PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 171056. March 13, 2009.*
DINAH C. CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS,
MARIETTA L. LINATOC, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Land Titles; Land Registration; Two Systems of Land Registration Distinguished; The registration
of an instrument under the wrong system produces no legal effect.—The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took notice of the Resolution dated 17 December 2002 of the LRA in Consulta
No. 3483, which involved circumstances similar to those in petitioner’s case. The LRA distinguished
between two systems of land registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the Property
Registration Decree, and the other is the system of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344
(now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree). These systems are separate and distinct from each
other. For documents involving registered lands, the same should be recorded under the Property
Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an instrument under the wrong system produces no
legal effect.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Certificate of Title; Title is generally defined as the lawful cause
or ground of possessing that which is ours; Certificate of title is a mere evidence of ownership, it is not the
title to the land itself.—The Court must clarify that a title is different from a certificate of title. Title is
generally defined as the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
259
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 259
Castillo vs. Escutin
lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of
ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a
just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title,
on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under the Torrens
system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the
decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original registration.
Same; Same; A certificate of title issued in an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.—The cancellation of petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of
the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already
covered by TCT No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of
title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. All persons must take
notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No. 129642,
the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name
a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the
name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the
name of another person, not supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled;
otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the
same property.
Same; Same; Tax Declarations; Tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to
prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same.—As
between Catigbac’s title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner’s title, evidenced only by a tax
declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the
same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac’s ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s certificate of
title is260
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used
to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same.
Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square-meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it
is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Yee Law Office for petitioner.
Camara, Tolentino & Associates Law Office for respondent Antonio M. Escutin.
Francisco, Balderama and Associates for respondents Aquilina A. Mistas and Marietta
L. Linatoc.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1
Court filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision, dated 18 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533, as well as
2
the Resolution, dated 11 January 2006 of the same court denying reconsideration of its afore-
3
mentioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Joint
Resolution dated 28 April
4
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-36.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B.
Dimaampao, concurring; Id., at pp. 37-57.
3 Id., at p. 58.
4 Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Raquel R.M. Cunanan-Marayag, with the recommending
approval of
261
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 261
Castillo vs. Escutin
2004 and Joint Order dated 20 June 2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
5
in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, dismissing petitioner Dinah C. Castillo’s
complaint for grave misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, against respondent public officers Antonio
M. Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas) and Marietta L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together
with private individuals Lauro S. Leviste II (Leviste) and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to
Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her
favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla
K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters,
situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No.
00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an
Order dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of
6
Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc.
for conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by “Perla K.
Mortilla, et al.” and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and
recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a
Certification stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Decla-
7
_______________
Director Joaquin F. Salazar, and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez; Id., at pp. 102-118.
5 Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao, with the recommending approval
of Director Joaquin F. Salazar, and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez; Id., at pp. 119-122.
6 Records, pp. 22-28.
7 Id., at p. 30.
262
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
 14 Id., at p. 37.
ration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified 15 Id., at p. 38.
true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City
8 16 Id., at p. 40.
17 Id., at p. 39.
issued a Certification attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and
9

Perla, was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the 264
issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. 264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public
auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the Castillo vs. Escutin
scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30 P.M. 18

Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development
Corporation (Summit Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit On 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled
Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not and TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was issued in its place.
show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint Affidavit before the 19

threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging several public officers and private
influential for petitioner to tangle with. individuals as follows:
“32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and July 2002 and onwards in
The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and petitioner bought Raquel’s
Lipa City, Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin], the Register of Deeds of Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the
1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713. Local Assessment Operations Officer III of the City Assessor’s Office of Lipa City[;] Marietta Linatoc,
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition of Raquel’s Records Clerk, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City, who are public officers and acting in concert and
1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in the Primary Entry Book and Registration conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L. Orense, Executive Vice President and Vice
Book of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 3344 : (a) Notice of 10 President, respectively[,] of Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation x x x while in the discharge
Levy; (b) Certificate of
11 of their administrative functions did then and there unlawfully, through evident bad faith, gross
_______________ inexcusable negligence and with manifest partiality towards Summit caused me injury in the sum of
P20,000,000.00 by cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City and instead
issuing in the name of Francisco Catigbac TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities well knew that TCT
8 Id., at p. 29.
9 Id., at p. 31. No. 129642 was already cancelled and therefore not legally entitled to a new tax declaration thereby
10 Now Chapter XIII, Section 113 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration manifestly favoring Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation who now appears to be the
Decree, on recording of instruments related to unregistered Lands. successor-in-interest of Francisco Catigbac, all to my damage and prejudice.” (Emphasis ours.)
20

11 Records, p. 32.
Petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit gave rise to simultaneous administrative and
263
preliminary (criminal) investigations, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 263 0728-F, respectively.
_______________
Castillo vs. Escutin
Sale; (c) Affidavit of Publication; and (d) Writ of Execution.
12 13 14
18 Id., at p. 40.
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration 19 Id., at pp. 4-20.
20 Id., at p. 19.
No. 00942-A, indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and
15

Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters. 265

When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in
Lot 13713, she was shocked to find out that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 265
No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with Castillo vs. Escutin
the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the circumstances surrounding the alleged
Title (TCT) No. 129642 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A, both in the name of Francisco
16 17
sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty and in the documents evidencing the same.
Catigbac (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting the The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002
supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty, to wit: by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, appeared to be a “one-way street.”
ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of LEONARDO YAGIN: For purposes
more particularly stipulated in the contract ratified before Atty. Ernesto M. Vergara of Lipa City as per
It did not express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its
Doc. No. 639; Page No. 29; Book No. LXXVI; Series of 1976. consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. No representative of Summit Realty signed
Date of instrument—2-6-1976 the left margin of each and every page of said Deed. It also did not appear from the Deed that
Date of inscription—6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m. a representative of Summit Realty presented himself before the Notary Public who notarized
ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF SUMMIT POINT the said document. The Tax Identification Numbers of Yagin, as vendor, and Summit Realty,
REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP:— as vendee, were not stated in the Deed.
ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE:—Of the parcel of land described in this cert. of title is hereby sold Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation, Summit Realty could only act through
and cancelled TCT No. 134609(SN-6672938) Vol. 671-A, having been issued by virtue of the aforesaid
instrument ratified before Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Notary Public for Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page
its Board of Directors. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B was presented for
31, Book No. LXVII, Series of 2002. recording before the Register of Deeds, it was not accompanied by a Secretary’s Certificate
Date of instrument: July 22, 2002 attesting to the existence of a Board Resolution which authorized said purchase by Summit
_______________ Realty. There was no entry regarding such a Secretary’s Certificate and/or Board Resolution,
whether on TCT No. 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A Secretary’s Certificate eventually
12 Id., at pp. 33-34.
13 Id., at pp. 35-36.
surfaced, but it was executed only on 30 July 2002, five days after TCT No. T-134609 in the
name of Summit Realty was already issued.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and recorded by the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City on 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., at exactly the same date and time TCT No. T-134609
was issued to Summit Realty. Petitioner theorizes that for this to happen, TCT No. T-134609
was already prepared and ready even before the presentation for recording of the Deed of
Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried. The agency Catigbac supposedly executed
in favor of Yagin was266
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
extinguished by Catigbac’s death. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had authority to
execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of Summit Realty,
making the said Deed null and void ab initio.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death, having
acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s
Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part
of 2000, Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbac’s property used to form
part of a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square meters,
covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbac’s death, Lot 1 was informally
subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of whom
again transferred their shares to other persons; Summit Realty separately bought subdivided
parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a consolidated area of 105,648 square
meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey; despite the subdivision and transfer of
ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 covering the same was never cancelled; and the owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated at the back of the
original copy of TCT No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order dated 3
21
January 2001, the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the same
terms and condition as in its original form.
Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection
with Catigbac’s property, purportedly without legal personality and capacity. The Special
Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the
_______________
21 Penned by Judge Vicente F. Landicho; Id., at pp. 46-48.
267
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 267
Castillo vs. Escutin
right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No.
00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but
Orense, who, through a letter dated 27 June 2001, requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181
22
covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orense’s
request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, later
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the
name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit
Realty, it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of
Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in her Complaint Affidavit the alleged
scheme perpetrated against her and the involvement therein of each of the conspirators:
“28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation went into action right after I paid Orense
a visit sometime May 2002. Summit resurrected from the grave. (sic) Francisco Catigbac whom they knew
to be long dead to face possible litigation. This is the height of malice and bad faith on the part of Summit
through its Lauro Leviste II, the Executive Vice President and Benedicto Orense, the Vice President. I had
only in my favor a tax declaration to show my interest and ownership over the 5,000 sq.m. of the subject
parcel of land. Evidently, Leviste and Orense came to the desperate conclusion that they needed a TCT
which is a far better title than any tax declaration.
Both then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by causing on June 26, 2002 at 11:20
a.m. the inscription with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City of a purported Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Leonardo Yagin (Annex “I”). Next, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “J”) was made the following
month in order to
_______________
22 Id., at p. 50.
268
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
make it appear that Yagin unilaterally sold to Summit the subject parcel of land purportedly belonging to
Francisco Catigbac. Since the latter was already dead and realizing that the agency was already
extinguished, Annex “J” was not signed or executed by Leviste or Orense. This fact however did not deter
the two from securing a BIR clearance on July 25, 2002. Also, on this same day, July 25, 2002, Annex “J”
was presented to Atty. [Escutin] at 2:30 p.m. simultaneously, at exactly the same time of 2:30 p.m. TCT
No. T-134609 in Summit’s name was issued by Atty. [Escutin] WITHOUT benefit of the submission of the
necessary documentation such as the Board Resolution, DAR Clearance, Revenue Tax Receipts for
documentary stamps, real property tax clearance, proof of payment of transfer tax, tax declaration, articles
of incorporation, SEC certification, license to sell and/or certificate of registration by HLURB, etc. Without
the total and lightning speed cooperation of Atty. [Escutin] to close his eyes to the total absence of said
vital documents, the desperately needed TCT to erase my interest and ownership would not have come into
existence. Atty. [Escutin] had indeed acted in concert and in conspiracy with Leviste and Orense in
producing Annex “H” and Annex “K.”
29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the already cancelledTCT No. 129642 in the name of
Francisco Catigbac to be the basis in seeking the cancellation of TD #00942A in my name (Annex “F”). The
Tax Mapping Division of the Office of City Assessor of Lipa City opined that my 5,000 sq.m. was (sic) part
and parcel of the 105,648 sq.m. covered by TCT No. 129642. A photocopy of the Certification from said
division is hereto marked and attached as Annex “P,” hereof. Aquilina Mistas, the Local Assessment
Operations Officer III of the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City then conveniently caused the
disappearance of my Notice of Levy and other supporting documents which she had personally received
from me on March 13, 2002. For her part of the conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk,
forthwith cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu thereof she issued TD #00949-A in the name of Francisco
Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas and Linatoc were presented a cancelled TCT as basis for obliterating
my 5,000 sq.m. The fact of cancellation is clearly stated on the posterior side of TCT No. 129642. Both can
read. But the two nevertheless proceeded with dispatch in canceling my TD, though they had ample time
and opportunity to reject the request of Summit who is not even the registered owner appearing on TCT
No. 129642. Francisco Catigbac could269
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 269
Castillo vs. Escutin
not have been in front of Mistas and Linatoc because he was already six feet below the ground. Mistas and
Linatoc could have demanded presentation of the document authorizing Summit in requesting for the
cancellation of my TD. Also, they could have demanded from Summit any document transferring my
interest and ownership in favor of a third party. Or, at least, they could have annotated in Tax Declaration
No. 00949-A the fact that I bought my 5,000 sq.m. from a public auction sale duly conducted by the court
sheriff. Alternatively, Linatoc and Mistas should have advised Summit to the effect that since they already
appear to be the owners of the subject parcel of land, the new tax declaration should bear their name
instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed conspired with Summit in the illegal and unwarranted cancellation of
my TD and in covering up the behind-the-scenes activities of Summit by making it appear that it was
Francisco Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even Leonardo Yagin, the alleged attorney-in-fact did not
appear before Mistas and Linatoc. Yagin could not have appeared because he is rumored to be long dead.
The aforementioned acts of the two benefitted (sic) Summit through their manifest partiality, evident bad
faith and/or gross inexcusable negligence. Perhaps, there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin is dead
because he does not even have a TIN in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. If indeed Yagin is already
dead or inexistent[,] the alleged payment of the purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on July 25, 2002 is a mere
product of the fertile imagination of Orense and Leviste. To dispute this assertion[,] the live body of
Leonardo Yagin must be presented by Orense and Leviste.” 23
After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriff’s Deed of
Final Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro-indivisoshare in Lot 13713 registered
with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. She also sought the annotation of her Affidavit of
Adverse Claim on the said 5,000 square meters on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty.
Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner Juanita
H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance regis-
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 15-18.
270
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
tered, since:
“The Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic) ownership in favor of the
Plaintiff, [Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it happen (sic) that the presented Tax Declaration [No.]
00942-A is already transfer (sic) in the name of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo, therefore[,] the registration of
Sheriff (sic) Final Sale is no longer necessary.” 24
Escutin likewise denied petitioner’s request to have her Affidavit of Adverse Claim
annotated on TCT No. T-134609 on the following grounds:
“1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the registered owner. The registered owner
is Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134609 of
the Registry of Deeds for Lipa City.
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or interest of the adverse claimant
is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San
Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel Buenaventura. The registered
owner, Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the
judgment debtor or a party in the said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them
(Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her adverse claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment
debtor who holds no title over the property.” 25
Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) the denial of her request for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed
of Final Sale/Conveyance and annotation of her adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609. This
petitioner did on 3 July 2003.
While her Consulta was pending before the LRA, petitioner
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 84, 102.
25 Id., at p. 103.
271
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 271
Castillo vs. Escutin
filed a Supplemental Complaint Affidavit and a Second Supplemental Complaint
26
Affidavit with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, bringing to its attention the
27
aforementioned developments. In her Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit, petitioner
prayed that Sta. Ana be included as a co-respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-
03-0728-F, averring that the latter’s actuation deprived petitioner of a factual basis for
securing a new title in her favor over her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713,
because the public auction sale of the said property to her could never become final without
the registration of the Sheriff’s Deed.
The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F filed their
respective Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. T-134609 reflected
the same date and time of entry of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin (as Catigbac’s
attorney-in-fact) and Summit Realty, i.e., 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., in accordance with
Section 56 of Presidential Decree
28
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 57-59.
27 Id., at p. 60.
28 SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies.—Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in
which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including copies of writs
and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book
the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded
as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which
it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial and city governments
shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and registration.
Every deed or other instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, so filed with the Register of Deeds shall be
numbered and
272
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. He emphasized that his duty
as Register of Deeds to register the Deed of Absolute Sale presented before him was purely
ministerial. If the document was legal and in due form, and there was nothing mutilated or
irregular on its face, the Register of Deeds had no authority to inquire into its intrinsic
validity based upon proofs aliunde. It was not true that he allowed the registration of the
Deed of Absolute Sale notwithstanding the absence of the required documents supporting the
application for registration thereof. On the contrary, all the required documents such as the
DAR Clearance, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Certificate Authorizing Registration
(CAR), Real Property Tax, Transfer Tax, Secretary’s Certificate and Articles of Incorporation
of Summit Realty were submitted. While it was true that the Secretary’s Certificate did not
accompany the Deed of Absolute Sale upon the presentation of the latter for registration,
Section 117 of the Property Registration Decree gives the party seeking registration five days
to comply with the rest of the requirements; and only if the party should still fail to submit
the same would it result in the denial of the registration. The License to Sell and the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board Registration of Summit Realty are only required when a
subdivision project is presented for registration. The use of TINs in
_______________
indexed and endorsed with a reference to the proper certificate of title. All records and papers relative to registered land in
the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public in the same manner as court records, subject to such reasonable
regulations as the Register of Deeds, under the direction of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may prescribe.
All deeds and voluntary instruments shall be presented with their respective copies and shall be attested and sealed
by the Register of Deeds, endorsed with the file number, and copies may be delivered to the person presenting them.
Certified copies of all instruments filed and registered may also be obtained from the Register of Deeds upon payment
of the prescribed fees.
273
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 273
Castillo vs. Escutin
certain documents is a BIR requirement. The BIR itself did not require from Yagin as vendor
his TIN in the Deed of Absolute Sale, and issued the CAR even in the absence thereof. The
Register of Deeds, therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As to the Certification earlier issued
by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners
Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by any certificate of title, Escutin explained that
the Register of Deeds was not technically equipped to determine whether a cadastral lot
number was within a titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or participating
in the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A for, as Register of Deeds, he
was not concerned with the issuance (or cancellation) of tax declarations.
Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the Office of the City
Assessor, Lipa City, disputed petitioner’s allegations that she personally received from
petitioner copies of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents, and that she caused
the disappearance thereof. Although she admitted that said documents were shown to her by
petitioner, she referred petitioner to the Receiving Clerk, Lynie Reyes, who accordingly
received the same. Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian of records of the Office
and she should not be held responsible for the missing documents. She opined that petitioner’s
documents could have been among those misplaced or destroyed when the Office of the City
Assessor was flooded with water leaking from the toilet of the Office of the City Mayor. As
Assistant City Assessor for Administration, Mistas identified her main function to be the
control and management of all phases of administrative matters and support. She had no
hand in the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and the issuance of
Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A for such function pertained to another division over
which she did not exercise authority. Thus, it was also not within her function or authority to
demand the presentation of certain documents to support the cancellation of peti-274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
tioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A or to cause the annotation of petitioner’s interest on
Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A.
Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the Office
of the City Assessor, Lipa City, she was in charge of safekeeping and updating the North
District Records. With respect to the transfer of a tax declaration from one name to another,
her duty was limited only to the act of preparing the new tax declaration and assigning it a
number, in lieu of the cancelled tax declaration. It was a purely ministerial duty. She had no
authority to demand the presentation of any document or question the validity of the transfer.
Neither was it within her jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner’s interest should have
been annotated on Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A. Examining the documents
presented in support of the transfer of the tax declaration to another’s name was a function
belonging to other divisions of the Office of the City Assessors. The flow of work, the same as
in any other ordinary transaction, mandated her to cancel petitioner’s Tax Declaration No.
00942-A, and to prepare and release Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A after the
transfer had been reviewed and approved by other divisions of the Office. It was also not true
that TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was already cancelled when it was presented
before the Office of the City Assessors; the photocopy of said certificate of title with the Office
bore no mark of cancellation.
Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged with the respondent public officers,
admitted that they were corporate officers of Summit Realty. They related that Summit
Realty bought a parcel of land measuring 105,648 square meters, later identified as Lot 1-B,
previously included in TCT No. 181, then specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the
name of Catigbac. As a result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from
Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good faith that said
property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of275
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 275
Castillo vs. Escutin
the latter’s certificate of title over the same. Catigbac’s right as registered owner of Lot 1-B
under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was superior to petitioner’s, which was based on a mere tax
declaration. Leviste and Orense rebutted petitioner’s assertion that the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, and Summit Realty was a “one-way street.”
The Deed was actually signed on the left margin by both Yagin and the representative of
Summit Realty. The inadvertent failure of the representative of Summit Realty to sign the
last page of the Deed and of both parties to indicate their TINs therein did not invalidate the
sale, especially since the Deed was signed by witnesses attesting to its due execution.
Questions as regards the scope of Catigbac’s Special Power of Attorney in favor of Yagin and
the effectivity of the same after Catigbac’s death can only be raised in an action directly
attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot 1-B, and not in an administrative case and/or
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman, which constituted a collateral attack
against said title. Leviste and Orense further explained that since the owner’s duplicate of
TCT No. 181 was lost and was judicially ordered replaced only on 3 January 2001,
entries/inscriptions were necessarily made thereon after said date. As to Orense’s failure to
show petitioner any document proving ownership of Lot 1-B by Summit Realty when the
latter paid him a visit, it was not due to the lack of such documents, but because of petitioner’s
failure to establish her right to peruse the same. Orense also denied ever threatening
petitioner during their meeting. Finally, according to Leviste and Orense, petitioner’s
allegations were based on mere conjectures and unsupported by evidence. That particular
acts were done or not done by certain public officials was already beyond the control of Leviste
and Orense, and just because they benefited from these acts did not mean that they had a
hand in the commission or omission of said public officials.
After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F were
finally submitted for resolution.276
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
In a Joint Resolution dated 28 April 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
29
Luzon gave more credence to respondent Escutin’s defenses, as opposed to petitioner’s charges
against him:
“Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he convincingly explained that he allowed the
registration of the allegedly defective Deed of Sale because he, as Register of Deeds, has no power to look
into the intrinsic validity [of] the contract presented to him for registration, owing to the ministerial
character of his function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said respondent, all the documents
required for the registration of the Deed of Sale were submitted by the applicant.
We likewise find said respondent’s explanation satisfactory that Section 56 of P.D. 1529 mandates
that the TCT bear the date of registration of the instrument on which the said TCT’s issuance was based.
It is for this reason that TCT 134609 bears the same date and time as the registration of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, which deed served as basis for its issuance.
As to his denial to register [herein petitioner’s] Affidavit of Adverse Claim and Sheriff’s Certificate of
Final Sale, through the issuance by the Registry of Deeds Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana, of the 29 June
2003 Order denying registration thereof, such matter had been raised by herein [petitioner] in a letter-
consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As the criminal
and administrative charges respecting this issue is premised, in part, on a matter still pending with the
LRA, we find it premature to make a finding on the same.
It is for the same reason that we deny the motion contained in the Second Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit praying for the inclusion, as additional respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana, who is impleaded
solely on the basis of having signed, by authority of Escutin, the 29 July 2003 Order of denial of
[petitioner’s] application for registration.
Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully demonstrate, through Consulta 2103 dated 25
July 1994, wherein the denial of registration by the Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of
_______________
29 Rollo, pp. 102-118.
277
Quezon City was upheld by the LRA Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice in the different Registries
that Examiners are given authority by the Register to sign letters of denial.” 30
 The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon declared in the same Joint Resolution
that there was no basis to hold respondents Mistas and Linatoc administratively or criminally
liable:
“In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges that Aquilina Mistas caused
the disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents received from [petitioner] on 13
March 2003 when she applied for the issuance of a Tax Declaration in her favor, she did not present her
receiving copy thereof showing that it was Mistas who received said documents from her. Neither did she
show that Mistas is the employee responsible for record safekeeping.
Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation that respondent Marietta Linatoc cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued Tax Declaration 00949-Q (sic) on the basis of a cancelled Transfer
Certificate of Title upon the behest of Summit [Realty], which was not the registered owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioner’s] allegation, admits having physically cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and having prepared a new declaration covering the same property in
Catigbac’s [name], as mandated by the flow of work in the City Assessor’s Office. However, she denies
having the authority or discretion to evaluate the correctness and sufficiency of the documents supporting
the application for the issuance of the Tax Declaration, arguing that her official function is limited to the
physical preparation of a new tax declaration, the assignment of a new tax declaration number and the
cancellation of the old tax declaration, after the application had passed the other divisions of the City
Assessor’s Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are the ones officially
designated to receive applications for issuance of Tax Declaration, evaluate the sufficiency of the
documents supporting such applications, and on the basis of the
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 112-113.
278
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
foregoing recommend or order the cancellation of an existing Tax Declaration and direct the annotation of
any fact affecting the property and direct the issuance of a new tax declaration covering the same property.
In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official designation of said respondents. While [petitioner]
impleads Mistas, in her capacity as Local Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records
Clerk, Mistas, in her counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, i.e., Assistant City Assessor for
Administration, while Linatoc claims to be the Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the City Assessor’s
Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents not having been neatly defined by [petitioner], this Office
cannot make a definitive determination of their liability for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, which charges both relate to the performance or discharge of Mistas’ and Linatoc’s official
duties.”
31
Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any probable cause to
criminally charge private individuals Leviste and Orense for the following reasons:
“Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully cause the transfer of the title
of [herein petitioner’s] property to Summit sufficiently explained by respondent Register of Deeds, such
allegation against private respondents loses a legal leg to stand on.
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently outline the official functions of respondents
Mistas and Linatoc to pin down their specific accountabilities, the imputation that private respondent (sic)
conspired with said public respondents respecting the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 00942-A is
likewise stripped of any factual and legal bases.”
32
As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter
property, which issue comprised the very premise of OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-
0728-
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 114-115.
32 Id., at p. 115.
279
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 279
Castillo vs. Escutin
F, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ruled that such matter was not within its
jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil action before the courts of justice.
In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed:
“WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that: (1) the administrative case
against public respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC
be DISMISSED, for lack of substantial evidence; and (2) the criminal case against the same respondents
including private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for
lack of probable cause.” 33
In a Joint Order dated 20 June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
34
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took notice of the
Resolution dated 17 December 2002 of the LRA in Consulta No. 3483, which involved
circumstances similar to those in petitioner’s case. The LRA distinguished between two
systems of land registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the
Property Registration Decree, and the other is the system of registration for unregistered
land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree). These systems
are separate and distinct from each other. For documents involving registered lands, the same
should be recorded under the Property Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an
instrument under the wrong system produces no legal effect. Since it appeared that in
Consulta No. 3483, the registration of the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan, the Certificate of Sale and
the Affidavit of Consolidation was made under Act No. 3344, it did not produce any legal effect
on the disputed property, because the said property was already titled when the
_______________
33 Id., at p. 116.
34 Id., at pp. 119-122.
280
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
aforementioned documents were executed and presented for registration, and their
registration should have been made under the Property Registration Decree.
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in the same Joint Order,
took into account petitioner’s withdrawal of her appeal en consulta before the LRA of the
denial by the Register of Deeds of her request for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which prompted the LRA Administrator to
declare the consultamoot and academic. For want of a categorical declaration on the
registerability of petitioner’s documents from the LRA, the competent authority to rule on the
said matter, there could be no basis for a finding that respondent public officers could be held
administratively or criminally liable for the acts imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court challenging the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution and 20 June
2005 Joint Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The appeal was
35
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90533.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on 18 October 2005, also finding no
36
reason to administratively or criminally charge respondents. Essentially, the appellate court
adjudged that petitioner can not impute corrupt motives to respondents’ acts:
“Without evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money or other pay-off or that they were
induced by offers of such, the Court cannot impute any taint of direct corruption in the questioned acts of
respondents. Thus, any indication of intent to violate the laws or of flagrant disregard of established rule
may be negated
_______________
 35 Petitioner no longer impleaded Leviste and Orense as respondents in her Petition before the Court of Appeals. She also did not appeal the
non-inclusion of Sta. Ana as a respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F.
36 Rollo, pp. 37-57.
281
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009
Castillo vs. Escutin
by respondents’ honest belief that their acts were sanctioned under the provisions of existing law and
regulations. Such is the situation in the case at bar. Respondent Register of Deeds acted in the honest
belief that the agency recognized by the court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered owner
Francisco Catigbac and Leonardo Yagin subsisted with respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to Summit
as the vendee, and that the Special Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale presented as evidence
during said proceedings are valid and binding. Hence, respondent Escutin was justified in believing that
there is no legal infirmity or defect in registering the documents and proceeding with the transfer of title
of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner Summit. On the other hand, respondent Linatoc could not be held
administratively liable for effecting the cancellation in the course of ordinary flow of work in the City
Assessor’s Office after the documents have undergone the necessary evaluation and verification by her
superiors.” 37
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his investigatory power. If the Ombudsman,
using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings,
unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court pronounced that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in
dismissing petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit against respondents.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The challenged Joint Resolution dated April 28, 2004 and Joint Order dated June 20, 2005 in OMB-L-A-
03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.” 38
In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of Ap-
_______________
37 Id., at pp. 55-56.
38 Id., at p. 56.
282
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
peals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for failing to present new matter which
the appellate court had not already considered in its earlier Decision.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,
with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION
OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT
(sic);
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS
COULD NOT BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR UNDULY FAVORING SUMMIT TO THE
DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER. 39
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, Registration Decree
which provides:
“SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate.—In case of loss or theft of an owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf
to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered.
If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a
new certificate to him or for the registration of any new instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such
loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and
281 due hearing, direct the issu-
_______________
39 Id., at p. 19.
283
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 283
Castillo vs. Escutin
ance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place
of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.”
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of the lost one. However, respondents did not
only issue a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in its place Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of
Catigbac. Respondents did not even annotate petitioner’s existing right over 5,000 square
meters of Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A.
Petitioner maintains that a new owner’s duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring
ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one. Under Section 109 of the Property Registration
Decree, the new duplicate of title was issued only to replace the old; it cannot cancel existing
titles.
Petitioner’s position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous arguments and befuddled
reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from a certificate of
title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours.
It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore,40
may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which
is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere
41
evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under the Torrens system, a
42
_______________
40 Antonio H. Noblejas and Edilberto H. Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds (2007 revised ed.), p. 2,
citing Hunt v. Easton, 21 N.W. 429, 431.
41 Id., at p. 3.
42 Id., at p. 4.
284
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the
decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original
registration.
Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the new owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its purchase of the same from Yagin, the attorney-in-fact
of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said property. Summit Realty merely sought the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it could
accordingly register thereon the sale in its favor of a substantial portion of Lot 1 covered by
said certificate, later identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s title to Lot 1-B passed on by sale to
Summit Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the separation of the said portion from the
rest of Lot 1 and the issuance of a certificate of title specifically covering the same. This
resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which
was subsequently cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Petitioner’s reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally
misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of
title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of the issuance
of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed
the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No. 181 (and
subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an
absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose
name appears285
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009
Castillo vs. Escutin
therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. All persons must take notice, and
43
no one can plead ignorance of the registration. Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No.
44
129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac
and issue in his name a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already
covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration
for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any
certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor
would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the same property.
As between Catigbac’s title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner’s title,
evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence
of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to
Catigbac’s ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s certificate of title is binding upon the whole world,
including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself. Time and again, the Court
has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title
to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the
same. Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square-meter property from Raquel, her
45
judgment debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence
her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed that, “[c]uriously, as to how and
when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K.
_______________
43 Barrera v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 559, 569-570; 372 SCRA 312, 319 (2001).
44 Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 815, 823; 288 SCRA 574, 581 (1998).
45 See Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 651, 659; 352 SCRA 47, 54 (2001); Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 73465, 7 September 1989, 177 SCRA 313, 320-321.
286
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated
in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent.” 46
Petitioner’s allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty
by Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already
acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes
conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot
be collaterally attacked in the administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree
categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant petitioner’s prayer in the instant
Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised by petitioner on the administrative
liability of respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it establishes that petitioner’s Complaint
Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon gave rise to two charges: (1) OMB-L-
A-03-0573-F involved the administrative charge for Gross Misconduct against respondent
public officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728-F concerned the criminal charge for violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 47
_______________
46 Rollo, p. 53.
47 Section 3(e) of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act reads:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
285 partiality, evident bad
287
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 287
Castillo vs. Escutin
against respondent public officers and private individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dismissed both charges.
In the Petition at bar, petitioner only assails the dismissal of the administrative charge for
grave misconduct against respondent public officers. Since petitioner did not raise as an issue
herein the dismissal by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, of the criminal charge against respondent public officers for violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the same became final and executory. 48
In Domingo v. Quimson, the Court adopted the well-written report and recommendation
49
of its Clerk of Court on the administrative matter then pending and involving the charge of
gross or serious misconduct:
“Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, ‘misconduct’ is a ground for disciplinary action. And under MC No. 8, S. 1970, issued by the
Civil Service Commission on July 28, 1970, which sets the ‘Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in
Administrative Cases and other Matters Relative Thereto,’ the administrative offense of ‘grave misconduct’
carries with it the maximum penalty of dismissal from the service (Sec. IV-C[3], MC No. 8, S. 1970). But
the term ‘misconduct’ as an administrative offense has a well defined meaning. It was defined in Amosco
vs. Judge Magno, Adm. Mat. No. 439-MJ, Res. September 30, 1976, as referring ‘to a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer.’ It is a misconduct ‘such as affects the performance of his duties as an officer and not such
only as effects his character as a private individual.’ In the
_______________
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
48 See Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Rabat, 398 Phil. 654, 667-668; 344 SCRA 706, 716 (2000).
49 A.M. No. P-1518, 19 August 1982, 115 SCRA 814.
288
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Escutin
recent case of Oao vs. Pabato, etc., Adm. Mat. No. 782-MJ, Res. July 29, 1977, the Court defined ‘serious
misconduct’ as follows:
‘Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this would be merely an
error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The term “serious misconduct” is a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action more particularly, unlawful behavior of gross
negligence by the magistrate. It implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to violate the law, or were a persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules. We have previously ruled that negligence and ignorance on
 the part of a judge are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained assert that a particular action was within or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it
by a reasonable interpretation. This is not so in the case at bar.’ ” (Italics supplied.) may be true that petitioner should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No.
00942-A was being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such would be the
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present
the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were a
statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that respondents should have
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
done or not done a particular act. A perfect example was her assertion that respondents
Luzon and the Court of Appeals found that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate
Mistas and Linatoc should have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in
petitioner’s charge of grave misconduct against respondents. For this Court to reverse the
the name of Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or
rulings of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals, it must recognizes the annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any
necessarily review the evidence presented by the parties and decide on a question of fact. reliable evidence, petitioner’s charge that respondents conspired with one another and with
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture.
is one of fact. 50
Just because the acts of respondents were consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not
Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
mean that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner prejudice. Respondents’ actions
the Rules of Court. In order to resolve this issue, the Court would necessarily have to look
were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by
into the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings below. It is not the
sale to Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by
function of the Court to reexam- certificates of title.
_______________
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED.
50 Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 164787, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 402, 409.
The Decision dated 18 October 2005 and Resolution dated 11 January 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner
289 Dinah C. Castillo.
VOL. 581, MARCH 13, 2009 289 SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Castillo vs. Escutin
ine or reevaluate the evidence all over again. This Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction
in these cases being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by
the lower courts or administrative bodies performing quasi-judicial functions. It should be
emphasized that findings made by an administrative body, which has acquired expertise, are
accorded not only respect but even finality by the Court. In administrative proceedings, the
quantum of evidence required is only substantial. 51

Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not disturb findings
of fact. The Court cannot weigh once more the evidence submitted, not only before the
Ombudsman, but also before the Court of Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770,
findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence which a
52

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 53

The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that respondents did not commit gross misconduct.
Evident from the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution of the former and the 18 October 2005
Decision of the latter is that they arrived at such findings only after a meticulous
consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties.
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to convincingly
explain that they had only acted in accordance therewith in their dealings with petitioner
and/or her documents. Respondents also enjoy in their favor the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their official duty. The burden of proving otherwise by substantial
_______________

51 See Basuel v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 143664, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 118, 126-127.
52 Dr. Almanzor v. Dr. Felix, 464 Phil. 804, 810-811; 419 SCRA 641, 647 (2004).
53 Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

