Nietzsche and Kant On The Pure Impulse To Truth (Downard)

Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth
Jeffrey Brian Downard
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 27, Spring 2004, pp. 18-41 (Article)
Published by Penn State University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/nie.2004.0002
For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/53558
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Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth
JEFFREY DOWNARD
W hen it comes to truth, most interpreters assume that Nietzsche is pri-

marily interested in one of two questions. First, what is the nature of
truth? Second, what is the value of truth? In this article, I want to focus on a
third question. In his early essay, “On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral
Sense,” Nietzsche raises a question about the origin of our pure impulse to
truth.1 I will suggest that, for Nietzsche, the third question is the central ques-
tion and must be answered before we can attempt to answer the other two.
I maintain that Nietzsche’s answer to the question about the origin of our
pure impulse to truth can be defended using arguments from Kant’s ethics
and aesthetics.2 According to Kant, both empiricist and rationalist accounts
of morality are mistaken, and for roughly the same reason. They both attempt
to ground morality in a principle of self-love. In a strikingly similar fashion,
Nietzsche claims that both empiricists and rationalists attempt to ground their
accounts of truth in vanity. The upshot of the arguments is that our commit-
ment to the principles of morality must, according to Kant, be grounded upon
a pure incentive of respect, and our commitment to inquiry must, according
to Nietzsche, be grounded upon a pure love of the truth. For both Kant and
Nietzsche, what is at issue is the purity of the motive.
The similarities between Kant’s rejection of consequentialism in ethics and
Nietzsche’s rejection of consequentialism in the pursuit of truth might help
us better understand Nietzsche’s criticisms. At the same time, they do not
explain why Nietzsche maintains that the origin of our pure impulse to the
truth is to be found in art. In order to make better sense of Nietzsche’s appeal
to art, I begin with Kant’s aesthetics. For both Kant and Nietzsche, it is aes-
thetics that teaches us to love from a pure impulse. I will lay emphasis on
the idea that Kant’s aesthetic argument against consequentialism is struc-
turally similar to his ethical argument against consequentialism. When it
comes to certain questions about truth, however, the aesthetic argument for
a pure impulse is the stronger of the two.
I divide the article into four sections. First, I reconstruct Nietzsche’s pre-
suppositions about the origin of the human powers of cognition. Second, I
compare Nietzsche’s arguments against rival accounts of the truth to Kant’s
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 27, 2004

Copyright © 2004 The Friedrich Nietzsche Society.
18
N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 19
ethical argument against consequentialism. Third, I compare Nietzsche’s argu-

ments against rival accounts of the truth to Kant’s aesthetic argument against
consequentialism. Finally, I examine the strengths and weaknesses of an aes-
thetic defense of Nietzsche’s claims and try to determine whether or not such
an argument is successful against Kant’s own account of moral truth.
1. A Reconstruction of Nietzsche’s Presuppositions
In his early essay on truth, Nietzche offers an explicit answer to the ques-
tion, What is truth? He starts by telling us what truth is not. On the one hand,
there is no such thing as a pure truth. We have no access to things as they are
in themselves. Truth is not a logical relation between concepts and objects.
This amounts to a rejection of a rationalist account of truth. On the other
hand, concepts are not true in virtue of their being grounded on perceptions
that resemble their objects. Truth is not a causal relation between objects,
nerve impulses, perceptions, and concepts. This amounts to a rejection of an
empiricist conception of truth. Having told us what truth is not, Nietzsche
turns to what truth is. Truth is a sum of effects. It is a mobile army of metaphors.
Most interpreters agree that Nietzsche challenges a traditional account of
truth. If most interpreters are right, then how should we understand his rec-
ommendations for rethinking the nature of truth? On the one hand, inter-
preters such as A. C. Danto, Jacques Derrida, and Sara Kofman maintain that
Nietzsche denies there is any such thing as truth. 3 According to Danto,
Nietzsche is offering something similar to a pragmatist account of truth. On
such a line of interpretation, a belief is true if it is useful. If, by acting in
accordance with the belief, we are able to satisfy our desires, then we have
sufficient reason to treat the belief as the truth. But it is a mistake to suppose
that beliefs correspond to the way things really are. On the other hand, inter-
preters such as Alexander Nehemas, John Wilcox, and Maudemarie Clark
suggest that Nietzsche accepts some parts of the common-sense account of
truth. They insist that he is at pains to deny a metaphysical understanding of
truth.4 They maintain that he is offering a perspectival account of truth. Such
a reading admits that there may be many interpretations of the truth, but main-
tains that some interpretations are better than others. According to readings
such as these, theories of truth fall on a spectrum from those that are strongly
noncognitivist to those that are strongly cognitivist. The debate is over where
Nietzsche falls in this spectrum.
Depending upon whether one thinks Nietzsche is a cognitivist or a noncog-
nitivist determines, to some extent, the kind of value one believes he ascribes
to truth. If truth is merely a matter of what is useful, then the value of any
20 J EFFREY D OWNARD
particular truth will depend on one’s individual interests. If truth is relative

