Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Nathalia Rogers
Dowling College
When the Communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
European countries collapsed a decade ago, there was much anticipation
regarding their transition towards more economically and politically
open societies. Western experts were recruited to advise new govern-
ments on the issues of transformation and large amounts of money from
the West were disbursed to aid these governments’ new economic, social
and political goals. At the same time, it was anticipated that the much
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needed transformation would also take place on the societal level and
that citizens would choose to support the new democratic and economic
liberalization reforms either on their own initiative or in response to their
governments’ initiatives. However, more detailed predictions about how
exactly the former Communist subjects were supposed to swiftly change
their mentality of complete economic reliance on the state and of deep
political alienation were hard to come by. Some scholars suggested that
once the state stopped striving for total control over the society, the
people would gradually reinvent a ‘civil society’, where citizens would
engage in a constructive political participation in various civic and
political groups, thus restoring and maintaining the democratic political
balance between the state and its subjects (Gellner, 1994; Tismaneanu and
Turner, 1995). Other authors implied that, with the fundamental change
in the economic relationships and the introduction of private property
ownership, political relationships would change too. In particular, large
groups of private property owners would be created, and these indi-
viduals would become supporters of new pro-democratic governments
(Boycko et al., 1995).
Not surprisingly there also were scholars who viewed the political
transformation of the post-Communist societies ‘from below’ as a rather
problematic task. Writing about transforming Russia, Rueschemeyer et
al. (1992: 295) predicted that its new capitalist class ‘will be weak econ-
omically and politically’. Eyal et al. (1998) argued that in the cases of the
Czech Republic and Hungary the politics of economic and political
liberalization was carried forward by an intellectual elite of former dissi-
dents, who successfully forged a union with the technocrats from the
former Communist government. To emphasize their point the authors
have coined the phrase ‘capitalism without capitalists’, but cautioned
that their theory of post-Communist managerialism should be applied
only to the explanation of the transition in Central European societies
(Eyal et al., 1998: 4).
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Results
Participation in Political Parties and Movements
Among the 20 owners of large capital that I interviewed, six business
people said that they were members of an existing Russian political party
and one other respondent was among the founders of an early political
party of entrepreneurs (the now inactive block ‘Transformation’). This
political involvement of large capital owners reflected the highest number
of active party members found among different groups of capital owners
interviewed. Four out of five owners of large capital who participated in
anti-liberal political parties and movements (CPRF, APR, RUIP, RCDM5)
owned ‘old state’ type capital, were older than 55 years and in the past
had been politically active in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). Overall, owners of large capital who participated in political
parties were a highly educated group with three respondents having five
years of college education and another three respondents having more
than eight years of college education (postgraduate degrees).
Among the six owners of small and medium-sized capital who were
members of political parties, the two owners of ‘old state’ type capital
belonged to the anti-liberal CPRF and the RUIP, while the four owners of
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Explanatory Model
Pinard (1986) developed a multidimensional theoretical model of political
mobilization that can be adopted for the purposes of explanation of
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Rogers Political Participation in the Period of Post-Communist Transition
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Table 1 Participation in Political Parties and Movements and Politicized Business Groups by Type of Political Attitudes and Type and
Size of Respondent’s Capital (N = 60)
Large capital Small and medium capital
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‘Old state’ ‘Independent’ ‘Old state’ ‘Independent’
Part. Non-part. Part. Non-part. Part. Non-part. Part. Non-part.
Type of political attitudes n n n n n n n N
Pro-liberal political and economic reform 2 0 1 1 0 1 4 10
Moderately pro-democratic,
pro-market reform 2 1 4 1 4 2 7 6
Authoritarian state with capitalist economy 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 1
Anti-democratic and market reform 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
Participation % (total n) 70% (10) 70% (10) 60% (10) 43% (30)
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Table 2 Political Participation by Respondent’s Age and Respondent’s Political Attitudes (N = 60)
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Age (years)
25–34 35–44 45–54 >54
Part. Non-part. Part. Non-part. Part. Non-part. Part. Non-part.
