CRESPO v.

MOGUL

FACTS: An information for estafa was filed against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice for the filing of the information. The
presiding judge, Leodegario Mogul denied the motion but the arraignment was deferred to afford
time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. Crespo then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a writ of injunction in the CA to restrain respondent judge from
proceeding with the arraignment of the accused. The Solicitor General recommended that the
petition be given due course and the CA granted the same.

Meanwhile, Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig reversed the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information
filed against Crespo. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial
Fiscal with the RTC, but the respondent judge denied the same and set the date and time for the
arraignment. Crespo then filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus with TRO to
restrain Mogul from enforcing his judgment, which was again issued by the CA. Later on, the CA
rendered a decision and dismissed the petition of Crespo and lifted the TRO. Hence this present
petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal
under orders from the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the
merits.
HELD: Yes.

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be
controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control.
The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of
Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be
filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine
the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused
is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
Estipona v Lobrigo

Estipona, Jr. accused in Criminal Case, Possession of Dangerous Drugs, (Shabu),

Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying
to withdraw his not guilty plea and instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession)

He argued that Section 23(disallowance of plea bargaining) of R.A. No. 9165 violates:

(1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

(2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and

(3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

Prosecution moved for the denial for being contrary to Section 23 which is said to be justified by
the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.

Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo issued an Order denying Estipona's motion

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the equal
protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but
drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses.
Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and
it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

NOTES: Plea bargaining in criminal cases

plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval

-give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that
both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses

-plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed, economy,
and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

BUT TN: the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
-it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

A GUILTY PLEA is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the
fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself
and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. 55

BUT!!! He has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty

Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but
depends on

1. the consent of the offended party 57 and

2. the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense
that is necessarily included in the offense charged

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the

1. arraignment,
2. the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
3. prosecution already rested its case

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the equal protection clause

We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases
until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued for the purpose. ETHID

SERRENO (CONCURRING)

When an accused pleads to a lesser offense, he or she waives all the fundamental rights guaranteed to an accused. 4
It is essentially a choice that only the accused can make, as a way to acknowledge his or her guilt and as atonement
for that guilt.

The reality is that most "drug-pushers" that come before the courts are found with less than n 0.1 gram of illegal
drugs. While some of these accused will be charged with both selling and possession, most of them will have to suffer
the penalty of selling, that is, life imprisonment. 5 They will be sentenced to life imprisonment for evidence amounting
to "only about 2.5% of the weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one- centavo coin (2.0 grams)." 6

The plea is subject to the acceptance of the prosecution and is only allowed by discretion of the court. 9 What is
essential is that the choice exists. Preventing the accused from pleading to the lesser offense of possession is a cruel,
degrading, and unusual punishment for those who genuinely accept the consequences of their actions and seek to be
rehabilitated. It will not advance the policy of the law to punish offenders with penalties not commensurate with the
offense and to hinder their reintegration into society.

3. Quisay v. People (2016)

Facts:

In 2012, Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a resolution finding probable
cause against Quisay (Petitioner) for violation of R.A. No. 7610 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES). Then an information
was filed with the RTC charging petitioner with such crime.

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground of lack of authority of the person
who filed the same before the RTC, pointing out the resolution and information were issued
without the approval or authority from the City prosecutor, which is tantamount to a
jurisdictional defect.

RTC denied the motion, since it found that the certification attached to the information
have sufficiently complied with the Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the
prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
informations. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. She appealed, but CA
affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue: Is it required to have a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein
before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts?

Ruling: YES. Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Information; Section 4, Rule 112 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts.—Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written
authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be
filed before the courts, viz.: SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.—If
the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the
resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown
by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint. Within five (5) days
from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within
ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior
written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and,
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the same Rules. People v.
Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 (2004), firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer
without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which
cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
POBLETE v. HONORABLE JUSTICES
EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, et al.
[G.R. No. 150610. March 25, 2004]

Facts:

The officers of Samahan ng Lahing Mandaragat ng Pulborista, Inc. (Samahan) filed a

complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner municipal officials of Kawit,
Cavite Federico A. Poblete, et al. The complaint alleges that the officials caused the registration
of foreshore land in Barangay Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the Municipality of Kawit and
subsequently sold the same to FJI Property Developers, Inc., notwithstanding that under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, specifically, Title III, Chapter [8], Section 59 in relation to Section
61, the land is inalienable and cannot be disposed by any mode or transfer, except by lease.

