I.

BILL OF RIGHTS

1. Martial Law as an exercise of police power by the President. (Lagman, et. al. vs.
Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: State the
question.)(Tip from Atty. Bong Lopez)

Effective May 23, 2018 and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President X issued
Proclamation No. 102 declaring a state of Martial Law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President submitted a
written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Proclamation, pointing out that
Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence for decades which
has worsened through time. Various citizens filed several petitions, essentially
invoking the Court’s specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 102 and seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for
being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis. Is there sufficient
factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

Yes. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogative, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Lagman, et. al. vs. Medialdea, GR
No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

2. ABC Taxi Corporation assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation

phasing out taxicabs more than six (6) years old on ground that it is violative of the
constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and
directly solely towards the taxi industry. Is the administrative regulation valid?

Yes. The Equal Protection Clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and
sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification
of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. What is required under the Equal Protection Clause is the uniform operation by legal
means, so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. ( Taxicab Operators of Metro
Manila, Inc. vs. Board of transportation, G.R. No. L-59234, September 30, 1982) (2015-2018
Headline, compiled by Atty. Justin Morilla – in relation to jeepney modernization)

3. Parens patriae vis-à-vis inherent powers of the State. (Southern Luzon Drug Corp. vs.
Department of Social welfare and Development , G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
(Commissioner’s Note: State the question.)(Tip from Atty. Bong Lopez)

X Drug Store filed a petition of prohibition against the DSWD, NCDA, DOF, and BIR
which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of RA 9257 otherwise
known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” which amends the "Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the
purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD),
respectively, and treating them as tax deductions as it will affect their profits as a
business. X Drug Store claims that the change in the tax treatment of the discount is
 illegal as it constitutes taking without just compensation. It even submitted financial
statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to support its claim of declining profits when
the change in the policy was implemented. Is X Drug Store correct in its contention?

No. The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the
community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens
patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its
people especially those who cannot tend to themselves. In fulfilling this duty, the State may
resort to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of
taxation. The power being exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen discount is its
police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not
required in wielding police power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved, but only
an imposition of burden.(Southern Luzon Drug Corp. vs. Department of Social welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

4. What is Inverse Condemnation? How is it different from payment of damages?

It is an action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency. It has the
objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government, even though no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. As
regard damages, inverse condemnation, on one hand, is an action to recover, while on the other
hand, payment for damages is predicated on statutory enactments and emanates from a
transgression of a right. ( National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of MacabangkitSangkay , G.R. No.
165828, August 24, 2011)

5. Requisites for valid taking.

a. The expropriator must enter a private property;

b. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
c. The entry must be under warrant or color of authority;
d. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
e. The utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Castelvi, G.R.
No. L-20620, August 15, 1974)

6. Types of “taking” under the power of eminent domain. (City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., G.R.
No. 118127, April 12, 2005) (Commissioner’s Note: State the question.)

X is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and

lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.City Mayor
Z approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance
prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of
the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business
operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses
to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and
 padlocked permanently. X filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the
ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional as the modality constitutes
as unlawful taking. Is X correct with his contention?

Yes. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The
ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs
owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert
said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of
the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking
and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.(City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr.,
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005)

7. Expansive concept of “Public Use” in Power of Expropriation.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include
any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit (of
the public)." If the genuine public necessity – the very reason or condition as it were – allowing,
at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no
more cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal
situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much
different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private
person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to
renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws. The expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the Petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another Petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the
expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same.(Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic of the Philippines , G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011)

8. Determination of just compensation. (Heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr. vs. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 215290, January 11, 2017) (Tip from Atty. Bong Lopez)

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property
is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred in the
name of the beneficiaries.

In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended:

(a) the acquisition cost of the land,
(b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom,
(d) the owner's sworn valuation,
(e) the tax declarations,
(f) the assessment made by government assessors,
(g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by
the government to the property, and
 (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land, if any, must be equally considered.

The said law shall not apply to claims/cases where the claim folders were received by the LBP
prior to July 1, 2009. In such a situation, just compensation shall be determined in accordance
with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its further amendment by RA 9700.(Heirs of
Pablo Feliciano, Jr. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215290, January 11, 2017)

9. X’s lot was taken by the government in line with the road-widening project in Manila
in 1981. Upon full payment to him in 1983, he alleges that the amount paid was
insufficient as the valuation should be based on the value of the lot when the
payment is made. Is he right with his contention?

No. For the purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is
transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.( City of Iloilo vs. Contreras-Besana, G.R. No. 168967,
February 12, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]; Landbank of the Philippines vs. Livioco, G.R. No. 170685,
September 22, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]; National Power Corporation vs. Samar, G.R. No. 197329,
September 8, 2014 [J. Del Castillo])

10. Significance of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 5 in

expropriation proceedings. (Spouses Mercado vs. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
196707, June 17, 2015 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: State the question.)

