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PRODUCT-
PAPER.
 Vault Productpaper
Contents

CONTENTS

WHAT IS VAULT? 03
ICO History 04
Crypto Economics 05
ICO Bubble 06
DAICO 07
Known Operational DAICOs 08
Why Vault? 09
VAULT’S VERSION OF DAICO 11
Vote Weight Saturation 11
Failsafe for Malicious Kill 13
Multi-layered Fundraise 14
Exceptional Fund Requests 16
Liquidity Concerns 16
Intercepted Start 17
SPECIFICATIONS 18
Permisioning Contracts 18
Token Contract 19
Locked Token Contract 20
Crowdsale Contract 21
Treasury & Poll Factory Contract 22
USER MANUAL 26
User Categorization 26
Investor Functionality 29
Issuer Functionality 37
APPENDIX 41

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 Vault Productpaper
What is Vault?

WHAT IS VAULT?
VAULT IS A DAICO PLATFORM.
DAICOS ARE ICOS THAT ARE DEMOCRATIC AND
RESPONSIBLE, ALLOWING INVESTORS TO
CONTROL THE RELEASE OF FUNDS, AND CLAIM
REFUNDS FROM SCAM OR ABANDONED
PROJECTS.

Vault is a platform for crowdfunding projects with the use of blockchain and
cryptocurrencies. It leverages blockchain to ensure that crowdfunding is
borderless, censorship resistant, and does not need an escrow. This
crowdfunding revolution started in early 2017, when a number of projects
issued their own cryptocurrency, and accepted ethereum in exchange for an
initial offering of their own coin. The idea was that the backers would
eventually get back their value when the crowdfunded project has utility (ie.
Users). This became known as initial coin offering (ICO). Eventually there was
an influx of profit seeking investors, and venture capitalists. While this greatly
expanded the market, this took the concept of crypto-economics to its literal
limits and stretched it until it broke. Crypto-economics is the economics of
token value and circulation. It is what describes how a token captures the
value. Finally, Vitalik Buterin, one of the creators of Ethereum posted about
an idea, for reforming crowdfunded projects. This idea was called a DAICO
(Decentralized Autonomous Initial Coin Offering) because it drew some
inspiration from DAOs and combined it with the intention of the ICO. The
following subsections describe the motivation behind building a platform for
DAICOs, and how it has taken shape.

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1. ICO
HISTORY
The first initial coin offering happened
when Mastercoin collected 5120 bitcoin
in 2013, amounting to $500,000. The
next major ICO to happen was Ethereum
in 2014, where they quickly raised 2.3
million dollars at the time. These ICOs
seem pale in comparison to the frenzy
that we saw in 2017, but one has to
understand the basic social agreement,
and understanding behind an initial coin
offering when it was conceived. An ICO
was not seed funding for a startup, in
fact it was intended as a crowd sourced
funding for developers who were
dedicating full time efforts to a project
that would potentially benefit the public.
In return for this generosity, the dev team would distribute native coins which
would function on their network once deployed. There was no promise for
profit whatsoever, nor any responsibility on the developers to become
salespersons and rake in revenue. That was on the community to bring users,
and become users of the system. The tokens usage would be designed in a
manner such that high network usage would eventually create a demand for
tokens, and this has been succesfully realized by the ethereum network, which
has consistently floated above a net market capitalization of 20 billion dollars,
since June 2017, to the time of writing of this document. The maximum
capitalization reached was around 135 billion dollars during the hype cycle
peak.

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2. CRYPTO
ECONO
MICS
Crypto economics is the
misunderstood science behind
the valuations of some very
successful crypto assets. It is the
study and design of incentive
structures which encourages network
participants to behave in an optimal
manner for the benefit of the network,
by using cryptographically secured
rules, that everyone agrees to follow.
Some of the most successful
cryptoeconomic stories that come to
mind are ethereum, and bitcoin. These
assets have systems which reward
miners for securing the network, and
ensures that the mode of reward - the
native token - holds its value due to its utility in payment of network fees. In
2017, when ICOs started becoming more and more popular, more and more
crypto economic schemes started showing up. Due to the popularity of the
ERC20 standard on Ethereum, a number of ICOs happened using the
ethereum blockchain, and as a result, people came up with token economics
to capture value in token based systems - where the token could not be made
a mining reward, nor be programmed to be a transaction fee. Different
schemes such as:

A. Dividend bearing ICOs (TenX),

B. Profit sharing mechanism (buy back) (Binance),
C. Governance based valuation (0x) &
D. Service fee payment (Basic Attention Token)
were proposed for several ICOs.

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A lot of these models were sound, and some of them faced scrutiny from
regulators, because they started qualifying as securities. Most of the tokens
did not have any sound token economics, and hence did not hold value - they
would choose the service fee model, where the paid service itself was not
compelling enough to retain users in case someone decided to undercut
them by using up the open source code written by the original authors. The
tokens with sound economics also failed to hold most of their value, because
token economics take time to play out. Ethereum and Bitcoin took years to
reach their valuations. However, the ICO market saw so much speculation,
that the real use cases were not enough to justify even a fraction of the
optimism.

3. ICO
BUBBLE
After Brendan Eich’s Basic Attention
token raised 35 million dollars very
quickly, there was lots of unmet demand,
due to optimism. This led to a rapid price
surge. This price surge caused people to
enthusiastically invest in a number of
other ICOs expecting similar results. The
results were great. Prices started surging
all over the place, and Ethereum itself
experienced in a huge demand surge,
skyrocketing from 50$ to 400$ in a
matter of months. This set off a chain
reaction of ICOs, where people would
make a whitepaper, and a lot of
promises, and collect money. Less than
half of these companies would survive
for over 4 months after the ICO. Around 7 billion dollars were raised in total
throughout the year of 2017. Everyone stopped caring about the product, and
about token economics. The main hope was that one could buy a coin in an
ICO and sell it off after a few days for a higher price and move on to the next

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ICO to repeat the process. This continued until February of 2018, when the
influx of new capital into cryptocurrency markets slowed down, and all prices
started crashing. While it is true that all crypto currencies lost at least 70% of
their value, the ICOs which promised the quick riches would typically fall over
95% from their all time highs. In the aftermath of this bubble, ICOs have been
reduced to a thing of yesterday, and are now seen with contempt and
skepticism. While there was something fundamentally wrong with ICOs, that
caused the bubble, there was also something fundamentally great about ICOs,
which has today allowed for the existence of ethereum, 0x, and several other
useful products which will help create a new financial system and a new
internet. Hence, it is worthwhile to look into how the system can be made less
flawed, and more empowering.