The complaint further avers that the sale of the land caused undue prejudice and
injury to poor people, especially the indigent families who claimed it as communal fishing
grounds since time immemorial, and gave private parties unwarranted benefits, the contract or
transaction being manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government and the public.

In an Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information to which the accused filed their
Comment, the Ombudsman Prosecutor sought to amend the information by inserting the
number of the lot under controversy and the amount representing the price paid by FJI Property
Developers Inc. for it.

Also, the Ombudsman recommending further amendments to the information, the

prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information (second AmendedInformation). For
lack of merit, the Sandiganbayan, denied the Motion to Quash the first amended information
and by a subsequent Resolution, it granted the Motion to Admit the
second amended Information. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
second amended Information.

HELD: NO.

As laid down by the Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely
states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information
and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.

The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second Amended Information which
are also alleged in the first Amended Information does not change the basic theory of the
prosecution, thus creating no material change or modification in the defenses of the accused.

Clearly, the allegations of Poblete, et al. are factual and evidentiary in nature which may best be
considered as matters of defense to be ventilated in a full-blown trial. Lack of
probable cause during the preliminary investigation is not one of the grounds for a motion to
quash. A motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information, which is evident on its
face. The guilt or innocence of the accused, and their degree of participation, which should be
appreciated, are properly the subject of trial on the merits rather than on a motion to quash.

Poblete, et al. having failed to substantiate the grounds they invoked in their Motion to Quash
the first Amended Information, and it having been established that the amendments introduced
in the second Amended Information are mere matters of form, the Sandiganbayan did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolutions of October 10, 2001 and
November 8, 2001.
5. MARCELINA GACUTANA-FRAILE VS. DOMINGO

FACTS: The case at bar is a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija.
Petitioner Fraile filed a civil case for Quieting of Title and Damages against private respondents
Angel T. Domingo and Benjamin T. Domingo.The case was raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija. While the case was pending, the private respondents Domingos also filed a
case for Quieting of Title against petititioner Fraile involving the same parcels of land. The latter
case was also assigned to the respondent judge.

Atty. Pascua, representing the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case fied by the
respondents not on the ground of the pendency of a Case involving the same parties, subject
matter and issues, but because of a decision earlier rendered by the RTC on the reconstitution
proceedings of Fraile's titles over the subject parcels of land. During the pre-trial conference,
Atty. Pascua withdraw her Motion to Dismiss as it would only delay the resolution of the case.
During the joint hearings, Atty. Pascua agreed to a continuous trial and the hearings for both
cases were finished within four days. Atty. Pascua also allowed the private respondent Domingos
to present their evidence ahead of the petitioner even if Fraile filed her case before the Domingos
filed theirs.

Subsequently, the respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of the Domingos. Atty. Pascua
filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration of the adverse decision. respondent judge
dismissed the Notice of Appeal and denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of proof of
service to the adverse party and written explanation why service or filing thereof was not done
personally. The pleadings likewise lacked a notice of hearing. The Notice of Appeal also failed to
specify the court to which the appeal was being taken. As Atty. Pascua did not challenge the
Orders, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution.

Appalled by the outcome of her cases, Petitioner hired another lawyer, Atty. Renato M. Esguerra,
and subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment citing
the procedural lapses allegedly amounting to extrinsic fraud committed by her previous counsel,
Atty. Pascua. Accordingly in filing a defective notice of appeal and defective motions for
reconsideration and in not elevating nor advising herein petitioner to elevate said orders to the
higher court for review are not MERE negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel but said acts
constitute EXTRINSIC FRAUD deliberately done, in connivance with private respondents
Angel and Benjamin Domingo, designed to defeat the cause of herein petitioner and to deprive
her of her right to due process.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OR PROCEDURAL LAPSES BY ATTY.