Thru a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO) of Davao City informed X that his property will be under CARP
coverage where he was offered Php 287,227.16 as just compensation. X rejected the
valuation and claimed that the fair market value of their property is ₱250,000.00 per
hectare; that they sold the remaining 4.6316-hectare portion, which is hilly and
uncultivated, compared to the subject portion which is flat, suited for agriculture and
has improvements, for such price; and, that said property is adjacent to "Eden," an
eco-tourism area, and likewise suitable for housing and other uses. PARO contends
that the valuation they made is in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5 and Section 17 of
RA 6657. This was appealed to the RTC where it fixed the amount of just
compensation at Php 25.00 per square meters taking into consideration production
as the only factor. X filed a Petition for Review contending that the RTC should have
taken into account other factors. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. Was the CA
correct?

Yes. The factors under RA 6657 and the formula under DAR A.O No. 5 serve as guarantees that
the compensation arrived at would not be absurd, baseless, arbitrary or contradictory to the
objectives of the agrarian reform laws. However, the Court clarified that the RTC may relax the
application of the DAR formula, if warranted by the circumstances of the case and provided the
RTC explains its deviation from the factors or formula.(Spouses Mercado vs. Landbank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015 [J. Del Castillo])

11. Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 5 may not be disregarded. (Landbank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Chu, G.R. No.
192345, March 29, 2017 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical
question on this case.)
 X is a registered owner of two parcels of agricultural land located in San Antonio,
Pilar, Sorsogon which were acquired by the government pursuant to its agrarian
reform program. The first parcel of land was acquired under Presidential Decree No.
27 and initially valued by the LBP at P177,657.98. The second parcel of land was
acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 where LBP valued the same at P263,928.57. X
rejected LBP's valuation; hence summary administrative proceedings were conducted
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) to determine the
just compensation where at it arrived at a P1,542,360.00 and P983,663.94 valuation
respectively which LBP opposed. On appeal, the RTC fixed the just compensation at
P2,313,478.00 and P1,155,173.00 for the PD 27-acquired land respectively. LBP
appealed contended that the valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the
formula under DAR A.O. No. 05-98 is mandatory in ascertaining just compensation for
purposes of agrarian reform cases. Is LBP correct with its contention?

Yes LBP is correct. Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 5 may not be disregarded as these serve as guarantees that the
compensation arrived at would not be absurd, baseless, arbitrary or contradictory to the
objectives of the agrarian reform laws. However, the Court clarified that the RTC may relax the
application of the DAR formula, if warranted by the circumstances of the case and provided the
RTC explains its deviation from the factors or formula.(Landbank of the Philippines vs. Spouses
Chu, G.R. No. 192345, March 29, 2017 [J. Del Castillo])

12. Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 may be valued
using the factors in Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. (Landbank of the Philippines vs.
Heirs of Maximo Puyat, G.R. No. 175055, June 27, 2012 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s
Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)

X owns a parcel of riceland consisting of 46.8731 hectares. The said land was
subjected to acquisition pursuant to PD 27 but the records does not show when the
DAR acquired the same. Sometime in December 1989 DAR then, issued several
emancipation patents in favor of various farm-beneficiaries. X, however, did not
receive any compensation for the acquisition. Sometime in September 1992 LBP
received DAR's instruction to pay the just compensation to X. The LBP made its
valuation, but X rejected the valuation and filed a complaint for determination of just
compensation with the RTC. Should a land acquired pursuant to PD No. 27 valued
using the factors in Sec 17 of RA No. 6657?

Yes, RA 6657 should govern. When the government takes property pursuant to PD 27 but does
not pay the landowner his just compensation until after the affectivity of RA 6657, it becomes
more equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657.(Landbank of the Philippines
vs. Heirs of Maximo Puyat, G.R. No. 175055, June 27, 2012 [J. Del Castillo])

13. Whether or not the legislature may validly fix the method of computing just
compensation. (National Power Corporation vs. Zabala, G.R. No. 173520, January 30, 2013 [J.
Del Castillo]; Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Galle, G.R. No. 171836, August 11, 2014 [J.
Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: State the question.)
 Can the legislature validly fix the method of computing just compensation by the
courts?

No the legislature cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts todetermine just
compensation. No legislativeenactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from
determining whether theright of the property owners to just compensation has been violated.
Thus, we haveconsistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the
methodof computing just compensation is not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as
mereguidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.(National Power Corporation vs. Zabala, G.R.
No. 173520, January 30, 2013 [J. Del Castillo];

14. Can establishments claim as tax deductions the senior citizen discounts that they
give?

Yes. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the
twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a
legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object.(Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of Department of Social Welfare
and Development, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])

