Neoclassical and Institutional Approaches to Environmental Economics

Author(s): Peter Söderbaum

Source: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 481-492
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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JeI JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES
Vol. XXIV No. 2 June 1990

Neoclassical and Institutional Approaches

to Environmental Economics

Peter Soderbaum

The environmental problems we face today are connected to a

number of factors. Population increases at regional and global levels in
turn increases the pressure on the environment and natural resources.
Human activities in the personal, business, and governmental spheres
must be reconsidered. In many sectors of our economy-such as the
energy, transportation, housing, mining, agriculture, forestry and fish-
eries sectors-an open discussion of technology and institutional ar-
rangements is called for.
At a more fundamental level, present environmental problems
represent a challenge to our thinking habits and conceptual frameworks
about societal development. In fact, thinking habits in relation to eco-
nomics can be listed among the factors potentially contributing to envi-
ronmental problems. The values and ideologies of various actors on
the public scene are also involved. To the extent that our thinking hab-
its and values are related to economics as a discipline, a readiness to
reconsider economics itself is required.

Paradigmatic Pluralism

In his book Beyond Positivism, Bruce Caldwell suggests "methodo-

logical pluralism" as a fruitful approach for philosophers of science who

The author is Professor of Economics, Swedish University ofAgricultural Sciences, Upp-

sala Sweden. This article was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Ev-
olutionary Economics, 27-30 December 1989, Atlanta, Georgia.

481

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 482 Peter SOderbaum

study economics [Caldwell 1982]. This approach "takes as a starting

assumption that no universally applicable, logically compelling
method of theory appraisal exists" [Caldwell 1982 p. 245]. Later Cald-
well suggested "critical pluralism" as an alternative term [Caldwell
1989]. Similarly, pluralism can be fruitful for practicing economists
hoping to contribute to the discipline. Richard Norgaard has made a
strong case for methodological pluralism in addressing environmental
problems [Norgaard 1989]. I will here suggest the label "paradigmatic
pluralism." By this I mean that a scholar in a given discipline A should
try to
* be open-minded and respectful to those who refer to perspectives
and traditions outside science itself;
* be open-minded and respectful in relation to the traditions of
scholars in other disciplines;
* be open-minded and respectful in relation to other schools of
thought within discipline A;
* welcome dialogue and fair competition between proponents of var-
ious perspectives;
* understand the subjective and value-laden aspects of knowledge,
especially in the social sciences.
Assuming that people distinguish between scientific and non-
scientific traditions, the latter are not regarded as falling outside the
imperative of pluralism. Ordinary languages and traditions in various
cultures and subcultures are often richer than "western science and ra-
tionalism" (cf. Feyerabend [1978]). Scientific progress is often the result
of successful interaction between non-science traditions and science.
Open-mindedness in relation to other disciplines is a second impera-
tive. This is based on the belief that economists will benefit from par-
ticipating in a respectful dialogue with scholars in other disciplines, for
instance other social sciences like psychology, sociology, business ad-
ministration, and various public policy disciplines.
A constructive and open-minded dialogue between proponents of
different schools within a discipline is often difficult to establish. For
instance, mainstream economists tend to use their power positions to
build cartels and to discriminate against all kinds of economists who
represent a threat to orthodoxy. This problem seems to be somewhat
diminished today because of the heavy criticism of neoclassical eco-
nomics, not only from non-neoclassical economists, but also from
other sciences and the public at large. The number of actors who "de-
mand" economic theory differing from the neoclassical variety seems

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 Environmental Economics 483

to be increasing. Such a demand could be met with a broader "supply"

of theory.
Just as "fair competition" in commodity markets has to do with in-
stitutional arrangements, "fair competition" in the world of discourse
is largely a matter of institutions. Do the rules of the game at our uni-
versities and conferences facilitate or hinder workable competition?
Often those who believe they know "the truth" tend to look upon mo-
nopoly as the normal state of affairs and dismiss competing views as
unscientific or as belonging to some other discipline.
The subjective aspects of knowledge, finally, are here regarded as an
argument for paradigmatic pluralism. Subjective elements, in various
ways, enter into the research process, and the research activities of a
particular scholar are not entirely independent of other aspects of his
or her person and lifestyle (to use an understatement). This subjective
side should be dealt with explicitly rather than hidden, and recognition
of the role of values and ideology in research will make a discipline
more, rather than less, "scientific." I also believe that open discussion
of valuational elements will reduce the degree of intolerance in scien-
tific and public discourse.