4. DAICO
BY
VITALIK
BUTERIN
Vitalik Buterin, the creator of
Ethereum, also happens to be one of
the earliest beneficiaries of an initial
coin offering. Understanding the
magnitude of the situation in January
2018, he published a short blog post
about how ICOs can be improved, by
bringing in governance practices which
were conceived during the DAO era -
2016. This would called DAICO.
Perhaps the crypto community was
stuck in a frenzy, and was unable to
introspect the consequences of such easy money in the crowdfunding market.
But given that ethereum has smart contract capabilities, in hindsight it seems

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What is Vault?

like a foolish error to not have accountability and governance over

crowdfunded money in the first place. Ethereum based ICOs removed the
escrow layer from the former traditional ICOs, but retained the archaic ‘no
questions asked’ nature of the primitive ICOs. While it worked for the pre
2016 projects, when they were only a handful, it proved to be ineffective
when the availability of capital was high and quality projects became difficult
to distinguish from systematic money grabs.
The reformation proposal was to have a governance system, where ICO token
holders would control the flow of capital from the ICO treasury to the
developers wallet. This would be done through a system that released money
at a fixed rate - wei/sec - and allowed token holders to increase this rate
through voting, ie. if the dev team performed well and needed to scale. The
second control that token holders would have is to kill the contract, meaning
that if the devs do not follow through with their actions, the token holders
could freeze the treasury and claim proportional refunds, thus cutting off the
project. There would be no option for decreasing the rate of capital flow, to
prevent the locking up of funds into the treasury.
This improvement is a monumental change in the design of ICOs, however
some would say that the suggestion came a bit too late. It has been 9 months
since the post, at the time of writing of this document, and there is little to no
adoption of the DAICO.

5. KNOWN
OPERAT
IONAL
DAICOS
As of October 2018, there is only one
major DAICO in operation, called Abyss.
They did a DAICO fund raise in May 2018,
and have been operational since. Public
participation in their governance has

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been quite low though. The polls are not transparent, and less easily auditable.
Voting on polls is not easy. Since public participation is low, the team(with
plausible deniability) is easily able to overturn any decision. These facts make
the DAICO no different from normal ICOs. When governance is not easy, and
not visibly effective, it breeds apathy. Vault has a mission to solve these
governance problems, and minimize apathy among crowdfunding investors so
that the field of permissionless innovation can flourish.

6. WHY
VAULT?
The mission behind building
Vault, is to ensure that
innovation can remain
crowdfunded, and create a
system that is not abused.
While DAICO is an excellent
direction to take the
crowdfunding experiment in, it has
some standardization problems.
Writing of secure DAICO smart
contracts is a huge and daunting task
in itself. Not every project team may
be up for doing the same. DAICOs can
be improved in a number of ways to
suit a large number of projects, but so
far there is no standardization of
DAICO contracts. Which is a two fold problem. The project must write these
smart contracts, pay for engineers to build them, and then pay for engineers
to audit the code. This is a hurdle for a small team, which is looking for funds
in the first place, to have to take a huge hit in the pocket before even getting
started. Secondly, for investors, it becomes a daunting task to ensure that the
DAICO code is not malicious. ICO contracts are fairly simple, and take minutes

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to go through, but a DAICO contract set is not one smart contract. It can take
weeks to audit, and be impossible to understand for a number of investors.
This raises a trust question everytime someone wants to deploy a DAICO.
Perhaps the above reasons explain why DAICOs have not seen much
adoption.
Vault aims to make DAICO deployment as simple as filling out a form, and
clicking a few buttons, and for investors, governance should be easy,
auditable and transparent. By leveraging the Electus protocol and its
supporting infrastructure, Vault polls and actions are publicly auditable and
callable. Additionally, Vault makes several additional improvements to the
vanilla DAICO model to prevent overfunding of a project, and deter 51%
attacks on a DAICO. The following section describes some modifications to
the DAICO model that are introduced on the inaugural version Vault, in order
to make it better suited to carry out the mission of making funding
governance more robust.
 Vault Productpaper
Vault’s version of the DAICO

VAULT’S VERSION
OF THE DAICO
VAULT AIMS TO TRANSFORM THE
WAY CROWDFUNDING WORKS
AND HENCE INSTEAD OF SIMPLY REPLICATING THE
DAICO PROPOSAL FROM VITALIK’S POST, VAULT
MAKES SOME FUNDAMENTAL MODIFIATIONS INTO
IT. THIS MAKES VAULT MORE SECURE,
TRANSPARENT AND FAIR.

A number of things about the original DAICO proposal were problematic, and
this was reflected in the fact that the proposal itself came with an ‘open to
improvements’ tag. Luckily, the proposal is very plain and compatible with
improvements. We also leverage Electus Protocol to improve the governance
security as well as to add transparency.

This section goes through each introduced change one by one on the basis of
potential problems not considered

A. VOTE WEIGHT
SATURATION
One of the problems that vault addresses is that
the total vote share of one member is not allowed
to exceed a certain pre decided number - this is called the individual vote cap.
While vote shares are typically proportional to coin balance of each individual,
there is a certain threshold after which the vote share does not increase upon
increasing coin balance. This is done in order to prevent concentration of
power into small number of hands.

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Vault’s version of the DAICO

Vote Weight CURRENT GOVERNANCE SCHEMES

Token Share

VOTE WEIGHT SATURATION WITH VAULT

Vote Weight

Token Share

In order to prevent people from splitting their balance into several accounts
to bypass this check, Electus protocol makes sure that each individual is able
to make only 1 account on Vault, meaning that multiple wallets owned by the
same person are not allowed to participate in governance. This is done
through mobile phone verification during sign up.