15. Requisites of Procedural Due Process in different proceedings.

TYPE REQUISITES
Judicial Proceedings a. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
b. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the Defendant and
over the property which is the subject matter of the proceedings;
c. The Defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
d. The judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. ( El Banco Español-
Filipino vs. Palanca, G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918)
Administrative and a. There must be a right to a hearing;
Quasi-Judicial b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
Proceedings c. The decision must have something to support itself;
d. The evidence must be substantial;
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or,
at least, contained in the record and disclosed to parties;
f. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
g. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision. (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940)
Disciplinary a. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
sanctions in schools accusation against them;
b. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
(Guzman vs. National University, G.R. No. L-6828, July 11, 1986)
16. “National Photobomber”. (Knight of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 18,
2017) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)(Tip from Atty.
Bong Lopez)

Z Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of Manila and was earmarked for
the construction of Torre de Manila Condominium project. After having acquired all
the necessary permits and documents, Z was ready to commence the intended
project. However, the City of Manila Council issued a resolution to temporarily
suspend the Building Permit until such time that issues had been cleared.
Subsequently, the City Council of Manila, issued another resolution ratifying and
confirming all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City for
Torre de Manila. X, on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO, and
later a permanent injunction, against the construction of the project. X argued that
the building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the monument, an
endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a construction borne out of bad
faith. Can the court issue a writ of mandamus against the City Officials to stop the
construction of Torre de Manila?

No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project. It was not
even considered as contrary to morals, customs and public order. The project was way well from
the Park where the monument was located. The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie
against the City of Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a
clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act,
and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.” In the
case at bar, such factors were wanting. Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any Law or
rule that the construction of such building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the building
was within the background sightline or vision of the Rizal Monument. (Knight of Rizal vs. DMCI
Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017)

17. Extrajudicial confession. (People of the Philippines vs. Constancio, G.R. No. 206226, April 4,
2016 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)

X, Y, and Z were charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide committed against
"AAA"3 on the night of March 11, 2001. During the custodial investigation, where
Atty. Suarez advised him of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his
statements, X executed an extrajudicial confession which was embodied in
a SinumpaangSalaysay. X also confessed to News Reporter Amparo during an
interview that he did take part in the execution of the crime. At the trial, however, X
denounced the SinumpaangSalaysay as false, and claimed that he was coerced into
signing the same. Is X’s extrajudicial confession admissible?

Yes. X's confession is admissible in evidence because it was voluntarily made to a news reporter
and not to the police authority or to an investigating officer. Amparo testified that he requested X
for an interview in connection with his confession, and that the latter freely acceded. Hence, X's
confession to Amparo, a news reporter, was made freely and voluntarily and is admissible in
evidence.

18. Whether or not a Respondent can be bound by a Decision and the consequences
thereof in a case in which he was not a party. (Aguilar vs. O’Pallick, G.R. No. 182280, July
 29, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this
case.)

There was a case between A and D involving several properties. D was able to obtain
a final and executory decision in his favor and as a result, the RTC caused several
properties of A, including a condominium unit which was previously sold by A to C.
The sale at a public auction was scheduled but before it happened, C filed an affidavit
of third party claim. During the auction, D was declared the highest bidder and a
certificate of sale was issued to him. Because A failed to redeem the property, a final
Deed of Sale was issued to D where the previous registrations were cancelled and the
property was registered to him, and moved for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession
which was granted. C instituted a case for quieting of title. Can C be bound by a
decision and consequence of a case he is not a party to?

No. He could not be bound by its disposition as well as the incidents and actions taken therein;
thus, he had the right to file a separate action to protect and vindicate his claim. It held that
since the execution sale proceeded despite C’s third party claim,he had no other recourse but to
file an independent vindicatory action to prove his claim

19. What are the instances when the twin requisite of prior notice and hearing may be
dispensed with?

a. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action;

b. Where the tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the Respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice
to the person affected; and
c. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had
not been claimed. (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000)

20. No deprivation of a day in court when afforded an opportunity to participate in the

proceedings yet failed to do so. (Demaala vs. Sandiganbayan [Third Division], G.R. No.
173523, February 19, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical
question on this case.)

X was accused for violations of Section 3(h) of RA 3019 wherein a motion to suspend
was filed against him and was granted. He failed to attend the hearings. He filed for a
Motion for Reconsideration and argued that the motion to suspend should have been
filed earlier and not when the prosecution is about to conclude the presentation of
evidence. The Sandiganbayan denied his MR. X alleges that he was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard on his MR even before the same could be heard on the
scheduled hearings. Is X correct with his contention?

No. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do
so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that
there was denial of due process.

21. State the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for
 failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. ( Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.
vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)

22. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may be considered vague – and thus, void –
because of (a) its inclusion of “other rebel groups”, and (b) the absence of any
guideline specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region. (Lagman, et. al. vs. Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 [J. Del Castillo])
(Commissioner’s Note: State the question.)(Tip from Atty. Bong Lopez)

Is a proclamation that is vague on its face be considered void as it is susceptible to

broad intepretation, misinterpretation, or confusion?

