an ordinance may be approved:
1. LCE signifies his approval
2. LCE does not act on the measure and the ordinance “lapses into law”
3. LCE vetoes, but the council overrides the vote by at least 2/3 votes of all
its members
- Punong Barangay has no veto power since he is a member of the sanggunian
LCE’s Veto Power
- Section 55
- Ultra Vires: Act is beyond the power, or outside of the authority of the sanggunian to
perform
- The written veto message shall contain a thorough explanation on the reasons why
the LCE considers the measure as ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare
- Cases where item veto is authorized:
1. Appropriation ordinances
2. Resolutions approving local development plans or public investment
programs
3. Resolutions creating a liability against the LGU
Legislative Review
- Section 56
Liability for Enforcement of Disapproved Measures
- Section 58
When Do Measures Take Effect
- Section 59

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Ordinances and Resolutions
- Ordinance: Enactments of the legislative body of a municipal corporation, and
governing matters not already covered by national law
o The law defines it as “legislative actions of general and permanent character”
- Resolution: Formal expression of the opinion or will of a public assembly, adopted
by vote, the subject matter of which would not properly constitute a statute
o The law describes it as “those of temporary character and matters relating to
proprietary functions and private concerns”
- Distinctions:
Ordinance Resolution
Has to undergo three separate readings No need; Unless otherwise decided by a
majority of all the members
Accompanied by a brief explanatory note
Not subject to such requirement
containing justification for approval
May contain penal provisions Generally cannot prescribe penalties; Except
when imposing disciplinary sanctions
against erring sanggunian members or
elective barangay officials
Subject to the veto power of the LCE Generally may not be vetoed; Except in cases
of local development plans and public
investment programs

Essential Requisites of a Valid Ordinance

1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must not prohibit but regulate trade
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy
6. Must be reasonable

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Must Not Be Unfair or Oppressive
- Unfair or oppressive if it violates the common rights of a person
o Sources of rights: Bill of Rights, civil law, and universally-recognized human
rights
o Unreasonable or oppressive if it operates to permanently deprive the owners
of the right to use their own property
Must Not Be Partial or Discriminatory
- “Unfavorable treatment based on prejudice”
Must Not Prohibit but Regulate Trade
- The word “regulate” means and includes the power to control govern, and to
restrain and cannot be construed as synonymous with “suppress” or “prohibit”
It Must Be Reasonable
- An ordinance is deemed valid and legal unless otherwise declared null and void by a
competent court
o Presumption is always in favor of validity and reasonableness
o Presumption must be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness is on
the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence
Classification of Ordinances
1. General Ordinance
o Pursuant to police power
o General objective is to promote the general welfare of the community
2. Appropriation Ordinance
o Pursuant to the power of the purse
o Aim is to allocate local funds for specific programs, projects, activities, and
purposes allowed by law
3. Tax Ordinance
o Taxing or revenue-raising power
o Levy taxes or impose fees or charges for the financial support of the LGU’s
operations
4. Special Ordinance
o To address any extraordinary concern or special purpose

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Illustrative Cases:
RAMON M. ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. VILLAROSA, respondent.
G.R. No. 161081. May 10, 2005
Doctrine: The vice-governor (or vice-mayor) is the administrative head of sanggunian
Facts: Petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa were the Vice-Governor and Governor,
respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, the petitioner Vice-
Governor received the Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 issued by the respondent
Governor concerning the AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES,
MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.
In reply, the petitioner Vice-Governor wrote the respondent Governor stating that: “We
are of the opinion that purchase orders for supplies, materials and equipment are included
under those as authorized for signature by the Vice-chief executive of the Sanggunian on
the basis of the DILG Opinion No. 96-1995 as affirmed by the COA Opinions on June 28,
April 11 and February 9, 1994 and coursing it to the Governor for his approval is no longer
necessary, xxx”
Then Governor issued the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 relating to the
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOB ORDER EMPLOYEES AND
REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES. The said memorandum reads:”
xxx all existing contract of employment casual/job order basis and reappointment of the
recommendees entered into by Vice-Governor Ramon M. Atienza are hereby terminated for
being unauthorized. xxx”.
In his Letter dated July 9, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor invoked the principle of
separation of powers as applied to the local government units, i.e., the respondent, as the
Governor, the head of the executive branch, and the petitioner, as the Vice-Governor, the
head of the legislative branch, which is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The petitioner Vice-
Governor reiterated his request for the respondent to make a deeper study on the matter
before implementing his memoranda. The request, however, went unheeded as the
respondent Governor insisted on obliging the department heads of the provincial
government to comply with the memoranda.

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 The petitioner Vice-Governor thus filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for
prohibition assailing as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate
court upheld the authority of the respondent Governor to issue the Memorandum.
Issue: Whether or not the Vice-Governor has the authority to sign purchase orders or
supplies, materials, etc., and to appoint officials and employees in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Held: The Supreme Court hold that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority. Under
Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislative power for the province is exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan2 and the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer.3 Being vested with legislative
powers, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacts ordinances, resolutions and appropriates
funds for the general welfare of the province in accordance with the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 7160.4 The same statute vests upon the Vice-Governor the power to: 1) Be the
presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the
provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang
panlalawigan.
Section 39 of the Manual on the New Government Accounting System for Local
Government Units, prepared by the Commission on Audit (COA), is instructive:
Sec. 39. Approval of Disbursements. Approval of disbursements by the Local Chief
Executive (LCE) himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed,
except for regularly recurring administrative expenses such as: payrolls for regular
or permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph
services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, BIR,
PHILHEALTH, LBP, DBP, NPO, PS of the DBM and others, where the authority to
approve may be delegated. Disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated
for the operation of the Sanggunian shall be approved by the provincial Vice
Governor, the city Vice-Mayor or the municipal Vice-Mayor, as the case may be.

2 Sec. 48 reads in part: Local Legislative Power. Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the
province.
3 Sec. 49 reads in part:Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

4 Sec. 468 reads in part: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body
of the province, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province
as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, .

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 While Rep. Act No. 7160 is silent as to the matter, the authority granted to the Vice-
Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes the authority to approve
purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary implication. Since it
is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and approves the payment for
the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment needed for the operation of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve the purchase
orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
Indeed, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the
provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto is greater and
includes the authority to approve purchase orders for the procurement of the supplies,
materials and equipment necessary for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Anent the second issue, the appellate court likewise committed reversible error in
holding that the implementation of the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 had rendered the
petition moot and academic. It is recognized that courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Even if the employees
whose contractual or job order employment had been terminated by the implementation of
the July 1, 2002 Memorandum may no longer be reinstated, still, similar memoranda may
be issued by other local chief executives. Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve whether
the Governor has the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of casual/job order
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the Vice-Governor.
We hold that the Governor, with respect to the appointment of the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no such authority.
Section 466 vests on the Vice-Governor the power to, among others:
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and
employees of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose manner of
appointment is specifically provided in this Code.

