RULE 110

Qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information and

duly proved with equal certainty as the crime itself.

People of the Philippines vs. Ludegario Belen y Marasigan

G.R No.21533;January 23,2017

ISSUE:
Were the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient
to prove the age of the victim?

HELD:
No, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient
to prove the age of the victim.

In People vs. Pruna (G.R. No.138471, October 10,2002), the Court set the guidelines in
appreciating the age of the victim, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstances.(1) The best evidence of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. (2) In the absence thereof, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. (3) In the absence thereof, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either
by affinity of consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient. (4) In the absence thereof, the
complaint’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused. To this effect, qualifying circumstances must be specially alleged in the
information and duly proved with equal certainly as the crime itself.

In this case, the prosecution a copy of AAA’s birth certificate but the same was not
authenticated, hence, could not be given any probative value. While attached to the
records is AAA’s baptismal certificate which showed that she was born on July 27,1991,
which the defense admitted to be faithful reproduction of the original, however, the
same was not offered in evidence, Furthermore, while BBB testified that her daughter
was 8 years old at the time of the rape incidents, she admitted that she did not know
when AAA was born, hence, her testimony as to AAA’s age could not be considered as
sufficient compliance with Number (3) of the guidance in the Pruna case.

Therefore, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution was
not sufficient to prove the age of the victim.
 RULE 110

The solicitor general alone shall represent the government in the Supreme Court
in all criminal proceedings and private offended party is merely a witness in the
prosecution of an offense.

Jona Bumatay vs, Lolita Bumatay

G.R. No.191320; April 25,2017

ISSUE:
Does Jona has the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case?

HELD:
No, Jona has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.

Rule 110. Section 5 of the Rules of Court, dictates that all criminal actions commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a
public prosecutor. Thus, in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and
only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the People can represent the
People in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court. In as much as the private
offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, it follows therefore that in
criminal cases, the dismissal of the case against an accused can only be appealed by
the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.

Moreover, settled is the rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest, who, in turn, is one “who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit”.

Here, the record is replete with indications that Jona’s natural parents are unknown and
she was merely raised as the “foster daughter” of Jose Bumatay, without having
undergone the process of legal adoption. Even in her own Reply to the comment to the
petition for review, Jona merely denotes herself as “the only child of the late Jose
Bumatay,” without, however, presenting or even indicating any document of proof to
support her claim of personality or legal standing.

Hence, Jona has no legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.
 RULE 110

In appelas of criminal cases before the CA and SC, the OSG is the appellate
counsel of the people and not the private parties.

Juanito Victor Remulla vs. Sandinganbayan and Erineo Maliksi

G.R. No. 218040; April 17,2017

ISSUE:
Was the petition for certiorari defective because it was filled by a private party on behalf
of the State?

HELD:
Yes, the petition for certiorari was defective for having been filed by a private party.
Procedural law mandates that all criminal actions, commenced by a complaint or an
information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control, of a public prosecutor.
In appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals (CA) and before this Court, the
OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. In certain instances, the OSP represented
the People, when it involved criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The present case challenges the dismissal of a criminal case due to the violation of the
right to speedy disposition of cases. The petition filed before this Court was initiated by
Remulla in his capacity as a private complainant without the intervention of either the
OSG or the OSP. Only on rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to
pursue the criminal action on his own behalf such as when there is a denial of due
process, or where the dismissal of the case is capricious shall certiorari lie. Remulla
failed to qualify in any of these exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, he has no legal
personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against Maliksi on the ground of
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of his case.

Hence, the petition for certiorari was dismissed.

 RULE 110

The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of

the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information.

People of the Philippines vs. Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez

G.R. No. 212193; February 15, 2017

ISSUE:
Is the facts recited In The Information
Determine the Crime Charged?

HELD:
It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the
Information (rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and
the recital in the Information (rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of the
same provision of law). However, this discrepancy does not violate appellant's right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

As ruled correctly by the RTC, the allegations in the Information charged appellant with
rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC and said
allegations or recital in the Information determine the nature of the crime committed.
The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.
 RULE 110

A mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name

of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is
controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the
real nature of the crime.
.
People of the Philippines vs. Enrile Donio y Untalan
G.R. No. 212815; March 1, 2017

ISSUE:
The issue to be resolved by this Court in this appeal is whether the prosecution has
successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of
carnapping with homicide?

HELD:
After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, this Court
finds no cogent reason to reverse Donio' s conviction. At the outset, the CA noted that
the prosecution should have filed Information for the special complex crime of qualified
carnapping in aggravated form. While it is necessary that the statutory designation be
stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the
correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is
controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of
the crime.