No. The Vagueness Doctrine
appropriate for testing the
terrorem effect resulting from
reason alone, the State may
conduct.
has a special application to free-speech cases only. It is not
validity of penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful

23. State the Overbreadth Doctrine.

The Overbreadth Doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. ( Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001)

a. Is an ordinance prohibiting letting out a room in hotels, motels, lodging

houses, and pension houses for less than 12 hours, on assumption that they
are being used for prostitution, overbroad? (White Light Corporation vs. City of
Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009)

Yes it is overbroad. The Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of
their clients. The court recognizes that the petitioners have a right to assert the
constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate"
time frame.

24. Requisites for valid classification.

a. Substantial distinctions which make for real differences;

b. Germane to the purpose of the law;
c. Not limited to existing conditions only; and
d. Must apply equally to all members of the same class. ( Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana
Growers and Exporters’ Association, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)

25. Whether or not Republic Act Nos. 9257 and 9442 are violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. (Southern Luzon Drug Corp. vs. Department of Social welfare and Development , G.R.
No. 199669, April 25, 2017) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this
case.)(Tip from Atty. Bong Lopez)

X Drug Store filed a petition of prohibition against the DSWD, NCDA, DOF, and BIR
which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of RA 9257 otherwise
known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” which amends the "Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the
 purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD),
respectively, and treating them as tax deductions as it will affect their profits as a
business. X Drug Store claims this is violative of the equal protection clause. Is X
correct with his contention?

No. To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid
classification. The Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it
a priority to address their needs. When the Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the
predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children,71 it did not make
any reservation as to income, race, religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a blanket
privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their
class.

26. Whether or not Sec. 1 of Presidential Act No. 1899 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. (SR Metals, Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 179669, June
4, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this
case.)

X was awarded a 2-year Small- Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) and was allowed to extract
Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co) in a 20-hectare mining site in Sitio Bugnang, Brgy. La
Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. The EMB sent the mining corporations a Notice of
Violation informing them that they had exceeded the allowed annual volume of 150,000
MTs combined production as their stockpile inventory of Nickeliferous ore had already
total 177,297 dry metric tons (DMT). X argues that there is no substantial distinction
between the miners covered under RA 7076, who can extract as much ore as they can,
and those covered under PD 1899 who were imposed an extraction limit and that such
limit is a violation of the equal protection clause. Is X correct?

No. With the 50,000-MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA 7076, the issue
raised on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the DENR treats all
small-scale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them. There is therefore no
more reason for the mining corporations to not recognize and comply with the said limitation. It
must be stressed that the DENR is the government agency tasked with the duty of managing and
conserving the country’s resources; it is also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations for the implementation of mining laws.

27. Undue discrimination against appointive officials and in favor of elected officials (see
Secs. 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code). (Quinto vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 189698, February 22, 2010, Resolution) (Commissioner’s Note: State the question.)

Is there a violation of the equal protection clause when appointive officials are
deemed resigned upon filing their CoCs while those occupying elective office are not
considered such?

Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically
the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact that there is
substantital disticinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts does not justify such differential treatment.

28. Discuss the three (3) levels of scrutiny to determine the propriety of the classification
under the Equal Protection Clause.
 a. Deferential or Rational Basis Scrutiny – It demands that the classification
reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. It often applies in cases involving economics
or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
b. Middle-Tier or Intermediate Scrutiny – When the classification puts a quasi-suspect
class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review.
Classification based on gender or illegitimacy received intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest
and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification
must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.
c. Strict Judicial Scrutiny – It applies when a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class. The government carries the burden to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. ( Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers and
Exporters’ Association, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)

29. What is a scatter-shot warrant? Is it valid?

Where a search warrant charged violations of two (2) special laws, it was considered a scatter-
shot warrant, and was declared null and void. Sec. 3 of Rule 126 of Rules of Court prohibits the
issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. (Tambasen vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 89103, July 14, 1995)

a. Does it have exception?

Yes. In People of the Philippines vs. Dichoso(G.R. No. 101216-18, June 4, 1993), it was
held that the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals with dangerous
drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs, and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species; thus, one search warrant may be validly issued for several violations
thereof. This is reiterated in People of the Philippines vs. Salanguit (G.R. No. 133254-55,
April 19, 2001).

30. What are the instances of valid warrantless arrest?

a. In flagrante delicto: When, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(Sec. 5[a], Rule 113, Rules of Court);
b. Hot Pursuit Doctrine: When an offense has just been committed and the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it. ( Sec. 5[b], Rule 113,
Revised Rules of Court);
c. Escape Rule: When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. (Sec. 5c, Rule 113, Rules of Court);
d. Abscond Rule: An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of
a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court
where the case is pending. (Sec. 23[2], Rule 114, Rules of Court); and
e. When the right is voluntarily waived (People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No.
130644, March 13, 1998)
31. What are the instances of valid warrantless search?

a. When the right is voluntarily waived (People of the Philippines vs. Omaweng, G.R. No.
99050, September 2, 1992);
b. Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest ( Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules
of Court);
c. Search of vessels and aircraft (People of the Philippines vs. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881,
December 18, 2000);
d. Search of moving vehicles (Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15,
2002); and
e. Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances ( Spouses Veroy vs.
Layague, G.R. No. L-95630, June 18, 1992)

32. Issuance of search warrant. (Petron LPG Dealers Association vs. Ang, G.R. No. 199371,
February 3, 2016 [J. Del Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on
this case.)