Type of political attitudes n n n n n n n N
Pro-liberal political and economic reform 1 1 4 3 2 8 0 0
Moderately pro-democratic, pro-market reform 2 0 5 6 4 3 5 2
Authoritarian state with capitalist economy 2 0 0 2 3 0 1 0
Anti-democratic, anti-market reform 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2
Participation % (total n) 83% (6) 45% (20) 45% (20) 71% (14)
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Discussion
Political Participation of Older Capital Owners
Out of 14 respondents who were aged 55 and older, only three owned
‘independent’ type companies of small and medium size. The other 11
respondents owned either large (six respondents) or small and medium-
sized companies (five respondents) of the ‘old state’ type. Such owner-
ship patterns are not surprising because older respondents had more time
and opportunities to advance their careers and to occupy positions of
power during the Soviet regime. These capital owners then succeeded in
holding onto their pre-reform job positions under the new economic and
political regime through becoming owners and co-owners of the
companies that previously belonged to the state. Out of the group of 14
older capital owners, six participated in anti-liberal organizations such as
the RUIP and/or RUIE, and another four respondents were members of
the moderately pro-reform RADSB. None of the respondents who
belonged to the older cohort participated in pro-liberal political organiz-
ations.
In order to find out about the motives, incentives and expectations that
led some older capital owners to participate in anti-liberal political
organizations, one has to start with an analysis of Russian economic and
political reforms, that left many Soviet top industrial managers with
strong grievances and also with expectations of greater state help for their
formerly state-owned enterprises. As reforms unfolded the majority of
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The loss of status and the ability to easily influence the state by many
top industrial managers/capital owners was no accident, but an intended
consequence of certain policies adopted by the new Russian government.
Laitin (2000: 128) pointed out that the tripartite program of economic
restructuring that was developed by western and Russian neoliberal econ-
omists and adopted by the new Russian government advocated liberaliz-
ation, stabilization and privatization, but purposefully ignored the goal
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of the stimulation of production because the latter could disrupt the goal
of stabilization. The economists also feared that the focus on production
would allow industrialists ‘to feed resources to favored state enterprises’
and gain political and economic power that could be used to disrupt
neoliberals’ transformation plans. The Russian government offered top
industrial managers the choice of either going along with its policies in
order to gain access to the top political actors through pro-liberal business
associations, or survival at their own risk.7 The industrial managers who
did not change their allegiances soon enough found themselves progres-
sively more isolated and powerless. Strongly motivated by their status
grievances and their aspirations for a continued state support of their
formerly state-owned Soviet enterprises, some of my respondents chose
to mobilize on their own. The collective incentives that these respondents
had in mind were the return to the dominance of the industrial sector in
Russia’s economic development, and for some, there was also a selective
incentive of the survival of their own enterprise and the ability to maintain
their position as company owners and managers. These respondents also
maintained reasonable expectations of success because of a number of
factors conducive to their mobilization efforts: (1) the presence of some
anti-liberal officials in the Russian government who were sympathetic to
the causes of development and state support of local industry; (2) exten-
sive past political participation experience of many capital owners (career
and active CPSU members) who were top Soviet industrial managers in
the past; and (3) the extensive connections within Soviet networks that
this group of respondents had developed were also being used for
purposes of mobilization.
The very few older top Soviet managers who were able to construct
closer and more productive relations with the new government, and thus
wield a broader political influence with the new democratic regime,
supported the new political order although not without some reservations
and with a realistic perception of the new democrats’ shortcomings. These
capital owners were among the non-politically participating respondents,
who reported using direct access to key governmental officials and having
little need to mediate their aspirations for greater cooperation from the
state through various political organizations.
On the other hand, none of the older capital owners who chose to
participate in the pro-moderate reform RADSB came from the top ranks
of the industrial enterprise management and all of these respondents
owned small or medium-sized capital. Even though these capital owners
maintained comfortable institutional positions under the previous regime,
they had never experienced a high level of power and ability to influence
key economic policies such as the top industrial managers did. The
survival of these respondents’ small and medium-sized companies also
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did not depend on massive cash injections from the state, but on the
cooperation from the local Moscow officials, such as help in arranging
loans and provision of reasonable real estate leases. These respondents
displayed much lower levels of political grievances because their expec-
tations of political power sharing were non-existent. Their participation
in RADSB was based on practical aspirations to get loans and cheaper
rents and the selective incentive of being a successful entrepreneur. Since
the RADSB had the mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov as its patron, these
respondents had reasonable expectations of success, hoping that their
loyalty to the organization would be rewarded by greater attention of city
officials to their requests.
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You know populism is always easy, but it does not lead to anything good.
