Navaro vs Solidum

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from
her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that
the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for
₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged
property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero
as to the real value of the property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum
III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account,
and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s
finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the
first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to
Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the
Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity.2 The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.3

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although Navarro financed the registration
of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she
granted him a loan. It was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for
his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-
meter lot as additional collateral but he failed to do so.

Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client,
Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft
the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his
knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s
account whose name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that
respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client.4 We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this
case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received ₱265,000 from her. Respondent
countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed
that he paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing fee,
publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s property.

Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had since passed away.

As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the
IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the
money he received from Presbitero.

Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client, Presbitero.1âwphi1Indeed,
his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to
the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent
was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.

While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out that
respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but
from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest
rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the
accounts were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use
all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on
respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required of him as a member of the legal profession.7 Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took
advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot
sustain the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid obligation to complainants, except for
advances for the expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.9 Our only
concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.10

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other.11 Nevertheless,
when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does not use the money for the
intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting,
and he failed. He must return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon
his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the
Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.

9. Garrido vs Garrido

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public.[15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a
direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a
witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in
considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to
be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both
a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19]

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the
Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of
this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or
violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated,
Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal
only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their
merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or
refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial
interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the communitys sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22]

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple
marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever
them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this
society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward
respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We
held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of
good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with
the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also
declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross
immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest
degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife;
marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia.[26] This was a
misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an
open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking
into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children
by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married
Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry,
considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women
who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed
against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission
rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated
his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all
of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered
this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition
to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands
that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish
motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used,
bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject
to the watchful public eye and community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this
scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the
circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them
exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no
distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the
respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of
morality required of them as members of the Bar.[35]

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good moral character, a person must
have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement
of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a
married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was
under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second
marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer,
a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems,
would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the
other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man
away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as
he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty.
Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away
from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and
willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of
immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she
felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the
nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired
before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine
marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she
agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration
of their marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help
but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty.
Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and
the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a
clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as
to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family.
Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his
vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already
mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of
decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty.
Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the
dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of
the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required
of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and
as an officer of the Court.[42]

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern of
grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their
separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her
character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the
integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and
knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
BUENO VS RANERA

The Court’s Ruling

The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the practice of law in accordance with Commissioner
Limpingco’s recommendation and based on our own observations and findings in the case.

The charge of negligence

According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve their clients with competence and diligence.
Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Rule 18.03, on the
other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall
render him liable."

"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them."20 A client is entitled to the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is expected to rely
on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses.21

In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an appellant’s brief amounts to inexcusable
negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court even found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous mode
of appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a
notice of appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Because of his error, the
prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit the required
memorandum would have amounted to negligence. However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her
allegations with court documents that she could have easily procured. This omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are
insufficient to prove Atty. Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this point.

The charge of soliciting money

In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a favorable decision for his client. He visited
the judge’s office several times and persistently called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The Court found
that the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to
refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing, the court. The respondent
lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the
same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the
investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the
notices given him about the case.

While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the Investigating Commissioner found her testimony to be
credible. The Court supports the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:

By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in secrecy with only respondent
Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily
affirmed her allegations in this regard in hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his
part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in this
investigation.25

Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some
extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate
administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved
himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false because no bribery
apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the
crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the
merits, but through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly
disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the
IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to
one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and the general public – that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters
given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not
compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs
against the respondent.

TIONG VS FLORENDO

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide, thus:

"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but
is a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.9 Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of
a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment.

In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman not his wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to
respondent's claim, their consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of indiscretion"10 considering that it lasted for two (2)
years and was only aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone conversation on March 13, 1995.

Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his
own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession.11 Likewise, he
violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 1712 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral
conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court.13 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct, among others.

Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his questioned conduct because he and Ma. Elena had already been
pardoned by their respective spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit14.

The Court disagrees.

It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case
but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is
not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as
a member of the Bar.15 Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of
abating the instant proceedings.16

However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months, instead of one (1) year as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHSeffective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely..