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 Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose
salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the
Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the authority to appoint casual and job order
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor.
The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the officials and employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is anchored on the fact that the salaries of these employees
are derived from the appropriation specifically for the said local legislative body. Indeed,
the budget source of their salaries is what sets the employees and officials of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan apart from the other employees and officials of the
province. Accordingly, the appointing power of the Vice-Governor is limited to those
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as well as those of the Office of the Vice-
Governor, whose salaries are paid out of the funds appropriated for the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. As a corollary, if the salary of an employee or official is charged against the
provincial funds, even if this employee reports to the Vice-Governor or is assigned to his
office, the Governor retains the authority to appoint the said employee pursuant to Section
465(b)(v) of Rep. Act No. 7160.

CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF
BUTUAN
Doctrine: LGUs may not, under the guise of reulation, unreasonably interfere with any lawful
business even in the name of police power
Facts: Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640
passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a
reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine
from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment.
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the
law from being enforced. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the
grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend

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that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as
provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal
board can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the
general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.
Issue: Whether of not the power of a municipal corporation to regulate places of
amusement includes the authority to interfere in the fixing of the prices of admission.
Held: To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of
the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.5 The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to
what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to the
supervision of the courts.6
The Supreme Court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any
necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means.7 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part
of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their
children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean
corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear
the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss
of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as
petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already
experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of
age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the
ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice
and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited

5 U.S. v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85; Fable v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Kwong Sing v. City of Manila.
6Fable v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486
7 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 11 51

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by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable.
The ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be
reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference
with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not,
under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of
police power.8 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of
a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of
their property rights.9 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be
sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the
protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to
manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for
their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.10

CITY OF MANILA v. LAGUIO and MTDC

Doctrine: When an ordinance is not a justifiable exercise of police power
Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although
duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
On March 30, 1993, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which
prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy
the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the

8 Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556,182 P. 530.

9 Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac, 3 SCRA 816.
10 Clifford v. Brandon, 2 Campb 358, 368.

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enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or
transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds
allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.
MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police
power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law. Then, Judge Laguio
ruled for the petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is in accordance with the exercise of police power
Held: The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every
sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein
transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called
upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.11
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity,
not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.12 It must be evident that no other alternative for the

11 Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila
Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20
July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.
12 U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486 (1912); Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913

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accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.13 Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the
social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the
means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive. It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all
reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the
community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
community’s social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it
can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The
closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under
the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate
the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.

LINA v. PANO
Doctrine: Ordinances or resolutions enacted by the LGU must not contravene existing
national laws
FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He
asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open

13 Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, No. L-38429, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 182, 191-193.

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the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.
The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995. As
a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said
complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna,
Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a
business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring
as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge,
Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kapasyahan Blg. 508 is valid
HELD: In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and
enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As
held in Tatel vs. Virac(1992), ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted
by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp(1994).
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first
place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they
cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single
act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from
existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not

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prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are
concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing
Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a
different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm
that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still
includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5,
Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its
will or modify or violate it.
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of
autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the
extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the
1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio.14
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot
avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as
justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an
expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Boards enactment, like spring water,
could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature.

14 Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52, 65 (1991).

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LOPEZ v. CITY OF MANILA AND VEGA
Doctrine: Where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency
the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to courts subject to certain exceptions. With regard to questions on the
legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections
187, 226, and 252 of R.A. 7160 and must be resorted to first.
FACTS: This case involves Section 219 of R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requiring the conduct of the general revision of real property. In September 1995, the City
Assessors Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values to the City Council
for its appropriate action. Acting on the proposal, the City Council enacted Manila
Ordinance No. 7894 entitled: An Ordinance Prescribed as the Revised Schedule of Fair
Market Values of Real Properties of the City of Manila. As a result, the tax on the land
owned by the petitioner was increased by 580% and 250% with respect to the
improvement on petitioner’s property. Petitioner Lopez, filed a special proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 with preliminary injunction
and prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) alleging that Manila Ordinance No. 7894
appears to be unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. The RTC Manila issued the TRO
on April 10, 1996. On the same date, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect, reducing by
50% the assessment levels for the computation of tax. As a result, Manila Ordinance No.
7905 reduced the tax increase of petitioners residential land. Despite the amendment, the
controversy proceeded when petitioner applied for preliminary injunction which was
denied and the respondent for motion to dismiss which were granted by the trial court for
failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies and that the petition had
become moot and academic when Manila Ordinance No. 7894 was repealed by Manila
Ordinance No. 7905. Hence, this action.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and thus the
petitioner should be dismissed. -YES
HELD:As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting
all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body,

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if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter
and decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to
give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but
also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. This rule, however, admits
certain exceptions. With regard to questions on the legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies
available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of R.A. 7160.
Section 187 of R.A. 7160 provides, that the taxpayer may question the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinance on appeal within thirty (30) days from effectivity thereof, to the
Secretary of Justice. In this case, the petitioner after finding that his assessment is unjust,
confiscatory, or excessive, must have brought the case before the Secretary of Justice for
questions of legality or constitutionality of the city ordinance.
Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, an owner of real property who is not satisfied with
the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from notice of assessment,
appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals. Should the taxpayer question the excessiveness
of the amount of tax, he must first pay the amount due, in accordance with Section 252 of
R.A. 7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase paid under protest and
accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a petition under oath
together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits or documents to support his
appeal.
The rule is well-settled that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulations of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. Furthermore,
the crux of petitioners cause of action is the determination of whether or not the tax is
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory which is essentially a question of fact and thereby,
precludes the court from reviewing the same. Moreover, the instant petition does not fall
within any of the exceptions above-mentioned. First, it involves not only questions of law
but more importantly the questions of facts which therefore needed the reception of
evidence contrary to the position of the respondent before the hearing of its motion for
reconsideration. Now, on the second exception on the rule of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, there is no showing that administrative bodies, viz., The Secretary of Justice, the

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City Treasurer, Board of Assessment Appeals, and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
are in estoppel. On the third exception, it does not appear that Ordinance No. 7894 or the
amendatory Ordinance No. 7905 are patently illegal. Re the fourth exception, in the light of
circumstances as pointed elsewhere herein, the matter does not need a compelling judicial
intervention. On the fifth exception, the claim of the petitioner is not small. Re the sixth
exception, the court does not see any irreparable damage that the petitioner will suffer if he
had paid or will pay under protest as per the ordinance. He could always ask for a refund of
the excess amount he paid under protest or be credited thereof if the administrative bodies
mentioned in the law (R.A. 7180) will find that his position is meritorious. Re the seventh
exception, the court is of the opinion that administrative relief provided for in the law are
plain, speedy and adequate. On the eight exception, while the controversy involves public
interest, judicial intervention as the petitioner would like this court to do should be
avoided. The ninth and tenth exception obviously are not applicable in the instant case
which are when the subject of controversy is private land; and in quo-warranto proceeding
respectively.
Therefore, since the petitioner fails to exhaust all administrative remedies such as
the remedies available to the taxpayer provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of R.A.
7160, the petition should be dismissed for being premature.

