5.7 Hazop V1.1

ACCIDENTS ON FIXED OFFSHORE UNITS ON THE UK CONTINENTAL SHELF 1991-1999
In 2000 an R&D project was defined by the UK Health & Safety Executive-Offshore Safety Division where the main
objective was to obtain complete statistics for accidents having occurred on fixed offshore units engaged in the o
gas activities on the UKCS in the period 1991-99. Fixed units in this project were defined as comprising bottom-fix
platforms (excl. jackups and TLPs) engaged in drilling, accommodation, production and storage. Det Norske Verit
(Norway) was contracted the work.
The results from this study would serve as a reference document for data to be used in future Risk Assessments o
offshore fixed units and furthermore, be a valuable reference document for UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE)/
Offshore Safety Division (OSD) when reviewing Safety Cases.
To fulfil the objectives of the project, relevant UK and Norwegian databases were interrogated with respect to both
population and accident data forming a complete data basis for obtaining comprehensive accident statistics for th
listed type of units, geographical area and time period.
The result after having interrogated the databases and removing overlapping records is shown in this spreadshee
documenting a total of 3438 events comprising accidents, hazardous situations and near-misses. Note: Best effor
have been made to ensure complete anonymity within the free text associated with each incident. However, it is
possible that within the 3438 incidents some anonymisation has been missed. In the event that such is found plea
contact one of the below listed individuals to ensure that corrections are made as soon as possible.
For each event the following information is given:

Year of event; Type of unit; Operation mode; No. of injuries/fatalities; Chain of events; Event category; Event
description
Any queries or comments to this spreadsheet or the project should be communicated to either:
Mr. Espen Funnemark, Det Norske Veritas AS. Tel: +47 67 57 74 94, Fax: +47 67 57 99 11, E-mail:
espen.funnemark@dnv.com
Mr. Eoin Young, UK Health & Safety Executive - Offshore Safety Division. Tel: +44 207 717 6926, Fax: +44 207 717 6
E-mail: eoin.young@hse.gsi.gov.uk
ACCIDENTS ON FIXED OFFSHORE UNITS ON THE UK CONTINENTAL SHELF 1991-1999
Year of Type of Operation Injuries/ Chain of events-------------------------------------------------- Event
Event Unit Mode Fatalities Chain1 Chain2 Chain3 Chain4 Chain5 Category
91 DP PR CN N
91 PR PR CN A
91 PR PR CN I
91 PR PR CN U
91 DR PR CN U
91 DP PR CN U
91 DP PR CN U
91 PR PR CN U
91 DP PR CR U
91 DP PR CR U
91 DP PR CR I
91 DP DD CR FA I
91 DP PR CR FA N
91 PR PR CR FA N
91 PR PR CR FA N
91 DR PR CR I
91 PR PR CR FA I
91 DP PR CR FA N
91 DP PR CR FA I
91 DP PR CR FA N
91 PR PR CR U
91 PR PR CR FA N
91 PR PR CR FA N
91 DP PR CR FA N
91 PR WO CR FA N
91 DP PR CR FA I
91 DP PR CR FA I
91 DP PR CR U
91 DP PR CR N
91 DP PR CR FA I
91 DP PR CR FA I
91 DP PR CR FA I
91 DP PR CR I
91 DP PR CR FA U
91 DP PR CR FA U
91 DP DD CR FA U
91 DP PR CR FA N
91 DP PR CR FA N
91 DP DD CR FA I
91 DP PR CR FA N
91 DP PR CR I
91 DP PR CR U
91 DP PR CR FA U
91 DP PR CR I
91 DP PR CR FA A
91 DP PR EX FI I
91 DP PR EX I
91 DP PR EX I
91 DP PR EX FI I
91 DP PR EX FI U
91 DP PR FA N
91 PR PR FA N
91 PR PR FA N
91 DP PR FA I
91 DP PR FA U
91 DP PR FA N
91 DP PR FA I
91 DP PR FA N
91 WS PR FA LG I
91 RI PR FI I
91 RI PR FI U
91 DP PR FI U
91 PR PR FI I
91 DP PR FI I
91 PR PR FI U
91 PR PR FI I
91 PR PR FI I
91 DP PR FI U
91 DP PR FI I
91 DP PR FI U
91 DP PR FI I
91 DP PR HE U
91 DP PR LE I
91 DP PR LG I
91 PR PR LG I
91 PR PR LG FI A
91 WS PR LG I
91 PR PR LG I
91 PR PR LG I
91 PR PR LG FI A
91 CO PR LG I
91 DR PR LG I
91 PR PR LG FI A
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG FI I
91 DP PR LG N
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG CR N
91 PR PR LG FI I
91 WS PR LG I
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG FI A
91 DP PR LG FI I
91 PR PR LG I
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG N
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP DD LG U
91 PR PR LG I
91 PR PR LG U
91 PR PR LG I
91 DP PR LG U
91 PR PR LG I
91 PR PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 PR PR LG I
91 DP EV LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP DD LG FA I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG U
91 DP PR LG EX FI A
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP DD LG N
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG FI U
91 PR PR LG I
91 PR PR LG I
91 WS PR LG I
91 WS PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR LG FI I
91 DP PR LG I
91 DP PR OT N
91 DP PR OT I
91 DP PR OT I
91 DP WO WP I
91 DP DD WP I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA A
91 PR PR 1 CR FA A
91 DP PR 1 EX FI A
91 DP PR 1 FA A
91 PR PR 1 FA A
91 DP PR 1 FA A
91 DP PR 1 LG U
91 DP PR 1 LG A
91 DP PR 1 OT A
91 DP PR 1 OT A
91 DP PR 1 OT A
91 DP DD 1 CR FA I
91 DP DD 1 CR FA I
91 PR PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 PR PR 1 CR I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 PR WO 1 CR FA I
91 PR PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP DD 1 CR FA I
91 WS PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 CO PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 WS PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 CR FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 PR PR 1 FA I
91 PR PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FA I
91 DP PR 1 FI I
91 DP PR 1 LG FA I
91 DP PR 1 LG I
91 DP PR 1 LG I
91 PR PR 1 LG I
91 DP PR 1 LG I
91 DP PR CR U
91 DP PR ST I
91 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR CL U
92 AC PR CN U
92 PR PR CN U
92 PR PR CN I
92 DP PR CN I
92 DP PR CN I
92 PR PR CN U
92 WS PR CN U
92 DP PR CR FA U
92 PR PR CR FA U
92 DP PR CR I
92 DP PR CR U
92 DP PR CR FA U
92 DP PR CR U
92 PR PR CR FA U
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA U
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR U
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 PR PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR U
92 DP PR CR FA I
92 DP PR CR FA I
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR U
92 DP WO CR FA I
92 DP PR CR FA I
92 PR PR CR I
92 DP DD CR FA N
92 DP PR CR U
92 DP DD CR FA
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA U
92 DP DD CR U
92 DP DD CR U
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA U
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 DP PR CR U
92 DP PR CR FA I
92 PR PR CR FA U
92 WS PR CR FA U
92 DP PR CR FA U
92 DP PR CR I
92 DP PR CR FA I
92 DP PR CR FA I
92 DP PR CR FA N
92 PR PR FA I
92 PR PR FA U
92 DP PR FA U
92 DP PR FA I
92 DP PR FA N
92 DP PR FA U
92 DP PR FA N
92 DP PR FA N
92 DP PR FA I
92 DP PR FA LG U
92 DP PR FA U
92 DP PR FA N
92 DP PR FA FI I
92 DP PR FA N
92 DP PR FA N
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI I
92 PR PR FI I
92 PR PR FI I
92 PR PR FI U
92 DP PR FI I
92 DP PR FI I
92 PR PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 PR PR FI I
92 DP PR FI I
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 PR PR FI I
92 DP PR FI A
92 DP PR FI I
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI I
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 PR PR FI U
92 DP PR FI I
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI I
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 DP PR FI U
92 PR PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 DP PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG I
92 CO PR LG I
92 CO PR LG I
92 CO PR LG I
92 CO PR LG I
92 DP WO LG FI A
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG A
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 PR PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP DD LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 PR PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP DD LG U
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 DP PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG FI U
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG I
92 PR PR LG U
92 WS PR LG I
92 WS PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP WO LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP WO LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 CO PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG EX I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI A
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 PR PR LG I
92 WS PR LG I
92 WS PR LG I
92 WS PR LG I
92 WS PR LG I
92 WS PR LG I
92 PR PR LG FI A
92 PR PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR OT N
92 DP PR OT N
92 DP PR OT N
92 DP PR OT N
92 DP PR ST I
92 PR PR ST I
92 PR PR ST FA I
92 DP DD WP I
92 DP PR WP I
92 PR PR 1 HE A
92 DP PR 1 CR FA A
92 DP PR 1 CR FA A
92 DP PR 1 CR FA A
92 DP PR 1 CR FA A
92 CO PR 1 CR FA A
92 DP PR 1 CR FA A
92 PR PR 1 CR FA A
92 PR PR 1 FA A
92 DP PR 1 FA A
92 DP PR 1 FA A
92 DP PR 1 FA A
92 DP PR 1 LG A
92 DP PR 1 LG FA A
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 PR PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP DD 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR I
92 DP PR 1 CR I
92 DP PR 1 CR FA I
92 DP PR 1 CR I
92 PR PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FA I
92 PR PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FA I
92 PR PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FA I
92 DP PR 1 FI I
92 DP PR 1 LG FA I
92 DP PR 1 LG I
92 DP PR ST U
92 DP PR LG I
92 DP PR LG FI A
93 DP PR CL N
93 PR PR CN U
93 PR PR CN U
93 RI PR CN I
93 PR PR CN I
93 PR PR CN U
93 DP PR CR I
93 WS WO CR FA U
93 WS PR CR FA
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR U
93 PR PR CR U
93 PR PR CR FA U
93 DP PR CR FA U
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP WO CR FA N
93 DP DD CR FA I
93 DP DD CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR I
93 DP PR CR U
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 PR DD CR FA I
93 PR PR CR I
93 PR PR CR U
93 PR DD CR LG FA A
93 PR DD CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP WO CR I
93 DP PR CR U
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR U
93 DP PR CR I
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 PR PR CR FA I
93 PR PR CR FA U
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP PR CR FA N
93 DP PR CR FA I
93 DP DD CR FA I
93 PR PR EX I
93 DP PR EX U
93 DP PR EX I
93 DP PR EX I
93 DP PR EX I
93 PR PR FA N
93 PR PR FA N
93 PR DD FA N
93 PR PR FA I
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA
93 DP PR FA I
93 DP PR FA N
93 PR PR FA U
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA I
93 PR PR FA I
93 DP PR FA U
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP DD FA N
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA N
93 DP PR FA U
93 DP PR FA U
93 AC AC FI U
93 PR PR FI I
93 CO PR FI U
93 PR PR FI I
93 WS PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 PR PR FI U
93 PR PR FI I
93 PR PR FI U
93 PR PR FI I
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 PR PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 PR PR FI I
93 PR PR FI U
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI I
93 DP PR FI U
93 DP PR FI U
93 PR PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP DD LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 WS PR LG I
93 PR PR LG FI I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG A
93 PR PR LG I
93 CO PR LG I
93 CO PR LG U
93 PR PR LG FI I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 DR DD LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI A
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 WS PR LG U
93 WS PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 DP DD LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG FI I
93 PR PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG FI A
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI A
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG FI U
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP DD LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG FI A
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 WS PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP WO LG I
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP WO LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 PR PR LG I
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI S
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 PR PR LG U
93 PR PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG I
93 DP PR LG U
93 DP PR LG FI I
93 DP PR LG I
93 WS PR LG I
93 DP PR OT U
93 DP PR OT I
93 DP PR OT U
93 DP DD WP I
93 DP WO WP LG I
93 PR DD WP FA I
93 DP WO WP I
93 DP WO WP I
93 DP WO WP I
93 DP WO WP I
93 DP DD WP I
93 DP PR WP I
93 WS PR 1 CR FA A
93 PR PR 1 CR FA I
93 PR PR 1 CR FA A
93 DP PR 1 CR FA A
93 DP PR 1 FA U
93 DP PR 1 FA A
93 DP PR 1 FI I
93 DP PR 1 CR FA I
93 DP PR 1 CR I
93 PR PR 1 CR FA A
93 DP DD 1 CR FA I
93 DP PR 1 CR I
93 DP PR 1 CR FA I
93 DP DD 1 CR FA I
93 PR PR 1 CR FA N
93 DP PR 1 CR FA I
93 DP WO 1 CR FA I
93 DP PR 1 CR FA I
93 DP DD 1 CR FA I
93 DP PR 1 CR FA I
93 DP PR 1 CR FA I
93 DP PR 1 CR FA I
93 PR PR 1 EX I
93 PR PR 1 FA U
93 PR PR 1 FA U
93 PR PR 1 FA U
93 DP PR 1 FA U
93 DP PR 1 FA U
93 DP PR 1 FA U
93 DP PR 1 FA U
93 DP PR 1 FA U
93 DP PR 1 FA I
93 DP PR 1 FA I
93 DP PR 1 FI U
93 DP PR OT I
93 DP PR 1 CR FA A
93 PR PR LG I
93 DP PR 1 FA A
94 PR PR CL LG N
94 AC AC CN U
94 PR PR CN N
94 DP DD CN LG I
94 DP PR CN I
94 PR PR CN I
94 WS PR CN I
94 DP PR CN U
94 DP PR CN U
94 DP PR CN U
94 DP DD CR FA N
94 DP DD CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA U
94 PR PR CR FA I
94 PR PR CR FA I
94 PR PR CR FA U
94 DR DD CR FA I
94 DP PR CR FA I
94 DP PR CR FA I
94 DP PR CR I
94 DP PR CR FA I
94 DP PR CR FA I
94 DP PR CR I
94 DP WO CR FA I
94 DP PR CR FA I
94 PR PR CR I
94 DP PR CR FA U
94 DP PR CR FA N
94 PR PR CR FA U
94 PR PR CR FA I
94 PR PR CR FA I
94 PR PR CR FA I
94 PR DD CR FA N
94 PR DD CR FA N
94 DP EV CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA U
94 DP PR CR FA N
94 DP DD CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA U
94 DP DD CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA N
94 PR PR CR FA N
94 PR PR CR FA N
94 DP DD CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA N
94 DP PR CR N
94 DP PR CR FA I
94 DP EV CR FA N
94 DP DD CR FA N
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94 DP PR CR FA N
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94 DP DD CR FA N
94 DP DD CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA N
94 DP PR CR FA N
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94 DP PR CR FA N
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94 DP PR CR FA I
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ENTAL SHELF 1991-1999
Event
Description
No. 2 port mooring wire parted after a period of prolonged heavy weather whilst the vessel was in standoff position on the east face of <…> platform. The tension on the
mooring wire at the time of failure was noted to be 50 tonnes. Actions taken/
Standby vessel <…> collided with West face of platform bow on. All platform personnel were in bed at the time when a massive blow shook the platform. This was followed
by three other less intensive blows. Three personnel proceeded on to m in deck and reported a vessel wallowing at the North West corner of the platform approx. 50 yards off
and drifting NE. Platform personnel were mustered. Damage was: one horizontal bracing was sheared off and one knee joint was also sheared off.
Whilst unloading equipment from standby vessel MV <…> to platform. Vessel collided with platform 'X' brace south side. Damage sustained on platform and stern of vessel.
Wind - 21 knots @ 186 deg. Wave - 1.5 to 2.0m. Visibility - good - 3-4 miles Air temp 16.5deg. Installation shut in after collision.
Supply boat unloading a container onto a satellite platform when it struck the leg of the platform. No visible damage to platform but slight damage to vessel. All usual safety
equipment on board boat and platform. Platform damage undetermined, boat damage - minor dent to stern. Wind: 14 knots 045deg, wave: 1metre, light: daylight, good
visibility for task, tide: 0.5 knots ne.
Standby vessel <…> imparted a glancing blow to the production platform riser guard, then passed beneath the bridge linking production platform to drilling platform.
The <…> was back-loading/discharging containers on the south side of <…>. The vessel moved in under the crane to allow the crane operator to place a container up forward
on the deck. The vessel struck cell 3 at the water line, and then m ved back out from the platform.
Supply boat <…> made slight contact with port leg of morecambe flame when manoeuvering alongside platform
At 08:02 the vessel <…> collided with s1 leg. Platform muster alarm sounded and field supervisor was despatched to the cellar deck.all platform personnel accounted for and
stood down from muster. Oim informed that the vessel was clear of the platform and that there seemed to be no visual major structural damage to the s1 or s2 legs and risers.
There were no injuries to personnel. A vessel with a rov is in field waiting on a weather window to confirm that there is no significant damage
While heaving with tugger 'b' to move clamp d-1 for installation of aec fire water caisson, the strop suspending last of 3 lines parted. The block had a hold back chain which
prevented fall of the gear. Minor damage occurred to the nearby scaffolding.
Following strop failure incident on previous night shift, failed strop was replaced and rigging re-instated. Work was to assist adjustment of d-1 clamp. Tugging was requested
with caution, when a second strop failed rence of incident
East crane was slewing round to 13 roof to land a container, when over 13 roof the operator realised something was wrong as he could not back- check the slew to stop the
crane boom movement. His immediate reaction on seeing the drill crane at the derrick "v" door, was to hoist up the boom and the load. The east crane pennant caught the drill
crane boom dragging it east away from the "v" door before coming to a halt due to the deadman brake automatically coming on due to the low level of hydraulic oil cau ed by a
leak
While lowering the block, the suspending wire of the make up tong became trapped in the dolly track. The downward movement of the wire, raised the counterweight
smashing the top clamp of the counterweight guide rails. The wire then parted and the tong f ll tothe floor. The now unsupported counter balance fell to the floor a few
seconds later.
During back loading operations to the supply vessel <…>, the main hoist lowering speed went out of control falling 20-30 feet before i arrested the motion with the brakes.
Statements attached to file.
<…> east and west cranes were hooked onto a rigging system, running through pulleys on main and cellar decks. The system is required for installation of riser protection for
30 inch a-line. Attached to the system were water bags for load testing the sys em. A similar system for installation of 30 inch b-line protection was tested on <…>. When the
bags weighed 23 tonnes the crane driver in the east crane requested permission to adjust the boom from 34foot radius to 30foot radius, permission wa granted. When
boomingup, the crane driver noticed an increase in weight, he thought the water bags had caught on something. As the crane was close to overload conditions. The driver
ebgaged the blockline power lower clutch. The load desended slowly at fi st, then rapidly. As the load descended the weight was transferred to the west crane which was shock
loaded by the sudden transfer of weight
The basket No.124 SWL 3000kgm, weight in basket 1000kgm last tested <…> was lifted off the main deck by the east crane when it was noticed that one of the basket 'o' rings
was in the wrong place. It was then slewed over the east side of the platform and boomed out until the basket was 30ft away from the platform and directly over the M.V.<…
>. The power lower on the whip line was engaged and at that moment one of the basket 'o' rings failed leaving the basket suspended by the other. One pi ce of plate 2ft x 3ft,
weight 300lbs fell onto the roof of a container 1189, portside midships of M.V. <…> from the platform main deck level. The basket was then placed back on the 48-29B main
deck. Weather at that time was a south-westerly win at 27 knots with a sea height of 3 metres.
On preparing to swing a 2,000kg load of scaffolding boards inbound of the platform, the crane boom was raised to and subsequently passed its minium operating radius. This
action caused the boom to strike the fixed boom backstop. Damage was sustained to th boom root section by this action. Damage to <…> crane was limited to distortion and
twisting of the root section. The crane is removed from service pending root section replacement and load testing weather: wind 5-8 knots sea state : calm full aylight
While working supply boat doing lifts with whip line, the safety pendant on mainblock became detached and fell from top of jib to main deck. A man received minor cuts and
abrasions but returned to work the same day.
While completing lift of pallet of lifting gear from outside the mechanical workshop to the shaker house roof, the pallet collapsed allowing several pieces of equipment to fall
to the stair wand walkway outside the bit shack.
The <…> was laying off the rat. The vessels deck crew hooked the cranes pennant to the generator which was sitting adjacent to the nowsco tank. During the course of the lift
the generator caught the nowsco tank causing it to overturn and causing t e two 3 ton brothers to snap. The generator endedup laying on its side on top of the upturned nitrogen
tank - which was venting - the rat crane had its strops replaced and lifted off the generator. The vessel then layed off the <…> while the <…> crane righted the nitrogen tank.
Once in the upright positi9on the venting subsided - the manual vent was opened - because of signs of damage to the tank frame and the lifting lugs the vessel was returned to
aberdeen, with the instruction to hose do n throughout the journey
The elevators were moved from the rig floor to the pipe deck using the north crane connected to the lifting sub. In order to remove the lifting sub from the centre bore of the
elevators the elevators were supported 4 to 5 feet in the air by the north cra e hook connected by a strap to the elevator handling bar. The above bar sheared and the elevators
dropped on to the pipe deck.
The north rig 'v' door was lifted approx. 4"using the air winch at rig floor level, the winch wire was fed through two elevated snatch blocks on the drilling derrick and secured
to the lower end of the 'v' door. A roller was inserted under the 'v' door p
Whilst changing out 500 t bails, one bail was being lowered down through the 'v' door when the strop snagged causing the bail to slip through the strop until the strop reached
the bail eye. The shock load caused the strop ferrule to fail causing the bail to fall approx. 40ft out the 'v' door down the ramp and continue for a further 50ft along the
catwalk. The bail weight is 1410 lbs. The strop was a certified swl of one ton. It was double wrapped round the shank of the bail approx 4ft from the eye.
Whilst preparing rig lifting equipment for 6 monthly statutory examination the rig electrican/supp was removing shackle joining a set of power tongs to the wire rope attached
to the tong counterweight to retain the wire rope at rig floor level he attached the hook on the "tie back" rope to the eye of the wire. When the shackle was removed the
counterweitht fell within it's guide assembly and the rope. In poor condition and not rated for the weight. Parted allowing the weight to continue descent. The weig t impacted
on the guide assembly base plate causing the plate and 'h' beam to which it was attached to flex downwards. The guide tubulars came free of the base plate retaining cub and
the weight being detached from the assembly fell to the rotary table d maging a snatch block lying on the floor. <…> managed to reach safety before impact being alerted by
the noise.
During the removal of a drilling stabiliser using the east crane at the east rig vee door. A lifting cap 4 1/2" weighing 15ins was knocked through a gap in a guardrail. This fell
into the rig substructure. No injuries were sustained, no damage to equipm nt experienced
During normal wireline operations a GS pulling tool was about to be disengaged from the main tool string. Before the tool could be disengaged the BT probe came free of the
GS and fell several feet to the cellar deck. The probe is held in place by a shear in which was found to have failed. The shear had probably weakened during the setting of the
DHSV although the operation had been carried out normally. Although not confirmed, it was thought that the BT probe may have struck a christmas tree but an immedi te
visual inspection revealed no damage
Supply vessel <…> alongside west side of platform to offload drilling mud. West crane commenced lowering bulk hose to the vessel when the power boom lowering chain
snapped. The boom overun cut out operated immediately and boom was prevented from ree falling. Crane was swung inboard and hose was lowered back into the securing
point and the crane boom footbrake operated to lower the boom into its rest. The cahin was inspected and found that one link had parted. Spare link fitted and chain checked
for slackness. Crane brought back into limited use to offlaod drilling mud and replacement chain called off. The failed link and the chain will be held for subsequent
examination.
Luffing hoist hydraulic motor failed while trying to lower the boom into the rest using the brake and the main blick as back up and while lowering lost control and the boom
crashed into the rest.
The n.w. crane was being used to discharge cargo from the <…> the container bridle caught under a vessel fixture. Subsequent downward motion of the vessel resulted in
minor damage to the crane pendant and failure of the bridle.
A planned change out of an <…> Turbine was in progress under the permit to work system. The time was 2100 hours, still air, dry and area well lighted by artifical light. The
old turbine had been removed using a 2 ton Swl <…> Travelling Block. As the new turbine was being moved into the cell, one of the sheaves on the block failed, splitting in
two through the vertical plane. The load of 1.75 tons remained on the block and there were no injuries to staff or damage to plant or the load. The are was made safe and
secure
The crane boom was reciving the wind at almost right angle. On one saw the incident but it is presumed the wind blew the crane boom off its rest and on until it struck the
lifting beam and exhaust stack. All personnel had been warned to stay indoors due o high winds.
The south crane was being utilised to offload an 11 ton lift from the mv <…>. When lifting the load, with 4 fall load line, a second swell brought the boat back into contact
with the load, on continuing to lift the load the crane driver noted a slack f ll of wire and stopped lifting, the boat had moved away. The deck crew went to the lower deck to
inspect the block, he saw a loop of wire hanging beneath the block. The load was lowered and the loop taken up until it seemed to become untangled in the bl ck and the wire
snapped. The load remained suspended from the block.
During proof loan test of a portable boom a pin sheared causing the boom to fall onto platform handrail.
While awaiting investigative action on a reported crane defect, later identified as a broken spring within the luff hoist pump, the pump continued to supply hydraulic power to
the luff hydraulic system causing the boom to creep inward past minimum radius. This overtravel activated the boom protection limit switches which failed to stop the engine.
These dual switches appear to have signaled the engine fuel control valve which failed to operate. The engine continued to run at low speed thus providing hyd aulic power
via the broken luff pump. The boom was pulled against the back stops and suffered structural damage the crane was in stand-by status with no load on the hook and the disel
engine at idle speed.
Crane operator was backloading the <…> with a 54ft kelly (approx wt: 3000 lb) operator was holding the kelly stationary 10ft above the work boat deck whilst the boat was
moving into position. Then when he moved the control lever to boom down the bo m ran away dropping the delly on the deck of the work boat. The crane operator returned
the control lever to the neutral position and the brake system stopped the boom.
Whilst lifting 22" flange with overhead gantry crane from wellbay to production deck the flange weighting approx. 600 ibs was lifted 25 ft then fell back down 5 ft. On
investigation it was found that the transverse direction control chain had caught in th lifting block. This resulted in the load being transferred to the transverse chain, which
subsequently broke. The load then fell back until the lifting chain became taut, arresting the load.
Whilst lowering bop riser on a51 slot 1 with weight (approx 36t) suspended on 4 hydraulic rams the load dropped approx 8 inches. One set of trolley rollers had come off
runway beam leaving load supported on remaining 3 munck beam trolleys. 3 of the 4 bol s on trolley wheel hub had sheared and support frame splayed allowing trolley to
leave runway. The load was retained on remaining supports.
Fire monitoring control panel of three sides, size 2 off 7' x 4' bridged by panel 4' x 3' to be lifted from the lower central corridor to the pipedeck for backload. The unit was
slung by the crane method and attached to the north crane. As the load reac ed the pipedeck, it was subjected to the prevailing weather conditions (wind 28 kts sw) which
turned the load upside down whereby it fell from the sling to the pipedeck, a distance of some 15'.
Due to mechanical failure of the crane engine the coupling bolts had loosened and sheared. Emergency power pack was used with limited impact as a result it was decided to
control the decent with a combination of the power pack and manual control of the b akes. The wind speed at the time of the incident was gusting 55 knots.
A single joint of 7" tubing was unscrewed from the tubing string and suspended approx. 4ft above the drill floor. The catwalk tugger was attached to the pin end and the joint
was pulled out of the v-door as the elevators were lowered. When the pin end s ruck the catwalk, the elevators unlatched dropping the 40ft joint of 7" 29ib/ft tubing approx.
30ft onto the drill floor. As it fell the tubing struck the cross beam on the guide tracks of the derrick, then the salvesen tubing tongs, damaging the latch m chanism. The
elevators in use were 7" (certification up to date) 150 ton sd casing elevators make: <…>.
The driver in attempting to give extra clearance to personnel was caught unaware when a gust of wind spun his load. The load was in close proximity to the opposite crane and
when it spun it caught the hvac ducting dislodging it and causing it to fall to he ground.
The bop stack had been lifted and moved over the well by the bop lifting frame (swl 30 ton). On attempting to lower the bop stack, the hydraulic jacks on the lifting frame
would not function properly. When attempting to raise the jacks a sharp crack was heard. It was noticed that the weld connecting one of the jacks to its pad-eye was broken
(lifting frame has 4 hydraulic jacks). No damage to any persons or any other equipment was sustained. On further inspection a second jack was found to have a crac in the
weld where it joined the pad-eye.
During lifting operations to replace 8.5ton caisson the vertical lift rigging arrangement collapsed inwards when the caisson was being turned to the horizontal. All personnel
cleared to safe area. The load was lowered under control to the deck.
The <…> crane was being used to offload the supply vessel <…>. During the first lift of a nitrogen tank (11.4 tonnes) control of the boom was lost which resulted in the boom
continuing to fall until it came to rest against secondary structural steelwork on the platform and the nitrogen tank entering the water. Eye witness accounts lead us to believe
that no contact between the dropped load and the installation structure took place. The weather at the time was fine
In attempting to lift a container from the deck of supply vessel. As the crane driver attempted to reel in slack wire & take strain, he heard a bang & the crane auxilliary hoist
stopped functioning. The crane driver stopped operations and made safe. The supply boat crew disconected the container strops, and sailed clear. The failure appears to be due
to a seigure of the winch drum/hydraulic motor drive gear.
In calm conditions, but foggy, crane operator was transferring two small pipe spools from the pipe deck to well deck of mod 15. Whilst leavering the load into the welldeck, as
the hoist block approached some 10-15ft above the deck level the operator noticed the line running out of control. Fortunately he forwarned the banksmen/riggers of the
situation, and they vacated the area rapidly. The rope ran off the drum and the block sropped to the deck, damaging a sea water pipe projecting above deck and trappi ng some
welding cables. The wrlding cables were quicly disconnected and made safe. The platform is currently shut down
Whilst in normal service a small explosion inside the firebox of f5000 flames exited from the front cover gasket. The fire was quickly extinguished by a firehose and the fixed
deluge system. Subsequent inspection showed a possible buckling (+ 20mm) of t e front cover. No other damage was visible interior/exterior. The explosion would appear to
have been caused by a build-up of diesel in the firebox. An in dept investigation by a vendor representative is underway.