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Vault’s version of the DAICO

B. FAILSAFE FOR
MALICIOUS KILL
DAICOs do not offer the option for decreasing tap,
and this choice is made in order to prevent a
malicious lockup of funds. However the original proposal has no mechanism
for prevention of a malicious kill vote. This is due to the inflexibility of polls on
the blockchain. Electus protocol allows Vault to take records of token based
vote tallies, and count the number of voters simultaneously, because one
user cannot make infinitely many accounts. Hence, Vault implements 2
simultaneous checks:

A. Votes in favour of kill has crossed the threshold.

B. Number of voters in favour of kill has crossed a certain threshold

Check# 1
TOTAL VOTE SHARE FOR KILL

VOTE SHARE THRESHOLD FOR KILL

Check# 2
TOTAL VOTERS VOTING FOR KILL

VOTER THRESHOLD FOR KILL

Execute Kill

The first threshold will typically be a design decision, and remain constant
throughout the life of the DAICO, however the second threshold will scale
with the current size of the DAICO - measured by number of tokens sold -
indirectly, by the amount of money raised. This prevents a hostile take over,
where a few individuals try to overturn the vote in favour of a kill decision.

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Vault’s version of the DAICO

C. MULTI-LAYERED
FUNDRAISE
While the DAICO proposal handles the issue of
capital release from treasury, it does not address
the issue of overfunding a project. Initial coin offerings have over time
evolved to include pre sales and private pre sales. These are similar to seed
funding rounds and multiple round funding, except that they are done in very
quick succession. Ideally, there should be a period of heads down, where the
project is focused solely on work, rather than marketing efforts. Multi layer
raises aims to address this. The crowdsale contract is designed in a way that
the token sale continues after the first sale, at a different, but elevated price.
The existing tokens can be bought from secondary market, and people will
buy into the primary sale only when the elevated price is justified. This
ensures that the price does not rapidly rise, protecting people from volatility,
while ensuring that some of the fruits of increased demand flow back to the
issuer.

CASE #1: TRADITIONAL ICO

Value

Issuance
Price

Date of ICO Time

Money Raised Money Spendable Token Price

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Vault’s version of the DAICO

CASE #2: DAICO

Value

Issuance
Price

Date of ICO Time

Money Raised Money Spendable Token Price

CASE #3: MULTI-LAYER RAISE DAICO

Value

Third Round
Issuance Price

Second Round
Issuance Price

First Round
Issuance Price

Date of ICO Time

Money Raised Money Spendable Token Price

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Vault’s version of the DAICO

We design the rounds such that each subsequent round’s buy in increases
with a certain ratio, meaning that later rounds are more expensive to buy
into. This ensures that the initial backers who took more risk are rewarded for
their risk if the project goes on to be successful.

D. EXCEPTIONAL
FUND REQUESTS
Vault introduces exceptional fund requests (XFR) as
a tool to temporarily bypass the tap. This allows for
the project manager to withdraw a chunk of funds which isnt limited by the
tap, for an upcoming expense. How it works is as follows:

1. The project manager raises a request poll, which starts off with a

default of ‘allow’. This request contains information like the amount to be
withdrawn, and the poll address.

2. Governance involves the vetoing of this motion, and if enough

people veto this request, the withdrawal is not allowed. There is a window
of 30 days for voting.

3. If the amount of votes for veto is insufficient, the withdrawal is

allowed after the window of 30 days is over.Note that this withdrawal
must happen within 3 days of poll completion, in order for the withdrawal
to be possible. Else, the XFR gets disabled. This is done to prevent hacking
due to increasing governance tokens in the future.

The absence of this option makes the project funding inflexible. The only
other way to accommodate an urgent request would be to increase the tap,
which cannot be decreased again.

E. LIQUIDITY
CONCERNS
One of the overlooked aspects in the DAICO
proposal was that of exchange holdings. Most

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Vault’s version of the DAICO

people hold their coins on exchanges. This means that people do not own the
private keys to the addresses holding the coins. If this is to be the case for a
token which is used in a DAICO, it reduces the pool of people who are able to
govern. This makes it easy to overturn consensus, and also it is unknown
what exchanges would do with the voting power that they would possess.
Electus protocol is used first of all, to disallow any exchange address from
participation in governance, and the Vault interface will provide a simple way
to exchange each tokens for Ether, subject to liquidity on permissionless
exchanges like etherdelta.
This is aimed at increasing the participation of contributors in governance.

F. INTERCEPTED
START
Vault allows for projects to set an initial withdrawal
chunk which helps them cover starting up costs. As
a result the tap curve does not start off as a straight line passing through the
origin, like the original DAICO proposal would have it. The line starts off with a
Y-intercept, which denotes the amount of funds that can be withdrawn
straightaway. This amount is openly known to the people who are
contributing before sending money, and cannot be changed thereafter.

Spend Curve Spendable Spent

5,400 ETH

4,700 ETH
Tap increased to
3,900 ETH 550 ETH

4th Aug 2018, 8,462 ETH

1,900 ETH

Intercept
0 ETH
XFR approved
2,000 ETH

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Specifications

SPECIFICATIONS
This section describes the main functional units of a Vault DAICO smart
contract group. Unlike an ICO, which is one smart contract along with the
token contract, a DAICO is multiple smart contracts, and even a smart
contract factory. This section will explain the role of each smart contract in
the smart contract group. All the smart contracts are open-source, and
publicly available on our github on the following URL:

https://github.com/chaitanyapotti/vault-sc

Note that the Vault issuer does not need to write any code, there is a turnkey
procedure which walks the user through all the steps and gets all the
following contracts deployed.

A. PERMISSIONING
CONTRACTS
There are 2 layers of permissioning contracts on
Vault. The first layer of permissioning is maintained
by Vault itself. It is an ERC 1261 smart contract, which assigns
memberships(called Vault membership) to individuals who wish to participate
in DAICOs deployed via Vault. The permissioning is done to ensure that one
individual cannot make multiple addresses which take part in DAICO
governance. This ensures that the vote cap rules are not bypassed, and also
allows Vault to leverage headcount based consensus. The mechanism for
permissioning is through phone number verification with a one time
password. The platform allows a user to request Vault membership, followed
by a phone verification. If the user correctly verifies the code, and if the
phone number is not already on Vault’s database, the membership request is
approved. The request transaction contains a fee which equals the gas
expense for approving the membership, and the SMS cost. Typically this is
never more than 0.25$, but may increase subject to network congestion. The
Vault membership contract also stores the members country, and whether
the member is an issuer or an investor. An issuer is additionally allowed to
deploy their own DAICO. There is a fee for becoming an issuer, it costs 0.5
ETH.

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The second layer of permissioning is for DAICO specific whitelists. Each DAICO
will have its own ERC1261 membership contract, which will give out MVTs,
based on hardcoded logic to anyone who requests. Typically the logic will
have constraints like ‘must be member of vault’, ‘must not belong to xxx
country’ and so on. These whitelists will be used by individual DAICO issuers
to further refine who may or may not participate in DAICOs. The contracts will
be fully configurable via the Electus Client, because they are designed with
Electus specifications - this means that the DAICO owner can manually add or
remove people in addition to the hard coded logic present on the whitelist.