to perspective, but some interpretations are more correct than others, then
one has reason to attribute a higher value to the truth. On this question, I
agree with Maudemarie Clark that Nietzsche’s mature account is neo-Kantian
in spirit.5 The relative value of truth is determined by its place within a larger
ideal of life. Like Kant, he denies that truth should be the single highest organ-
izing end in our ideal. Part of Nietzsche’s larger project is to examine vari-
ous ideals and argue that many, such as the ascetic ideal, are mistaken because
they are life denying. He will praise only those philosophical expressions of
ideals that are life affirming. Unlike Clark, however, I believe that Nietzsche
affirmed this position in his early essay on truth. Furthermore, I believe that
Nietzsche’s primary mode for evaluating the relative worth of ideals is aes-
thetic, and it is this move to art that he announces in “On Truth and Falsity
in Their Ultramoral Sense.” Having briefly sketched the interpretative ter-
rain, let us turn to a reconstruction of this early essay on truth.
I want to suggest that many readings of Nietzsche neglect the possibility
that he was primarily interested in a different kind of question. Nietzsche
suggests that it is not possible to determine whether or not our representa-
tions correspond to the essence of things without ending up in dogmatism—
at least at the outset (TF, 180). As such, the general nature of the truth is
probably one of the last things we will be able to determine. Over the course
of this early essay, I believe that Nietzsche turns from the traditional ques-
tion, What is Truth? to the question, Why ought I engage in the pursuit of the
truth? The traditional question about the nature of truth seems to require some
theory of the objective standards that enable us to determine the truth.
Nietzsche’s question, on the other hand, seems to require an account of the
subjective impulses that lead human beings to commit themselves (or fail to
commit themselves) to the pursuit of the truth.
At the very beginning of “On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense,”
Nietzsche recites a fable in which animals living in a remote corner of the
universe invented cognition. One reason Nietzsche calls this story a fable and
provides a remote setting is to stress the status of the ideas contained within
the story. The ideas are offered only as a metaphorical expression of what is
possible. It is at least possible that animals lacking the power of cognition,
at some specific point in time, came to possess the ability to reason.
Furthermore, it is possible that such animals might lose the powers of cog-
nition. It is much easier to establish the evolution of the powers of cognition
as one possibility among others, than it is to establish the claim as a histor-
ical fact for the world in which we live.
Consider what is implied in the possibility that animals might have invented
cognition. In calling these beings animals, Nietzsche does not want to set
them apart from human beings. After all, human beings are animals. Rather,
they lack the capacity that, according to philosophers ranging from Aristotle
to Kant, makes us must most human—that is, the capacity to reason. In order
for an animal to become a rational animal, that being must gain an ability to
think in terms of the concepts and principles of reason. In telling this fable,
Nietzsche raises the following question. How is it possible for an animal that
is not rational to gain the ability to reason? More specifically, how did the
powers of cognition evolve from what were originally just natural impulses?
Nietzsche frames this line of questioning in terms that are familiar to us
from Rousseau’s discussion of the evolution of human rationality. In the first
and second Discourses, Rousseau challenges the assumption that human
beings are essentially rational. In his hypothetical reconstruction of the state
of nature, human beings lack both reason and language.6 In order to explain
the evolution of reason, Rousseau insists that human beings first developed
the capacity to use language. Reason grew out of this capacity. How did lan-
guage ever come about? It isn’t clear. Part of the answer, however, is that it
occurred as a matter of chance. Because the development of language was
contingent, and reason grew from the capacity to use language, the ability of
human beings to reason is contingent as well.
Nietzsche expresses agreement with the idea that the evolution of both lan-
guage and reason are merely contingent both in his early essay on truth and
in his later works. In Zarathustra, for example, Nietzsche makes similar
claims about the role of chance in the evolution of values. He asserts that
chance is “the most ancient nobility of the world” (Z, 27–28). Zarathustra’s
goal is to free us from servitude under ‘Purpose.’ What we need is an under-
standing of how it is possible for purposes (including the ends of reason) to
grow from what was once merely a matter of chance.
Nietzsche claims that the moment in which the clever animals invented
their power of cognition was the moment of their greatest deceit and arro-
gance. Why might Nietzsche criticize these animals for their haughtiness and
mendaciousness at the very moment that most historical philosophers would
think is their greatest achievement? While these philosophers think of the
cognitive powers as the source of our greatest dignity, some offer a more
qualified assessment of the role of reason in the development of human cul-
ture. For instance, Rousseau argues that the theoretical use of reason has not
necessarily improved the lives of human beings. Rather, it has corrupted their
capacity for virtue and caused them to be more self-interested and prone to
conflict.
As human beings gained the capacity to reason, they learned to use their
new powers primarily as a means to attain their self-interest. Very quickly,
human beings began to realize that their interests are better served living in
the society of others. According to Nietzsche, the basis of society is a peace
treaty in which individuals have agreed to use concepts according to fixed
conventions (TF, 176). These conventions established the first laws of truth.
In such a society, the only difference between the liar and the honest man is
that the liar breaks the established conventions in the pursuit of his own self-
ish purposes. The honest man, on the other hand, believes it is in his interest
to obey the established conventions.
Rousseau claims that the only characteristics essential to all human beings
are the capacities for reflection and free choice. Much of the reason for exam-
ining man in the state of nature is to discover what human beings would need
to do in order to retain, and perhaps improve, their capacity to exercise free-
dom. Part of what a philosopher should do is to uncover hidden biases and
prejudices in the way that we employ various concepts—including those con-
cepts that we hold highest such as truth, virtue, justice, honesty, and even
freedom.
It is here that we find Nietzsche raising questions about the evolution of
language and the realization of freedom. He seems to think that we need a
better account of how human beings gained the capacity to use language. His
suggestion is that all of the concepts embodied in a language have their ori-
gin in metaphor. It is through the activity of the artist that new ideas come
to be expressed in language for the first time. At the same time, we cannot
simply assume that human beings possess the capacity for freedom as part
of their essence. Like language, we need some account of how the capacity
for freedom evolved.
This, I believe, is Nietzsche’s key point in the early essay on truth: “In man
. . . deception, flattery, falsehood and fraud, slander, display, pretentiousness,
disguise, cloaking convention, and acting to others and to himself in short,
the continual fluttering to and fro around the one flame—Vanity: all these
things are so much the rule, and the law, that few things are more incom-
prehensible than the way in which an honest and pure impulse to truth could
have arisen among men” (TF, 175). Our thinking can only express our sta-
tus as free beings if the impulse to truth, or to any end for that matter, is a
pure impulse. In order for us to explain how it is possible that human free-
dom might arise, we need to understand how a pure impulse might evolve
from natural inclinations.
One might be tempted to suppose that I am misreading Nietzsche’s point.
Contrary to what I have suggested, it is possible to read Nietzsche in such a
way that he is denying the very possibility of a pure impulse. In several places,
Nietzsche reminds us that our pursuit of ends such as truth, equality, and jus-
tice are nothing more than the expression of personal interests. He might be
claiming that all human actions are entirely governed by personal interests.
The main difficulty with such a reading is that it is hard to square such
assumptions with Nietzsche’s emphasis on freedom. This early essay on truth
is divided into two sections. In the first section, Nietzsche argues against
philosophical accounts of truth that attempt to ground inquiry on a vain

impulse. In the second section, Nietzsche is concerned with the prerequisites
for restoring harmony between the intuitive and rational parts of our intel-
lect. Only where such harmony has been achieved is the intellect released
from its former slavery. As members of the modern period, the character of
our intellect has become fragmented and out of proportion. In particular, our
reason has come to dominate over the intuitive part of our soul. This lack of
harmony is not our only problem. Reason finds itself just a servant to our
self-interest. We use it only as a tool for selecting the best means for the sat-
isfaction of our desires. Nietzsche claims that only art can restore harmony
between the intuitive and rational parts of our character, and only the artis-
tic imagination can restore freedom to our intellect (TF, 190–92).
Another reason for reading Nietzsche in this manner is that it preserves the
consistency between this early essay on truth and his later works. In Zarathustra,
for example, he tells us that the lion is the powerful spirit that prepares to do
battle with the great dragon. The lion wants to fight this last master so that he
can gain the freedom to be his own master. He does not possess the freedom
to create new values. For that, the innocence and the beauty of a child is nec-
essary. But the power of a lion is sufficient for the “creation of freedom for
oneself for new creation” (Z, 27–28). As in his early essay on truth, Nietzsche
stresses the need for purity: “Cast your eyes into the well of my pleasure,
friends! . . . It shall laugh back at you in its own purity” (Z, 98). Zarathustra
tells us that “even the liberated spirit must still purify himself. . . . his eyes
must still become pure” (Z, 43–44). Often, this requirement of purity is referred
to as innocence, solitude, honesty, or forgetfulness. Our experience must be
a new beginning, an immaculate perception.
On my reading of the essay, other interpreters were likely led into a mis-
understanding of Nietzsche’s point about the purity of our impulse to truth
by his comparison of the state of nature and modern society. In the state of
nature, human beings lack the ability to act from a pure impulse. In modern
society, it is difficult to determine whether or not human beings act from pure
impulses because the motives for their actions are cloaked by social con-
ventions. For all we know, human beings might act from selfish motives most,
if not all, of the time. Other interpreters have made the mistake of confusing
Nietzsche’s observations of modern society with the position he wants to
advocate. Regardless of whether or not we actually do possess the capacity
to act from pure impulses, Nietzsche wants to examine what we ought to do
to gain or improve such a capacity. His reason for inquiring into the origins
of our pure impulse is to determine what we would need to do to gain or
improve such a capacity for freedom. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche
makes the point quite clearly: “Poetry does not lie outside the world as a
fantastic impossibility begotten of the poet’s brain; it seeks to be the exact
opposite, an unvarnished expression of truth, and for this reason must cast
away the trumpery garments worn by the supposed reality of civilized man.
The contrast between this truth of nature and the pretentious lie of civiliza-
tion is quite similar to that between the eternal core of things and the entire
phenomenal world” (BT, 53).
In his early essay, the suggestion that artistic freedom is the basis of the
harmony of our intellect is not as fully explored as it will be in his later works.7
In The Birth of Tragedy, for instance, Nietzsche searches for the basis of artis-
tic freedom in the experience of the beautiful and the sublime. He suggests
that the sublimity of the Dionysian spirit has priority over the beauty of the
Apollonian spirit (BT, 36–39). In Zarathustra, Nietzsche attempts to ground
the creation of all values—including such values as truth, justice, and virtue—
in the artistic imagination. I believe the upshot of his argument is a defense
of the freedom of the artistic imagination. Contrary to Maudemarie Clark’s
suggestion that Nietzsche’s early essay on truth is inconsistent with his later
essays, I want to suggest that this early essay sets up a larger philosophical
project that he continues to develop in his later works.
2. An Ethical Argument for a Pure Impulse to Truth
In the first section of the early essay on truth, Nietzsche presents a series of
objections against various philosophical accounts of the truth. What is trou-
bling for interpreters is that the objections appear to be a mere collection of
points without any underlying theme, much less the structure of an argument.
Despite appearances to the contrary, I hope to show that it is possible to
defend Nietzsche’s criticisms of various philosophical theories of truth using
Kant’s argument against rival theories of morality.
If Nietzsche’s criticisms can be defended in this manner, then we will
secure for Nietzsche the advantages of Kant’s argument. The main argu-
mentative advantage that I hope to confer on Nietzsche’s criticisms is that
they are not directed against a mere collection of views. Kant’s argument has
the effect of placing all philosophical accounts in a table that exhausts all of
the possibilities. The point of the argument is to show that, despite the dif-
ferences between the views, they are all based on the same fundamental mis-
take. According to Kant, all rival theories of morality are grounded on a
principle of self-love. The point of Nietzsche’s criticism is that all prior philo-
sophical accounts of truth are grounded in an impulse of vanity. Let us begin
by reconstructing Kant’s argument in the second Critique and Groundwork
and then determine whether or not Nietzsche’s criticisms can be defended
using this kind of argument.
In the “Analytic of Principles” section of the second Critique, Kant argues