The cable connector on the 3.3kv supply to seawater winning pump g4001b split open explosively. The failure appears to have been due to a short circuit within the plug. No
personnel were injured and no other damage was sustained.
Water cutting was taking place externally on module 11 roof. Due to jet reaction the cutting nozzle missed its target weld and penetrated module roof causing water to be
sprayed on 480 volt main incoming supply cubicle. Main cubicle circuit breakers sh rted out causing extensive internal damage, severe heat damage to cubicle panels and
smoke damage to switch gear room. Firefighting equipment was deployed but was not required as no fire occurred.
During the starting of the train 1 gas compressor the <…> auto transformer experienced a flash over between 4 pairs of unused tapping studs. This resulted in the destruction
of the perspex cover which in turn initiated a red hazard alert and a main electrical shutdown. Smoke from the transformer was cleared by fans using power from emergency
generators. Shortly afterwards the main electrical supply was reinstated.
Main generator tripped due to governor fault. Loadshed operated and tripped water injection, sub generator tripped under frequency as a result, loss of service waterpressure
caused firepumps to be called for. Firepumps 1 and 2 auostarted. Area technician was requested to shut down firepump no.2. When he attended, he found the room full of
smoke. He was instructed to shut the engine down usingthe emergency fuel shut- off valve, which he did. He reported back that he had stopped the engine and was ventilating
the room, before entering to investigate. When the smoke dissipated, a small flash fire occured on the engine entablature, and this was extinguished. The fire was caused by
loss of coolant water hose failure & subseqent overheating. The magnitude of the fire was insufficient to initiate the rate of temperature rise heat detectors.
Whilst carrying a 21' scaffold tube along the west side w/way in above area the scaffolder slipped on the deck, thus dropping the tube which subsequently fell into the sea. The
tube entered the water adjacent to the b2 leg of the platform where diving op rations were in progess.
Hydraulic pressure relief while the hydlaulic pressure control valve was screwed down and the unit was engaged in wind position. This action caused the wireline and attached
tool to be pulled rapidly up to the sheave where the tool parted from the wireli e and fell to the rig floor.
During scaffold erection on module 232, lower west walkway, a 5' tube slipped out of a coupling and fell a distance of approx. 40 metres to the celler deck. Personnel working
in the area were protected by overhanging structural steelwork. No injuries to p rsons or damage to equipment occurred.
Scaffolder walking along walkway with 2mtr tube when gust of wind blew helmet off. He placed the tube on guardrail whilst retrieving helmet. Tube slipped through gap in
guard rail and then between gap at kennedy grating and kick flats. Tube fell to deck below damaging kennedy grating. No casualties
3" x 7" pin securing the lower end of the racking arm elevating ram to the racking tower some 10ft below monkey board. Split pin sheared allowing pin to come out and fall to
rig floor.
Fast line crown sheave roller bar sheared the bolt attaching it to crown structure. The roller fell from height of 147 ft to the rig floor.
The body of the anemometer (wind speed indicator) was found lying on the walkway adjacent to drilling office's upper pipedeck toilet. By the degree of damage to the body of
the anemometer and toilet roof, it is assumed that the body somehow became detache d, fell onto the roof of toilet then finally landing on walkway. A fall of approx. 60ft.
Weight of equipment approx. 121bs. There was no reported sighting of this action, damaged equipment was found by a drilling employee who was passing and subseqently
reported finding to logistics supervisor.
During a period of high 90 kt. Winds from a westerly direction. The guy wires appear to have failed causing the stack (approx. 75m x 10m long) to fail at a flanged joint and
topple to land on containers on the skid deck.
After completion of a successful pressure test on instrument pipework upstream of s.d.v. 0923 actuator, a function test of the quick dump valve was required. Whilst pressuring
the actuator to 104 bar the front plate of the actuator blew off approximately 12 inches, restrained from further movement by the instrument pipework. The resultant spray of
hydraulic oil (p79a) caught the rigger in the right eye although he was wearing safety glasses. After irrigation of the eye he returned to work. Resulting inv estigation
confirmed that the actuator had a working pressure of 80psi (normal) 120psi (maximum) and had been procured and supplied in error.
No 1 generator was started locally from the shelter panel on <…> satellite by personnel paying maintenance visit. When the generator came on the distribution board,
personnel observed noise as unusual and investigated. Check showed flames, sparks and smoke being emitted from alternator causing machine shutdown by operation of
emergency button, flames sparks, smoke, then ceased
Following modifications to discharge pipework a new 24" blank flange was being fitted. Stress relieving on the flange was being carried out. Fire blanket was caught by the
wind, moving supply cable to heating mat into contact with the flange. The flange a this time was very hot, causing the insulation to break down, creating a small fire. This
was contained and put out by a 9lb fire extinguisher. This happened during daylight hours. Dry environment, no noise, light winds.
Movement of stockpot on galley range caused an un-noticed spill of fat, whcih seaped through range top onto heating elements. Current to stove isolated, trays below stove
withdrawn and small fire put out with damp cloths.
After a failed attempt to start <…> gas turbine 'a', temperature readings inside the turbine began rising rapidly even though turbine was shutdown. Platform fire alarm was then
initiated by flame being detected by two uv detectors inside the turbine en losure. Platform fire team were deployed using water hoses to effect cooling of the turbine exhaust
stack inside and above the turbine enclosure. Damage: external to the turbine exhaust stack was minimal. Dent
Starting up the first of the main generators, <…> gas turbine gt3, after a period of shutdown, the automatic start control sequence defaulted allowing excess fuel gas to pass
unburnt through the power turbine. The unburnt fuel gas was then ignited in th exhaust trunking resulting in severe damage to the trunking and attachments.
An electrically powered multiway welding set was in use. This was situated remotely from this particular welding site. Several lengths of power and earth leads were
employed. All except the last length were tied up overhead. The final joint was lying on a wet patch and shorted out. Overheating caused lead to fire. The fire was spotted by a
pipefitter, who phoned control room immediately and isolated the power supply. A control room operator extinguished fire with dry powder extinguisher. Control room infor
ed OIM who ordered precautionary muster. No platform equipment was damaged and all other leads were checked out. Situation normal at 19:41 hrs.
Sparks from welding ignited small pool of lub oil below grating at "B" compressor. Firewatch immediately extinguished fire. Platform production was shutdown and vented.
Muster alarm was activated manually from control room as a precautionary measure. Pers nnel stood down after site check.
Smoke detected at 17.18 hrs on the <…> scada system and reached other locations by 17.34 hrs. Halon was automatically discharged into affected areas at 17.47 hrs. No fire
alarms were activated during the period. By 21.00 hrs a team from <…> platform equipped with ba had inspected the forbes platform and declared it to be safe.
The scaffold was erected below, and in close proximity, to the diesel engine exhaust from p65, fire pump. P65 was run up for its routine test. The heat from the exhaust gases
ignited the boards.
Platform alert initiated by mcr due to indications of smoke and heat from 03 fire pump room. Fire team mustered and pump room entered by ba and hose reel. (halon manually
discharged prior to fire team entering). Once smoke had cleared extensive heat dam ge found on fire pump engine (wireing, paint etc). Heat detector found melted. All
platform personnel mustered by 0905 and stood down at 0910.
1458 pump p4a tripped on overload. Gas operator sent to investigate and found smoke venting from exhaust cowl of motor. Local isolation stop button isolated. Control
room notified. Fire alarm activated. Full life boat muster fire teams attended at scene. Electrical isolation of motor at switchgear room. Natural cooling of dump allowed 1525
situation considered under control. L/boat muster stood down 1540 fire teams stood down.
Two men were repairing/fault finding on humidifier which involved working with electrical power online to check that it was operating satisfactorily. During these tests the
unit caught fire. The men raised the alarm by using the local "mac" (manual alarm all point), isolated the unit and fired 2 bcf extinguishers to put out the fire. All platform
personnel mustered and checks carried out in the area using ba teams to comfirm fire extinguished, area ventilated to clear smoke and platform returned to normal duties.
Employee was loading freight onto a <…>'s Tiger helicopter when it took off. Noticed by logistics co-ordinator. Helicopter returned without injuring employee.
Fire main section being recommissioned after hydrant replacement. 1" drain v/v bonnet failed. Workshop area flooded and water accessed essential services switchroom below
via hole in deck penetration cable transit. Water cascaded onto 110v control section of essential svs distribution board causing power failure and platform shutdown.
Emergency generation not activated due to its being fed from essential services switchboard.
Interstage condensate pump 26105a had been disassembled to replace the mechanical seal. On completion of the work preparations were made to restart the pump. This
involves introducing gas from the interstage scrubber at 46 bar via a 1/2" balanceline in o the pump, at this stage the operator involved observed and heard gas escaping. He
immediately isolated alll the lines to the pump and the gas ceased. This release was picked up by the detection system as a low gas alarm by one detector some 40 feet fro the
source of the leak. There was a 40 knot wind blowing through the module. The cause was the failure of a swagelok fitting on the 1/2" balance line which had been cross
threaded on reassembly.
Gas leak testing was in progress following repairs carried out on a senior Daniel orifice box on a 10" process gas test line. The leak test was carried out in 25 bar stages, and
had reached 100bar without problem when the failure occurred. The leak occur ed at the corner if the lower flange. The two technicians involved closed the inlet valve and
opened the vent valve on the test separator, before retreating to their muster point.
Sump tank on cellar deck dumped some gasoline into the sea. This gasoline was ignited by sparks dropping down from welding being carried out nearby on the fire pump
house. The automatic deluge system operated and smothered the fire. 3" drain valve was clo ed on the sump tank which shut off fuel source. Paintwork on north end of
platform at spider deck level was scorched.
The hydraulic skid on ED satellite is a dual type 3000 and 5000psi. The 3000psi section was bled down for the changeout of a faulty motor driven 3000psi pump. During the
removal of the pump, a pipe fitting which was found to have a loose connection was im acted by a wrench. The pipe fitting blew off due to the above and the 5000psi system
being left pressured up.
A leak of hydrocarbon gas was detected by personnel working in the area and was confirmed using a portable gas detector. A leak was identified from the "Manway cover" of
the square drum. The system was isolated and all the work in progress on platform sus ended. The system was de-pressurised and area barriered off.
Recommissioning gas turbine which had been shutdown for maintenance when gas release occurred leading to General Platform Alarm and hydraulic shutdown. Turbine was
re-isolated and preliminary investigation indicated failure to have been in vent line.
The whole complex was in a state of shutdown for the annual shutdown and modifications. All pipelines including sub sea were de-pressured and purged with nitrogen. B.c.
(compression) fuel gas surge drum pressure control valve bonnet was removed for overha l. During removal a small spillage of condensate which at the time was thought to be
water occured from the value body, onto the desk. Later in the day hotwork commence above the site after the necessary gas free checks had been carried out a hot spark f om
the hotwork site ignited the spillage which was extinguished immediately by the firewatcher.
A 1/4" stainless steel pipe adaptor attached to K200 gas compressor high discharge pressure switch sheared off. High pressure gas was released to atmosphere via the adaptor.
Two personnel were in the vicinity of the pressure switch. Upon seeing/hearing th gas leak they quickly isolated the leak by localised valves. Duration of the gas leak was
between 30 and 60 seconds. The compressor was manually ramped down to idle mode whilst the pressure switch was totally replaced. The compressor hall has wide openin s
at its ends with the sides partially clad by windwall. At the time of the incident the wind speed was 30 knots.
Platform brought on line at <…>'s request. A leak was detected - wells were isolated but gas was still leaking from well flowline at a 3" elbow going into production header.
Therefore ESD was initiated at 16:05hrs.Platform blowdown @ 16:07hrs. Informed <…> and field production supervisor
Turbine exhaust was being pressurised/started. Operator heard sound of gasket failing. Fire hose was immediately run out but oil had leaked onto turbnine exhaust and did
ignite. No damage was sustained, just slight scorching of bellows material.
A packing seal on no.1 cylinder 6.156 gas compressor failed causing a gas leak. Platform sustained a class ii shutdown and went to muster stations upon the sounding of the
general platform alarm. No injuries or damage.
During normal production operations h1 gas alarm registered in area 6a gpa sounded personnel proceed to muster stations and class 2a shutdown initiated. Gas release caused
by kidney joint failure. Transmitter was then isolated and area doors opened to a low gas to disperse. Personnel stood down from muster stations at 20:47hrs.
During normal production operation two 20% lel gas alarms for area annunciated in the ccr. The system worked as per design. A gpa was sounded and a glass 2a shutdown
initiated. The muster was stood down at 20.23 hours. The cause of the release was the nd cover of g156-low pressure no 3 cylinder.
At 07.50 hours a class 2 shutdown initiated when 2 hi-hi gas alarms were activated, gpa sounded platform went to muster. Deluge fired automatically. Gas release identified
and isolated which was caused by instrument blowdown line tied into the kill mani old having blown. Tapping isolated 07.52 hours, deluge reset at 08.14 hrs. The line had
been broken earlier in the day to facilitate the removal of a spool piece from the kill manifold. The spool piece and instrument line had been reconnected and produc ion
restarted at 07.00 hrs that day. The tapping blew during pressure test of reinstated pipeworm in the kill manifold system.
Gpa sounded and fire team assembled at scene to extinguish fire. The cause was due to a diesel spill that occurred earlier at 13:45. After a thorough clean up of this spill, it
was decided to leave gtg1 running and monitor the area. This was done to dr out the lagging.
Whilst venting no.2 to the poor boy gas alarms were activated in the upper mezzanine above the trip tank - a gpa initiated. Due to rate of blowdonw required for this operation
the "u" tube seal was overcome and some hydrocarbon liquid/mud from previous op rations was pushed through to the trip tank, resulting in hydrocarbon mist contracting 4
gas heads. No damage - no injuries.
Preparing to resinstate hydrocarbon water treatment units (v4805 a/d) isolation of tilted plate separator (v4801 a) for water flow through v4805 a and v4801 b units. Lines
walked and system checked that all valves were close/open for correct line-up. Co trol valve opened from ccr for water flow through hydrocyclone unit. Oil spillage was
reported and hi hi pressure alarm noted from tps v4801 a. Valves were tripped supplying water to system. Investigation revealed that a bypass valve was not fully clos d and
another valve apparently leaking to v4801 a. Also v4801 a atmospheric vent valve was closed from previous work on other related equipment.
Whilst backloading crane boom transportation cage (empty) from <…> deck to supply vessel a hydraulic oil leak occured due to the failure of two studs which secure whip
line low boost filter housing. The whip brakes were applied automatically and the dri er lost all three motions
Generator while runningon diesel fuel developed a pinhole leak in a flexible diesel supply line. The leaking fuel ignited on contact with hot turbine components. The resultant
small fire which was extinguished. Damage was confined.
During checks of valve closures satellite oim was proceeding down to slot 2 on the platform when he heard a noise which subsequently identified as a gas escape from a pin
hole leak at the willis choke outlet flangeweld on slot 2.(this was the only slot fl wing at the time) the well was immediately shut in and the line de-pressurised.
A portable injection pump was being used to inject methanol into a well flow line. A leak was observed from the pump seals and a decision made to shutdown the pump and
effect repairs. The operator isolated the pump air supply and then proceeded to open he pump bypass valve to bleed off residual pressure. Prior to doing this he should have
closed two valves connecting the pump to the well. His failure to do this resulted in back pressure from the well flowline into the pump header tank forcing methanol ut of a
filler hole and spraying him with methanol.
Escape of hydrocarbon liquid from <…> unit inpection hatch
To overcome seal draining problems on k9300, both sour seal oil traps onon the hp compressor bundle had been replaced with units taken from the dismantled standby machine
k9300. When compressor was restarted a gasket blew out on the 4th stage seal draintr p inlet flange. At the same time, the labyrinth seals backed up forcing luboil and gas to
blow from the seal tell-tale gooseneck vent. The gas released brought all gas detectors in m4e to high level causing a surface process shutdown. Subsequent investi ation found
the drain line joint had been made up with a new gasket but an old, partly split, gasket had been left stuck on the trap flange. A segment of the old joint had blown out
providing the source of most of the leaking oil and gas
During commissioning of reciprocating compressor, a proposed 12 hour monitored test was initiated. Operated normally for 20 minutes when the hand recycle valve was
gradually closed in order to create a minor load across the unit. A yellow gas alert occurr d followed by a red hazard status. The compressor was manually tripped and
depressurised. Muster called and all personnel accounted for.
At 2150 hrs a fire was discovered inside the turbine hood of a1040 sub- main generator by a power technician during a routine inspection toru of module mie. He immediately
operated the local stop button shutting down the machine. With g1040 shutdown its load was shed to g1050 which was unable to accept it and tripped causing a total power
shutdown. The technician immediately started the energy generator g1060, and returned to mie. The bcf fire protection system had not fired by this time, he operated t e
manned system and extinguished the fire. This caused the platform to go to red hazard status at 2145. The ert were called to check the area and the machine. On confirmation
that the fire had been extinguished the platform was stood down from red stat s at 2248 hours
Bang heard by 2 gas techs. Who were in control room, on ivestigation a strong smell of burnt lub oil was detected. The running lub/seal oil pumps were shut down and the oil
level checked via sight glass. The level was below the bottom of the glass and a umber of alarms showing in the gas comp. Control toom, including low level alarm. The
compressor sump tank heater was isolated. Both hp and lp seal oil tanks were full as were the soak oil traps and the flame compressor casing. Lub oil was ejected via he 6"
vent line. The vent liner external arrestor gauge and cowling were also ejected.
During routine plant operations, well was being commissioned in order to top up the <…> process plant pressure. The production technician lined up well as per procedure by
opening umv and wing valve. Upon opening the wing valve, the technician observe a flowline surge condition (normal for this operation) followed by a high pitched sound.
Investigation of this sound led the technician to discover a gas leak emanating from a <…> flange immediately downstream of flowline choke. The technician immedia ely
activated the W.H.T. process shutdown trip and informed the control room who raised the general alarm. Flow line was immediately isolated and vented in a controlled manner.
Well and associated flowline isolated and an ICC raised.
Plate type cooler amnufactured by apv ruptured and caused escape of hydrocarbens approx three barrels of oil lost in spill. Spill totally contained on platform and recovered
through drainage system.
The 'o' ring failed in hp mud service, with ca. 3000 psi in the live, causing the coupling to wash out, and spray a jet of water based mud onto the deck. The system was
shutdown, depressured and flushed. Operation was tranferred to the second hp manifold no personnel were in the are due to its inaccessible/remote location.
Following a planned shut down, oil production was restarted at midnight. Some wells were on line and oil and gas were flowing through the three separators. The separation
train was isolated by closed valves from the gas compression system. At 0133 gas wa detected by first one, then later two more of a group of 3 gas detectors positioned at floor
level alongside the tube and seal oil skid of the lp/ip gas compressor. The control action caused a production system shut down and depressurisation. Two produc ion
operators noticed gas coming from the lube oil tank vent and the lp compressor/gearbox casing. Investigation indicates that gas had passed from the 3 stage separator, through a
closed 16" esdv, which must have leaked into the lp compressor; through th shaft seals. The seal and lube oil systems were shut down at this time, thereby allowings gas to
pass through the machine.
Mud wasbeing circulated through two mud lines running underneath rig structure. Driller noticed a pressure loss which was quickly identified as due to a leak on a coupling
on one line. Leak was later found to be due to a failure of ring within the coupl ng and washing of the metal faces. The mud pumps were shut down, the line was isolated, and
the standby line put into service. 5 barrels of mud were estimated to have been lost, which escaped through grated decks into the sea.
During normal operations, a gas turbine driven compressor shut down on process trip due to high level in condensate interstage drum. This caused blowdown to vent. Gas
alarms registered in gas turbine hall and <...> enclosure. Automatic ESD activated and evel 4 alarm sounded. All platform personnel mustered and the emergency teams
isolated the HP ventto the generator enclosure situated on the production mezzanine level. The C turbine generator had been removed from service for maintenance. The
resultant o en pipework had not been fitted with blank flanges. This and the failure to isolate the HP vent line left the system vulnerable when HP venting occurred.
Platform was in normal operating mode. A leak developed from a 1/32 x 1/4 inch slit in the valve body of 52-SDV-2047 which is the produced water/methanol shutdown valve
from <…> inlet separator to produced water/methanol/condensate header. The eak was minimal and will have no environmental impact
In preparation for running train 1 compressor after a turbine starter motor had been fitted some days earlier the gas fuel system was being re-commissioned. During
pressurisation the upstream flange o ring joint failed adjacent to the fuel gas shut off c ck. The shut off cock had not been included in the starter motor isolation as it played no
necessary part. The gas generator cell was not inhabited at time of release. Upon immediate investigation the enclosure had cleared of gas.
During routine process operations, signs of oil contamination in the water injection supply water was reported. This water is supplied through the service water system. A
detailed investigation was conducted into the possible source through any of the ydrocarbon/serv. Water interfaces on the platform
D-gas compressor had been shut down to replace faulty vibration monitor probe. Three attempts were made to restart. Each failed attempt vented the fuel gas system for the
compressor. Gas cloud built up over module and was ingested by control room pressuri ation vent system.
D gas compressor had been shutdown and vented to atmosphere for maintenance work. During the cooling down cycle, lube oil pump, vent fans continue to run until the
control unit automatically shuts down the auxilliry units. Gas was detected inside "D" tu bine enclosure. The production crew opened the enclosure doors to investigate the
problem and in doing so released gas which was detected by a second gas head which resulted in the automatic alarm being initiated followed by a precautionary muster of the
rew. Investigation showed that a flexible vent pipe down stream of the fuel gas P.S.U. had fractured possibly due to fatigue
A pinehole leak was discovered by production tech during routine plant checks. Leak was caused by external corrosion of the pipe work. The gas was taken off line in a
controlled shutdown at 2010 hours.
The ngl plant had been restarted at <…> after a maintenance shutdown period. While preparing to put fuel gas to the power generation turbines, gas was blown to a low
pressure flare/drain system. The gas flowed to a draw tank, and pressurised a floor drain loop seal, blowing it onto the module deck. Area was well lit.
A new production flowline had been fabricated and installed on well no. 5-3. The personnel involved with the installation had partially leak tested the pipework with water.
This team also had unsecured a flange further downstream of their leak test. Th s flange was not retensioned or leak tested. When the process department commenced to
commission this flowline a small quantity of crude oil was seen to leak from this flange, this leak also caused a low gas alarm to activate - 20% level.
The incident was caused by the solenoid valve (sv6212) on the fuel gas supply to gt2 failing to close properly or seal. The permited communication between the fuel gas
distribution pipework and the llp flare pipework leading to overpressuring of the flare system. Overpressuring of the llp flare system caused gas to be released to atmosphere
from a tundish drain and from the offline ngl compressor seals. The platform gas detection system correctly followed to identify the source and make safe.
Incident was caused by the solenoid valve on the fuel gas supply to gt2 failing to close properly or seal. This permitted communication between the fuel gas distribution
pipework and the lp drain pipework via (sol 16) bend valve leading to the loss of a ater loop seal due to overpressurisation. This allowed gas to be released to atmosphere
from a tundish drain in the deck. The platform gas detection system correctly indentified the gas escape and procedures were correctly followed to identify the source and
make safe.
The operating crew were routinely depressuring the pig launcher via closed vent system to the main cold vent. The weather was almost calm with just a slight northerly air
flow. This caused the gas plume to come back across the installation and gas was ing sted by the ALQ pressurisation fan. Production and power generation were automatically
shutdown and power disconnected from ALQ. All as per cause and effect chart. Total POB of 7 were accounted for with no injuries. Situation made secure and production re
tarted at 15:10hrs
A programme to perforate well <…> was progressing, no perforation had taken place and the well remained cased with 5" casing, although there was a 1.000' column of + -
100psi on the well tubing head, following gas lift offloading. When <…> were virtually ready to run in the hole the <…> engineer phoned the control room to enquire
whether it would be possible to get someone the <…> to standby to open the swab valve. The message was misinterpreted by the control room operator, <…>, at hat precise
time was in the process of screwing the lubricator <…> quick union onto the bop's. He had screwed 1 to 2 turns of the union onto the bop's and a surge was coming out of the
union. He called to get the well shut in and <…>, proceeded immediately to get the swab valve closed
At approx 07.28hrs gas alarm annunciated in the control room. Area operator proceeded to module b2 to investigate, on arriving at the scene he noticed condensate escaping
from condensate pressure transmitter, he informed the control room of the situation a production shutdown and general alarm/muster was initiated at 07.28 hrs area operator
isolated the feed to the transmitter and gas dispersion commenced. At 07.36 hrs muster completed all personnel accounted for. At 07.40 hrs react teams, returned to ontrol
room and stood down. Following the incident the pressure transmitter was examined and the exact cause of the leak, was determined to be the centre of a 1/4" crawford
patented swagelok 316 blanking cap, which had blown out causing the leak.
Wireline risen connection broken out befor being fully drained. Less than one barrel of oil spilled into well bay activating 4 gas heads. 2 heads went to hi level causing yellow
s.down. General alarm sounded 1000. Pob accounted for 1007. Personnel sto d-down 1009.
Platform producing at full rate. Oil leak reported in m3 deck. Nothing detected on fire and gas system. Yellow shutdown activated. Central alarm sounded. Source of leak as
above. Section of plant containing leak isolated, depressurized and flushed. Escaping oil covered with foam blanket and washed into platform closed hazardous drain system.
Personnel at muster stations stood down.
A pressure safety valve was being removed from a line for testing prior to commissioning of the hydraulic package (<…> unit). The line contained residual pressure from
commissioning operation which had taken place in the construction yard although th unit should have been mothbalied prior to module shipment. The psv was screwed into
the hydraulic line and it was ejected from the line with some force when it was backed out to the last thread or so. The technician involved suffered minor bruising to is hand
and he and his colleague were sprayed with hydraulic fluid. The psv suffered minor damage on its threaded nipple when it impacted on the steel deck. No part of the hydraulic
unit was in operation at the time.
Gas compressor c1050 was being pressured up during commissioning of the unit. When the seal gas solenoid valve opened, the downstream connection parted causing gas to
escape into the module activating the low gas alarms in the fire and gas panel in the c r. The supply pressure to the seal gas line was 170 psig. The unit was immediately shut
down. The leak was stopped by the dresser commissioning engineer de-energising the solenoid valve. The failure of the connection was found to be caused by a missing eal
(olive) in the swagelock.
Removal of blind hub from flowline, four routing valves were closed, two vent valves on top of flowline opened. No indication of pressure in flowline. The graylock clamp
was loosened. No indication of pressure was present, the graylock clamp was remove leaving the blind hub, which was knocked to loosen. It blew off as there was still
pressure in flowline.
Whilst testing a 2" choke line from the bjunit down to mod 3 cellar deck up to ss2 rig floor with 3,500 psi the operator noticed a rapid decrease in pressure. After investigation
a cap was found to have blown off a bullplug. This cap was welded on to a " male nipple.
E404 is the fuel gas heat exchanger which warms gas from the fuel gas scrubber prior to use. A 20% lel gas alarm was seen in the module 5 east cellar and an operator sent to
check out the cause of the alarm all hot work permits were withdrawn. The alarm was found to be "good". The leak was located on a large flange on the body of e404. The
fuel gas system was isolated and vented.
When changing crude metering stream 1 filter which was isolated, drained down and open to atmosphere, a surge of live crude came from the filter as the filter lid was being
replaced. The filter basket was already in place. As a result a spillage of crud oil occurred resulting in the ccr operator initiating a 2b platform shutdown.
While dismantling at-497 produced water separator, using oxy-accetalene burner, hot metal dropped onto the produced water treater at-498. Gas which had accumulated on top
at-498 flashed off up to a height of 15ft. A gas check had been done on the vessel 0 minutes prior. One isolation valve to at-412 was left open. The vessel had been drained,
flushed and filled with clean water. After the incident the level was found to have dropped 12".
Dischare pressure of k106 rose to approx. 147 bar soon after a44 well was shut in. Psv550/1, the discharge relief valve, lifted and routed gas to flare. The 6" flange gasket blew
on the downstream side of the psv d e to the block valve sp141 being in the closed position. A large gas escape occurred which was detected by platform fire and gas detection
system. Due to the extent of the gas migration within the module a 2b shutdown was initiated. This was followed sh rtley after by a 2a shutdown. To assist in the
dissipation/control of the gas, the deluge systems in mods 4 & 5 cellar and production were activated. High gas levels then started to drop after which an investigation team
entered the doule to try and det rmine the source of the escape.
Rig floor: all floor personnel behind drawworks for safety. Incident: displacing drill pipe with drilling mud. Upon pressure up of drill string to burst the bressure deck, the hose
ruptured, spraying drilling fluid on the drill floor. /plann
Fuel gas filter v400a developed a seal leak, v400a is isolated by chief operator and pressure bled off. Chief operator returned to control room and notified mechanical foreman
that v400b had developed a leak. Permit was raised to repair v400b. Technicia obtained permit to perform work. Technician mistook chained and locked normally open
valves to be chained and locked in closed position. Subsequent work resulted in gas release. Gas alarm was raised, platform was shut in and personnel were musstered.
Safety valve 11 sv5543 was to be fitted between 'a' gas compressor and the flare system. Ellis interlocked isolation block valves up and dwonstream of safety valve had not
been isolated. A permit to work head not been issued to remove blanks from the lin e. The blanks were removed from both isolation valves; a quantity of gas escaped into the
moduel causing a plant shut down. This in turn allowed large quantities of gas to be vented to the flare system, because the blank had been removed a large volume of gas was
discharged into module 11.
While test running fire pump p7003, a 1/4 pressure gauge fitting on a hydraulic oil line at the pump end of the engine blew out, spraying oil over the hot engine and exhaust.