290

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Castillo vs. Escutin
evidence falls on petitioner, who failed to discharge the same.
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions held by
respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How then could she even
 G.R. No. 161034. June 30, 2009.*
ZENAIDA ACOSTA, EDUARDO ACOSTA, ARNOLD ACOSTA, DELIA ACOSTA, SPS.
TEODULO MACHADO AND AURORA ORENZA, SPS. ROLDAN PALARCA AND PACITA
PANGILINAN, SPS. FROMENCIO JONATAS AND LUCENA M. MARIANO, SPS.
MARCIAL IGLESIA AND VIRGINIA LAPURGA, ATTY.-IN-FACT FELINO MACARAEG,
SPS. MANUEL MANGROBANG AND VALERIANA SOTIO, SPS. VIRGINIA DELA ROSA
AND ROMEO DELA ROSA, SPS. PACIFICO SOTIO AND LOLITA SORIANO, JUAN
DALINOC (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY DAUGHTER CONSUELO DALINOC, SPS.
MARIANO TORIO AND MAXIMA MACARAEG, REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS
TORIBIA TORIO AND MAYUMI MACARAEG, TEOFILO MOLINA AND AVELINO DIZON,
petitioners, vs. TRINIDAD SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR, respondents.
Land Titles; Indispensable Parties; Since no indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars
in their petition for cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac,
herein petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said court.—The petition for cancellation of
entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have been directed against specific persons:
namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably, against their
successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of the property over the years because it is in
the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly, the Salazars should have impleaded as party defendants
the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those claiming ownership over the property
under their names because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this case. Since no
indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of entry filed
before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said
court. Consequently, the judgment or order of the said court never even acquired finality.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
263
VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 263
Acosta vs. Salazar
Same; Same; The failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition
for cancellation of entries in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 40287 should have been a ground for
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case; Although the
action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of
authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action.—The
failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries
in OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings
of the case. Yet, although the action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still
null and void for want of authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded
in the action. Thus, the orders issued by said court dated October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986 never
acquired finality. Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.
Same; Torrens Title; Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and
indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct
action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law.—To allow any individual, such as the Salazars in
this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing an ex
parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system
was adopted in this country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the
legality of the title, except claims that were noted, at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto. Once a title is registered under the Torrens system, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts or sitting in the “mirador su casa” to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and
indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct
action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.264
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acosta vs. Salazar
Orlando M. Lambino for petitioners.
Eriberto S. Guerrero, Jr. for respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 25, 2003 Decision of the Court 1
of Appeals (CA) as well as its November 25, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 70161, which
2
reversed and set aside the December 20, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
3
Branch 64, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7256. Said RTC decision dismissed the complaint for
quieting of title filed by herein respondents Trinidad Salazar and Aniceta Salazar against
petitioners.
Below are the facts.
On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar (hereinafter,
Salazars), filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and
Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue. The Salazars claim that two of the entries—Entry
4
Nos. 19756 and 20102—annotated at the back of the aforesaid title are void since no
consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the entries;
and that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled OCT No.
40287, is non-existent according to
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon Magtolis
(retired) and Arturo D. Brion (now Supreme Court Associate Justice), concurring; Rollo pp. 72-88.
2 Id., at pp. 95-96.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 40-43.
4 Docketed as LRC Land Case No. L-2829 before Branch 63, RTC of Tarlac and nentitled: IN RE: CANCELLATION OF
ENTRY, TITLE AND ISSUANCE OF TRANSFER TITLE, TRINIDAD SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR, Petitioers; I Records, pp. 222-
223.
265
VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 265
Acosta vs. Salazar
a certification issued by the RD. On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to
5
grant the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry No. 20102. No respondent was 6
impleaded in the said petition.
Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to
direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles issued under Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 and to
cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. The motion was granted in an Order
issued on November 7, 1986. 7
_______________
5 CA Rollo, p. 74.
6 The dispositive portion of the October 21, 1986 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, The Register of Deeds of Tarlac is hereby ordered after payment of the required legal fees to CANCEL
Entry No. 20102 found at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 40287 of the Land Records of Tarlac and to issue a new
transfer certificate of title over Lots (sic) Nos. 75, 76, and 288 embraced in OCT No. 40287 in the names of Trinidad Salazar
married to Loreto Dasala and Aniceta Salazar married to Pablo Dungca both residents of Paniqui, Tarlac, thus partially
canceling OCT No. 40287 with respect to said lots.
The new transfer certificate issued to petitioners is hereby subject to real estate tax lien due to the government to be
annotated in said new title.
SO ORDERED. (II Records, p. 736.)
7 Pertinent portion of the November 7, 1986 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the URGENT MOTION is hereby granted for being resoundingly meritorious.
The Register of Deeds of Tarlac, Tarlac is ordered to implement the cancellation of Entries No. 19556 (sic) and 20102
at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 40287 of its office by recalling and cancelling all the titles it had issued based
on the cancelled entries and for the Assessor’s Office, Tarlac, Tarlac to cancel all tax declarations it had issued based on said
cancelled entries. The Assessor is directed to declare or re-declare for taxation purposes Lots (sic) 75, 76 and 288 of the Cad.
Survey of Ramos, in the name of the titled owner, Juan Soriano based on the latter’s title.
SO ORDERED. (Id., at p. 737.)
 266
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acosta vs. Salazar
On November 20, 1986, the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners
of the affected property be ordered to appear before the court to show cause why their titles
should not be cancelled. 8 13 Id., at p. 123.
On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of Tarlac be
ordered to comply with the court’s order issued on November 7, 1986. The RD, however,
explained that to comply with the said court order would remove the basis for the issuance of
TCT No. 9297 which title had, in turn, been cancelled by many other transfer certificates of
title and would indubitably result in the deprivation of the right to due process of the
registered owners thereof. On this basis, the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars
9
to elevate the matter en consultato the Land Registration Commission (now Land
Registration Authority or LRA). After the Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC
directed the RD of Tarlac to comply with the October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986 orders.
Threatened with contempt, the RD elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, which, in turn, issued a resolution directing
the RD to comply with the RTC’s orders. On March 7, 1989, OCT No. 40287 was reconstituted
10
and TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars, sans Entry Nos. 19756 and
20102.
It was at this stage of the proceedings that herein petitioners together with other
subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed property—twenty-seven (27) titleholders in
all —filed their formal written comment dated April 17, 1989. In their comment, the
11 12
oppositors contended, among others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for
value,
_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 75 and 148.
9 Id., at p. 75.
10 Id., at pp. 75-76.
11 CA Rollo, p. 103.
12 Id., at p. 122.
267
VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 267
Acosta vs. Salazar
and that the lower court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues
of ownership. 13
On September 14, 1989, the said court, apparently realizing its mistake, issued an Order,
stating thus:
“Upon motion of Atty. Alcantara and without objection on the part of Atty. Molina and Atty.
Lamorena, all the incidents in this case are hereby withdrawn without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate action in a proper forum.
SO ORDERED.” 14
This prompted the Salazars to file a complaint for quieting of title impleading herein
petitioners as well as other individuals who claim to have purchased the said property from
the heirs of Juan Soriano. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7256 before Branch 64 of
the RTC of Tarlac. The complaint alleged that TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of
15
the Salazars without Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 at the back of said title, but the previous
TCTs issued by the RD of Tarlac as well as the tax declarations existing in the Assessor’s
Office have not been cancelled and revoked by the said government agencies to the detriment
and prejudice of the complainants (herein respondents). They also alleged that Pcs-395, from
which Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V were taken, is non-existent and, thus, the court should cause
the cancellation and revocation of spurious and null and void titles and tax declarations. 16
Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg, Martha
Estacio (both deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg, Lucio Macaraeg, represented by Eufracia Maca-
raeg Baluyot as attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter,
Macaraegs) maintained that the No-
_______________
14 II Records, p. 771; Exh. “7.”
15 I Records, pp. 1-9.
16 Rollo, pp. 76-77.
268
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acosta vs. Salazar
vember 7, 1986 order of the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case. They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is
void and that the case for quieting of title is not a direct, but a collateral, attack against a
property covered by a Torrens certificate. 17
Defendants, now herein petitioners, for their part, maintained that the Plan of
Consolidation Subdivision Survey Pcs-396 had been an existing consolidation-subdivision
survey plan annotated on OCT No. 40287 under Entry No. 20102 dated February 17, 1950
from which TCT No. 9297 was issued covering Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V, inclusive, in the
names of the heirs of Juan Soriano. They argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of
the Salazars is spurious and null and void from the beginning since it was acquired pursuant
to an illegal order issued by the court. By way of special and affirmative defenses, they also
18
alleged, among others, (1) that the Salazars were not among the heirs of the late Juan
Soriano, not within the fifth civil degree of consanguinity, and hence, they have no right to
inherit; (2) that TCT No. 219121 constitutes a cloud upon the Torrens title of herein
petitioners, and should therefore be cancelled and revoked; (3) that assuming, without
admitting, that the Salazars have any right over the lots in question their right to enforce
such action had already prescribed by laches or had been barred by prescription since more
than forty (40) years had lapsed since the heirs of Juan Soriano had registered the lots in
question under TCT No. 9297 on February 17, 1950; and (4) that petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest acquired the lots in question in good faith and for value from the
registered owners thereof. 19
_______________
17 Id., at p. 78.
18 Id., at pp. 78-79.
19 Id., at pp. 80-81.
269
VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 269
Acosta vs. Salazar
Defendant spouses Francisco Jonatas and Lucena M. Mariano and spouses Manuel
Mangrobang and Valeriana Sotio filed their answers practically raising the same defenses. 20
Meanwhile, on July 29, 1991, petitioners, together with the Macaraegs and Jonatas, et
al., filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment rendered by RTC Branch 63 of
21
Tarlac, Tarlac. The case, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25643, was, however, dismissed on the
ground of litis pendencia. 22
On December 20, 2000, Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac dismissed the complaint for
quieting of title. The trial court faulted the Salazars for failure to present proof that they are
heirs of the late Juan Soriano. It also declared TCT No.
23
_______________
20 Id., at p. 81.
 21 CA Rollo, pp. 101-117. hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known
22 Pertinent portion of the decision dated January 15, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25643 reads:
Considering the incidents that form the backdrop of the present petition as hereinabove discussed in this and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. 30

decision, it is clear that the present petition now before this Court is a duplication of the case already filed and
pending before Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac (Civil Case No. 725[6]). The main issue in said
case, which is for quieting of the respective titles of all the parties involved, is the validity of the action taken by
the respondent Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court in Case No. L-2829 which led to the issuance of T.C.T. No.
219121 in the names of the Salazars, private respondents in the case now before us. It is apparent that any
decision to be rendered in Civil Case No. 7256, which was filed ahead of this case, will settle the issue of who has
the valid titles to the property in question. In the determination of this issue, the validity of the orders issued by
the respondent Branch 63 necessarily will come to the fore and will have to be determined in the said proceedings.
xxx
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (CA Rollo, pp. 124-125.)
23 II Records, pp. 825-829.
Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the Salazars—both in Branch 63 of
the RTC of Tarlac for the cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 and later in Branch 64 of
the RTC of Tarlac for quieting of title—can hardly be classified as actions in rem. The petition
for cancellation of entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have been directed
against specific persons: namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as appearing in Entry No. 20102
and, indubitably, against their successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of
the property over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly,
the Salazars should have impleaded as party defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or
Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those claiming ownership over the property under their names
because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this case. Since no 31

270 indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein petitioners are
_______________
Acosta vs. Salazar
219121 issued in the name of the Salazars as null and void, and affirmed TCT No. 9297 as 30 Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 ed., p. 42.
31 Supra note 4.
well as all certificates of title derived therefrom. 24

Unsatisfied, the Salazars appealed to the CA, which ruled in their favor.
25
272
According to the CA, it was erroneous for Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac to reverse and
declare as null and void the decision of Branch 63, which is a court of equal rank. Such issue
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
should have been properly ventilated in an action for annulment of final judgment. Acosta vs. Salazar
Consequently, the orders issued by RTC Branch 63, had become final and executory, hence, not bound by the dispositions of the said court. Consequently, the judgment or order of the
32

covered by res judicata. 26

The CA also struck down the arguments raised by the appellees that the orders of RTC
Branch 63 are null and void for lack of proper notice. It ratiocinated that the proceeding is a
land registration proceeding, which is an action in rem. This being so, personal notice to the
owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the
said court never even acquired finality.
Apparently realizing their mistake, the Salazars later on filed an action for quieting of
title, also an action quasi in rem, albeit this time before Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac.
Because the Salazars miserably failed to prove the basis for their claim, the RTC dismissed
the complaint. In fact, the RTC was bold enough to have pronounced thus:
33

court with jurisdiction over the res and over the parties. 27
“Who are the heirs of Juan Soriano who caused the consolidation and in whose favor TCT No. 9297
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
28 29
was issued? Certainly, they are not the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs claim that they are the only heirs, they
_______________ should file a case against those who executed the consolidation in whose favor [E]ntry [N]o. 20102 was
made.
24 The fallo of the December 20, 2000 RTC Decision reads: x x x In its order dated February 24, 2000, this Court ruled that it is necessary that plaintiffs should
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: prove that they are the heirs of Juan Soriano, the registered owners as indicated in OCT No. 40287 of (sic)
1. Dismissing the complaint; Vicenta Macaraeg, the late spouse. Despite the cue, the plaintiffs opted not to present evidence on how
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. 219121; they became the heirs of Juan Soriano or Vicenta Macaraeg. There being [no] evidence presented to prove
3. Restoring or maintaining the validity of [E]ntry No. 20102 at the back of OCT No. 40287 and also
that plaintiffs are the heirs of the late Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, they had no right and cause of
affirming TCT No. 9297 and all titles derived therefrom.
No pronouncement as to costs. action to prosecute this case.” 34

SO ORDERED. (Id., at pp. 828-829.)

25 Filed on June 15, 2001 and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 70161; CA Rollo, p. 19. Needless to say, the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in
26 Rollo, p. 86. the petition for cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground for the
27 Id., at p. 87.
28 Id., at pp. 89-94. RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case. Yet, although the action
35

29 Id., at pp. 95-96. proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for
_______________
271

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 271 32 B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul, G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 402, 432.
33 Rollo, p. 70.
Acosta vs. Salazar 34 II Records, pp. 827-828.
35 Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345 (1925) and Cortez v. Avila, 101 Phil. 705 (1957) cited in I Regalado, Remedial Law
Pivotal to the resolution of this case is the determination of the validity of the action Compendium, 2002 ed., p. 82.
taken by the Salazars in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac.
We rule for petitioners. 273

It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 273
rem and not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be
instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the Acosta vs. Salazar
state or notice by mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of want of authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded
the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would in the action. Thus, the orders issued by said court dated October 21, 1986 and November 7,
36

1986 never acquired finality. Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.
37 38
 Paraphrasing by analogy this Court’s ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage
System v. Sison, a void order is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid order. It may
39
be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be
given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place and thus
tioners who, for themselves, were able to secure TCTs in their own names. All of these would
lead to the inevitable conclusion that if there is any validity to the claim of the Salazars over
the said property—although such issue is not the subject of the present case—the same had
already prescribed or, at the very least, had become stale due to laches.
45

cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2003 Decision of the
protection to those who seek to enforce the same. Accordingly, all proceedings founded on the Court of Appeals including its November 25, 2003 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE.
void court order are themselves regarded as invalid, and the situation is the same as it would Accordingly, the December 20, 2000 Decision rendered by Branch 64 of the Regional Trial
be if there was no order issued by the court. It leaves the party litigants in the same position Court of Tarlac City, Tarlac is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
they were in before the trial. A void order, like any void judgment, may be said to be a lawless
40
SO ORDERED.
thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight. 41 Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.
_______________
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.
36 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 267-268; 280 SCRA 20, 37 (1997); Alabang Development Corporation v.
Valen-zuela, No. L-54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 261, 277 (1982); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181 Phil. 432; Note.—While it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
93 SCRA 238 (1979); and Tanhu v. Judge Ramolete, 160 Phil. 1101; 66 SCRA 425 (1975).
37 Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119193, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 672, 689-
registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property
690; Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722-723 (1925). by reason of laches. (Isabela Colleges, Inc. vs. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, 344 SCRA 95
38 That which is void originally does not by lapse of time become valid. [2000])
39 G.R. No. L-40309, August 31, 1983, 124 SCRA 394 (1983).
40 Id., at p. 404, citing 31 Am. Jur., 91-92.
——o0o——
41 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 20, 57; Leonor v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 112597, April 2, 1996, 256 SCRA 69, 82. _______________

274 45 Article 1141 of the CIVIL CODE provides in full:

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by
prescription.
Acosta vs. Salazar
More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property registered
under the Torrens system. To allow any individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to
impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing an ex
parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the
Torrens system was adopted in this country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop
forever to any question on the legality of the title, except claims that were noted, at the time
of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. Once a title is 42

registered under the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the courts or sitting in the “mirador su casa” to avoid the possibility
of losing his land. Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and
43

indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only

upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law. 44

Finally, this Court also takes note of the fact that for more than 30 years—from the time
Entry No. 20102 was annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 on February 17, 1950 until the
time of the filing of the ex parte petition for cancellation of entries on the said certificate of
title on November 19, 1985—the Salazars remained deafeningly quiet and never made any
move to question the issue of ownership over the said land before the proper forum. They also
failed to ventilate their claim during the intestate proceeding filed by the heirs of Juan
Soriano sometime in 1939. Likewise, they miserably failed to stop the transfer of portions of
the property to peti-
_______________

42 Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590-591 (1915).

43 Id.
44 Section 48 of PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 provides in full:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.—A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

275

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 275

Acosta vs. Salazar
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
1

VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 315 Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Buenaventura J.
2

Guerrero (retired) and Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed from the service) of the Eighth Division of the Court of
Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes Appeals; Rollo, pp. 29-37.
No copy of this resolution was submitted to the Court.
3

G.R. No. 142938. August 28, 2007. * Penned by Judge Johnson L. Ballutay; Rollo, p. 93.
4

Id., p. 33.
MIGUEL INGUSAN, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF AURELIANO I. REYES, represented by 5

Lot 126, Cad. 342-D; id., p. 29.

