Analysis
October 13, 2010
Summary: The shortcomings
evident in both the design of
and the debate surrounding the
controversial Holy Cross (Surb
Khach) liturgy are emblematic
of the challenges underlying the
process of normalizing relations
between Turks and Armenians.
But the occasion also offered
an opportunity to witness some
of the new and positive realities
emerging. While setting high
standards for Turkey is helpful,
so is recognizing that small,
incremental steps are more likely
to yield sustainable results for
Armenian-Turkish reconciliation.
Offices
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Turks and Armenians: Walking the
Reconciliation Tightrope
by Diba Nigar Göksel
The first religious service in 95 years
at the 10th century Armenian Church
of the Holy Cross (Surb Khach)
on Akhtamar (Akdamar) Island in
eastern Turkey’s Lake Van was held on
September 19. As with most steps on
the path to Turkish-Armenian recon-
ciliation, this essentially construc-
tive initiative triggered considerable
criticism. The relative absence of
members of the Armenian diaspora
among the 4,000 visitors reported to
have attended the liturgy was attrib-
uted largely to calls for a boycott of
this “publicity stunt” by Armenian
political parties, journalists, and reli-
gious institutions.1 At the other end
of the spectrum, in a backlash riddled
with symbolism, Turkish national-
ists held Friday prayers in northeast
Turkey on October 1 at the ruins of
the Holy Virgin Cathedral (converted
into Fethiye Mosque) at Ani, once
the capital of a medieval Armenian
kingdom. Corresponding with the
first day of the Turkish parliament’s
new legislative year, this public display
was marked with pledges against
surrendering to “those using the guise
of modernity, democratization, and
1
“Armenian Ruling Party Slams Planned Church Service
In Turkey,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August
11, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Rul-
ing_Party_Slams_Planned_Church_Service_In_Tur-
key/2124612. html.
freedom in their attempt to take the
Turkish motherland in Anatolia.”
The shortcomings evident in both the
design of and the debate surrounding
the Surb Khach liturgy were emblem-
atic of the challenges underlying
the process of normalizing relations
between Turkey and Armenia. But the
occasion also offered an opportunity to
witness some of the new and positive
realities emerging. While setting high
standards for Turkey is helpful, so is
recognizing that small, incremental
steps are more likely to yield sustain-
able results for Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation.
Negative Twists to Positive Change
According to those who advocated a
boycott of the religious service at Surb
Khach, the “opportunistic” Turkish
government would have been aided in
its effort to “score propaganda points”
by Armenian attendance. The local
government of Van was criticized for
being motivated by the prospect of
material benefits from Armenian tour-
ists. Some argued that nothing short of
“justice” — meaning genocide recogni-
tion and the return of “ancestral lands”
— could be accepted.
Analysis
The renovation of one church
and the holding of services there
once a year obviously does not
suffice as a solution to the many
problems between Turks and
Armenians.
Surb Khach had also sparked a divisive debate between
2005 and 2007, when its renovation was financed by the
Turkish government. The Armenian media was rife with
speculation that Turkey was actually destroying the Arme-
nian elements of the church under the guise of restoration,
and it was suggested that the “advertisement of goodwill”
in the Surb Khach case was distracting attention from
the destruction of other Armenian churches in Anatolia.
The drama-ridden coverage included assertions that the
“blasting of Armenian churches” was a commonplace
occurrence in Turkish military exercises. Turkey’s motiva-
tion for renovating Surb Khach and holding an opening
ceremony in March 2007 was seen, at best, as a “showcase of
tolerance” meant for the European Union. At the same time,
the adornment of the ceremony site with Turkish flags was
seen as an insult to Armenians.2
Indeed, the renovation of one church and the holding of
services there once a year obviously does not suffice as a
solution to the many problems between Turks and Arme-
nians. The good news is that this is merely one of many
ongoing efforts aimed at overcoming the long-troubled
relationship Turkey has had with its Christian minorities.
Even better, the change is being spearheaded by intellec-
tuals, NGOs, and various local constituencies. In August,
the Greek Orthodox Soumela monastery in northeastern
Turkey held its first service since 1923. The Surb Giragos
Church in Diyarbakir is being restored by Armenians in
Turkey thanks to legislation passed in 2008, marking the
2
Information in this paragraph is based on analysis of Armenian media and political
debates conducted by ESI staff in 2007.
2
first time a ruined Armenian church is being returned to
service in an area with virtually no remaining Armenian
community. These and other similar examples are evidence
of a sense of change and growing momentum on this front.
Constructive dialogue between the Turkish authorities
and representatives of Christian minorities has stepped
up, freedom of expression on previously taboo issues has
increased, and there are ongoing efforts to crack down on
criminal assaults and assassinations of Christians in recent
years. However, there is still much to be done before this
progress can be consolidated, and the fact that develop-
ments on this front are still in flux is all the more reason
why a responsible and constructive debate is crucial.
