H.

Allowance & Disallowance of Wills

1. Guevara v. Guevara

GUEVARA vs. GUEVARA

Parties: Petitioner-appellant— ERNESTO M. GUEVARA; Respondent-appellees— ROSARIO

GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON

Doctrine: The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is
essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Facts:
● Victorino L. Guevara has two children— Ernesto M. Guevara (legitimate child), and Rosario
Guevara (acknowledged natural/illegitimate child)
● Victorino executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife
in the second marriage. Both Ernesto and Rosario were bequeathed real and personal properties.
● Victorino died in 1933, but his last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court
for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his
estate. It is not of record whether the legatees and devisees mentioned in the will received their
respective inheritance.
● After the death of Victorino, Ernesto appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in
the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of
paying the debts left by his father.
● Meanwhile, Rosario had her father's last will and testament in her custody, but did nothing
judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor.
● Only after four years after Victorino’s death did Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her
legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained
in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not
probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
● Rosario based her claim for inheritance on the theory or assumption that Victorino died intestate,
and she used the will merely as proof of Victorino acknowledging her as his natural child.

Issue​:
WON the probate of a will can be dispensed with

Ruling​: No.
● Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will
and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory
and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
● Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which took effect on July 1, 1940, outlines the procedure for,
among others, the Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution.
Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory

2. Lasam v. Umengan
Parties:​ Petitioner- Heirs of Rosendo Lasam; Private Respondent- Vicenta Umengan (daughter of Abdon
Turingan)

Doctrine:​ The Last Will and Testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to establish
petitioner’s right to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said last will and
testament could not be the source of any right.

Facts:
● The lot subject of the unlawful case is situated in Cagayan and originally owned by Spouses
Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan.
● The spouses conveyed the ownership of the lots in favor of their 2 children: Irene and Isabel
Cuntapay.
● Isabel had 4 children by her first husband (Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria). Had 2 children by her
second husband (Trinidad and Rosendo).
● Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent, who was then occupying
the subject lot. Petitioner alleged that they are the rightful owners of the lot and merely tolerated
respondent to temporarily occupy it.
● Respondents alleged that the lot was inherited by Irene’s 6 children through intestate succession.
Each had a 1/6 share of the subject lot. That she purchased the respective 1/6 shares of Mara
and Sado, as evidence by the Deed of Sale. That Abdon, her father donated his share to her as
evidenced by a Deed of Donation.
● RTC: Affirmed the MTCC decision which is in favor of petitioners. Gave credence to the newly
discovered last will and testament executed by Isabel Cuntapay.
● CA: reversed. Last will did not comply with the formal requirements of the law on wills like paged
were not numbered, did not contain the requisite attestation clause, the parties did not affix their
signatures on the 2​nd​ page, and no acknowledgment before a notary.

Issue​:
WON the petitioner has a better right to possess the subject lot.

Ruling​: No.
● Although the case involves ejectment case (possession), the issue of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon to determine who is entitled to possession de facto.
● The purported Last Will and Testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to
establish petitioner’s right to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the
said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
● Art. 838. That no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the rules of court.
● Isabel’s last will and testament which has not been probated, has no effect whatever and
petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.
● Considering that the purported will has, as yet, no force and effect for not having been probated,
her 6 children are deemed to be co-owners of the lot having their pro indiviso shares. Hence, the
conveyances made by the children of Isabel to respondent are valid insofar as their pro indiviso
shares are concerned.

3. Gallanosa v. Arcangel
4. Manahan v. Manahan
Parties
• TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner and appellee,
• ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent and appellant
Doctrine
• In the phraseology of the procedural law there is no essential difference between the
authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in
this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declare that in the execution of the will the
essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is
valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

• The proceedings followed in a testamentary case being in rem, the decree admitting the will to
probate was effective and conclusive against the appellant, in accordance with section 306 of the Code of
Civil Procedure

Facts
• On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate
of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan.The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the
executrix in said will.
• On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence
was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was
probated on September 22, 1930.
• One year and seven months later, that is, on May 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant herein filed
a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio.
• The appellant claims 1) That she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as
such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that the court, in its order
of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and
(3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code
of Civil Procedure is not complied with.
• Trial Court- admitted the will to probate and appointed petitioner as executrix

ISSUE
WON Engracia Manahan was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was
entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will
HELD
NO. The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable. ​She was not entitled to
notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not
an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof.Her allegation that
she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on
the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir.
Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.
The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the
will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will
may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the
procedural law, there is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate
thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that
the competent court declare that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been
complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the
law.
The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once a will has been
authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on
appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be
impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding.