CORAZON REYES-REGUYAL and ARTEMIO S. REYES, respondents.
6

**
Id.
7

Property; Land Titles; The issue of the validity of title (e.g. whether or not it was issued fraudulently 317
or in breach of trust) can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.— We agree with
the CA that OCT No. P-6176 remains valid. The issue of the validity of title (e.g. whether or not it was VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 317
issued fraudulently or in breach of trust) can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes
purpose. A certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally.
succeeded by his son Ignacio who also later died and was succeeded by his son, petitioner
Same; Same; The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public should be able to rely on a Miguel Ingusan. Macaria also died and was succeeded by her child, Aureliano I. Reyes, Sr.
8

registered title.—The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public should be able to rely on a (father of respondents Artemio Reyes, Corazon ReyesReguyal, Elsa Reyes, Estrella Reyes-
registered title. The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most Razon, Aureliano Reyes, Jr., Ester Reyes, Reynaldo Reyes and Leonardo Reyes). Thus, 9

effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim petitioner is the grandnephew of Leocadio and Aureliano, Sr. was the latter’s nephew. 10

of ownership is established and recognized. In Filestate Management, Inc. v. Trono, 482 SCRA 578 (2006),
we explained: It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to
land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
After the death of Leocadio, Aureliano, Sr. was designated by the heirs as administrator
of the land. In 1972, while in possession of the land and in breach of trust, he applied for and
11

without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the “mirador su casa” to avoid the was granted a free patent over it. As a result, he was issued OCT No. P-6176 in 1973.
12 13

possibility of losing his land. In 1976, petitioner filed an accion reivindicatoriaagainst Aureliano, Sr. and his wife
Jacoba Solomon seeking the recovery of Lot 120-A with an area of 502 sq. m. which was part
Same; Same; OCT No. P-6176 which was registered under the Torrens System on the basis of a free of the land at issue here. But the case was dismissed because petitioner did not pursue it.
14

patent became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year.—OCT No. P-6176 which was Also in 1976, Aureliano, Sr. executed a special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of his son
registered under the Torrens System on the basis of a free patent became indefeasible and incontrovertible
after the lapse of one
Artemio authorizing him to mortgage the land in question to any bank. Using that SPA,
_______________ Artemio mortgaged the land to secure a loan of P10,000 from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). 15

* FIRST DIVISION. In 1983, Aureliano, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his children, the respondents. 16

** The Court of Appeals was originally impleaded as respondent. However, it was excluded pursuant to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of _______________
Court.

316 8 His two sisters, Eladia and Arcadia died with no heirs; id., p. 62.
9 Id.
10 Id.
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 11 Id., p. 30.
12 The free patent was issued on May 17, 1972; id., p. 35.
Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes 13 The title was issued on February 29, 1973; id.
year as provided in Section 32 of PD 1529: x x x Upon the expiration of said period of one 14 Civil Case No. 927 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch IV; id., p. 63.
Id., p. 30.
year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
15

Id.
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy
16

by action for damages against the applicant or any other person responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis 318
supplied)
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes
Bauto, Bauto & Flores Law Offices for petitioner. In 1986, petitioner paid the PNB loan. The mortgage over the land was released and the
Edralin S. Mateo for respondents. owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176 was given to him. 17

On June 19, 1988, respondents and petitioner entered into a Kasulatan ng Paghahati-
hati Na May Bilihanwherein they adjudicated unto themselves the land in question and then
CORONA, J.:
sold it to their co-heirs, as follows: (a) to petitioner, 1,171 sq. m. and (b) to respondent Estrella,
83 sq. m. This deed was notarized but not registered. 18

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
1 2 3
On January 8, 1990, respondent Corazon, despite signing the Kasulatan, executed an
(CA) dated January 21, 2000 and April 10, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 56105 which affidavit of loss, stating that she could not find the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176.
modified the decision dated April 17, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan
4 5
This was registered and annotated on the original copy of said title. 19

City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 25 in Civil Case No. 2145-A1. Subsequently, the following documents appeared purportedly with the following dates:
This case involves a 1,254 sq. m. residential land located in Poblacion, San Leonardo,
Nueva Ecija originally owned by Leocadio Ingusan who was unmarried and childless when
6

he died in 1932. His heirs were his two brothers and a sister, namely, Antonio, Macaria and 1. a)April 23, 1994 —notarized deed of donation of titled property supposedly executed
20

Juan. Antonio died and was

7
by the spouses Aureliano, Sr. and Jacoba, whereby said spouses donated 297 sq.
21

_______________
 m. of the subject land to respondent Artemio and the remaining 957 sq. m. to 1. and TCT Nos. NT-239747 and NT-239748 were issued in the names of petitioner
petitioner; and Florentina Fernandez, respectively. 24

2. b)September 5, 1994—cancellation of affidavit of loss supposedly executed by

respondent Corazon stating that the annotation of the affidavit of loss on the title
On June 27, 1995, petitioner took possession of his portion and built his house thereon.
should be canceled and the petition for a new title was
25

On July 4, 1995, respondents filed an action for cancellation, annulment and surrender
of titles with damages against petitioner and Florentina Fernandez in the RTC of Cabanatuan
_______________ City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 25. In their complaint, they alleged the following, among others:
they inherited the land in question from their father, Aureliano, Sr.; petitioner caused the
Id.
17
preparation of the spurious deed of donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss,
Id. According to petitioner, this document was not implemented; id., p. 63.
agreement of subdivision with sale and forged the signatures appearing thereon except his
18

Id. Why she did this considering that she had divested herself of her interest in the land under the Kasulatan ng
19

Paghahatihati Na May Bilihan was never explained. (petitioner’s) own and, in conspiracy with Fernandez, fraudulently registered said documents
The year “1982” was superimposed on the typewritten year of 1994; id., p. 34.
20
which resulted in the cancellation of OCT No. P-6176 and the eventual issuance to them of
The signatures of petitioner and respondent Artemio also appeared thereon, presumably as donees; id., p. 31.
TCT Nos. NT-239747 and NT-239748. They prayed that these titles be declared null and void
21

319 and that petitioner and Fernandez be ordered to surrender the land and pay damages to
them. 26

VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 319

In his defense, petitioner alleged that respondents’ father, Aureliano, Sr., fraudulently
Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes secured a free patent in his name over the land using a fictitious affidavit dated April 10,
1970 purportedly executed by Leocadio selling to him the land in question and, as a result,
OCT No. P-6176 was issued to him; that it was respondent Artemio who proposed to petitioner
1. no longer necessary because she had already found the missing owner’s duplicate the scheme of partition that would assure the latter of his share with the condition, however,
copy of OCT No. P-6176; that he (Artemio) would get a portion of 297 sq. m. (which included the share of respondent
2. c)September 27, 1994—agreement of subdivision with sale purportedly executed by Estrella of 83 sq. m.) because he had already earlier sold it to Fernandez and in fact had
respondent Artemio and petitioner, with the consent of their wives. Pursuant to already been partially
this document, the land was subdivided into Lot 120-A with an area of 297 sq. m. _______________
corresponding to the share of Artemio and Lot 120-B with an area of 957 sq. m.
which was the share of petitioner. The document also indicated that Artemio sold 24 Id.
Lot 120-A to one Florentina Fernandez. 22
25 Id.
26 Id., p. 32.

When respondent Corazon learned about the cancellation of the annotation of her affidavit of 321

loss, she executed an affidavit of adverse claim on January 17, 1995 stating that the
cancellation of affidavit of loss and the agreement of subdivision with sale were both spurious
and the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries. This affidavit of adverse claim was not
registered. 23
On April 17, 1995, petitioner brought the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176, the
paid P60,000 for it; that to implement this scheme, respondent Artemio caused the execution
of several documents namely: (1) deed of donation of titled property; (2) agreement of
subdivision with sale and (3) cancellation of affidavit of loss and that, thereafter, he instructed
petitioner to present the said documents to the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija for
registration. 27

cancellation of affidavit of loss, deed of donation of titled property and agreement of On October 26, 1995, respondents moved that Fernandez be dropped as defendant
subdivision with sale to the Registry of Deeds for registration. Consequently, the following because she was no longer contesting their claim and in fact had surrendered to them her
took place on that same day: owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. NT-239748. Thus, she was excluded from the suit. 28

1. 1.Corazon’s annotated affidavit of loss was canceled;
2. 2.by virtue of Aureliano, Sr. and Jacoba’s deed of donation of titled property to
Artemio and petitioner, OCT No. P-6176 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. NT-241155 in the name of petitioner and TCT No. NT-241156 in the name of
respondent Artemio were issued and
3. 3.by virtue of the agreement of subdivision with sale, TCT Nos. NT-241155 and NT-
241156 were canceled
In a decision dated April 17, 1997, the RTC dismissed the case and declared OCT No. P-
6176 as well as the subsequent certificates of title (TCT Nos. NT-239747 and NT-239748), the
deed of donation of titled property, agreement of subdivision with sale and cancellation of
affidavit of loss as null and void. It held that the aforementioned documents were spurious
since the signatures were falsified by respondent Artemio.
Furthermore, having found that OCT No. P-6176 was issued on the basis of a document
falsified by Aureliano, Sr., the RTC ordered the reversion of the land to its status before the
OCT was issued.
Finally, it held that petitioner, being an innocent victim, was entitled to damages. 29

_______________
_______________
27 Id., pp. 32-33.
28 In an order dated November 9, 1995 of the RTC; id., p. 33.
22 Id., pp. 30-31. 29 Id., pp. 33-34. The dispositive portion stated:
23 Id., p. 31. “PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

320
1. 1.Dismissing the [respondents’] complaint;
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 2. 2.Declaring OCT No. P-6176 as well as the subsequent certificates of Title (TCT Nos. NT-239747 and NT-239748) all of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija and the Deed of Donation, Subdivision Agreement and Cancellation of

Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes

 322 324
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the “mirador su casa” to avoid the
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED possibility of losing his land.” 34

Ingusan vs. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes

Petitioner merely invoked the invalidity of OCT No. P-6176 as an affirmative defense in his
On appeal, the CA modified the RTC decision. It ruled that only TCT Nos. NT-241155, NT-
answer and prayed for the declaration of its nullity. Such a defense partook of the nature of
241156, NT-239747 and NT-239748 were null and void. Their source, OCT No. P-6176,
a collateral attack against a certificate of title.
remained valid because it had already become indefeasible and could no longer be attacked
35

Moreover, OCT No. P-6176 which was registered under the Torrens System on the basis
collaterally. It also found that petitioner schemed with Artemio in defrauding their co-heirs
of a free patent became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year as
and was therefore in pari delicto. Consequently, neither party was entitled to claim damages
provided in Section 32 of PD 1529:
from the other. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
30

“Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall
Hence this petition raising the following issues: not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right
of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
1. 1)whether OCT No. P-6176 was valid or invalid, and interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
2. 2)whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages. Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one
year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition
_______________
There is no doubt that the deed of donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss
and agreement of subdivision with sale, being falsified documents, were null and void. It 34 Id., p. 585, citing Domingo v. Santos, et al. v. Santos, et al., 55 Phil. 361(1930).
follows that TCT Nos. NT-241155, NT-241156, NT-239747 and NT-239748 which were issued 35 Ugale v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 149516, 11 September 2006, 501 SCRA 376, 386, citations omitted; in Heirs of Enrique Diaz v. Virata, we discussed
the distinction as to when an action is a direct attack and when is it collateral:
by virtue of these spurious documents were likewise null and void. Neither side disputes these An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment
findings and conclusions. pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
_______________ nevertheless made as an incident thereof. (G.R. No. 162037, 7 August 2006, 498 SCRA 141, 164-165, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
152627, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 99, 107-108.)

1. Affidavit of Loss as null and void, and ordering the reversion of Lot 120, Cad-120-C Case 1 of San Leonardo Cadastre to the status 325
before OCT P-6176 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.
2. 3.Ordering the [respondents] to pay the costs of the suit. be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
As regards the counterclaim of [petitioner], there is a preponderance of evidence that supports the same, hence the Court hereby orders the
[respondents] to jointly and severally pay [petitioner] the [sums] of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 other encumbrancer for value.
as attorney’s fees. Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate
SO ORDERED.”
of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in
any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person
Id., pp. 34-36.
responsible for the fraud.” (Emphasis supplied)
30

323
The question is whether the source of these titles, OCT No. P-6176, was valid. Petitioner
argues that it should be invalidated because it was issued based on a fictitious affidavit
purportedly executed in 1970 by Leocadio (who died in 1932) wherein the latter supposedly
sold the land to Aureliano, Sr. According to petitioner, Aureliano, Sr. used this to fraudulently
Indeed, both the RTC and CA found that Aureliano, Sr. fraudulently and in breach of trust
secured OCT No. P-6176 in his name. Unfortunately, petitioner chose not to pursue a direct
proceeding to have this certificate of title annulled. In 1976, he filed an accion
reivindicatoria against the spouses Aureliano, Sr. and Jacoba questioning the validity of OCT
36

and in breach of trust secure a free patent over the land in his name. No. P-6176 and seeking to recover a portion of the land (specifically, Lot 120-A with an area
We agree with the CA that OCT No. P-6176 remains valid. The issue of the validity of of 502 sq. m.) but he voluntarily withdrew the case. Now, the title has undeniably become
37

title (e.g. whether or not it was issued fraudulently or in breach of trust) can only be assailed incontrovertible since it was issued in 1973 or more than 30 years ago. 38

in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. A certificate of title cannot be attacked
31
We now proceed to the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to damages. The RTC held
collaterally. Section 48 of PD 1529 states: 32
that he is entitled to moral damages (P50,000), exemplary damages (P30,000) and attorney’s
“SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.—A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral fees (P20,000) because he was not aware that the docu-
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” _______________

The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public should be able to rely on a Docketed as Civil Case No. 927 in the former Court of First Instance of Gapan, Nueva Ecija; id., pp. 30, 105.
36

Id., p. 63. He admitted that this was due to the promise of the spouses Aureliano, Sr. and Jacoba that they would give
registered title. The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to 37

back the land to him after five years; id., p. 32.

be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their An action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in four years while an action for reconveyance based on implied
38

indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. In Fil-estate trust prescribes in ten years; Bejoc v. Cabreros, G.R. No. 145849, 22 July 2005, 464 SCRA 78, 88.
Management, Inc. v. Trono, we explained: 33

“It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to
stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
_______________
326
ments were falsified and he was merely instructed by respondent Artemio to have them
registered. The CA shared the finding of the RTC that it was respondent Artemio who
masterminded the preparation and use of the spurious documents. Nevertheless, it did not 39

Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140752, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 534, 550, citing Apostol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125375, 17
31
find petitioner an innocent victim who was merely dragged into litigation:
June 2004, 432 SCRA 351, 359.
Property Registration Decree.
32
“... [Petitioner] was far from innocent. [Respondent Artemio] and [petitioner] signed the bogus “Deed of
G.R. No. 130871, 17 February 2006, 482 SCRA 578.
33
Donation of Titled Property” and the fraudulently baseless “Agreement of Subdivision with Sale.” It was
[petitioner] who personally submitted all the bogus documents with the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.
He stood to benefit from the registration of said fake documents. It was he who received the titles issued
in consequence of said fraudulent registration. In the natural course of things and in the ordinary
experience of man, the conclusion is inevitable that [he] knew [about] the spurious nature of said
documents but he made use of them because of the benefit which he would derive therefrom. In short,
[petitioner] confabulated with [respondent Artemio] in defrauding all their co-heirs of their shares in said
property.” 40
We agree. Petitioner was not in good faith when he registered the fake documents.
“Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting “honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together
with absence of all informa-
_______________
39The RTC and CA relied on the following facts: 1) respondent Artemio was a law graduate and a former chief of police of San Leonardo, Nueva
Ecija whereas petitioner merely reached grade 3 of elementary education; 2) respondent Artemio actually received P60,000 from Florentina
Fernandez as partial payment for the 297-sq. m. portion he allotted for himself which he sold to her and 3) he refused to give specimens of his
signature to the National Bureau of Investigation for its report; id., p. 102.
40Id., p. 36.
327
tion, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render the transaction unconscientious.”
41
Petitioner claims that he was not aware of the contents of the falsified documents and their
legal consequences because of his low level of intelligence and educational attainment. But
from his own narration, it is clear that he was aware of the fraudulent scheme conceived by
respondent Artemio:
“[Respondent Artemio] approached [petitioner] and propose[d] a [scheme] of partition that [would] assure
[petitioner] of getting his share including that which he and his predecessor-in-interest have purchased
from the other heirs of the late LEOCADIO INGUSAN, but with the condition that in implementing the
document known as PAGHAHATI-HATI NA MAY BILIHAN, the corresponding shares of ESTRELLA
RAZON will go to him [respondent Artemio who] has agreed to have it sold in favor of one FLORENTINA
FERNANDEZ for P120,000.00, partial payment of which has already been received by [respondent
Artemio], which negotiation of SALE and the payment made by FLORENTINA FERNANDEZ was
acknowledged to be true. Without much ado, a survey of Lot No. 120 was conducted by one Restituto
Hechenova upon instruction of [respondent Artemio], partitioning the land into two (2), one share goes to
[petitioner] with an area of 957 square meters and the other with an area of 297 square meters in the name
of [respondent Artemio], the latter share was to be sold in favor of Florentina Fernandez. To have this
IMPLEMENTED, incidental documentation must be made thus; A DEED OF DONATION OF REAL
PROPERTY allegedly executed by Sps. Aureliano Reyes and JACOBA SOLOMON; SUBDIVISION
AGREEMENT WITH SALE by and between [petitioner] and [respondent Artemio] as alleged DONEES
and SALE in the same document in favor of Florentina Fernandez, making in the process [petitioner]
presentor of all these questioned documents, adding among others an AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-6176 allegedly falsified by [petitioner] of the signature of [respondent] CORAZON
REYES REGUYAL.” 42
_______________
41 Bercero v. Capitol Development Corporation, G.R. No. 154765, 29 March 2007, 519 SCRA 484, citation omitted.
42 Rollo, p. 64.
328
Petitioner does not deny that he signed the fictitious deed of donation of titled property and
the agreement of subdivision with sale. Even if he reached only grade 3, he could not have
feigned ignorance of the net effect of these documents, which was to exclude the other heirs
of the spouses and the original owner Leocadio from inheriting the property and, in the
process, acquiring a big chunk of the property at their expense. The cancellation of respondent
Corazon’s affidavit of loss of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-6176 also removed all
obstacles to the registration of the title covering his portion of the lot. In short, by registering
the spurious documents, he had everything to gain.
Although it was respondent Artemio, an educated individual, who engineered the whole
scheme and prepared the fraudulent documents, still petitioner cannot deny that he was a
willing co-conspirator in a plan that he knew was going to benefit him handsomely.
As a result, there is no basis for the award of damages to petitioner. Coming to the court
with unclean hands, he cannot obtain relief. Neither does he fall under any of the provisions
for the entitlement to damages.
Respondents presented an additional issue involving the recovery of possession of the
subject land. They contend that petitioner, his heirs and relatives illegally occupied it and
constructed houses thereon. However, it is well-settled that a party who has not appealed
43
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those obtained from
the lower court whose decision is brought up on appeal. While there are exceptions to this
44
rule, such as if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court’s jurisdiction over the sub-
_______________
43Id., p. 131.
44Real v. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, 26 January 2007, 513 SCRA 111, citing Tangalin v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 358,
364; 371 SCRA 49, 54-55 (2001); Rural Bank of Sta. Maria, Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 27, 45; 314 SCRA 255,
272 (1999).
329
ject matter; (2) plain errors not specified and (3) clerical errors, none applies here. 45
Lastly, we note that petitioner entered into certain agreements with respondents to
ensure that he would obtain a portion of the subject land. He not only paid the loan of
respondent Artemio to PNB in order to release the mortgage over the land but also bought
from respondents 1,171 sq. m. (almost 94% of the 1,254 sq. m. lot) under the Kasulatan ng
Paghahati-hati Na May Bilihan. These are undisputed facts. Ultimately, however, he failed
to get his portion of the property. Although petitioner did not demand the return of the
amounts he paid, we deem it just and equitable to direct respondents to reimburse him for
these.
Article 1236 of the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no
interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he
paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor.” (emphasis ours)
Respondent Artemio was the debtor in this case, PNB the creditor and petitioner the third
person who paid the obligation of the debtor. The amount petitioner may recover will depend
on whether Artemio knew or approved of such payment.
Petitioner should also be able recover the amount (if any) he paid to respondents under
the Kasulatan since this agreement was never implemented. Otherwise, it will result in the
unjust enrichment of respondents at the expense of petitioner, a situation covered by Art. 22
of the Civil Code:
_______________
45 Id., citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100963, April 6, 1993, 221 SCRA 42, 46.
330
“Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.”
Petitioner is not entitled to legal interest since he never made a demand for it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. However, respondents are ordered to
return to petitioner the amounts he paid to the Philippine National Bank and under
the Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati Na May Bilihan.The court a quo is directed to determine
the exact amount due to petitioner. The January 21, 2000 decision and April 10, 2000
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56105 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 Petition denied.
Note.—A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or other
title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. (Orquiola vs.
Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 301 [2002])

——o0o——

331
 G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005. * VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO,
respondents.
Land Registration; Property Registration Decree; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Since the
Property Registration Decree is silent as to the situation wherein two applicants filed a single application
for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in
their respective names, the Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action.—The
Property Registration Decree recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a
single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be
registered; and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that
the same are located within the same province. The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to
the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are
seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names. Since the
Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of
Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself
provides that, “[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be
applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Misjoinder of Causes of Actions and Parties; Jurisdictions; Misjoinder of
causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide the
case—they are not even accepted for dismissal thereof.—Considering every application for land registration
filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect
in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of
causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias
and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422
and 8423, respectively. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Herbieto
involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. They are not even
accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action
and parties involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court,
acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
Same; Same; Same; Publication in a Newspaper of General Circulation; A land registration case is
a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the
land through publication and service of notice.—A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication
and service of notice. Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice
of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and
(3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner: 1. By
publication.—Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner
of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in
the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and “to all whom it may concern.” Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even as the Supreme Court concedes that Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 276 SCRA 276 (1996), that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the
land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants.—Even as this
Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of
185
185
Republic vs. Herbieto
the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the
land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section
23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication,
mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of
the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied
with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice
of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus—It may be asked why publication in a
newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not
as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the
notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties
may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the
all encompassing in remnature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of
general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result.—The late
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no
publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice,
the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents’
application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December
1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Herbieto
Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
Same; Public Lands; Property Registration Decree; Public Land Act; No public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that
the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law.—As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the
State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands
of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which
reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent). Each mode of disposition is
appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements
and application procedure for every mode. Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,
then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Any period of possession prior to the date when public lands were
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession—such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been
classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.—
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June
1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June
1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession;
such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confir-
187
 _______________
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 187
Republic vs. Herbieto Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz and Mariano C.
1

Del Castillo concurring, Rollo, pp. 52-58.

mation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that respondents could Penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Records, pp. 100-108.
2

not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as Records, pp. 1-6.
3

amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or 189
legalized.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 189
is confirmed by the court, while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied Republic vs. Herbieto
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue
of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession; Even as an applicant may acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to certain lots under the Public Land Act, his application for judicial 1. (a)Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance
confirmation or legalization must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree.—The Court of Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David; 4

Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. 2. (b)The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;
5

Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while 3. (c)Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing
under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and with the need for Surveyor’s Certificates for the Subject Lots;
6

that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or 4. (d)Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title
continuous, open, and notorious possession. As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the covering the Subject Lots; 7

Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public 5. (e)Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act. DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963; 8

title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization 6. (f)Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name
thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name
reads—SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994; and
9

lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application 7. (g)Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents
and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Statutory Construction; Relative to one another, the Public 8423 was sold to David.10

Land Act may be considered a special law that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law.—
Provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types
of land, while the Public Land Act On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an
188
Opposition to the respondents’ application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that:
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots
required by law; (2) Respondents’ muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute
Republic vs. Herbieto
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The
specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may
be considered a special law that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an
Sub-
established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law
prevails—Generalia specialibus non derogant. _______________

Ibid., at pp. 7-8.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. 4

Ibid., at pp. 9-10.

5

Ibid., at pp. 11-12.

6

Ibid., at pp. 13-14.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 7

Ibid., at pp. 15-18.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
8

Ibid., at pp. 19-20.

9

P.B. Flores & Associates Law and Realty Offices for respondents. Ibid., at p. 21.
10

190

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Herbieto
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of ject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to
Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV private appropriation. 11

No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial
1

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. All owners of the 12

Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, granting the application for land
2

land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A copy of 13

registration of the respondents. the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject
filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels Lots were located. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August
14

of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). 1999 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.
15 16

They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special
parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Together with their
3

Default, with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject
17

application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:

Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary
evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive
further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David
over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject
Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods
of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable
only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO’s certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in
applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v.
Doldol, where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
21

Lots. Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the
18 Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its
19 of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
_______________ Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
Ibid., at pp. 27-29.
11 applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential
Order, dated 29 April 1999, penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Ibid., at p. 41.
12
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the
Ibid., at p. 59.
application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple
13

Ibid., at p. 52.
14

Ibid., at p. 58.
15 applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application
Ibid., at pp. 96-97.
16
may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to
Penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Ibid., pp. 62-65.
the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are
17

Penned by Judge Wilfredo A. Dagatan, Records, p. 109.

18

CA Rollo, pp. 20-38.

19 situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred
191 by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 191 complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply
with the procedure for land regis-
Republic vs. Herbieto
Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus: _______________
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as
within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the
G.R. No. 132963, 10 September 1998, 295 SCRA 359.
Civil Code, respectively provides that “All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
21

prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial
character shall not be the object of prescription” and that “Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need
of title or of good faith.”
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels
of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it
with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it
is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the
subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even
assuming arguendo that appellees’ possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time
the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the
appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated
June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express
provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as
provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by
law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when
CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of
land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant
application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the
finding of the court a quo.
20
193
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 193
Republic vs. Herbieto
tration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void,
as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons
different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the
MTC to hear and proceed with respondents’ application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though
they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the
individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and
hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court’s
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

22

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above-cited sections of
_______________ the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed
with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdic-
Supra, note 1, pp. 57-58.
20

192 _______________

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 370, 438, also quoted and/or reiterated in subsequent cases of Alabang Development
22

Republic vs. Herbieto
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
Corporation v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-54094, 30 August 1982, 116 SCRA 261, 271; Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-55771, 15 November 1982, 118 SCRA 273, 309; Register of Deeds of Malabon, G.R. No. 88623, 05 February 1990, 181 SCRA 788, 791; Allama v.
Republic, G.R. No. 88226, 26 February 1992, 206 SCRA 600, 605.
194

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Herbieto
tion as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all
proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse
committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with
and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree recognizes and expressly allows the following
23
situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are
co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered; and (2) the filing of a single application
24
for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same
province. The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation
25
wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the
separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this
Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the
Property Registration Decree itself provides that, “[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.”
_______________
23Presidential Decree No. 1529.
24Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree provides that, “Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners
shall file the application jointly.”
Section 18 of the Property Registration Decree reads—
25
SEC. 18. Application covering two or more parcels.—An application may include two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicant/s provided
they are situated within the same province or city. The court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more of the
parcels or by a severance of the application.
195
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 195
Republic vs. Herbieto
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for
registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action
and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and
David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the
court to hear and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal
26
thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties
27
involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the
court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim
against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been
corrected by the MTC motu proprio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable,
however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for
_______________
26 Katipunan v. Zandueta, 60 Phil. 220 (1934).
27 Significant provisions of the Rules of Court are quoted below—
RULE 2, SEC. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action.—Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action
may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
RULE 3, SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.—Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Herbieto
registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did
not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of
action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated
by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a
land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not
affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which
bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents’ application
for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be 28
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of
notice. 29
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of
the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the
following manner:
1. By publication.—
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and “to
all whom it may concern.” Said notice
_______________
28 Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113549, 05 July 1996, 258 SCRA 223, 236.
29
197
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 197
Republic vs. Herbieto
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why
the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration
Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory
30
for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or
applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in
detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing,
then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general
circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case,
this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus—
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when
the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all
of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality
that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. 32

real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves,
default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
the Subject Lots are “within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map
posting. 31
No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063,
dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest
_______________ Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992.” The Subject Lots 33

are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June
G.R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 276.
30
1963.
Ibid., at p. 286.
31 As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
198 persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable 34

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED that the person

Republic vs. Herbieto _______________

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03
September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official TSN, 24 September 1999, p. 28.
32

Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published Records, pp. 15, 17.
33

Padilla v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 967, 969 (1934).

in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the
34

200
province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December
1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, Republic vs. Herbieto
would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published
claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process
other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing
35

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and
to oppose respondents’ application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in
mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State. It
support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to
36

explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever
be barred from contesting respondents’ application for registration and even the registration
decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special 1. (1)For homestead settlement;
Default on 03 September 1999. 2. (2)By sale;
3. (3)By lease;
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
4. (4)By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to
such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject
Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents’ application for registration thereof. 1. (a)By judicial legalization; or
Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and 2. (b)By administrative legalization (free patent). 37

confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act
21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode. Since 38

of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC respondents herein filed their application before the MTC, then it can be reasonably inferred
39

without jurisdiction. that they are seeking the judicial confirmation

199

VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 199 _______________

Republic vs. Herbieto Lee Hong Hok v. David, G.R. No. L-30389, 27 December 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 379.
35

Section 2.
II Period of Possession
36

Section 11.
37

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Rebublic, G.R. No. 158449, 22 October 2004, 441 SCRA 188, 196.
38

judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. Section 34 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
39

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and
proceed with respondents’ application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it
necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to
public land.
Respondents’ application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their
title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots
by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
allows the inferior courts (i.e., Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), duly
assigned by the Supreme Court, to hear and determine cadastral and land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots with values not exceeding P100,000. Decisions of the inferior courts in such cases
shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A, dated 15 November 1995, authorizing the inferior courts to hear and decide the cadastral
or land registration cases as provided for by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
201
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 201
Republic vs. Herbieto
or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding
144 hectares, may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land
40
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads—
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
1. (a)[Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
2. (b)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
3. (c)Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse
possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots
became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to
_______________
Section 47 of the Public Land Act, as amended.
40
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Herbieto
the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can
never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very 41
apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession
required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents’ title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous
supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property
Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November
2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any
other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the
Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963
to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject
Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the
Civil Code. 42
_______________
Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476; Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate
41
Court, G.R. No. L-74957, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 679; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40402, 16 March 1987, 148
SCRA 480.
The complete text of these provisions are reproduced below, for reference—
42
ART. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
203
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 203
Republic vs. Herbieto
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and
the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title
which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is
that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only
claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and
notorious possession. As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject
43
Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the
Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect
or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial
confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration
Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads—
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or
interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the
proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and
that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
44
Hence, respondents’ application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with
the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural
requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights
apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of
the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be con-
_______________
Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, 858 (1919).
43
Now the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.
44
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Herbieto
sidered a special law that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an
45
established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the
special law prevails—Generalia specialibus non derogant. 46
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED.
The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December
1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents’
application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., Out of the Country.
Petition granted, judgment reversed.
Notes.—A land covered by a title which is outstanding cannot be subject of an application
for registration unless the existing title which has become indefeasible is first nullified by a
proper court proceeding. (Orchard Realty and Development Corporation vs. Republic, 364
SCRA 100[2001])
 A judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction, or because of the pendency of
another action between the same parties and for the same cause, or a judgment absolving a
defendant because he was not served with summons, or a dismissal on the

_______________

This Court is not unaware that there are decisions by this Court declaring the Public Land Act as a general law
45

[Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106673, 09 May 2001, 357 SCRA 608, 616; Oliva v. Lamadrid, 128 Phil. 770, 775; 21
SCRA 737, 742 (1967)]. These cases, however, involve the Public Land Act in relation to statutes other than the Civil Code.
The pronouncement made in the present Petition is particular to the nature of the Public Land Act vis-à-vis the Civil Code.
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224 (1919).
46