that the possible material grounds of the will can be divided along two axes:
the grounds can be either subjective or objective; and they can be either inter-
nal or external.8 Simplifying matters, I think the argument consists of a series
of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive dichotomies that progress along
the following lines. First, a putative moral principle can have only one of two
possible forms: either it is a categorical imperative or a hypothetical imper-
ative. Second, the highest end of the fundamental principle can be one of two
possible things: either it is an end that is determined by a principle of rea-
son, or it is an end that is determined by the faculty of desire. Third, the incen-
tive that connects the fundamental principle to an action can be related to the
principle in one of two ways: either the incentive is a pure feeling of respect
that follows from the fundamental principle, or the incentive is a feeling of
pleasure that precedes the principle. The analytic is a series of arguments
designed to show that only an account of moral judgment that affirms the
first option contained in each of these three dichotomies will be able to legit-
imate our common moral knowledge. That is, the fundamental principle must
have the form of a categorical imperative, the end of autonomy, and a pure
incentive of respect that follows from a formal principle. His argument is a
regress on the conditions that a moral judgment would have to satisfy in order
to legitimate our common understanding of morality.
As moral agents, we must abstract from all personal inclinations and every
contingent end when duty calls. Our will must be determined objectively by
a principle having the form of a categorical imperative and the end of auton-
omy. At the same time, our will must be determined subjectively by an incen-
tive of pure respect.9 The objective conditions establish the requirements that
any putative principle must satisfy to be a principle of morality. The subjec-
tive conditions establish the requirements that we must meet as moral sub-
jects for our actions to be properly determined by the moral law.
Kant argues that all previous moral philosophers have made roughly the
same mistake. Their mistake was to assume that the basis of our duties could
be a material practical principle. Given the range of different moral theories,
how is it possible that they could all be based on the same mistake? According
to Kant, a practical principle is material and not formal if it presupposes some
contingent end. Ultimately, the choice of any contingent end is made on the
basis of a principle of self-love. Epicurus and Hobbes would have little dif-
ficulty admitting that their moral theories are grounded on a principle of self-
love. After all, they believe it is a strength and not a weakness that their
theories are based on an account of motivation that is as psychologically plau-
sible as self-interest. But why does Kant believe that philosophers ranging
from Plato to Hume and Wolff have made a similar mistake? It is hard to see
how attempts to ground morality on feelings of sympathy, social conventions,
and a rational principle of perfection might fall prey to such an objection.

Kant’s argument takes the following form. One reason that a material prin-
ciple cannot be the basis of our duties is that such a principle has the wrong
form. Material practical principles have the form of a hypothetical imperative
and not a categorical imperative. Kant argues that all rational agents are under
a practical principle that is hypothetical in its form: if an agent has adopted
an end, then she should either adopt the necessary means to the end or forgo
the end.10 But a principle having the form of a hypothetical imperative cannot
be the primary principle of morality because it leaves the choice of end open.
As a rational agent, one always has the option of choosing to forgo the end if
one decides there is something else one would rather pursue. The only thing
that one ought to do under a hypothetical imperative is pursue the means that
are necessary for one’s ends. Under hypothetical imperatives, there is no sense
in which a rational agent ought to pursue any given end, except insofar as it
is a means to some further end that the agent has adopted.
Any attempt to justify actions by appeal to hypothetical imperatives threat-
ens an infinite regress. If we justify an action by saying that it was a neces-
sary means to the pursuit of a given end, we have a further question of what
justifies the choice of the end. The only way to justify the choice of the end
under a hypothetical imperative is if the end is a necessary means to some
further end, and so on ad infinitum. Practically speaking, the threat of an infi-
nite regress is not a real threat. After all, we often ground our choice of ends
by appeal to some given inclination. The point of Kant’s discussion is that
such a move does not justify the choice of the end. There is no sense in which
we ought to choose ends that satisfy our given inclinations. We often do make
such choices, but the choices are merely expressions of personal inclinations.
Kant maintains that any attempt to justify a choice of an end on the basis
of given inclinations is grounded on a principle of self-love. He calls it a prin-
ciple of self-love for the following reason. When an agent asks the practical
question “Why should I pursue this end?” and answers the question by say-
ing “The fact that I desire it is good enough reason for me,” the agent is tak-
ing this fact to be a sufficient basis for making the choice. It is a principle of
self-love because the fact that the individual desires it is good enough rea-
son for that individual to pursue the end. The agent has taken a merely sub-
jective inclination and treated it as if it justified the choice. But, according
to Kant, the only way to justify a choice in terms of determining whether or
not it is something that one ought to do, is on the basis of a rational princi-
ple. Practical principles can have only one of two forms: hypothetical imper-
atives and categorical imperatives. Setting to the side imperatives that are
categorical in their form, the only remaining type of principle that can jus-
tify a choice is a hypothetical imperative. But the decision to pursue an end
simply because it is something that I or you happen to want is no justifica-
tion at all—at least not a justification that is sufficient to establish an imper-