5. De la Cerna v. Potot

G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., ​petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ​respondents.

PARTIES:
Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca - deceased who executed joint last will
Paula De la Cerna et. al. - heirs and successors of late Bernabe de la Cerna
Manuela Rebaca Potot - niece of the deceased and was named in the last will.

DOCTRINE:

The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by
appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final
decision, however erroneous.

Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's
lifetime.

FACTS:

It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint
last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land acquired
during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece,
whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union, Manuela
Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will
continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being covered
by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon,
province of Cebu. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to
probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due
publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of
October 31, 1939.

Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will
insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No.
1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and
her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on March
30, 1954
CFI - declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in
the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines)

CA - ​reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate
jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the joint last will and testament of Bernabe in 1939 is valid.

RULING:

NO. (inupheld ng Supreme Court yung decision ng Probate Court kahit invalid sya but as to the
will of Bernabe lang.)

It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code). prohibits the making of a will jointly by
two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this
form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used; and when, as in
the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a
Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions
thereof that are not contrary to law.

The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will
and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills,
whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code).
The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by
appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final
decision, however erroneous.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the
probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It
could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and
over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely
because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will
could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate,
and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or
unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

6. Dorotheo v. CA
Dorotheo vs. Court of Appeals
PARTIES: Petitioner: Lourdes L. Dorotheo; Respondents: CA, Nilda D. Quintana, for herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of Vicente Dorotheo and Jose Dorotheo
DOCTRINE: Probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. Intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even
after the will has been authenticated; Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
FACTS:
·​ ​Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
·​ ​Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
· ​In 1977, after Alejandro’s death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died,
filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter’s last will and testament. Alejandro’s will was
admitted to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a “Motion
To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void.”
· ​The trial court granted the motion. TC issued an order declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the
late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo
Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
· ​Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took
care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other.
·​ ​Her motion was denied and her appeal with CA was dismissed which became final and executory.
· ​A writ of execution was issued by the lower court, private respondents filed several motions including
a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering
the properties of the late Alejandro.
· ​Petitioner refused to surrender the TCT’s, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said
titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
· ​An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground
that the order was merely “interlocutory,” hence not final in character. Court also added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased
spouses
· ​Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. A petition was filed with the
CA, in which the latter nullified the two assailed orders.
ISSUE​: Whether or not the last will and testament of Alejandro which admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
RULING​: No, it can no longer be given effect.
· ​A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter
how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained
finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of
Appeals.
· ​It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects: whether the will submitted is
indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament; compliance with the prescribed formalities
for the execution of wills; the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the due execution
of the last will and testament. .
· ​The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that
an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will
 was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the
lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession,
the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so
when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding
on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be
intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if
the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a
decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the
decision or order.
· ​In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held
by the trial court. Furthermore, Alejandro’s disposition in his will of the alleged share in
the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his “only beloved wife,”
is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of
properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the
conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties
that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
spouse’s estate.

I. Institution of Heirs

1.​Austria vs. Reyes

PARTIES: ​RUBEN AUSTRIA,CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA Mozo, petitioners
vs.
PERFECTO CRUZ,BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ,ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ
CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.

DOCTRINE: ​Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code,
the following requisites must concur: ​First, t​ he cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, ​the cause must be shown to be false; and ​third, i​ t must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the
Cause.

FACTS:
● On July 7, 1956, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate,
​ f her last will and testament.
aatte mortem, o
● The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria rBenta
and Lauro Austria Mozo (nephews and nieces of Basilia) but was dismisse. Hence, probate was
allowed.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Mefiez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had
been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
 ● On April 28, 1959, Basilia died.
● Respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor.
● On November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia.
● That the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al,, had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs.
● The court allowed the intervention.
● Both parties debated the authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and
presented by the respondents.
● On motion of the petitioners, these documents were referred to the NBI for examination and
advice. NBI report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents.
● Dissatisfied, petitioners obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned document
examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents.
● They moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further
study.
● On February 6, 1963, petitioners moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the
genuineness of the adoption of the respondents.
● Before the hearing, respondent Benita Cruz-Menez filed a motion asking the lower court to
confine the petitioners’ intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will
of the decedent.
● The lower court delimited the properties to those not disposed of in the will.
● MR by petitioners was denied. Hence, this petition by certiorari.
● LC assumed, by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material
nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were
spurious, the respondents, will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as
testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia’s will.
● · Petitioners’ contention:
● 1. The entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the
institution of heirs embodied in the decedent’s will.