B. TOKEN CONTRACT
This is an ERC 20 compliant token, with some
added functionality. This added functionality is
intended to ensure that the tokens may be used
for fair token proportional voting, for DAICO kill
refunds, and for incomplete sale refunds. This section will detail the
additional functionality given to the DAICO specific ERC-20 tokens.

1. REFUND MODE
If the first round of crowdsale does not complete on time, or if the
treasury of a completed DAICO gets killed, then the funds are returned to
any token holder in proportion of their holdings. This requires the user to
send their tokens to a certain address, following which the token is burned
and the user is reimbursed. This requires the token to be designed with burn
functionality.

Refund
The DAICO that you are looking for could not succesfully reach its Round 1 goal.
Refund
Click the refund button & sign the transaction to start the refund process.
Round 1 Ended on: 3rd Aug 2018

Refund
The DAICO that you are looking for has been killed by investor consensus.
Refund
Click the refund button & sign the transaction to start the refund process.
Project Killed on: 3rd Aug 2018

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2. MINT-ON-SALE
Unlike most token sales, where the tokens are first generated and
then sold to people, the DAICO tokens are minted into the address of the
buyer when they contribute ethereum to the crowdsale. This is done to
ensure that the subsequent rounds of DAICO can go on seamlessly while
governance processes have started. If all tokens are minted before hand, it
may dilute some of the polls where inaction favours the issuer.

3. FREEZABLE
The DAICO tokens get frozen in a users wallet when a user uses the
wallet to vote in the governance of that project. This is done to ensure that a
token can be transferred from a wallet only if the wallet has unvoted from
their poll, or if the poll has ended. The user can vote in multiple polls at the
same time using the same tokens, meaning that frozen tokens are counted
while checking voting balances. However, the user must unvote on all polls
before attempting to transfer the tokens.

4. TOKENS UNDER GOVERNANCE

The DAICO token is used for consensus polls where the choice is
between yes and no. Instead of taking yes and no votes, Vault uses a poll
where the default is set to one of yes and no, and the user votes for the
opposite. This is done to increase the difficulty of manipulation. Due to the
presence of a default, it is necessary to know the number of tokens held
totally among the voterbase. This is why we store and maintain the number
of tokens under governance. This is also used for offchain analysis like
DAICO health calculation. This is why we store and maintain the number of
tokens under governance.*

C. LOCKED TOKEN
CONTRACT
This is a smart contract where unsold tokens are
kept. These tokens will typically belong to team
members of the project, and other stakeholders like foundation, bug bounty
addresses, advisors, etc. The Locked Token contract holds all of the

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beneficiary addresses, who can later withdraw the tokens after the lockup
period has elapsed. This section explains how to successfully withdraw ones
locked tokens:

Unlock Tokens
The initial lock-up period for your tokens has elapsed and the tokens are unlocked.
Withdraw
Click the withdraw button & sign the transaction to start the withdraw process.
Tokens locked since: 3rd Aug 2018

Note that this method will not release any tokens if the lockup period has not
elapsed.

D. CROWDSALE
CONTRACT The crowdsale contract is responsible for carrying
out the token sale of a particular DAICO. By design,
Vault DAICOs have 3 rounds. The crowdsale contract manages the token
prices for each round, the number of tokens on sale for each round, and the
duration of the first round. As soon as ether is sent to this contract, the
contract makes the necessary record updates and sends the ether to a
separate contract called treasury. The treasury is responsible for governance
functionalities of the DAICO. The first round of a DAICO is different from
subsequent rounds of a DAICO in 2 ways. Firstly, before the first round
completes, the DAICO does not allow for any governance, or withdrawal.
Contributors are not allowed to vote on any motion, and issuer is not allowed
to withdraw any funds. Secondly, the first round has an expiry time. If the
round 1 cap in ether is not reached by the end of the expiry time, the DAICO
is considered to be failed, and goes into refund mode, where contributors can
get their ether back(addressed by treasury smart contract). In that sense, the
round 1 cap is like a soft cap.

Once round 1 is succesfully funded, the DAICO governance begins on a

separate contract, however the crowdsale contract continues to accept
ethereum for the second and third rounds. When a round ends, the
crowdsale contract temporarily stops accepting ethereum for a day, and then
needs to be re-activated by the issuer from the Vault interface. This pause is
introduced to prevent any accidental purchase at higher prices.

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Finally, if the governance results in the killing of the given DAICO, the treasury
rejects any incoming ethereum, hence the crowdsale smart contract becomes
effectively useless.

This table describes the possible states of the DAICO and the values of state variables in the
crowdsale contract.
Contract Variables

Contract State Ether Reception currentRound currentRoundEndTime paused

Before DAICO Not Allowed 0 0 True

Round 1 Allowed 0 R1 End Time False

Round 2 Allowed 1 R1 End Time False

Round 3 Allowed 2 R2 End Time False

Round 3 Ended Not Allowed 3 R3 End Time True

Round 1 Failure Not Allowed 4 R1 End Time True

Killed by Consensus Not Allowed Same as when killed Same as when killed *False

Paused due to Round Gap Not Allowed From Previous Round From Previous Round True

*In this case, the daico is disabled from the treasury contract, and not from crowdsale contract.
Hence no ether is accepted despite paused = false

E. TREASURY & POLL

FACTORY CONTRACT
This smart contract is at the heart of the entire
DAICO, and brings together all the building blocks
required to govern the funds contributed towards the project.

1. WITHDRAWAL MANAGEMENT
The treasury is the smart contract that manages all withdrawal.
There is only one address which is allowed to withdraw funds from this
address. Whenever there is a request, the withdrawals are processed in the
following manner:

A. Check how much has been withdrawn until now

B. Check how much withdrawal has been requested
C. Check how much withdrawal is being permitted by the contract presently
D. If A+B<C, allow the withdrawal, else reject the transaction.

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The calculation of A is straight forward, a variable is maintained and updated

upon every withdrawal, to record the amount of ether withdrawn so far. B is
also straightforward. The transaction data contains this information. The
parameter C is maintained in a data structure, which essentially captures the
tap mechanism. This is described in the next sub section.