ative for action. Lacking any rational justification, the choice is a mere expres-
sion of personal interest.
The upshot of Kant’s argument against philosophical theories that appeal
to subjective inclinations is that they might offer an empirical explanation of
our behavior, but they do not justify our choices of action in terms of any
imperative. While such a charge might hold against empiricists such as Hobbes,
Hutcheson, and Montaigne, how does it work against rationalists such as
Crusius and Wolff? On both of their accounts, our choices are ultimately
grounded on a principle of perfection.
Theological moralists such as Crusius maintain that our choices ought to
be guided by the pursuit of external perfection. As human beings, it is our
place to contribute to the greater perfection of all of God’s creation. But,
when asked why we ought to pursue such perfection, Crusuis’s answer is that
God gives us the end. Whether such an end is implanted in our natural desires,
or the end is natural to our reason, Kant objects on grounds that such a move
does not justify the choice of end. It does not show that we ought to pursue
the greater perfection of all things. All that Crusius and the other theologi-
cal moralists can establish is that we actually do pursue such an end.
Kant’s objection against moral theories that posit an internal objective end
takes a similar form. Rationalists such as Wolff claim that the principle is
innate in our capacity for reason. It is clear that, among the four types of
moral theories listed in Kant’s table, his own theory bears the closest resem-
blance to Wolff’s. Wolff asserts that the principle of perfection is innate in
our capacity for reason, while Kant asserts that the categorical imperative is
innate in our capacity for reason. Kant holds, however, that there is a signif-
icant difference between a categorical imperative and a principle of perfec-
tion. As a rational principle, a principle of perfection is a merely logical
requirement. For any set of beliefs, or desires, or ends, we ought to attempt
to bring them into greater harmony and completeness as a system. The prob-
lem is that a principle of perfection does not, on its own, establish that we
ought to pursue any particular end. As a logical principle, it is a purely for-
mal requirement. The only way Wolff can treat the principle of perfection as
the primary principle of morality is if he can find some way to sneak in a
determinate end. Whether that end is virtue, knowledge, or some other end,
Wolff has given us no reason for thinking that we ought to pursue such an
end. His only recourse is to assert that we do pursue such ends because they
are a natural part of our reason.
All four types of moral theories fall prey to the same objection. The prin-
ciples that they hold up as the primary principle of morality all have the form
of a hypothetical imperative. Hypothetical imperatives establish only that a
means is good relative to some end. In order to show that a given end is worth
pursuing, all of these moral theorists simply assert that we are inclined toward
such an end either because it is something that we desire, or because we have
rational impulses that move us in such a direction. According to Kant, all
such incentives, regardless of whether they are empirical or rational in char-
acter, are impure. As such, they fail to express our freedom as moral agents.
Only an incentive of respect that is generated by an awareness of the cate-
gorical imperative is pure. The reason is that only a principle of this form
expresses our autonomy as moral agents. The difference is a matter of pri-
ority. The feeling of respect is pure because it follows from the moral law.
All other moral theories use a form of justification that puts the incentive
first and the principle second.
At this point, let us turn to Nietzsche’s argument against both rationalist
and empiricist accounts of truth. I hope to show that Nietzsche’s criticisms
can be defended using Kant’s moral argument against consequentialism. If
Nietzsche’s criticisms can be defended in this manner, then his criticisms will
work against any philosophical account of truth that is grounded on a prin-
ciple of self-love. The targets of Nietzsche’s criticisms in his early essay on
truth can be divided, according to Kant’s table, along the axes of subjective
and objective accounts. Taking them in reverse order from Kant’s argument,
let us first examine rationalist accounts of truth.
According to Nietzsche, such theories posit the following kinds of claims.
Rational beings control their behavior entirely by abstractions. Their aim is
to avoid being carried away by a disorderly array of perceptual impressions.
Abstract concepts can be put into a pyramidal order of genus and species,
with the unruly impressions residing at the bottom. Standing back, looking
at the pyramid that we have constructed, we are impressed by those concepts
that are “more fixed, general, known, human of the two and therefore the reg-
ulating and imperative one” (TF, 181). In creating such a world of concepts,
our conduct is regulated by imperatives. These imperatives guide the con-
duct of our inquiry and determine how we ought to form concepts and dis-
tinguish between those assertions that are worthy of being believed and those
that ought to be treated as false. The target of Nietzsche’s criticism is, first
and foremost, the imperatives that rationalists think should guide the con-
duct of our inquiry, and only secondly the beliefs that are held to be true at
any given time as a result of following those imperatives.
Nietzsche makes his criticism of rationalist accounts of truth in the fol-
lowing terms.
When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the
same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seek-
ing and finding. Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding
“truth” within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal,
and then, after inspecting a camel, declare “look, a mammal” I have indeed
brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value.
Nietzsche’s criticism has the same structure as Kant’s criticism of Wolff’s