The smoke produced was observed by patrolling platform staff who responded by sh utting down the engine and isolating the gauge fitting. Subsequently flames were seen
coming from the exhaust cladding. These were quickly extinguished by dry powder.
Well F5 choke had been opened from 18 to 19 degrees and the area operator was conducting his checks. Gas detection came up in the main control room for WT-1 which
activated the general platform alarm. The operator was instructed to investigate and the prod uction foreman went to WT-1. A very small leak was seen coming from the
upstream flange on F5 choke (dripping water with entrained gas). The well was shutdown immediately and fully depressured. Personnel were mustered. No one was injured.
Slug catcher was being re-commissioned after a planned inspection. In accordance with the re-commissioning programme the unit was being pressure tested under the
supervision of the Production Foreman. After successful leak tests the pressure was being incr eased slowly to the next test point when a flange on the satellite import line
began to leak. This activated two gas detectors and the general alarm was initiated automatically. Personnel were called to muster stations and were all accounted for. The slug
catcher was depressured and personnel were stood down at 03:35hrs.
Sand separator was on a clean up operation. Problems were encountered with liquid level control. Sand separator was isolated and fully depressured to allow inspection hatch
to be opened and unit to be washed out to remove any sand debris externally. The hatch was opened and remained open. A gas alarm was activated beside the open separator.
Gas was being emitted from the open doorway. The hatch was closed and sealed. The cause of the gas ingress into the separator was later identified as 2 passing valves of the
separator.
Wind n.w.e. 10 knots sea 1 metre. Mustered all personnel in emergency shelter after confirming gas/hydrocarbon leak from v-11 sight lglass. Platform shutdown and
depressurised via blowout system. During depressurising platform move all personnel to main deck liferaft/scrambl e net due to gas ingress around the emergency shelter,
lifeboat and helideck.
A gas leak was reported by the master of the <…> as emanating from the gas riser. The production supervisor was immediately notified and inspected the source of the leak
and confirmed the location as being on the insulating joint on 18" gas export pipeline. Platform was shutdown and all non essential personnel sent to nearby platforms.
Witnesses working in module "b" noticed an area of failure on t8 <…> which they reported to production department. <…> was isolated at production choke valve as t8 was
temporarily shut in to comply with flare restriction. After isolating tree side of coflexip, an inspection was made of the damaged area, it was found an area about 10' square had
sustained failure of stainless steel outer wrap and external thermoplastic sheath. No leakage of oil and a slight smell of gas soon dissipated.
Water from a leak in the 2" drinking water line from r/o water discharge drained through the bulkhead and down the rear of iv801 electrical inverter panel. The water caused
shorting of the inverter transformer. The resultant smoke from the shortened transf ormer was picked up by the fixed smoke detectors, initiating an automatic release of halon
into the inverter/battery room.
Whilst changing out an header valve on slot 32, the ball valve which supplies air to the two isolation valves for the test header, was stuck, the impact causing it to open and
heed air to the isolation valves. This caused the isolation valves to open, releasing oil and gas into module 8.
Air dive 40fsw - 90 min. A section of the diver's laid up umbilical became unlaid.this caused a kink in the air hose which decimated the surface air supply & caused the diver to
go on bail-out.the kink occured 280 feet back from the diver in the umbilical storage net. Diver was recovered without further incident.
Recently we have discovered movement of the <…> pipelines on module m4 roof of <…>. The precise cause of the movement is not clear and further investigation is
continuing. Both production and test lines have moved 280 - 300 mm.
Prior to radiography commencing, 5 scaffolders had gained access to an area remote from the shot location but nevertheless within the control barriers. A final check of the
area had failed to reveal their presence and the radiography continued to complet on while they were within the barries
A <…> 1" coiled tubing unit was rigged up on well <…> and had run in hole to approx 6000'. A pull test was being performed 4000lbs was pulled when tubing parted. The
blind rams were closed when trying to close swab valve, it appears that the tubing s across the xmas tree
A riser was being rigged down from the top of the tree. This had been bled down and the top section removed (master valve and swab valve closed). The shear rams were fully
closed to allow them to pass through the hole in the floow. While waiting for the verhead crane and lifting cap to be lowered the shear ram coupling was completely undone.
A small leak had occurred into the bottom section of the lubricator which built up and foreced the ram assembly off the bottom section.
Valves were being removed from the choke manifold for maintenance. Beam clamps and chain blocks were rigged to take the weight and lower the valves. One valve had been
successfully removed. The second valve was was attached to the rigging assembly by a ractice of 'a' assembly hooked into a webbing sling and the valve, and 'b' assembly
hooked into 'a' hook. As the bolts holding the valve were cut and the valve levered free the weight of the valve came onto the rigged lifting assembly. 'B' hook ripped o en the
safety catch of 'a' hook and the valve swung supported on 'a' lifting assembly. At the end of the swing it struck i.p. fracturing it in two locations.
Operator was engaged in launching a line cleaning sphere into the 30" leman bt to bacton pipeline. Whilst pressuring up the sphere launcher prior to launch, the launcher end
closure failed. Parts of the mechanism damaged facilities on the bt top deck incl ding the crane boom (which collapsed). The operator was injured by blast and glass fragments
(from shattered crane windows).
In plq. Three explosions, major damage and minor fire damage to se wing of level 3.
I.p. was standing on tubulars waiting to connect the crane hook to slings on the drillex mud motor. The mud motor was stacked on tubulars at a level above where i.p. was
standing. The mud motor rolled off and trapped his right foot. <…> who was working with i.p. attatched the slings to crane and instructed the crane driver to lift the motor in
order to free i.p.'s foot.
A flowline spool of roughly double 'l' shape was being lowered from the wellbay mezzanine area to main deck level 1 via a short stairway. A chain block was being used to
control the descent down the stairway. Control of the spool was lost just short of ma n deck level 1 when the spool turned and rolled, because of its shape, and trapped ip's foot
between second bottom stiar tread and the spool.
Ip working on drill floor making connection to drill-string when a bolt fell from the top drive safety guard, then bounced off the rig floor striking ip in the face.
While transferring tote tank from bund on m13 roof to m8 chemical tank hose was connected to wrong link thus transferring chemical to tank in m3 which overflowed. Drain
link to slop tank which should have drained away the overflow was blocked resulting i oxygen scavenger ebing blown over diving vessel <…>.
Production operator opened inlet valve to pump gm7602a to start a chemical posing operation. The inlet valve to the granduation pot was left open allowing the flow of
'corexit 7679' to discharge to atmosphere the resulting release splashed onto the opera or affecting his eye/face hands
Pipework was radiographed within the dgl module. The 2 persons, were working within a habitat, distant from, but still within the barriered area, during radiography. Prior to
radiography, the 2 persons failed to hear the warning tannoy message. They also escaped detection. The dose rate was calculated by the radiological protection advisor. The
estimated does rate each man received is 22.5 microsieverts.
Diver had been diving at a 60' depth (estimated air depth 35'). After surfacing reported he was not feeling well.symptoms indicate a type 11 bend and diver was immediately
put into decompression (table 6). O.m.s. was contacted and advised to continue (tabl e 6). Initial symptoms reported by diver at 0130 hours. Decompression commenced 0226
hours and completed 0711 hours.
Radiographic n.d.t. testing using 2.6 ci iridium 192 source was taking place on 14" firewater line on stairway ucc-lcc. After completing 4 1/2" minute panoramic exposure the
radiographer noticed an employee of cct in an adjacent area to test site approx. - 2 1/2 mtrs from source exposure
While attempting to set slips on running 5" drill pipe in the hole, the front of the slips caught on a recess in the rotary causing the back of the slips to rise. Ip was holding the
back handle which came into contact with the elevators being lowered, ca
During lifting operations to transfer equipment test head from catwalk to drill floor i.p. was struck by swinging load.
Deck grating had been landed by crane alongside a container and were being held back against the container by 2 members of deck crew. While removing the lifting slings
used to lower the bundle the grating fell forwards. Deck crew tried to move clear.
The platform east crane was delivering the portable water bunkering hose to the balblair, with crane hook connected by a sling to the hose end connection. The supply boat
deck crew collected and tied down the hose at the end section. The bridge requested the crane operator to take the weight of the hose but omitted to say that hose was secured
at rail. As weight was taken the vessel fell into through and stretched the hose which parted at the hose end union. Hose snaked, hitting crew member on hand.
I/p was assisting the banksman to lower the harben pump on to the skid deck. During this operation, he trapped his finger between the cargo basket and pump frame. The
initial injury seemed superficial, but over the next few days grew progressively worse resulting in medivac.
After stabbing first section into top of second section crane was signalled to lift. The bottom coupling snagged on steelwork inside storage frame. Ip was guiding load,
standing on frame platform. Banksman indicated to stop laod. As the crane stopped t e snag slipped the load swung and trapped the mans thumb between another section of
lubricator stored within the rack.
Ip was usinga pull- lift to alter the position of a heavy door that had been removed from its usual position and slung - up overnight when the pull - lift twisted and momentarily
trapped his thumb between the pull- lift and a platform handrail
I.p. hooked lift ont cranehook, he then walked back 25' from the unit to be lifted. As the crane driver took the weight the lift cleared the deck swinging and hit the aft end of a
25' x 2' cargo basket. The seaman involved was standing at the fwd end of the basket, 4' away from it. The fwd end slid across the deck hitting the seaman forcing him against
another piece of cargo, resulting in an injury to the groin
The deep gas lift module was being manoeuvred into position using the <…> crane and tuggers. During final stages, the chain, of the chain block used for guiding/pulling the
module, failed. The sheared chain struck ip in the face.
Ip on manriding winch to free snagged wire when he was suddenly thrown back and upwards sustaining injury to middle back and minor facial laceration.
In the process of refitting the right hand slew gearbox to the n.e. crane, ip was lifting the brake band (with assistance) and brake cylinder bracket back into place. The bracket
then fell trapping and injuring ip's finger. During the task, ip positione himself towards the rear of the crane in preparation to receive the bracket and bushing when the
incident occured. At this point, ip had been in a bent over attitude and standing on pipework bolted to crane deck.
The work over of well s15 was closed to completion and <…> were rigging up a 'polished rod lubricator' to remove a 'h check' tubing hanger plug. While attempting to
position a 'cross over' or adapter on top of the swab valve, the wireline operator all wed it to slip from his grasp. He tried to catch it and it crushed his finger against a lower
portion of the wellhead. Good natural light, sheltered location, but heavy seas may have moved the wellhead a little at a critical moment, contributing to slip top of swab
valve is 6ft above deck, an awkward height, and cross over weights about 40 kilo.
4 1/2" tubulars were being unloaded from supply vessel using main pedestal crane. Ip was steadying load prior to landing the load in pipe bay, when tubulars started to turn,
trapping his middle finger left hand, between load and samson post. Extensive la eration and suspected ligament damage to finger. Atmospheric conditions were clear and dry
with top deck illuminated by artificial light
Whilst pulling out of the hole with drillpipe ip was attemtping to set the slips in the rotary table. They failed to set correctly, with assistance from anothe roustabout, they lifted
and turned the slips. When they were being lowered to the correct posi ion ip slipped and his toes were trapped between the slips and rotary wear bushing. The assistanct
driller pulled the pipe up, when he observed what was happening.
Supply vessel <…> was discharging deck cargo at <…> platform. Part of the cargo for discharge consisted of crane test weights. These are single point lifts, 6-8 feet long and
1 ft square. Also on deck was a back loaded generartor. Dur ng discharge one of the weights struck the generators protection flame. This broke the weld at one end, which in
turn allowed the metal bar to stand proud of the unit. During further cargo handling a bright of the crane wire hooked onto this bar. As the , he was sent to north sea medical
centre where it was found that the cartilage had seperated from the rib
Changing out the bottom hole assembly rig tongs were used because there was a stabilizer at the rotary table which has a fish neck of only 1.50' above the blades and it was not
possible to use the "iron roughneck". Also we were working with monel drill co lars which require light handling. When connection was broken the men unlatched each
others tongs - the tongs were allowed to come together, at which point ip's fingers of h is left hand were " caught or nipped" and injured.
Local lightings, scaffold access platform, lifting equipment personal clothing and boots were all good. Gloves were being worn. While removing ventillation ducting from
under level 1 in the centre core a suspended section of ducting snagged on one stud. On pushing with his left hand the load swung free and levelled itself nipping the right
hand fingers of i.p.
<…> rigging crew, under <…> supervision, were removing shackle pins from large fitting assembly (total wt - 150 tons). Assembly was hanging off main crane. The i.p. was
removing the shackle pin nut when the sling trapped his finger. Movement o sling due to roll of barge.
Whilst laying down 9 5/8" casing in V door ( 3 JTS per lift ). <…> opened the safety latch on the crane hook to remove sling from hook. As he was removing the sling, the
safety latch closed on the back of his right hand.
Ip was operating the 'v' door non-man riding tugger to lift a tugger from the draw works side. The purpose of this was to remove the tugger from the drill floor. Two of the
employee's colleagues were pushing the tugger to land it at the edge of the 'v' oor so the crane could reach it. The heavy end swung round and trapped ip finger between the
tugger and line feeding the drill pipe spinner.
Whilst dismantling a pre-assembled ESV enclosure which was being supported by the crane, an incident occurred. During the removal of the final bolt the crane driver left the
cab to speak to the OIM. The panel started to spin on the crane hook, knocking I.P. to deck
The crane driver had just landed a lift at the centre of the pipedeck. He jibbed up on receiving the signal from the banksman. Whilst raising the jib in preparation for the nexy
lift the pennant hook struck ip a member of the deck crew, on the side of the face. Ip ip was retrieving a sling from on top of a lift.
I.p. was in the process of moving sections of steel plate into the door of the galley area when the remaining plates fell trapping i.p. beneath them.
I.p. was erecting scaffold in module 2 north pig launcher valve access.
Subject was handling one end of a toolstring to mate it with a perforating gun. The toolstring was raised 5'-6' and was balanced on a riser joint. In the course of mating the
string to the gun, the toolstring dropped of the riser, trapping i.p. finger a it did so.
Whilst carrying out a pump and pipe fitting iperation a length of pipe stowed above the worksite waiting to be fitted, became released from its storage. Falling from height it
struck the i.p. at the worksite below approx. 15-18 feet distance. No materia or structural damage was sustained. Casualty received in juries indicated in section 5.
A crew was engaged in transferring a gas generator from a trolley to it's operating location. In the course of this task, the 3ton hoist was seen to be mal-functioning in that the
gypsy wheel was slipping on the main drive shaft. The task supervisor inst ucted the work group to cease the operation while he sought specialist advice on the problem. In his
absence the workmen elected to proceed with the task. This resulted in the gypsy chain coming off the wheel, causing the casualty to lose his balance, fa l and injure his back
Compact spool was removed from ba26, scaffolding being errected to a seight of 8ft for the operation, the work stage was reduced to two boards, ie 18" wide leaving a large
gap between the inner edge of the stage and the compact spool. Two valves removed rom the old spool were placed on the scaffold. All the valves were landed correctly but
were subsequently stood on end. Ip was attempting to fit one of the valves which was suspended from the bop winch. The work stage wass too high to allow the valve t fit in
place so was retracted, placing it on the work stage. Although the valve was not landed heavily the shock caused one of the other valves to topple. It fell inwards, dropping
between the leading edge of the stage and the compact spool. After str king the spool, it was deflected under the scaffold, where it struck the right foot of ip who was under the
scaffold stage. After the incident collegue laid the remaining valves flat on the work stage. No damage was caused to any materials
Whilst guiding pipe joint through 'v' door on winch, operator was controlling swing with rope wrapped round it. Joint swung forward rope dropped down the pipe, coming to
rest over his thumb.
Whilst recovering casing, extended type 'b' rig tongs were being used to break the casing joints. At the time of the incident a joint had just been broken when it was noticed
that the connection had become tight again. The back-up tong was lower on the onnection and the crew ordered to clear the area. The incumbent stood behind some racked
drill collars. Toolpusher had just started to re-break the connection when the back-up tong failed. Part of the tong flew across the rig floor, struck the iron rou hneck, changed
direction and hit the incumbent on the right shin.
<…> was in the vicinity of the gangway to the flotel when he was struck on the shoulder/neck by a plastic bag containing water which had been thrown from above.
When opening a transport container for the first time since receipt, two cardboard boxes 800 x 400 x400 fell out, and in twisting out of the way injured his back. The top right
webbing restraint fixing was not attached and the boxed fell from this area. The webbing and the location points were serviceable.
Whilst flogging bolts on the manway cover of the coalescer, the hammer sprang off the spanner, glanced off a scaffold pole and back down onto the injured persons foot. The
scaffold formed part of an access staging for the work.
Ip was acting as a firewatch during welding operations. As he changed his postion he came into contact with a length of electrical cable connected to a portable light fitting
which was resting on pipework approximately 5ft above his head. The fitting fe l striking ip on forehead
Ip was working on an instrument box when the lid slammed shut, trapping his thumb. The lid had not been secured whilst the task of removing a labnel from the front of the
box was being carried out.
I.p. was guiding the hp riser through the rotary table, the riser spun and his thumb was caught between the slings as they twisted together.
I.P. was positioned on a certified scaffold below level 1 to assist in guiding the accumulator through the opening. The load was swaying slightly so he tried to steady it and in
doing so his thumb was pinched between the load and a scaffold clip on the ha drail erected on the scaffold platform he was working from.
While moving freon containers: the container moved in its carrier trapping the fingers of <…>'s left hand.
Pulling main powe cable for new dgl compressor with colleague fcd cable so far and draped over scaffold structure. Cable unsecured and therefore slipped back falling to deck
and striking ip on the safety helmet. No visible injury, ip was fitted with cervi al coller and will be medivaced to ari for spinal x-ray.
While checking gas lift recorders, on 'a' module west mezzanine level, i.p. fell through an open hole in the grating. A section of grating on the mezzanine level had been
removed by <…> wireline crew to enable the rigging of a wireline lubricator on well h-34. Fortunately for i.p. he managed to prevent himself from falling further and possibly
into module x1, by hooking his left arm over a section of wire rope, which was attached to a length of chicsan piping which was in close proximity to the open ho e in the
grating, at the time of the accident no barriers were in position around the hole in the grating, at the menzzanine level or around the open hatch at the production deck level.
An impact wrench was being utilised to tighten nuts on 3" valve (Fill up line on standpipe manifold). A <…> Tourpusher was using the wrench off a platform. <…> was on the
deck of drill floor. The impact wrench spun off the nut and <…> rea hed up to prevent the wrench from falling. His left hand was caught by a split pin used to secure the
impact socket on the wrench, the socket was still turning, and he received cuts to left hand and finger. <…> was not wearing gloves.
Ip was in the process of drilling when the work piece spun round catching the middle finger of his left hand. Ip was holding the plate with his left hand while operating the
drill advance lever with his right. The finger was lacerated and may have susta ned tendon/nerve joint damage. Ip person sent ashore to hospital from there sent home for a
period pending further examination.
Ip was returning through hatchway down a vertical ladder from the 'a' frame to the engine compartment, following inspection of the 'a' frame and cable drums, when the wind
blew closed the hatchway cover striking him on the head.
Ip installing lifting tackle under mezz deck of mod 11a for pipework erection. He climbed onto scaffold to gain access to beam when the scaffolding gave way and he fell
against steelwork. Scaffold inspected and found to be partially dismantled and unsafe to use. In heavily congested area difficult to jude interface betwwen safe and unsafe
scaffolding. Scaffolding should have been secured even if it had been taken out of use.
Setting up lifting beam and equipment to remove turbine a. Lifting beam was stood on grating, resting against handrail and toppled over falling onto ip foot.
I.p. was carrying out maintenance of 440v isolator. He inadvertently attempted to tighten "live" connections. The screwdriver he was using shorted between the live terminal
and the isolator case to earth. The resultant flash caused the i.p. to receive uperficial flash burns to area around right eye. The breaker systems worked correctly and rendered
the circuit safe.
Whilst removing graylock clamp from non return valve of g253 gas compressor discharge line, due to gas trapped downstream on n.r.v. the remaining half of graylock clamp
blew off causing gas in line to release which resulted in injury to face and eyes from projected particles
Whilst preparing burning equipment oxy and acetylene cylinders were opended to check for leaks, whilst pressurised the oxy hose burst with a loud bang adjacent to burning
torch. Torch was held in hand at the time. No iginition.
While alone on the skid deck, ip claims he inhaled some substance which subsequently caused acute respiratory distress with paroxymal spasms of coughing. No possible
source of substances, vapours, or fumes has been determined. From the time the man left the platform it has not been possible to date to obtain further medical information as
to the cause of his condition
A high pressure gas release from a pressurised flowline occurred whilst slackening off a 4" clamp ring. This resulted in an uncontrolled breakaway of the clamp, blind plug,
seal ring and one stud bolt into the area. Two men were injured and flown onshore or medical examination. One has no serious injury and has returned to work. The other
sustained a perforated ear drum.
While removing some pipework from the crude oil prover loop drain system, two pipefitters inadvertadly removed a valve which permitted an escape of crude oil vapour. The
men, who were working beneath the prover in a restricted position, inhailed some of the vapour and subsequently were taken to the sick bay. Both men were then sent to an
onshore hospital for a check-up. The power loop had been drained and flushed prior to work starting.
Diver assisted clamping operation on horizontal member at 100' clamp loose fit on member and floated by rigging comprising :- double block on 6t web strop anchored at +68'
+lt check chain block) winch wire back to manual pneumatic winch at +20'.
During the storm, the bridge linking the semisub <…> and the platform collapsed and one lifeboat was lost.
A full-scale anti pollution operation was launched when oil was found to be leaking from the export riser. 20 barrels of oil had leaked out causing an oil slick about 1.5 miles
away from the platform. The oil was recovered shortly after and hence no environmental damage.
Wind 170 deg at 15 knots, seas 3-4 feet, darkness with good night visibility. Mv <...> conducting survey at position 25 metres north east of leg d3 <...> lost dynamic position
power and swung around beam on to platform. Tried to clear platform by going full astern. Continued going astern but unable to clear <...> platform and went full ahead.
Collided with ftp platform in vicinity of legs c1, b1, a1. Collision impact seemed beam on. Vessel continued going full ahead alongside <...> and collided wit boat bumpers
and boat landing on <...>. Running alongside until clearing north end of 48/29a. No immediate visible damage to either structure apparent. Tidal flow at time of incident 325
degrees at 3.1 knot. Reported damage mv <...>, 4 inch g sh, port hull.
The cimbined standby/supply vessel <...> was located at south side of <...> loading container. During manoeuvre for keeping ship in position the "joy stick" operation of the
azimuth motor got stuck resulting in the vessel bumping into the south
Whilst vessel <...> was moving into position of ad platform to unload containers, the vessel came too close to the ne corner of <...> platform resulting in the rear of the boat
colliding with the jacket leg. Weather conditions - good clear visibil ty, tide - 161 degrees from north 1.5 knots, wind speed - 11 knots at 125 degrees, sea state - calm less than
0.5m
The stand by vessel, <...> collided with the starboard side of the <...> production platform striking the riser platform frame; the vessel continued to move towards the drilling
platform making contact with the boat landing deck, prior to steaming lear the installation visual damage and deflection of the riser protection frame and boat landing deck.
Platform and sealine shutdown and depressured as a safety precaution, possible damage to riser. Department of transport marine investigation branch dea ing directly with
<...>, vessel owners, to determine probable cause.
The stand by vessel <...> was positioned to the south of the platform. The vessel lost power to the engines (suspect contaminated fuel) and began to drift towards the platform.
It drifted stern first, to the west face of the plat orm. In doing so it delivered a glancing blow to the west side legs of the platform. Damaged escape ladder, superficial damage
to buffers and the protective coating. The <...> suffered damage to one of the fast rescue crafts. To prevent recurrence of incident
While <....> was coming alongside <....> to offload power was lost and a collision occurred with the <....> platform. Damage was caused to: no 2. Lifeboat including davits, the
escape ladder on the south west leg, diagonal bracings on the jacket (2 off) at the south end cellar deck south walkway and guard rail. Wind was 185 degrees and 22 knots. Sea
state was 2.2 metres.
Sbv was on location loading crude oil from rig. Primary position keeping equipment (artemis) failed (distance indicator lock up) and vessel moved forward and made slight
contact with fender ring of rig causing minor distortion of fender and damage to hos section (no spillage of oil occurred).
0030 hrs, clearance given to s/v <...> to enter platform 500m zone to <...>, positioned 200m south of platform. At 0205 hrs vessel collided with platform cellar deck between
legs a4 and b4, causing superficial d mage to 'j' tube dead weight clamp and cross bracing of cellar deck. Master of vessel informed that he had lost joy stick response when
engaging control level into both slow and full astern and could not prevent forward trajectory, and that a decision had been made not to engage thrusters. Damage sustained to
vessel was slight and confined to forrard mast.
During offloading operations a tote tank was being lifted from the deck it fouled on an empty compactor, the vessel fell away in the swell and before the crane could lower off
the compactor fell to the deck(8-10ft) the shock of the impact on the deck trip ed the azimuth thruster. The joystick tripped and as the transverse thruster was pushing the stern
towards the platform at the time the swing continued and struck the platform. Superficial damage was caused to the platform. The vessel sustained incidental damage on the
starboard quarter
The sanitary water pump was pulled together with the deck wash pump riser from caisson for maintenance. On re-installation, the assembly was being handled into position
when the sanitary water pump assembly parted from the deck wash pump riser while being suspended by the crane. This created a whiplash effect resulting in the sanitary
water pump assembly fell across the crane cab and eventually landed on no 1 separator hitting the relief valve.
The tugger winch wire parted as first module was being lifted from the <...> to platform (tugger was being used to orient module for lift). Minor damage to panel. The cause of
wire failure was a defective winch. The payout speed was insuffi ient compared with boom out speed of crane
While deploying flexible flowlines crew experienced a shuddering of the drum against the friotion rollers. All the activities were stopped. The drum was checked, driving of
the drum resumed another shudder was experienced quickly followed by an uncontroll d pay-out of the conflexis from the reel. All crew cleared the deployment area. The
drum continued to rotate in an uncontrolled manner deploying the flexibles subsea until the termination heads attained a deployment depth at which point the frictional for es
on the reel overcame the downward load applied by the flexibles and the reel stopped.
While recovering a flexible padeye from the seabed, the suspended load had been transferred from the vessels main crane hook. Recovery continued until approx 2-3 metres of
the flexible was in contact with the hud of the reel. At this point a padeye locate on a flanged pulling head on the flexible sheared causing the suspended flexible to fall back to
the seabed under its own weight.
Loss of operational control of bop crane whilst operating north bop crane - control was lost over operation - crane traversed indepentdantly - pendant control buttons were not
functional - local electrical isolator was closed in order to stop crane movement
Bundle of scaffold was slung on 8m level then crane hook pulled in to allow removal to cellar deck (17.5m level) lay down area. Slings on load were double wrapped as usual
but failed to tighten up on load when pull was applied by crane. This resulted in approx 25 tubes slipping into sea. Type of sling being used was new to platform ie 20ft/ton
swl wire rope sling with a protective polythene tubing covering 50% of the sling. When tension was applied to load the protective tubing snagged on the eye of the sling thus
preventing tightening of load. Normally this type of load is bulldogged once tension is applied to slings. Not being a vertical lift the deck crew were unable to do this. No
injuries or damage.
During the transfer of 20inch casing from the pipe deck to the drill floor via the vee door using the west crane, the crane boom struck the drilling derrick. This incident
disclosed the cathead light and control box causing them to fall to the bop deck. N casualties were sustained
During drill pipe operations. Winch wire broke and fell to the drill floor. On inspection the rig up arrangement was such that the winch wire was firm around a heavy guage
hand rail and had formed a grove through use. This groove had caused the wire to s ag during operation & break.
30" hydril was being pressure tested when a leak developed at the <...> joint near its base. The connection was forced out of alignment and the load of the hydril was therefore
taken up on the main gantry crane using 2x35 ton hoists. These were att ched to the north and south sides of the hydril. In order to align the hydril with its stub in an east-west
plane to 6 ton auxiliary hoist was attached, the intention being to rock the hydril into correct alignment but as the hoist was raised the rope fai ed and the block/hook assembly
fell to the floor
Container slipped 20' onto sea when east crane main hoist failed due to grease contamination during off loading <...>.
The crane had been reeved to double fall for a lift expected later that day. The supply vessel arrived with 5 lifts. No backload was planned. Two lifts were taken from the vessel.
On lowering the hook to take a third lift the main rope released itself fro the main drum and the hook assembly fell approximately 3m to the deck of the vessel.
Two production assistants were carrying out routine bunkering of perlite into the hopper which involves attaching a bag of perlite (approx.240kg) to the lifting bar and securing
to side pins. The bag is then hoisted off the deck and manoeuvered over the h pper before being lowered down and secured by means of a ratchet belt. The contents of the bag
are then emptied into the hopper.once the bag is empty it is raised using the hoist and positioned over the laydown area. At this stage the empty bag is app. Ft from the deck
and would then be lowered to the ground completing the operation. In this particlar instance when the production assist ants came to lower the empty bag onto the laydown
area the chain snapped allowing the lifting bar, chain, hook and e pty bag to fall to the deck the production assistants reported the incident to the system supervisor (process)
who immediately suspended all operations using the hoist pending an investigation.
The new (refurbished) drilling mud tank was being offloaded from the supply vessel to d3ee roof using the s/v 100ft crane. The tank weight was 32 tons with 3 tons lifting
bridle. The tank was positioned on the roof, at an angle, then an attempt was made t reposition the tank. During this attempt, the tank was swinging & appeared to foul/strike
on the projecting deck level above the tank. The padeye sheared off and the tank now only being attached by 3 padeyes canted over at an angle hitting the deck. The /v crane
driver then pulled the tank clear hitting the upper flange of the extreme outboard deck girder and repositioned the load to the s/v deck.