X filed a letter-complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation requesting

assistance in the surveillance, investigation, apprehension and prosecution Y for
alleged illegal trading of LPG products and/or underfilling, possession and/or sale of
underfilled LPG products . Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI-IRO - through its
agent Z - conducted surveillance and test-buy operations. During the test-buy
operations, Y took Z’s empty cylinder and replaced it with one that is filled.
Afterwards, Z filed for a search warrant which was granted. Z searched Y’s property
and confiscated the cylinders and Y was eventually charged. Y contends that the
search warrant should have not been issued because he does not own the property
seized. Is Y correct with his contention?

No. The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized.

AB Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Spouses A and B) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order against the Spouses X and Y. The Spouses A and B claimed that
Spouses X and Y constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy
the walls of their building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So
in order to get pieces of evidence for the case, Spouses A and B illegally set-up two
(2) video surveillance cameras facing Spouses X and Y’s property. The former’s
employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. Spouses X and Y
then filed a case against the Spouses A and B for violating their right to privacy. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an order granting the application and directed
Spouses A and B to remove the video surveillance cameras they installed. Spouses A
and B appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, which annulled and set aside the
RTC Decision. Spouses X and Y elevated the case to the Supreme Court with this legal
question: Is the installation of the two video surveillance cameras of Spouses A and B
violated their right to privacy?

Yes. Such act of the Spouses A and B violated the right of privacy of Spouses X and Y under Art.
26(1) of the Civil Code prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it
is a business office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny
 them access. (Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 [J. Del
Castillo])

33. Distinguish Content-Based Regulations from Content-Neutral Regulations.

On one hand, under the content-based regulations, the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, extremely serious, and the degree of imminence is extremely
high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality. On the other hand, content-neutral regulations are concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place, and manner. It must pass
the substantial interest test. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)

a. What is the test to be used to distinguish content-based from content-neutral

regulations?

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified (1) if it is within the constitutional

power of the government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms (of
speech, expression, and press) is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. (U.S. vs. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 [1968] as cited in Social weather Stations, Inc.
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001)

34. Facial challenge. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014Imbong
vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014) (Commissioner’s Note: State the question.)

Is the application of facial challenges limited to laws involving free speech?

No. The application extends to those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
The Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

35. State the Overbreadth Doctrine.

The Overbreadth Doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. ( Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001)

36. Briefly discuss the following:

a. Gag Law – it was inappropriate to bar media reporting on a criminal case prior to the
trial itself, except in matters where a "clear and present danger" existed that would
impede the process of a fair trial. (Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
[1976])
b. Sub Judice Rule – restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings
to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. It applies not only to the parties to the case, but also to the public in general,
including the media. (Romero et al. vs. Estrada et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009)
c. Shield Law (Republic Act No. 1477) – designed to shield journalists from being forced
to reveal the sources of information they gathered or obtained in confidence.
37. X posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH LAW!”,
referring to the Reproductive Health (RH) Law; and the second tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “Anti-RH/Team Buhay” with
a check-mark, or “Pro-RH/Team Patay” with an x-mark, clearly referring to how the
politicians vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Can the Commission on Elections
assume jurisdiction on the matter?

No. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
(Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

38. Rule on Right to Assemble.

If the assembly is to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for
the assembly itself, may be validly required. But the power of local officials in this regard is
merely one of regulation, not prohibition. However, a permit to hold a public assembly shall not
be necessary where the meeting is to be held (a) in a private place, (b) in the campus of a
government-owned or –operated educational institution, or (c) in a freedom park. Where
permit is required, the written application shall be filed with the Mayor’s office at least five (5)
days before the scheduled meeting and shall be acted upon within two (2) days, otherwise the
permit shall be deemed granted. Denial of the permit may be justified only upon clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public
order, safety, convenience, morals, or health. Action on the application shall be communicated
within 24 hours to the applicant, who may appeal the same to the appropriate court. The law
permits law enforcement to detail a contingent under a responsible officer at least 100 meters
away from the assembly, in case it becomes necessary to maintain order. (Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)

39. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), as a party list
based on moral grounds, saying that it is in violation of the principles laid down in
the Bible and the Koran. Can the COMELEC refuse recognition on the aforesaid
ground without violating constitutional precepts?

No. The non-establishment clause calls for government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. It
was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party.(Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J. De Castillo])

a. Exceptions to the Non-Establishment Clause.

1. Exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious purposes (Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except those
established by religious groups and mission boards (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV, 1987
Constitution);
3. Optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools (Sec. 3[3], Art.
XIV, 1987 Constitution); and
 4. Appropriation allowed where minister or ecclesiastic is employed in the armed forces,
in a penal institution, or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium (Sec.
29[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

40. What is Benevolent Neutrality Approach?

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests
but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests. ( Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])

41. What is a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot meddle following the
Doctrine of Separation of Church and State? (Austria vs. National Labor Relations
Commission [Fourth Division], G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999) (Commissioner’s Note:
State the question.)