The Nature of Environmental Problems

Whether a theory adds something to our understanding or not de-

pends, of course, on the nature of the problems faced. Will the
conceptual framework of institutional economics match environmen-
tal problems better than neoclassical theory? I have elsewhere dis-
cussed the nature of environmental problems at some length
[Soderbaum 1987]. These problems are multidimensional and multi-
disciplinary rather than one-dimensional or limited to one discipline.
They are non-monetary as well as monetary in nature. On the non-
monetary side, physical as well as social and cultural dimensions are
involved.
Complexity and uncertainty are other characteristics of environmen-
tal problems. Our knowledge of human health effects and ecotoxicology
is typically incomplete and one may ask whether research and mon-
itoring activities will ever be able to match the flood of new chemicals,
products, and technologies.
Degradation of non-monetary resources, such as human beings (in
areas such as health, for instance), social relationships, ecosystems, or
natural resources is often irreversible or very difficult to reverse. Where

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484 Peter Soderbaum

processes are reversible in some respects, the monetary and other costs
of returning to a position similar to the original one may be consider-
able. The burning of fossil fuels, for instance, means that the corre-
sponding resources are no longer available and that other resources
may be polluted. Ecosystems and endangered species are examples of
unique or rare resources that may be irreversibly lost for future genera-
tions of human beings.
Irreversibility and other forms of inertia mean that environmental
problems are extended in time. The problems also often cross admin-
istrative boundaries both geographically (municipality, county, nation
et cetera) and sectorally. For instance, the environmental problems of
agriculture are not limited to the agricultural sector, but tend to influ-
ence other sectors as well, such as fisheries or the quality of water supply
in urban areas. The environmental impacts of non-agricultural sectors
in turn influence agricultural activities-pollution from industry and
energy supply systems or from the spreading of sewage sludge on agri-
cultural land, for example.
Environmental problems also often extend beyond the actors in-
volved in market transactions; that is, they impinge on the
interests-such as property rights-of other parties. This is part of a
larger issue. As already indicated, conflicts of interests are the normal
case rather than the exception where environmental policy and deci-
sion situations are concerned. Such conflicts have to be addressed with
reference to some system of ethics or ideology and, as we all know, an
important aspect of public debate concerning the environment and nat-
ural resources is about ethics and ideology.
It should be added that a discussion of the nature of environmental
problems of the kind presented here cannot be seen as objective and
independent of personal values or scientific perspectives, such as those
of institutional economics. Along these lines, it can be argued that I
have formulated the problems in a way that opens the door to institu-
tional economics as the most appropriate perspective. I regard such an
argument as quite reasonable. It is assumed here that there is a mutual
dependence between the person looking at some particular problem
area and "what is seen."
In a similar manner, the neoclassical economist will see the world
through neoclassical spectacles and formulate problems accordingly.
The question of whether one perspective is preferable (or complemen-
tary) to another can hardly be settled in scientific terms, but has to be
judged as much by the people engaged in or affected by environmental
and related societal issues. The point I wish to make here, however, is

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 Environmental Economics 485

that for such judgments, a broad information base encompassing two

or more scientific perspectives rather than one is preferable to the nar-
row information base of only one paradigm.