● 2. The controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads: “The statement of a false cause
for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”
● 3. The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late
Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath onehalf of her entire
estate to the respondents. the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were
compulsory heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of heirs is valid

RULING: YES.
● Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: ​First, ​the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, ​the cause must be shown to be false; and ​third, i​ t must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
● Where the decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such
institution of heirs, the will cannot be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code. Such institution
 may be annulled only when it is clear, after an examination of the will that the testator clearly
would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false.
● The petitioners would have the court imply, from the use of the terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana”
(compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the
institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she could not do
otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did
not make it known in her will.
● The “​tagapagmana” a ​ nd ​“sapilitang mana” ​were borrowed from the language of the law on
succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract
object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed
her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make
allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposition) which
largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter’s children, and the children of the
respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents
more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them.

J. Pretertion

1. Nuguid v. Nugiod
Remedios Nuguid vs. Sps. Felix & Paz Nuguid

DOCTRINE
Where the one-sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole universal heir and preterits the parents of
the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by
itself is VOID. And intestate succession ensues.

FACTS
Rosario Nuguid died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11yrs. prior to
her demise. The will instituted Remedios as the sole, universal heir of all Rosario’s properties. Remedios
prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were
illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

ISSUE
Whether the subject will preterited the compulsory heirs. ​YES
RULING
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law."

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in
the direct ascending line– her parents, now parent/oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid.
And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they
were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.

The word “annul” employed in the statute means that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal
heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written. Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a
will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of
preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent.

Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal
heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

2. Acain v. CA

Acain vs. IAC (G.R. No. 72706. October 27, 1987)

Petitioner: CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN

Respondents: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A.
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON

Facts:

·​ ​Petitioner is the son of the deceased’s brother. The deceased is N​emesio Acain​.

· ​Nemesio Acain made a Last Will and Testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will
provided:

“All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly with
my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of
legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo
Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City
which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion,
Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.”​
· ​Segundo Acain died before Nemesio Acain, hence Segundo’s children became the universal heirs of
the deceased, pursuant to the abovementioned Will.

·​ ​The private respondents are the deceased’s surviving spouse and adopted daughter.

· ​The petitioner filed a petition to probate the will of the deceased (​Special Proceedings No. 591
A-CEB). The private respondents opposed the probate, alleging that they were pretirited and that the
petitioner has no interest in the estate of the deceased and is not a proper party to probate the will.

Issues:

1. ​Whether or not the private respondents (surviving spouse and adopted daughter) have been pretirited
under Article 854 of the Civil Code.

2.​ W
​ hether or not Petitioner is a party in interest to probate the will.

Ruling:

1.​ NO. As to the surviving spouse, there is no preterition.

YES. As to the adopted daughter, there is preterition.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited.

Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is
not in the ​direct line.

As to the adopted daughter, under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was
totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator.

2. ​NO.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must:

·​ ​have an interest in the estate,
·​ ​or in the will,
·​ ​or in the property to be affected by it.

He must either be:

·​ ​an executor,
·​ ​or a claimant of the estate, or
· ​an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor.

Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the
testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to
receive.

At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil
Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law.

However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal
institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for
the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.

3. Neri v. Akutin
NERI v. AKUTIN

Petitioner: Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL.,

Defendants: IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN

FACTS:

-Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage six children named
Eleuterio,
Agripino,
Agapito,
Getulia,
Rosario and
Celerina;

-While by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children namely
Gracia,
Godofredo,
Violeta,
Estela Maria, and
Emma.

-Getulia, a daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, before the death of her father Agripino
Neri and was survived by seven children namely
Remedios,
Enacarnacion,
Carmen,
Trinidad,
Luz,
Alberto and
Minda.

-In Agripino Neri's testament, which was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that his
children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had already
received their corresponding shares during his lifetime.

-At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial court found, contrary to what the testator had declared
in his will, that all his children by the first and second marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without
prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last
conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin.

-The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with the modification that the will was "valid with
respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of. "This judgment of the Court of
Appeals is now sought to be reviewed in this petition

ISSUE:Whether or Not the omission of the children of the first marriage in Agapito Neri’s will constitutes
as a valid PRETERITION

RULING: YES

The court ruled that Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not
accorded any share in the heriditary property, without expressly being disinherited.