Grounds for Suspicion
Among other things, the mass at Surb Khach also revealed
stubborn patterns of behavior in Ankara that continue to
cast shadows over opportunities to set a new mood and
build confidence. The announcement only days before the
liturgy that the church’s 2-2.5 meter iron cross would not
be installed atop the dome in time for the service raised
many questions. The reason provided — technical difficul-
ties — did not satisfy most interested parties.3 One thing
that should be clear to Turkish authorities by now is that
ambiguity does not serve them well when it comes to Arme-
nian-Turkish affairs. Although it was finally installed on the
Constructive dialogue between
the Turkish authorities and
representatives of Christian
minorities has stepped up.
church on October 1st, the delay, and the possible political
considerations behind it, ended up stealing the show. In an
environment where deep distrust and over-analysis turn the
3
Turkish authorities explained that more time was required because of the difficulties
associated with working on a protected heritage site, including the bureaucracy involved
in recreating original features and hiring someone to affix the heavy cross (among the
wide range of figures, 76 kg is the lowest reported, while 110 kg is the most common in
Turkish press).
Analysis
One thing that should be clear to
Turkish authorities by now is that
ambiguity does not serve them
well when it comes to Armenian-
Turkish affairs.
slightest ambiguity into a conspiracy, more straightforward
communication on the part of Turkish authorities is impor-
tant.
This was only the most recent in a series of similarly
dubious actions. The Armenian origins of Surb Khach were
not even mentioned in the invitations to or the opening
ceremony of the “monumental museum” in 2007.4 The
long-running reluctance among Turkish authorities to refer
to Armenian heritage in Anatolia as “Armenian” suggests a
denial of the traditional Armenian presence in these lands.
Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining information about
the status of much of this heritage feeds into suspicions.
It is common knowledge that throughout Anatolia, many
churches have been abandoned to decay or converted into
mosques. The appearance of covering up such realities
overshadows the festive celebrations of progress when there
is any.
Another long-time grievance that re-emerged at Surb
Khach was the sense of being vulnerable to Turkish power-
holders. For those who believe it is good for Turkey to
debate history freely, restore its heritage, and expand the
scope of minority rights, the presentation of these concil-
iatory steps as “goodwill gestures” runs counter to the
spirit such reforms should enshrine.5 The patronizing tone
embedded in Turkey’s political culture — and not restricted
to the Armenian issue — is out of synch with the progres-
sive steps taken, and thus raises questions of sincerity. And
4
Phil Gamaghelyan “Akhtamar Reopening: Deficient but Powerful Seed,” Armenian
Weekly, September 29, 2010 http://www.armenianweekly.com/2010/09/29/gamaghely-
an-akhtamar-restoration-deficient-but-powerful-seed/
5
Alin Ozinian “Büyük bir vizyon, biraz daha cesaret,” Zaman Daily, September 21, 2010,
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1030034&title=yorum-alin-ozinian-buyuk-
bir-vizyon-biraz-daha-cesaret
3
the presumption that the Turkish authorities will use such
seemingly generous gestures to demonstrate progress to
Western skeptics also has grounds.
However, none of this changes the groundbreaking nature
of the renovation of Surb Khach and the service held there,
or the fact that the event has led to a series of new oppor-
tunities. Many people in Van went out of their way to make
those visiting Surb Khach feel welcome. A local multilingual
newspaper printed Armenian content, families volunteered
to house Armenian guests, and effective security measures
were put in place. The Van Chamber of Commerce and
Industry and the municipality have been vocal about their
desire to increase Armenian tourism in their province and
have taken concrete steps to this end, including publishing
a guidebook in Armenian for the first time. It is important
to put the problems in perspective — both in terms of what
else is happening in the country and how much has changed
in the past 10 years.
Opportunistic Policies and Debates
Even if motivated by monetary gain from Armenian
tourism, enthusiasm among locals for restoring an Arme-
nian church is certainly preferable to the vandalism carried
out for decades to find gold rumored to be hidden within.
Whether opportunistic or not, more contact between Turks
and Armenians and the restoration of Armenian cultural
heritage in Anatolia is good, and should not be taken for
granted. In the same vein, the opportunism of the Turkish
government — whether to improve its image in Europe,
bring money into the country, or increase its votes — is not
necessarily all bad. In fact this opportunism has arguably
fueled many of the recent reforms, to the benefit of different
segments of Turkish society. Intelligently crafted oppor-
tunism might just be the best we can hope for, particularly
The presentation of conciliatory
steps as “goodwill gestures” runs
counter to the spirit such reforms
should enshrine.