Institutional Economics

According to the philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright, there is a

tension within science generally between reductionist-mechanistic
modes of thinking on the one hand and holistic-evolutionary tenden-
cies on the other [von Wright 1986]. Reductionist-mechanistic ap-
proaches have dominated physics, chemisty and biology since Isaac
Newton and have succeeded in some respects. Considering especially
the environmental problems now facing mankind, von Wright calls for
an increased emphasis on holistic-evolutionary approaches.
Neoclassical economics is largely on the reductionist-mechanistic
side. The approach is built upon a belief that far-reaching specialization
and simplification is fruitful. Economics and the economy can be di-
vided into subfields. One variable can be studied at a time according to
ceteris paribus assumptions. Values, technology, and institutions tend
to be regarded as given and an exogenous part of models. Economic
analysis can be carried out in one-dimensional terms (such as cost-
benefit analysis). Theories in equilibrium terms exemplify mechanistic
tendencies and represent analogies to Newton's mechanics.
Institutional economics, on the other hand, is more holistic and ev-
olutionary. The holistic aspect of institutional economics is exempli-
fied by its interdisciplinary orientation and its tendency to regard
values, technology, and institutions as endogenous. It is not enough,
for instance, to register consumers' values as revealed preferences or
willingness to pay. The institutional economist is ready to problemetize
values and articulate ethical issues. The idea of a societal objective
function is regarded with skepticism and as being incompatible with
democracy.
Contrary to mechanistic tendencies, institutional economists have a
preference for evolutionary thinking. "Patterns modelling" is a charac-
terization of this interest in how technology, institutions, habits, values,
and the economy at large evolve through time [Wilber and Harrison
1978] (cf. Norgaard [1985]). Where neoclassical economists use models
that are closed in a mathematical sense, institutionalists prefer models
that in the same sense are open-ended or partially closed [Myrdal 1978].
Neoclassical economists, similarly, tend to prefer models that are
closed with respect to values and ethics, whereas institutionalists favor,

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486 Peter Soderbaum

as already argued, a more open discussion of ethical options and im-

plications.
Concerning epistemology, neoclassical economists remain innocent
positivists while institutionalists exhibit an interest in the subjective
aspects of knowledge. A case in point is the recent debate about her-
meneutics between Philip Mirowski and Paul Bush in this journal [Mi-
rowski 1987; Bush 1989]. Another sign is Gunnar Myrdal's discussion
of how values, ideology, and socio-cultural factors influence our work
as scholars. "Values are always with us" [Myrdal 1978] and science that
is objective in every sense is simply not possible.

Environmental Economics. A Research Agenda

The imperatives of paradigmatic pluralism previously suggested may

be extended to a research strategy for subfields of economics. In addi-
tion to the open attitude toward scholars working with other scientific
perspectives, it is possible for one to internalize an interest in several
perspectives. Referring to the well-known opportunity cost principle,
it can be argued that each scholar should have a good knowledge of at
least one (the best, one would hope) of the paradigms that compete with
his first preference. It is doubtful whether, for instance, the neoclassical
economist can be regarded as having a good knowledge of neoclassical
economics if he or she knows nothing about institutional economics
and other alternatives to the neoclassical perspective. It should be
added, however, that some pluralism can be achieved also within each
of the perspectives here named-neoclassical and institutional eco-
nomics. There are some stimulating tensions among institutionalists,
and Austrians as a branch of the mainstream, differ in some important
respects from those neoclassical economists who attribute a substantial
role to government control and intervention.
While neoclassical economists often know little about alternative
perspectives, the institutional economist tends to have a good idea of
the neoclassical paradigm. Institutional economists can benefit from
this knowledge by discussing in a dialectic way differences between the
two approaches. This was done in relation to environmental and nat-
ural resource problems earlier by K. William Kapp [1950], and more
recently by James Swaney [1987]. I will here make a similar but sketch-
ier attempt and discuss the tendencies of the two perspectives in rela-
tion to views of economics, views of development and progress,
approaches to decisionmaking, information, and accounting systems,

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 Environmental Economics 487

views of man, social and institutional change, and finally, views of mar-
kets, government, and public policy.