It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not
expressly made or is not at least manifest.

Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" because
preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession.

In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator.
Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code,
and where no express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would presume that the testator had
no intention to that effect.m

In the will here in question, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the second
marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available for
free disposal.

The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the
heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's
intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his property equally among
all his children.
Decision of the trial court is reaffirmed. The CA’s decision was reversed by the SC.

4. Solano v. CA
Solano vs CA

Parties
•ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO,petitioner and appellee,
•BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S. GARCIA, opponent and appellant

Doctrine
· ​The preterition of illegitimate children should annul the institution of the heir “only insofar
as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired”.

Facts
• Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS), claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr.
Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against him. In his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity.
During the pendency of the suit, SOLANO died.

· ​Petitioner ZONIA was ordered substituted for the DECEDENT as the only surviving heir
mentioned in his Last Will and Testament.

· ​The GARCIAS impugned the recognition of ZONIA as an acknowledged natural child with the
prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous child of the DECEDENT.

· The Trial Court specified the legal issues as: 1) the question of recognition of the GARCIAS; 2) the
correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated Will.

· ​The Trial Court, while declaring that the plaintiffs GARCIAS and the defendant ZONIA as the
illegitimate children of the late Dr. Solano under the class of ADULTEROUS CHILDREN, nullified the
institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole and universal heir and ordered that the three (3) children shall
share equally the estate or one- third (1/3) each, without prejudice to the legacy given.

ISSUE​:
·​ ​ hether, in an action for recognition, the lower Court has jurisdiction:
W

1) to declare ZONIA as an illegitimate child of SOLANO;

2) to order the division of the estate in the same action despite the pendency of the case
(acknowledgment)
3) to declare null and void the institution of heir in the Last Will and Testament of SOLANO, which was
duly probated and concluding that total intestacy resulted.

HELD:
 ​ e Illegitimacy of ZONIA​: The oral testimony and the documentary evidence of record inevitably point
R
to that conclusion that Zonia was also an illegitimate child of the DECEDENT. Moreover, the Supreme
Court is bound by the findings of fact of both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, particularly, the f
inding that the GARCIAS and ZONIA are illegitimate children

Re Division of estate in an action for recognition​: While it is true that the action below was basically
one for recognition, ZONIA defended the case not as a mere representative of the deceased but also
asserted rights and defenses in her own personal capacity. During the trial, ZONIA failed to object to the
presentation by the GARCIAS of their oral and documentary evidence to show that ZONIA was also
illegitimate and even cross-examined the witnesses of GARCIAS. Thus, the litigation was converted into a
contest between the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their
respective rights.

Re nullification of SOLANO’s will​: It should be recalled that SOLANO himself instituted the petition for
probate of the Will during his lifetime. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have terminated
except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO’s death, continued to file pleadings therein. The
records further disclose that the action for recognition were pending before the same Branch of the
Court and before the same presiding Judge. Further, it is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive
only as to its due execution and that a probate decree is not concerned with the intrinsic validity or legality
of the provisions of the Will.

Thus, the Trial Court had jurisdiction to conclude that as a result of preterition​,
The institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854​. However, the
Trial Court was wrong when it held that the entire Will is void and intestacy ensues.

The pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the institution of SONIA as heir only insofar as the
LEGITIME of the omitted heirs is impaired. So the Will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation

It is plain that the intention of the testator was to favor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which,
under the law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as
to the one-half (1/2) portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of. Since the legitime of
illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, the GARCIAS and ZONIA each
have a right to participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA’s hereditary share will,
therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3
of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate. The usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the properties
indicated in the Will is valid and should be respected.

(STORY FOR ILLEGITEMACY)

1ST WIFE - MELITON SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay, married Pilar Riosa. The latter died.

2ND WIFE -On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who became his second wife in
1928. The union was short-lived as she left him in 1929.

3RD PARTNER (GARCIAS' MOM) - SOLANO started having amorous relations with Juana Garcia, out
of which affair was born Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia. Their birth certificates and baptismal
certificates mention only the mother's name without the father's name. The facts establish, however, that
 SOLANO during his lifetime recognized the GARCIAS as his children by acts of support and provisions
for their education.

4TH PARTNER (SONIA's MOM) SOLANO started living with Trinidad Tuagnon. Three children were
born out of this relation but only petitioner SONIA Ana Tuagnon, 1941, is living. In her Birth Certificate,
her status was listed as "illegitimate".