Recently, it was held that failure to designate the offense by the statute or to mention
the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged.

The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information
determines the character of the crime and not the caption or preamble of the information
or the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated.

In the case at bar, the acts alleged to have been committed by Donio are averred in the
Information, and the same described the acts defined and penalized under Sections 2
and 14 of R.A. 6539, as amended.
 RULE 111
Corporate officer acquitted froma criminal charge of BP 22 cannot be held
civilly liable in the same case.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Carlos Duque and Teresa Duque.
G.R. No.216467; February 15,2017

ISSUE:
May the respondents, as corporate officers, still be held civilly liable despite their
acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22?

HELD:
No, a corporate officer who Issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly
liable when he is convicted.

In the case of Gosiaco vs. Ching (G.R no. 173807, April 16, 2009), the court held that
the general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing checks can be held
civilly liable when he is convicted. The criminal liability of the corporation itself, such civil
liability arising from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this criminal liability with the
corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to
recover such civil liability, not from the corporation, but from the person who signed the
check in its behalf.

As such, in this case, it follows that once acquitted of the offense of violating BP 22, a
corporate officer is discharged from any civil liability arising from the issuance of the
worthless check in the name of the corporation he represents. Since the respondents
were acquitted from criminal liability, civil liability does not attach against them.
Therefore, a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held
civilly liable when he is convicted.
 RULE 111

Death of accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon.

People of the Philippines vs. Pala Toukyo y Padep

G.R No. 225593, March 20, 2017

ISSUE:
Whether the criminal case may be dismissed due to the death of the accused pending
appeal?

HELD:
Yes, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the appeal, is hereby dismissed.

Under paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.

As held in People vs Bayots(G.R. No. September 2,1994) the effects of the death of the
an accused pending on his liabilities, are so follows:
1. Death of accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.’’
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict.
Thus upon Toukyo’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case, there being no private
complainant to begin with.

Therefore, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the instant appeal, is hereby
dismissed.
 RULE 111
There is prejudicial question if guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal
case would necessary be determined in the civil case.

Renato S.D Domingo on his own behalf and on behalf of his co heirs of the late
Spouses Felicidad De Domingo and Macario C. Domingo vs. Spouses Engracia D.
Singson and Manuel F. Singson
G.R. No.203287; April 5,2017

ISSUE:
Were the proceeding in the criminal case properly suspended on the fround of
prejudicial question?

HELD:
Yes, the proceeding in the criminal case were properly suspended on the ground of
prejudicial question?

The appears to be a prejudicial question in this case. Engracia’s defense in the civil
case is that Engracia bought the subject properly from her parents prior to their demise
and that their signatures appearing on the Deed are true and genuine. Their allegation
in the civil case is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily
determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the
signatures of the Spouses Dominggo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then
there would be no falsification and Engracia and her spouse be innocent of the offense
charged. Hence, the criminal case was properly suspended.
 RULE 111
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as the civil liability.

People of the Philippines vs Porferico Culas y Raga

G.R. No. 211166; June 5, 2017

ISSUE:
What are the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities?

HELD:
In People v. Layag, 6 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an
accused pending appeal on his liabilities.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability [,] as well as the civil liability [,] based solely thereon.1âvvphi1 As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription. 7

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is
well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against
the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may
file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted
by law and procedural rules.
 RULE 112

Determination of probable cause is not lodged with SC; its duty is confined in the
issue of whether executive or judicial determination of abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 20800; June 19, 2017

ISSUE:
May the SC validly determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause?

HELD:
No, the SC may not validly determine the existence of non-existence or probable cause.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. There
are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka
vs. Enrile (G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990). It must be emphasized that this
Court is not a trier of facts. The determination of probable cause is and will always entail
a review of the facts. The determination of probable cause is and will always entail a
review of the facts of the case.

The CA, in finding probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the case but
raised questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled
that, “Questions remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfleider as
the inducer and why the other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime”. From
this query, the CA has raised doubt.

Therefore, this petition is granted and the Court finds it appropriate to remand the case
to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a proper determination of probable
cause.
 RULE 113

The rule against warrantless searches and seizures admits of exceptions, one of
which is warrantless arrest.

Peopl vs. Marciel Pardillo

G.R. No. 219590; June 7, 2017

ISSUE:
Is a valid warrantless necessary before a warrantless search?

HELD:
Yes, a valid warrantless necessary before a warrantless search may be conducted.

It is well- settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. Any evidence obtained in violation of his
provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, the rule against
warrantless arrest, which justifies a subsequent search under Sec 5 (a), Rules 113. The
same provides that (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. For exception in Section
5(a) to operate, this Court has ruled that two elements must be present: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, actually
committing or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the case at bar, the accused was seen by the police officer holding the transparent
plastic containing shabu and when he was asked what he was holding, the accused
said that someone just asked him to buy shabu.