205

VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 205

Coronel vs. Capati
ground of misjoinder cannot operate as res adjudicata on the merits. (Valenzuela vs. Court of
Appeals, 363 SCRA 779[2001])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 142676. June 6, 2011.*
EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO
CHAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 146718. June 6, 2011.*
EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SAMUEL GO CHAN and AIDA C. CHAN, and
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Actions; Reconveyance; Land Titles; An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available
to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name; As
a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not
with the land registration court.—Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property.
In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, 449 SCRA 173 (2005), we described an action for reconveyance
as follows: An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a
_______________
** Additional member per Special Order No. 994 dated May 27, 2011.
* FIRST DIVISION.
345
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 345
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name.
Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner
is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action
in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice
of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the
action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and
preserve the claim of the real owner. (Emphases ours.)
Same; Same; Same; An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real
property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing—any judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded.—The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole
world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is
binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a
party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties
and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for
declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action
but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a
tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court—a writ of execution
can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.—Since they were
not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final
judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment
cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only
real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued
pursuant thereto.
Same; Same; Same; It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the
root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value.—The fact that the titles
to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were already declared null and void ab
initioby final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 is not enough, for it does not automatically make the
subsequent titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan correspondingly null and void ab initio. It has long
been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative
title was obtained in good faith and for value. Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title,
every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of
the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances
culminating in the vendor’s acquisition of the property. The rights of innocent third persons who relied on
the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be
disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode
public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.
Same; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of
physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth—in such
cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto; Any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the
plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.—There is forcible
entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is
347
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 347
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal
court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and
second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also
settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical
possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently
of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue
deprivation thereof. Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who
had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession
and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the
court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Summary Procedure; The Rule on Summary Procedure prohibits petitions for
certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the
disposition of cases.—The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule
prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays
and to expedite the disposition of cases. Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters
that do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. An order granting a preliminary
injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.
Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.—The prohibition in Section 19(g) of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is plain enough. Its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.
The
348
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 is clearly
covered by the said prohibition, thus, it should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch 88. While
the circumstances involved in Muñoz’s forcible entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are
admittedly very peculiar, these are insufficient to except the petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and
Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the prohibition. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera Law Office for petitioner.
Felix B. Lerio for respondent Spouses Chan and Atty. V. Yabut, Jr.
Benedicto, Verzosa, Gealogo & Burkley for respondent BPI.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 Before Us are the following consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
In G.R. No. 142676, Emerita Muñoz (Muñoz) is seeking the reversal, annulment, and
setting aside of the Decision dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the
1 2
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which af-
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 67-74; penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul with Associate Justices Eubulo G.
Verzola and Eugenio S. Labitoria, concurring.
2 Id., at p. 101.
349
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
firmed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court,
3 Ching regarding the papers, Emilia M. Ching abandoned him. Nonetheless, Yee L. Ching ratified the transfer of the subject
Branch 88 (RTC-Branch 88) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The RTC dismissed
Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case instituted by Muñoz against Atty. Victoriano R.
Yabut, Jr. (Atty. Yabut) and Samuel Go Chan before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994, granting
4
Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which restored
possession of the subject property to Muñoz.
In G.R. No. 146718, Muñoz is praying for the reversal, setting aside, and nullification of
the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of the Court
5 6
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which affirmed the Orders dated August 21, 1995 and
7
October 3, 1995 of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95 (RTC-Branch 95) in Civil Case No. Q-
28580 denying Muñoz’s Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender
of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297 against respondents Bank of the Philippine
8
Islands (BPI) and the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan).
I G.R. SP No. 10148 and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Court of
FACTS
The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madriñan St., Diliman, Quezon
City, formerly owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 75-94.
4 Id., at pp. 95-100.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), pp. 61-72; penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring.
6 Id., at p. 73.
7 Id., at pp. 127-130.
8 Id., at pp. 111-126.
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
(spouses Ching), Muñoz’s sister. Muñoz lived at the subject property with the spouses Ching.
As consideration for the valuable services rendered by Muñoz to the spouses Ching’s family,
Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject property transferred to Muñoz. By virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muñoz, the latter acquired
a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186306 covering the subject property in her name on
December 22, 1972. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, Muñoz
10
purportedly sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching. As a result, TCT No.
186306 was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia M. Ching’s name. Emilia M.
Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, sold the subject property to spouses
Go Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced
by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go’s names.
On October 15, 1979, Muñoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT
No. 258977 of the spouses Go. The next day, on October 16, 1979, Muñoz filed a complaint for
the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the
cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go’s names, and the restoration and revival of
TCT No. 186306 in Muñoz’s name. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-28580
and raffled to RTC-Branch 95. On October 17, 1979, Muñoz caused the annota-
_______________
349 9 According to Yee L. Ching’s Answer with Cross-Claim in Civil Case No. Q-28580, he was out of the country at the
time he supposedly executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in Muñoz’s favor. Emilia M. Ching was somehow able to make it
appear that her husband, Yee L. Ching, signed the said Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yee L. Ching confronted Emilia M.
property to Muñoz (Rollo [G.R. No. 142676], pp. 111-112).
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), p. 102.
351
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 351
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
tion of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. In an Order dated
December 17, 1979, the RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Go’s motion for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in
possession of the subject property. The writ was implemented by the sheriff on March 26,
1980, driving Muñoz and her housemates away from the subject property.
Muñoz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, assailing
the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 10148. The appellate court dismissed Muñoz’s petition on January 4, 1980. Yee L.
Ching and his son Frederick M. Ching filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene in CA-
Appeals issued a TRO. However, in a Resolution dated March 18, 1980, the appellate court
denied the motion to intervene of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching, and cancelled the
TRO previously issued. Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching challenged before this Court,
in G.R. No. 53463, the Resolution dated March 18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals. Eventually,
in a Resolution dated June 3, 1981, the Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 53463, for
lack of merit and failure of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching to substantially show that
the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals gravely abused their discretion. In a subsequent
Resolution dated June 21, 1982, the Court clarified that its Resolution of June 3, 1981 was
without prejudice to the continuation of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-28580 still pending
before the trial court, “in order that proper and final adjudication may be made of whether or
not the deed of sale by Emerita L. Muñoz in favor of Emilia M. Ching is a real, genuine and
authentic transac-
352
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
tion, thereby to settle once and for all the issue of ownership of the property herein in
question.” 11
Trial in Civil Case No. Q-28580 proceeded before RTC-Branch 95.
In the meantime, Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977
9
was cancelled on October 28, 1982 on the basis of an alleged final judgment in favor of the
spouses Go. The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank
12
(BPI Family) and to secure the same, they constituted a mortgage on the subject property on
November 23, 1982. When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family
13
foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the highest bidder at the auction sale of the subject
property. The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption within the prescribed
period, thus, BPI Family was finally able to register the subject property in its name on
October 23, 1987 under TCT No. 370364. Apparently, the original copy of TCT No. 370364
14
was among those razed in the fire at the Quezon City Register of Deeds on June 11, 1988. As
a result of the administrative reconstitution of the lost title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was
issued to BPI Family. On December 3, 1990, BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses
Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the 15
subject property for and in consideration of P3,350,000.00. Consequently, TCT No. RT-54376
(370364) in the name of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297 was issued in the
spouses Chan’s names on January 28, 1991. The spouses Chan obtained a loan from BPI
16
Family on October 2, 1992 for the construction of a building on the subject property, and to
secure the same,
_______________
11 Id., at p. 113.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 101.
13 Id.
14 Id., at pp. 102-103.
15 Id., at pp. 104-105.
16 Id., at pp. 106-108.
353
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 353
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
constituted a mortgage on the subject property in favor of BPI Family. 17
On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. Q-28580,
18
against Emilia M. Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found
that Muñoz’s signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972 was forged;
that Muñoz never sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the
spouses Go were not innocent purchasers for value of the subject property. The fallo of the
said decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for lack of merit [Emilia M. Ching, et al.’s]
respective counterclaims, cross-claims, and counter-cross-claim, declaring as null and void ab initio the
following documents, to wit: (a) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, copy of which is marked
in evidence as Exh. M; (b) TCT No. 186366 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is
marked in evidence as Exh. N; (c) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. 3; and, (d) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District III, copy of
which is marked in evidence as Exh. 4, and directing defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
from the records of the subject property the registrations of all the said documents and to restore and
revive, free from all liens and encumbrances, TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City,
copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. L, as well as ordering defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song
and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muñoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and
to pay the costs of suit. The court also hereby dismisses the rest of the claims in [Muñoz’s] complaint, there
being no satisfactory warrant therefor.” 19
Emilia M. Ching, et al.’s, appeal of the foregoing judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33811
_______________
17 Id.
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 102-106.
19 Id., at p. 106.
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated March 4, 1993, the appellate court not only
20
affirmed the appealed judgment, but also ordered the spouses Go and their successors-in-
interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the subject property, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against
[Emilia M. Ching, et al.]. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued on December 17, 1979 is
hereby set aside and declared dissolved. Defendants-appellants Go and Tan, their successors-in-interest
and assigns and those acting on their behalf, are ordered to vacate the disputed premises and to deliver
the same to [Muñoz] immediately upon receipt of this decision.” 21
Emilia L. Ching, et al., filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file their
petition for review, which was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 109260. However, they
failed to file their intended petition within the extended period which expired on April 23,
1993. In a Resolution dated July 12, 1993, the Court declared G.R. No. 109260 terminated.
22
The Resolution dated July 12, 1993 of the Court in G.R. No. 109260 became final and
executory on July 15, 1993 and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on even
date. 23
More than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ of
execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property from BPI Family, then came forward
and filed before the RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution
as Against Spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 107-123.
21 Id., at p. 123.
22 Id., at p. 124.
23 Id., at pp. 125-126.
355
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 355
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
Chan, opposing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan
24
asserted ownership and possession of the subject property on the basis of a clean title
registered in their names under TCT No. 53297. The spouses Chan further contended that
the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 could not be executed against them since they
were not parties to the said case; they were not successors-in-interest, assigns, or acting on
behalf of the spouses Go; and they purchased the subject property from BPI Family without
any notice of defect in the latter’s title.
It was only at this point that Muñoz, upon her own inquiry, discovered the cancellation
on October 28, 1982 of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the spouses
Go’s TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent events that led to the transfer and registration of
the title to the subject property from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses
Chan.
In its Order dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chan’s
25
urgent motion to stop the execution. According to the RTC-Branch 95, the photocopy of TCT
No. 370364 in the name of BPI Family, submitted by the spouses Chan with their motion,
could hardly be regarded as satisfactory proof that Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated therein were also missing from the original copy of said certificate of title.
Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis pendenswere annotated on TCT No. 258977 in the
spouses Go’s names as P.E.-8078 and P.E.-8178, respectively. So when TCT No. 258977 of the
spouses Go was cancelled and TCT No. 370364 was issued to BPI Family, it could be presumed
that the Register of Deeds regularly performed his official duty by carrying over Muñoz’s
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens to TCT No. 370364. In addition, the RTC-Branch 95
pointed out that in this jurisdiction, the entry of
_______________
 24 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), pp. 98-100.
25 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), p. 127.
356
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
the notice of lis pendens in the day book of the Register of Deeds was already sufficient notice
to the whole world of the dispute over the subject property, and there was no more need to
annotate the same on the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title. Finally, the RTC-Branch
95 held that TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) of BPI Family and TCT No. 53297 of the spouses
Chan shall be subject to the reservation under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 26 “[t]hat
certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner stated in sections five and six
hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was
duly noted in the original, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which
has not been made on the reconstituted certificate of title.” Thus, the spouses Chan were
deemed to have taken the disputed property subject to the final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-
28580.
On January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias Writ of Execution. On January
10, 1994, the writ was enforced, and possession of the subject property was taken from the
spouses Chan and returned to Muñoz. In its Orders dated April 8, 1994 and June 17, 1994,
28
the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chan’s motion for reconsideration and notice of
appeal, respectively. 29
G.R. No. 142676
Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chan’s motion for
reconsideration and notice of appeal in Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muñoz instituted before the
MeTC on February 4, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer
_______________
26 An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed.
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 128-129.
28 Id., at pp. 130-134.
29 Id., at pp. 185-186.
357
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, docketed
30
as Civil Case No. 8286. Muñoz alleged in her complaint that she had been in actual and
physical possession of the subject property since January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and
two security guards for the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut, along with 20 other men, some of whom were armed, ousted Muñoz of possession of
the subject property by stealth, threat, force, and intimidation. Muñoz prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and
all persons claiming right under them to vacate the subject property. Muñoz additionally
prayed for judgment making the mandatory injunction permanent and directing Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut to pay Muñoz: (1) compensation for the unlawful occupation of the
subject property in the amount of P50,000.00 per month, beginning February 2, 1994 until
the said property is fully and completely turned over to Muñoz; (2) attorney’s fees in the
amount of P50,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per court appearance of Muñoz’s counsel; and (3) costs
of suit.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muñoz’s allegations, insisting that Samuel Go
Chan is the valid, lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the subject property. Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut averred that the Turn-Over of Possession and Receipt of Possession
dated January 10, 1994—attached to Muñoz’s complaint as proof that the subject property
had been placed in her possession—is a falsified document. The Writ of Execution issued on
September 20, 1993 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had already expired and the Sheriff’s Return
on the Writ—another document purporting to show that possession of the subject property
was turned-over to Muñoz on January 10, 1994—was then being challenged in a complaint
before the Office of Deputy Court Ad-
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 137-145.
358
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
26
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
ministrator Reynaldo L. Suarez of the Supreme Court. Samuel Go Chan’s possession of the
subject property has never been interrupted. His sister, Cely Chan, resided at the subject
property and was never removed therefrom. On February 2, 1994, Atty. Yabut was at the
subject property only to protect the rights and interest of his client, Samuel Go Chan, and
since the latter’s possession of the subject property had never been interrupted, Atty. Yabut
entered the same peacefully, without intimidation, force, or stealth. The other people at the
27
subject property on February 2, 1994 were there to attend the services at the Buddhist Temple
which occupied the fourth floor of the building erected by the spouses Chan on the subject
property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, thus, asked the MeTC to dismiss Muñoz’s
complaint for lack of merit and legal basis. 31
The MeTC received evidence from the parties on whether a writ of preliminary injunction
should be issued, as prayed for by Muñoz. In its Order dated May 16, 1994, the MeTC
adjudged that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was already executed against the
spouses Chan and there was, indeed, a turn-over of possession of the subject property to
Muñoz. Accordingly, the MeTC granted Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring possession of the subject property to Muñoz.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the foregoing MeTC order through a
Petition for Certiorariwith Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC-Branch 88, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632.
32
They asserted that they were not bound by the execution of the final judgment of RTC-Branch
95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 as they were not parties to the said case. Muñoz, on the other
hand, argued that the MeTC Order of May 16, 1994 was an interlocutory order, and under
357
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 178-184.
32 Id., at pp. 146-156.
359
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 359
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
Section 19 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, a petition for certiorari against an
interlocutory order issued by the court is one of the prohibited pleadings and motions in
summary proceedings.
In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994.
On August 5, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued another Order resolving Muñoz’s motion
to dismiss the petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, motion for reconsideration
of the Order dated June 10, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and motion to resolve with additional grounds for dismissal.
According to the RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC failed to distinguish the issue of finality of the
judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 from the assertions of Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut that the spouses Chan are not covered by said final judgment because
they are not successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of the spouses Go and they are
purchasers of the subject property in good faith. The issue of whether the final judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan was then still being litigated in the
same case before RTC-Branch 95, where the spouses Chan’s motion for reconsideration of the
denial of their notice of appeal was pending. The RTC-Branch 88 further found that the MeTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry on
the ground of “lis pendens,” as the issue as to who between Muñoz and the spouses Chan had
the better right to possession of the subject property was the subject of the pending proceeding
in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95. In the end, the RTC-Branch 88 decreed:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment—
(a) Denying the motion to dismiss of respondent Muñoz for lack of merit; 360
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
(b) Denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent Muñoz for the recall and/or setting aside
of the writ of preliminary injunction granted to petitioners;
(c) Declaring the Order dated May 16, 1994 of Public respondent Hon. Elsa de Guzman in Civil Case
No. 8286 illegal and therefore null and void; and
(d) Dismissing the ejectment suit in Civil Case No. 8286 on ground of lis pendens.
Without pronouncement as to costs.” 33
Muñoz appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88
before the Court of Appeals. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35322. Aside from
the nullification of the two orders, Muñoz additionally prayed for the dismissal from the
service of the RTC-Branch 88 presiding judge and the disbarment of Atty. Yabut.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21, 1995, sustained the appealed orders
of RTC-Branch 88. The Court of Appeals held that the MeTC should have dismissed the
forcible entry case on the ground of “lis pendens”; that the spouses Chan were not parties in
Civil Case No. Q-28580, and impleading them only in the execution stage of said case vitiated
their right to due process; that the order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the spouses Chan
in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was null and void, considering that they are strangers to the case,
and they are innocent purchasers for value of the subject property; that the notice of lis
pendens was already cancelled from the spouses Go’s certificate of title at the time they
mortgaged the subject property to BPI Family; and that the title to the subject property was
already free of any and all liens and encumbrances when the spouses Chan purchased the
said property from BPI Family. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated March 9, 2000,
denied Muñoz’s motion for reconsideration.
_______________
33 Id., at p. 94.
361
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 361
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
G.R. No. 146718
Meanwhile, Muñoz filed before the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 a Motion
to Cite the Register of Deeds in Contempt of Court for the failure of the Register of Deeds to
restore Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306 despite having been served with a copy of the writ of
execution on October 11, 1993. In its Judgment (on the Contempt Proceedings against the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City Samuel C. Cleofe) dated March 18, 1994, the RTC-Branch
34
95 denied Muñoz’s motion, convinced that the Register of Deeds had a valid excuse for his
inability to implement the served writ. The Register of Deeds could not cancel the spouses
Chan’s TCT No. 53297, the subsisting certificate of title over the subject property, absent any
authority or directive for him to do so. The directive in the final judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-28580 and the writ of execution for the same only pertained to the cancellation of the
spouses Go’s TCT No. 258977.
Thereafter, Muñoz filed a Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan and a Second
Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muñoz also filed a Motion for
an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 53297, in which she prayed for the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing
35
the Register of Deeds not only to cancel TCT No. 258977 and all documents declared null and
void ab initio in the dispositive portion of the Decision dated July 19, 1991 of RTC-Branch
36
95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances
Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306, but likewise to cancel the present certificate of title covering the
subject property, TCT No. 53297.
_______________
34 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 110.
35 Id., at pp. 111-126.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 102-106.
362
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
In its Order dated August 21, 1995, the RTC-Branch 95 denied all of Muñoz’s
aforementioned motions. The RTC-Branch 95 was of the view that Samuel Go Chan’s title
should be litigated in another forum, not in Civil Case No. Q-28580 where the judgment had
already become final and executory. The RTC-Branch 95 also stressed that since the judgment
in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had long become final and executory, it could no longer be changed
or amended except for clerical error or mistake. Accordingly, the RTC-Branch 95 resolved as
follows:
“1. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the denial of [Muñoz’s] first and second motions for
contempt and hereby absolves respondents Samuel Go Chan, Celia Chan, Atty. Victoriano R.
Yabut, Jr., and several John Does of the Contempt Charges against them.
2. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the
Court’s Deputy Sheriff:
(a) Defendants Go Song and Tan Sio Kien, their successors-in-interest and assigns and
those acting on their behalf to vacate the disputed premises and deliver the same to
[Muñoz];
(b) Defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject
property the registration of all the following documents, to wit: (1) “Deed of Absolute
Sale” dated December 28, 1972; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186366 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (3) “Deed of Absolute Sale” dated July 16, 1979;
and (4) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila II, and to restore
and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City; and
(c) Defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay
[Muñoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of suit.”37
_______________
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 128.
363
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 363
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
Unrelenting, Muñoz filed a Motion for Clarificatory Order, pointing out that the spouses
Chan are the present occupants of the subject property. The Order dated August 21, 1995 of
the RTC-Branch 95 directed the deputy sheriff to deliver the subject property to Muñoz, and
this could not be done unless the spouses Chan are evicted therefrom. Resultantly, Muñoz
prayed that “a clarificatory order be made categorically stating that the spouses Samuel Go
Chan and Aida C. Chan, and all persons claiming right under them, are likewise evicted from
the subject premises pursuant to the Order of 21 August 1995.” 38
 Once more, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muñoz’s motion in its Order dated October 3, 1995.
The RTC-Branch 95 reiterated the rule that after the judgment had become final, only clerical
errors, as distinguished from substantial errors, can be amended by the court. Furthermore,
when the decision or judgment sought to be amended is promulgated by an appellate court, it
is beyond the power of the trial court to change, amplify, enlarge, alter, or modify. Ultimately,
the RTC-Branch 95 pronounced that it was “restrained x x x to consider as mere clerical error
the exclusion of spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan in the Decision of the Court dated
July 19, 1991, a final judgment, which judgment cannot now be made to speak a different
language.” 39
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Branch 95 in issuing its
Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995, Muñoz filed before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was remanded to the Court of Appeals in observance of
the hierarchy of courts, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision on September 29, 2000 dismissing Muñoz’s petition. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the RTC-Branch 95 that the spouses Chan could not be
_______________
38 Id., at p. 293.
39 Id., at p. 130.
364
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
covered by the alias writ of execution considering that they were not impleaded in Civil
Case No. Q-28580. The cancellation of TCT No. 53297 in the spouses Chan’s names could not
be done apart from a separate action exclusively for that matter. The spouses Chan are
deemed buyers in good faith and for value as the certificate of title delivered to them by BPI
Family was free from any liens or encumbrances or any mark that would have raised the
spouses Chan’s suspicions. Every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go
beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendor’s
acquisition of the property. The Court of Appeals denied Muñoz’s motion for reconsideration
in a Resolution dated January 5, 2001.
Muñoz comes before this Court via the present consolidated petitions.
Muñoz posits that the final judgment and writ of execution of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 bind not only Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, but also their
successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on their behalf, namely, BPI Family and
spouses Chan. The spouses Chan cannot be deemed innocent purchasers for value of the
property since the cancellation of the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on the spouses
Go’s TCT No. 258977 is completely null and void.
Muñoz further argues that the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 in Civil Case No. 8286
correctly ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring
possession of the subject property to her, as she had already acquired prior possession of the
said property upon the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Also, the
spouses Chan’s petition for certiorari before the RTC-Branch 88, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-94-20632, challenging the Order dated May 16, 1994 of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 8286,
is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure; and the RTC-Branch 88 and
the Court of Appeals
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Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
should be faulted for giving due course to the said petition even in the absence of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in their comments to the two petitions at bar, the spouses Chan, Atty.
Yabut, and BPI Family assert that given the peculiar factual circumstances of the case, RTC-
Branch 88 was justified in taking cognizance of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut’s petition
for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that Muñoz is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 88 after participating in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-94-
20632; that the spouses Chan’s title to the subject property is not affected by the final
judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and the said judgment cannot be
executed against the spouses Chan since they are neither parties to the case, nor are they the
successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on behalf of Emilia M. Ching or the spouses
Go; that BPI Family and consequently, the spouses Chan, obtained title to the subject
property as innocent purchasers for value, there being no notice of any infirmity in said title;
and that Muñoz is guilty of forum shopping for filing her petition in G.R. No. 146718 even
while her petition in G.R. No. 142676 is still pending.
II
RULING
For the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first the merits of the petition in G.R.
No. 146718.
G.R. No. 146718
Civil Case No. Q-28580 involved Muñoz’s complaint for the annulment of the deeds of
absolute sale dated December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the cancellation of the spouses
40 41
Go’s
_______________
40 Purported sale of the subject property by Muñoz to Emilia M. Ching.
41 Purported sale of the subject property by Emilia M. Ching to the spouses Go.
366
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
TCT No. 258977, and the restoration and revival of Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306. The final
judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was in favor of Muñoz and against
Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go. The problem arose when during the pendency of the
said case, title and possession of the subject property were transferred from the spouses Go,
to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan. BPI Family and the spouses Chan were never
impleaded as parties and were not referred to in the dispositive portion of the final judgment
in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
Muñoz questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the Order dated August 21, 1995 denying her
Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan, Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, and Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for
Surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297; and (2) the Order dated October
3, 1995 denying her Motion for Clarificatory Order, both issued by the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, and upheld by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. In sum,
Muñoz was seeking in her aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical order from the RTC-
Branch 95 that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 be executed against the spouses
Chan; and (2) the surrender and cancellation of the spouses Chan’s TCT No. 53297 and
restoration of Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306.
There is no merit in Muñoz’s petition in G.R. No. 146718.
Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property. In Heirs of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, we described an action for reconveyance as follows:
42
“An action for reconveyance is an action in personamavailable to a person whose property has
been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. Although the decree is recognized
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the
_______________
42 G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173.
367