Outlines of an Institutional Environmental Economics

Concept of Economics

Neoclassical economics reflects a very specific philosophy in its ar-

guments about marginal monetary costs and benefits (for instance, to
establish the "optimal level of pollution control measures"), and gen-
erally in its approach to practical economic analysis at the societal
level. This philosophy is one of monetary reductionism. In principle,
it is assumed that everything can be traded against everything else
in monetary terms. Costs of construction can be traded against social
impacts, health impacts, ecosystem impacts, et cetera in a one-
dimensional manner. Cost-benefit analysis also implies that the analyst
can approach the issue of values and ethics in society with scientific
objectivity.
Cost-benefit analysis does not cope very well with the irreversibility
of many environmental impacts and the ethical, often ideological, con-
flict that characterizes policy considerations, decisionmaking and im-
plementation in the environmental field [Kapp 1970]. For instance,
how do we allow for the interests of future generations? Can this be
done by using a positive discount rate based on one-dimensional com-
parisons of resource allocation options through all sectors of the econ-
omy, or the revealed preferences of the present population for
immediate consumption compared to future consumption?
I have elsewhere suggested a holistic approach to economics and de-
cisionmaking, in which monetary and non-monetary impacts are kept
separate and described in historical time rather than aggregated into
so-called "present values." Also, conflicts of interest are identified and
articulated rather than hidden [Soderbaum 1987].

Views of Development and Progress.

Neoclassical economics tends to support and legitimize a view of

progress that is limited to the traditional indicators of GNP growth,
such as balance of payments, employment, indices of inflation. But the
environmental debate suggests that this conceptual framework is in-
sufficient and that analysis that is limited to such indicators is danger-

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 488 Peter Soderbaum

ous to society. A number of catchwords have been used to suggest a

new direction for societal development. These are: qualitative growth,
eco-development, ecological ethics, ecological imperatives for public
policy [Soderbaum 1982], and sustainability. The recent World Com-
mission on Environment and Development report emphasizes sustain-
ability, but argues that vigorous economic growth is a necessary
prerequisite for environmental measures [World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development 1987] and thus, in my view, reflects a kind
of wishful thinking and lack of understanding of paradigm issues in eco-
nomics [Soderbaum 1988].

Approaches to Decisionmaking.

Decisionmaking in relation to the environment and natural re-

sources can be improved along the following two lines. One is the
articulation and development of societal ideologies that incorporate a
consideration of environmental objectives and means of achieving
them-for instance, attempts to make the meaning of ecological ethics
or sustainability more precise and comparable to traditional ideas of
GNP growth. Development views are useful, for instance, in the search
for and design of alternative courses of action.
A second road to improved decisions is impact analysis of the alter-
natives considered. In a democratic society, a many-sided analysis of
alternatives and impacts is preferable to a reductionist analysis. De-
cisions can be regarded in a holistic manner as a matching procedure
between multidimensional impact profiles of the alternatives consid-
ered and the likewise multidimensional ideological or value profiles of
politicians and other decisionmakers [Soderbaum 1987]. This match-
ing procedure, in pattern or Gestalt terms, may in fact be seen as more
"rational" in relation to complex problems than the one-dimensional
comparisons of conventional approaches.

Information and Accounting Systems

Accounting systems for business and society should reflect the pre-
sent problems of the society concerned. New information systems are
called for that deal with non-monetary dimensions in a systematic way.
In addition to the previously mentioned distinction between monetary
and non-monetary impacts, a distinction between flows (referring to
periods in time) and positions (referring to points in time) is suggested.
The term "position" is preferred to "stock" because the word stock
tends to be interpreted narrowly as stored entities of an often homoge-

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 Environmental Economics 489

neous kind. Position refers not only to the quantitative but also to the
qualitative state or status of various objects of description. Non-
monetary balance sheets may be designed and changes in these esti-
mated and observed from one point in time to another. Again, a
disaggregated and multidimensional view of flows and positions is pre-
ferred to exclusive reliance on conventional accounts in monetary
terms.