2. TAP MANAGEMENT
The tap is a rate at which the spendable amount increases in the
smart contract. In order to maintain the spendable amount(as a function of
time), we use pivot points. A pivot point is defined as the moment when one
of the following happens:
A. Withdrawal B. Tap Increment
Whenever there is a pivot point, we perform certain operations, in order to
update and maintain 2 variables,
splineHeightAtPivot & pivotTime

These 2 variables are used to store the last known value of withdrawable
amount, and the time of last such knowledge. The idea is that the tap cannot
possibly change between the previous pivotTime and current time, so at
any moment, withdrawable amount (C) can be calculated as:

splineHeightAtPivot + tap * (now - pivotTime)

Whenever a new pivot point occurs, (C) is calculated as

splineHeightAtPivot + tap * (now - pivotTime) and then the
required action - tap increment, or withdrawal - is processed as per required
conditions, and then the splineHeightAtPivot is updated with
splineHeightAtPivot + tap * (now - pivotTime) , and
pivotTime is updated with current time.
The decision to increase the tap is taken when there is a tap increment
request. A function checks whether the tap increment poll has enough
consensus in favour of increase, and then accordingly updates the tap(along
with the necessary pivot updates). The increase of tap happens in a
multiplicative fashion, where the increment factor is decided beforehand by
the user.

There is a tap increment poll which is deployed by this contract. This poll
records the consensus in favour of increasing the tap. If this crosses 50%, the
tap can be increased by the issuer by calling a function in the smart contract.
Once the tap is increased, the poll is no longer usable, and the issuer must
deploy another poll. This deployer is present in the same smart contract. Both
the above functionalities can be invoked from the Vault UI.

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Specifications

3. XFR
XFR is short for Exceptional fund request. This is a provision in the
treasury smart contract that allows issuers to withdraw a sizeable amount of
funds from the smart contract, bypassing the tap. When there is an XFR, the
treasury balance falls, however this does not affect the withdrawal manage-
ment calculation. Meaning that there is no pivot point, no tap recalculation,
spent and spendable amounts are unchanged..
When an issuer wants to raise an XFR, they call the function createXfr in this
contract, and enter the amount that they want to withdraw. The Vault UI
allows this. When an Xfr is created, the contract deploys a poll, and stores
the address of this poll. The Vault UI then tracks the results and the presence
of this poll to tell investors that there is an XFR being floated. The XFR poll
allows investors to decline the request by sending in a transaction. This
means that the default vote is yes. This is designed to ensure that voter
apathy does not cause issuer to suffer.
However this also means that the UI must keep the investors aware and
alert that there is an XFR poll that they have not yet seen, or responded to.
The number of simultaneous XFRs that may be created is 2. In order to
create more than that, the issuer must wait for one of the XFR polls to com-
plete. At any time, this smart contract is aware of the 2 poll addresses, along
with the amounts that they allow the user to withdraw.

4.IFR This is a feature that allows issuers to withdraw a certain amount

of funds immediately after completion of round 1. This is done to allow
issuers to obtain some spending relief - from the expenditures that were
incurred before the DAICO, however this release is not allowed to be more
than 10% of the round 1 funding cap. The withdrawal is processed as any
other withdrawal, and the spendable amount starts off from this IFR value.
In essence it is the first pivot point.

5.KILL This is the part of the smart contracts functionality that allows
investors to vote for no confidence in the project and freeze the funds from
withdrawal, resulting in a token proportional refund to all token holders.
There are 8 polls in total, each of which span for 3 months, and start after
the previous kill poll has ended. The kill polls span a total of 2 years. Each kill
poll starts with a default vote of do not kill, and investors can vote for killing
if they find the project to be inefficient, wasteful, or fraudulent. When over
80% of vote share goes in favour of killing, any user can trigger the end of
the DAICO. However there is an additional check before this can happen.

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Kill Quorum Threshold

Slope = 1 Person / 20 ETH

Ether Collected

Not only does 80% of all vote share vote for killing, but also the number of
individuals voting for kill must be greater than a certain threshold. Keeping in
mind the various community sizes for different ICO sizes, this threshold is not
a fixed number, but proportional to total number of ethereum. Presently the
threshold is set so that per additional 20 ether raised, the threshold increases
by 1 person. At current ethereum prices(31st october, 2018), this would mean
that at least 1000 people are required to kill a DAICO that has raised around
4-5 million USD.
All kill polls are deployed at the beginning of the DAICO, which means that the
issuer cannot stall the deployment and avoid the killing. The Vault UI shows
the current active kill poll, and its poll address.

6.REFUND MODE
This is the the final piece in the functionality of this smart contract.
When the smart contract has been killed by public voting, or the first round
of sale has failed to complete, the treasury stops accepting any further ethe-
reum, and allows individuals to send in their DAICO tokens to get a propor-
tional refund of the funds remaining in the treasury. While there is only one
refund mode in both cases, and it behaves identically in both events, they
are triggered in different ways. In the case of an incomplete round 1, the
crowdsale contract is the first one to know about this failure, and alerts the
treasury to trigger refund mode, and itself stops accepting any further trans-
actions. However when the DAICO is killed through governance, the crowd-
sale does not know about the refund mode. The refund mode is triggered in
treasury contract by calling the kill function. In this case, the crowdsale
simply tries to send ether to the treasury contract, but fails to do so because
the treasury is no longer accepting ethereum, as a result, investors tx will
fail, and no ethereum will be lost.

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USER MANUAL
This section describes the functionality of the platform from a users
perspective. First, the section goes over sign up and sign in practices on the
platform, and next describes all the features available to users. The last
subsection elaborates on issuer features. Issuers are special users who
conduct their DAICOs on the platform.

A. USER
CATEGORIZATION
When a user first lands on the website, their login
status is classified into the following brackets. The
login system on Vault is not quite like most server based web apps, nor is it
like pure dapps. Vault is a hybrid dapp. Sign in is processed through
metamask, and the registration process is managed on chain via ERC-1261
smart contract. This creates an inverted relationship between signing in and
signing up. Most individuals are used to signing up and then signing in. On
Vault, you sign in via metamask first, and then request and gain membership
into Vault. Upon gaining membership, you get to participate in DAICOs. This
membership is subject to a mobile phone verification, and submission of
relevant information. Another perk of submitting information is that you do
not have to fill a new whitelist form every time there is a new DAICO, you can
simply get whitelisted with one click because your data is already integrated
into Vault databases. The following cases represent different kinds of users
that may visit the website:

1. METAMASK IS NOT INSTALLED

If the user does not have metamask, they must install the chrome
extension. The sign in button on the corner will take the user to the official
metamask website. The user may browse the website, but may not partici-
pate in any DAICO.