MATHAY v. COURT OF APPEALS

Doctrines: B.P. 337 shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief
executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council or sanggunian through enacting
ordinances that provide for the absorption of specific persons to certain positions.
The Civil Service Commissions power is limited to approving or disapproving an
appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific
individual be made.

An appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested.

The right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law
expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.

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A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the
appointment.

FACTS: During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Simon appointed private respondents to
positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the local government of Quezon City created
pursuant to PD No. 51 which was allegedly signed into law on November 15 or 16, 1972. On
February 23, 1990, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 33, stating that PD No. 51
was never published in the Official Gazette. Therefore, the presidential decree is deemed
never in force or effect and therefore cannot at present, be a basis for establishment of the
CSUs. The CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil Service Regional or
Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 51 on the ground that the same never became law. For Quezon City
CSU employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by the enactment of
City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which established the Department of Public
Order and Safety (DPOS) which absorbed personnel of the CSU. However, these were not
filled due to lack of funds for the new DPOS and the insufficiency of regular and permanent
positions created. Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the situation by offering private
respondents contractual appointments but petitioner Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of
Quezon City who again renewed the contractual appointments of all private respondents
and upon their expiry, these were no longer renewed which became the seed of discontent
from which these three consolidated petitions grew. Private respondents appealed to the
CSC holding that the reappointment of private respondents to the DPOS was automatic,
pursuant to the provision on absorption in Quezon City Ordinance No. NC-140 and
ordering their reinstatement to their former positions in the DPOS. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

1) Whether the Sanggunian or the City Council can enact ordinance providing for the
absorption of specific persons to certain positions. -NO
2) Whether the Civil Service Commission has the authority to direct him to reinstate
private respondents in the DPOS. -NO

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3) Whether private respondents could be automatically absorbed in the DPOS pursuant to
Section 3 of the Ordinance. -NO
HELD:

1-2) The law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old Local Government Code and not the Local
Government Code of 1992 which became effective only on January 1, 1992, when the
material events in this case transpired. Section 3 of the said Ordinance is invalid for being
inconsistent with B.P. 337 since it directs the absorption of the personnel of the defunct
CSU into the new DPOS. The Ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions which the
city council or sanggunian, through the Ordinance, is in effect dictating who shall occupy
the newly created DPOS positions. However, B.P. 337 shows that the power to appoint rests
exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council
or sanggunian through the simple expedient of enacting ordinances that provide for the
absorption of specific persons to certain positions. The powers of the city council and the
city mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated by B.P. 337 stating that the
power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive an the power of the city council or
sanggunian is limited to creating,consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions
supported by local funds wherein the power to appoint is not one of them.

By ordering petitioner to reinstate private respondents pursuant to Section 3 of the

Ordinance, the Civil Service Commission substituted its own judgment for that of the
appointing power. The Civil Service Commissions power is limited to approving or
disapproving an appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an appointment
of a specific individual be made. Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the
person chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in the appointment process
necessarily ends. The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested
in the appointing authority.

Therefore, since an appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be

performed by the officer in which it is vested, the Civil Service Commission has no power to
order petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. to reinstate private respondents.

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3) The right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of
a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Since Presidential Decree 51
creating the CSU never became law, it could not be a source of rights. Neither could it
impose duties. It could not afford any protection. It did not create an office. It is as
inoperative as though it was never passed. A void appointment cannot give rise to security
of tenure on the part of the holder of the appointment. In this case, assuming the validity of
the Ordinance, the absorption contemplated therein is not possible. Since the CSU never
legally came into existence, the private respondents never held permanent positions. Their
appointments in the defunct CSU were invalid ab initio. Their seniority rights and
permanent status did not arise since they have no valid appointment. For them to enter the
Civil Service after the revocation and cancellation of their invalid appointment, they have to
be extended an original appointment, subject again to the attesting power of the CSC.
Therefore, being then not members of the Civil Service, they cannot be automatically
absorbed/reappointed/appointed/reinstated into the newly created DPOS.

MENZON v. PETILLA
Doctrines: There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified
incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized
to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.

There is a vacancy in the office of the vice-governor if the incumbent assumes another office.

To obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President,
acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. As
between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and
the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in
favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

FACTS: Because no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary
of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Petilla as Acting Governor
of Leyte. Petitioner Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also
designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte.

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the Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Local Government as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to
act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte and in his reply letter, it stated that stated that since B.P.
337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a
temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is
not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the
Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. As a result, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a resolution invalidating the appointment of the
petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The petitioner sought clarification from
Undersecretary regarding the said opinion and affirmed the latter. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

1) Whether there was a vacancy. -YES

2) Whether the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary
appointments. -YES
HELD:

1. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the
office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy
when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the
duties of the office. Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, the office of the Vice-
Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was
appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected
was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the
Vice-Governor. There is no satisfactory showing that Leopoldo Petilla, notwithstanding
his succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the
duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a
full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended
period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that
resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of
Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the

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 position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion
to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that
particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting,
may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority. Therefore, there was vacancy
in the Vice-Governor position.

2. The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of
a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law
must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting. there is indeed a
necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the
governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the
province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been
proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on Elections. The
two-year interregnum which would result disruptions and delays in the delivery of
basic services to the people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local
government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to leave the situation
without affording any remedy was ever intended by the Local Government Code. To
obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the
President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may
remedy the situation. As between the President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the
vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law
provides otherwise. Therefore, the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner
to act as the Vice-Governor is valid for the exigencies of public service demanded
nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.

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MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA v. MADRONA
Doctrines: Local councils may perform other non-legislative functions such as boundary
dispute settlement.

Under Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute
between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on
the other -- or between two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, it is the RTC which has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case.

FACTS: A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of
Ormoc and by agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint
session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Kananga but there was no amicable settlement was reached. A resolution to that effect was
issued, and the sanggunians of both local government units mutually agreed to bring the
dispute to the RTC for adjudication. To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed
before the RTC-Ormoc City. The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds, among
others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. The RTC held
that it has jurisdiction over the matter. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city. -YES

HELD: Jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. It
must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by
estoppel. Under Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code, the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly

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urbanized city on the other -- or between two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units
involved.

In this case, there is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under

Republic Act No. 542. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component, city created under Republic Act No. 179. Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city
may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent
component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. It is a city independent of the province. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a
situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute
with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a
municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them so that the general rules governing
jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 which states that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Since there is no law providing for the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes
between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to
Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so
to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but
also exclusive.