moral theory. On both accounts, the mistake of the rationalists was to assume
that merely logical principles could establish how we ought to conduct our-
selves—either morally or in scientific inquiry. Logical principles cannot
establish what we ought to hold as true any more than they can establish
ends that are morally worthy of our pursuit. In order to hide this flaw, ratio-
nalists try to sneak in a given end or belief. But the question remains, is that
end really worth pursuing and is that assertion really worth believing? We
should note that Nietzsche does not assert that the belief adopted on the basis
of such a procedure is false. Rather, he says that it has limited value as a
truth. The reason is that the belief is, to some extent, improved by follow-
ing the rationalists’ method. It is rendered more consistent and harmonious
with all the other assertions that are held to be true. But the rationalists have
failed to use a method that honestly asks whether or not the belief itself is
worthy of being believed.
By way of contrast, empiricists explain the origins of our beliefs in the
following kinds of terms. A habitual relation between a word and certain
images is caused by mere repetition. A nerve stimulus causes an image to
appear in our consciousness as a sound or a sight. Objects external to us
cause the stimulation of our nerves. Nietzsche’s first point against an empiri-
cist account is that the appeal to an object outside of us is the “result of a
wrong and unjustifiable application of the concept of causality” (TF, 177).
This concept has led empiricists to formulate a chain of causes, each one
explaining what follows it in the series. Empiricists such as Hobbes and
Hume openly assume that all objects have the same basic nature (material
objects for Hobbes and conscious impressions for Hume), and all relations
between things must be understood in terms of de facto causes. But insuf-
ficient justification is given for the presumption that words, images, nerve
impulses, and objects external to us all have the same nature and can all
stand in causal relations to one another.
Empiricists believe that these kinds of philosophical assumptions should
guide our inquiry. Nietzsche takes issue first and foremost with the impera-
tives that they think should regulate our conduct. What is the basis of these
imperatives? Why not think that there is a difference in kind between nerve
impulses and conscious images? Why not think that the relation between the
two is fundamentally an aesthetic relation and not a merely de facto causal
relation? The question that Nietzsche puts to the empiricists is at root the
same as the question he puts to the rationalists.
The point of Nietzsche’s criticism of both rationalists and empiricists can
be understood by considering his account of our move from the state of nature
to the state of society. In order to end the war of all against all, human beings
forge a peace treaty in which they agree to use concepts according to fixed
conventions. This treaty establishes the difference between truth and lie. The
honest person follows the fixed conventions, the liar uses the fixed conven-
tions to make things that are “unreal appear to be real” (TF, 2). He reverses
the fixed conventions and says, for example, “I am honest,” when the correct
word for his actions is “dishonest.” The liar misuses the proper designations
for his own selfish purposes and causes harm to others. The majority of peo-
ple follow the established conventions, but are their actions any less fraudu-
lent? What the majority of people hate is not being deceived, but the harmful
consequences of being deceived.
Once again, Nietzsche does not assert that there is no value to such a grade
of truth. Rather, he wants to question whether there is a higher grade of truth
that we ought to pursue. The point of his criticism of both rationalists and
empiricists is to question whether or not the imperatives that they recom-
mend for the conduct of our inquiry can lift us out of the this state. In this
state, we can establish a certain peace. We can rest in confidence that the
fixed conventions have the status of accepted certainties. But we lack free-
dom. Nietzsche does not believe that either account can improve our free-
dom. The reason is that neither teaches us to act from a pure impulse to truth.
Rather, they encourage us to seek the pleasant consequences of preserving
the fixed conventions.
3. An Aesthetic Argument for a Pure Impulse to Truth
Nietzsche maintains that art and not morality is the origin of our pure impulse
to truth. I believe that Nietzsche’s purpose in appealing to art is to find a basis
for establishing and perhaps improving our freedom as inquirers. According
to both Nietzsche and Kant, aesthetic judgments express a special kind of
freedom. Kant maintains that this freedom surpasses even the autonomy of
our moral agency.11 Like moral judgments, aesthetic judgments must be free
from any given inclination or contingent purpose. Unlike moral judgments,
aesthetic judgments must be free from any given concept or principle, includ-
ing the ends and principles of reason. Given Nietzsche’s larger philosophi-
cal project, this fact makes it easy to see why he would appeal to art. His
question is one of how the capacity to act from a pure impulse ever evolved
from natural inclinations. Furthermore, he wants to give an account of how
this capacity evolved that does not make an appeal to either language or rea-
son. It is the independence of art from both the concepts embodied in lan-
guage and the principles of reason that makes art an especially appealing
candidate.
At this point, I would like to review the general features of Kant’s account
of aesthetic judgment. At the same time, I will offer some textual evidence
for thinking that there are substantial agreements between Kant and Nietzsche
about the nature of aesthetic judgments. In his early essay on truth, Nietzsche
does not offer an account of aesthetic judgment. As such, I would like to start
by briefly reviewing the agreements that Nietzsche expresses in both The Birth
of Tragedy and Zarathustra with Kant’s aesthetics. According to both Kant and
Nietzsche, there are two types of aesthetic judgments. We experience the sub-
lime when we confront the infinitude of abysses, mountains, and storms. We
experience the beautiful when we hear the harmony of a piano sonata or see
the unity in a painting. Setting to the side the differences between these two
types of judgments, let us focus on the points that are common to both.
Kant’s analytic is an attempt to make sense of three conflicting intuitions
that we share about aesthetics.12 On the one hand, matters of art are a matter
of personal taste. Aesthetic estimations are subjective judgments. Because
they are subjective, there are no objective proofs to which we could appeal
to settle disputes. At the same time, we do quarrel about matters of beauty
and sublimity. If I find a painting beautiful and you think it is ugly, we take
ourselves to be engaged in a real disagreement even if there are no objective
grounds to settle the dispute. In order to help settle our quarrel, I might point
to the harmony of shapes, while you might point to the unattractive colors.
Nietzsche maintains that the distinction between the subjective and the
objective cannot be used in aesthetics to do any philosophical work.
Nietzsche’s main point, like Kant’s, is that aesthetic judgments are not merely
subjective. They are not expressions of what is merely agreeable for an indi-
vidual. A judgment of taste cannot be based on the satisfaction of personal
preferences: “the striving individual bent on furthering his egoistic pur-
poses—can be thought of only as an enemy to art, never as its source” (BT,
41). At the same time, aesthetic judgments are not determinative judgments,
for there are no objective grounds for matters of taste. Nietzsche challenges
the idea that aesthetics is grounded on standards of reason (Z, 166). He wants
to suggest that the aesthetics must be independent of such determinate con-
cepts and principles.
Nietzsche recognizes that there can be quarrels over matters of taste. In
fact, he elevates the idea to a crucial position in his argument in Zarathustra
when he challenges those who would maintain that judgments of taste are
merely subjective expressions of personal preference: “[t]aste—that is at the
same time weight and scales and weigher; and woe unto all the living that
would live without disputes over weight and scales and weighers!” (Z, 117).
The fundamental prerequisite to being a self-conqueror is that one over-
come one’s personal biases and prejudices. According to Kant’s transcen-
dental analysis, judgments of taste must be grounded on a disinterested
pleasure. In order for the pleasure that we take in an aesthetic experience to
be disinterested, we must seek a higher ground for our judgments. In exer-
cising his judgment, Zarathustra tells us that he “had to fly to the highest
spheres that (he) might find the fount of pleasure again” (Z, 98). Not only do
we need to set aside our interest in what we find agreeable and what we find
to be consistent with our prudential interests, but we must also set aside our
interest in satisfying the requirements of morality (BT, 142).
According to Kant’s analysis, aesthetic judgments must be purposive with-
out any given purpose. Zarathustra teaches us to live without any depend-
ence upon given ends. He urges us to renounce any servitude under given
purposes. Often, Nietzsche refers to such a condition as a matter of chance
or accident. It is through the purposiveness of art that purposes grow from
mere accidents (Z, 62). Purposiveness is realized where harmony and unity
are restored to what was merely fragmentary.
Under the last two moments of Kant’s analysis, aesthetic judgments must
make claims of subjective universality and subjective necessity. When we
estimate the beauty or sublimity of an object, we make claims to the effect
that all other human beings ought to agree with our judgment.13 The judg-
ment is universal insofar as it makes a claim on all others. According to
Nietzsche, judgments of taste help us to become reconciled to one another
by teaching the “gospel of universal harmony” (BT, 19–24). A judgment of
taste is necessary insofar as it makes a claim on how others ought to estimate
the object. According to Nietzsche, in the Apollonian state we experience
dreams with a sense of real necessity. For Zarathustra, the “Thou shalt is
higher than to command for those that are sublime” (Z, 48). Nietzsche rec-
ognizes that it is possible to make such claims of necessity only where you
have set aside personal biases and prejudices. As such, you can only make
such claims where you call this cessation of all need “necessity” (Z, 77, 222).
So far, we have reviewed the agreements between Kant and Nietzsche on
aesthetic judgments and have found them to be in substantial agreement on
major points. The fact that the agreements are found in both The Birth of
Tragedy and Zarathustra is evidence that Nietzsche did not dramatically
alter his position on these points in aesthetics between his early and later
periods.14 Furthermore, the fact that “Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral
Sense” and The Birth of Tragedy were published at about the same time indi-
cates that Nietzsche was likely working with such ideas in his early essay
on truth.
Kant tells us that the key to the critique of taste is in the solution to the
following problem. The question is whether the feeling of pleasure that we
take in an aesthetic judgment follows from the judgment, or whether the feel-
ing of pleasure precedes the judgment.15 Only if the feeling of pleasure fol-
lows from the judgment is the judgment free from determination by external
causes. Only if the judgment is free from such causes can we presume to
require that others agree with our judgment. As an aesthetic reflective judg-
ment, the basis for the correctness of the judgment is the complete freedom
of the subject.
Here we find what may be the key to understanding Nietzsche’s account of
aesthetic judgments. In Nietzsche’s terms, the purely perspectival character
of aesthetic judgments is the key to their legislative authority. For Kant, one
who is engaged in an act of aesthetic judgment can tell us how we ought to
judge because only a subjective necessity is presupposed by such judgments.
Taste claims a special kind of autonomy. Only where we have overcome all
of the external causes of bias in judgment, including the tyranny of our feel-
ings, the tyranny of reason (scientific, prudential, and moral) and even the
tyranny of the object and the truth of its existence, does our judgment have
autonomy. Only where autonomy has been realized can we presume to tell
others how they ought to judge, assuming that they have adopted an aesthetic
perspective and distanced themselves from their own biases and prejudices.
The structural similarities between Kant’s two arguments against conse-
quentialism are striking. In both Kant’s ethics and his aesthetics, the issue is
one of the purity of the judgment. Because of the structural similarities between
the two arguments, we can make the same kinds of arguments against ratio-
nalist and empiricist accounts of truth from the perspective of art as can be
made from the perspective of ethics. On Kant’s account, aesthetic reflective
judgments share some of the same features as determinative moral judgments.
Most important, aesthetic reflective judgments are categorical in their form
even though they are singular judgments and are not determined by an objec-
tive principle of reason. Because they are categorical and not hypothetical,
aesthetic judgments must be grounded in a pure impulse. Kant claims that
the experience of the sublime teaches us to esteem in opposition to our inter-
ests and that the experience of the beautiful teaches us to love. In a similar
fashion, Nietzsche claims that the experience of the sublime gives us a height
above our vanity and the experience of the beautiful teaches how to love
something, such as the truth, from a pure impulse (Z, 116–18).
4. Defending Nietzsche’s Appeal to Art Against Kant
In this last section, I want to argue that Nietzsche’s appeal to art as a basis
for our pure impulse to the truth can be defended using arguments from Kant’s
aesthetics. In fact, I will suggest that the aesthetic argument for a pure impulse
can be used to show that Kant’s own account of moral truth is grounded on
an impulse of self-love. That is, on certain questions, Kant has fallen prey to
his own objections against consequentialism. This point is easiest to see if
we examine Kant’s metaphysical claims about the principles of morality.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that Nietzsche is correct to criti-
cize rationalists and empiricists for grounding truth on vanity. Let us sup-
pose that any account of inquiry needs to be grounded on pure impulses in
order to preserve the importance of our freedom. Even if we grant Nietzsche
such assumptions, why should Kant agree that the pure impulse to truth should
be grounded in art? Why cannot we model our obligation to engage in inquiry
on our moral duty to be honest? Even if Nietzsche does not fully develop the
reasons in his early essay, let us examine the advantages of turning to art over
morality.
Nietzsche’s goal is to understand how it is possible for pure impulses to
evolve from what were, originally, merely natural inclinations. The first point
that needs to be made is that Kant’s ethics cannot give the answer to such a
question. Kant’s ethics is grounded on the assumption that our duties are
determined by principles of reason that are absolutely necessary and univer-
sal. Kant believes the principles of morality cannot give us overriding rea-
sons for acting unless they have such a special status. If the principles of
morality are absolutely necessary and universal, then they are true at all times.
Part of the purpose of Nietzsche’s account of the transition from the state of
nature to society is to challenge the assumption that our awareness of the
principles of reason has no history.
On Kant’s account, every minimally rational agent knows the requirements
of duty. Difficulties may arise where there seem to be a conflict of duties,
and the requirements of morality may seem vague where our understanding
of the circumstances is limited, but these are exceptional cases. Nietzsche
challenges such assumptions in the following terms:
We call a man “honest”; we ask, why has he acted so honestly to-day? Our
customary answer runs, “On account of his honesty.” The Honesty! . . . We
really and truly do not know anything at all about an essential quality which
might be called the honesty, but we do know about numerous individualized,
and therefore unequal actions, which we equate by omission of the unequal,
and now designate as honest actions; finally out of them we formulate a qual-
itas occulta with the name “Honesty.” (TF, 179–80)
The suggestion seems to be that a moral epistemology that starts from indi-
vidual cases of fine conduct and then infers certain general principles is prefer-
able to one that merely assumes the general principles from the start. One of
Nietzsche’s reasons for turning to aesthetics is that it gives us a model of
judgment in virtue of which it is possible to evaluate the attractiveness of an
individual case without presupposing any antecedently given principles.
Such a move will give us an epistemology of our normative requirements
that looks something like the epistemology of the natural sciences. In the nat-
ural sciences, our awareness of individual pieces of data comes first. Later,
we infer general laws in order to explain the individual pieces of data.