Search... Projects My Tokens Install

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2. NOT SIGNED INTO METAMASK

Certain users may have metamask, but might not be signed in. For
such cases, the user is prompted to sign in using metamask, in order to
access the features of the website. The user may browse the website, but
may not participate in any DAICO.

Search... Projects My Tokens Sign in

3. SIGNED INTO WRONG NETWORK

If the user is signed in to metamask, but on a test network, instead
of the ethereum mainnet, the user is treated as not signed in. They are given
a modal notifying them to change the network to mainnet.

Logged as 0xb5bo...
Search... Projects My Tokens
Wrong Network

4. SIGNED IN, BUT NOT YET

A VAULT MEMBER
When the user signs in to metamask for the first time on Vault, they are not
a member of Vault. This means that the web app is aware of their address,
and can communicate and interact with them, however the user is not
allowed to participate in DAICOs yet. The user is required to request for a
membership, following which they are allowed to fill up a registration form.
Upon completion of this form, and phone verification, the user becomes a
member of Vault, and is given an ERC 1261 token on their address. This
token is not transferable, and is used by Vault to recognize who is a member
and who isnt.

Logged as 0xb5bo...
Search... Projects My Tokens
Register for Vault

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5. SIGNED IN, MEMBER BUT

NOT AN ISSUER
Once a user has become a member, they have access to all features of Vault,
any time they visit the website, if they are logged into metamask from the
address that is carrying the ERC 1261 membership. Note that one
user(identified by phone number) may only gain Vault membership on one
address. If users are found having memberships on multiple addresses,
these memberships may be confiscated. The features available to logged in
vault members are detailed in the next subsection: Investor functionality.

Search... Projects My Tokens Johnny Abrams

6. SIGNED IN, MEMBER, ISSUER

This user case is a special version of Vault membership. It is for
users who wish to conduct their DAICO on Vault. While requesting
membership, a user may declare that they wish to gain an issuer
membership. This request is taken into account, and the membership cost
for such an account is 0.5 ethereum. This fee is set to prevent the
unnecessary creation of several issuer accounts. The fee is small enough to
not matter to a project carrying out a DAICO, but large enough to prevent
spam. The issuer account has access to extra features in addition to the
investor accounts, and these features are detailed in the subsection: Issuer
functionality.

Search... Projects My Tokens Publish DAICO Johnny Abrams

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B. INVESTOR
FUNCTIONALITY
This subsection covers all the features that are available to investors that use
Vault to participate in DAICOs.

1. BROWSE DAICOS
The landing screen shows the user featured, or popular DAICOs,
and there is a projects page which takes the user to a list of active,
upcoming, and ended DAICOs. These views allow users to go through the
DAICOs that are using Vault as a platform.

Active DAICOs Upcoming DAICOs Ended DAICOs *Prices based on current ETH/USD ratio

Name Rounds R1 Goal Final Goal Raised* Price* Started at R1 Ends in

Omesigo (OMG) 2 of 3 $500k $15 Mn $6.7 Mn $0.02 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT R1 Ended

Omesigo (OMG) 1 of 3 $60k $11 Mn $67 k $0.03 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT 5D 4H 20M

Omesigo (OMG) 1 of 1 $10 Mn $15 Mn $11 Mn $0.04 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT 5D 4H 20M

Omesigo (OMG) 2 of 3 $5 Mn $30 Mn $6.7 Mn $0.09 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT R1 Ended

Omesigo (OMG) 3 of 3 $1 Mn $19 Mn $14 Mn $0.1 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT R1 Ended

Omesigo (OMG) 2 of 2 $5 Mn $10 Mn $9 Mn $0.11 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT R1 Ended

Omesigo (OMG) 1 of 3 $1 Mn $13 Mn $600k $0.02 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT 5D 4H 20M

Omesigo (OMG) 1 of 1 $12 Mn $12 Mn $6.7 Mn $0.09 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT 5D 4H 20M

Omesigo (OMG) 2 of 3 $1 Mn $11 Mn $4.4 Mn $0.04 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT R1 Ended

Omesigo (OMG) 2 of 3 $15 Mn $16 Mn $7 Mn $0.05 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT R1 Ended

Omesigo (OMG) 1 of 2 $8 Mn $15 Mn $6.7 Mn $0.12 5th Aug 2018 | 02:30 PM GMT 5D 4H 20M

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2. SEARCH BAR
The search bar allows users to go to a DAICO by directly typing the
name or the token ticker, saving time. The first 2 features are accessible to
users who are not signed in as well.

Search...

3. MY TOKENS
This is a page that shows the users brief summaries of DAICOs of
coins that they hold in their logged in wallet. Some key information is shown
on these tables, and the governance pages can be accessed by clicking on
the particular DAICO that the user wishes to govern.

My Tokens *Prices based on current ETH/USD ratio

Name Price(USD)* Tokens Health Tap Increment Kill Consensus Next Kill in XFRs

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (-5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (-5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (-5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

Omesigo (OMG) 1.89 (5%) 2,000 ($3,780) 12,987 12.67% (Yes) 12.67% (No) 5D 12H 01M 0

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4. DAICO WHITELISTING AND

PARTICIPATION
Vault as a platform, changes the way users will interact with whitelists and
ico participation. The user no longer needs to fill a new form every time a
new DAICO needs to whitelist people. All DAICOs have their requirements
and criterion, and get integrated with the data held by Vault. This means that
the user simply needs to click ‘get whitelisted’, and if they are eligible for the
whitelist, they get whitelisted without having to make new accounts or give
their email id to every company. Participation in a DAICO is similarly easy -
just click the buy button, and a modal will open up and ask you how much
ethereum you wish to contribute, and show you how many tokens you will
receive.

Omisego (OMG)
0.008761 ETH

2.8M Tokens Sold of 50M (Round 1 of 3)

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy
nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi
enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis
nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in

Read our whitepaper

Buy
Learn more on our website

5. GOVERNANCE
Vault allows investors to control the capital flow in projects
crowdfunded by them. This is done through a number of methods. This
sub-subsection explains each of the governance tools available to investors.