Therefore, the trial court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

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PALMA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALANGAS,
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR
Doctrine: Power of LGUs to levy tolls, fees, or charges for the use of any public road, pier,
or wharf funded ad constructed by the LGU.
Facts: Palma Development Corporation is a company engaged in the milling and selling of
rice and corn in Zamboanga. It uses the municipal port of Malangas as transshipment point
for its goods.
The municipality passed Municipal Revenue Code No. 09, Series of 1993, which
imposes a service fee for the use of municipal roads or streets leading to any point along
the shorelines within the jurisdiction of the municipality and for police surveillance on all
goods and equipment harbored within the premises of the wharf.
Petitioners paid such dues under protest questioning the municipality’s authority to
tax goods and vehicles that passed through their jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Malangas has the authority to impose such
regulation?
Held: No, Municipal Revenue Code No. 09 is invalid.
The Local Government Code provides that LGUs, through their Sangguinian, may
prescribe the terms and conditions for the imposition of toll fees or charges for the use of
any public road, pier or wharf funded and constructed by them, however, the same law
prohibits the imposition, in the guise of wharfage, of taxes, charges or, fees in whatever form
on goods or merchandise. It is irrelevant that the fees are imposed for police surveillance of
the goods because such is clearly prohibited by the Local Government Code.

RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

Doctrine: Legislative power may be delegated to local governments for purely local
matters.

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No. 25 which directed the non-
Christian inhabitants or Mangyans of Mindoro to be relocated in a permanent settlement
site in sitio Tigbao in the efforts to educate these people. Such resolution also provides that

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if any Mangyan should refuse to comply with the order will be imprisoned for not more
than sixty days in accordance with the Administrative Code.
Petitioners challenge the validity of the resolution, claiming that it was invalid
because the Legislature could not delegate such power to provincial authorities.
Issue: whether or not the provincial board of Mindoro has the capacity to enact such
resolution?
Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of delegation of legislative authority.
As a general rule, legislative power of Congress cannot be further delegated. An
exception to this are those sanctioned by immemorial practice wherein the central
legislative body can delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The legislature may
make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts.
As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, the provincial board is in the best position to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the backward people in the community.
This delegation to local governments, however, should be only limited to those of
purely local matters or concerns.

RURAL BANK OF MAKATI v. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI

Doctrine: Remedies of a local government unit against violators of local tax ordinances.
Facts: Atty. Valero, the municipal attorney of Makati, went to the office of the Petitioner
Rural Bank to inquire about their payment of taxes and fees to the municipality. Rural Bank
refused to pay such assessments claiming to be tax exempt under R.A. 720.
Because of such refusal to pay the mayor’s permit fee and business tax, a complaint
was filed against Rural Bank. While the case was pending, the municipality ordered the
closure of the bank until the petitioner was able to pay such liabilities. Due to the constraint
of such closure orders, the petitioner paid under protest.

The petitioner claims that such closure order was invalid because Atty. Valero did
not have the authority to enforce such ordinance. The municipality on the other hand
asserted that such fees were a legal obligation and such was required for all businesses

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operating in the municipality in the exercise of the municipalities’ police power to regulate
business. Also, such exemption claimed by the petitioner had no basis in law.
Issue: whether or not the closure of Petitioner Rural Bank is valid.
Held: Yes, however, there are other remedies available for LGUs against violators of local
tax ordinances.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the state for the promotion and maintenance
of local self-government and such are endowed with police powers to carry out the
objectives of their creation. They are allowed to enact ordinances imposing licenses and
require permits under the purview of the general welfare clause. Thus, the closure of the
bank was a valid exercise of police power. This can be validly exercised by the municipal
mayor and was validly delegated for execution to Atty. Valero.
However, the Court held that since the bank was not engaged in illegal or immoral
activities, it did not warrant an outright closure. Section 62 provides for civil remedies to
enforce payment of delinquent taxes through distraint of personal property, and by legal
action, which can be done one at a time or simultaneously at the discretion of the
authorities. The provision did not provide for closure. Considering that the bank was in
good faith thinking that they were really tax exempt, such violation did not warrant the
municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial remedies. It should have observed due process
before ordering the bank’s closure.

VELASCO v. VILLEGAS
Doctrine: Ordinance based on prior investigation of nefarious activities that are harmful to
the people’s health, peace, morals, and the like.
Facts: The City of Manila passed an ordinance prohibiting barbershops to also engage in
the business of massage parlors adjacent to the barbershops. The purpose of such
enactment was to impose proper licensing fees on massage clinics and to curb possible
immorality, which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of
customers.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of such ordinance contending that such
amounts to a deprivation of property and means of livelihood without due process.
Issue: whether or not such ordinance was valid?

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Held: Yes, such ordinance was based on prior investigations on nefarious activities that are
potentially harmful to the people’s health, peace, morals, and the like.
The ordinance passed by the City of Manila was a valid exercise of police power. It is
widely accepted that the general welfare clause covers such ordinances, which the Court
has sustained as a valid delegation of police power to municipalities.

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 PART II: ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
Authority to Discipline Local Officials
- Involves elective public officials of lower level LGUs
- Generally designated as administrative proceedings
o Call for the exercise of quasi-judicial powers
Various Grounds for Imposing Disciplinary Sanctions
- Section 60
o Disloyalty to the Republic – Crimes against national security under the RPPC
and Commonwealth Act No. 616
o Culpable Violation of the Constitution – Must be willful and intentional
o Dishonesty – Concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant
tot one’s office or the performance of his duties
o Oppression – Act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination, or
excessive use of authority; Willful violation of another’s common rights
o Misconduct – Transgression of some established rule of action; Unlawful
behavior or gross negligence
o Gross Negligence – Entire want of care as to raise the presumption that the
person is conscious or indifferent of the probable consequences or danger of
injury to others
o Dereliction of Duty – Voluntary abandonment of one’s office without
justifiable reason
o Moral Turpitude – Contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals;
Implies inherent baseness, vileness of principle, shameful, wickedness, or
depravity
o Offenses punishable by Prision Mayor – 6 years and 1 day up to 12 years
imprisonment
o Abuse of Authority – Use of power or authority in a manner contrary to law
o Unauthorized Absences – At least 15 consecutive days in case of all elective
local government officials; Sanggunian members: At least 4 consecutive
sessions of the council
o Foreign Citizenship or Immigration

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Disciplinary Sanctions Allowed by Law
1. Fine
2. Warning
3. Censure
4. Forfeiture of Salaries
5. Suspension
6. Removal
- The first 5 sanctions may be meted out in administrative cases
- Removal may only be inflicted by order of a court of justice
o It involves the nullification of the electorate’s decision to put the incumbent
official to his position or office
Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints
- Must be verified – signed by the complainant under oath
- Without prejudice to whatever civil or criminal actions that may be instituted
Against Whom Where Filed
Elective official of a province, or of a Office of the President
city/municipality within Metro Manila
Elective official of a municipality Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Elective barangay official Sangguniang Panlungsod/Bayan
(Decision is final and executory)