Analysis
if progressive segments of society ensure that their demands
remain on the agenda.
Moreover, the assumption that the Turkish government has
no issues of political expediency to deal with in tailoring
its steps towards rapprochement is naïve and can result in
a debate detached from reality. Reconciliation initiatives
come at a cost for both politicians and civilians.6 As the reli-
gious service scheduled to take place at Surb Khach neared,
skeptics from across the political spectrum used it to stir up
latent emotions. Some argued this was particularly insulting
to Turks because Van was the center of an “Armenian
rebellion” in 1915; others questioned why Armenians were
being rewarded despite their labeling Turks as genocidal.
Speculation about whether the government was increasing
the religious rights of Christians only to pave the way for
more freedom for Muslim fundamentalists was voiced, as
were interpretations that Turkey was only trying to increase
its leverage with Europeans who do not want minarets and
mosques in their own countries. Some also argued, like
their Armenian counterparts, that the Turkish government
only allowed for a religious service in Surb Khach as a result
of European pressure — much like a capitulation.
Less than two weeks after the religious service at Surb
Khach, the leader, district representatives and members
the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) held Friday prayers
at Ani, along the border with Armenia, having received
permission from the Culture and Tourism Ministry. MHP
Leader Devlet Bahceli explained the choice of location by
noting that this was where Sultan Alp Arslan of the Selcuk
Empire prayed when he conquered the region in 1064. In
his vigorous statement underlining MHP’s readiness to fight
for the motherland, Bahceli refered not only to the religious
services held at Soumela and Surb Khach, but also implicitly
to the government’s Kurdish initiatives.
Having received a slap in the face by the constitutional
referendum in September,7 and looking ahead to the parlia-
mentary election scheduled for June 2011, the MHP appears
6
The Kars mayor who went out on a limb to brand his province as a welcome center for
such intercultural bridge-building lost his seat in the last local elections, for example.
7
“MHP the ‘most disappointed’ party in Turkish referendum,” Hurriyet Daily News,
September 13, 2010 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=mhp-the-loser-of-the-
referendum-2010-09-13
4
intent on cashing in to the backlash against rapprochement
within elements of Turkish society. Debates surrounding
Armenian heritage and genocide make for a convenient
target, and play into resentments that can be heard among
ordinary Turks, especially when provided leading questions
such as “Which Christian neighbor is renovating historic
Turkic mosques and opening them to once-a-year Friday
prayers?” or “Why is it only Armenia’s historic civiliza-
tion that should be remembered or reclaimed while those
claiming moral superiority do not repent Muslim or Turkic
ethnic cleansing?” The deep rifts within both Turkish
society and between East and West are echoed in the
apparent contest between Sunday mass and Friday prayer.
The opportunism of the Turkish
government — whether to improve
its image in Europe, bring money
into the country, or increase its
votes — is not necessarily all bad.
Advocates of change in Turkey do not have a free reign, but
change occurs because there are brave, intellectually honest
people who over the years have withstood intimidation
for their alleged unpatriotism. In this sense, the uncritical
nationalism and ethnocentrism still regarded as politically
correct among intellectuals in Armenia can be disheart-
ening. While politicians in both Armenia and Turkey
remain boxed in by realities of political expediency, civil
debate does appear inhibited by “peer pressure” to prove
one’s patriotic credentials.
Destination: Normal
Indeed, there is a lot that is not normal in relations between
Turkey and Armenia and it will take time for that level of
normalcy to be achieved. For Turks to know their history,
for churches in Anatolia and mosques in Armenia or
Nagorno-Karabakh to be restored and opened to religious
service, for travel across borders throughout the region to
Analysis
be possible, all of this will require change on many fronts,
and will take time and hard work from both Turkey and
Armenia.
The choice appears to be to settle
for the status quo or to create
a base, with incremental steps
and increased interaction, for
sustained, long-term change.
The bilateral protocols of 2009 — which in and of them-
selves would not have established normalcy anyway —
flopped arguably because they aimed, either explicitly or
implicitly, to solve too many deep-running differences at
once, and to do so from the top down. Today, the choice
appears to be to settle for the status quo or to create a
base, with incremental steps and increased interaction, for
sustained, long-term change. The two sides in this confron-
tation are not Armenians and Turks. The divide is rather
between those on either side who want something to be
done and those who prefer that nothing be done. It would
be unfortunate if the lesson drawn from the Surb Khach
initiative is that doing nothing is more convenient. There is
a shared responsibility to ensure that this is not the case.
Diba Nigar Göksel, Senior Analyst,
European Stability Initiative
Diba Nigar Göksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative
and editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of GMF or those of the European Stability Initiative.
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