A. Tap increment
The DAICOs start off with a tap. Tap defines how much ether can be
withdrawn from the DAICO per unit time, say eth/month. This number
can later be increased to accommodate an expanding company in the
the future if burn rate increases, and the investors feel that the

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additional expenditure is justified, or beneficial. To take part in this

decision, investors may choose to vote for a tap increment. The
governance page allows users to make or revoke this vote.

Tap Increment View Tap History

Current Tap Amount: 550 ETH Tap increment Unit: 50 ETH

Increment Approval: 9.23%

Approve

B. Kill
If the DAICO is dissatisfactory to a large number of investors, and there
is no liquidity in the market for dissatisfied investors to sell tokens off,
then it means that the project is unable to justify the amount of funds
collected. In such an event, the DAICO tokens enable investors to vote
for no confidence. A high enough number of votes can result in
triggering of refund mode, following which contributors can get back
their ethereum, and the DAICO is no longer functional.

Project Details View Kill History

Your Tokens: 376.98125 Your Vote Share: 0.00024%

Vote Saturation Limit: 0.05% Kill Attempts Left: 5
Kill Frequency: Quarterly Next Kill Attempt: 15th Oct 2018
Your Token Value: $302k Your Refund Value: $60k

Total Refundable Balance: 19,076.98125 ETH

Kill Consensus: 9.23%

Unlock Tokens Kill Project

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C. XFR
Exceptional fund requests are tools that enable the issuer to request for
a chunk of funds that would require bypassing the current tap, without
increasing the tap amount. This ensures that projects can meet sudden
expenses without worrying about requesting the investors to increase
tap value. When an XFR is requested, the default vote is yes. This choice
is made to ensure that the issuer does not suffer because of crowd
apathy. However to mitigate the chances of withdrawal through apathy,
the XFR poll lasts for 30 days, and investors have that much time to veto
the poll. At the end of 30 days, if majority of the votes are in favour of
allowing the withdrawal, it is allowed. Else, nothing happens. XFRs are
important for the user, and the Vault UI attempts to make the XFRs
visible for relevant DAICOs as soon as they appear. Also, no more than 2
XFRs can be posted simultaneously.

Exceptional Fund Requests View XFR History

App Redesign 20th Aug 2018

500 ETH
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy
nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi
enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis
nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in

Approval Rate: 99.99% Ends in: 5D 12H 20M

Deny

App Redesign 20th Aug 2018

500 ETH
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy
nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi
enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis
nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in

Approval Rate: 99.99% Ends in: 5D 12H 20M

Allow

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D. Unlocking Tokens
Votes on Vault are token proportional(although capped). In such polls, a
common exploit is to vote with ones tokens, and then send the tokens to
another friend so that he can vote again with the same tokens. Hence,
when someone casts a vote on vault, their tokens are locked up until
they unvote. In order to allow the user to quickly unlock tokens when in
a hurry, Vault allows the user to quickly unvote from all active polls and
release their tokens.
* Refer to (B. Kill) page 31 for component mockup

E. Health Index & Spend Curve

Vault provides 2 visualizations for all DAICOs. One of them is a line chart
showing how much money has been spent, along with how much money
the tap and XFR have collectively released over time.

Spend Curve Spendable Spent

5,400 ETH

4,700 ETH
Tap increased to
3,900 ETH 550 ETH

4th Aug 2018, 8,462 ETH

1,900 ETH

1,000 ETH

0 ETH
XFR approved
2,000 ETH

The second visualization is a histogram of vote weights. Since there is a

vote weight cap, individuals holding a token share greater than this cap
will have their vote weights truncated to the vote weight cap. As a result,
vote weights of all voters are bound between zero and vote weight cap.
The histogram shows the distribution of vote weight among investors,
and generates a health index, where ‘health’ is defined as the minimum
number of colluding investors required to add up to an 80% vote share.
Note that vote shares(used in health calculation) are not vote
weights(charted on histogram). This is explained in the appendix.

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Vote Histogram
Health Index: 9,521

0.0415%, 8,462

0.05%

F. Track Record of Polls

The governance page allows the user to access the details of past polls
related to the DAICO, such as previous tap polls, previous kill polls, and
previous XFR polls. These details are very brief, and additional details
can be found on pollscan.io, which is accessible by clicking on poll
addresses.

Exceptional Fund Requests View XFR History

Project Details View Kill History

Tap Details View Tap History

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6.KILL SWITCHES
Whenever a project is eligible for killing, any member of Vault can
execute the transaction that kills the DAICO. This transaction sets the
treasury into a mode where it no longer allows withdrawals and no longer
accepts deposits coming from crowdsale contract, leading the crowdsale
contract reject incoming transactions. For any member to be able to do this,
Vault provides a kill switch on the top of the governance page for all DAICOs,
when the project is eligible for killing.
Additionally, if the first round of a DAICO fails to collect the required amount
of funds before the round’s end time, any member can initiate the start of
refund mode. Both the above cases allow the user to claim their
proportional share of ether back, by following the steps explained in the
next sub-subsection.

Execute Kill
The kill consensus on the Kill Project poll has exceeded 80% with 4507 voters for kill.
Execute Kill
Click the execute kill button & sign the transaction to start the project kill process.
Kill Quorum Threshold: 2,597

7. REFUND MANAGEMENT
Once a DAICO is killed by any of the above methods, the investors
may access their governance pages, to get redirected to the refund page.
This page has a button which allows users to withdraw their share of ether,
while destroying the tokens that they hold - in exchange for the refunded
ether.

Refund
The DAICO that you are looking for has been killed by investor consensus.
Refund
Click the refund button & sign the transaction to start the refund process.
Project killed on: 3rd Aug 2018

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C. ISSUER
FUNCTIONALITY
This subsection describes the features that the
issuers can access which investors cannot. Note that the issuer can access all
the features that the investors can access:

1. PUBLISH DAICO
The primary purpose of becoming an issuer is to conduct a DAICO.
The publish button takes the issuer to a page where they can start their own
DAICO. Note that one issuer may start only one DAICO.

A. Populate Information
The issuer must first fill out a form detailing the DAICO. Some of these
details are on-chain details, such as coin price, coin supply and so on.
These details are frozen after deployment. There are other offchain
details such as website URL and whitepaper link, which can be edited
any number of times after upload.
This page allows the issuer to save a draft, as well as to move to the
deployment stage.