- Task may be delegated by the President to the Executive Secretary or DILG

Secretary
o Must emanate from the OP or rendered by authority of the President
- If final and executory, may still be addressed before a court of justice, especially if it
involves pure questions of law
Notice of Hearing, Venue of Investigations, Reglementary Periods
- The official is required to submit a verified answer to the complaint; It must contain:
1. Respondent is the very person who is under investigation
2. The answer was prepared by, or upon the instruction of the respondent

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 3. The respondent has read the contents of the answer
4. The allegations made therein are true of respondent’s own knowledge

Who Where Investigated or Heard

Elective officials of provinces or highly- Place where he renders/holds office
urbanized cities
All other elective local officials Office of the investigating sanggunian is
located

Preventive Suspension
What is Preventive Suspension
- Measure aimed at preventing an elective local official, who is under administrative
investigation, from continuing in his office and using the same to influence or
intimidate witnesses, or to threaten the safety, integrity or availability of papers,
records, and documents
- Distinguished with the penalty of suspension; Here, the official is not yet deemed
guilty
Who Has The Power to Order Preventive Suspension
Against Whom Who
Elective officials of provinces, a highly-
urbanized city, an independent
President
component city, or a municipality within
Metro Manila
Elective officials of component cities or
Governor
municipalities
Elective official of barangays Mayor

When is Preventive Suspension Justified

- After the issues are joined and there are no longer any substantial preliminary
issues that need to be resolved

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 - The offense charged is serious
- The evidence of guilt is strong
- There is a great probability that the continued holding of the office could influence
witnesses, or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence pertinent
How Long
- Maximum duration of 60 days
- If official is facing multiple cases, not more than 90 days within a single year in the
same grounds existing and known during the 1st suspension
Implications of Pendency and Termination
- Pendency: No salary or renumeration
- Termination: Reinstatement with full benefits
- The proceedings shall continue, subject to the condition that the same shall be
terminated within 120 days from the date the respondent was formally notified of
the case
o If proceedings are delayed due to the respondent’s fault, the delay will not be
counted in computing the 120-day period
Rights of Respondents
1. Full opportunity to appear and defend oneself in person or by counsel
2. Confront and cross-examine witnesses
3. Subpoena testificandum and subpoena duces tecum
Termination, Form and Notice of Decision, Effects of Penalties
- 90 days from the date of filing to complete investigation
- 30 days thereafter to formulate and issue a decision
- The decision should:
1. Be in writing
2. Set forth the facts, law, jurisprudence and reasons relied upon by the
investigator
- Suspension should not exceed 6 months or the unexpired term of the respondent
o Will not bar the subsequent candidacy of the official
- Removal will disqualify the person for any elective position

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Appeals
Decided by Whom Where FIled
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod of HUCs/Independent
Office of the President
Component Cities, Sangguniang Bayan
of Municipalities within Metro Manila
Sanggunian Panlungsod of Component
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Cities or Sangguniang Bayan

- Where no appeal is filed within 30 days from receipt of the decision, the same shall
be final and executory
- When the penalty is removal, may be appealed in proper courts of justice, the
decision being rendered by a court of justice
- The decision of the President is final and executory
o May be brought to the Supreme Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion
Execution Pending Appeal
- The act of filing an appeal will not stay the execution of a decision
o The effect would be to place the respondent under preventive suspension
during the pendency of his appeal
- If the appellate body exonerates the official, he will be entitled to the full payment of
salaries and emoluments during the pendency of the appeal
Issues in Administrative Investigations
Power of Contempt
- LGC does not expressly grant the power of contempt
o It partakes of a judicial power and thus, cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power
o The proper remedy is to seek the assistance of the court

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Subpoena Power
- Not inherent in local legislatures
o May only issue such when duly allowed by law and always in connection with
the matter they are authorized to investigate
- Expressly conferred in cases of administrative investigations conducted for the
purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions
Investigate vs. Adjudicate
Investigate Adjudicate
To discover, to find out, to learn, to Settling, deciding, resolving a
obtain information controversy in the exercise of judicial
authority
Ordinary legislative investigations and Only in administrative investigations of
administrative investigations of elective officials
elective officials

Right Against Self-Incrimination

- May invoke constitutional right against self-incrimination
o When proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal suit
- Quasi-judicial determination of facts and the consequent imposition of suspension
or removal will not make the proceedings criminal
Right to Counsel
- In legislative investigations, conducted as an incident of its regulatory or taxing
powers, the assistance of counsel cannot be invoked as a matter of right
- In administrative investigations, which are quasi-judicial or adjudicatory in nature,
the parties are allowed to be represented by counsel
- The technical rules of procedure and evidence are not applied strictly
Right to Notice and Hearing
- Essence is to be able to hear ones side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.

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Illustrative cases:

VALERA v. RAVELEZ
Doctrine: The State can never be the author of illegal acts done in the personal capacity of
its agents.
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo G. Varela (Varela) was the mayor of Cadiz City. He created a
reorganization committee. On 22 September 1998, he submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cadiz City the committee’s Proposed Reorganizational Structure and Staffing
Pattern of Cadiz City. The Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 98-112. The
resolution declared all positions in the city government vacant, except elective positions
and positions in the city and assistant city treasurer.
Varela gave notices of termination to the city government employees. The
employees opposed and questioned the legality of Resolution No. 98-112.
On 12 January 1999, Ma. Daisy G. Revalez and 40 other city government employees
filed with the RTC a complaint against Varela for the declaration of nullity of Resolution No.
98-112 and for damages.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is personally liable for the payment of damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses as the petitioner sued in his official, and not in his
personal capacity.
Held: YES. Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the
complaint, the employees stated that, due to the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs
suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation. The State can never be the author of illegal acts.
The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City. It did not
categorically state that Varela was being sued in his official capacity. The identification and
mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically transform the action
into one against Varela in his official capacity.

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GUANZON v. COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: Power of supervision and control
Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints,
ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary
detention.
Respondent Secretary issued a preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for sixty
days, which was done three times in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor
Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced a petition for
prohibition in the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the said petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can
suspend and/or remove local officials.
Held: YES. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide. The new Constitution does not prescribe
federalism. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause)
was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the
latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental
premise of autonomy. Since local governments remain accountable to the national
authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials.
Also, we take note that "supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms;
"investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have).