Hence, a valid warrantless search was conducted.

 RULE 113

Prior coordination with the PDEA is not necessary to make a buy-bust

operation valid.

People of the Philippines vs Kusain Amin y Ampuan

G.R. No. 215942; Jan 18 2017

ISSUE:
In convicting appellant of the crimes charged, the CA disregarded his position that there
was no valid buy-bust operation, because the arresting team had not coordinated the
matter with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

HELD:
While prior coordination with the PDEA is not necessary to make a buy-bust operation
valid, we are constrained to reverse the findings of the CA because the non-
presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

In People v. Andaya, 24 the importance of presenting the poseur-buyer's testimony

before the trial court was underscored by the Court in this wise:

The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the
suspect is arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in
the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the
arresting police officer or private person. The arresting police officer or private person is
favored in such instance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it
is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the
dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State
accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to
prove his innocence until and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has
been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.

In the same case, we emphasized that "[t]here would have been no issue against [the
buy-bust operation], except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their
being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the
supposed transaction. It was even noted in that case that the "members of the buy-bust
team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur-buyer.
While there is a "need to hide [the poseur-buyers] identit[ies] and preserve their
invaluable service to the police,"28 this consideration cannot be applied to this case,
because, as in Andaya, the "poseur-buyer and the confidential informant were one and
the same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate
the accused.
 RULE 115

Any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his voluntary act of
entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.

People of the Philippines vs Jeffrey Hirang y Rodriguez

G.R. No. 223528; January 11, 2017

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in not finding that Hirang’s rights under RA
7438(an act defining certain rights of person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining and investigating officers)
were violated?

HELD:
The CA correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his
voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.In
People v. Vasquez, the Court held: the Court rules that the appellant can no longer
assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "a]ny objection,
defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against
them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the
trial court's jurisdiction.
 RULE 115

We have been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims

especially in sensitive cases of rape.

People of the Philippines vs Ludigario Belen y Marasigan

G.R. No. 21533; January 23, 2017

ISSUE:
Appellant argues that the prosecution miserably failed to overthrow the presumption of
innocence in his favor. He contends that the bulk of AAA' s testimony was supplied by
the prosecutor who even made presumptions and legal conclusions even before
hearing the evidence. He claims that AAA's testimony is doubtful as it is inconsistent
with the medico-legal report findings of only one laceration in the victim's hymen.

HELD:
We have scrutinized the records of this case and are convinced that appellant had
carnal knowledge of AAA with threat and intimidation, thus, against her will and without
her consent. AAA categorically declared that in two separate instances, appellant had
inserted his penis into her vagina while she was crying.

Accordingly, what is crucial is that AAA's testimony meets the test of credibility, which
serves as the basis for appellant's conviction.40 Notably, PSI Cabrera, in his cross
examination, had clarified that it is possible that a person being raped or a hymen, or a
vagina being penetrated by a penis would create a laceration at the same spot just like
a lightning hitting on the same spot.41 Therefore, AAA's straightforward testimony that
appellant had raped her twice is not at all negated by a finding of only one laceration in
her hymen.

We have been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims especially in

sensitive cases of rape,42 as no young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience,
not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.
 RULE 115
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the
seized item subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized
items subject of the illegal possession case. We find that the prosecution
failed to overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant enjoys.

People of the Philippines vs Salim Ismael y Radang

G.R. No. 208093; February 20, 2017

ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant when his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
After a careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the prosecution failed
to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in violation of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165.
.
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item
subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal
possession case. This is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal
possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized drug.

Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting
officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the
presence of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere
technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of the accused
to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to
comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs
were likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break
in the chain tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity
of the seized drugs became highly questionable.

In sum, we find that the prosecution failed to: (1) overcome the presumption of
innocence which appellai1t enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish
an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any explanation why the
provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not complied with. This Court is thus
constrained to acquit the appellant based on reasonable doubt.
 RULE 115

The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to every
person accused of a crime, among them the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.

NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 211917; February 27, 2017

ISSUE:
Whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph from the one
charged is legally permissible?

HELD:
In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and
penalized by Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,

However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article
315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code

What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was
convicted of a crime charged in the Information as embraced within the allegations
contained therein. A reading of the Information yields an affirmative answer.

Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting

to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property. This, at least, is very clearly shown by the factual
allegations of the Information.