Nietzsche draws an analogy between the concept of honesty and the concept
of a leaf to make this point. In botany, we start with many different individ-
ual images of leaves. Only later, by a process of abstraction, do we infer the
general concept of a leaf. For us, the general property that all leaves have in
common in virtue of which they are all leaves is an occult property. To claim
that a property is occult is to maintain that it is, for us, hidden from view and
mysterious. The reason is that we have no direct acquaintance with such gen-
eral properties. We always perceive leaves as individual images. We never
directly perceive general properties.
Famously, Kant makes a similar point about the epistemology of the nat-
ural sciences in the first Critique. All of our perceptions are given as indi-
vidual intuitions. The application of general concepts to objects as they exist
is always grounded in individual intuitions. His main reason for insisting that
ethics is different and must start from an awareness of the principles of rea-
son is that ethics is not an inquiry into how we in fact do act, but how we
ought to act. In this respect, ethics is like logic, which does not merely explain
how we in fact do think, but teaches how we ought to think.16 The require-
ments for how we ought to act, like the requirements for how we ought to
think, must be grounded upon timeless principles of reason; otherwise the
requirements could not be absolutely necessary. An ethics or logic that was
grounded on individual cases could never be anything more than an empiri-
cal description of how we in fact do act or think.
It is in response to this objection that we find another advantage of turn-
ing to aesthetics. Namely, it gives us a model of singular judgments in which
the estimations are fundamentally normative. When we estimate the beauty
or the sublimity of a work of art, we make a judgment of the worth of an
individual example. The estimation is one of good or bad or, perhaps more
accurately, better or worse. Using aesthetics as the model for such judgments,
Nietzsche can avoid the charge that the individual pieces of data are merely
empirical observations.
Kant might object that an epistemology built on inferences from individ-
ual cases can give no account of the overriding character of our obligation
to be honest. One response to such an objection is that there is no need to
explain the overriding character of such obligations. Kant mistakenly assumes
that we have knowledge of what duty requires. Based on such an assump-
tion, he argues that our obligations must be grounded on absolutely neces-
sary principles of reason. Furthermore, he had to assume that all minimally
rational agents are quite aware of these principles, even if they cannot fully
articulate their form. Living in the twenty-first century, we are a bit more
sanguine about our understanding of the requirements of morality. Faced with
disagreements on all sides about the moral life, we feel forced to reexamine
assumptions about certainty in the moral realm. Nietzsche, living in an age