GALANGI v. ABAD
Doctrine: Disrespect of, and disobedience to the Provincial Board, may only be punished
by a court of justice as indirect contempt
Facts: Mayor Julian Dulawan of Kiangan, Ifugao filed Adm. Case No. 5 against Vice-Mayor
Daniel Galangi, complainant herein, for dishonesty, misconduct in office and oppression
before the Provincial Board of Ifugao. Because of Galangi’s non-copmpliance to the

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demands of the Provincial Board, the latter convened and issued Resolution No. 16
petitioning the proper court of justice to cite Galangi for contempt and for the Provincial
Fiscal of Lagawe to file the necessary contempt proceedings. Upon the filing with the court
of first instance of Ifugao. An Order declaring Galangi in direct contempt was issued.
Issue: Whether or not direct contempt may be committed against an administrative officer.
Held: NO. The record shows that complainant Galangi was cited in respondent's court for
alleged disrespect and in disobedience of the Order of the Provincial Board of Ifugao which
is a duly constituted body to hear and decide administrative cases against a local
government official but it may be noted without going into the merits of the charge that he
was within his rights in demanding that he be furnished a copy of the charges against him.
Assuming arguendo that he had committed a contumacious act, the same, however, was not
committed "in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstract or interrupt the
proceedings before the same ..." (Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court), Hence, the charge
against complainant was an indirect contempt and not direct contempt as found by
respondent judge. The correct proceeding should have been for indirect contempt and the
Petitioner's right to be informed of the charges against him as well as his right to be heard
should have been observed in consonance with Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for contempt.
Respondent judge erred in not assessing the fact that a judo may summarily declare a
person in direct contempt only when the person committed the act or acts constituting the
said offense, in the presence of or near a court or judge, who may have actually witnessed
or perceived the commission of the punishable act or acts, such that there is indeed no
need for another court proceeding to prove that the acts were actually committed.
In the instant case, the contumacious act of herein petitioner was committed before
the Provincial Board of Ifugao, which was, indeed, beyond the perception of respondent
judge. Under such circumstances, the charge against complainant merely constituted

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indirect contempt which should be heard first as provided for in Section 3 of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.

JOSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Doctrine: The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of formal hearing in
administrative cases is explicitly authorized only with respect to appointive officers, but
not with respect to elective officials.
Facts: Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging
petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Petitioner, Governor of the
Province of Nueva Ecija, submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed the truth of
the allegations that he barged into the session hall of the capitol and committed physical
violence to harass the private respondents who were opposed to any move for the province
to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In his Order, Undersecretary Sanchez admitted
petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam but treated it as a position paper. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner reiterated this motion on October 29,
1997. Petitioner's motion was denied. Secretary Barbers found petitioner guilty as charged
on the basis of the parties' position papers. On January 8, 1998, Executive Secretary Torres
adopted Secretary Barbers' findings and recommendations and imposed on petitioner the
penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay
Issue: Whether or not the suspension from office of Governor Joson was valid?
Held: No. The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary
conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they
desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the
discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records
show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded
several rights under the law, to wit:
"Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. -- The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity
to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and

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 the production of documentary evidence in his favor through compulsory process
of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum."
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused.
These rights are essentially part of procedural due process. The local elective official has
the (1) right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance
of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the
Rules Implementing the Local Government Code and in A.O. No. 23. Well to note, petitioner
formally claimed his right to a formal investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been
admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against
him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government
Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that
administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit
their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No.
23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in
cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each
other.
An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community
that elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of
short duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this
term of office. When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived
of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the
people are entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension and
removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and
the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.

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LAPID v. COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: Appeal in administrative cases against elective local officials are decided by the
Ombudsman
Facts: A complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid with alleged
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
for allegedly having conspired with other accused in demanding and collecting from
various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of
P120.00 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted
provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its
collection.
The Ombudsman issued an Order preventively suspending petitioner. The
Department of the Interior and Local Government (hereinafter the DILG) implemented the
suspension of petitioner Lapid. Later, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the
administrative case finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct thus
suspending him for one year without pay.
A prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was filed by the
Petitioner. The Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the petitioners prayer for
injunctive relief. The following day, or on March 23, 2000, the DILG implemented the
assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking Provincial Board Member of
Pampanga, Edna David, took her oath of office as O.I.C.- Governor of the Province of
Pampanga.
A Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus and the Supplement to the Petition itself were filed in view of the resolution
of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction.
After due deliberation, the Court finds that the respondents failed to establish the existence
of a law mandating the immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The immediate
implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus premature
OSG and Office of the Ombudsman filed motions for reconsideration.

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Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein
petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one
(1) year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Held: No. A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more
than one months salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent
therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of
the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the
judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of
appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in
the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly
categorized as a final and executory judgment in respect to which execution shall issue as a
matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right
to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable
would be rendered nugatory.
And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and
the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with
public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory construction that
where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other. In the instant case, the acts
attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary
proceedings before the Office of the President under the Local Government Code or before
the Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that
petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern
his case.
Under these rules, which were admittedly promulgated by virtue of the rule-making
power of the Office of the Ombudsman, the decision imposing a penalty of one year
suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not immediately executory.

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Note: There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies are immediately executory. Decisions rendered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for example are not immediately executory and are stayed when an appeal is
filed before the Court of Appeals.15

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL SAMANIEGO

Doctrine: The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension is immediately
executory pending appeal.
Facts: This is a resolution for a second motion for partial reconsideration.
Respondents prayer for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction (for
purposes of staying the execution of the decision against him) was held as a superfluity.
The execution of petitioners joint decision against respondent should be stayed during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.
The Court reconsider.
Issue: WON Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year
is immediately executory pending appeal?
Held: Yes. Under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003,
provides:

SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is

absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed
is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and

15 Under P.D. 902-A, as amended, there is no provision which states the immediate execution of decisions rendered by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Section 6 thereof only provides as follows:

XXX

The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision, or ruling of the Commission sitting en banc to the Supreme Court by petition for review in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

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 conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty
is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed
as a matter of course. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA.
Respondent cannot successfully rely on Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 12. Effect of appeal ― The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment,
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals
shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
In the first place, the Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of the
Ombudsman suppletorily only when the procedural matter is not governed by any specific
provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Here, Section 7, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is
categorical, an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when
a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision
in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately
executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis
derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other.

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TEVES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Doctrine: Local officials are prohibited from holding business or pecuniary interest in any
business enterprise where the licensing of which requires the official intervention of their
offices.
FACTS: Edgar and Teresita Teves are married. In 1983, Edgar registered for the Office of
the Presidenteration of a cockpit. This was renewed in 1989. By January of 1990, he turned
over the management of the cockpit to Teresita. However, Edgar was also the Mayor of
Valencia during 1988 to 1998. Thus, the Spouses were charged with violating Sec. 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for Edgar’s alleged unlawful intervention in the
issuance of a business license/permit for his cockpit.
The Sandiganbayan convicted the spouses for possessing a pecuniary interest in the
cockpit, but absolved of the charge of causing the issuance of a business permit/license.
On a petition for review of the Sandiganbayan’s decision, the spouses argue that
they were convicted for a crime other than the offense charged, violating their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
The Information reads: That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime
subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal
Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to,
while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the apprOffice of the Presidentriate
business permit/license to Office of the Presidenterate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation
Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or
pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned
and Office of the Presidenterated by him and accused Teresita Teves.
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following x x x constitute[s] corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
Directly or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part