DIVORCE FROM THE FRENCH WOMAN - SOLANO obtained a divorce from Lilly Gorand on
November 29, 1943 and on December 22, 1943, SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura
de Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural" acknowledging SONIA as a "natural child" and giving her the
right to use the name SONIA Ana Solano y Tuagnon. The document was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar on the same date.

On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y Testamento" instituting ZONIA as his
universal heir to all his personal and real properties in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the province
of Albay, except for five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, which were given to Trinidad
Tuagnon in usufruct. The Will was duly probated on March 10, 1969 in Special Proceedings of the Court
of First Instance of Albay.

5. Aznar v. Duncan

Parties:
Edward E. Christensen (Testator)
Lucy Duncan (Legitimate Daughter)
Helen Garcia (Preterited Daughter)
Aznar (Executor) - Not important

Doctrine:
● Preterition is the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the testator’s estate.
● In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited to the completion of his legitime (instead of
the
● annulment of the institution of heirs) it is not necessary that what has been left to him in the will
“by any title,” as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir.
● As successional rights are vested as of the moment of death, the forced heir is entitled to the
fruits and increments of his legitime from the testator’s death.
Facts:
● Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will
executed on March 5, 1951.
● The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of
February 28, 1954.
● In that same decision the court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased.
● In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased’s estate, the trial court approved the
project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court
found to be valid under the law of California.
 ● Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval.
● The case was returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided
by said law.
● The Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the project of partition submitted
by the executor wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Lucy Duncan
whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter and Helen Garcia.
● The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the
will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the properties passed to both
of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other
persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the
legatees.
Issue:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal
shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the
extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate.

Held:

From the provisions of the will, he refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and
limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to
possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his
subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his
estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.

The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the
Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. Onefourth (1/4) of said estate descended
to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment of the death
of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or
increments thereof subsequently accruing.

Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the project of partition as
submitted by the executor​appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is remanded with instructions to
partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated in this decision, that is, by giving to oppositor​appellee
Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to
one​fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include
those imposed in the will of the decedent

6. Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu (19 SCRA 85)

Parties: ​Tirso Reyes, guardian of minors Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso, all surnamed Reyes y Barretto,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Doctrine: “Diminution of legitime of forced heir does not constitute preterition.—Where the testator
allotted in his will to his legitimate daughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstance
would not invalidate the institution of a stranger as an heir, since there was no preterition or total
omission of a forced heir.”​

Facts:
1. Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.
2. When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, he left his share of these properties
in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff’s wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small
portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and
nieces.
3. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in Bulacan, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerardo.
4. Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. Thereafter, she prepared a project of partition,
which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto.
5. CFI Manila approved the petition for partition.
6. Maria Gerardo the died on March 5, 1948 and it was discovered that she executed two wills.
7. Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of
the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
8. in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone.
9. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes
(as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria by her husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same.
10. TC: The project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Bibiano is null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee (Salud), predecessor of
Tirso et. al., was not a daughter of the Sps. Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the project of partition was
decreed on the basis of Art. 1081 (OCC) (A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without
being so, has been included, shall be null and void). As Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano, she
was entitled to recover from Salud and her successors all the properties received by her from Bibiano’s
estate, in view of Art. 1456 (NCC) which states that property acquired by mistake or fraud is held by its
acquirer in implied trust for the real owner.
11. Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her legitimate heir, Tirso now falls back
upon the remnant of the estate of Bibiano (the fishpond), which was given in usufruct to Maria. Hence,
this action for the recovery of the one-half portion thereof. This action afforded Milagros an opportunity to
set up her right of ownership; not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed
and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano,
thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court
based thereon as well.

Issue:
1. WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud
did not acquire valid title to it.
2. WON Milagros’ action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Held:
YES. Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied. Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in Bibiano’s last will and
testament together with Milagros. Hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with
a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under Art.
1081. The legal precept of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud did not happen to be a
daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament;
for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share
(½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was no preterition or total
omission of a forced heir here. The view that the partition in question is void for being a compromise on
the civil status of Salud, in violation of Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A compromise presupposes the
settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties; and the condition of Salud as
daughter of the testator Bibiano, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate
of testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. While a compromise over civil status
is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to
a claimant to the estate. At any rate, independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for
distribution of estate), it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution,
once final, that vests title in the distributees. Where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of
the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes
irrelevant.