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 367
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as
an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration
court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent
third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title
immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an
innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.” (Emphases ours.)
43
The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a
judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is
binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment
directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding
only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of
ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam,
for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. 44
Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses
Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses
Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in
interest in an ac-
_______________
43 Id., at p. 190.
44 Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61, 86-87; 375 SCRA 390, 408-409 (2002).
368
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
tion are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant
thereto. 45
A similar situation existed in Dino v. Court of Appeals, where we resolved that:
46
“As the registered owner of the subject property, petitioners are not bound by decision in Civil Case
No. R-18073 for they were never summoned in said case and the notice of lis pendensannotated on TCT
No. 73069 was already cancelled at the time petitioners purchased the subject property. While it is true
that petitioners are indispensable parties in Civil Case No. R-18073, without whom no complete relief could
be accorded to the private respondents, the fact still remains that petitioners were never actually joined as
defendants in said case. Impleading petitioners as additional defendants only in the execution stage of said
case violated petitioners’ right to due process as no notice of lis pendens was annotated on the existing
certificate of title of said property nor were petitioners given notice of the pending case, therefore
petitioners remain strangers in said case and the Order of the trial court involving them is null and void,
considering that petitioners are innocent purchasers of the subject property for value.”
47
We further stress that Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, clearly provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.” Herein, several Torrens titles were already issued after
the cancellation of Muñoz’s. Certificates of title had been successively issued to Emilia M.
Ching, spouses Go, BPI Family, and spouses Chan. Civil Case No. Q-28580, in which a final
judgment had already been rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the certificates of
title of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go only. To have the present certifi-
_______________
45 Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 323, 332-333; 386 SCRA 301, 311 (2002).
46 G.R. No. 95921, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 422.
47 Id., at pp. 432-433.
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VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 369
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
cate of title of the spouses Chan cancelled, Muñoz must institute another case directly
attacking the validity of the same.
The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go
were already declared null and void ab initio by final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 is
not enough, for it does not automatically make the subsequent titles of BPI Family and the
spouses Chan correspondingly null and void ab initio.
It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of a
valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value. Following the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing with registered lands may
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not
required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the
vendor’s acquisition of the property. The rights of innocent third persons who relied on the
correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby
cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that
would impair or erode public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration. 48
Hence, we pronounced in Republic v. Agunoy, Sr.: 49
“Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer
part of the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens
titles in their favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have
reechoed in Pino v. Court of Appeals and the cases therein cited:
_______________
48 Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 765; 300 SCRA 565, 576 (1998).
49 492 Phil. 118; 451 SCRA 735 (2005), citing Pino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94114, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 434, 445; Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43972, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 735, 741; Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 Phil. 88, 93-94; 138 SCRA
489, 494 (1985).
370
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a
previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its
source) cannot apply here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of
Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of
sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been
transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name
indicated by the forger.” (Emphases ours.)
50
Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-28580 that
the titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there is yet no similar
determination on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The question of whether or
not the titles to the subject property of BPI Family and the spouses Chan are null and void,
since they are merely the successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of Emilia M. Ching and
the spouses Go, ultimately depends on the issue of whether or not BPI Family and the spouses
Chan obtained their titles to the subject property in bad faith, i.e., with notice of Muñoz’s
adverse claim and knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-28580. The latter is a factual
issue on which we cannot rule in the present petition, not only because we are not a trier of
facts, but more importantly, because it was not among the issues raised and tried in Civil
Case No. Q-28580.
In support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution against BPI Family and the spouses
Go, Muñoz cites our ruling in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in relation to De 51
la Cruz v. De la Cruz. 52
_______________
50 Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., id, at pp. 137-138; p. 753.
51 G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992, 208 SCRA 215 and G.R. No. 76265, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
52 215 Phil. 593; 130 SCRA 666 (1984).
371
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
De la Cruz is an action for reconveyance of Lot 671 founded on breach of trust filed by
Augustina de la Cruz, et al., against Lucia dela Cruz (Lucia) and Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK). We
upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 671 by Lucia to INK, and thereby validated the title of
INK to the said property.
Calalang actually involved two petitions: (1) a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition originally filed by Virginia Calalang (Calalang) before this Court, and (2) a
petition for injunction with damages originally filed by Augusto M. de Leon (De Leon), et al.,
before the RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767. Calalang and De Leon, et al., assert
titles that were adverse to that of INK. De Leon, et al., in particular, claim that their titles to
Lot 671 were derived from Amando Clemente. Calalang and De Leon, et al., sought from the
court orders enjoining INK from building a fence to enclose Lot 671; requiring the
Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA)
to conduct an investigation of the anomaly regarding Lucia’s reconstituted title to Lot 671;
and dismissing the proceedings instituted by the Register of Deeds for the cancellation of their
titles. We dismissed the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., on the ground of res
judicata, the legality or validity of the title of INK over Lot 671 had been settled with finality
in De la Cruz. De la Cruz was applied to Calalang and De Leon, et al., since the facts on which
such decision was predicated continued to be the facts on which the petitions of Calalang and
De Leon, et al., were based.
Muñoz’s reliance on Calalang is misplaced. There are substantial differences in the facts
and issues involved in Calalang and the present case.
In Calalang, there is duplication or overlapping of certificates of title issued to different
persons over the same property. We already upheld in De la Cruz the validity of the certificate
of title of INK over Lot 671, which effectively prevents us from recognizing the validity of any
other certificate of title over the same property. In addition, Lucia, the predecessor-
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
in-interest of INK, had her certificate of title judicially reconstituted. The judicial
reconstitution of title is a proceeding in rem, constituting constructive notice to the whole
world. Hence, we rejected the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., to enjoin INK from
building a fence enclosing Lot 671, and the concerned public authorities from instituting
appropriate proceedings to have all other certificates of title over Lot 671 annulled and
cancelled.
In the instant case, there has been no duplication or overlapping of certificates of title.
The subject property has always been covered by only one certificate of title at a time, and at
present, such certificate is in the spouses Chan’s names. As we have previously discussed
herein, Muñoz cannot have the spouses Chan’s TCT No. 53297 cancelled by a mere motion for
the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the spouses Chan
were not parties to the case. Civil Case No. Q-28580 was a proceeding in personam, and the
final judgment rendered therein—declaring null and void the titles to the subject property of
Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go—should bind only the parties thereto. Furthermore,
despite the void titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, the derivative titles of BPI
Family and the spouses Chan may still be valid provided that they had acquired the same in
good faith and for value.
More in point with the instant petition is Pineda v. Santiago. Pineda still involved Lot
53
671. INK sought from the RTC a second alias writ of execution to implement the judgment
in Calalang against Conrado Pineda (Pineda), et. al. In opposing the issuance of such writ,
Pineda, et al., asserted that they held titles to Lot 671 adverse to those of Lucia and INK and
that they were not parties in De la Cruz or in Calalang. In its assailed order, the RTC granted
the second alias writ of execution on the basis that the issue of ownership of Lot 671 was
already determined with finality in favor of Lucia and INK.
371
_______________
53 G.R. No. 143482, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 47.
373
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 373
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
The writ ordered the deputy sheriff to eject Pineda, et al., from Lot 671. When the matter was
brought before us, we annulled the assailed order as the writ of execution issued was against
Pineda, et al., who were not parties to Civil Case No. Q-45767, the ejectment suit instituted
by De Leon, et al. We elaborated in Pineda that:
“Being a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes of an action in personam. In Domagas
v. Jensen, we have explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated some actions and
proceedings which are in personam, viz.:
“The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature
and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose
of a proceedingin personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety
to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far
as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal
rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and
obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property
are in personam.”
The respondent judge’s jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in the injunction suit. To stress,
the petition for injunction,
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only by therein petitioners Augusto M. de Leon, Jose de
Castro, Jose A. Panlilio, Felicidad Vergara Vda. De Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando M. Vitug II,
Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia, and later amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C.
Cristobal-Generoso as additional petitioners therein, against Bishop Eraño Manalo, in his capacity as
titular and spiritual head of I.N.K. Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never became parties thereto.
Any and all orders and writs of execution, which the respondent judge may issue in that case can, therefore,
be enforced only against those parties and not against the herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. In
issuing the assailed Order dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of the 2nd Alias Writ of
Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the respondent judge clearly went out of bounds and
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The nature of the injunction suit—Civil Case No. Q-45767—as an action in personam in the RTC
remains to be the same whether it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review. An action in
personam does not become an action in rem just because a pronouncement confirming I.N.K.’s title to Lot
671 was made by this Court in the Calalang decision. Final rulings may be made by this Court, as
the Highest Court of the Land, in actions in personam but such rulings are binding only as
against the parties therein and not against the whole world. Here lies another grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he relied on the Calalang decision in his assailed Order
dated 07 May 1998 as if it were binding against the whole world, saying:
“After evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive on the incident is the decision of
the Supreme Court in favor of the respondent I.N.K., represented by its titular and spiritual head
Bishop Eraño G. Manalo, sustaining its ownership over the subject Lot 671. This Court could do
no less but to follow and give substantial meaning to its ownership which shall include all
dominical rights by way of a Writ of Execution. To delay the issuance of such writ is a denial of
justice due the I.N.K.”
As a final word, this decision shall not be misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our
ruling in Calalang. The final ruling on I.N.K.’s ownership and title is not at all affected. Private
respondent I.N.K., as the true and lawful
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VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 375
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, simply has to file the proper action against
the herein petitioners to enforce its property rights within the bounds of the law and our
rules. I.N.K.’s recourse of asking for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the petitioners
in Civil Case No. Q-45767 and the respondent judge’s orders in said case, granting I.N.K.’s prayer and
enforcing the alias writ of execution against the present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very
fundamental rules and must therefore be stricken down.” (Emphases ours.)
54
Consistent with Pineda, and as appositely recommended by the RTC-Branch 95 and the
Court of Appeals in the present case, Muñoz’s legal remedy is to directly assail in a separate
action the validity of the certificates of title of BPI Family and the spouses Chan.
G.R. No. 142676
G.R. No. 142676 is Muñoz’s appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible
entry case she instituted against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land
or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the
prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations
are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege
prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived
of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the
resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession
of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior posses-
_______________
54 Id., at pp. 64-67.
376
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
sion de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such
cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely
to prove prior possession de factoand undue deprivation thereof. 55
Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who
had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is
prior possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and
stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or
ownership. We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals that:
56 57
“Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for
recovery of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal
possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical
possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The
absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the
parties in an ejectment case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is—who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It
does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into
public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government
agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or
_______________
55 Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, 511 Phil. 458, 479-480; 475 SCRA 13, 34 (2005).
56 Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 115, 132.
57 G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492.
377
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 377
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect
for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in
an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.” (Emphases ours.)58
Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At the time
said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only gone so far as holding
a hearing on and eventually granting Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Muñoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in prior
possession of the subject property since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff on January
10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC-Branch 95 to implement
the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The factual issue of who was in prior possession
of the subject property should be litigated between the parties regardless of whether or not
the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan. Hence, the
pendency of the latter issue in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not
warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia.
The two cases could proceed independently of one another.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses Chan have never lost possession
of the subject property since acquiring the same from BPI Family in 1990. This is a worthy
defense to Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry, which Samuel
_______________
58 Id., at pp. 510-511.
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should substantiate with evidence in the continuation of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC.
In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, Section 19 whereof provides:
“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.—The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall
not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
xxxx
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the
court.”
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this
objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order
to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. 59
Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not touch on the
merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. An order granting a preliminary
60
injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MeTC in its Order dated May
16, 1994, directing that Muñoz be placed in possession of the subject property during the
course of Civil Case No. 8286, is an interlocutory order. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
assailed the said order before
_______________
59 Go v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 214, 224; 297 SCRA 574, 583 (1998).
60 Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc., 504 Phil. 150, 158; 466 SCRA 584, 595 (2005).
61 United Coconut Planters Bank v. United Alloy Philippines Corporation, 490 Phil. 353, 363; 449 SCRA 473, 474
(2005).
379
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
the RTC-Branch 88 via a petition for certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The
RTC-Branch 88 gave due course to said petition, and not only declared the MeTC Order dated
May 16, 1994 null and void, but went further by dismissing Civil Case No. 8286.
The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is plain
enough. Its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The petition for certiorari of Samuel
62
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 is clearly covered by the said
prohibition, thus, it should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch 88. While the
circumstances involved in Muñoz’s forcible entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut are admittedly very peculiar, these are insufficient to except the petition
for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the
prohibition. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. 63
Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC
may accord to Muñoz in the event that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry by
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut into the subject property (i.e., that the sheriff actually
turned-over to Muñoz the possession of the subject property on January 10, 1994, and that
she was deprived of such possession by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on February 2, 1994
by
can no longer insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 granting a
preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in possession of the subject property during
the course of the trial. Muñoz though may recover damages if she is able to prove wrongful
deprivation of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until the finality of
61
this decision in G.R. No. 146718.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we:
(1) GRANT Emerita Muñoz’s petition in G.R. No. 142676. We REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Decision dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August
5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632.
We DIRECT the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to reinstate Emerita
Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286 and to resume the proceedings
only to determine whether or not Emerita Muñoz was forcibly deprived of possession of the
subject property from February 2, 1994 until finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or
not she is entitled to an award for damages for deprivation of possession during the
aforementioned period of time; and
(2) DENY Emerita Munoz’s petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of merit, and AFFIRM
379
the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, affirmed the
381
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 381
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95 of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition in G.R. No. 142676 granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Petition in G.R. No.
146718 denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—A court cannot hold a witness liable for damages – a judgment cannot bind
persons who are not parties to the action. (Maccay vs. Nobela, 454 SCRA 504 [2005]) When
the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. (Santos
vs. Lumbao, 519 SCRA 408 [2007])
——o0o——