The State cannot meddle in purely ecclessiastical affairs such as excommunication, ordinations
of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious
significance An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of
the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed unworthy of membership. an ecclesiastical affair involves the
relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.

42. Non-establishment Clause in Municipality. Religious affiliation as consideration vis-

à-vis vesting of jurisdiction. (Municipality of Tangkal vs. Balindong, G.R. No. 193340,
January 11, 2017) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.) (Tip
from Atty. Bong Lopez)

X filed a Complaint with the Shari'a District Court against the Municipality of Tangkal,
for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. He allege that he is the
owner of the land, and that he entered into an agreement with the Municipality of
Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way for the construction
of the municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed a
condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35
years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to X. X claimed
that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land within the agreed
period nor returned the land to him. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to
him. The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious
affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a
Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Is The Municipality of Tangkal
correct with its contention?

Yes. When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-and neither does
he become-a real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest;
the representative remains to be a third party to the action. That the mayor of the Municipality is
a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement
under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real
party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim.
43. Justice X initiated the holding of masses in the Hall of Justice. Justice Y filed a
Complaint against the former contending that such act is unconstitutional being
that the separation of the Church and State should be inviolable. Is Justice Y
correct?

No. The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of
Church and State. The 1987 Constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State
shall be inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing
religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact,
these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. (In Re: Letter of Tony Q.
Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City , A.M. No.
10-4-19 SC, March 7, 2017)

a. Make another question in relation to accommodation. (In Re: Letter of Tony Q.

Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City ,
A.M. No. 10-4-19 SC, March 7, 2017) (Tip from Atty. Bong Lopez)

Does accomodation of religious practices tantamount to establishment of religion

in the workplace?

No. In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a
policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some
governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the
reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown
that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment

44. What are the unconstitutional provisions in Republic Act No. 10354 (Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012) and its counterpart provisions in
its implementing rules and regulations?

a. Section 7: (a) requiring private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals
and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and (b) allowing minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage
access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s;
b. Section 23(a)(l): punishing any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
c. Section 23(a)(2)(i): allowing a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;
d. Section 23(a)(2)(ii): limiting the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures;
e. Section 23(a)(3): punishing any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
 f. Section 23(b): punishing any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
g. Section 17: rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect
the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
h. Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations: adding the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 10354 and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

45. Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Duterte to implement a nationwide

curfew for minors, several local government units in Metro Manila started to strictly
implement their Ordinances with respect to curfew for minors through police
operations. Petitioners filed a Petition arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because, among others, it deprive minors the right to liberty and
the right to travel without substantive due process. Are they correct?

No. Grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. The
stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on
the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate
vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming
victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement,
i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law", our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing
the State's duty to afford special protection to children. ( Samahan ng
mgaProgresibongKabataan et al. vs. Quezon City et al., G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

46. Limitations on the right to travel. (Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018)
(Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.) (2015-2018 Headline,
compiled by Atty. Justin Morilla)

DOJ Secretary Y issued a Hold Departure Order and Watch List Order against X on
the ground that crmininal charges of plunder, qualified theft and violation of the
Omnibus Election Code were filed against him. X filed a TRO against the orders
seeking relief from the court to allow him to travel to get medical treatment abroad
which was granted. The DOJ instead of following the court issued a Circular that
refused to process X’s travel documents. X questions the constitutionality of a DOJ
Circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. Is the DOJ
Circular Constitutional?

No. The ground that the issuance of the Circular is for X to be present during the preliminary
investigation of their cases is outside the allowable restrictions provided by the Constitution.
Hence, it is an ultra vires act and has no effect.

47. Whether or not an examinee has constitutional right to have access to the
examination papers. (Antolin vs. Domondon, G.R. No. 175705, July 5, 2010 [J. Del
Castillo]) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)
 X took the CPA Licensure exam and failed. Convinced that he should have passed, X
wrote to the Board of Acountancy requesting that his answer sheets be re-corrected.
She was shown her answer sheets but since it showed only the shaded marks, he was
not able to determine why he failed the exam. He asked for the questionairre, answer
sheet, answer keys and explanation of the grading system but was denied. X filed for
a Petition for Mandamus with Damages praying that the board provide him with all
the documents to show whether or not his paper was graded correctly. Will his
petition be granted?

No. Any claim for re-correction or revision of the examination cannot be compelled by
mandamus. X did not have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and there is no corresponding duty from the Board to perform the act being asked for.

48. Reconcile the cases of Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998) and
Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. National Economic Development Authority Director-General
(G.R. No. 167789, April 19, 2006) in relation to National ID System vis-à-vis right to
privacy.