YES​. Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that Salud was not her child, the act of
Maria in agreeing to the partition and distribution was a fraud on her rights and entitles her to belief. This
contention is unfounded. First, there is no evidence that when Bibiano’s estate was judicially settled and
distributed, Salud knew that she was not Bibiano’s child. Thus, if fraud was committed, it was Maria who
was solely responsible; and neither Salud nor her minor children can be held liable therefor. Second,
granting there was such fraud, relief therefor can be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the
record shows that this period had elapsed a long time ago. At the time of distribution, Milagros was only
16. She became of age 5 years later (1944). On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the
ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father’s estate and the 4-year period of limitation started
to run, to expire in 1948. Conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946, her action
still became extinct in 1950. Her action was barred in Aug. 1956, when she filed her counterclaim in this
case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano’s estate. There is no evidence of an alleged verbal
promise by Tirso to reconvey the properties received by Salud, which allegedly induced Milagros to delay
the filing of the action. Granting that there was such promise, it would not bind Tirso’s wards, who are the
real parties-in-interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition, and not of
administration, cannot bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper
court.

7. Dy Yieng Seangio v. Reyes

8. Morales v. Olondriz
Morales v Olondriz

Petitioner: ​IRIS MORALES

Respondent​: ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO
OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ

Doctrine: The preterition of a compulsory heir ​in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the
devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will
does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result
in total intestacy.

Facts: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (​the decedent​) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow,
Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O.
Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz.

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for
the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator. RTC appointed
Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.

However, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will dated
July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for hex appointment as special
administratrix.

The pertinent portions of the decedent's will reads:

1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and
administrator of my estate until its distribution in accordance herewith,
2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among and
between (1) IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., (3)
ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother (6)
MARIA ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR.

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.

RTC - order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.

The RTC noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will not hesitate to set aside probate
proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might become an idle ceremony because the will is
intrinsically void.

The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is
an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the
evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as
administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.

CA - dismissed petition for certiorari

While probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into intestate
succession. Thus, the continuation of the probate proceedings would be superfluous and impractical
because the inheritance will be adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not preterition of a compulsory heir annuls the institution of heirs in the will
and opens the entire inheritance into intestate succession?
 2. Whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during
probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.

Ruling:

1. Yes

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or,
although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the
estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime. Preterition requires
that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his
legitime.

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir ​from the testator's
inheritance​ without the heir's express disinheritance.

Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the ​compulsory heirs in the ​direct line​,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, ​shall annul
the institution of heir​; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir ​in the direct line shall annul the institution of
heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired.
Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line will result in total intestacy.

In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless
Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his
preterition.

During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco
received donations ​inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not
appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot
fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

2. Yes

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is limited to questions on
the extrinsic validity of the ​will;​ the probate court will only determine the will's formal validity and due
execution. However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances. When
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is
probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition annulled the
institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the ​total abrogation of the will, resulting in total
intestacy of the inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null
and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much less grave abuse of discretion -
on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.

Palacios v. Ramirez

● Marcelle, widow, is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain.
Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
● Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow(Marcelle) as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate.
● On June 23, 1966, Palacios submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into
two parts. One part shall go to the widow “en pleno dominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or “free
portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nuda propriedad.”.
● Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3)
with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
● Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the following grounds:
a. that the ​provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow’s usufruct and
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda’s usufruct are invalid because the
first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator;
b. that the ​provisions for fidei commissary substitutions ​are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code;
● Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order.
● Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the substitutions are valid?

Held: Vulgar Substitution Valid, fideicommissary substitution Void

● Provisions:

The substitutions. It may be useful to recall that “Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into
the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.” (Art. 857, Civil Code.) And that there are several kinds of
substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fidei commissary. (Art. 858, Civil Code.)

According to Tolentino, “Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two.” (III Civil Code, p. 185
[1973].)
 The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads: “ART. 859. The testator may designate
one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not
wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.”

The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows: “ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution
by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a
second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second
heir are living at time of the death of the testator.”

● It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez, who also questions the “sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria” in connection with Wanda’s usufruct over
two-thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez. They allege that the substitution in
its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the
testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. ​Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
● As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants ​are correct in their claim that it is void for
the following reasons: (a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution “provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.” (b) There is no absolute duty imposed
on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the
appellee admits “that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners.”
● Degree’ as designation, substitution, or transmission. From this point of view, there can be only one transmission or
substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir construe the word ‘degree’ as generation, and the
present Code has obviously followed this interpretation, by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one
degree ‘from the heir originally instituted.’ The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and
be one generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir.​ These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.