_______________

62 Bayview Hotel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119337, June 17, 1997, 273 SCRA 540, 547-548.
63 Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882, 890-891; 314 SCRA 197, 205 (1999).
380

380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth). Taking into account our ruling in
G.R. No. 146718—that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the
spouses Chan, who were not impleaded as parties to the said case—the MeTC is precluded
from granting to Muñoz relief, whether preliminary or final, that will give her
possession of the subject property. Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful
execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Based on the same reason, Muñoz
 G.R. No. 195097 August 13, 2012.* _______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Agnes Reyes-Carpio and Eduardo B.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.MARLON MEDIDA, respondent. Peralta, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 31-40.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,” 320
Distinguished.—The distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is settled. There is a
“question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and 320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
which does not call for an examina-
_______________ Republic vs. Medida
* SECOND DIVISION.
318
Nabor Derama (Derama). At the time of the lots’ purchase by Medida, the properties were
covered by Tax Declaration No. 08774 under the name of Romero. Medida started occupying
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the properties in 1997, and had since then declared the properties for tax purposes under his
Republic vs. Medida name. 2

tion of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand,
there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
Civil Law; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine; Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied
in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
Also among the witnesses presented during the proceedings a quo were Asuncion Derama
Binagatan (Binagatan) and Engineer Rafaela A. Belleza (Engr. Belleza).
Binagatan, daughter of Derama, testified that her father had inherited the subject
properties from his uncle, one Florencio Villareal, who possessed the lots even prior to the
Second World War. She presented the old Tax Declaration No. 08590 under the name of her
father and covering the subject properties. 3

right to any ownership of land.—Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of
Engr. Belleza, the Chief of the Technical Services of the Land Management Services–
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII, testified that the
lots’ survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Jose V. Dumaguing (Engr. Dumaguing) was
approved by their office. Per the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and 597 identified 4 5

proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person by Engr. Belleza, the subject properties had already been declared alienable and disposable
applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. portions of the public domain.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
On June 21, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of Medida via a Decision with dispositive 6

subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Same; Land Registration; As the rule now stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of
portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petitioner to have sufficient title proper for registration, the petition is
an application for registration is alienable and disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of
hereby GRANTED and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the title of petitioner Marlon D. Medida[,]
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
married to Patricia F. Medida[,] over the following parcels of land: 321
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.—As the rule now
stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and VOL. 678, AUGUST 13, 2012 321
disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands Republic vs. Medida
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the 1. A parcel of land, Lot 817, Cad. 1049-D, under AP-07-003683, situated in Barangay
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and Poblacion, Municipality of Boljoon, Province of Cebu, containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND
disposable. In a line of cases, we have ruled that mere notations appearing in survey NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]TWO (5,972) SQUARE METERS; and
319
2. A parcel of land, Lot 597, Cad. 1049-D, under AP 07-003653, situated in Barangay
VOL. 678, AUGUST 13, 2012 319 Poblacion, Municipality of Boljoon, Province of Cebu, containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTY[-]THREE (533) SQUARE METERS.
Republic vs. Medida IT IS SO DECIDED. 7

plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’ alienable and disposable character. Unsatisfied with the decision of the RTC, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal before the CA based on a lone assignment of error, to
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. wit:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. The trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition for registration because the subject lands were not
Chan & Parawan Law Offices for respondent. occupied and possessed for the period required by law. 8

REYES, J.: In support of its appeal, the OSG argued that it was only from the subject lands’ date of
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the alienability and disposability that the reckoning of the thirty (30)-year statutory requirement
Philippines (Republic) to assail the Decision dated December 16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
1 of possession should begin. Based on the Advance Survey Plans submitted by the respondent,
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870, entitled Marlon Medida, Petitioner-appellee v. Republic of the Lot Nos. 817 and 597 were declared alienable and disposable in 1987 and 1980,
Philippines, Oppositor-appellant. respectively. The OSG then argued that Medida’s possession of the properties prior to 1987
9

On October 22, 2004, herein respondent Marlon Medida (Medida) filed with the Regional and 1980, as the case may be, should not be credited as part of the period of possession
Trial Court (RTC), Argao, Cebu a petition for registration of title over two parcels of land required from him as an applicant for land registration.
situated in Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu, identified as Lot Nos. 817 and 597 of Boljoon Cad. 1049- On December 16, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the appeal. It
10

D and measuring 5,972 and 533 square meters, respectively. The petition was docketed as ruled that the doctrine in-
_______________
LRA Case No. AL-31 and raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Argao, Cebu. 7 Id., at p. 84.
The initial hearing on the petition was conducted on September 22, 2005, with the 8 Id., at p. 87.
attendance of the public prosecutor. The RTC delegated the reception of evidence to its Clerk 9 Id., at p. 90.
10 Id., at pp. 31-40.
of Court. Before the court, Medida testified that he purchased the subject properties in 322
February 1997 from one Eufemia Romero (Romero), who had previously obtained the lots
from 322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Republic vs. Medida
voked by the OSG had been abandoned by recent jurisprudence. The appellate court
emphasized that the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, now merely
requires the property for registration to be already declared alienable and disposable at the
time that the application for registration of title is filed in court. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision
dated June 21, 2006, rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Laoang Northern Argao, Cebu, in
LRA Case No. AL-31 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The Republic invokes in its petition a lone
ground, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE PART OF THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS WITHOUT BASIS. 12
Citing jurisprudence on the matter, the Republic argues that the alienable and disposable
character of the subject parcels of land has not been sufficiently proved by the mere
presentation of the surveyor’s notations on the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and
597. Petitioner Republic claims that such requirement must be established by the existence
of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute.
_______________
11 Id., at p. 39.
12 Id., at p. 14.
323
VOL. 678, AUGUST 13, 2012 323
Republic vs. Medida
In his Comment, Medida maintains that he has sufficiently proved that the subject
13
properties have been declared alienable and disposable. To further support this assertion, he
submitted with his Comment the following certifications issued by the DENR-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Argao, Cebu: (1) the
Certification dated June 22, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No.
14
817, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 5,972 square
meters is within the alienable and disposable area, Proj. No. 59-A, L.C. Map No. 3280,
certified on August 6, 1987, as verified by actual ground verification; and (2) the
Certification dated July 5, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No.
15
597, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 533 square
meters is within the alienable and disposable area, Proj. No. 59 L.C. Map No. 2876, certified
on January 11, 1980, as verified by actual ground verification.
Medida also seeks the petition’s denial on the ground that it raises a question of fact,
which is not allowed in petitions for review under Rule 45. Medida further argues that the
OSG is bound conclusively by its declaration before the CA that the subject parcels of land
have been declared alienable and disposable.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the main issue for this Court’s resolution is: whether or
not the CA erred in ruling that the parcels of land subject of the application for registration
are part of the alienable and disposable portions of the public domain.
The petition is meritorious.
First, we address Medida’s argument that the present petition raises a question of fact
which is beyond the coverage of a
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 116-124.
14 Id., at p. 125.
15 Id., at p. 126.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Medida
petition for review on certiorari. The distinction between a “question of law” and a
“question of fact” is settled. There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand,
there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law. 16
Judging by the arguments that are raised by the OSG in its petition, the issue delves on
the alleged insufficiency of the documents presented by the respondent to support the CA’s
conclusion that the subject parcels of land have been validly declared alienable and
disposable. In Republic v. Vega, we explained that when a petitioner seeks the review of a
17
lower court’s ruling based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative
value but only on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of
law is raised. We explained:
[T]he Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes issue
against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of
the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the
decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their
probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a
question of law is raised.
xxxx
_______________
16 Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 410, 420.
17 G.R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011, 639 SCRA 541.
325
VOL. 678, AUGUST 13, 2012 325
Republic vs. Medida
Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the
evidence presented, x x x. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to
support the lower court’s conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Otherwise
stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the proceedings below, were the trial
and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and
character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolution
of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts. (Emphasis ours) 18
The issue in the present petition has been limited by the Republic, as it merely concerns
the merit of notations in survey plans to prove that the properties sought to be registered
have been declared alienable and disposable. Similar to the Vega case, the contest rests on
the matter of sufficiency of evidence, an issue on a conclusion that was made by the appellate
court without necessarily raising an attack on the authenticity of the documents that were
presented in the proceedings before the RTC. The issue being invoked by the Republic to
support its petition is then a question of law, a matter that is within the purview of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
We now resolve the petition’s substantial issue. Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a
private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof
in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person apply-
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 547-548.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Medida
ing for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 19
On this requirement of proof to establish that a land has become alienable and disposable,
the respondent argues that the Advance Survey Plans that were prepared by Engr. 20
Dumaguing and approved by the DENR-Land Management Bureau, providing notations that
the lots indicated therein are within the alienable and disposable properties of the State,
should suffice. We disagree.
As the rule now stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable and disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. In a line of cases, we have ruled that mere notations appearing in survey plans
21
are inadequate proof of the covered properties’ alienable and disposable character. Our ruling
in Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation is particularly instructive:
22
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable.
_______________
19 Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 621-622.
20 Rollo, pp. 74-75.
21 Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 299.
22 534 Phil. 181; 503 SCRA 91 (2006).
327
VOL. 678, AUGUST 13, 2012 327
Republic vs. Medida
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required
by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties
are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar,
while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the
DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and
has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed
to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration
are indeed alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
23
Clearly, even the testimony of Engr. Belleza fails to satisfy the required proof. Before us,
Medida attempts to remedy the deficiency in his application by submitting the
Certifications of the CENRO of Argao, Cebu, attached to his Comment to further
24
substantiate his claim that the subject properties were already declared alienable and
disposable. Unfortunately for the respondent, the said CENRO Certifications remain
inadequate to support his intended purpose.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., this Court explained that a Provincial
25
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by itself, fails
to prove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of land. We ruled:
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 194-195, 102.
24 Rollo, pp. 125-126.
25 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Medida
[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. (Emphasis ours)
26
We further explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be considered prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official
repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable
and disposable. The CENRO should have attached
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 489.
329
VOL. 678, AUGUST 13, 2012 329
Republic vs. Medida
an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
“Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facieevidence of the facts stated
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.”
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of
public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not
reflect “entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer,” such as entries
made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook. The
certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the
legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x
x. (Citations omitted and italics ours)
27
The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration
be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. Medida failed in this respect. The records only include
28
CENRO Certifications on the subject properties’ alienability and disposability, but not a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by
its legal custodian. Furthermore, even the CENRO Certifications filed before this Court
deserve scant consideration since these were not presented during the trial. The genuineness
_______________
27 Id., at pp. 489-491.
28 Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 158.
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Medida
and due execution of these documents had not been duly proven in the manner required by
law. 29
In view of the failure of the respondent to establish by sufficient proof that the subject
parcels of land had been classified as part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, his application for registration of title should be denied.
 There is even no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the Republic is bound by an ——o0o——
alleged judicial admission on the subject properties’ alienability and disposability, when the
latter included the following statement in its Brief filed before the CA: 30

The Advance Survey Plan clearly shows that the Lot No. 817 and Lot No. 597, albeit alienable and
disposable land, were declared only as such in 1987 and 1980, respectively. (Citation omitted)
31

Said statement cannot be construed as an admission on the alienable and disposable

character of the subject properties, as the Republic merely cited the contents of the Advance
Survey Plans to lay its basis in saying that Medida had not satisfied the required number of
years of possession. Furthermore, the afore-quoted statement should not be interpreted in
isolation or taken out of context, as the statements prior to the alleged judicial admission in
fact provide:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conversion of such patrimony. The
same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Hence, anyone who applies for registration of owner-
_______________
29 See Republic v. Gomez, G.R. No. 189021, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 669.
30 Rollo, pp. 85-94.
31 Id., at p. 90.
331

VOL. 678, AUGUST 13, 2012 331

Republic vs. Medida
ship over a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Such burden was not discharged in the present case. x x x (Citations omitted and emphasis
32

ours)
This Court also holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the
matters that can be established by mere admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The
law and jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such fact. Our
Constitution, no less, embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain
33

belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The courts
are then empowered, as we are duty-bound, to ensure that such ownership of the State is duly
protected by the proper observance by parties of the rules and requirements on land
registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
December 16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870 is hereby SET ASIDE.
The application for registration filed by Marlon Medida is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Brion, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
** ***

Petition granted, judgment set aside.

_______________
32 Id., at pp. 89-90.
33 The 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
** Additional member per Raffle dated March 9, 2011 vice Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
*** Additional member per Special Order No. 1274 dated July 30, 2012 vice Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno.
332

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Medida
Notes.—Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, land that has not
been acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant or any other mode recognized
by law, belongs to the State as part of the public domain. (Republic vs. Heirs of Juan Fabio,
575 SCRA 51 [2008])
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and the
latter is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land—the State presumably owns
all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership. (Republic vs. Roche,
624 SCRA 116 [2010])
G.R. No. 157485. March 26, 2014.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF
FISHERIES (ANCF) and DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF
Superintendent, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION
L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL
L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA, respondents.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title; The requirements for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073.—The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows: Sec. 48. The
following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
42issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: x x x x (b) Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. An equivalent provision is found in
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which provides: SECTION 14. Who may apply.—The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for Judicial Confirmation of Title.—This Court has thus held that
there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and
disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year. Petitioner emphatically objects,
alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that lands
not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.—Accordingly, in the case at bar,
43the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared
a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said
land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified
lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro
S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 500 SCRA 209 (2006), wherein we held: While it is true
that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests,
the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition. x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Applicants have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.—In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession
by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation
No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained
to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case
No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Benjamin C. Santos and Ray Montri C. Santos Law Offices for respondents.
44
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
1
S.P. No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from
the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed
by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr.
Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they
are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land
situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and more particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan,
containing an approximate area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square
meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by
Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by
Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax
Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00. 2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint
against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF
Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership
with damages. Respondent heirs
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 38-47; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.
2 Id., at p. 56.
45claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped
by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land
they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by
respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of private
respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The
ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and
therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and
Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted
by Ricardo Andres, then the designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view
of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger
parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington,
Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale
(Exhibit “B”), and then developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango
trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was
occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs
of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the
concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land until it was converted into a fish-
46pond by the ANCF. To prove possession, respondents presented several tax declarations,
the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and
possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the same
from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No.
2074 dated March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the
unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when the
same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning
the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00
for attorney’s fees and costs of this suit. 3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh.
“LL”) shows that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074
was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960 (Exh. “4-D”). The MCTC observed
that the phrase “Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415” was printed on the Map of the Civil
Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. “6”), indicating that
the disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
_______________
3 Id., at p. 71.
47
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals where it was pronounced that:
4
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later
included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the
President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons to
depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who has settled
thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been
previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations
omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to
depart from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private
rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue
of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts
to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where
the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with
modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo
Andres from the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision are
affirmed in toto. 5
_______________
4 165 Phil. 142, 155-156; 73 SCRA 146, 156-157 (1976).
5 Rollo, p. 55.
48
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by
private individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal
unless the court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of
its findings. The RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as
there was no showing on record that he acted with malice or in bad faith in the
implementation of Proclamation No. 2074. 6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her
capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
through a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals
held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise declared
a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of
the private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates
of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and therefore
disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.\
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject property
from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years
before the said landholding was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the
possession of the previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it does not
tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property had been privately possessed for more than 30
years before
_______________
6 Id., at p. 54.
49itwas declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession has ripened into an ownership
against the State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come
under the meaning of “private rights” under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the
mass of civil reservation granted to petitioner. (Citation omitted.)
7
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM TO SUPPOSED “PRIVATE RIGHTS” OVER
SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS
TIMBERLAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY
RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES
TO THEM. 8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of
Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of Natural
Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to
private rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares, situated
in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the
attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x [.] 9
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 46-47.
8 Id., at p. 18.
9 Id., at p. 74.
50
 The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain
private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above
proclamation thereon. The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which
respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property, through their
predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22,
1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree.
Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of
possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership as such an application and
proceeded to determine if respondents complied with the requirements therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
51
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. 10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quoheld that the disputed property was
alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence
that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on
said year. Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all
11
lands of the public domain belong to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
_______________
10 Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, 484 Phil. 145, 154; 441 SCRA 188, 192 (2004); Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, 589 Phil. 156, 197; 568 SCRA 164, 208 (2008).
11 Rollo, p. 46.
52
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in
the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic: 12
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources v. Yap, 13
_______________
12 G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 299, 306-307.
13 Supra note 10.
53which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province of Aklan.
On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay
Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On
September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The
respondents-claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes. The respondents claim that through their predecessors-in-interest, they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their
lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with
this Court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). Petitioner-claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064,
alleging that it infringed on their “prior vested right” over portions of Boracay which they
allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the
petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-a-vis the right of the claimants to lands
they claim to have possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State owner-
54ship, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands
which have been “officially delimited and classified.”
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land
is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[1](Emphases in the original;
citations omitted.)
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent
evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as
such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable
prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 182-183.
Notes.—A reconstituted title is ordered issued in an ordinary civil case, not in a cadastral
proceeding for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over unregistered property. (Heirs of the
Late Jose De Luzuriaga vs. Republic, 591 SCRA 299 [2009])
In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings, applicants may
obtain the registration of title to land upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-
interest have been in (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of (2) agricultural lands of the public domain, (3) under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, (4) for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. (Republic vs. Ng, 692
SCRA 589 [2013])
——o0o——

55publiclands. Such was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, wherein we held:
15

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released
and rendered open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the members of this
Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic. In Malabanan, the members of this Court
16

were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945
may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no
disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since
respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-
interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents
cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as
to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus
constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner
Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.
_______________
15 531 Phil. 602, 616; 500 SCRA 209, 222-223 (2006).
16 G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.

56
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which
upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and
the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the
portion of land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case
No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan,
Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.