A joint of casing, weight 1 1/2 tons, was being lifted from its predeccesor in the string. The threads snagged and the swivel parted allowing the joint to drop back into the
string. A hook load of only 5000lb was indicated but an overpull in excess of 3 tons cannot be discounted. No injury, no collateral damage.
500 kg cooler being supported by stops fell 4ft when one stop failed. Failed equipment being investigated.
A mechanical specialist was given the task of repairing a pully which was part of the system to lower a hinged walkway from the cellar deck to the spider deck. Whilst it was
held up by the winch, the specialist rigged up the chain block with two three ton slings. This was to allow him to winch off and leave the "stairways" supported by the chain
block. He totally underestimated the weight and the chain block parted at one of the tucks on the main lifting chain. The specialist was on a fixed part of the pla form whilst
operating the winch and thus was in no danger.
After replacing boom hoist brakes bands, the crane was in process of being tested. 6.1 tonnes were on the hook at 120ft radius when noise was heard emanating from the drive
housing. Shortly afterwards the boom power lowering facility failed. The operator sed the foot brake to arrest decent, and then lowered the load in a controlled manner. He
then put the boom in the rest and shut the machine down.
West crane power boom lowering chain
Two halon cylinders (full) were lifted from cages on level 1 south west and temporarily stored on west side moving pipe deck-secured to fence awaiting crane transfer to halon
room.pkg 7 roof. During the interim period a boat came alongside to unload. A gu carrier was being landed on the west side of the moving pipe deck. The banksman
misjudged the rate of descent of the load as it crossed over the halon bottles. The corner of the gun carrier struck the tip protective cover of the halon bottle with suffici nt force
as to fracture the valve neck. This caused a release of halon(the contents of the cylinder). The senior deck operator was informed who in turn informed the fos. No persons
injured.
Crane mechanic was adjusting clutch linkage on the n.w. crane, which was stopped and plumbed over the west face of the platform. Person bent over to gain access to the
linkage his lower back inadvertantly came into contact with the load line lower. Alth ugh there was no load on the crane the hook and ball slowly descended until it struck the
deck on level 1. Several witnesses in the area saw the ball descent and had time to ensure they were clear of the striking area.
A half height container 20' x 7' x '4 deep which by design has four side access doors, was in transit, being lifted aboard using the north west crane from the main deck of the mv
<....>, one of the access door had not been secured in place.
Drill collar had become plugged with kill pill material during the workover of well 4-1. The collar had been removed from the well and in an attempt to remove the kill pill
material, had been suspended in the vertical position over the moving pipe deck b one hook of a two legged bridal assembly off the northwest crane. When the collar was
lowered to the deck, it freed itself from the hook as the lifting hook was no longer in tension. The collar fell southwards towards the ngl plant, striking some scaff lding as it
slid towards a horizontal position on the moving pipe deck. Only minor damage to scaffolding poles.
The <....> wireline crew commenced rigging down lubricator/bops off well h-36. They were utilizing the "a" frams on the skid deck with a 3 tonne air hoist. The first two
sections had been removed successfully. The lifting cap was transferred to the fina section, hoist attached and bowen quick union released. The crew signalled to one another
that it was safe to lift. The <....> wireline operator on "a" module mezz. Took the weight on the hoist and the hoist body to hook securing bolts failed causing th hoist to drop
into "a" module, a distance of -48ft. The load being lifted at the time the failure occurred was an 8 foot section of 5" lubricator weighing approx. 500 lbs. Subsequent
investigations indicated attachment material was not the correct comp nent for attaching the hoist hang off hook to the hoist body. The hoist was subjected to a six monthly
inspection on the <....> which required the hoist to be descaled, painted and swl added. Additionally the hoist was sent ashore for brake repairs, (brake slipping), on <....>. The
hoist was returned to the platform on <....> following repair, complete with certification of test and examination.
After erecting the gin pole the operator observed the hoist cable had parted and was unsafe. The gin pole had been secured by one locking pin out of the two available. The
platform crane was used to make the gin pole safe by de-telescoping the jib and t e gin pole was rigged down from the hydraulic work over unit for inspection and repair. The
cable that was fed through the jib extension had parted at the point where a milled slot had been provided to accept the hoist wire. Through wear, the slot had be ome sharp
around its edge and had worn the hoist cable, finally severing it. The gin pole had previously undergone certification prior to shipment offshore.
Technician was operating hydraulic unit to raise bop stack. During the operation one of the hydraulic rams bearing detached from the pinned clevice. An initial investigation
showed partial corrosion to the clevice thread which caused the ram to collapse shearing the holding pin.
Dynamo pattern eyebolts failed whilst lifting a drains tank pump. Three eyebolts and one safety wire were fitted in total. No damage to perssonnel or equipment sustained.
Remaining one eyebolt and safety wire held the load.
Whilst running 20" conductor, a joint was dropped 4ft onto rig floor. The procedure called for tailing in joints onto the rig floor whilst picking up with the side door elevators
by means of the blocks. The elevators are latched onto the joint on the rig floor. In this instance, the latch was not properly closed. This resulted in the elevator doors opening
when load was taken.
As the hook and pennant were lowered to the drill floor there was slight contact with derrick steelwork above the vee door. This caused the top eye of the pennant to be lifted
and passed through the safety catch of the hook. The pennant then dropped app ox. 20' to the drill floor.
While lifting waste skip from landing area on module 7 north the skip lugs caught under a handrail. The handrail section - 20 feet - was lifted clear of the deck sockets and fell
into the sea.
While running 13 3/8 csg. On rig 2 a joint of casing was being picked up from 'v' door. It caught up on the 'a' frame roller bar. The joint was approx. 15ft out of the 'v' door
and was still resting on the catwalk when the sling parted. The sling was c nnected between the pick-up elevator and the block hook when it parted.
Whilst picking up 13 5/8" bop with weight suspended on 4 hydraulic rams. After picking up the bop stack approx. 3ft, one threaded piston rod stripped loose from threaded
clevs, leaving load supported on remaining 3 piston.
East pelloby overhead crane was being used to lower a set of 13 3/8 casing slips into the well bay. At the end of its travel the chain passed through the winch. Dropping the
load approx 1" and the chain fell to the deck. Investigation showed that the l mit switch had been removed along with the end stop. This equipment was independently
inspected it is not known when the safety equipment had been removed or the reasons for removal.
North crane being used to lower nitrogen tank to the lower central corridor. Tank was stopped 4' above deck, an attempt was made to use the boom up facility to orientate the
tank, boom control was lost and tank dropped the 4' to deck. Load was unhooked, boom control returned and crane was put in rest.
4 3/4" drill collars were being picked up from piperack. A collar had been latched in the elevators and was in the process of being transferred to the vertical so that the upper
end was approximately 15' above the drill floor. The elevators unlatched & the drill collar fell to the floor. There were no injuries.
Bundle of instrument tubing (10x20x0.5") fell approx 30' from the upper central corridor to the lower central corridor after up ending on handrailing. Incident was the direct
result of a radio failure on the south crane cab. 3 deck crew members each gave erbal radio instructions to "stop" lowering. None were received by south crane driver.
Function test proved that an intermittent fault caused radio failure.
Due to insufficient height it was necessary to transfer the section of pump caisson from the main air hoist to a one ton chain block located at a higher level. Whilst carrying out
this operation the air hoist would appear to have gone block to block resul ing in a chain link on the anchor side failing. The transferring of the load to a one ton chain block is
not the normal procedure but due to the line shaft and enclosing tube couplings being seized it was necessary to lift the caisson pipework clear of th protruding line shaft.
A small half height container was being winched up to the top of the flare stack for the removal of redundant steel and bolts, when the basket was nearing the tope of the flare
stack (95m) the rigger informed the winchman to stop, via the radio. No commu ication was received by the winchman and the basket continued. This resulted in the ferrule
being pulled through the sheave to the block so the 3 tonne webbing strop parted, causing the work basket to fall to the skid deck, causing damage to the nitrogen tanks and
workshop.
The cp crane had previously been working the supply vessel <...> and was being slewed to the parking position to prepare for helicopter operations. During the slewing
movement, while no load was on the pennant, the aux line (whipline) pennant beca e disengaged from the aux line hook and fell into the sea. It appears that while the crane
was slewing the weight came off the auxiliary line pennant. This would allow the pennant to rise upwards and part from the auxiliary hook if the safety catch was not fully
closed.
Whilst lifting a 6 tonne container over the side of platform, prior to loading on to supply boat <...> deck, the hydraulic hose feeding the left side boom hydraulic ram split,
releasing oil and causing the boom to lower to its limit. The load ame to rest approximately 2 metres above sea level. Atmospheric conditions had no effect.
<...> crane was lifting a 7 (t) mud changing room container when the crane below began to vibrate and engine stalled. After re-start of engine this happened again. On re-start
and whilst trying to land the load safely onto the pipe deck the container made an uncontrolled descent of about 11ft onto the pipe deck.
G1 crane boom collapsed due to boom going past the limit stops and onto the "a" frame and breaking off 1 metre from the end of the boom base. Boom at rest on "a" frame and
broken base on north pipe deck walkway wedged under drill pipes. Also, cab damage aused by boom. No load was being lifted at the time as the boom was being raised into
position for lift when incident occurred. No injury.
Whilst running 9 5/8" casing on well <...>, the pick up elevators were opened before the casing was properly stabbed. The resulted in the joint falling from the stump. The
joint impaced the drillfloor, and then lay back in the derrick. No one was injured
Operations were taking place to backload equipment and containers from <...> a onto the supply vessel mv <...>. Container <...> lowered onto the vessel's deck when, due to
sea swell and vessel movement, the container tipped slightly forward the motor in the container broke free from its seafastening, slid out through the container doors and on to
the vessel's deck. The doors of the container were damaged as a result. No injuries resulted. Container and electric motor were brought back p to <...> pipe deck for
examination.
Whip rope fouled on main hoist rope guard at main hoist load watcher sheave. The rope guard became detached and fell from the elevated jib onto the pipe deck walkway
below. No one was injured. The rope guard is designed in such a manner that it is possi le to snag the wip rope on the guard. The guard is not designed to withstand such a
load. A three ton test weight was being raised by the whip hoist at the time.
The compressor building is a recent addition to the complex facilities and is at the latter stages of construction. The internal lighting is of a temporary nature and has been
installed on a ringmain protected by earth leakage circuit breakers. The light ittings are securely mounted from their appropriate steel mounting brackets to secured scaffold
poles at the roof of the building by a minimum of two stainless steel plastic coated 9mm (3/8ins) wide buckle fastening tiewraps. The scaffold tubes form no pa t of a
scaffolding structure. The light fitting in question has fallen 15 to 25ft to deck level. The fitting has sustained damage on impact and pulled itself free of its cable glanding
whilst falling, the eicb protection worked as designed. No personnel w re in the vicinity of the falling object at deck level but at least three people were working at the height
of the lighting fixtures on an adjacent independent scaffold structure installing water deluge piping. It is not proven if anyone was on the scaf
Whilst erecting scaffold on 27a compression spider deck two scaffolders were being passed tubes by a third situated on a walkway above them. This involved carrying tubes
from a loading platform to the work site. Whilst going to fetch a different length tu e i.p. lost his balance handling an unsecured tube of the original tubes being passed to the
two scaffolders. He fell overboard from the walkway some seven metres into the sea striking a bracing on the way. His lifejacket inflated on immersion. The wat hman called
the standby boat, putford snipe, who sent his fast rescue craft. The frc arrived on the scene in two minutes to find the man overboard being retrieved by his workmates. I.p.
was examined by the platform medic who informed the north sea medic l centre. On their advice i.p. was kept under observation for four hours before being allowed to return
to work
While carrying out routine maintenance on lifeboat 3, the fitter was demonstrating to a colleague the release mechanism for the boat & the locking device, explaining that the
lock is secure until boat is water borne when hydrostatic pressure releases lock fitter then proceeded to lift & pull lever to demonstrate that it was locked, but instead of
meeting the solid resistance as expected, the lever travelled up & across into the release position. The boat was released from the hooks & dropped 6" on to the ang off
pennants that are fitted prior to maintenance on lifeboats.
While running 26" riser from drill deck to seabed for well, a joint parted at scid deck level and all pipes fell to sea. No major damage obvious topsides. Rov inspection revealed
some damage to guides and guide support structures some minor.
The utilities shaft cover located in the valley area was raised on scaffold, kick plates arranged & a fine mesh wrapped around the open areas. This was a temporary
modification to allow air into the shaft as the hvac supply fans & ducting were being refur ished during the shutdown. A scaffold on the north walkway at the east end of the
valley area was to be dismantled. The work party were given no toolboxtalk as the scaffold to be dismantled was a simple scaffold. Work commenced at 19:00hrs & the work
part chose the route from the worksite to the scaffold rack at the west side of the valley. The route over the protected hatch was deemed safer than carrying scaffold tubes along
a busy main walkway. One man was positioned at either side of the barriers & the scaffold poles were slid accross the shaft cover. During this operation one pole rolled off the
hatch cover at the drilling module site. The gap between the shaft cover & the module +- 6", this being dictated by a vertical pipe run. The gap on the drillin module side had
not been covered completely with netting & the pole slipped through & fell down the shaft.
<...> the survey vessel <...> reported sighting explosives container <....> on the seabed alongside the pipeline. Investigation revealed that container <....> came from <....>. The
con -tents were ast checked on <....> confirming its presence on board at that time. Subsequent investigation assumes that the container was blown overboard during
extremely high winds during the night <....> to <....>. Wind 260 degrees by 85 to 95 gusting 136 knots. No damage was sustained by any part of the platform.
Piece of redundant 6" cable tray weighing 2 kg fell from the flare tower on to the ngl plant without causing injury or mechanical damage. Platform production was shutdown
under controlled conditions, flare risers were isolated, purged and blanked off for lare tower access. Flare tower access gained, further loose cable tray removed and remainder
secured
During severe storm conditions a bundle of scaffold boards rigged ready for backloading and stowed on top deck, bogah to break up. The first board spilt allowing a 2nd board
to work free of the lashing. The boards were blown off the top deck and landed on level 2 north walkway approx 6" from galley door which was closed due to storm
conditions.
During a severe storm on <....> a <....> heatshield panel on the platform flaredeck weavering approx 1.5m x 1m and weighing 50kg was dislodged from its fastenings and came
to rest between the safety hoops of an access ladder. The damage was not noticed until <....> the platform ops and inspection engineers surveyes the damage from a helicopter.
There assessment concluded that the panels in its current position was unlikely to fall from the flaredeck.
Whilst rigging up to run a wireline plug in well c3 the spring jars fired and the plug dropped from the lubricator. The plug hit the low torque valve on the side outlet from the
drilling riser as it fell. The impact partially fractured the pipe between th valve and the riser causing a leak of treated seawater at about 1bbl/hr from the well. (apart from
closing the bop blind rams there was no way to isolate this leak path from reservoir pressure.) To allow an explosive set "pes" plug to be set in the well he platform had to go
into radio silence. As a precaution, production was shut down before entering radio silence and setting the plug. When the plug had been set the riser was bled down and
observed before the damaged stub piece and valve were replaced.
During routine operations on the rig floor a 12" adjustable spanner fell from the upper regions of the rig floor and struck a driller on his helmet. The man was shocked and
suffered a stiff neck, subsequently he returned to work after examination by the latform medic. Some construction personnel were moving about within the derrick and work
had been in progress during the preceding day. However, no one would admit to having had or used an adjustable spanner
Compression washer from the cross bearer on the power swivel, dropped approx. 110'. Struck i/p (grazed neck).
Falling sparks from work on generator exhaust dropped to pud g deck level, igniting paint on pipework and small amount of debris on deck under gratings. Blistering to
paintwork and cable. Fire was extinguished using co2 extinguisher.
Ip was employed fitting insulation to the bulkhead in the internal stairway north west, one flight below accommodation level 1 at the same time that scaffolders were employed
erecting a work platform internal stairwell nw accommodation roof 1w4 as a 5" tu e was laid against the east bulkhead it slipped and fell int the space between the east
bulkhead to the stairway. It bounced off the bulkhead prior to striking ip.
Backloading of drilling materials had been in progress.the crane was stowed due to the arrival of crew change helicopter.due to prevailing wind conditions the flight path of the
chopper was over the skid from east to west.the downdraught from the helicopt r dislouged a scaffold board which was lying on the roof of a container on the south side of the
skid deck.the board was propelled overboard and struck the after deck of the supply vessel.
Main 3 phase supply cables between switchboard bus bars and live side of main isolator in cubicle appear to have 'shorted' to earth. The fire and gas system detected the
consequent smoke and fumes, setting off the halon protection.
Horizontal surge pump was in normal service when motor failed. Immediately before being stopped flame and sparks were emitted from motor casing. These were
extinguished using a bsf fire extinguisher. The motor has seized and has been returned ashore for i vestigation and repair/replacement
At 01.00 i was awoken by a loud bang and a fire and gas alarm. I went into the ccr and reset the uv detector. I talked to ccr, then i woke up the deputy oim. There was a violent
storm overhead. I took a radio and walked out to wap keeping in contact wit my deputy. As i arrived on wap the vent stack beside the contactor tower was hit by lightning,
igniting the vent gases. Raised g/alarm, fire team mustered assessing situation. Tried to extinguish fire with water, little to no effect. After discussion with firemen, p1 plant
fire went out. Cooled with water. Stood down fire team after inspection of the whole installation and after debrief. (03.15 am)
Immediately after a fire alarm and muster, it was noted on <...> control room annunciator that <...> firewater pump had failed to start. It was investigated and control switch
was in "auto" mode. Tried to start pump in manual mode and saw smoke emulating from b ttery box. Immediately switched pump off by switching to "stop" and switched off
battery charger locally. Called for assistance by radio, fire extinguished by use of 9 kg dry powder extinguisher. Batteries look in fair order but damage to insulation on is
lation links that connect batteries to starter motor cables.
Smoke alarm (single) altered personnel to compressor house and duty at approx 1910 hrs a smoke alarm came up on fire/gas panel, zone 55 bc compressor no. 1 personnel
dispatched to investigate. It was found that smoke was present in bci compressor house. T is was traced to seal oil pump 'b', "motor end bearing". The pump was stopped, at
which time a small flame was noted issuing from the motorend bearing. This was extinguished by the use of a portable dry powder extinguisher (bc1 compressor esd).
At 0418 hours on <...>, smoke on top of gtg 3 was reported. Area was h osed down gtg 3 shutdown. Investigations showed that the exhaust was not damaged but transit from
area 10 is damaged and this caused debris to be blown on to hot exhaust. No damage o injury.
Cause of smoke in the 11kv switchroom at 0445 hours on <...> traced to burnt out transformer in ndg 130. (110 volt ups) panel. Reason for burn out of the transformer was the
use of a heat gun on the ups socket . These sockets were of the normal type and the person using the heat gun did not realise the difference. The power on socket was not rated
high enough for a heat gun.
12" weldolet connection was being installed on the inlet line to c101 to provide a tie-in point. Having installed the weldolet, the internal orifice was cold cut, leaving a lip of
metal which had to be removed by oxy/acetylene burning torch. Some gas was ignited.
Whilst welder was carrying out fabrication work in fab. Shop his firewatcher noticed sparks and flame coming from the welding unit: the firewatcher extinguished same
using dry powder agent, subsequent inspection by the electrical foreman revealed that the positive connection on the unit had overheated, causing contact with the chassis
frame, which resulted in the surrounding paintwork being burnt: the cause is thought to be due to the positive connector becoming slack (due to vibration).
Module 23 hvac plenum, fan cm3308c overheated bearing, causing smoke to ensue into the general area of module 23/24, thus causing smoke detectors to activate, with a
control action of a level 3.1 shutdown.
Whilst applying post weld pre-heat to the weld using a butane burner ring round the weld, insulation material on the underside of the module caught fire. Initial findings of the
inspection teams indicated that the fire was restricted to the mastic coatin on the rockwool insulation bounded by grids 4,5,c & d - an area of approx 120 square metres. No
injuries sustained.
Smoke was observed from pipework at air inlet to air cooler of g4500 avon gas turbine. The area technician was informed. He initiated isolation of smoke heads and started to
unload the generator, while a sentry with hand extinguisher monitored the smoke. Fter approx. 5 min the insulation started to glow and ignited. The turbine was shut down
and the fire extinguished
At approximately 18.51hrs a smoke detector in the 11kv switch gear room activated the alarm in the ccr; the crt requested one of the ops techs and the fso to investigate. On
arrival in the area the ops tech found smoke and advised the ccr that there was a fire. The crt activated the general alarm 18.53hrs and requested that the fire team attend the
scene of the fire. When the fso arrived in the switch gear room he found smoke and the ops tech who had tackled the fire with a portable extinguisher. He not fied the ccr the
fire was in a waste basket and that it was under control. (18.57hrs) he checked that the fire was out and notified the ccr at approximately 19.00hrs. The emergency muster was
allowed to complete and personnel stood down at 19.05hrs.
Diesal generator on weekly load test run with operations in attendance. Exhaust lagging smoked due to absorbtion of oil residues. A small flame appeared for a few seconds.
This was extinguished by operations & the lagging removed. Machine then load-tested okay
Smoke and exhaust fumes were seen issuing from the pump's exhaust. The exhaust cladding was cooled and stripped. Investigation revealed failure of a flange gasket which
allowed heat and flames to permeate and damage the lagging. Atmospheric conditions w re not a factor in this instance. (platform went to muster).
The welder comenced cutting a section of grating away, after approx 1 minute of work the fire watch noted that the atmospheric vent tip had ignited. He informed the welder
and both the welder and his work mate immediately left the flare boom. The observer informed the control room who then informed the safety tec. Who extinruished the small
flame
<....> air compressor was being driven by a 150hp electric motor (k07a). At 10.30 hours a high bearing temperature alarm tahh-228 annunciated in the control room and the
standby unit put on line. At 10.31 hours the area operator and a mechan c went to investigate and found the module partially filled with smoke, approx 70% and flames from
the motor drive and bearing approx 18 inches high. The area operator pressed the manual stop button and extinguished the fire by use of a hand held dry pow er extinguisher.
The fire was out at 10.32 hours no other investigations ongoing to determine cause of failure.
On investigation of smoke alarm in module 1 switchroom, no sign of fire but switchroom was filled with smoke. Traced to overheating of the resistor banks in drawworks 'c'
dynamic brake panel, causing the resistor insulation to smoulder and burn off. No extinguishing media required
During the reinstatement of the electrical distribution system after an 11kv failure, an 11kv/630v 800kva cast resin transformer feeding a 'squeeze injection' package failed.
The switchroom in module 4 filled with smoke. One electrical technician was in the switchroom at the time of the incident. He was not injured and was unaffected by the
smoke. The electrical protection equipment on the 11kv switchboard operated correctly, disconnecting the supply. No other equipment was damaged. Platform f & g syst m
operated correctly
Radiated heat from flare ignited wooden boards above crown block. The boards were wedged into structural 'h' beams as protective packing during the module load out stage.
The wood was external to the radiation shielding, and hence exposed to direct heat from the flare. The wind was blowing the flare across the top of the derrick at the time of
the fire.
Work consisted of welded repair to 3" hot water line in hot water circulating system (heating supply to non-accommodation modules). All necessary isolations had been
reviewed and correctly made in accord with company mechanical isolation procedures but se ondary stopper and vent line to classified safe area had not been fitted. Welder
successfully welded upper part of line but when he moved to the lower a small ignition occurred, which he and the firewatcher were able to extinguish with their gloves.
Gas turbine was being run up on diesel fuel after completion of speedtronic calibration. On reaching 1600 rpm machine tripped on overtemperature. Smoke was reported
coming from exhaust stack. Further investigation revealed a fire within exhaust plenum. Boundary cooling was applied to external exhaust enclosures and water spray applied
internally to extinguish fire.
Technician blowing down annulus observed flame at line exit. Valve isolated, flame extinguished.
Smoke was seen to be emitting from "a" generator by shift safety officer at the same time. F & g panel indicated fire alarm status on temporary generator "a". On investigating
discovered small fire in generator compartment and that the machine had shutdow on smoke detection. On examination it was found that fitter material was still smouldering
and was extinguished using 1 x co2 extinguisher. The alternator windings appeared to have burned out.
Temporary f & g panel in mcr indicated a fire on generator b. This was investigated by the duty safety officer who found smoke to be coming from the generator cabinet. The
doors were closed and the generator had been shutdown. The safety officer used a co extinguisher to secure/extinguish smouldering material.
Scaffolders erecting above the site of the butt involved in the stress relieving, smelt burning. Upon investigation they discovered fire; was extinguished by dry powder
extinguisher. Heating bands & insulation were removed.
Shale shaker extract fan km 8518a motor shaft was rubbing against drive belt guard casing creating excessive heat which transferred along motor shift to drive pulley. Drive
belts subsequently subjected to heat and started to smoke
During the first run of the power generator gas turbine, when ignition was achieved the heat generated in the urbine caused residual oil and grease in the machine to give off
smoke. Smoke detectors in the generator compartment were activated and the contr l room operator initiated a halon release and the gpa was sounded.
Whilst cutting away the sea fastenings on the top drive rogue sparks from the cutting equipment were blown down the rotary hole, igniting oily rags below. The gpa was
sounded, leading to a full muster and evacuation of all non-essential personnel.
Fire alarm in module 11a initiated by heat rise detector. A platform shutdown and deluge release followed due to the compressor running prior to the event large quantities of
steam were generated and area enveloped in dense vapour. Heat rise detector acti ated by turbine a&b exhaust gased which were being blown by prevailing winds directly at
11a
During transfer of methanol from <...> to <...>, vessel reported low discharge pressure and asked platform to check amount received. Amount corresponded with remains in
vessel's tanks, and transfer continued. Production operator carefully watch d the rise in platform tank (v23) and contacted vessel after 10 minutes, when a shortfall was
discovered. Transfer was stopped and when picking up the transfer hose it was observed that it was burst, spilling methanol in to sea.
Wireline operations were being conducted on a well and a gas lift valve had been replaced. The wireline toolstring had been installed in the lubricator and the lubricator re-
installed. The driller was preparing for a pressure test of the tubing string a d opened the surface flowhead master valve. He noted 1000 psi pressure on the wireline lubricator.
He proceeded to close the surface flowhead master valve and bleed off the lubricator pressure to the mud gas separator. The fluid trap on the mud gas sep rator was overcome
by the gas pressure/volume and gas escaped to the triptank area and set off the gas alarms. It appears the surface flowhead master valve was not properly closed and the full
tubing string cap was opened to the mud gas separator causing excessive volume of gas to be released into the system
Mcr operator witnessed gas alarms from c module on jcp 5464 fire/gas panel. On investigation condensate/gas was discovered being emitted into module from the interdtage
scrubber sight glass.
Approx. 0410 hrs, having undergone maintenance, a fuel gas start on `a' r/royce was unsuccessfully attempted, allowing gas to enter generator. At approx. 0415 hours start
logic was manually bypassed allowing fuel gas skid operating pressure to be recalibe ated to 18 bar, again allowing gas to enter generator, this operation lasting for approx.
30 secs., This coincided with level 4 shutdown.
The unauthorised removal of isolations resulted in the preasuring up of the densitometers, bursting a vent hose attached and causing an emission of oil and gas into module m5
mezz
Horizontal pump was being fitted to replace existing vertical pump. While welding, the old pump was removed and some condensate trapped in the pump seals escaped. The
condensate ignited but was immediately put out by the firewatcher.
During routine pm inspection, operator discovered the pin hole leak. He informed the main control room of the leak on m20 well. The well was shut in and flow line de-
pressurised.
During routine well service activities on pb15, gas was inadvertently released from the swab cap vent valve into the wellhead area, causing a platform s.p.s. the status of the
well pb15 xmas tree prior to the incidence was:- sssv umgv and fwgv were closed the swab valve was open three (3) turns and the swab cap vent valve was open with cavity of
wellhead open to vent system. The well service crew were in the process of pressure testing the sssv and umgv via remote control hydraulic lines and removing the wab cap.
The incident occurred when the umgv control hydraulic lines was inadvertently pressured up and opened the umgv, allowing gas to enter the xmas tree cavity and escape via
vent system and the swab cap vent valve into the wellhead area.
At 1650 hrs the <...> drilling rig contacted the <...> platform to inform us of a fluid leak from the well head area of the <...>. The <...> was standing off the platform at the
time. The platform was shut in at 1700 hrs from the <...>. At 1800 h s the <...> oim confirmed that the leak had ceased, he also confirmed that the leak was from the area
around pb17, he also observed that the well casing was wet with an oily film. On investigation of the dcs it was noted that the sssv on pb17 had closed on loss of hydraulic
pressure. The <...> platform was visited the next day and it was confirmed that the reported leak was from pb17 control line with the resulting loss of 60 ltrs. Of tellus t15. On
the night of the incident there was a 40 knt wind and heavy sea. Casing movement had pushed the small bore control line against the steelwork and eventually a fitting
developed a leak. Complete loss of hydraulic fluid was prevented by the closure of the excess flow valves.
A leak was discovered on a grease nipple on tk valve gw20, inlet to separators from <...>. sealant was injected to try to stop the leak. When the grease gun was removed the
leak became worse and gas started to come from the nipple. I then decided to vent the line between <...>. and the separators, the separators were then isolated from <...>. our
first thought was to vent through the test separator and out of the normal platform vents. However, the wind was directly down the platform towards the accommoda ion and
very hazardous. The only safe option was to vent through well 23, by closing the upper master valve on well 23, by closing the upper master valve on well 23 and jacking open
the wing valve in order to vent through the wellheads and out of the sate lite vents. This was successful
Under production conditions v/v gw 822 was leaking water from grease nipple slightly. Production was stopped, separator isolated, vented down grease nipple was removed no
non return v/v in grease chamber could be found. Platform staff fitted a new nrv & n w grease nipple to v/v. Type, t.k. serial no. <...> no damage or injury sustained. Wind
11kts 175 degrees qfe 1020, sea calm.