much closer to our own than Kant, was willing to challenge such assump-
tions about moral certainty.
Perhaps a better response to the objection starts by pointing out that aes-
thetic judgments, on Kant’s own account, do carry a certain kind of necessity.
While they don’t carry the objective necessity that is implied in Kant’s account
of moral judgment, they do make a claim to subjective necessity. The open
question is whether subjective necessity is sufficient when it comes to truth.
I believe the shift from objective standards of reason to subjective impulses
makes all the difference in the world. If it is not possible to determine at the
outset what the principles of reason really are, or how we ought to use those
principles to determine what the truth really is (without ending in dogma-
tism), then it is an open question why any individual person ought to pursue
the truth. Nietzsche’s task is to show that we may have sufficient subjective
grounds to pursue the truth, even if we do not have any clear idea what it
might turn out to be. If we do not know at the outset what we might find if
we search for the truth, we run the risk of finding something that is contrary
to our desires, disrupts the peace, and even threatens our lives. Given such a
possibility, the task is to show that we have sufficient subjective grounds to
pursue the truth, even if it turns out to be something that is contrary to our
personal interests.
In order to determine whether or not subjective necessities are sufficient
for matters of truth, we need to focus more closely on Nietzsche’s point of
attack. Nietzsche questions the metaphysical assumptions that are often made
about truth. As scientists, we seek to convince ourselves of the “eternal rigid-
ity, omnipresence, and infallibility of nature’s laws” and that everything “is
quite secure, complete, infinite, determined, and continuous” (TF, 185). The
metaphysical principles behind such assumptions include the principles of
sufficient reason and continuity. According to Kant, we have no right to
assume that nature corresponds to such principles. Rather, such principles
are merely regulative for our inquiry. Regulative principles are only subjec-
tively sufficient for us as inquirers.17 We ought to act as if nature was entirely
complete, determined, and continuous, even if it turns out that nature is, in
at least some respects, incomplete, indeterminate, and discontinuous. Kant
tells us that such regulative principles have the status of transcendental hypothe-
ses. They are not objectively sufficient to establish what must be the case,
but they are subjectively sufficient to serve as a belief or as a hope for how
we ought to act.
It is at this level of the debate that Nietzsche can engage with Kant. In a
number of places, Nietzsche forwards some of his most important—and most
contested—ideas as hypotheses, conjectures, and guesses (BT, 32). Nietzsche
insists that we ought to reject any hypotheses that are empty or self contra-
dictory (GM, 156). But the kinds of contradictions that we ought to reject are
not limited only to logical contradictions. There is no logical contradiction
in assuming that we know what honesty is. Nietzsche is attempting to warn
us against making grand assumptions that contradict the purposes of making
a hypothesis in the first place. Such hypotheses are counterproductive to the
purposes of experimental inquiry. In key places in Zarathustra, for example,
Nietzsche addresses himself solely to those experimenters that are willing to
hazard a daring guess.18 He does so to point out that the claims made will be
legitimate only as conjectures and only from the perspective of those that are
engaged in experimental inquiry.
According to Kant, truth and falsity are but one species of the more gen-
eral standards of correctness and incorrectness of judgments.19 Certain aspects
of the standards of correctness may vary from one area of inquiry to the next.
What makes a judgment true in mathematics is different in some respects
from what makes a judgment true in the natural sciences. Furthermore, the
standards of correctness in ethics are not primarily a matter of truth and fal-
sity, but that of right and wrong. In aesthetics, we have no need for a simple
dichotomy when it comes to the correctness of the judgments. Rather, dif-
ferences in terms of degrees of better and worse are more appropriate.
What I find especially insightful about Nietzsche’s early essay is that he
thought to raise questions about the standards of correctness for claims about
truth. Rationalists say that truth is a logical relation between concepts and
objects. Empiricists say that truth is a causal relation between objects, nerve
impulses, and perceptions. Nietzsche seems to be asking, “What is the stan-
dard for judging the correctness or incorrectness of such claims about truth
generally?” Given that there are a number of different standards of correct-
ness, what should be the model for the core set of standards that all areas of
inquiry share? (GM, 286–89). When it comes to claims about truth itself,
should the standard of correctness be modeled on judgments in mathematics
or natural science? Or, should the standard be modeled on judgments of right
and wrong in ethics? Nietzsche suggests that the standards of correctness
should be modeled on aesthetic estimations of better and worse. Art is the
proper model for understanding the origin of our pure impulse to truth because
art is the origin of our pure impulse generally. If aesthetics is the origin of
the general standards of correctness for judgments, then we have reason to
question whether or not we need a set of objective standards at the core.
Why should we think that Nietzsche is right to claim that art is the origin
of our pure impulse to truth? Why shouldn’t we agree with Kant that a pure
impulse to the truth can and should be grounded in practical reason? I believe
that Nietzsche can make the same criticism of Kant that he has made of empiri-
cist and especially rationalist accounts of truth. Namely, that on certain ques-
tions, Kant’s account of truth is grounded in a principle of self-love. The main
reason Kant falls prey to such an objection is that there are a whole host of
questions Kant is unable or unwilling to admit are real questions.
Let us start with Nietzsche’s example of honesty. According to Kant, why
should we be honest? The answer is that any minimally rational agent rec-
ognizes a duty to be honest. Rational agents need no further reason to do their
duty because the principles of morality give them overriding reasons to be
moral. On Kant’s account, can a moral agent honestly question what it is to
be honest? What I mean is, supposing the circumstances are perfectly clear,
and supposing that there are no apparent conflicts of duty, can a moral agent
honestly raise the question, what ought I to do? Kant maintains that any min-
imally rational agent already knows the answer. Such an agent may feel a
temptation to violate the duty to be honest, but the agent recognizes that the
duty to be honest should always be given the highest respect.
Nietzsche seems to think that we can raise honest questions about our val-
ues. On the one hand, the requirements of conscience do appear to impose
necessary obligations for our conscience. On the other hand, we can raise
questions about what, in particular, is required by an obligation. Furthermore,
we can raise questions about the legitimacy of an obligation itself. As moral
agents, we realize that social traditions and personal biases may unduly affect
our conception of the requirements of morality. Even those requirements of
conscience that seem the clearest and the strongest may, in a manner great
or small, be infected by certain biases and prejudices.
Kant insists that all minimally rational agents know what duty requires
and, as such, are aware of the principles of morality. When a question about
the requirements of morality arises, all we need to do is carefully abstract
from our personal biases and prejudices and focus our attention on the prin-
ciples that are innate to our power of practical reason. In effect, the answers
to any moral questions that might arise are already contained in the princi-
ples embedded in our conscience. We can rest assured that the principles are
absolutely universal and necessary. As a system of principles, the set is com-
plete, consistent, and unchanging. Why does Kant believe that the system of
moral principles has these general features? In ethics, he takes a stronger
stand than he does in natural science. The ideas of freedom, immortality, and
God are regulative ideas that are justified only as practical postulates. But
the ideas that the requirements of morality are absolutely universal, neces-
sary, complete, consistent, and unchanging are constitutive of the very idea
of a categorical imperative. In ethics, we know with significantly more cer-
tainty that the requirements of morality really do have these general features.20
Nietzsche is free to question Kant’s assumptions on such general points.
How do we know the truth about honesty with such certainty? Kant’s response
is that we just know the principles of morality. Nietzsche’s point is that such
a response is empty. It is not an answer to the question. Rather, it is an attempt
to avoid the question. Why does Kant seek to avoid the question? His reason
seems to be that the question leads us to skepticism about the requirements
of morality. A natural response to Kant’s worry is that such questions may
lead us to be skeptical about claims to certainty in ethics, but it is an open
question as to whether or not we need such certainty in ethics.
Kant’s mistake was to turn his back on questions that we ought not ignore.
He closes the door to inquiry by setting to the side questions to which we
ought to seek answers. That is a bad habit to inculcate. Nietzsche’s criticism
works equally well against both the rationalists and Kant (GM, 289–92). The
attempt to avoid real questions by saying that the question has no answer, or
by simply assuming an answer, is ultimately grounded on vanity. The fact
that you happen not to like the consequences that follow from the question
is not sufficient reason to set the question to the side.
Kant would have been better off to forward such claims as regulative prin-
ciples. He could have made his claims about the absolute necessity and uni-
versality of the principles of duty as transcendental hypotheses. While such
a move would have avoided premature claims to certainty, it would not remove
Nietzsche’s objection. As a hypothesis, the claim that the principles of prac-
tical reason are absolutely universal and necessary is not a good hypothesis.
The problem is not that it is false. For all we know, the principles of moral-
ity may be absolutely necessary and universal. The problem is that, as a
hypothesis, it does not answer real questions. How can I be so sure that my
understanding of my moral duties is correct? I have a clear understanding of
the principles of morality and it is plausible to suppose that those principles
are absolute. Simply asserting that the principles of morality are absolutely
universal and necessary does not answer the question, regardless of whether
the assertions are forwarded with certainty or only as hypotheses.
Having made what I take to be the main point of Nietzsche’s criticism in
his early essay on truth, and having turned the criticism toward Kant’s ethics,
let us step back and consider how he might have obtained the upper hand in
the debate. The main question is, When engaged in inquiry, why ought I to
commit myself to standards of correctness in general? Kant and Nietzsche
agree that the pursuit of truth must be grounded on a free impulse. The advan-
tage of modeling the standards of correctness on aesthetic judgments and not
moral judgments of duty is the following. The former but not the latter are
free from determination by any given purpose or rule. As such, Nietzsche
does not need to make nearly as many presumptions about the nature of truth
as Kant. The fact that aesthetic judgments are not determined by objective
principles was thought to be their greatest weakness. But Nietzsche seeks to
turn a weakness into a source of strength. The greatest strength of aesthetic
judgments is their superior freedom from such presumptions. Aesthetic judg-
ments are a natural model for such hypotheses because neither makes a claim
to truth. When we forward a hypothesis, we say that it would explain a cer-