Views of Human Nature and Social and Institutional Change

Institutional economists generally are skeptical about "economic

man" assumptions with their emphasis on self-interest and specific
ideas about rationality. These reductionist ideas of human motives can
be contrasted with the concepts of a "dual self" or "multiple self' sug-
gested in the literature. According to the latter view, human behavior
cannot be understood fruitfully if all tensions between various egoistic
and idealistic motives are assumed away. It is, of course, convenient
to assume that ethics is of no importance, but a theory based upon such
simplification is of little relevance (cf. Etzioni [1988]). Amartya Sen,
until recently the president of the International Economic Association,
also argues in favor of an increased emphasis on ethics in economics
and a consequent de-emphasis on the engineering tradition of the dis-
cipline [Sen 1987]. When it comes to environmental problems, it be-
comes even more absurd to believe that problems can be resolved on
the basis of a simple counting exercise in which human values are en-
tered as data that can be registered just like any other kind of data.
Public choice theory is essentially an extension of economic man as-
sumptions to new actor categories such as politicians, civil servants,
and members of labor unions [Mueller 1979]. It is true, and an impor-
tant point to make, that the behavior of politicians and civil servants
is influenced by egoistic motives, but assuming that there is nothing
but egoism makes the theory highly questionable. (For an alternative
actor-network approach where ideological commitment plays a role
and where heterogeneity is assumed within each actor category, such
as farmers, see Soderbaum [forthcoming]).

Views of Markets, Government and Public Policy

Institutionalists tend to have a bias in favor of institutional arrange-

ments connected with the mixed economy rather than arrangements
that are extreme on the government or market side. Concerning envi-
ronmental policy, an exclusive reliance on neither the market nor gov-

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 490 Peter Soderbaum

emnment intervention is regarded as fruitful. Instead combined

strategies are suggested, with market as well as government elements
(cf. Dietz and van der Straaten [1988]).
The market view held by institutionalists is one of "administered
prices," which can be judged with respect to fairness or reasonableness
[Ramstad 1989], and instrumentality in relation to particular purposes.
Many markets are better understood as habitual or discretionary social
relationships than as forces in a mechanistic sense. Power is at the heart
of the institutional view, and the fact that a transaction takes place does
not necessarily mean that it is fair either with respect to buyer and seller
or in relation to third parties.
Monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits are always contin-
gent on actual institutional arrangements, and these in turn have a spe-
cific historical background. Institutional change is in part discretionary
[Tool 1979], and with new institutions and rules of the game, monetary
and non-monetary costs and benefits will be shared in a different way
[Bromley 1989].

Concluding Remarks

It should be added that my preference for an institutional perspective

does not mean that all is bad with neoclassical economics. Also, institu-
tionalists like me may at times argue in a reductionist way. Limitations
of space mean, for instance, that I have based my arguments mainly
on personal experience and have not done justice to the many
contributions-also in the area of environmental economics-of other
institutionalists or unorthodox writers.
Marc Tool has argued that the neoinstitutional perspective "now ap-
pears to be a candidate for full paradigm standing" [Tool 1986 p. 26].
I agree with this judgment, but would add that in relation to particular
problem areas such as the environment and natural resources, neoclas-
sical economists have a longer way to go to achieve paradigm status
than their institutional colleagues. As I see it, neoclassical environmen-
tal economists are wasting scarce intellectual and financial resources by
trying to do what is impossible or not meaningful. In the U.S. context,
one can point to the many projects and research programs devoted to
attempts to estimate benefits relating to health and the environment in
monetary terms. From the many failures in estimating such benefits,
the conclusion drawn is that more research is needed (cf. a number of
contributions in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement).

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 Environmental Economics 491

Another possible conclusion is that attempts in this direction are

meaningless and that monetary reductionist cost-benefit analysis is
doubtful in every sector of the economy and more so where irreversible
environmental impacts are involved. In my experience, the problem
here is that many neoclassical environmental economists are more ea-
ger to save their theories and methods than to improve the chances of
human survival on this planet. We are back then to Thorstein Veblen's
early reference to vested interests and also to the earlier argument that
ethics matters in every area of human behavior.

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