On one hand, in Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998), the Supreme Court ruled
that the Administrative Order No. 308, which establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System, was a violation of the right to privacy because it
does not provide in clear and categorical terms how the information to be gathered shall be
handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances,
and for what purpose. It falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. On the other
hand, in Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. National Economic Development Authority Director-General
(G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006), the Supreme Court ruled that no constitutional infirmity on
the right of privacy was shown by Executive Order No. 420, which streamlines and harmonizes
the existing ID system within each government agency. It limits the data to be collected and
recorded under the uniform ID system, and it applies only to government entities that already
maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws.
It does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under
existing laws.

49. When is there substantial impairment in relation to Non-Impairment Clause?

There is substantial impairment (a) when the law changes the terms of a legal contract
between the parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or (b) imposes new
conditions, or (c) dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something
different from that provided in its terms. (Clements vs. Nolting, G.R. No. L-17959, January 24,
1922)

50. Distinguish bail as a matter of right from bail as a matter of discretion.

BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT BAIL AS A MATTER OF

DISCRETION
Before conviction a. Cases filed before the a. Cases filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court of an
Municipal Trial Court, and offense punishable by
Municipal Circuit Trial death, reclusion perpetua,
Court; and or life imprisonment
b. Cases filed before depending if the evidence
Regional Trial Court of an of guilt is strong;
 offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment
After conviction a. Cases filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial
Court;
b. Accused convicted by
Regional Trial Court, but
the penalty imposed does
not exceed six (6) years
and the judgment is not
yet final.
a. Cases filed before the
Regional Trial Court for
offenses notpunishable by
death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment;
b. Cases filed before the
Regional Trial Court if the
penalty imposed is
imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, provided none of
the circumstances
enumerated in Sec. 5(3),
Rule 114 are present.
(Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 121917,
July 31, 1996)
c. When the accused is
charged with a capital
offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life
imprisonment, and
evidence of guilt is not
strong. (Sec. 7, Rule 114,
Revised Rules of Court)

51. Will it be proper for the judge to grant bail without conducting a hearing even if the
prosecutor interposes no objection the bail application? (Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,
G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000)

No. The courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process
for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or
the denial of the application for bail.

52. Is a condition in an application for bail that accused be first arraigned before he
could be granted bail valid? (Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1,
2000)

No. Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused.
Further, the court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment.
53. Discuss bail on (a) extradition (Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan,
G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002) and (b) deportation (Government of Hong Kong vs.
Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007).

a. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which
he is charged. One should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court. (Government of the United States of
America vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002)
b. In deportation proceedings, the provisions on bail can be applied. While deportation is
not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law.
(Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007).

54. On June 5, 2014, Sen. X was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund
Scam. Initially, Sen. X, in an Omnibus Motion, requested to post bail, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Sen. X's arrest was issued,
leading to his voluntary surrender. He again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion
to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds of his advanced
age and voluntary surrender and that he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied. Was the Sandiganbayan correct in denying
his motion?

No. The Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health
and advanced age of Enrile. His social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight
or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. Further, bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. ( Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
213847, August 18, 2015)

55. Auditors of ABC Bank conducted an audit where they found some questionable
transactions. X, an employee of the bank, was summoned by the Vice President for
an administrative hearing. When he arrived, he was surprised to see that there
were other people in the Office of the Vice President: two lawyers and two
policemen. He was asked to sign a written statement and was threatened to be
brought to the precinct should he not sign, so he signed it. The paper he signed
turned out to be a confession. During trial, his counsel contends that the written
statement should be declared inadmissible for X was deprived of his rights in a
custodial investigation. Is X’s counsel correct?

No. The rights of a person to remain silent, have competent and independent counsel and to
be informed of the two mentioned are present only in custodial investigation. Such rights are
not present in an administrative investigation. ( Tanenggee vs. People of the Philippines , G.R.
No. 179448, June 26, 2013[J. Del Castillo])
56. Right to speedy disposition of case. (Remulla vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April
17, 2017) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)(Tip from
Atty. Bong Lopez)

X was the governor of Cavite when Y complained that he caused the purchase of
Medical supplies from Allied Medical Laboratories Corporation in the year 2002
without conducting a public bidding. After nine (9) years , the Ombudsman ruled, on
August 27, 2014 found a probable cause against X for Violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019. Thereafter X filed his Motion for Reconsideration stating that there was no
probable cause for filing a case against him and his right for a speedy trial or
disposition of his case was violated.The said Motion was Denied by the Ombudsman.
An information against X was filed by the Ombudsman to the Sandiganbayan. X filed
his Motion to Dismiss before the Sandiganbayan alleging that his right to a speedy
trial and disposition was violated under the constitution. Is X correct with his
contention?

No. A criminal case filed before the appellate court must be represented by Office of the Solicitor
General as the appellate counsel under Section 35 (l) , Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. The Office of the Special Prosecutor represents three People when criminal
cases filed before the Sandiganbayan. Here, it was initiated by Y in his capacity as a private
complainant, being a taxpayer, without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General or
the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The cases against X were filed and were consolidated and
was one reason for the cause of the delay.

57. Violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. (Almeda vs. Office of the
Ombudsman [Mindanao], G,R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016 [J. Del Castillo])
(Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)

X and several other public officers and employees were charged administratively and
criminally before the Ombudsman, in connection with the alleged improper use and
disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted to Y, Surigao del
Norte Congressman, and implemented through the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and the DepEd. In 2003, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP) then took over the case. The case was endorsed to the Office of the
Ombudsman. X filed written manifestations for the resolution of her case but to no
avail. Years went on but he received no response despite his annual written
manifestations for resolution. In 2011, X filed a petition that the case against him be
dismissed arguing that his right to speedy disposition of cases is violated. Is he
correct?

Yes. The Court has held that inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases, which
warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.

58. Table of comparison of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and
Kalikasan.

Habeas Amparo Habeas Data `Kalikasan

Corpus
 Nature
Special Proceeding Special Civil
Action
Availability
To all cases of To any person To any person whose right to Special remedy
illegal whose right to privacy in life, liberty, and available to a
confinement life, liberty, and security is violated by an natural or
or detention. security is unlawful act or ommission juridical eprson,
violated or by a public official or entity authorized
threatened employee or of a private by law, people’s
with a violation individual or entity engaged organization, or
by an unlawful in: any public interest
act or group accredited
ommission by a 1. Gathering by or registered
public official 2. Collecting with any
or employee or 3. Storing government
of a private agency, on behalf
individual or Of data or information of persons whose
entity. regarding the person, family, constitutional
home and correspondence of right to a
the aggrieved party. balanced and
healthful ecology
is violated or
threatened with
violation by an
unlawful act or
omission of a
public official or
employee, or
private individual
or entity,
involving
environmental
damage of such
magnitude, to
prejudice the life,
health or property
of inhabitants in
two or more cities
or provinces.
Rights Violated
There is an There is an There is an actual or There is an actual
actual actual or threatened violation of the or threatened
violation of threatened aggrieved party’s right. violation of one’s
the right to violation of the right to a
liberty of and aggrieved healthful and
rightful party’s right. balanced ecology
custody by involving
the aggrieved environmental
party. damage.
59. Writ of Amparo. (Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012 [J. Del
Castillo])(Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)

A vehicle of B arrived at the house of X. The arrival of the vehicle awakened X’s
sons,D and C and who were then both staying in her house. When X went out to
investigate, he saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of
them immediately asked X where they could find her son C. Before X could answer,
the guard saw C and told him that D and C should go with them to the security office
of A because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and
lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, X, D, C were in the office of the security
department of B. X and D were able to go home and C was left for questioning.
Having noticed that C hasn’t gone home, his wife went to the security office to look
for him and saw that he wasn’t there. The security officers said they are not aware
where C is. C’s wife filed for a petition for the writ of amparo. Is her remedy correct?

No. Her Petition for Writ of Amparo must be dismissed. The law provides that for the protective
writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.

60. May the Writ of Kalikasanbe issued? (Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16,
2014) (Commissioner’s Note: I want a hypothetical question on this case.)

On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship with
diplomatic clearance, ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured
in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners
filed for a writ of Kalikasan with the claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga
del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. Are petitioners correct with their
contention?

No. The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and
not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In
fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. The Court
considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan.

61. May the right against self-incrimination be validly invoked during inquiries in aid of
legislation? (Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee , G.R. No. 89914, November 20,
1991)
 Yes. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but
only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. Hence, people may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify and
produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.

62. What are the immunities that may be granted to a witness?

a. Transactional Immunity – that which may be granted by the Commission on Human

Tights to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, which makes the witness immune from criminal
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates ( Sec. 18[8], Art.
XIII, 1987 Constitution);
b. Use and Fruit Immunity – prohibits the use of witness’ compelled testimony and its
fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. ( Galman
vs. Pamaran, G.R. No. 71208-09, August 30, 1985)

63. Exceptions to the prohibition of involuntary servitude.

a. Punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted;

b. Service in defense of the State (Sec. 4, Art. II, 1987 Constitution; People of the
Philippines vs. Zosa, G.R. No. L-45893, July 13, 1938);
c. Naval (merchant marine) enlistment (Robertson vs. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 [1897]);
d. Posse comitatus or the obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace
and good order of his community (United States vs. Pompeya, G.R. No. L-10255, August
6, 1915);
e. Return-to-Work Order in industries affected with public interests ( Kaisahan ng
mgaManggagawasaKahoy vs. Gotamco Sawmill, G.R. No. L-1573, March 29, 1948);
f. Patria potestas(Art. 311, Civil Code of the Philippines);
g. Compulsory overtime work (Art. 89, Labor Code of the Philippines); and
h. Working on a rest day (Art. 92, Labor Code of the Philippines)

64. Requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach.

a. A valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction

of the crime charged;
b. A competent court of competent jurisdiction;
c. The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
d. The accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express
consent. (Chiok vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179814, December 7, 2015)