JORGE PASCUA IN THE HANDLING OF PETITIONER'S CASE ARE GROSS AND PALPABLE
ENOUGH AS TO CONSTITUTE EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
RULING: Petitioner's allegation that the acts of Atty. Pascua constitute extrinsic fraud is
merely a conclusion drawn by petitioner Fraile and does not find support in the evidence on
record. To impute negligence on her counsel is one thing, to prove that such negligence was in
collusion with the private respondents is another. We cannot therefore subscribe to petitioner
Fraile's contention.

On the other hand, the doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client because
otherwise, "there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who
could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or
learned. The exceptions to this rule is where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law, or where the application of the rule will result in outright
deprivation of the client's liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require and relief
ought to be accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable
mistake or negligence. What must be determined therefore is whether the instant case falls
under the above exceptions.

Atty. Pascua's negligence in filing a defective notice of appeal and defective motions for
reconsideration and in not elevating nor advising herein petitioner to elevate adverse orders to
the higher court for review is undisputed, but it cannot be said that there was "sheer absence of
real effort on his part to defend his client's cause" amounting to gross negligence. Nor was
petitioner Fraile outrightly deprived of her property as she was given ample opportunity to
adduce evidence on her behalf and to meet the evidence of the private respondents. Absent any
showing of irregularity in the proceedings, the continuous hearings which were finished in four
days was not improper and was in fact laudable and consistent with the policy of speedy
administration of justice. It cannot be gainsaid that the proceedings in the trial court satisfied
the requirement that the petitioner be afforded due process of law. Thus the petitioner's
allegation of extrinsic fraud as basis for a petition for relief or annulment of judgment has no
merit.
Dante Tan vs People
GR NO. 173637, April 21, 2009

FACTS:

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of

the People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases pertained to allegations that petitioner employed
manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares and the
alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn
statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares.

In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and
Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. On the
same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for
Consolidation praying that the cases be consolidated together which the trial court granted.
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges. The charges
Petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case 119830 due to failure to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of time. He was claiming for his right to speedy trial. The prosecution
opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement to defer the
trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the
presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done
separately. RTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case 119830. Hence Appeal to the CA. CA
reinstated Criminal Case 119830 RTC to conduct further proceeding. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the
case. Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari

ISSUES:
1. Whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial.
2. Whether the petition for Certiorari violated Tan’s right against double jeopardy.

RULING:
1. No. The Court stated that an accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right
to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
“salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest
possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. The oft-repeated adage “justice delayed is justice denied” requires the
expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.

The Court added that following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic
Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998,” was enacted, with Section 6 of
said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems
resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme
Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Section 2 of Rule 119.

In the case at bar, it was established that from the initial hearing on 27 February 2001
until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admitted that no
evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two
years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal
Case No. 119830. The question was whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay. To this, the Court applied the four-factor test previously mentioned. It stated that in
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

2. No. The Court held that double jeopardy had not attached, considering that the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was
without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was
no reason to support the initial order of dismissal. Double jeopardy did not apply to this
case, considering that there was no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial.
Jacob v Sandiganabayan
Facts:
From 1993 to 1997, Petron Corporation (Petron) received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by
assignment from 18 private firms registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). The TCCs were
issued by the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit & Duty Drawback Center (OSS), an office
under the Department of Finance (DOF). Petron used the assigned TCCs to pay its excise tax
liabilities.
Petron then forwarded said documents to the OSS, with a request for authorization to use said
TCCs to pay for its excise tax liabilities. DOF Undersecretary Antonio P. Belicena (Belicena)
approved the request of Petron through the issuance of Tax Debit Memoranda (TDM) addressed
to the Collection Program Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The BIR Collection
Program Division accepted the TCCs as payment for the excise tax liabilities of Petron by issuing
its own TDM.