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 in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by
any law from having any interest.
Also, they assert that it was not shown that Edgar was the Office of the
Presidenterator and licensee from 1989 to 1992. Finally, the existence of a conspiracy was
disputed by the spouses.
The Sandiganbayan maintains that Edgar’s interest continued up to and beyond 1992,
as he merely turned over the management of the cockpit. The charge of having a pecuniary
interest is necessarily included in the charge of intervention in the issuance of its business
license/permit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Edgar Teves can be held liable for intervening in his official capacity for
the issuance of a business permit/license. NO.
2. Whether Edgar can be held liable for having a proscribed pecuniary interest in
the cockpit. YES.
3. Whether Teresita can be held liable as a conspirator. NO.
HELD:
1. Edgar cannot be held liable for the charge of intervening in relation to the issuance of a
business permit/license for his cockpit.
The Court enumerated the essential elements of a violation of Sec. 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act:
a. The accused is a public officer;
b. Having a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract,
or transaction;
c. Such public officer either:
i. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest; or
ii. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.
In this case, no intervention can be ascribed to Edgar as he cannot be said to have
intervened in his official capacity. He is charged for an act that occurred at or about
February 4 of 1992. The law governing the issuance of cockpit licenses is the Local
Government Code of 1991. Under this law, the Mayor is not a part of the Sangguniang

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Bayan, which has the authority to issue the license. This is contrary to the previous
governing law (BP 337) where the Mayor is the presiding officer.

2. Edgar can be held liable for having a proscribed pecuniary interest in the cockpit. Based
on the second sub-element of the third element of Sec. 3(h), Edgar is liable. The law that
prohibits Edgar from having such pecuniary interest is the Local Government Code. Sec.
89(a)(2).

It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to
hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
The essential ingredients of having a proscribed pecuniary interest and of
intervention in one’s official capacity in relation to that interest are the same, such that the
variance doctrine applies.
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.

3. Teresita cannot be held liable as a conspirator. No conspiracy was proved.

Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime, with proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
Direct evidence is not necessary, an inference is sufficient based on conduct before,
during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, showing a community
of criminal design. (Citing Leacroz v. Sandiganbayan).
a. Marriage to an errant spouse is not conspiracy by itself.
b. Intentional participation aimed at the furtherance of a common design
must be shown.
c. A conspirator must be shown to perform an overt act that contributes to
the execution of the planned crime, except where the accused is the

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 mastermind.
d. There must be active participation in the actual commission, or moral
assistance. (citing Pecho v. Office of the President).
In this case, the Anti-Graft Law has specific provisions as regards private individuals.
Sec. 4(b) of that law provides that it is unlawful for a person to knowingly induce or cause a
public official to commit the offenses. Here, it was not shown how Teresita induced or
caused Edgar to commit the offenses.Edgar was already the owner of the cockpit as early as
1983. He transferred the management on January 1990, before the effectivity of the Local
Government Code.
After this transfer, it was Teresita who applied for the renewal of the registration,
referring to herself as the Owner/Licensee and Office of the Presidenterator/Manager. She
also listed herself as the Duly-Licensed Person in the Philippine Gamefowl Commission’s
list.
Teresita is not a public official so she is not prohibited from holding an interest in the
cockpit. As regards the penalty, the Local Government Code prevails over the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act as the LGC is the specific law and the latter is the general law.
Also, the LGC was enacted subsequent to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Dissent (Tinga):
1) Disagrees that possession of a prohibited interest is necessarily included in a public
official’s intervention in relation to that interest.
2) The Information is not sufficient for a conviction for another crime aside from the
intervention in procuring a business license/permit.

SALALIMA V. GUINGONA
Doctrine: Penalties of suspension totaling more than six months are proper, provided that
suspension imposed for each administrative offense does not exceed six months, and the
successive service thereof does not exceed the unexpired portion of the official’s term of
office.
FACTS: This refers to the administrative complaint filed against Albay Governor Romeo
Salalima, Vice-Governor Danilo Azafla, Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Juan
Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Jesus Marcellana, Arturo Osia, Clenio Cabredo, Ramon Fernandez,

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Jr., Masikap Fontanilla, Vicente Go, Sr., and Nemesio Baclao relative to the retainer contract
for legal services entered into between the Province of Albay, on the one hand, and Atty.
Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the disbursement of
public fund in payment thereof.
The complaint alleges that by entering into the retainer agreement with private
lawyers and paying P7, 380, 410.31 to the said private lawyers, respondents violated
several provisions of law which warrants the imposition of administrative penalties against
them. It is to be noted that respondents Victoria, Reyes, Cabredo, Marcellana and Osia were
not yet members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when Resolution No. 129 was passed.
However, the complaint alleges that these respondents were named in the complaint
because they approved the supplemental budget/appropriation ordinances providing for
the payment of the attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the
retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making
payments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case filed by NPC with the
Supreme Court against the Province.
HELD: Yes. Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) requires the
appointment of a legal officer for the province whose functions include the following:
Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the
local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity is a party; Provided,
That, in actions or proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party.
The Supreme Court has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok, that local
government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial
Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand
because Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code is based on Sec. 1681 of the Revised
Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in the case of Municipality of
Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay,
respondents exceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the Local
Government Code and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.

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 Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. First, the
disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by the
Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the prior written
conformity of the Solicitor General and the written concurrence of the Commission on
Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-25 5 dated 2 April 1986.
The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the Solicitor
General’s conformity dated 15 July 1993. This conformity was, however obtained after the
disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. What is required by COA Circular No.
86-255 is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General.
Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. Resolution No. 0 1-90
authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal
services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd., Quezon City. The
retainer contract signed by respondent Governor was, however, not only with the Cortes &
Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of Jamecca Building, 280 Tomas
Morato Avenue, Quezon City. That Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm
are two separate entities is evident from the retained contract itself.
In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm
but also with Atty. Jose R. Cornago, respondent Governor exceeded his authority under
Resolution No. 01-90.
Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is the fact
that it was only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the
Province in the Supreme Court case. Even the Solicitor General, in his letter to respondent
Governor dated 15 July 1993, noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme Court
by Attys. Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm.
Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province was
signed by Atty. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Consequently, the Cortes
& Reyna Law Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G.R. No. 87479. And yet, six
of the ten checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3.6 million were
issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes. In other
words, respondents disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter
did not appear as counsel for the Province in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479.