Platform production facilitation controlled venting executed in preparation of annual shutdown. Complex vent system pipework becomes full of gas as expected. One inch
drain pipe from common vent system header which is used for periodic manual draining of iquids hand operated isolation valve had been left in the open position therefore
allowing gas to escape. Platform gas detection systems did work. There was no one working within the vicinity of the release and the release was isolated expeditiously by th
platform incident team
Proir to start up of <...> compression, <...> scrubber 301-1205 was being drained to the closed drain system. The closed drain system was pressurised sufficiently to remove the
loop seal (15' head of water). Which resulted in gas/condensate entering the cellar deck via the open drain system. This led to 60% gas detect and platform gpa.
On the evening of <...> as k200 was about to be shut down a noise was reported in the cellar deck viscinity. No cause could be found and the unit was shutdown. At 0810 0n
<...> the unit was started for production purposes and a further check was ma e to locate the noise. A blind flange was found to have broken off from a commissioning purge
valve on the recycle line at the point where gas re-enters the suction line. The valve was in the open state so allowing gas to escape. The unit was immediately shutdownand
vented and investigations commenced.
A noise was heard coming from the ac cellar deck area. One of the compression operators proceeded to the cellar deck and quickly determined that the source of the noise was
a gas release from k400's suction valve differential pressure switch stainless ste l tubing. The compression operator contacted the duty operator via his portable radio and the
compressor was immediately esd'd via the unit control panel. An instrument technician was called to the scene and he discovered that the stainless steel tubing c nnected to the
compressor suction pipe work isolation valve had sheared off at the parker 'a' lok fitting. The fitting was replaced and the tubing reconnected satisfactorily and the compressor
was put back on line. Gas release was not detected by the plat orm's f/gas detection equipment.
Man investigated an unfamiliar noise on the cellar deck. He discovered a natural gas leak from a union on the 3/8" pipe to the dp switch across k100 compressor inlet suction
valve. He informed the control room operator who went to the scene of the leak. T e unit was immediately shutdown and vented. An unexpected esd occurred as the unit was
shut down. It is felt that this was not directly related to the incident and that someone pushed an esd button. This however cannot be confirmed. A pltform safety commi tee
investigation team carried out an investigation which revealed that the stainless steel pipework had fractured at the ferrule. The time between the location of the leak and
shutting down the unit was less than five minutes. The pressure in the suction line was 228psig
At 10.40hrs on the <...> a weld failure occurred on k100's suction boot 1" auto-drain line pipe work which resulted in an uncontrolled release of gas and condensate in the
vicinity of the vessel. The leak was immediately spotted by <...> who was w rking in the area and he reported the facts to the control room operator. The onshift chief operator
went to the site and quickly assessed the situation and the compressor was shutdown and vented at 10.30 hrs. No personal injuries were sustained as a resu t of the incident.
Gas release from previously depressured casing annulus of well a51 (slot a17) during workover. Pressure in annulus was vented through two tie-down screws when the casing
was lifted from the speedhead. All flammable gas detectors in area 4 were activated o 100% lel. In ignition, no injury, gas was vented safely after about 40 minutes.
22.37 hours - two 20% gas readings initiated class 2a s/d and gpa was sounded. Six gas heads around 20% mark (highest 24%) in area 4a. (gas head no. 34-39). 23.02 hours -
leak found to be from a 1/2" vent needle vavle on hp gas injection header in area 4a commenced venting header to flare. At 23.16 hours header pressure was zero. Removed
threaded vavle body from 1/2 weldolet on header and replaced. Tested removed valve and found leak to be via the stern gland packing. Header was subsequently tested and
recommissioned
Gas escaped from the vent portof downstream pilot isolation valve. On inspection it was found that the 1/2" npt plug was missing. There was no damage to the threads of the
valveor marks on a nearby girder to indicate the plug had been blown out. The line ad been vented down the previous day for mtce dept. To work on the choke. This was the
first time pressure had been re-introduced to system after mtce task.
During mini shutdown to undertake hot work tie-ins of a new glycol regeneration package a spark from welding operations ignited a small quantity of condensate which had
gathered on the deck below. The fire was extinguished immediately on ignition by the w rk groups involved using a dry powder extinguisher. No injuries, no damage.
During routine inspection, operator opened instrument box. This released a very minor quantity of accumulated gas into the meter room. This initiated hi. Hi. Gas alarm, g.p.a.
muster and shutdown of <...> and <...> platforms. Investigation revealed minor leak whithin the meter house that had been constantly monitored
Operator venting down discharge line, small section between auto & manual discharge valves, both valves were closed at this time. During venting, a union joint parted, the
operator who was on the venting valve closed it immediately. Two gas heads register d 20% lel
During a43 choke changeout a cap on the pilot instrumentation pipework was removed to act as a vent point to monitor for any hydrocarbon build up. Upon completion
however this cap was not re-installed after the system was hydro tested. Wells a46 & a32 wer opened to the test separator. Gas leaked passed the test manifold hv on a43 which
initiated executive action. Note: operator had received both written handover & verbal instructions to re-install the cap.
Gpa sounded, emergency team to area 9, personnel to muster stations. Deluge operating. Fire team checking area for gas source 15:59 hours, gas levels drop to 8% lel. Search
for gas source continues, 16:20 hours gas levels drop below 4% lel. No leak source found. Deluge isolated. Personnel stood down from muster. 'A' train isolated production
flowing to 'b' train.
Seven gas heads came into alarm. All personnel mustered. Inlet, atmospheric and test seperators were vented, gas heads cleared. Deluge sets were manually isolated, reset
and rearmed. Investigation of area revealed no damage to vessels, sight glasses p pework or instrumentation. Gas monitors were used and the only potential source appeared
to be the discharged instument pipe on the original potential source. Personnel stood down. Normal work resumed.
This incident took place during the annual shutdown. The gas line (along with all gas pipework on the platform) had been purged free of gas with nitrogen. Prior to hot work
being done on this pipe, its contents had been checked as being gas-free. Subseque t investigation showed that a small quantity of liquid condensate had gathered in a strainer
(a low point in the line). The heat of the cutting torch caused this condensate to flash off gas, which was then ignited inside the pipe by the cutting torch flame
Low level gas detection occured in module p02 main deck east. The on duty safety operaor and shift supervisor with gas detection equipment went to investigate and observed
vapours eminating from flotation unit h40ib oil compartment hatch cover. The leak stopped when the shift supervisor tightened the two hatch cover screwed fasteners. Gas
detector 04222 indicated high level and gas detector 04226 went into high level alarm resulting in platform esd2 (coincidental gas detection) the general alarm was act vated
and emergency essential personnel instructed to proceed to muster stations. Module p02 was checked using portable gas detectors and confirmed gas free. Personnel were
stood down.
During video/rov survey of well from dsv, gas and crude oil leak observed through the interface between the xmas tree flowline connector and the flowline connecting hub
within the completion guide base, this interface is sealed by a metal vx gasket.
Oncoming shift power tech noticed gas card on panel was indicating a 12% reading. He informed cro & went to investigate the area, approaching from the lower east walkway
due to high wind. On reaching area he smelled crude oil. He continued to area where l oking through to the loading room he could see crude spillage on the floor. He raised the
alarm with the cr by phone & continued round to area. At this time other o/t's summoned by his call for assistance investigated area from the walkway, observed crude spilling
from the power loop mezzanine floor & initiated an sps manually from a callpoint. This raised the platform to red hazard status & thus initiated a full muster. Meanwhile,
acting in the emergency response role the technicians successfully isolated the prover loop & export system after confirming that the process had shut down. The area had last
been checked at 06:40hrs. It is estimated that 4bbl of crude oil were spilled, but all the spillage was contained within the platform drains system & thus the platform drains
system and there was no enviromental impact.
Following a <...> gas alarm annunciation on <...> remote scan of the wellhead area indicated hydrocarbon release. Platform shutdown remotely, hydrocarbon release leased.
Z gas release in the gas generator cell of <...> generator caused a control action shutdown of the unit, subsequent investigation reveals that the gas emminated from a crack in
the elbow of gas supply pipe. The elbow has been replaced with a unit of a more rounded nature. The reason for the crack is thought to be through exvessive vibration when it
is running up to idle speed during the start sequence
A <...> generator running on load share at 12 mw, gas was detected by aspirators, gas was confined to g.g enclosing unit shutdown cause of release was found to be a split weld
on the gas ring and also cracked burner elbows on numbers 1-4-6 and 8.
Power generation unit tripped on gas detection in gas generator enc. (fire and gas trip). Leak found to be flexible hose elbow to gas burner leak repaired and unit returned to
service.
On the morning of <...> a low level gas alarm was received in the ccr on the f + g panel 29% (99414) investigation revealed that the leak was eminating from a flange on
thermal relief valve psv 1902b crude export pump a. The plant was subsequently shutdown pending repair.
Module 17 hvac air supply fan no. Cx4902x drive end bearing collapsed causing smoke from the damaged bearing to be drawn into the hvac ducting of module 17.
Investigation of the fan revealed that the d.e. bearing had failed resulting in high shaft tempera ures and loss of the lubricating grease from the bearing.
Fuel gas ring failed releasing gas into generator compartment. Mechanical failure in normal service. Quick actions taken to offload machine, change to liquid fuel and isolate
all gas supplies. Forced extraction dispersed gas from compartment to open air. O fire or explosion
Operator was closing upstrwam valve on pv 0503 to seat passing valve. An unidentified leakage (of gas) occured which the operators were unable to repeat when undertaking
similar operations on the same valve. Gas smell was evident throughout top level of m dule and 2 gas detectors activated g9101 - low level, g9105 - high level.
A process plant upset led to a high pressure in the test separator.due to incorrect flare valve control settings, the pressure was relieved by the psv's. Gas vented into the module
via the tell tale from the psv bellows.
Whilst working on a injector fault circuit breaker opened causing fuel gas secondary high speed shut off cock to close against fuel gas pressure, gas leaked from gland packing
on valve the leak was detected by the automatic system.
14:47 lo level gar detected. 14:58 co-incident lo level gar level two operated. 15:09 high level gar detected - level three shutdown. All executive actions functioned correctly
production shutdown.
Indication of a smoke detector poisoning was identified on the central fire and gas panel. Investigation of the cause followed and a small gas leak was detected at xxv 1543
upstream flange 2nd stage hot gas by pass valve gas injection machine was shut dow and flange bolts flogged up, 3 in number. This action successfullu prevented further
leakage the machine and system was returned to service and monitored. There was no damage, and no casualties resulted.
Gas release from gland on fuel gas supply to drive unit, valve located in enclosure outboard. Level shutdown executive action. Functioned correctly until shutdown.
Minor gas release from leaking instrument connection to pressure transmittor - detected by aspirated gas detectors. Welding jackets on plstform isolated automatically. -
generator shutdown.
During start up of "a" power generator gas was detected within the generator compartment. A level of 50% lel was indicated at the central fire and gas panel in the control room
and the machine tripped on esd. Investigation revealed that a pigtail hose to o12 burner has split. Pressure at hose was approx 1 bar. Further investigation also revealed a leak
on the ring manifold which appeared to have resulted from ignition within the ring.
<...> generator being started for the first time following 20,000 hour overhaul. Within 4 or 5 seconds of propane gas being turned on low level gas alarm followed by high level
gas. Propane gas supply immediately turned off. Investigation revealed gas le ks from base of sight glass propane filter/knockout pot & stem of valve immediately upstream of
ko pot.
The drilling department were slowly bleeding off tubing head preasure in order to dissipate a hydrate in ba 28, the contents of which was predominantly sea water. The liquid
was being routed through the drilling choke manifold, the poor boy de-gasser, flo line and shaker house to the cutting ditch. Gas entrapped in the sea water broke out and was
detected by a gas head in the shaker house.
Failure of valve bonnet retention studs causing the valve actuator plus valve bonnet to separate from the valve. This caused the loss of integrity of the valve & subsequent
release of system contents (approx 20 standard cubic feet of hydrocarbon gas). Bei g in an open area no gas detection heads activated & the gas dispersed into the atmosphere.
Rigged up high pressure flexible hose and pressure tested to 500 psi started pumping the hec pill at 2800 psi but the hose started vibrating and broke off a pressure gauge which
was connected to the lubricator. Gas released into wellhead area. Pumping sto ped immediately - needle valve to pressure gauge closed. No damage except for broken
connection on pressure gauge.
At 2205 hrs on <...> the recip. compressor (k9320) was started up having been shut down for the day. Within a minute of the suction val ve starting to open a loud bang was
heard closely followed by the sound of escaping gas. After the bang inves igation quickly showed the source of escaping gas to be from instrumentation pipework at the after-
scrubbe r. The machine was immediately shutdown manually and on further investigation the instrumentation pipework to the discharge pressure guage for inj ction mode
was found to have failed at a swagelock connection
Platform shutdown for annual maintenance activities. Train 2 had been water flushed as per procedure.all oil wells supplying train 2 had flow line chokes removed and blanks
fitted to xmas trees. Relief valve was being removed from 1st stage separator for e-certification. When studs being removed, small pocket of gas under valve escaped into
module, causing gas detector situated immediately above worksite to go to low then high level.
Platform in full production, 3 trains on line, gas to export. During routine plant watch-keeping the oil technitions noted oil dripping from the relief header at the six o'clock
position on the pipe bend at north end of header. Monitoring indicated that t e leak rate was increasing and production was shutdown in a controlled manner. All systems were
depressurised and actual hydrocarbon release was minimal. Subsequent investigation of the pipe bend revealed corrosion pitting at the leak point.
Platform in production mode with gas & water injection on line. At time of incident 2 avons were running in module m4w. Hazard alarm from module m4w - 2 technicians
confirmed fire/smoke in module & manually released btm bottles. At 09:27 a team entered th module wearing breathing aparatus & confirmed that the fire had been
extinguished. The area was inspected & oil found dribbling from a 3/8" compression fitting on the discharge of the turbine driven lub-oil pump. It was concluded that oil had
sprayed ove the hot exhaust & ignited.
At 01:22 the platform status changed to yellow alert, with an indication of low level gas in m3e. 2 technicians were sent to investigate, & reported widespread gas in module
m3e. The system supervisor decided to manually initiate red hazard status. He sta ted sub-main generation & initiated an sps (surface process shutdown). Although
widespread, no gas card was seen to indicate greater than 40% lel. Once shutdown, the process was depressurised. When it was deemed safe to enter the module, the source of
the gas was identified as a pin hole leak in the body of the flow control valve (fcv) of well. Train 3gas re-entry valve had failed to close, & as a result, the logic had prevented
the injection manifold from blowing down. Mv9324 was opened manually, & the flowline isolated. Final depressurisation was achieved by running hoses from bb31 swab &
flow wing sides.
Platform went to yellow alert as gas head activated in module. Investigation revealed lean oil pump pressure gauge leaking onto the module deck. The pump was shut down,
gauge isolated & replaced. During the subsequent clean up operations, the oil was swept into the drains gulley & some of the oil went down the storm drains & less than a
barrel of oil escaped into the sea.
During mode change, a leak to atmosphere of gas from the valve cover om k9320 occurred activating a gas head & taking platform to yellow alert status. The machine was shut
down & automatically depressurised. Machine status monitored throughout. Hydrocarbo gas released into the module from the leak dispersed through the ventilation system in
a controlled manner.
Low level gas alarm triggered by gas release in module m4e. A single head indicated 30% gas. Two other heads indicated 15% & 20%. On investigation, the upstream fitting
on the balance line of rv9310 (4th stage discharge header 8" g452) was found leaking. 9310 immediately shutdown, blowdown & isolated. Stainless line & fittings removed
for inspection. New pipework/fittings fitted.
On restablishing fuel gas to g1050 after installation of a new relief valve, a leak developed on the start gas regulator filter separator bowl seal. The pressure regulating valve
was pasing & relief valve had lifted. The leak source was the seal at the dr in port on the filter separator.
At 18:31 hrs the platform went to yellow status due to gas head activation in module um4e. This was very shortly followed by a red hazard status due to coincident gas head
initiation. A surface process shutdown was initiated automatically & the platform p rsonnel mustered. A total of 28 gas heads were initiated in module um4e. The gas
compression blowdown system was initiated manually. Gas technicians observed from the doorway of um4e oil & gas escaping from the pre-absorber separator boot level sight
glas . The module was ventilated naturally & access gained & the sight glass isolated manually by closing the velocity check valves above & below the sight glass. At 19:41hrs
the platform was returned to yellow status & at 19:43hrs all gas heads had been reset & the platform returned to normal green status when the hvac system was started.
It was reported to the production control room that there was a fire in the vicinity of the exhaust stacks. It was found that a 205 litre drum of lub. Oil which was stored on the
um4w roof, had corroded & leaked. The leaking oil from the drum had escaped ia a gap in the south west corner & ran onto exhaust where it flashed off
During platform startup the gas process blowdown was operated. Platform status to yellow alert - indication of llg in u4e annexe. Area technician discovered hydrocarbon gas
leaking under pressure from the downstream flange of mv9088 blowdown valve restric ion orifice (newly installed). Mv9088 was closed and the system depressurised via an
alternative route. Investigation revealed sealing faces of flanges and gaskets to be undamaged, but torque settings were found to be low. 250lbs/ft against 300lbs/ft as s ated on
the flange tag. An 8mm wedge was also evident across flanges at point of gas release.
Apparent <...> tube failure allowing a hydrocarbon mist to be sprayed into the area. Failure of the pressure gauge was noticed by the area technician.
A methanol leak was reported to a member of the production department. The operations engineer and production senior technician went to the scene of the incident. The ccr
and oim were informed. The leak was isolated. Fireteams 1 & 2 were sent to the scene to assist with washing down and to be on scene just in case of any escalation. The
control room onshore was kept fully informed and the platform emergency control room personnel were at their stations. The wind direction was se which blew any fumes and
me hanol away from the installation.
A contractor employee was measuring from the mezzanine deck grating to the bleed/blanking plug, in preparation for the installation of a stainless steel chemical injection
pipework. He stated that as he touched the plug he felt it was loose and it suddenl came out with a sudden rush of high pressure gas. Gas pressure at the time of the incident
estaimated at 200 bar. He, plus two others who were working in the wellhead area at the time of the incident, immediately evacuated the area initiating a manual br ak glass
alarm. The alarms and platform shutdown system operated almost instantaneously, drilling and process operations ceased and all personnel on both rig and platform attended
their respective assembly points. The gas release is estimated to have laste d for less than one minute and the gas cloud is said to have dispersed in less than two minutes
During routine operational rounds a production technician discovered a pool of liquid on the floor of pp cellar deck. As this liquid was initially thought to be condensate,
platform production was shut down and a full investigation carried out including line pressure test. The leak was subsequently identified as chemical, coming from a pipe
union on a 1/2" stainless steel chemical injection line
During the testing of pc1 compressor following maintenance work completion, a level sight glass "equip no 53 lg11015" fractured under pressure allowing the release of
hydrocarbon gas. Nb: hydrocarbon gas not detected on platform gas detector heads. Detect d by portable detector in use by personnel engaged on test.
Platform status changed from green, to yellow, then immediately to red status due to high level gas indication. This caused total platform shutdown.
The incident occurred while tripping out of a well, for a change of bit the pipe was pulled wet and mud bucket was in use. After having pulled 15 stands, the mud bucket was
tied back to the stabbing board ladder on the west side of the drill floor using a rope. It was not noticed that the winch wire, with mud bucket attached, had been approx 59 ft
above the drill floor. During lowering of the blocks, the dolly caught the wire and pulled it down over the bracket, thus lifting the mud bucket. Movement of he mud bucket
was stopped when it hit the underside of the bottom cross member of the west dolly track. Due to the inertia of the blocks, the tension of the winch wire increased until it
parted at the bracket on the dolly track. The mud bucket and 43 feet of wire dropped to the drill floor. The tripping operation was immediately suspended for damage
assessment and initial investigation. Upon inspection, marks caused by the strands of the wire rope were clearly visible on the dolly track bracket.
Low level gas detected by 4 gas heads located in the vicinity of interstage gas compressor k2280 located in module m2e, compressor tripped on low pressure. Process
shutdown and blowdown initiated manually as a precaution. Gas release traced to a failed 1/ " instrument needle valve tapping on the second stage suction scrubber. Failed
fitting was a screwed connection into a flange and failed at threadedn union.
Detected gas in exhaust of vacuum pumps of de-airator towers, indicating hydrocarbon gas present in service water system. All precautionary measures taken to monitor and
avoid gas levels in safe areas and diagnostic survey carried out to locate source. Cl sing in cooler resulted in gas levels dropping to zero, indicating this as most likely source.
A pinhole leak (+-1mm) was discovered on a transition spool piece between the wellhead mounted choke and the flowline. The hole was discovered as part of routine
operations on the wellhead platform, there was no specific work ongoing at the time. Gas wa not detected on any of the nearby gas detectors before the flowline was isolated
and vented.
A contract turbine maintenance technician was working on a major overhaul of one of <....> mol pump turbines when he observed a spray of water coming from the spindle of
a daniel orifice box in the pipework above p06. He informed a production technician wh in turn informed the production supv. A controlled plant shutdown was instigated
and the pipework drained down. It was found that the packing had failed on the lower plate carrier shaft. This was replaced. No damage of injury sustained.
A smell of gas was traced to a rtj flange on k3001 gas lift kick off compressor pipework system.the machine was being run up to kick off a gas lifted oil production well.
System was shutdown and vented, hot work stopped, permits withdrawn.
During wireline operations gas was detected by visual observation from control line block and bleed manifold part of permanent wellhead/tree installation. Leak was
minimised and valve manifold replaced foreign object - 1/4" dia magnet found inside pipe co nection affecting: a) its security b) operation of n r valve. No emergency declared
fso and fire party on standby.
Gas leak was noticed emitting from rjt flange on k-300 gas lift compressor system pipework.the system was being lined up to unload/ kick off newly completed production
well.system was shutdown and depressurised.hot work stopped, permits withdrawn - fire t am and safety officer alerted. No damage sustained or emergency declared.
Gas leak reported to fso who, in turn, requested crt to raise general alarm. Fixed gas detectors in the area registering 0%. Handheld monitor used and also registered 0% lel. On
further investigation smell confirmed to be diesel fumes coming back from th open drains. Source of diesel was identified as an overflow pipe from one of the diesel
emergency generator fuel tanks. (muster).
As part of programme to carry out pressure integrity tests, a chicksan line was rigged for flow purposed under test conditions in segregated well compartments. During testing
of this chicksan a screwed joint leaked as it had not been properly tightened. N damage to plant. One gas detector in area alarmed at low gas level. Spillage and subsequent
clean up contained within platform drain system. Fire team laid precautionary foam blanket to suppress vapourisation of crude estimated at 1 barrel.
A quantity of oil wascarried over from the test separator to the flare system during an operation to pressurise vo3 using well to assist sand displacement. A large percentage of
the oil carry over was collected in the hp knock out drum & this resulted in i-level alarm in the mol control room. The remainder of the oil was carried up the hp flare where
not all of it was burned by the mardair, a small amount falling as oil droplets to the main deck ( report received by control room technician & other oil obs rved as burning on
the flare anti-radiation platform deck.
A fuel hose had been fitted to a diesel storage tank. The hose fitted w/2 isolation valves, one ofn the tank piping and the other at the hose end. The last known fuel transfer had
been made several days previously and it is assummed that valve had not be n closed. A leak occurred in the hose near the upstream connection and over a period of a few
hours, diesal had leaked onto the deck. There were several users of this line and it is not known how the leak developed. The spill was mopped up and residues ho ed down
with detergent. No raw fuel was discharged into the open drain system.
Whilst moving a hose connection from the 9 5/8 annulus drain pipework on well 3-3, the treaded connection at the main annulus valve parted. As the well was live oil and gas
was discharged into the eggbox activating 2 low gases and 1 high gas. The main ann lus valve was quickly isolated and the gas disipated immediately. Hot work was
withdrawn.
On attempting to restart the well, an escape of gas was apparent from the stem seal of the wing valve.attempt to start the well was abandoned and suspect valve isolated.no gas
detectors were activated.valves since been replaced by vendor and well returned to service.
P1000 had been mothballed and isolated since <....>. During removal of the process pipework namely the recycle line as the pump unit was being removed completely, a small
amount approximatley 1 gallon of oily water was released onto the deck. No gas detecto s were initiated, however, hot work permits were withdrawn as a precautionary
measure.
The fuel gas pilot regulator from gas turbine was changed out as part of the maintenance routine. The replacement unit was of new manufactur from stock. Afteer installation
the pilot regulator was being adjusted to the pressure setting recomended. At ab ut 40 psi a gas vapour was observed escaping from behined the manufacturers lable plate. In
response to the leakage the gas valve was shut, the line ventilated and the system isolaed. Examination of the pilot regulator revealed that two of the rivet holes for locating the
manufacturers label had been penetrated through the regulator casing allowing gas escape.
During drilling operations and in the process of bringing the pump on line a rubber bellows spool piece ruptured under pressure and discharge water based mud. Incident
brought inder control in 2/3 min. The pump was isolated and cleaning up started. Dri ling operations immediately put on hold to assess damage and then decided to pull out
the hole and continue further investigations.
Problems with clearing blocked deck drains from the ngl plant roof area had been encountered on many occasions due to drain line bend configuration. Break couplings were
being installed to a drain line to facilitate access for rodding equipment to clear b ockages. A second pipe was identified as requiring break couplings too as bend design was
similar. On cutting the pipe it was evident that a positive pressure was there. A gas check was taken but no trace of hydrocarbons was found, it was assumed that air had been
trapped in the pipe due to blockage. On further investigation the cut pipe was identified as the process water drain (2'') from the water ko vessel v16 to the production
separators.
The complete well compartment was isolated under icc for 4-1 and 4-3 flowline and downcomer replacement. (the design of the new flowline configuration is such that 4-1
flowline now goes to downcomer slot 4-3 and well 4-3 is directed to downcomer 4-1). Th new downcomer for 4-1 had a blank flanage fitted to sample point prod sup
instructed tech to remove and have altered in the workshop to allow monitoring of pbu at a later stage. Part of the workscope also involved changing over divertor actuator
control lines for 4-1 and 4-3. Control tech asked permission of prod staff to function test the valves in question; and was told to proceed. On opening the 4-1 test divertor, a
small quantity of gas escaped from the open ended sample point. A single gas head w nt to "high gas", by the time crt checked , behind panel, meter had dropped back to
normal. No gas detected by fso on arrival.
Production department were preparing separator vessel v02 for maintenance. This separator was out of service and hydro carbon contents had been drained to the process
system. During water flushing/ filling of the vessel the main gas outlet valve was clo ed and the maintenance vent line valve was opened. A small quantity of crude oil was
emitted from this vent line and caused a fine spray/depost of the steel cladding of turbine ko1 exhaust stack
Production team were preparing to transfer top-up oil. No proper valved connected existed, so blank flange split on top of tank to facilitate filling. First indications are that
associated gas from the seal oil was caught by the southerly wind and activ ted adjacent gas heads to "low gas". Reset to zero in 2-3 minutes. Flange resealed, emergency
action as per forties emergency procedures. Without prejudice to the outcome of the investigation, operation of system nitrogen purge is being examined for conf emation of
operation
2 uv flame alarms came up on k02 gas compressor. Fire and gas control action activated halon release into k02 hood and shut down ngl plant. Two minutes later 4 gas heads
were activated g112/113/114 and 115. Reading high gas. 3 gas heads reset to 0 with 0 secs. Fso and fire team stood by k02 while halon discharged into turbine hood. No
evidence of ignition during the incident or at the initial investigation. The cause of the control action is under investigation by the platform investigation team.
Low gas alarms were activated by 2 detector heads in the ngl plant. Investigation by a production operator using a portable gas detector confirmed there was a gas release at
ko1 gas compressor. The ngl plant was shut down and all hot work permits withdraw
Low gas alarm (g94) activated in ngl plant, going immediately to high gas alarm. Low gas alarm (g93) in ngl plant activated. Production operator determined gas leak came
from seals of ko1 gas compressor. Ngl plant shutdown manually.
Release of vapour and oily water mixture from separator inlet flange during preparation for maintenance.
During hydrocarbon runs on deep gas lift kick-off compressor k3001, a flange on the inlet pipework to exchanger x-3002 leaked high pressure gas. (approx 160 bar) this
activated a low level gas alarm to 32% lel. After checks by production and safety staf , the leak was found and isolated/depressurised. An accident/incident report is being
prepared.
Low gas alarm activated from detector g-3482 which is located on the kick-off compressor. Gas was traced to a leaking flange on the compressor casing drain line. The
machine was shut down and isolated. Nb the machine was on a commissioning run and had b en running for approx 4 hours.
During normal pumping operation a hole developed in the cyclone on the seal oil system on the pump p.03 (test separator booster pump). A production technician reporting for
shift entered the mol area, saw oil spraying from the leak, raised the alarm and i olated the leak, then shut the pump down, they also shut down p.02, the adjacent pump
because its motor had been sprayed with oil.
During normal pumping operations a production technician noticed a fine spray of oil emitting from p03 cyclone pipework. (test separator booster pump). He raised the alarm,
with the pump being shut down and isolated. It was then flushed out prior to furth r investigation
A production technition whilst on routine plant checks noticed drops of oil on the deck. Investigation revealed oil oozing from a weld joint on ths t.s/v relief line for flow line
1-2. The well was immediatly shut in, the flowline isolated, de pressuris d and water flushed .
The well had just completed a workover and was being deisolated. The following spec blind was to be swung into position. The flowline was double valve isolated, water
flushed and dipressured. When the joint was broken a small amount of residual gas and ater was suddenly released as the line had not been totally depressured. The plant was
manually shutdown. Investigation revealed that one isolation valve was faulty and would not fully close.
