03/11/2018 The scientific turn in metaphysics: a factualist approach | SpringerLink

The scientific turn in metaphysics: a

factualist approach
Synthese

pp 1–15 | Cite as

Valerio Buonomo (1) Email author (valerio.buonomo@unimi.it)View author's

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1. Department of Philosophy, University of Milan, , Milano, Italy

S.I. : Materialism & Metaphysics

First Online: 07 June 2017

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Abstract

In a recent paper, Cumpa (Am Philos Q 51(4): 319–324, 2014) argues that a scientific
turn in metaphysics requires the acceptance of a materialist criterion of
fundamentality, according to which the most fundamental metaphysical category is
the one that provides us with a reconciliation of the ordinary world and the physical
universe. He concludes that the dominant category of substance cannot be the most
fundamental category, for it does not satisfy this criterion of fundamentality. The most
fundamental category is instead the category of fact. Although convincing, the defense
of factualism over substantialism offered by Cumpa takes into account the case of
classical physics without considering the physical universe of quantum mechanics. My
aim in this paper is to offer a completion to Cumpa’s factualist approach. To achieve
my aim, I show that substances cannot provide a satisfactory account of the
relationship between the ordinary world and the physical universe even in the case of
quantum mechanics, whereas a factualist approach does.

Keywords
Scientific turn in metaphysics Categories Factualism Substantialism Cumpa
Heil
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Cite this article as:
Buonomo, V. Synthese (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1445-5

Received 13 March 2017

Accepted 15 May 2017
First Online 07 June 2017
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1445-5
Publisher Name Springer Netherlands
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Online ISSN 1573-0964
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