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 Finally, the attorney’s fees agreed upon by respondent Salalima and confirmed by
the other respondents are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingent
fee of 18% of the ”P2l4 million” claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38.5
million. The word “unconscionable,” as applied to attorney’s fee, “means nothing more
than that the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to
show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been
taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him.”
The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had already filed a comment on
NPC’s petition against the Province. The comment filed by Atty. Ricafort already covers the
basic issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago filed an appearance and
subsequently a memorandum for the Province, the petition was already been given due
course by the Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed by the parties before the
Court would issue its decision was a memorandum. Surely, one memorandum could not be
worth P38.5 million.
Furthermore, the professional character and social standing of Atty. Cornago are not
such as would merit a P38.5 million fee for the legal services rendered for the Province.
During the hearing, respondent Governor admitted that he had hired Atty. Cornago because
they were schoolmates at San Beda College of Law.
It is evident that respondent Governor hired Atty. Cornago not on the basis of his
competency and standing in the legal community but purely for personal reasons. Likewise,
the standing of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as would merit P38.5 million for
one memorandum, which, in this case, it had not even filed because it was not the counsel
of record. Hence, considering the labor and time involved, the skill and experience called
for in the performance of the services and the professional character and social standing of
the lawyers, the attorney’s fee of P38.5 million is unconscionable. By allowing such
scandalously exorbitant attorney’s fees, which is patently disadvantageous to the
government, respondents betrayed a personal bias to the lawyers involved and committed
abuse of authority.

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PALMA vs. HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH
Doctrine: An elective official may be suspended in an administrative case for a crime
involving moral turpitude, provided that if it is not connected with the performance of
official duties, there must first be convictions by final judgement.
FACTS: On March 30, 1981, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vivencio P. Estrada of Bukidnon,
at the instance of the offended parties Nelia Arandel Clerk-typist and Susan Palamine,
Clerical Aide, both of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of
Bukidnon, filed with the Court of First Instance of the same province, Criminal Cases Nos.
2795, 2796 and 2797 against petitioner Teodulo M. Palma, Sr., the duly elected and
qualified Mayor of said Municipality.
By virtue of the aforesaid three (3) separate cases, said offended parties in a sworn
joint letter complaint requested respondent Provincial Governor for an immediate
administrative investigation for the purpose of suspending Mayor Palma from office
pending final determination of these cases.Treating the same as a formal letter complaint,
respondent Governor formally informed the Mayor of the administrative charge against
him for Misconduct in Office. Forthwith the record of the administrative case against the
Mayor was forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Bukidnon. Said
body, after receipt thereof, set the case for hearing on April 13, 1981. After the hearing
where complainants were required to testify and then cross-examined by petitioner's
counsel the former petitioned for the preventive suspension of the Mayor which was
granted by respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan in its Resolution No. 82-87.
The Mayor accepted his preventive suspension from office. Nonetheless, he filed this
petition.
In the resolution of April 24, 1982 of the First Division of this Court, respondents
were required to comment on the petition. On June 14, 1982 petitioner filed an urgent
motion for immediate issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. In the resolution of June
16, 1982, the motion of petitioner to file therein a reply to respondents' comment was
granted: the petition was given due course and a temporary restraining order was issued
enjoining the respondents from continuing with the hearing and/or investigation of the
administrative case and from enforcing the order of suspension against petitioner.
On October 1, 1982, the offended parties moved for intervention and for admission of

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their attached brief which was granted and the aforesaid brief noted in the resolution of
October 20, 1982 .Thereafter, the case was calendared for decision.
Petitioner contends that "Acts of Lasciviousness" although how numerous, do not fall
within the category of "malfeasance and misfeasance" or "conduct in the office"
contemplated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 5185, and therefore cannot be the basis of the filing of
a separate administrative case against an elective official and the preventive suspension of
the latter.
Respondents, alleging otherwise, maintain that the lascivious acts of the petitioner
constitute misconduct under Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution, re:
"Accountability of Public Officers."
However, on September 1, 1983, petitioner filed a Manifestation and informing this
Court that the three criminal cases filed against him were all dismissed by the Regional
Trial Court of Bukidnon Branch X in an Order dated February 24, 1983. Thus, on the
premise that the administrative case in question as well as the resulting preventive
suspension is now bereft of any legal basis, petitioner now prays that judgment be
rendered in accordance with his prayer in the petition.
But, before the instant petition could be decided by the Supreme Court, the
Provisional Constitution also known as the Freedom Constitution was promulgated in
Proclamation No. 3, dated March 25, 1986, by President Corazon C. Aquino.
Article III, Section 2 thereof, reads:
All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
Under the above quoted provision of the Freedom Constitution, an incumbent Mayor,
elected under the 1973 Constitution may be replaced by an "Officer-in-Charge a specie of
successor considered as within the ambit of the provision. Coming back to the case at bar, it
appears from the records of the Ministry of Local Government that petitioner who was
obviously elected under the 1973 Constitution has been replaced by OIC Fabian Gardones
as Mayor of Don Carlos, Cagayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing and pendency of the aforesaid three (3) separate

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information for "acts of lasciviousness" against an elective local official would constitute
"misconduct in office" within the meaning of section 5 of republic act no. 5185 which may
warrant the filing of an administrative complaint against him and/or his suspension from
office.
HELD: The administrative case filed against the petitioner was dismissed for lack of basis
and subject petition have become moot and academic.
As a general rule, dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily follow the
dismissal of a criminal case, the former requiring as it does, only preponderance of
evidence while the latter requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.
However, in administrative actions against municipal officers, the Supreme Court in
Festijo v. Crisologo, et al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]), classified the grounds for suspension
under two categories, namely: (1) those related to the discharge of the functions of the
officer concerned (neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of
maladministration of office) and (2) those not so connected with said functions. Under the
second category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the
performance of official duties, conviction by final judgment is required as a condition
precedent to administrative action.
The ground for filing of the administrative action in the case at bar and the
suspension of petitioner Mayor is misconduct allegedly committed in the form of lascivious
acts of the latter.
Misconduct has been defined as "such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been
said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of
the officer. " (Lacson v. Roque, et al., 92 Phil. 456).
Now, as to whether or not, such misconduct of petitioner affects his performance of
his duties as an officer and not only his character as a private individual, has been laid to
rest by the ruling of the Supreme Court in an analogous case where it was held that while
"it is true that the charges of rape and concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a
municipal official may be proceeded against . . . but before the provincial governor and
board may act and proceed against the municipal official, a conviction by final judgment
must precede the filing by the provincial governor of the charges and trial by the provincial

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board." (Mindano v. Silvosa, et al., 97 Phil. 144-145 [1955]).
Indeed, there is merit in petitioner's contention that the same ruling applies to acts of
lasciviousness which falls under the same classification as crimes against chastity. In the
instant case, not only is a final judgment lacking, but the criminal cases filed against the
petitioner were all dismissed by the trial court, for insufficiency of evidence, on the basis of
its findings that the attendant circumstances logically point to the existence of consent on
the part of the offended parties. Under the circumstances, there being no showing that the
acts of petitioner Mayor are linked with the performance of official duties such as "neglect
of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration of office" (Festijo v.
Crisologo), there appears to be no question that the pending administrative case against
him should be dismissed for lack of basis and the restraining order issued by the court
should be made permanent.
Nonetheless, the replacement of petitioner Mayor by the Officer-in-Charge Fabian
Gardones has rendered the issues of removal and suspension from office, moot and
academic.

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