Identity Details Token Sale Distribution

Admin Name Admin Email Tokens Sold at Level 1 Token Price at Level 1 (ETH)

Project Name ERC20 Token Tag

Tokens Sold at Level 2 Token Price at Level 2 (ETH)

Project Description
Tokens Sold at Level 3 Token Price at Level 3 (ETH)

Website Link Telegram URL

Non-Sale Distribution

Github URL Medium URL

Facebook URL Twitter URL 1. 4500 ETH - Bug Bounty

2. 3500 ETH - Team
Upload Thumbnail Upload Whitepaper
Number of Tokens Reciever

Add to Token Distribution Chart

DAICO Details

Initial Fund Release DAICO Rounds

Token Distribution Chart

DAICO Start Date DAICO End Date

Individual Cap Vote Sat. Limit

20%
First Token Sale ($500k)
Kill Frequency 5M tokens at $0.01 27.5%
Second Token Sale ($3.5M)
17.5M tokens at $0.02
Initial Tap Amount Tap Increment Unit
Third Token Sale ($11M)
27.5M tokens at $0.04 1.0 BILLION
TOTAL TOKENS
Foundation

20%
Team

37
17.5%
Bounty
10% 5%
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B. Deploy DAICO
Vaults intelligent engine uses the parameters filled in the information
page to generate the smart contract code for all DAICO contracts. The
issuer only has to pay for gas fees on deployment. There are 12 steps,
where the issuer has to click a button, and then you are done. Before
execution of the first step, the DAICO information is fully editable, but
once the first step has been taken, onchain details are frozen.

Deployer

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

You have initiated the deployment of the Locked Tokens contract.

Deploy
Click the Deploy button to deploy Poll Factory contract.

2.EDIT OFFCHAIN DETAILS

AFTER PUBLISHING
The issuer can change offchain details of the DAICO at any time, by going to
the manage DAICO page, which is accessible after the issuer has initiated
publishing. Once the DAICO is deployed, the manage page brings you not to
the information form, but to different pages, however those pages provide
an edit button through which the issuer may edit the details.

Identity Details

Admin Name Admin Email

Project Name ERC20 Token Tag

Project Description

Website Link Telegram URL

Github URL Medium URL

Facebook URL Twitter URL

Upload Thumbnail Upload Whitepaper

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3.START ROUND 1
The issuer must trigger the start of the DAICO at the beginning of
round 1 time. This is a measure taken to ensure that the DAICO cannot be
started without setting up the kill polls beforehand. This transaction
succeeds smoothly if the DAICO is deployed properly, but there is a check in
the smart contract which makes the start fail, until the kill polls are deployed.

4. GOVERNANCE
The issuer has access to a number of controls to manage their DAICO:

A. Deploy Next Tap Poll

When the issuer feels the need to increase the rate at which funds are
released, the issuer deploys a poll which takes the consensus of
investors, and based on the response, allows the issuer to raise the tap.

B. Deploy XFR Poll

If the issuer needs to withdraw an amount that is not allowed by the
tap, but does not wish to increase the tap, then he may deploy an XFR
poll to request investors to release a fixed amount of one time
withdrawal. This poll has to be live for 30 days before it can allow a
withdrawal, because the default on this poll is yes, and 30 days is
enough time to make a decision on the XFR poll.

C. Increment Tap
This is a button that fires the transaction that increases the tap. This
transaction works only if the approval on the tap increment poll is
greater than 50%, and hence, is only available for use in that
circumstance.

D. Claim XFR
This transaction triggers a withdrawal of the XFR amount. This button is
only accessible after the XFR poll has been active for 30 days, and if the
approval ratings are above 50%. Note that this button is available for 3
days only, and the withdrawal must be made in the time window of 3
days between T+30 and T+33 where T is the date of deployment of poll.

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E. Withdraw
This button processes a withdrawal from the treasury based on how
much is requested, how much has already been withdrawn, and how
much is allowed for withdrawal at any given moment.

F. Start Next Round

A DAICO may decide to keep multiple rounds, and the rounds may be
differently priced, as they are intended for different stages of the
project. As a result, issuers may want to choose to delay the start of a
certain round. The governance dashboard allows the user to trigger the
start of the next round. There is a minimum waiting period before
starting a subsequent round, 24 hours. After waiting 24 hours, the issuer
may start the next round immediately, or wait for a future time.

G. Edit Offchain Data for Tap and XFR Descriptions

The governance page allows issuers to add textual detail to the XFR and
Tap polls, to give investors information or justification for the funds
requested. This text can be edited from the governance dashboard.

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Appendix

APPENDIX
This section is intended to make some definitions and distinctions clear:

A. Token Balance (T ) i
This is nothing but the number of tokens(DAICO token issued by issuer)
that the user is holding.

B. Token Share (t ) i
This is the token balance of the user divided by the total mintable supply
(T) of tokens.

ti = Ti / T

C. Vote Weight (v ) i
On vault DAICOs, vote weight is defined as Token Share, if the Token
Share is greater than the Vote Weight Cap (v) (Issuer input parameter
before deployment), if the Token Share is greater than the Vote weight
cap, vote weight is equal to the Vote weight cap. Note that vote weights
are assigned only to token holders who have Vault membership.

vi =
{ ti,

v,
for ti < v

for ti > v

D. Cummulative Vote Weight (V)

This is the sum of all vote weights across all vault members who are
holding tokens.

V= Σv
All Vault
i
Members

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E. Vote Share (Vi )

This is defined as the users vote weight(vi ) divided by cumulative vote
weight(V). As with vote weights, vote shares are also assigned to only
Vault members. Non vault members cannot vote, even if they hold
tokens.

Vi = vi /V

In conclusion, the purpose of this appendix is to explain that vote shares and
vote weights are different things. Vote weight depends only on how many
token you hold, and what is the vote weight cap. Vote share depends on how
many tokens other people are holding as well. For example, if there are only 3
vault members who hold 0.01% of total mintable supply while the vote weight
cap is 0.05%, then their vote weights are 0.01%, but their vote shares are
33.33%.

Difference between Vote Weight & Vote Share

Vote Weight Vote Share

Depends only on token balance Depends on total vote shares in the governance pool

Are not used in DAICO polls directly Are used in DAICO polls directly

Dont necessarily add up to 1 Always add up to 1

Shown on histogram Not shown on histogram

Not needed for calculating health Used in health calculation

Disclaimer:
The mock screens used in the product paper are represntative and are
subject to change.

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