There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual allegations therein
sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and
satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa by misappropriation. Petitioners are fully
apprised of the charge against them and for them to suitably prepare their defense.
Therefore, petitioner Norma Gamaro was not deprived of any constitutional right. She
was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and conviction for
estafa, because the RTC has the discretion to read the Information in the context of the
facts alleged.
 RULE 119
The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in
chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.

Republic of the Philippines vs Alfredo De Borja

G.R. No. 187488; January 9, 2017

ISSUE:
Was the Sandiganbayan correct in granting respondent De Borja’s demurrer to
evidence?

HELD:
Yes, the grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper because the Republic
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the alleged complicity of respondent De
Borja with the required quantum of evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence
produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain an issue. 31 The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.

The Court joins and concurs in the SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of
knowledge with respect to the contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to
respondent De Borja's office, which remained sealed the entire time it was in Verano' s
possession. Nothing in the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even alludes, to
the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving
address commissions from vessel owners. Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to
show any right to the relief sought, the Court affirms the SB in granting the Demurrer to
Evidence.
 RULE 120
Variance doctrine

People of the Philippines vs Salvador Aycardo

G.R. No. 218114; June 5, 2017

ISSUE:
Aycardo argued that AAA's behavior after the alleged first sexual assault in September
2007 was inconsistent with the crime of acts of lasciviousness. He pointed out that AAA
testified clearly that his finger was never inserted into her vagina, and that he only tried
or attempted to remove her shorts and panties, but was unable to do so because she
resisted his indecent act.

HELD:
With respect to Criminal Case No. FC-08-0272, both the RTC and the CA ruled
correctly that Aycardo cannot be convicted of the charge of rape by sexual assault, as
he was unable to insert his finger inside AAA's vagina, but he can still be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness because its elements are necessarily included in the offense
charged, and were proved in court. The rulings of the RTC and the CA are consistent
with Section 4, in relation to Section 5, of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provide for the "variance doctrine," viz.:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof -When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Navarrete v. People, 15 the Court noted that, under Section 5(b ), Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, 16 when the victim is under 12 years old, the accused
shall be prosecuted under either Article 335 (for rape) or Article 336 (for acts of
lasciviousness) of the RPC. Accordingly, although an accused is charged in the
information with the crime of statutory rape (i.e., carnal knowledge of a woman under
twelve years of age), the offender can be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness, which is included in rape.

In People v. Bon, 17 the Court ruled that even if the statutory rape charge against the
accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held liable for the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC,
in relation to R.A. No. 7610, since all the elements of this offense were established. It
cannot, therefore, be successfully argued that the accused's constitutionally-protected
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated
when he was found guilty under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. 18

Applying the variance doctrine to this case, Aycardo, who was charged with one (1)
count of rape by sexual assault, can still be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 even though he was unable to insert his finger
into the victim's vagina, because the prosecution has proved that he intentionally
touched the same - an act which is deemed a lascivious conduct.
 RULE 120

COURT MAY PROMULGATE JUDGMENT IN ABSENTIA IF THE ACCUSED, AFTER

BEING NOTIFIED, FAILS TO APPEAR WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION; AN ACCUSED
WHO JUMPS BAIL LOSES AVAILABLE REMEDIES TO ASSAIL JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION

Loida M. Javier vs. Pepito Gonzales

G.R.No.193150; January 23,2017
Sereno, C.J.

ISSUES:
1. May the court promulgate judgment in absentia against an accused who jumped
bail?
2. Is a motion for reconsideration required before filing a petition for certiorari to
assail the reversal of the judgment promulgated in absentia an accused eho
jumped bail?

HIELD:
1. Yes, the promulgation of judgment in absentia is valid.

Section 6, Rule 120 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to
promulgate a judgment in absentia. The promulgate of judgment in absentia is
mandatory pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section, Rule 20, which stated
that the case accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by address or thru his
judgment in criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
Records show that Gonzales was properly informed of the promulgation
scheduled on December 15,2005. During the promulgation of judgment on
December 15, 2015, when Gonzales failed to appear despite notice, and without
offering any justification for his absence, the trial court should have immediately
promulgated its decision.

Therefore, the promulgation of judgment in absentia is valid.

2. No, a motion for reconsideration is not required before a petition for certiorari be
filed to assail the reversal of the judgment promulgated in absentia against an
accused who jumped bail.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can
only be restored to if he accused did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face
the promulgation of judgment. Gonzales did not appear during the scheduled
promulgation and was deemed by the judge to have jumped bail. The fifth
paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states that if the judgment is for conviction and
the failure of the accused to appear is without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in the rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his
arrest.

Therefore, no motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari

may be filed to assail the reversal of a valid judgment promulgated in absentia
against an accused who jumped bail.