Due to operational problems with the fuel gas system there was a loss of platform power and a trip and blow-down of the compressors. The seal oil pumps ran down and the
seal oil pressure fell. At least one seal on each compressor train did not close up as per design. This allowed gas to pass through the seals and vent into m4. Six gas heads were
reading above 75%. Natural ventilation cleared the gas from the module in 27 minutes. At the time of the power loss the sub-main generator was shutdown for mainten
Due to loss of platform power, the <....> compressor shutdown and their associated seal oil pumps shutdown caused by load shed of 440v swithboard. At least one seal on each
compressor did not close as designed allowing gas to pass through the seals and to vent into the module
Whenever a rod packing indicates any mecanical difficulty gas from the packing is carried in the return cooling tank. Gas passing to this tank is vented and gas heads around
and above it, warn of a rod packing problem. The platform went to alert status, the machine was identified by the control tech and stopped. Area checked and gas confirmed
at cooling tank. Gas dispersed by hvac, heads back to zero and platform to green at 12:10.
A technician was carrying out an isolation for planned shutdown work. He was required to open a blowdown valve on the mechanically isolated system and sps'd the platform
error. Low gas was detected in m4 around a <....>. On investigation it was discovere that the seal oil pump control circuit logic supply had been lost, as it was not a maintained
supply. Recent, agreed modifications, had failed to identify this detail
30 minutes after start-up of a <....> booster compressor there was an indication of high level gas detection in m4 around a elliot 3rd stage knock-out pot, followed by an sps.
Upon investigation a needle valve was found open on the drain line from the kno k-out pot instrument bridle.
Test separator was isolated for the technitians to remove & inspect level control valve. Before commencing the job the system was monitored for pressure rises etc., Over a
period of 3 hours by the operations technicians nothing was observed at this time. Est separator outlet line was depressurised & drained down using a 2" drain line near the
lcv. After draining, the lcv bonnet joint was broken & the valve removed for examination. Approx 1 hour later the supervisor & technicians were preparing to refit th valve
bonnet when suddenly approx a 1/3 barrel of oil overflowed from the valve into the module drains system, gas coming from the spillage was picked up by the detection system
& indicated in the control room as alow level gas detection. The technicians informed the cro via the telephone to initiate an immediate sps & blowdown. This was done & the
flow ceased forthwith. The lcv was then re-instated.
A failure of the low level control switch lc6504 to shutdown tm650 duty pump resulting in a low level in hazardous drains tank, which reduced the effectiveness of the liquid
seal between the various inputs and the overflow line. Low pressure purge gas fro the cutting chute reverse flowed into tm650 via the overflow line causing a small pocket of
gas to enter the open hazardous drains system which emerged in m5 activating the gas detection system wihtin the module and initiating a surface process shutdown.
During preparations for the start up of the platform following an sps, hydrocarbon gas from the <....> subsea flowline was vented to the flare whilst an unknown excessively
high liquid level existed in the lp drum. This caused entrainment of liquid and ts subsequent expulsion through the flare tip in the form of oil droplets/mist. At the time of the
incident the flare was not lit. Expelled oil was blown by a north westerly wind onto the north end of the platform. Approx. 2 cubic metres is estimated to b discharged to the
environment. The high oil level in the lp flare ko drum was primarily due to backflow from the coalescer to the 3rd stage separator which became overfilled and discharged
lliquid to the flare via its pressure control valve. At no time was the subsea well production valve opened.
Diesel leak from burner ignited on hot engine when machine changed over to diesel from gas. Flame detection shutdown machine, platform went to red status. Halon on
manual, technician extinguished small flame with dry powder portable extinguisher. Platf rm returned to green status
Hydrocarbon leak from the oul cooler plates. Resulted in process shutdown. Approximately 0.5 barrel of oil escaped to sea resulting in a sheen on the water. Estimated size of
sheen 0.5km (dispersing due to wave and wind action).
D.s.v. <....> was preparing for a dive operation when a cloud of gas, now thought to be condensate via the platforms sump drain, affected the vessel. Production operations
were shut down and h.p. gas systems depressurised. At 01.55 deck was considered c ear and diving operations commenced. Wind direction was 093 degrees at 5 knots with
an air temperature of 7 degrees c.
0320 hrs o5o gas generator was loaded to min.speed. 0552 hrs general alarm initiated - 1st level smoke in 050 enclosure. Investigation discovered smokey haze in enclosure
roof emitting from power turbine tunnel. 0630 hrs 2nd ga - coincidence smoke in same area. Pesd 2 initiated, deluge released. Areas checked for possible oil leaks - none
found. 0650 hrs 050 gas generator re-started to idle mode. Prior to loading, technician positioned in vicinity to monitor. 0909 hrs 050 loaded to minimum speed. Within 10
mins, smoke seen emitting from enclosure and lube oil level fell by 1/4" - unit immediately shutdown and unit examined. Discovered braided hydraulic hose had ruptured due
to chafing on engine servo limiter. Hydraulic fluid had sprayed (aeroshell 560) onto gas generator
Prior to the incident, the <....> station was exporting gas with 4 units on line and flowing 130 mmscfd. At 0328 hrs a platform general alarm was initiated by the platform f & g
detection system. Upon investigation, it was found to be 1st level gas detection n unit 040 gas generator enclosure which had operated. In order to investigate further, the unit
was shut down and the fuel gas system to it depressurised. The result of further investigation found a cracked fuel gas manifold to the engine burner "pig-tai " pipe. (this was
replaced)
0915 hrs general alarm was initiated. The production team were in the process of loading unit 070 gas compressor. Zone 14, k.0. Pot east. Gas head g90 showed a reading of
20%. P1 and p2 checked area with gas monitor. Pcv 331-1 on fuel gas skid "a" was fou d to be leaking via the stem packing.
During commisioning of the generator, fuel gas was introduced to the regulator, which leaked from the body joint of the pilot. The gas was detected by a head situated
immediately above the regulator. As the unit was off line, no enclosure fans were runnin to disperse the gas. On further investigation of the pilot regulator it was found that,
although the 'o' ring was intact, the screwed halves of the body were not fully tight.
Unit 060 shutdown on a vibration trip. For operational reasons, the engine enclosure vent fans were turned off, this was timed at 0935 hrs. At 1008 hrs, a g.a. was initiated by
first level gas in 060 enclosure. The supervisor and technician investigated t e incident, no obvious gas leaks could be found. Further investigation required the floor panels
and fuel gas mini skid protective panel to be removed. The leak was traced to a quadrant spindle from the woodward fuel valve.
Installation was not manned at the time of the incident. Bacton terminal which monitors location, received indication of first then second level gas which initiated sps and main
platform esd. On manning the installation the following morning, the outlet s ool of a willis m4 hydraulic actuated choke was found to have two 12.7mm holes cut due to sand
erosion.
Unit body bolts (top 2) sheared, allowing loss of approximately 35 gallons of hydraulic oil, total contained within the skid. Unit isolated and removed for investigation.
Well a7 was flowed to the separator. A quantity of oil and gas was lost into the platform well bay. Operators were on site and immediately requested shutdown.
Flash gas compressor started up after being off line. Sour oil trap bypasses not returned to closed position and allowed gas, normally routed to l.p.flare, to enter the de-gasser
and escape via atmospheric vent pipework located outside mod. 14 mezz.
During wireline operations a sudden release of gas struck an employee in the chest knocking him to the floor. No equipment damage. Employee returned to work after
examination by the medic.
During routine checks, water was seen to be dripping from 2" bottom stub on the spool downstream of the main suction valve. Reported to central control room and the pump
was shut down, isolated and de-pressured.
Operations technician noticed large pool of oil spreading from test separator densitometer pump. Pump was stopped, suction and discharge valves shut, pump body de-
pressured and central control room informed.
On investigation of gas alarm near to mol booster pump g2001a, gas leak was traced to a flange associated with pressure switch 20pal0017. Switch was isolated and leak
stopped immediately.
Gas turbine was running on diesel fuel and within a minute of change over to gas. One gas head, located in the combustion chamber extraction trunking, came into low alarm,
followed by another. The machine was changed back to diesel fuel and the gas leak investigated. The gas leak was traced to the new burners which had been fitted the previous
night.
Process train 1 oil/gas/water separator c1001 was being leak tested. One of the battery limit valves can not have been sealing fully. Once the pressure in c1001 had been built
up to an interim test value of 12 bar g with nitrogen, a flow became establish d from c1001 across the closed valve into the hp gas scrubber c1301. C1301 had not been
prepared for leak test, and was therefore still open to the atmospheric maintenance vent, as was the train 1 lp gas scrubber c1302. The nitrogen passing from 1001 thu
established a flow through the atmospheric vent header system, which disturbed the atmospheric vent knockout pot loop seal, and through some open vents on the c1302
system. Pockets of hydrocarbon gas within these systems were carried along by the flow, e caping to atmosphere, giving rise to low level gas alarms seen in module 3
deck/module 1 deck. Having identified the leaks and the driving force behind them, operations staff then:- 1. Depressurised c1001. 2. Closed the vents on the c1302 system. 3.
Re-es
<....> unit had previously been flushed. It was isolated from operating plant (checked and confirmed during incident) and showed no liquid level or pressure indication. It is
thought that the period of good weather with high temperatures allowed the resi ue in the unit to expand and "gas off" through leaking seals on access hatches.
Seal oil skid had been recommissioned in preparation for start-up of the flash gas compressor. During normal watchkeeping activities it was discovered that the bonnet on
13lv3012 was leaking. Approximately 100 litres of oil leaked, but were contained wit in the bund and subsequently recovered.
While conducting pre-startup checks on train 1 gas export, the production technician noticed a leak coming from the down stream grease nipple on valve 32xxv0032. He
reported the problem and train 2 gas export was shut down and de-pressured. The non retu n valve and grease nipple were replaced.
Following a shutdown and power failure at <....>, the <....> oil export line high pressure alarm sounded (85 bar). Rapidly followed by an automatic total production shutdown
initiated by the high pressure trip (93 bar). Immediately following the rip, an oil and gas leak was reported in the pig launcher area. General alarm was sounded, personnel
sent to muster points and fire team sent to control the incident. No indications or trips were recorded by the fire and gas system. The leak was traced to a body bleed plug on
valve 31hv0033 on the oil export line. The section of line was depressurised and the leak stopped. Approx 30 litres oil spilled and was covered with foam blanket. Personnel
were stood down after 30 minutes. No oil escaped to the sea
Whilst carrying out plant routine inspections, a producton technician noticed a minor oil/gas leak coming from a grease injection nipple on valve 31 hv0060. He contacted the
control room and reported the problem. Production was shutdown via the yellow shu down facility and depressured. The non return valve and grease nipple was replaced.
A gas release was detected and traced to the wireline operations. The gas was issuing from a hose with an open end attached to a tee-piece connected to the non active side arm
of well. The hose had previously been used by personnel to bleed down from abov the bop via the t piece and into the platform closed drain system druing a fishing operation
and should have been disconnected completely at the end of their job.
Instrument pm's were being carried out on 'b' export gas compressor. Part of the routine called for the calibration of the sour seal oil pot/trap level control loop. The method of
calibration requires that the trap level is set up to coincide with that o pots sight glass. In this incident it appears that the level transmitter was set up with the aid of the sight
glass. However, unknown the sight glass on the pot was blocked and a false level was visually indicated, hence the transmitter was set up incor ectly to the true level of the
trap. The pot was recommissioned and the level control valve remained open for some while after the level had emptied in the trap, allowing gas to pass through and escape via
the atmospheric vent. Due to the wind conditions at the time, some of the gas was blown back into the module and activated several gas alarms below their action points. No
control action resulted.
Wireline lubricator was set up on well c5 to recover a deepset injection valve. It was tested to 3000 psi. The tool was run, latched and jarring commenced. A leak developed
on the 5 1/2 inch by 3 1/2 inch crossover. The bops were immediately closed co taining the leak. On investigation it was discovered that the 'o' ring at the crossover had burst.
C5 is a water injection well
This incident occurred while logging well a-1. After the well had been flowing approx 4 hours an intermittent release of gas was observed coming from the 3" connection on
the 5 1/2"x3 1/2" crossover of the lubricator (wireline). The well was then closed in and wireline bops closed. Grease was injecyed between the rams and a seal obtained.
Pressure was bled off above the bops and integrity confirmed.
0.5 bbl of oil based mud,detergent and water went through the drain and overboard whilst cleaning out a mud pit. No damage to personnel or equipment.
A pressure gauge blew off some instrument pipework, striking a man working immediately adjacent and releasing a small amount of gas into the atmosphere. The man suffered
a bruised jaw and bit his tongue, but continued to work after medical attention.
While person was operating newly replaced compactor unit. Actuation of the compactor failed to operate the machine. The operator opened the adjacent air supply valve. The
air supply hose was not connected to the compactor. The resultant blast of air w s directed onto the operators arm resulting in only superficial skin damage.
Whilst repairing leaks on the ssiv hydraulic power unit skid, the psv on the charge pump discharge was assembled incorrectly and adjusted manually without using a psv test
rig. Subsequently, the charge pump was started against a closed discharge valve. He psv popped almost immediately and a few seconds later the charge pump accumulator
exploded, damaging hydraulic lines, structural steel, and severing an electrical cable. The working pressure of the accumulator was 210 bar. The system design pressure i 310
bar. The vendor, a nelson, was inside the skid when this occurred.
The oil plant was operating steadily, but gas export was being re-established following a trip, when low level gas detection was observed in module 7 (cellar deck). On site
investigation by a production technician confirmed the smell of gas and he was joi ed in the investigation by the fire & safety officer and the production supervisor. Hand held
meters confirmed the presence of gas and the plant was shut down and vented by manual pushbutton from the central control room as a precautionary measure. The leak was
eventually traced to a weld defect in an 8" line connected to the hp flare manifold upstream of the ko drum.
Gas release from flotation cell. 20% lel gas indication in module 3 vicinity of v1220. Operator with portable gas monitor sent to investigate. Operator confirmed 20% lel near
v1220 & started to investigate possible source. Gas detector nos. 166. 167 & 168 went to 60% lel. Gas alarm sounded on p.a automatically. Control room operator activated
platform shutdown from the control rom on his own authority. Control room operator activated module 3 water deluge from control room. All platform personnel mustered.
Headcount commenced. Water deluge turned off. All gas detectors showing less than 10%lel. Full muster achieved and headcount completed. All gas detectors out of alarm
condition. All clear given on oim insturctions. All personnel to normal duties. Instrument technicians reset module 3 water deluge valve. Gas detector no. 167 went to 60%
lel, causing p.a gas alarm. This was due to a small amount of redidual oil in v1220 gassing off. Oim was standing beside v1220 when this happened. Production was still
shutdown and in et to v1220 was still double blocked. Control room operator made p.a. As before, and activated water deluge. All personnel mustered. Water deluge turned
off. Fire hose run out. End hatch of v1220 opened. Operators commenced flushing out vessel with eawater and detergent. Full muster achieved and headcount completed.
Manual operator (handle plus drive shaft) came off block valve on discharge side of caisson pump while valve in open position. Dead crude from the 48" caisson, which was
in the discharge pipework from the pump, backflowed and escaped from the failed valv . Pump was running but had lost suction. Estimate 2bbls oil escaped onto deck and
surrounding structure. Oil cleaned up and flushed into deck drains. Small percentage lost through area of grating near 48" caisson. No significant escape of gas. No ga
Two operators went to investigate a suspected high liquid level in the fuel gas knock out pot in the supply line to the turbine generators. They opened the drain valve on the
vessel but no drop in the level was observed. They then decided to crack open a wagelock union on a tee- piece on the 3/4 inch stainless steel drain line downstream of the
valve to check for a blockage in the line. When they loosened the union it blew off. As the drain valve was in the open position this resulted in an uncontrolled r lease of gas
into the turbine hall, activating the low level of gas alarm. They immediately contacted the control room operator who manually activated the high level gas alarm and operated
the level 1 esd pushbutton. Personnel were mustered. The all clear was given within 2 minutes
Maintenance technicians were installing spades on c5015 gas compressor suction sdv 35021 and bypass valve. The system they were working on had been isolated and de-
pressured. Oil production re-started and 12 minutes later, a discharge of gas and glycol ater occurred at both spaded flanges. The 60% gas alarm activated and production
shutdown. Tge leakage of gas persisted for 30 minutes despite the belts being checked for tightness by personnel in breathing apparatus. The leakage was finally stopped by
solating the heating medium. Investigation showed that a bursting disc had gone on e2720 hc liquid heater. This was caused by the heating medium system being
overpressured by gas from v1620 slug catcher as the 16"manual valve from v1602 to flare had been left in the closed position. This had been closedfor the initial isolations on
gas compression but should have been re-opened prior to re-starting arbroath production. As the gas compression flare system had been isolated, the gas/heating medium
mixtur
Gas alarm was activated on east side of m4c at and around the <...> unit. This was followed by a 60% gas alarm in the same area. As a result of the alarm status the control
room operator manually initiated a "2b" shutdown of the process plant. A full mu ter was called and all muster points reported in. Following the investigation into the incident
by on board personnel it was found that gas had been entering the <...> unit (at498) via the low pressure vent system. This was as a consequence of ngl's being carried over to
thefuel gas scrubber (v404) from the ngl stabilisation plant.
A50 well was being brought back on production after a choke change during de-isolation the kill wing valve was not closed properly and the plug not replaced in the blind
flange (used for double block and bleed)- when the master valve was open a small amou t of gas was released activating one gas head to 60%+ and another to 20% - the master
valve was wuickly closed and the gas dissipated rapidly.
Operator noticed strong smell of diesel and fog/smoke issuing from enclosure exhaust vents. Unit was shut down and fire team summoned. Halon discharged manually to
enclosure causing fire alarm to sound. Mustered platform crew. Enclosure entered by two m n in b.a. no fire found. Discovered fuel link cracked weld. Fire team kept on
standby until unit returned to ambient temperature.
Low level gas alarm was raised in enclosure. All work permits were withdrawn and the alarm was checked with a hand meter. The alarm was confirmed. A small crack was
found in the fuel ring on the avon turbine. Unit was taken offline and was isolated.
After a prolonged test run. The unit was s/d and prepared for another start up by operations maintenance depts. The avon was started and a successful lite off obtained. An
excessive flow of liquid fuel was observed coming from the transition piece which i nited due to the heat from the rear of the engine. The unit was immediately s/d and the fire
extinguished with a hand held extinguisher. No damage occurred. Uv and halon systems were bypassed due to presence of personnel in attendance in enclosure during trials
After a period of static pressure the lines were depressurised (a28 being used as the relief well) b j pipework was firstly bled down to a28. 400kph remained within the system.
Upon bleeding back to the bj unit residual gas escaped thus activating the g s alarm located adjacent to the bj unit. No damage resulted. A42 is a water injection well. Two gas
detectors are located 6' from the leak source and are not on a voting system. Both gas detectors alarmed and cleared within one minute.
Whilst under normal operating conditions the main oil shipping pump tripped on high vibration at a journal bearing. The back up shipping pump also tripped on high vibration
during start up. To avoid overfilling the production vessels the main production wells were shut in and the production vessel levels were reduced to the water treatment plant
thus allowing time to carry out remedial work on the shipping pump vibration monitoring system. The increased rate of water flow to the vessel at 498 during this exercise was
at a faster rate than the level control valve could cope with causing the vessel to overflow there by cousing the layer of oil and residual blanket gas to be forced out through the
vessel lid and skimmer shaft glands. The emission of fluid an gas first brought a 20% then 60% gas detection in module 5 cellar. This gas escaper rapidly dispersed and no
further gas was detected. At the time of the gas alarm sounding the manual production shut down was activated even though the gas detection syste had not sensed a serious
enough circumstance by the executive alarm zone voting system. The production plant was held in a shut down condition until a full investigation had taken place. The gas
detectors which picked up the hydrocarbons are gd42 and gd3 . Gd38 is 8 meters from the wemco at 30cm from the deck. This was the first to alarm at 20% quickly followed
Earlier in the day while the section was shutdown a low pressure hose was used to clear a high high level in v208 by draining water/condensate to drains outside the module.
The opratorrs concerned then went on to do other things and the hose was not d after this operation. Later an operator on this section witnessed a higher than normal level in
v208 and decided to lower this level by using this hose, however, the section was now opreating at approximately 80 bar. The hose came apart and discharged w remov
ter/gas/condensate into the module activating a 20% and a 60% alarm. Production was manuallly shutdown the valve supplying the hose was closed and the gas levels quickly
returned to normal.
During normal two train gas compression operation the sales gas compressor k106 tripped in a spurious failure, to allow time for maintenance the standby compressor k206
was prepared and started. When the start sequence reached the purge phase a 20% gas a arm activated followed immediately by a 60% gas alarm. The control room operator
located the area of the release as module 5 production and instructed the gas plant operator to stop the compressor. The emergency stop activated and both 20% and 60% alarm
cleared very quickly. Upon activation of the 60% alarm a full platform muster was called and completed in 5 minutes. Initial investigation of the compressor identified a
casing drain valve as having raised gas although it was fully wound down. The com ressor was fully isolated and a full investigation proved the drain valve had failed. This
will be replaced and all other valves of this type and service checked.
Precautionary muster. Small leak of crude oil from isolated section of pipe work. During final flushing of feed pipework from mod 03 to the heat exchanger in mod 13, approx
1/4 bbls of crude oil was displaced on to the mod floor. Resultant high gas dete ted shutdown all platform hydrocarbon systems and initiated the general alarm. All personnel
satisfactorily accounted for.
There was a failure of the drive end bearing housing with serious damage to the motor, compressor and drive coupling. The debris from the disintegrating bearing housing and
sheared coupling was thrown distances up to 20 metres in the module, shattering a luorescent light fitting, casing impact deamage to a structural member within the module
and puncturing the module wall. The damage to the compressor allowed gas to leak from the dirve shaft seal. The gas ignited with the damaged light fiting being the li ely
souce of ignition. The platform's esd production and gas supply to the compressor. The module water deluge was activated automatically. In addition, the fire crew entered the
module and deployed three hosed on the fire. When the locus of the fire was etermined, the fire team requested that the compression system be vented to flare to reduce the
hydrocarbon inventory that was feeding the fire. The fire was extinguished.
During a planned production shutdown a hydrocarbon leak occured on booster pump recirculation line. Two low gas alarms (fixed detection system) were raised (20% lel).
Two fire hoses were operated to disperse crude oil. Lines valve isolated and system drai ed. Recirc system physically disconnected pending ndt survey and necessary repair.
After routine prover ball change out the prover loop was repressurised. The door vents had been left open by the metering vendor and on repressurisation oil and gas escaped
causing a high gas shut down. Production was restarted 1 hour later. (muster)
Automatic fire detection system activated showing fire indicated in zone 19 (generator room). Fire confirmed, all personnel to emergency stations. Fire extinguished. Fire
cause: turbo charger bearings seized & turbine shaft sheared at exhaust side. Lub oil sprayed onto exhaust & ignited. Incident happened on lay barge, stenna apache
(unregistered).
During the initial re-commissioning stages of the glycol absorber pre- scrubber vessel fa1122 hydrocarbon gas from gas compressor gb4001 was being introduced into the
vessel, as per the commissioning procedure. Within minutes of the gas suppy valve being racked open to introduce gas into the vessel mod 11 gas detectors in the visinity of
fa1122 went into lo alarm status. The gas supply was immediatly isolated and the gas source identified and isolated by the plant operators involved in the commissioning.
Whilst the operators were locating the leak, one of the five gas heads which alarmed went to a high alarm status, this initiated a platform alert and a secondary 'b' s.d. six
minutes from the initial gas detection the effected gas heads had gone back to ormal status and pklatform personnel stood down from muster. Investigations confirmed the gas
at maximum pressure of 2 bar g escape from an incorrectly made up flange on 11 ls 464.
During leak test at test separator manifold, n2he was released violently when class 1 esd was activated. No apparent injuries were sustained at the time of the incident.however,
the following day the test engineer complained of shock and was transferred onshore
Co-incident smoke detection <...> b generator compartment. This resulted in an automatic shutdown of the generator. Halon was released manually from the control room. Epa
was initiated by the control room there was no evedince of fire within the mach nes compartments. Residual oil was lying in the load gear box compartment in the floor and
within the power turbine bell mouth. Personnel reported to muster stations.
As the main <...> plant was being re-pressured in controlled stages after a major shutdown, a flange occured as a result of incorrect make up. The flange had been previously
broken to allow insertion of a blind. The leak was detected by a nearby wi ness who reported the leak allowing gas to be vented via the vent system before any gas detectors
picked up the leak. After correctly making up the flange the plant was repressured without problem.
Having isolated one of two in-line sand filters and prior to changing the filter element the vent valves on the isolated filter were opened. The vent gas was routed to the <...>
vent boom via a 5000 psi wp hose, however, due to entrained sand a steel elbow local to the filter was eroded/ruptured allowing the filter to vent locally to atmosphere.
The <...> clean up system had been shutdown and isolated to allow routine maintenance of the 'a' seperator's liquid control valve. As a routine precaution the filters were to be
vented prior to starting work on the seperator. As the filters were vented to tmosphere(standard procedure) the vented gas was blown to-wards the <...> control shelter and the
gas detectors in the hvac inlet ducting detected the vented gas and instgated a level 4 shutdown as per design. It is estimated that approximately 4 cu ft of as in total was
vented as a result of the routine venting. No-body was injured and no equipment damage was sustained as a result of this incident.
Control room received an alarm indication of low gas levels. The intervention crew of three personnel landed on the platform and one gas head indicating 22%. The area was
approached with caution and a gas/condensate leak found at the pryopant filter on we l ie a "destec" joint on the outlet pipework of the filter. The well was closed in and an
isolation set. Wind was approx 4 knots @ 270degrees.
<...> was manned at 08:21 - helicopter operations ceased at 08:45. As part of arrival checks, the well bays were inspected and a gas leak noted in the north well bay originating
from well ra-11 sandfilter inlet pipework. The well was immediately shut in and the filter isolated and vented down. Oim <...> informed.
On <...> during a routine visit to <...> gas was noted to be escaping from the stem packing of well <...> choke valve. <...>. The well wasimmediately shut in and the floe-line
de-pressurised. The flowline was isolated from e ch of the three possible sources of hydrocarbon gas. (i.e. Resevoir, production header and test header) and the stem packing
renewed. Leak testing on completion showed the repair had not been successful; the isolation was left in place. The flow-line pres ure noted to be zero and ther platform de-
manned at 19-40 hrs. At 21-14 hrs, <...> <...> control room received a low-gas alarm at <...> manifold area. In accordance with operating procedures the platform was shut
down and top-side pressure monitored continuously. The platform was manned at 22-28 hrs. On arrival on <...> the gas head which had indicated the alarm condition(no 6) was
foun to be reading 0% lel. Investigation of the area around this particular head, visually and usin a portable gas detector, it was revealed that a)rb-13 flow-line was at a pressure
of approximately 80 barg and b)rb-13 choke stem seal was allowing a continuous, albeit small, escape of gas. It was felt that given the prevailing conditiond and the relati e
positions of the choke and gashead no.6, it was likely that this leak had caused the initial alarm. Calibration of gas-head was checked.
During the removal of corroded flange bolts oxy-acetylene burning equipment was being used. All process and mechanical isolations had been correctly applied but in the
pipework involved (approx. 20' of 1.5" pipe) there was a trapped inventory of gas. Th s length of pipework had not been vented down resulting in the release and subsequent
ignition of the trapped inventory. Minor damage was sustained to adjacent trace heating and electrical cables. No injuries were sustained.
At the time of the incident a well services team were carrying out maintenance on the production wing valve, the engineer reports their activities were incidental to the fitting
failure, i.e. the vibration from thier activities may have accelerated the inc ident. The leak had been quickly isolated by a member of the well service team who then reported
the incident to the control room. This was almost simultaneous with a low press alarm received in the control room. No damage sustained.
Low level gas alarm was activated in south end of module 'a'. On checking out the area using gas detector sweep, gland found to be leaking on pcv25 (v5) located in the south
side of the module. Leak was detected by gas head g105 which was checked and fo nd to be in working area.
Low level of gas alarm activated in north end of module 'a' above v3 separator. Leak was detected on srv 25. The internal bellows of the srv was found to be split and gas was
released through the vent port on the srv. Isolation not able to be closed. 3 depressed and hp flare pressure lowered. Valve inserted into bonnet vent and closed.
While lifting pump from disposal pile under blanket gas pressure platform shutdown caused pile to pressurize, releasing gas. Muster police informed. Press release issued. All
resolved by 10:30.
After establishing gas lift to ta19 the pressure increased in the a & b an i necessitating blowdown, on opening valves a small emission activated the adjacent gas heads.
Hydrocarbon liquid was sprayed from the atmospheric vent of the knock out pot situated in module 2a and onto the exhaust ductwork of c turbine. This occurred during
draining of module 5 gas compressor casings during start up routine. Platform general al rm was sounded and fire team assembled and laid foam blanket over area affected as
a precaution
Gas was detected by remote sensor in module 5 mezzanine level which activated an alarm in the central control room. Site investigation revealed that gas was leaking from the
stem seal on control valve xcv 2615 on the gas export compressor discharge line. Gas compression system was immediately shut down and valve stem seal replaced.
Single gas head registered full scale deflection. Fire and gas detection system initiated general alarm and production shutdown. On investigation no gas found and gas head
ok. Calm weather conditions at the time and it was suspected gas rising from the overboard dump became trapped in a pocket in the mezz. Level above the chemical tanks
Minor gas escape in enclosure. Levels in excess of 25% lel picked up close to gas head sampling points but not detectable elsewhere in enclosure with portable detectors.
Leak located in flange in fuel gas line.