GARCIA VS SESBRANO

We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were
walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed
his rifle, and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño
when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them.
Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots
and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly,
hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in
the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that
Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing
done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re
Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon"11 which
restored his "full civil and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of Commutation13 did not state
that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in
the Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the
authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original
sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity
of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to
pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00.14

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and
political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a
mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never
wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final
Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly
remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is
nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

SOSA VS MENDOZA

The Court’s Ruling

We adopt with modification the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for the imposition
of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued
practice of law.16 Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies
disciplinary action.17

Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."18

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay
the loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.

We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and
acknowledgement receipt showing he received P500,000.00.19 Although he initially denied getting this amount and claimed that he
only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without
qualification as to the amount.20

Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms.
Sosa deferred depositing the postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he would pay. Despite all
these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty.
Mendoza did not dispute.

Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing with the IBP Investigating Officer.21He allegedly failed
to deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived late.
We find Atty. Mendoza’s excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for him to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had
the real intention to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to settle his obligation because of his
manifestation that he already had the money.22

It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosa’s request for settlement after claiming that he already had the needed funds.
He was either lying he had the money, or had no intention of paying in the first place. Atty. Mendoza was also not candid with the IBP
Investigating Officer when he claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his
obligation remains outstanding after all these years.

In Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez23 this Court sitting en banc held:

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner
that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [Emphasis supplied.]

Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his obligation,24 Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he
failed to pay despite his admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire financial condition does not
justify non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico.25

We also reiterate that –

[A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. To this end nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the profession.

While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney
may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him.26 [Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.]

The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the
lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his personal
integrity but his profession as well.27

To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by
Atty. Mendoza’s act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just debt.28

While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ with its recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the
amount of the loan plus legal interest.1âwphi1

We take exception to the IBP’s order to pay only because the case before us is solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is
not a civil action for collection of a sum of money. The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases alone deters us from agreeing
with the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative complaint before us only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability,
while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence.

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant.

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare.29

The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant
in the dispensation of justice.30 The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of
the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.31

We are aware that jurisprudence has allowed a complainant in a disbarment case to collect an outstanding debt from a
lawyer.32 However, in the recent case of Heenan v. Atty. Espejo,33 this Court sitting en banc did not agree with the IBP’s
recommendation to order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the complainant. We said in this case:

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material
bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only
question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant.34 [Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted.]

We note that as in the facts of the present case, the respondent-lawyer in the Heenan case also did not deny the validity of her loan nor
did she proffer any reason for issuing unfunded checks.

As a final note, we understand the frustration of, and sympathize with Ms. Sosa in her present situation. However, because the matter
before us is not a civil action for the collection money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding loan. We can only
clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to any future civil or criminal action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may file
against Atty. Mendoza in the future. Our action likewise is without prejudice to any action we may take that is not based on the
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one

(1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

ANDRES VS NAMBI

Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Our Ruling

At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding, our discussion should be limited only on the issue of
whether respondent acted in gross ignorance of the law when he granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution; when he
issued an Amended Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the monetary judgment against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its
incorporators; and when he denied complainants’ Urgent Motion to Quash.

As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there must be a showing that the error was
gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. As
such, our discussion should be focused primarily on whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as to amount to
malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud and dishonesty.

On the other hand, we need not delve into the issue of whether there is an apparent misapplication of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction when respondent issued the Amended Alias Writ of Execution. For one, it is outside the ambit of this
administrative proceeding. Moreover, the issue of whether the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the subject of
an appeal brought by complainants before the National Labor Relations Commission and eventually to the Court of Appeals.13

We perused the records of the case particularly respondent’s Order14 dated March 13, 2006 denying complainants’ Urgent Motion to
Quash. Therein, we note that respondent’s ruling was not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based on his personal
assessment of the facts at hand, viz:

As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida A. Mercado, who are
doing business under the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the name of M.A. Block Works, Inc.
where individual movants are one of the incorporators. We give credence to the argument of the complainants that the incorporators
therein are relatives of Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado as shown by the Articles of Incorporation adduced by the former. The
incorporators listed have similar family names of the Mercados and the Andreses and common address at Gen. Hizon, Quezon City
and 50 Daisy St., Quezon City, and Maximo A. Mercado is the biggest stockholder. Aside from the Articles of Incorporation,
complainants also submitted a Letter of Intent/Notice To Proceed where respondents, despite representation that they have already
ceased their business operation, are still continuing their business operation. The documents submitted by the complainants were
corroborated by certification issued by Maggie T. Jao, AVP-Assistant Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their
records, an amount of P3,291,300.00 representing a sum total of all goods, effects, money and credit that was garnished belong to
M.A. Mercado Construction and/or Maximo Mercado and/or Aida Mercado and/or M.A. Block Works, Inc. and/or Gertrudes Casilda
A. Mercado, Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and/or Elito P. Andres.

This Office has therefore, enough reason to conclude that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the movants herein
are one and the same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to defraud the complainants and to consequently evade payment of
judgment award. x x x As respondents are duly notified and aware of the execution proceedings, the argument of denial of due process
is untenable.15

It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondent’s conclusion had some bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to
speak. Clearly, respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as imbued with
malice, fraud or bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated above, we are not here to judge in this present administrative
proceeding whether respondent’s ratiocination on the application of the piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here is to
decide whether respondent’s error was so gross as to amount to fraud and dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it cannot
be said, by any stretch of imagination, that respondent’s error, if any, was so gross or that he was actuated by malice when he issued
the above orders. His conclusion was reached after an examination of the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of the
arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the
positions of the contending parties.

In any event, we hold that respondent should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the appreciation
of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that matter, would be
continually plagued with the possibility of being administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure,
this would not augur well to the administration of justice as a whole.

Pertinently, the Court ruled in Andrada v. Judge Banzon,16 viz:

Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law
or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases.

Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision he renders would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment.17

Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

However, we note that respondent had consistently and obstinately disregarded the Court's and IBP's orders. It is on record that
respondent totally ignored the Court's June 7, 2006 Resolution18 directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the
mandatory conference before the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice.19Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a
former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of the court "are not mere requests but directives which should have been
complied with promptly and completely."20 "He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession 'to obey the
laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.' x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to
obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court."21

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.1âwphi1 - A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that this appears to be respondent's first infraction, we find it proper to impose on himpenaltythe of reprimand with
warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi for obstinately and unjustifiably refusing to obey
lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

CHU VS GUICO

What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:

x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for
money or malice x x x. The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.1âwphi1

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer
should not render any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold
and obey,25 for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal
Profession.26 Verily, he or she must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the Legal Profession.27 Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such
membership in the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a
favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually
using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His
acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to
delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as
well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave misconduct is "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."28 There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or
private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such
privilege.29

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years would be
too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be disbarred,30 for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal
profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte v. Abellana:31

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country
should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law
Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to
remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.

Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be ordered to return the amount of ₱580,000.00 to Chu is
well-taken. That amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the latter’s interest as the client. Although the
purpose for the amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully account for and to return the money to Chu.
It did not matter that this proceeding is administrative in character, for, as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v. Reyes:32

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of
the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair
and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property should be required to still litigate in
another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent’s liability. x x x

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S. GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

PEOPLE VS CASTANEDA

The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.

At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary periodfor the filingthereof under Rule 65. The
petition itself statedthat a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on
May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M.
Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case, considering
that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According toAtty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the May
15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.Thus, it was prayed that the petitionbe given due course despite its late filing.

This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureis explicit in stating thatcertiorarishould be instituted within a period of 60
days from notice of the judgment, orderor resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.13 While there are
recognized exceptions14 to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.15

In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the
Rules.Notably, the records show that the petition was filedonly on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which
fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfairto the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming
rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry
even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.

The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes that neededto be addressed
by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked toeffectively curb
smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of revenue every year.