Every time that I have to think about my own political decisions – I mean my
own personal political choices for whom to vote, and which political organiz-
ation I should support – I have this recurrent desire to support authoritarian-
ism, a reasonable, balanced authoritarianism. Doing this will be in the interest
of my business, for example. It may stabilize my market faster and may protect
my company from being taken over by a foreign competitor. But on the other
hand, as a Russian person, I know first hand what authoritarianism can lead
to. We must to learn how to look further than our immediate economic inter-
ests. We absolutely need democracy. We absolutely need to defend economic
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and political freedoms and civil rights. When I contribute to DCR or pay dues
to AAPPE, I feel that I am supporting the liberal causes from which my child
may benefit in the future.9
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The quote above also illustrates the effect that the imperfect supply of
political organizations may have on political participation. Respondents
who were moderately pro-reform had few political organizations to turn
to because in the late 1990s the two largest Russian parliamentary political
parties, the CPRF and the LDPR, did not advocate democratic political
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Conclusions
When the age cohorts are taken into consideration, it is the younger (25–34
years) respondents and the older (>54 years) respondents who partici-
pated the most actively. Interestingly, in both age groups the majority of
participating respondents chose anti-liberal political organizations. Some
respondents in the middle-aged cohort participated in pro-liberal or
moderately pro-reform political organizations, but the majority of capital
owners in this age group chose not to participate. Among the owners of
small and medium-sized capital, respondents who owned ‘old state’ type
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Notes
The author wishes to thank the three anonymous reviewers and many other
colleagues who provided helpful comments on an early draft of this article,
especially Saïd Arjomand, Maurice Pinard and Suzanne Staggenborg.
1. According to Boycko et al. (1995: 2) the number of Russian citizens who owned
shares in privatized firms and mutual funds reached 40 million in 1994.
2. Russian capital owners were distinguished on the basis of the size and the
origin of their capital. Firms with a yearly turnover of up to US$200,000 were
classified as small businesses, firms with a yearly turnover from US$200,000 to
US$25 million were classified as medium-sized businesses, and firms with a
yearly turnover higher than US$25 million were classified as large businesses.
3. Out of 60 respondents, a little more than half (33) were selected on the basis of
the membership lists of major business associations. These business associations
were: the All-Russian Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises (AAPPE),
the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), the Russian
Association for the Development of Small Business (RADSB), the Moscow
Association of Women Entrepreneurs, and the Moscow Chamber of Commerce.
The remaining 27 respondents in this sample were selected in ways that did not
involve business interest groups. I approached some respondents at the Moscow
Small Business Days Exposition where I interviewed owners of every fifth
company that had an exhibit stand, others were chosen through various business
catalogues, and a few respondents were approached through friends.
4. RTBR stands for the Round Table Business of Russia.
5. APR stands for the Agrarian Party of Russia, RUIP for the Russian United
Industrial Party and RCDM stands for the Russian Christian-Democratic
Movement.
6. Interview with Vladislav Gorshenin, the president of the privatized concern
Technology and Industry, chair of the Moscow Branch of the Russian United
Industrialist Party and the vice-president of the Russian Union of Industrial-
ists and Entrepreneurs, on 25 November 1997.
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7. Interview with Gennady Tomchin, head of the AAPPE, now the deputy of the
Third Russian Duma on 25 February 1998.
8. Interview with Irina Shcherbatova, owner of the firm Faks, 28 November 1997.
9. Interview with Marina Pereverzeva, co-owner of the company Raster’s, 27
February 1998.
10. Interview with a company owner who wished to remain anonymous, 5 March
1998. One-fifth of my respondents requested to remain anonymous, while the
rest of the capital owners whom I had interviewed had no objection to my
use of their names when quoting them in print.
11. Interview with an anonymous capital owner, 18 March 1998.
12. Making offers to become a group’s vice-president was one of the techniques
the leaders of the RUIE used in order to recruit wealthy business owners who
could then be asked for money to support the organization. Inside RUIE no
one knew exactly how many vice-presidents RUIE had, but in the interview
with the author one of officials said that there were ‘dozens of them’.
13. Interview with Artem Vagin, president and owner of Blick Communications,
17 December 1997.
14. When considering these results, readers must be aware that the sampling
procedure in which about a half of all respondents were selected with the help
of business interest groups has undoubtedly affected the outcome. Nonethe-
less, for those respondents who were selected independently from the lists of
business interest groups the finding that business interest groups were their
preferred form of political participation over various political parties still
stands. This trend has been also confirmed by Russian sources (see Avilova,
1997: 63).
References
Avilova, A. V. (1997) ‘Malyi Biznes v 1997 Godu’, Biznes i Politika 4(29): 59–64.
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1995) Privatizing Russia. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Eyal, Gil, Szelenyi, Ivan and Townsley, Eleanor (1998) Making Capitalism Without
Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe.
London: Verso.
Gellner, Ernst (1994) Conditions of Liberty. New York: Penguin.
Laitin, David D. (2000) ‘Post-Soviet Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 3:
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Lentini, Peter, ed. (1995) Elections and Political Order in Russia. Prague: CEU Press.
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