However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
eventually found that the aforementioned transactions involving the TCCs were irregular and
violative of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. The Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution dated March 27, 2000 finding probable cause against several public officers. On April
10 2010 the Office of the Ombudsman filed a total of 62 Informations, 18 of which, were against
DOF Undersecretary Belicena, petitioners and other Petron officials, and officers of the BOI-
registered firms which assigned the TCCs to Petron, charging them with violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Thus on 20 August 2001, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, through its

Chairman, Justice Nario] issued a verbal order dismissing the cases, the criminal cases
had been pending for about a year and four months by the time they were dismissed. On
4 February 2002, OR SIX (6) MONTHS after [Justice Nario] issued the verbal order of
dismissal, the [Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division] issued an Order setting aside said
verbal order.

The petitioners now filed a petition for certiorari under under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court for the nullification of the Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not a verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of Section 1, Rule
120 of the ROC which requires such judgment to be in writing (MAIN ISSUE)
 2. Whether or not there is double jeopardy after the reversal of the decision
3. Whether or not there is a violation of their right to a speedy trial when the case was
pending for more than a year

1.Yes. The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not abuse its discretion in setting
aside Justice Nario’s verbal order, which dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, for not
only was such order baseless, as we had previously discussed herein; but more importantly,
because it is an utter nullity, as we had ruled in Corpuz. We held in Corpuz that: x x x We agree
with the foregoing ratiocination. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
mandates that a judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order
dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a
speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence,
such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario
failed to issue a written resolution dismissing the criminal cases for failure of the prosecution to
submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases within the sixty-day period fixed by the graft
court. Moreover, the verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the members of the
Sandiganbayan Special Division. In fine, there has been no valid and effective order of dismissal
of the cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot then be faulted for issuing the assailed resolutions.

2.No. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:

(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal
jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far no
valid dismissal or termination of the criminal cases against petitioners.

3.No. “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining
whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered,
in view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum. Yes, there had been an undue and
inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, which failed
to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the
Sandiganbayan, and even more than a year thereafter. However, the Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Nario’s dismissal of the criminal cases was
unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived
of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. Justice is administered with dispatch, the
essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
Valerio vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Milagros valerio, the petitioner herein, is the wife of the victim, Justice Jun Valerio. Victim
(Chief of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) was shot and killed in front of his
house at No. 82 Mapang-akit St. Diliman Quezon City.

An Information for murder was filed against Antonio E. Cabador, Martin M. Jimenez,
Samuel C. Baran, and Geronimo S. Quintana. While an Information for parricide was filed
against the victim’s wife, and as being the mastermind thereof basing from the sworn statement
of the co-accused, Antonio Cabador. She was found to have relationship with Cabador who is
the mastermind of the incident. Milagros filed an application for bail claiming that the evidence
of guilt against her is not strong. The prosecution, on the other hand, moved to discharge
Samuel Baranan to have him as state witness.

The RTC granted Milagros for Bail but denied the motion to convert Samuel as state witness.
On March 5, 2002, Milagros posted a bail bond furnished by Central Surety and Insurance
Company, and was ordered released. The victim’s sister Laarni Valerio, elevated the case to the Court of
appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion. Milagros, however, counters that she is entitled to
bail as a matter of right because the evidence of guilt against her is not strong. She stressed that
the trial courts determination of the credibility of Samuel and Modesto deserves the highest
respect because it has the peculiar advantage of hearing their testimonies and observing
their deportment and manner of testifying.CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the RTC.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court commited grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to convert Samual as a state witness.
2.Whether or not Milagros is entitled for bail considering she was pointed by Antonio
Cabador as the mastermind of the incident.

Ruling:
1.Yes.
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying unreservedly the
prosecution’s motion to discharge Samuel as state witness.

In denying the prosecution’s motion to discharge Samuel as state witness, the trial court held
that not all the foregoing requisites were met. The trial court held that there was no "absolute
necessity" for Samuel’s proposed testimony because it would only corroborate the testimony of
prosecution witness Modesto.