The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspectthat the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was
doomed by designfrom the start. The failure to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently
and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file this petition on
time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs ofa reluctantand subduedattitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by
the lawyers in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the
lawyersrepresenting the offices under the executive branchshould be reminded that theystill remain as officers of the courtfrom whom
a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Courtwill not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the
government’s goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar activities.

Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects
of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in
prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.

In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result would remain the same. While a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must be
shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this case, a
perusal of the challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its partor denial of due
process.The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of
evidence and opposed the demurrer.1âwphi1

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in accordance with the rules on evidence and existing
jurisprudence.

On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs that the canons embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS
lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26, 2013 and May 15, 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Tax
Appeals are AFFIRMED.

The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation for possible criminal or administrative offenses
committed by the Run After the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs,
relative to the filing and handling of the subject complaint for violations of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines

LINSANGAN VS TOLENTINO

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule
8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of
law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT
LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client
nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes
that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he
never denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice.
He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond,
etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations
of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction
recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its
findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from
their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism
degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to
prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

LORENZANA VS FAJARDO

The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from concurrently holding any other office
or position in the government is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides:

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
2employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.[4]

In trying to justify his appointment as PLEB member, respondent invoked Section 43 (c) of R.A. No. 6975[5] quoted below which,
according to him, is the law allowing him to be appointed as such member of the Quezon City PLEB.

Section 43. Peoples Law Enforcement Board

xxxxxxxxx

(c) Compensation, Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty. However, PLEB members may be paid per diem as may be determined by
the city or municipal council from city or municipal funds.

It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members. It cannot be construed as an exception to the
Constitutional and statutory prohibition against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees.

Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his
appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes. Indeed, respondent,
in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local Government Code
of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorneys Oath.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

These duties are further enshrined in the Attorneys Oath, which every lawyer in this jurisdiction has to take before he is allowed to
practice law. The Attorneys Oath states in part that every lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities

The lawyers paramount duty to society is to obey the law. For of all classes and professions, it is the lawyer who is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant.[6] Sadly, respondent failed to fulfill this exacting duty.

On respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, while serving as Legal
Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements Office, we agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order, being
allowed by law.

Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members

xxxxxxxxx

(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except as provided for in Section 393 and without prejudice to
incentives as provided for in this Section and in Book IV of this Code. The Department of Interior and Local Government shall
provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the ability
to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them. While in the performance of their duties,
the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer
from any diminution in compensation or allowance from said employment by reason thereof.

The above provision allows government officials and employees to sit as lupon or pangkat members. The phrase whether in public or
private employment sustains respondents posture.
We now determine whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer V in the Manila Urban
Settlement Office. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones
self to the public as a lawyer.[7] Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a succession
of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has
been interpreted as customarily habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.[8]

In the case at bar, respondents appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by complainant shows that he had an
extensive practice of law. While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law office.
The pleadings he signed as counsel for his clients filed with the courts indicate his office address as Room 201 7 JA Building, 244
Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City. Following is the letter head appearing on the letters and envelopes[9] sent to his clients:

Cesar G. Fajardo

Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law

Room 201 7 J & A Building

244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches

Quezon City.

Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila Urban Resettlement) is not really strict when it
comes to appearing in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to render service even on holidays without
additional compensation. At most, he should have asked written permission from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules that (n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department.

As to respondents alleged unlawful stay on complainants property affecting his conduct as a member of the Bar, suffice it to state that
any discussion on this issue is premature since the case is still pending in the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City.

Anent the penalty to be imposed, as mentioned earlier, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended for
one (1) month for accepting a prohibited appointment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City and be reprimanded for failing to
obtain a written permission from his superiors to appear as counsel for certain friends and relatives. We believe that a heavier penalty
should be imposed upon him for he transgressed not only the statutes but the very fundamental law itself, in violation of his Attorneys
Oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which is
he is required to take before admission to practice, for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly
and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice (Stress supplied).

WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently employed as Legal Officer V
of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorneys Oath
and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED
that any repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

DACANAY VS BAKER ANF MCKENZI

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine
other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the
names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a
client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office."
Not having received any reply, he BAKER AND MCKENZIEfiled the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago,
Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar,
practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.