Due to the gas leak from the flange close to the fcv. 3 gas heads in the area detected gas and initiated a partial production shutdown. Gas lift compression shutdown and venting
plus 'c' train shutdown. 50% lel detected on one head and 20% on the other tw heads. Gas leak localised
The gas leak was identified by two gas heads, one of which showed a max. Reading of 50% lel. As a result gas lift compression shutdown as well as 'c' train. 'B' turbine also
tripped through lack of fuel gas. The general alarm was manually activated from the ccr. The lp discharge scrubber vent valve failed to open.
The gas leak activated one gas head 11a/22/kr/5x which sounded a ccr audible alarm; reading 40%. The reading fell away and then rose rapidly. The platform general alarm
was activated manually. Production techs and oss were on their way to the module. Feed ack was of a 'bad gas leak' the glc. Plant was shutdown manually from the ccr. Gas
levels in the module decayed immediately. Noone was injured. A subsequent inspection of the leaking joint revealed uneven tightness of the bolting which could have been a
contributing factor.
Electrical fire in 'b' generator enclosure, due to saltwater ingress from ruptured rubber transition piece on cooling water pipe work. Two technicians were about to carry out
high voltage phase rotation tests (4160 volts) between platform electrical supp ies and new diesel generators. Test requires that covers be removed from circuit breaker
junction boxes to allow access to the terminals. The platform power was put on, then the diesel gen. Was started up. The two electrical techs. Were inside to carry out the
tests. A jet of water came over the heads of the techs, directly into the junction box which resulted in an electrical short circuit, flash and arcing before circuit breakers
operated. The two techs were shaken but unhurt.
Gas leak on redundant plant being recommissioned. Leak occurred from flange joint on the outlet nozzle of redundant fuel gas cooler in mod 5. The section of line on the fuel
gas system for the power turbines was being slowly pressured up with gas, when a 50psig the joint released containment, thereby activating the gpa
Safety relief flare was replace with one of modified design. On <....> the flare deck was accessed to effect repairs to the heat shield. It was noticed that the gas emmission slot
on the flare had closed considerably. Measurements were taken. There w s a subsequent unplanned production when it was noticed that during plant blowdown there was a 3
bar back pressure on the safety release system. Further tests were carried out at low production rates and the plant closed down.
One person entered a radiography controlled zone during a controlled exposure of a radiographic source. The man came about 10m from the source which was collinated and
directed away from where the man was stopped by the radiographer. A subsequent trial e posure proved that no significatn exposure took place.
During radiography on the main deck, two mechanical technicians opened a door on the deck above which leads to a platform above the radiography area. The witnesses
statements confirm that about the time this was done the radioactive source was wound in. Evertheless, this does indicate a weakness in the control procedures for
radiography.
Radiography was being carried out on cellar deck whilst two painters were working directly underneath from scaffolding. (the radiography was contained within a lead lined
enclosure.) Having discovered this, tests were carried out to repeat the shot and m nitor exposure on scaffold below. Readings were found to be zero.
A plt survey had been completed on<...> and all equipment rigged down. Rig remained parked over <...> waiting on weather before skidding to <...> for another plt survey.
Average wind speed at time of incident was over 29 kts with a maximum gust of 126 k s recorded at 0437. Wind direction from 250 dgs ie. Parallel with the skid beams. A
catwalk supporting bracket was fractured but otherwise no major structural damage is apparent.
During rov operations it was noticed that the bottom three sections of the temprary firewater caisson had become disconnected and the temporary pump/riser assembly was left
suspended without the protection of the caisson. The detached section had fallen n to the conductior support/ guide frame. The pump assembly was installed during the early
days of the hook up as a congingency measure and it has no effect on the operation or performance of the firewater system.
Hurricane winds of 134 knots from the south west ripped off 75% of the pfp covering the north wall of the accomodation. The winds worked under the pfp at the west corner of
the module tearing the pfp away in sheets. The pfp comprised rockwool held in plac with chicken wire and coated in chartek.
While drilling an increase in gas levels in the mud was detected. The well was flow checked and appeared to be flowing. The well was shut in and drill pipe and casing
pressures checked. No pit gain was detected. Production was shut down and esd valves clo ed based on the apparent well flow. Mud was circulated out through the choke and
the poor boy de-gasser. The well was opened up and the weight of mud increased to 12.7dpg.
While drilling ahead at 18255'md (14783'tvd)an increase in return flow was indicated. The annular b.o.p. was closed and the well shut in. No casing or drill pipe pressures were
evodent. The well was circulated through the choke for 20 mins with no gain or loss. The well appeared static and the annular was opened. The well was observed to be
flowing and was shut in. Drill pipe pressure of 180psi and casing 950psi were recorded.
Helicopter <...> on deck with rotors turning disembarking passengers in preparation for refuelling under supervision of landing officer. Helideck assistant approaching front of
helicopter with the fuel sample bottle in his hand to show the pilot. Main rotor blade came in contact with casualty's skull. Weather conditions - good. Wind southerly at 10
knots. Slight drizzle. Dark except for platform and helideck lighting.
Ip struck by casing bundle, whilst waiting to land it on deck of <...> supply boat.
During replacement of mud outfall pipework a multipoint lifing arrangement was in use. On restarting work after two days suspension due to weather conditions the 3t hoist
went into immediate hoist mode. The rigging supervisor cut the web sling to release he load and was struck a glancing blow on the hand. An accompanying rigger was also
struck a glancing blow on the knee. Investigation indicates steel control button sticking in brass bush.
Whilst installing hp cement valve into cement line on the rig floor between two vertical connections. The valve was lifted into position with a chain lift. It was observed that
the pipework was out of alignment. The chain lift was removed and the valve he d manually in position, chain lift was repositioned torealign the pipework. Whilst pulling, the
valve moved and persons assisting were unable to support the valve. The valve fell 4ft striking employees right foot behind the toe protection of the boot.
<...> (ip) was being assisted by <...> to push the 5" drill pipe over to the racking area. On reaching racking position, assistant driller lowered the drill pipe. The derrick man
unlatched the elevators, the 5" drill pipe bowed, <...> arm got trapped between the 3 1/2" drill pipe in stowage and the 5" drill pipe being positioned.
Whilst preparing lifejacket box to be lifted by crane from the extreme edge of transit container, the box became unbalanced and fell forward towards deck, as injured party was
unable to hold the weight, he stumbled backwarks and received injury to his lef leg. The lifejacket box weighed 200kgs, weather fine, wind 35kts.
During preparations for lifting a waste skip, using the south deck crane, a small section of right-angled unistrut bracket fell from a height - thought to be between 15-20ft - and
hit the deck foreman on the face. It is assumed that the bracket had been l ing loosely on a cable tray or similar ledge and was dislodged by the crane wire.
Following the rigging up of the block the control line was required to be inserted. Man was hoisting up to the block 15' above the drill floor he opened the block to insert the
control line. After opening the block the main sheave fell from the block hous ng striking ip working below.
On rolling the blind over a deck plate seam weld the injured party lost control of the blind and was unable to prevent it falling trapping his left foot.using a valve handle as a
leaver they raised the blind sufficiently to release the i.p foot.
Two instrument technicians were attempting to remove a spring assisted valve actuator. The actuator attachment nuts were being released while the actuator internal spring
was under compression. The actuator was projected towards, and hit, the ip causing minor injury to the face and leg
Whilst ip was sealing a spool end with standard lsa bag and tape, the spool, suddenly dropped onto his left foot - fracture of left foot.
Ip was working in a party fabricating sea-fastenings.a section of pipe fell and struck ip across the back.ip fell across a section of pipe and was pinned by the falling pipe.
The wireline crew went working over slot a5/09. They were bleeding down the lubricator to the closed drain system via a 3/4" reinforced flexible hose. As they were carrying
out this operation the hose burst spraying hydrocarbon liquids and gas in the imm diate area. Some liquid was splashed int the face of an operator near by (but not in the eyes).
He returned to work after receiving treatment from the medic. The hydrocarbon gas activated detectors in the area, giving rise to an automatic platform shutdown
Removing choke valve from a supposedly depressurised line. After clamp bolts had been removed and clamp struck with a hammer to free it, valve was blown off its seating,
into the air, by internal pressure, throwing the clamp sections aside.
While removing 16" flange tester out of 16" pipe on mezz level area 1, it dropped on the wire strop, swung and trapped ip's left hand between the wire strop and the scaffolding
damaging his left thumb.
As a container was about to be landed the ip attempted to steady the container prior to landing in final position. He had a grip of a vertical edge of the container to help stop the
movement, whilst doing this the container moved again trapping his thumb etween the container and an adjacent one.
While lifting bop out of half height on bop deck, the air winch being used on the rig floor for the main lift was resting against a walkway that is designed for rig skidding
purposes to fold up. The ip was standing on this walkway giving directions by rad o. The air winch on the bop deck was being utilised to pull bop clear of half height, with
this, the sideways force on the other line folded up the walkway trapping the man.
During the course of breaking out drill pipe in the derrick to lay out on the pipe deck.the elevator horns struck the monkey board shearing it from its fitting.this threw the
operator off the monkey board leaving him suspended by his safety hareness.whils falling the operator struck his left leg on a protrusion. The casualty was recovered by man
riding winch,removed to sick bay, examined by medic and medivaced to hospital at aberdeen.
The 16" flowline lifted from the header box on the swarf recovery unit, swung over the top of the shakers & struck the floorman in attendance. The floorman received a
glancing blow & was trapped against the railings of the unit by the flowline.
Well bd03 flowline spool pieces required alterations and so had to be removed from m3w to the fabrication shop for hotwork. Two woodgroup rig gers, <...> (injured party )
and <...> (witness) assembled the rigging gear and proceeded to remove the fi st spool piece. During removal the load snagged on a supprt beam. <...> then physically tried to
free the load which caused the load to swing and trap his hand between the load and an adjacent handrail. The area is well lit & access was reasonable
It was necessary to move a 4" x 4" open container full of scaffold fittings from the se pt cellar deck lay down area to the plq roof. The crane used for this operation is situated
above the mezz deck. On making sure that the lifting strops were secure, th general assistant gave a signal to the crane operator to commence the lift. During the initial stages
of the lift, a stropped bundle of scaffold poles rolled off the side of the second bundle of poles and against the leg of the general assistant. The mom ntum of the poles was
stopped when they rested against the container. I.p. Sustained damaged ligaments and severe bruising to his right knee.
Worker hearing completion on well. The adaptor spool was held by the gantry crane as it was being attached to the tubing head flange. The adaptor spool was hung up leaving
a gap of approx. 1 inch, the ip was fitting a nut to the end of the thread of a s ud protruding through the tubing head flange when the adaptor spool slipped down. Ip's finger
was crushed between bottom of nut and part of tubing head.
The incident occured when the lifting operation of removing a 14" valve was almost complete. The valve was over a cradle arrangement in a barrow and <....> was
manoeuvring it with his hand to centralise it over the barrow centre. In this operation murray positioned his hands on the small block valve at the opposite end of the actuator.
A combination of the c- hain block being lowered with his pressure to centralise the valve over the barrow cradle, caused the valve to move and pinch his hand between the a
jacent steelwork
A section of the rig floor weighing approx. 2 ton was being removed from its location. This involved a compound lift using chain blocks and a tugger hoist to lift the section
and turn to a vertical position once in this position the weight was transferre on a tandem lift to the north west crane hook to manoevre the lift through the v door. It was at the
point of the tandem lift that the load balance shifted and the load swung trapping the ips finger
Drill pipe was being tripped in the hole. Prior to making up the last stand of pipe a single joint of pipe was picked up. As this joint spun up, the chiksaw swivel fell from the
top of the drill pipe joint on to the pipe spinner, from there it bounced a d struck the roughneck in the face.
Recovering the standby boat fast rescue craft from the sea, the f.r.c. was hooked up to the cable of the davit ready to be raised.while holding the lifting strop clear the boats
weight came on to the strop trapping the subjects right hand against the hand ail that goes around the forward end of the control console of the fast rescue craft.
The drilling deck crew were backloading equipment to the s/v on the south side of the platform. The south crane hook was lowered to the load to be lifted. As the roustabout
approached it the hook "slipped" & hit him in the face.
Two men had been designated the task of unloading bags of grit from a container. The ip was loading a barrow with two bags of grit when one fell off onto the ground. In
trying to pick it up he injured his left arm.
Ip was revolving a slung gas bottle rack to gain entry. The cylinders were not secured, and one fell against his left hand, resulting in a crush injury to his little finger.
Employee was engaged in lifting a diesel circulating pump with air winch he pulled the winch wire to prevent snagging. On doing so, his glove became trapped in the block
pulley, pulling his hand into the mechanism- fractured right 5th finger.
10" scu 160 duplex pipe spool (weighing approx 170kg) was being rigged out of pipework to allow installation of pressure test blind flanges. During rigging operations
chargehand rigger trapped his left hand little finger between the spool and an adjacent scaffold tube when the spool moved unexpectedly. As a result his finger was broken and
lacerated.
While dismantling the tool store a section of steel panel was being lowered to the floor, when it slipped trapping ip's foot. After a full examination it was diagnosed as been a
soft tissue injury to the right ankle and abrasion to the shin on r/leg.
Whilst loading a container on the pipedeck of rig 112 ip's finger was trapped between the container and a freezer unit.
Deluge system has 3 distribution rings around the vessel, with bracing installed between the rings. During removal of deluge pipe on inactive glycol contactor v2a, bracing
was mistaken for a support attached to the structure. When cutting the pipe the distribution ring tilted, capsized and hit the ip on the r/elbow.
After experiencing excess water in the utility air system, ip was instructed by <...> chief mechanic to check all drain lines. He proceeded to the after cooler and attempted to
close the drain valve. After assuming it was closed he removed the ball plug w ich blew off, causing subskin injection of grit/air.
While moving blank flange by rolling it along grating, it hit edge of grating toppling onto left ankle of ip.
The ip was about to enter d06 mezz corridor via the north external walkway. A scaffold tube 5' length fell from above the door striking the ip on the left hand. The scaffold tube
had lain unnoticed on a ledge above the door, had become dislodged by the cl sing of the door. The ledge which exists above the door is obscured by a cable tray hence the
loose tube being missed during routine housekeeping inspectons.
Whilst an operator was attempting to ignite the platform flare, at the flare ignition panel, which is a cupboard recessed into the module bulkhead, one of the cupboard doors
was caught by the wind & fell off. The door struck the operator on the chest & wh lst attempting to avoid the blow, the operator struck his back against the adjacent handrail.
Ips had been asked to remove scaffold tubes and fittings from a scaffold on the ne face of p10 - 18m level. While removing the fittings the scaffold collapsed, throwing the
men into the sea. They landed close to leg b5 and swam towards the sea access la der and climbed back on board
Wireline operator was guiding 4" bop for stabbing onto extended riser on well 3-4 caught his left hand between scaffolding pole and bop. His hand was badly bruised and
swollen but suffered no loss of movement and subsequent x-ray revealed no bone damage.
Bop riser had been removed from well on completion of workover. Opening thus left in bop deck hatch had been temporarily covered by by scaffolding boards. Boards started
to be removed in preparation for hatch removal and one was accidentally dropped thro gh opening and struck ip working on tubing hanger. Boards should not have been
moved until area below had been cleared.
Whilst walking along the walkway on level 2 p.u.d south ip was proceeding along to the south east corner. An angle bracket fell from above, missing i/p's head but hit his foot.
Ip was working on the main deck level to the north side of the derrick removing a hatch cover to inspect a mud logging pit sensor. Whilst doing so, he was struck on the head
and left hand by objects falling from above.(10" piece scaffold tube and a scaffo d clip). No persons were seen working at this point after the incident. The ip suffered a
fracture to the third finger of his left hand.
Back fire while starting gas compressor. Causing exhaust system to split normal class 2 shut down - alarm - muster. No prior indication of gas from detectors. B avon turbine
exhaust severely damaged.
Whilst preparing a piping system for hydro-test the ip was using an 1/2 n.d. screwed pipe plug to vent air from a high point in the system this action released the plug, under
pressure, causing the plug to hit the person in the eye. Ip was given medical a sistance and arrangements made to medevak him to a.r.i. ip claimed that he had been wearing
safety spectacles.
Ip turned on tap to fill bucket. The valve assembly came off the valve body and hot water (approximately 80 degrees) sprayed out vertically from the tap, hitting the ip in the
face.
Output from the <…> and <…> fields was suspended because of damage to fire-resistant cladding on the exterior of the living quarters of the <…> platform caused by
exceptionally high winds. Production loss is about 80,000 barrels per day.
Gas alarm on the east side of <…> at and around the <…> unit (at498). Gas had been entering the at498 via the lp vent system due to that ngl's had been carried over to the
fuel gas scrubber (v404) from the ngl stabilisation plant. The high level of ngl's in v404 was a result of a malfunction of pic426 which in turn increased the fuel gas system
pressure.
Strong smell of diesel and fog/smoke issuing from the generator "b-m400b" (which was on line) enclosure exhaust vents was discovered. The unit was shut down and halon
was discharged manually to the enclosure. A cracked weld on the fuel link to the turbine was detected.
Vessel on collision course with eider. 33 people on board polatform platform was not evacuated vessel missed by 2 miles.
Dsv <...> was stationed on dp in close proximity to the south face of the f.t.p. Structure. The dsv was (is) engaged in 'a' line riser repair work. At approximately 07:10 the dsv
crane was swung over the starboard side of vessel in readiness of assi ting ongoing saturation diving opeaations. The crane opeator parked the crane with the boom head in
what he judged to be a position well clear of the structure, however due to the prevailing weather conditions-wind:26 knots-2050,sea state: 2-2.5m,visibili y good. The dsv dp
footprint enlarged enabling the vessel to close in on the structure and the crane boom head to strike the cellar deck handrailing. Subsequent interrogation of the crane dp
operator and deck banksman indicated a probable lack of vigilanc and concentration during the crane operation. Both were suitably experienced and should have been
monitoring the cranes position and clearance to the structure. Subsequent inspection revealed no damage to the dsv crane no personal injury was sustained.
At 08:52 while attempting to come alongside the platform the supply ship <...> struck the sw corner leg a glancing blow. Little damage sustained by <...>. But the boat was
holed by a "foot plate" on the leg. Weather calm wind 10 knts. Sea state 2 t de 35/c 1.6 knots
<...> with capt. <...> approached the north side of <...> platform, stern first. The intention was to accept onto the installation diesel using <...> platform bunker hose. The sea
state was 0.5m to 1.0m, wind speed 8 knts - wind and tide from the est. The vessel approach was proceeding as normal up to approx. 5m of ar. At this point, the vessel started
to slew clockwise, prior to lowering the bunker hose. The vessel moved slowly eastwards until the bow was approx. 1m off <...> platform. The wave acti n rocked the vessel,
causing the starboard stack to strike <...> cellar deck floor bracing, windfall
The standby boat <...> called up the <...> and said that the conditions were suitable to pick up the mail. The vessel came within the 500 meter zone and the mail was passed
down by nylon line. All mail was received and the lines were being coi ed up, at that moment a part of the vessel struck the spider deck of <...> drilling causing a deflection of
approx 6 inches and a dent in a horizintal 10 inch brace. The conditions at the time were 30 knot winds southerly and an approximate 2 meter sea.
Prior to the collision at 16.15 on <...>. One lift had been made from the supply vessel and one lift backloaded from the platform. While in position to continue cargo handling
operations, 3 or 4 consecutive large waves pushed the supply vessel <...> in a northerly direction and it's stern collided with the bracing node at the slash zone/sea of the <...>
platform. Weather conditions at 16.15 wind kts at direction 150. Wave height 2.5/4.5 meters. Preliminary inspections of supply vessel and platfor structure indicate only
superfical damage. All wellheads and platform cross bridge connection checked and in order.
The wireline equipment was rigged up on c23 to perform a plt programme. After the riser and bops had been installed, the 3" lubricator was lifted from the v-door by utilising a
wire sling (swl 1 ton) that had been choked just below the stuffing box and sh ckled to the utility air tugger on the rig floor. The tool string was made up by the wireline
operator and the lubricator made up to the bops. On completion of the setting of the production sleeve, shutting in of the well and depressurisation of the equ pment, a team
began the routine task to disconnect and lift the lubricator in order to change the tool string. With the logging engineer on the tag line, the driller manning the utility tugger, the
winch operator in the wireline unit, the wireline operato backed off the nut on the bowen connection and lifted the nut to ensure disconnection. The wireline operator
instructed the hand on the tag line to keep the lubricator vertical while the tugger operator picked up. He then instructed the driller to pick up slowly. After lifting the lubricator
approx 1/2", the wire sling parted resulting in the tugger line jumping the sheave and snagging on the monkey board support. The lubricator remained in position but not
sealed correctly in the bop female connection
After rigging up wireline lubricator and stabbing into well 4 (b2) the weight was released from the lubricator in readiness for wireline operations. The crane driver was present
in the cab but distracted when it was noticed that the sling supporting the l bricator parted. The cause of the incident was traced to an electrical short in wiring that controlled
the hoist. This allowed the hoist to creep although the controls were not being touched. The lubricator was not pressurised. The bop was shut.
Platform crew doing minor maintenence/function checks on the crane before <...> testing engineer performed full load test on the unit for recertification purposes. Crane jib
was in raised position with electrical motor for hydraulics turned off. Jib luf ing motor (hydraulic) brake mechanism did not hold the weight of the jib which dropped,
uncontrolabley on to adjacent hand rails. No injury to personnel or damage to equipment other than slight bend in hand rail. The task was done under the control of con co
permit to work procedure.
A load tersting of the north crane was taking place after routine maintenance on the crane. While the test weight (water bags) were over the sea, the main hoist parted. The main
block was lost into the sea with water bags. There was no other daamge or inj ry. Subsequent access and inspection confirmed that this incident was the result of incorrect
reeving of the main hoist rope. The lacing strut immediately beneath the main block sheeves was seen to be deeply wirecut two thirds of the way through the section
While pulling out of hole, crown block travelled past the limit into the crown block timbers
Rigger had started to take the weight of a sea water coarse filter element (hx 5401b) using a 1 tonne elephant super 100 chain block when a link in the filter element actually
lifted. No damage or injury occurred as the failure happened before the filter lement actually lifted. Rigger estimated the load on the chain block at point of failure to be less
than 0.5 tonne. Chain block was last inspected in <...> when no defects were found.
During static proof testing of one of two dive bell guide wire winches, the winch drum end flange failed, allowing the wire to come off the drum and the test load to drop about
one meter. The winch is one of two used in a compensated mode, and normally p ovides the guide wires for the deployment of the onboard dive bell. Diving operations were
not in progress and the equipment was undergoing maintaenance and testing routines as part of the <...> annual survey. The winch has been removed and is to be replac d with
a new unit. The winch used on the other guide wire is to be inspected and ndted before being operated. The failed winch is to be examined onshore to determine the failure
mode
Whilst lifting a wireline lubricator rack from the deck of the supply vessel, one of the top retaining rails fell away from the lift and landed in the sea.
Small spool pipe fell from injection compressor barrel package, whilst being lifted into module 13 (west side) the spool fell onto handrail outside module 13, then onto a
container located on the west landing of the m.s.f
Following completing of wireline work on the drill floor a start was made on rigging down the equipment. The lubricator assembly had been lowered to the drill floor using a 3
tonne sling suspended off of the bails of the top drive unit but the <...> requested that the load be raised again in order that a thread protector could be fitted. As the lubricator
was raised a foot or so off of the deck it snagged off on the crossover of the 7 5/8 landing string without being noticed. The 3 tonne wire rop sling was therefore subjected to a
severe overload which caused its falure. The lubricator assembly dropped about a foot to the drill floor and then sideways against the v door windwall
The drillcrew were running 7 5/8 ths casing. At 1600hrs the casing pin joint was incorrectly stabbed into the box joint and caused the respective threads to engage whilst
misaligned. The driller attempted to pick up on the single joint to have another go t restabling correctly. Unbeknown to the driller the engagement of the misaligned threads
prevented him from picking up the single casing joint and he was unwittingly at this stage attempting to pick up the weight of the complete casing string. The drille continued
to increase the lifting forces to free the casing joint until the breaking strain of the single joint elevator string assembly was exceeded and the pin in the gunnebo link failed
catastrophically. At this point the single joint elevator assembl fell down the entire 40ft length of the casing joint, the slings stricking one of the drillcrew as it came to rest.
Crew were running casing on the drill floor. A joint was miss-stabbed and as the driller attempted to pick up, the joint moved, dropped down and stabbed properly. This
imposed a shock load on the assembly which sheared the link between the swivel and the ard eye for the p/u slings. Slings fell down striking floorman on hand and arm
Whilst backloading a cargo basket weighing 6 tons onto supply vessel <...> the load slipped through the brake from approx 100ft landing on containers on the vessel deck
Sections of drill pipe being off-loaded from the<...> when the crane boom started to shake. The load was lowered onto the deck and investigation revealed that the upper main
hoist drum end flange had fractured down to the outside diameter of the drum. The hoist rope was linked with some wires broken. The crane boom was lowered into the rest
without incident.
Broom failure of linkbelt 238 crane whilst lifting 4 tonnes load from vessel <...>. Lift returned to boat.broom hanging by wires stadive providing assistance to remove boom.
At the time of the incident the sea state was <1 metre, the wind was from 355 degrees at 14 knots.
7 inch tubing was being pulled from well bc34 using 450 ton elevators. A set of bj type sp single joint elevators was hanging freely below, approx. 25 feet above the drillfloor.
A tapered inset plus pin and spring assembly from the single joint elevator ell and landed on the drill floor. No injuries were sustained. On examination the 3/8 inch diameter
locating pin had fractured allowing the insert to come out of place. The tapered insert weight is 1.5 lb.
The east crane had been working throughout the morning, at 11:00hrs it was put in the boom rest for approx 2hrs. Shortly after 13:00hrs the driver was called to restart lifting
operations. He lifted the boom, tested the clutches and brakes in a no-load co dition, before slewing around into position on the pipe deck. A compactor weighing 2.75t was
hooked on, and when the deck crew were clear of the lift, the load hoisted to a height of approx 3m. The driver then returned the hoist lever to the neutral posit on which
automatically engaged the hoist brake. He was also operating the slow down brake which slows the motion of the drive train. It was at this point that the load dropped or
slipped throught he brake. The compactor landed onto the pipe deck, the impa t causing a small penetration in a deck plate, which allowed some standing water to drain into
the drilling workshop.
Whilst running in the hole and the cement plug was tagged at 2734m. The driller pulled off the bottom to prepare to make ip the top drive. The slips were set and the drainwork
parking brake engaged. After noting the previous operations the driller releas d the parking brake but did not engage the hand brake simultaneously, causing the block to travel
approx 10ft bending 2 joints of drillpipe. 6 5/8".
The puq north crane was under maintenance, as part of routine maintenance recharging of the gross overmovement protection system was carried out at this time but not test
run. On trying to operate the crane the control system pressure only registered 5 t 10 barg normally 60 barg. System checks were then carried out. During the checks, the
crane mechanic went to check the (gopu) and reset the valves for start up, he returned to the crane engine bay to ionform mechanic supervisor that the low control pre sure
problem had been resolved and proceded on the test gauge and attempted to slacken off the adjusting valve. During this operation the crane mechanic increased the engine
revs. Mechanic supervisor noticed the increase in pressure and moved to the eng ne compartment door to get the mechanic to stop the engine. As the mechanic reacted to
mechanic supervisors call the hydraulic oil accumulator exploded.
On inspection of draw works drillers found 3 brake caliper pivot pins broken and 1 cracked. 15% of breaking had been lost.awaiting new set of pivot pins. No damage.
On the drawworks a caliper support pin on the disc brake system failed this caused a piston to be pushed out of its cylinder and resulted in hydraulic fliud loss aditionnaly the
hyrdraulic fluid contaminated the the disc and impared the braking ability w th the small amount of fluid present. The traveling block and top drive assembly collided with the
drill string.
Partial 50% failure of draw works braking system causing pipe in situe hydrulic coupling on draw-works braying system became disconnected and resulted in loss of pressure
to 50% of the draw-works system. Brake failure resulted in slippage of the travellin block and top drive assembly. Top drive rested on stand of drill pipe which caused
deformation of an accelerator sub assembly.
A 45 gallon drum of oil was being lifted from the west side of pipedeck to the porch of mod6 when it slipped from the barrel clamp. The drum dropped approx 25ft no persons
were injured and damage was restricted to the drum itself. Weather conditions dry a d clear.
The power boom lowering chain parted while operating the crane under light load conditions,(1 tonne)auto brake activated preventing boom falling.crane returned to rest.
Rig mechanic was carrying out a monthly planned maintenance procedure on the casing stabbing board, part of which was to check the sky climber operation and controls.
Whilst lowering the board downwards (approx halt way down its travel) the hoist/lower w re parted, resulting in the board dropping approx 10ft onto the guide rail stops. The
safety locking mechanism on the hoist appears only to have engaged after the board bounced up off the stops. The rig mechanic was left suspended in mid-air on his safety
harness.
Wireline operations on going on well <...> wireline lubricator was suspended from bop crane swl 18t. The lubricator lifting clamp was attached by a bow shackle and pin swl
3t. Difficulty was encountered while pulling the lubricator free from the riser u ing the bop crane. The lifting clamped failed and on inspection was found to be sheared and the
pin in the shackle was bent and deformed this indicates that forces above the swl of 3t. Had been exerted.
During reinstatement of x01 tuve bundle, vertical loops was held on a 3t chain block and horizontal pull being achieved via the 1.5 tonne chain lift. Bundle was installed some
months ago, this operation was concluded only by pulling in the last 6" or so rior to fitting the vessel end cover. During this operation, the 1.5 tonne chain lift failed on the
hook length. No other damage was sustained and no one was injured.
During routine crane operations a piece of kennedy grating (approx 3' x 2') fell approximately 40 mts, from the crane boom walkway narrowly missing a crew member by 8'.
Damage was confined to the section of grating.