The trial court, however, misapprehended the import of the proposed testimony of Samuel
to the successful prosecution of the case against the other accused. While the testimony of
Modesto tends to establish that Milagros and Antonio plotted the killing of Jun Valerio, the
evidence that would prove that Milagros and Antonio carried out their sinister plan to eliminate
the said victim is supplied by Samuel

It must also be stressed that Milagros and Antonio are not the only accused in the consolidated
criminal cases (Q-00-93291 and Q-00-93292) pending trial before the lower court. Aside from
the two, the other accused are Martin Jimenez and Geronimo Quintana. The testimony of
Modesto is silent on the participation of Martin Jimenez and Geronimo Quintana in the
killing of Jun Valerio. Thus, there is more need to discharge Samuel as state witness as he
alone has personal knowledge on the involvement of the other two accused

From the foregoing, it is evident that the proposed testimony of Samuel is not merely
corroborative of the testimony of Modesto, contrary to what the lower court believed.
Moreover, the evidence presented by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge
Samuel as state witness shows that he is not the "most guilty." Said accused did not plot the
killing of Jun Valerio like Antonio and Milagros. He did not volunteer to carry out the killing like
his co-accused Martin Jimenez. Neither did he provide the vehicle which facilitated the
commission of the crime like his co-accused Geronimo Quintana. At most, his participation
appears to be limited to serving as a lookout. Surely, this act alone does not qualify him to be
considered as the "most guilty."
The trial court said that from the evidence presented by the prosecution, Samuel was present on
the two occasions in December 1999 when Antonio discussed the plot to kill Jun Valerio. The
trial court added that a "neighbor of the Valerio also gave a statement that he saw [Samuel]
within the vicinity of the locus criminis an hour before the killing." With these observations, the
trial court ruled that "it is still premature to conclude on the participation of [Samuel]" as "there
was no basis yet to find him as not the most guilty."
But even assuming that it cannot be determined yet whether Samuel is not the "most guilty," the
trial court should have held in abeyance the resolution of the prosecution’s motion to
discharge Samuel as state witness and should have waited for the presentation of
additional evidence to enable it to determine the precise degree of culpability of said accused.

2. No.
Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital
offenseor an offense punishable by reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

In this case, the trial court had disregarded the glaring fact that the killer himself has
confessedto the crime and has implicated Milagros as the mastermind. When taken in
conjunction with the other evidence on record, these facts show very strongly that Milagros may
have participated as principal by inducement in the murder of Jun Valerio. It was thus a grave
error or a grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court to grant her application for bail.
The appellate court clearly committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision
granting bail to Milagros Valerio.

EXTRA:
SEC. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more persons are jointly charged with
the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
G.R. Nos. 212593-94 Mar. 15, 2016
Jessica Lucila G. Reyes v. OMB

FACTS: Petitioner was charged as a co-conspirator for her respective participation in the
anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam the illegal utilization and
pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for the years
2004-2010. The charges in two complaints. 1. Plunder, filed by NBI. 2. Violation of Sec. 3(e) of
RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman. [FIO]

Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this case, for fraudulently
processing the release of Sen. Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements - through: (1) project
identification and cost projection; (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters, project
reports, and pertinent documents addressed to the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) and the Implementing Agencies (IAs); and (3) endorsement of the preferred JLN -
controlled Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) to undertake the PDAF-funded project - and
for personally receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds representing Sen. Enrile's
"share," "commissions," or "kickbacks" therefrom, as well as her own;

In her defense, Reyes filed her consolidated affidavit, contending that the letters and documents
which she purportedly signed in connection with the allegation of the PDAF of Sen. Enrile were
all forged and that none of the three witnesses who mentioned her name in their respective
affidavits, directly and positively declared that she received money from the PDAF in question.

While preliminary investigations proceedings were on going before the Ombudsman, Ruby
Tuason, who was likewise charged, surfaced as an additional witness and offered her affidavit
implicating Reyes in the PDAF scam.

Reyes then filed before the Ombudsman an omnibus motion requesting that: (a) she be
furnished copies of: (1) Tuason's affidavit; (2) the transcript of the alleged 12-hour clarificatory
hearing on February 11, 2014 where Tuason was said to have substantiated the allegations in
her affidavit; and (3) the additional documents the latter submitted thereat; and (b) she be given
a period of time to comment on Tuason's affidavit or to file a supplemental counter-affidavit, if
deemed necessary. The Ombudsman denied Reyes's Omnibus Motion on the ground that "there
is no provision under [the said office's Rules of Procedure] which entitles [Reyes] to be furnished
filings by the other parties, including the other respondents."

