WIEGEL v DIY

Facts

Karl Heinz Wiegelasked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said
prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion
having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.

Issue: Is the prior marriage void or voidable

Ruling:

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID.

DOMINGO v CA

Facts

Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia, for support
and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation of
property.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

Ruling:

Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purpose of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of other instances other
than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of
the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that the previous
one was an absolute nullity.
Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the
State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.

ATIENZA v BRILLANTES

Facts

An administrative case was filed by herein complainant against Judge Brilliantes of MTC, Manila. Complainant
alleges that he has two children with De Castro who stays in Makati, Manila in the house he bought and stayed while
he is in Manila. Sometime in 1991 he saw Respondent Judge sleeping on his bed, upon inquiry, he was told by the
houseboy that respondent was cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant further alleged that respondent was married
to a certain Zenaida Ongkiko and begot five children.

In reply respondent alleged that the complainant was not married to De Castro, he also denied having been married
to Zenaida ongkiko, however admitted having five children with her. He stated that the marriage between him and
Ongkiko was not valid since there was no marriage license and further claimed that when he married De Castro he
believed in all good faith of it’s intent and purpose.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code that required nullity of previous marriage for purpose of remarriage
shall apply?

Ruling:

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party
thereto can enter into a second marriage as provided in Article 40 of said Code:

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art 40 to his case.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his
immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no
duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

APIAG v CANTERO

Facts:
Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the
respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu,
with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.

Resoondent judge claimed that his marriage with Apiag was invalid because it was done in jest and without his
consent freely given, alleging that he was only called by his parents to attend his sister’s wedding but later found out
that he was made to appear in a drama marriage and was forced to acknowledge their signatures in the marriage
contract. He was forced to get married with complainant to save name and shame. They separated without living
together as husband and wife. He also alleged that Apiag was kiving with another man. And that he didn’t file
annulment because he believed that the marriage was void from the beginning.

respondent and the complainant have already signed a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto (sic)
attached as Annex '1', stating among other things that respondent will give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic)
Sacurom in the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the complainant will withdraw their complaint from the Supreme Court.

Issues

The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":

"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the presumption that
she is already dead, that there was no need for any judicial declaration;
3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed the offense, he
was not yet a member of the judiciary;
4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed; 5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law."[13]

Ruling:
RTC found judge guilty of grave misconduct and was ordered his dismissal in the service

SC:

Grave Misconduct -Th e acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have
no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official
responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For any of
the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x (t)o warrant disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a
direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate the character of the man from the
character of the officer.

Nullity of Prior Marriage- Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a judicial
declaration of such fact"[20] before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void."[21] This was expressly provided under Article 40[22] of the Family Code. However, the marriage of Judge
Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-
Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of
respondent.
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in the
bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the
accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first marriage was
void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public
document,[23] which must be appreciated in his favor.

Penalty of suspension is warranted. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his
death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.