tain phenomenon if it were truth. We think it is a plausible conjecture, but
we do not (at least yet) claim that it is true. Similarly, the freedom of an aes-
thetic judgment is predicated upon its independence from any claims to truth.
Nietzsche wants to raise further questions. What is the origin of our pure
impulse to the truth? How can beings that were once governed entirely by
self-interest ever gain the capacity for freedom? In order to gain the upper
hand on these questions, Nietzsche does not need to assume that the capac-
ity to act from pure impulses did in fact evolve from natural inclinations. The
main advantage to his position is not merely that he can give answers to ques-
tions that Kant cannot. Rather, the main advantage to his position is that he
can raise the questions in the first place. Because he does not need to pre-
suppose the status of any rules or ends, he is free to pursue any line of inquiry
whatsoever, let the consequences of what he discovers be damned.
Once we have decided to address such questions in the terms of art, we
have new resources available to us. Instead of having to ignore certain diffi-
culties, we can stare them in the face. For Nietzsche, overcoming our servi-
tude to vanity is the greatest hurdle: “Nature threw away the key; and woe
to the fatal curiosity which might be able for a moment to look out and down
through a crevice in the chamber of consciousness, and discover that man is
indifferent to his own ignorance, is resting on the pitiless, the greedy, the
insatiable, the murderous, and, as it were, hanging in dreams on the back of
a tiger” (TF, 177). Ultimately, the way in which we need to face such chal-
lenges is to let the sublimity of the task remind us of the sublimity in our-
selves.
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NOTES
1. References to Nietzsche’s works are cited in the text with the following abbreviations:
TF: “On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense,” in Early Greek Philosophy and Other
Essays, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 171–92.
BT and GM: The Birth of Tragedy and The Geneology of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing
(New York: Doubleday, 1956).
Z: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1966).
BGE: Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1990).
2. My purpose in comparing Nietzsche’s and Kant’s arguments is to show that there are
points of agreement between the two and that Kant’s arguments can be used to defend some
of Nietzsche’s claims. I do not attempt to show that Nietzsche’s views are based on his read-
ing of Kant’s texts. My assumption is that there are at least enough points of agreement between
Kant and Nietzsche about the nature of aesthetic judgment to get a debate between the two
off the ground.
3. Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965); Jacques Derrida,
Spurs: The Styles of Nietzsche, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979); Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche et la Métaphore (Paris: Payot, 1972), translated in David B.
Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977).
4. Alexander Nehemas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1985); John Wilcox, Truth and Value in Nietzsche (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1974); Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1990).
5. See Matthew Rampley in Nietzsche, Aesthetics, and Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000); David Cartwright, “Nietzsche’s Kantian Critique of Pity,” Journal of
the History of Ideas 45:1 (1984).
6. Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald Cress and Peter Gay (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1987).
7. I believe Nietzsche’s points in the second section of the essay express his general agree-
ment with Friedrich Schiller’s argument in The Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man about
both the fragmentation of the modern character and the need to appeal to art to restore harmony.
8. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 41
[40].
9. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1981), 13, [400–401].
10. See Tom Hill Jr., “The Hypothetical Imperative,” in Dignity and Practical Reason, 17–37.
11. Kant refers to the special freedom expressed in our aesthetic reflective judgments as
heautonomy to distinguish it from the rational autonomy of our moral judgments. Heautonomy
is a special kind of freedom in part because the imagination is not determined by a given
principle.
12. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 209–19
[337–47].
13. Ibid., 53–64 [211–19], 85–95 [236–44].
14. In this claim, I agree with J. Porter, The Invention of Dionysus (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000).
15. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 61–64 [216–19].
16. Kant, Logic, trans. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (New York: Dover Publications,
1974), 16.
17. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 617–38
[B 670–97].
18. For example, Nietzsche employs the hypothesis of the primordial one in The Birth of
Tragedy, the conjecture of eternal return in Zarathustra, and hypothesis of the Will to Power in
the Nachlass.
19. Kant, Logic, 55–63.
20. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 71 [69].

Nietzsche and Kant On The Pure Impulse To Truth (Downard)

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Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth

Jeffrey Brian Downard

Published by Penn State University Press

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Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth

W hen it comes to truth, most interpreters assume that Nietzsche is pri-

Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 27, 2004

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 19

ethical argument against consequentialism. Third, I compare Nietzsche’s argu-

1. A Reconstruction of Nietzsche’s Presuppositions

particular truth will depend on one’s individual interests. If truth is relative

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 21

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 23

philosophical accounts of truth that attempt to ground inquiry on a vain

2. An Ethical Argument for a Pure Impulse to Truth

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 25

In the “Analytic of Principles” section of the second Critique, Kant argues

and a rational principle of perfection might fall prey to such an objection.

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 27

tion at all—at least not a justification that is sufficient to establish an imper-

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 29

Nietzsche’s criticism has the same structure as Kant’s criticism of Wolff’s

3. An Aesthetic Argument for a Pure Impulse to Truth

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 31

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 33

4. Defending Nietzsche’s Appeal to Art Against Kant

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 35

we infer general laws in order to explain the individual pieces of data.

assumptions about certainty in the moral realm. Nietzsche, living in an age

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 37

N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 39

to truth. When we forward a hypothesis, we say that it would explain a cer-

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N IETZSCHE AND K ANT ON THE P URE I MPULSE TO T RUTH 41

4. Alexander Nehemas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

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