The Ombudsman later found probable cause against Reyes. Reyes filed a timely motion for
reconsideration. Pending resolution of such motions, the Ombudsman issued a joint order
granting Reyes’ request for copies of the respective counter-affidavits of Tuason and Dennis
Cunanan and ordered her to filed a comment thereon. Copies of Tuason’s Feb. 21, 2014 sworn
statement and Cunanan’s Feb. 20, 2014 sworn statement were allegedly attached to the joint
order. However, Tuason’s Feb. 4 sworn statement and the transcripts of the clarificatory hearing
requested by Reyes were not included. Reyes filed another motion requesting copies of said
documents, and she subsequently filed a reiterative motion for the same purpose. Ombudsman
denied the motions on the ground that the Feb. 4 sworn statement did not form part of the
Preliminary investigation and that the special panel of investigators did not conduct clarificatory
hearings.

Due to reports of Tuason being officially declared as a state witness and granted immunity
criminal prosecution for the PDAF scam-related cases, Reyes wrote a letter requesting for the
copy of the immunity agreement, which was denied by the ombudsman for the reason that the
immunity agreement is a privileged communication which is considered confidential. The motion
for reconsideration of Reyes was denied. In an attempt to exculpate herself from the charges,
Reyes contends that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it: (a) relied upon
hearsay and unsubstantiated declarations of the whistleblowers who merely mentioned her
name in general terms but did not positively declare that they saw or talked with her at any time
or that they had seen her receive money from Janet Napoles or anyone else connected with the
latter; (b) granted immunity to the whistleblowers and Tuason; (c) denied her of due process
When she was deprived of the opportunity to rebut and disprove the statements of Tuason as
she was never furnished a copy of the latter's Feb. 4 sworn statement despite repeated requests
therefor; and (d) disregarded the fact that her signatures found on the documentary evidence
presented were forged, falsified, and fictitious.

Reyes then claims that the whistleblowers and Tuason are the "most guilty" in the perpetuation
of the PDAF scam, thus, the Ombudsman violated Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in granting immunity to
Tuason and the whistleblowers.

HELD: No. The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Whether or not
the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its
grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution.

Tuason admitted to having acted merely as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the Office of
Senator Enrile. It is in this capacity that she made "direct arrangements" with Janet Napoles
concerning the PDAF "commissions," and "directly received" money from Janet Napoles for
distribution to the participants of the scam. In the same manner, Luy and Suñas, being mere
employees of Janet Napoles, only acted upon the latter's orders. Thus, the Ombudsman simply
saw the higher value of utilizing them as witnesses instead of prosecuting them in order to fully
establish and strengthen her case against those mainly responsible for the scam.

The Court has previously stressed that the discharge of an accused to be a state witness is
geared towards the realization of the deep-lying intent of the State not to let a crime that has
been committed go unpunished by allowing an accused who appears not to be the most guilty to
testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal, against a more guilty co-accused. It is aimed at
achieving the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest
number among the accused for an offense committed. In fact, whistleblower testimonies -
especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be condemned, but rather, be
welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order to expose the
perpetrators and bring them to justice.

[Notes: I focused lang kay Reyes and sa Rule 119 Sec. 17]
Velarde v SJS (2004)
Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not conforming to the form and
substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent.

Facts:

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against
Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño
Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano. SJS, a registered political
party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the
separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of
religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members
of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the
trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of
action and that there was no justiciable controversy.

The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination
as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation
of church and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle.
Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific
candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."

The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however.
Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the
trial court owing to these facts.The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for
review.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC’s Decision conform to the form and substance required by
the Rules of Court?

Ruling: No. The decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the
facts on which it was based. The SC had the opportunity to discuss thoroughly the essential
parts of a good decision. Which are as follows

a. Statement of the case

b. Statement of the facts
c. Issues or assignment of errors
d. Court’s ruling in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolve, and
e. Dispositive portion

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as
follows:

Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon
which the judgment is based.