When laying out joint of conductor, night shift, joint tailed out with platform crane, running tool held in elevators. 2 off tuggers attached to running tool lifting shackle. After
lowering joint to allow second crane hook to be attached, conductor move towards v-door. Because the elevator and bails were facing the opposite way, the link tilt was
limited. The bail arms contacted upon the bail pins/rollers. Three out of four pins failed and fell to the drill floor.
<...> deck crew and crane driver using <...> south crane to effect a lift from <...> main deck. In doing so the hook arrangement made contact with the handrailing on the
walkway on the side of the drilling package. The handrail was dislodged nd fell approx. 40 feet to land on the <...> main deck. The banksman took cover and was not
injured. There was no other damage indicated. On investigation it was found that no safety securing bolts were fitted to secure the handrail in the platform sockets. Weather at
the time was dry, warm and sunny.
The overhead crane was being used to lower a clamp to the cellar deck when the end of the chain passed through the machine and dropped through the hatchway a
On offloading cargo from the <...> using the west crane of the <...> platform the limit switch hoisting gear warning lamp began to flicker on and off. The hoisting of the cargo
stopped and the limit switch hoisting gear warning lamp showed continuo sly. The crane operator then gently lowered the load at which point the limit switch hoisting gear
warning light was extinguished and the hoist motion immediately restored. The offloading of cargo was then aborted and an inspection of the crane effected. It was found that
one of the chains holding the limit switch striker plate support had broken. This chain was then replaced with certified slings, a short piece of chain had to be utilised to enable
the striker plate to remain level.
At approximately 1430hrs on <...> the east crane of the <...> platform was being used to move light loads on the main deck for construction materials storage purposes. The
crane being banked by a qualified banksman member of the pl tform contsruction deck crew and driven by competence assessed driver <...> crane specialist on long term hire
to <...>, the <...> pltform operator designate). The load manoeuvred out of site of the driver behind the drilling derrick sub structure by the banksman using dedicated vhf radio
communication with the driver. On instructions from the banksman the driver lowered his boom to extend reach and in so doing the boom foot section of the crane boom came
into contact with a temporary cra e boom rest on the deck immediately in front of the crane. This caused buckling and crush damage to a lower boom chord and resulted in
damage to the main boom lower (right from cab) member at the root area of the all welded joint between chord and main me ber. A detailed incident investigation is underway
on the platform under the leadership of the enterprise oil senior offshore representative at the request of the hook up and commissioning oim. A full technical evaluation of the
damage and repair/replace ent options is also underway using structural and metallurgical specialists. There were no personnel placed directly at risk as a result of the incident
A 12 foot spool had been rigged by day shift riggers in preparation for night shift to lift. Night shift comenced lift, when spool reached a height of approx. 5 ft. It fell back to
the deck together with block, tackle and sling. No injuries occurred. In estigation concludes that no failure of rigging equipment occured. Incident was caused by one of two
eyes of the upper sling not being passed fully over hook of block and tackle, and therefore not being retained by sping loaded clip.
Whilst the north crane was working over the pipedeck, an 8" spacer bar, at the four fold block (weighing approx 8 1/2 lbs) became detatched and fell to the pipedeck. No
injury or damage was sustained.
Two 45 gallon drums of lube oil being transported in a wire cargo net by the north crane <...>. Cargo net snagged on a protruding light fitting approx 20 feet below the roof
level of mod 38 (east side). This area is out of site of the crane operators posi ion, two banksmen were engaged in directing the transfer. Banksman <...> was initially
directing the crane by radio, but his partner <...> realised the radio was not transmitting. <...> then attempted to stop the crane using his own radio, agai this message was not
received. By this time the crane operator had realised something was wrong and had stopped booming down, however the net had already snagged on the light fitting. The
two drums began to slip from the net and then fell approx 60 fee onto mod 30 roof landing area causing one to burst on impact. Causes:- 1. <...>'s radio found to be damaged.
2. <...> radio rendered useless by transmission "black spot" 3. Poor positioning of banksmen relative to crane operators position. Wind south west 9 knots, conditions
favourable.
During mechanical investigation and repair to brake system the crane driver raised the boom. On returning the control lever to the neutral position, the brake did not come on,
thus allowing the boom to run away. The paul ratchet did not stop the boom and subsequently broke off before the driver pressed the emergency stop. This action stopped the
boom immediately.
Platform crane was lifting pipe spools from the lower central corridor to module 43. The spools ( two x 12" diameter x 2 1/2') snagged on a beam. The wire lifting strop
snapped and both spools fell approx 25' back to the lower central corridor deck. The trop was rated at 1 ton. The spools weight - 1/4 ton. No damage other than to the strop
was incurred.
At approximately 13.30hrs <...> rigging personnel were installaing the motor for the l.p. Flare pump. The motor was lifted from a trolley on to its mountings, a lift of
approximately 4ft once on its mountings the weight was taken off the lifting gear, bu left in place to await the electricians who along with the riggers would complete final
alignment and installation. At 13:55 the gpa sounded. On returning to the site the cahin blocks were found lying on the deck. <...> who was responding to the goa, h ard a lod
crack by the flare k.o. Drum and on looking across and up he saw the chain blocks falling to the deck. No personnel were injured and no equipment was damaged.
The pin on which the 2 top luffing sheaves rotate had to be replaced. In order to do this the sheaves had to be supported by a rigging arrangement - in this case the sheave was
supported by a webbing sling .when the pin was removed the weight of the sheav was taken up by the sling, the sheave moved to the side and fell out of the sling, striking the
luffing wire and the crane boom before coming to rest on a cablea tray some 50ft below.
While transferring material to the new 20 feet stores container the <...> crane whip line control failed. The whipline went into freefall. It fell approx 10 feet until the whip line
ball and hook fell into the store container access scaffold.
The sea crane was being used to back load containers to the supply vessel <...>. During this operation the penant line detached from the whip line hook ( no load suspended at
the time of incident). No injury or damage sustained. Wind speed 20 knot . Direction 040deg. Visibility 18 miles. Barometer 10 mb. Air temp 27 deg c. Sea state 8-9.
Unwanted material was being cleared from the monkey board area (90'el) and transferred to the frill floor using materials basket esa 1542. When loading of the basket was
complete it was lifted off the west fingers and lowered between the east and west fin ers. When the load was approx 30ft from the drill floor (at 114' el) the floorman operated
the monobeam, moving it to the north to ensure that the load would not come into contact with the top drive. The monobeam moved in a jerky fashion and at that poi t the
basket and contents fell to the drill floor. The winch wire whipped upwards and the weight of the line on the opposite side pulled the socket end up to the block at the crown.
The slack wire landed heavily by the winch.
Deck cre were involved moving steelwork from pipedeck to skid deck racks they had three previous lifts of tubular steelwork. At the time of the incident they had prepared a
lift of 6 pieces of 80mm angle iron. The angle was stowed heel to heel and 100kg swl endless canvas slings were used to lift the load. Stell slings had been tried but were
slipping so canvas slings were used instead. A tag line was attached to the load to control it. The wind speed at the time was 33kts. Weather was clear and sunny the load
was being transferred from the north side to the south side. As the load was passing the south crane rest the wind caught the load and started spinning the angle. The operator
holding the tag line could not control the load and it came into c ntact with the crane rest. This unbalanced the load causing the angle to drop to the skid deck. One section of
angle fell outwith the handrails and struck a section of walkway, 20m below. It ruptured the grating and went into the sea.
Deck crew were moving an isert mandrel (length 4m dia 6" weight 80 kgs) from the helideck to the skid deck using g4 crane. The deck roustabout was sent to the helideck to
sling the mandrel using two wire slings. Both slings were of correct type and clour code. The roustabout was advised by the crane driver to double wrap the sling and put one
eye through the other to secure a bite on the mandrel. The load was subsiquently lifted on the roustabouts order and all appered to be correct. The crane operator started to
lower the load to the skid deck when the load slipped from the slings and fell to the deck from a hight of 20 ft. Narrowly missing a painter who was crossing the skid deck at
the time.
Whilst lifting rack of argon cylinders from <...> deck with <...> east crane, rack caught on protruding steel member of adjacent winch bumper gaurd. Although the banksman,
sited on safe britannia, gave immediate instructions to the crane operat r to cease hoisting, the accommodation vessel rolled in the swell. This increased pressure on the slings
and 3 of the 4 legs of the lifting slings parted. The cylinder rack was lowered to the deck using the undamaged leg where the top of the rack was obse ved to be damaged and
possible damage to four cylinder neck valves was noted.
3 metal beam sections (approx 1m long) were bundled together using web type straps. They were lifted by west crane in order to relocate them to n/e of mod 2. During lifting
and while 40ft above the deck level the bundle touched part of the structure and t e beams dislodged from the straps falling to deck below. No injury to personnel and only
minor structural damage substained. NB: web staps used no round turn used
During installation of sea water lift pump a into its caisson, the pump motor and riser assembly (8.4 tonnes) were suspended by pneumatic chain hoist, the 3 inch motor cable
was being fed into the caisson and banded to each lengh of raiser at the flanged nds. The assembly had been lowered, the cable banded, and personnel were preparing to fit the
next 3m lenth of raiser. The installation clamp 9to hold the assembly) had been positioned. The assembly was lifted approx 70mm to allow fitting of the flange bo ts when one
link of the hoist chain failed causing assembly to fall onto the clamp. N.b hoistswl 15 tonne. This incident had a high potential for serious injury since, had the chain parted
when the clamp was not positioned, the assembly would have fallen nto the caisson taking with it the cable from the adjacent cable drum and the hoist chain, the hoist was
being operated correctly and experienced riggers.
Make up tong line was caught in travelling, block and it swung over and crashed into 'doghouse'.
While moving the divertor annular from the south side of bop arae onto the divertor spool the tugger handle on the upper bop tugger sheared pulling the annular assy across the
bop area uncontrolably. With there being no fitted isolation valves at the tugg r the driller was unable to stop the air supply to the tugger this resulted in the assy continuing
across the area onits own because the tugger was sheared in the pulling position and it went all the way to the 13 3/8 bop before it came to a halt and the ir supply was isolated
by the driller at the rig floor which is the nearest isolation point. During the travel of the annular originally and rigged up on the south side of the lifting frame via a sheave and
2 ton sling secured to the back of the v door, c me tight and snapped the 2 ton sling. A 5 ton chain hoist being utilised on the lifting frame also snapped the operating cahin
while the bop was on the annular assy to tilt prior to it comingto a halt against the 13 3/8 stack.
Well c6 mudline safety valve left its lockout location and moved into the wellhead. This occurred during the routine testing of the mlsv as part of a 3 monthly test. The mlsv
was closed. The flowline was being depressured by flowing into production when t e wellhead pressure reached 400 psig. A loud bang was heard in the xmas tree, and c6 was
closed in at the wellhead control panel immediately.
3/8"s.s. Swagelock fitting failed whilst two men were fitting tarpaulins over the <...> hydraulic unit in module 02. The fitting has not been made up to the manufacturers
specification when installed. The pipework was accidently moved causing the pipe to blow out of fitting. No injuries were substained.
After several attempts to start machine a further attempt was made on diesel but after 56 seconds no flame was observed and the machine was manually stopped.large
explosion occurred rupturing the expansion bellows
Prioe to the explosion their had been 3 attempts to start the turbine, each time it failed on ignition failure. Following this the engine was cranked for five minutes to disperse
any accumulation of fuel in the combustion chamber. A 4th start was attempted on the turbine, this is when the explosion took place. Damage was restricted to the air inlet
ducing, filter bank and plenum doors. It is suspected that a build up of fuel in the combustion chamber was responsible for the explosion. Investigation ongoi g on fuel
systems
Gas compression in process of being commissioned and were at the stage of doing on-line running commissioning checks with vendors in attendance. Vendors associated with
these tests were :- 2 x <...> (gas compressor) 2 x <...> (compressor driver) 1 x <...>. (comp. Anti-surge control) plant running with two gas compression trains running in
parallel with no problems encountered from 1700hrs on previous day <...>. Tests that had been carried out on the compressors were load sharing of both compressors t
120bar discharge pressure. <...> vendor was satisified with duration of run and now wanted to progress to next stage. This was to increase discharge pressure of the
compressors to normal operating pressure of 163 bar. Presuure increase is achieved b control valve pv 0311 (on p&id ac et fe 00209 01) and this was started at 0835hs 31st
may. Pressure was increased in 5 bar increments over a 30min. Period from 120 bar to 160 bar which is the set point of pepic0311 controlled at the dcs in c.c.r. At ap rox
0920am a loud bang was heard by the witness in compressor start up room. They proceeded to investigate the noise which had first some had thought was the result of crane
operations. As can be seen from the witnesses statements their observations wer passed on to c.c.r. Operator who passed information on to colin twiss who continued to
A hydrostatic body leak test of a coiled tubing shear seal bop on well n11 xmas tree was being performed. The test medium was water/glycol and the final leak test pressure
was 5000psi. The thread protector cap on top of the bop was not removed and repla ed by a pressure rated test cap with a vent valve as per the written procedure. Neither was
air venting undertaken prior to pressuring up the bop. At approximately 40 bar the top of the thread protector uniformly parted from its body and was projected ve tically to a
height of 80ft before landing on the naa pipedeck (diameter of cap 10.5" and weight 6lb). There were no injuries and no other equipment damage
While pulling out of the hole, a brass bushing fell from the derrick onto the rig floor. After investigation it was established that the bushing had come from the monkey board
hinge pin.
Bumper guard used to protect top drive hydraulic hoses and electrical control cables dropped off and fell approx 40 feet onto the drill floor the gaurd weighs appox 20kg and
inspection revealed t were inadequate for the purpose hat the welds failed. The welds were only 'tack welds' and
13ft 6in free standing scaffold structure completed <...>. Rq no <...>, tag no <...>. Structure blown over in one piece on <...> during high winds. Damage cause included
deformed scaffolding tubulars, 2 x broken floodlight fittings in control boxes. Wind speeds of up to 75 knots gusting to 90 knots were experiencing at sea level on the previous
morning. Wind speed immediately after incident was measured at 37 knots.
During the erection of a scaffold outboard mod02 roof level, a 7 ft scaffold tube fell from the scaffold to mod 56 deck east side some 120 ft below, where it glanced off a
handrail and into the sea below.
At 0230 hrs a scaffold board fell from a height in the void between modules 02/03 although thought to have seen secured by the dayshift scaffold squad before end of shift, one
of there 13' scaffolders " working boards had worked free from its securing the e and fell some 40' below, coming to rest on a completed scaffold, no damage was sustained but
the board was seen by a member of a three man work party to land approximatley 10' from them. The weather at the time was 35/40 knots n/w
Two mechanics were re-orientating a valve in a vertical 2'' line. They removed the raimaining bolts from both flanges so as to be able to swing it round on the r.t.j. 'S. On
removal of the last bolt the pipework sprung open causing the valve (weight 185 k ) to fall 12 feet to deck level. On falling the valve hit a cross member which deflected it, and
it landed between the blast wall and the cross bracing. The passive fire protection on the bracing sustained slight damage. Lighting in the modulegood. Noise level was low.
Weather at the time good.
A fault was identified on the cable supply power to the helicopter warning light on the east crane. An electrical technician was authorised to carry out investigation and repair.
The repair required removal of the hatch cover to install a new junction box within the stanchion. Before he could complete the work the crane was requied for operational
reasons. The technician made safe, replaced the cover and removed himself and tools from the worksite. After the cran operation was complete and crane parked, cr ne driver
moved to the west crane. Approximately 15 minutes later the hatch cover became detached and fell approximately 60 metres onto the deck of the <...>. The hatch cover
dimensions are as follows: 600mmx 130mm, weight 3200 grammes.
At some time on either <...> or early on <...> a section of the <...> compressor turbine exhaust ducting weighing approx. 2 tonnes and about 10m long appears to have dropped
from its support support mounting directly in to the sea. Ther were no witnesses to the incident. A short section of loose ducting remains stuck in the support frame. The
ducting appears to have failed at a flange(the ducting is made up of short sections bolted to-gether). Detailed inspection has not been possible a yet due to access difficulties.
The compressor was shutdown as the end of the remaining section of ducting possibly infringes the hazardous area envelope. Whilst the machine was on line at the time of the
failure there have been no recent operations or a tivities on-going in the vicinity of the exhaust ducts. The weather over the period that the incident occured was calm with 10-
16 knot south easterly winds ans 0.5-1 metre seas.
It was noted that an area of passive fire protection while remaining intact had loosened from the face of the plq south wall. The surrounding area was immediately barriered off
and steps taken to inform all personnel of the possibility of the caoting fall ng from the wall. The matter was discussed with dept, heads, onshore management and <...> safety
reps. The ca were informed of the matter in writing on <...> when the weather improved a protective scaffold was erected and an access scaffold b ilt. Following a forecast of
severe adverse weather, the valley area was placed out of bounds. Further warnings were broadcast to personnel regarding this matter. The <...> reps. Were advised of this and
the actions the oim would take if the passive fire protection failed. The platform processes were shutdown and all risers closed, onshore staff advised as were the coastguard,
the latter were advised at 05:00hrs that the platform was secure. The area remained out of bounds and non essential personnel were confined to the plq in case other falls
occurred.
On <...> the platform was subjected to rough weather. During the storm all non-operations personnel were confined to the living quarters and operations personnel to internal
areas of the production facility. Weather data from the computerised weather s stem indicated park wind speeds of 93 knots, with a wind direction of 320 defrees and a
significant wave height of 7.5 meters in the <...> area at around 1700 hours on <...> On <...> during a tour of the well head jacket platform engineer, the wel head jacket lifting
frame was discovered to have been lost to the sea. Discussions with platform staff established that the 'a' frame was probably lost during the storm of <...> A number of
personnel including safety representatives were aware of a c ange to the jacket following the storm, but had not grasped the significance until platform engineers tour. The
handrails at the east and west corners of the south end of the wellhead jacket upper level were found to be damaged. The area was barriered off and sub-surface safety valves
on wells at the well head jacket were closed in, in case of sub-sea damage to the stucture.n.b. The lifting frame could only be seen from limited areas on the platform, and not
from the lower level of the jacket were the rama nder of the jacket facilities are situated. Initial investigations have established the following information: 1. The 'a' frame fell
Following a loud bang being heard in the accommodation, investigation found the source to be the disintegration of hvac condenser fan a rotor. As the fan had peeled off its
rotor, the debris had punctured the side of the enclosure. The force of the impact caused parts of the fan blades off and project through the damaged guard, landing up to 20
feet away.
Deck operator was lowering a turbine hood to the deck. He stopped lowering by releasing the lowering lever. However the load continued to lower, slowly approximately two
feet to the deck. No one was injured and no damage was done. The job was immediat ly stopped
During high wind conditions (60-70kts) doors, which give access to install main hoist wire spool, fell to skid deck. Hinge pins had seized in sovkets and with constant
buffeting by winds pins sheared off.
Failure of split pin caused the kellycock actuating finger to drop 90 feet on to the rig floor.
A drill pipe protector cap approx. 1lb fell from the pipedeck onto a walkway between m3 and m5 20 metres below. A few moments earlier a scaffolder had used this walkway
and heard a noise behind him. Investigation discovered the cap lying on the walkway.
A crane rope deflector plate fell off the apex of the v door and landed on the pipedeck. The securing plates similarly fell and landed on the edge of the drill floor. The deflector
plate weighs approx. 75kgs and fell about 15 metres in total. No operat ons were ongoing through the v door at the time and neither had there been for several hours. No
personnel were in the immediate vicinity of the v door. The drilling operations were very steady with little or no vibration in the derrick structure. The late and bolted
assembly had been installed circa 2 hours prior to it breaking free. The weather was sunny and dry with light winds of approx. 5 knots from variable directions.
During routine tripping operations, pulling out of hole, a pin from the hydraulic cylinder on the pipe handler at the monkey board fell off, landing on the rig floor between the
racking mats. The pin weighed 0.3kg and fell approx. 85ft. The upper retain ng circlip on the pin dislodged allowing the pin to fall.
During operation of north crane one of the boom walkway retaining clamps weight 6 lbs approx - fell from the boom cathead section onto the pipedeck, approx. 60 mtr fall
During an independent inpsection of <...> derrick an inspector was using a chipping hammer to check integrity of steelwork. A plate weighing 11lbs dislodged and fell 26
metres to the rig floor. A wireline operator was laying out tools on the rig floor a the time and the falling plate cam to rest 5.7 metres from him. The plate appears to have been
tack welded on to the structure and with subsequent corrosion failed.
Plate fell from the dolly track beam to drill floor 50ft below. The two holding bolts had loosened, allowing the plate to fall.
Diesel-oil was bunkered and hose was racked at 11:15. At 13:00 the hose parted at the swedged connection and fell into the sea - a distance of approximately 61m . No injury
or further damage occured.
The forklift was being used to move a stack of seven empty pallets from a position adjacent to the outboard handrail at the 42m elevation. When the stack was picked up the
top two pallets fell overboard directly into the sea. They were recovered immediate by by the standby vessel.
During drying of clothes in tumble dryer no 1, smoke was observed coming from the dryer. The dryer was stopped, door opened and clothes removed. The smoke came from
the heating element. Reason - the filter element was not put right in place so shag came n contact with the heating element
The<...> is a normally unmanned platform, and at the time of the incident was producing gas under scada control from <...>. Following a shutdown to the platform gas turbine
driven generator, caused by loss of fuel gas pressure, a fire started insid the turbine's inlet air plenum, within an acoustic enclosure. The consequent temperature rise, tripped
heat activated devices, releasing the halon flood system and a platform esd. Fire damage was limited to the turbine inlet air plenum and trunking, and lectrical wiring adjacent
At 17:40 hrs, smoke observed in area of k400 power turbine bearing support. Note, smoke smelt of hot metal/paint rather than oil. During investigation flame was observed
and the unit manually shutdown at 17:52 as an additional precaution the platform was sd'd manually at 17:54. The flame extinguished as the unit shutdown without the use of
a fire extinguisher
Compressor k104 was started at 03:18 at 03:55 unit esd and halon discharge automatically on uv detection on inspection power turbine transition lagging ties appear to have
smouldered and set off unit uvs. K104 has completed 150hrs since installation of re lacement zero rated hour engine and lagging material. Note no flames evident at time of
incident.
Lp vent was ignited by a lightning strike. All lp vent systems were manually shutdown and the vent was extinguished using the halon vent snuffing package. Wind speed : 5
knots wind direction : 025 degrees cloud : 5/8 450 feet visibility : cables , heavy rain, lightning
Cardboard boxes containing light bulbs ignited (they were stored on top of the dc cabinet in <...> engine room and were in contact with a hot air exhaust). The motor man and
welder who were in the motor room had been investigated a burning smell which as thought to be new lagging drying out. They extinguised the fire with 2 halon and 2 dry
power extinguisers. In the process of extinguishing the fire the motor man recieved stinging to his eyes and the welder had breathing ploblems due to inhalation of e tinguisher
medium. Both personnel were sent to the medic the motor man returned to work, the welder was stood down for 24 hours and leter returned to work. All offending articles
were removed and the area checked for further damage (none found)
At 0740hrs smoke was seen to be coming from no 2 tumble drier. The smoke detection which is in the void above the ceiling had not operated. The gpa in the laundry was
operated bring the platform to hazard status. The isolation switch was operated for the achine and the door opened and coveralls were removed. As they were removed flames
were observed in the machine and a holon extinguisher was used to extinguish them. It was observed at the time that the drier elements were glowing red. The machine was
kep under observation until the elements cooled down.
Smoke detectors activated and resulted in an automatic deluge release in module o6. (gas compression) no flame detected by uvs. Plant shut down. Fire teams mustered and
area investigated. Drive end bearing on seal oil pump was cause of smoke. Note- compre sor not running at the time. Platform normal at 03:05.
During normal production operations smoke was detected by one detector in mod 05 mcc room. This was followed by activation of two smoke detectors (co-incident detection)
in module 03 lcr. The co-incident detection of smoke in module 03 lcr caused the auto atic release of halon into that area and a total production shut down. A thorough check
of modules 03 05 and the hvac supply system revealed no evidence of smoke.
At 02.06 coicident smoke detection (2 x smoke detectors) caused the automatic initiation of the deluge system covering module 16. Invest revealed that non drive end bearing
on the motor of c seal oil pump had collapsed and over heated thus generating suff cient smoke to cause detection and extinguishant release
Production systems shutdown, depressurisation of the gas injection manifold was underway to complete this activity xxv 1364 was opened- coincident with this occuring.
Smoke detectors local to the valve activated and initiated automatic deluge/foam of the odule and level three shutdown. Precautionary g.p.a. Called p.o.b. Accounted for area
checked out, no evidence of smoke source found. Xxv 1364 removed stem damaged packing defective
Scaffolder working under deck reported that there were scaffold boards smouldering by lifeboat no 6 on investigation it was found that a scaffold had been built under deck in
close proximity (+/-12'') to the diesel fire pump exhaust. The pump was running t the time as part of the weekly checks. As the area technician switched off the fire pump, a
smoke head in d3ww detected smoke and put the platform on to red hazard status. At the time the alarm was raised, the diesel fire pump had been running for 19 mi utes. The
hot exhaust playing on the scaffold boards had charred the boards. Once the fire pump stopped running, the charred boards burst into flames over a small area. Immediate
action was taken, deploying a fire hose andbranch to extinguish the flames a d cool the area. The emergency response team arrived shortly after to find the situation fully under
control. The platform returned to normal green status at 1349 hrs some 10 minutes after the first alarm
Tecnician observed smoke coming from exhaust chamber of the power turbine of a roll turbine generator. The operator raised the alarm and production were shut down . The
emergencey responce team attended the incident but were not required. The fire self ex ingusied as the machine shut down. Precautionary muster carried out.
The north fire pump was running to provide cooling water to the s.e. Flare which was in use to clean up pw27 following acidisation. At 1103 hrs <...> contacted the control
room (cr) and reported a burning smell adjacent to the mechanical workshop. No alarms. The cro <...> contacted <...>, briefed him and told him to check the north fire pump,
that being the most likely source. <...> found the pump room to be full of smoke and advised the cro. The cro stopped the fire pump with the rem te in the cr at 11:06 hrs and
then contacted and briefed the operations supervisor <...>. No alarms. The os. Instructed the cro to contact messrs <...> and have them pick up b.a. Sets and meet him at the n
fire pump. Cro. Did so. A single flame sensor initiated led at 11:10 hrs. Cro advised os. Os. Instructed cro. To put on zone lockout. Cro actioned. Co-incident flame initiated
led at 11:14 hrs. The cro. Advised os then contacted the oim who instructed the gpa to be activated. Gpa activat d. With the ert onsite the fire was extinguished and the
electrical supplies isolated. Module was then ventilated and photographs taken of the fire damage. The source of the fire appears to be the jacket water system heater which
overheated as aresult of oss of cooling medium when the heater discharge pipe fractured. The heat build up tracked up a lifting trolley chain which was found hooked over the
During welding operations external to a non-pressurised 6" vent line, a minor "pop" and flamewas observed by the welder across the adjacent, open end of the vent pipe. The
flame self-extinguished but a hand held extinguisher was discharged as a precaution no alarms were initiated. At the time of the incident the entire installation was
detpressurised, shut-down and nitrogen purged for routine maintenance. The vent line and associated system had been spaded off from the hp knock out drum, with additional v
lve isolations performed along the length of the system. Prior to cmmencement of welding operations, the system had been purged with nitrogen and pressurised to 10 bar.
This was repeated on three occasions prior to the vent system being left depressurised and open to atmosphere. The incident was thought to have been caused by a small
amount of residual condensate vapour, drawn through the system by thermally induced ventilation, being ignited by the heat from the welding activity.
A group of 3 persons (1 welder and 2 platers) had been working from a scaffold on the 17.00m level of leg a3 (south west) of the platform carrying out welding and burning
operations. Immediately prior to the incident, <...> (platers were working on the scaffold and <...> (welder) was acting as safety watch. A query was raised about subsequent
work so the equipment was isolated and the three persons proceeded to visit the supervisor. It appears that hot slag had fallen onto a poly ropylene mooring rope adjacent to
the scaffold and caused it to ignite. The burning rope subsequently set fire to the scaffolding boards. After a period of about 11 minutes (from the time the 3 left the site) a fire
on the sw leg scaffold was reported t the <...> control room. The platform muster alarm was sounded - all persons accounted for and the fire extinguished using water and
hoses from the attendant jack-up vessel <...>. Report from <...>, platform safety officer, suggested that "th fire developed quite quickly due to the mooring rope material
involved acting as an accelerant." Notification of incident event log from the platform oim reads:- 11:36 fire reported to control room dppa 11:41 complex muster alarms
sounded due to fire e calation (rope had ignited scaffolding boards around leg). 11:46 firepumps on 11:50 all pob accounted for 11:56 fire extinguished 11:59 structural
Smoke alarm activiated in lv switch room. Humidifier cubicle overheated causing damage to the contractors and internal fittings. The switchboard was isolated. Damaged
cubicle being investigated by the switchboard vendor.
Fire pump 'a' was undergoing weekly function test run. Following pre- start checks, operator commenced auto-start test run at 13.45 hrs. Establishing all running conditions as
'normal'. After period of approx. 30 mins in attendance, operator left site to attend to other duties, leaving engine in 'running' condition. At 14.50 hrs a platform 'red' alert sd2
condition was initiated, caused by 'fire detection' within fire pump 'a' module. Auto deluge was initiated which extinguished fire condition. Subsequent investigation into
cause of fire directed towards turbo-charger where significant amount of paintwork scorching and blackening was evident. Following clean-up, engine was test run under
controlled conditions in attempt to locate cause. Test run was aborted after approx. 2 mins following lifting of crankcase relief valve due to sump over-pressurisation. Fault
finding investigations are proceeding with assistance of manufacturers vendor rep. Turbo-charger at drive end of engine removed. Exhaust manifold gaske found broken. It is
considered the passage of hot exhaust gasses across the flange via. The failed gasket ignited paintwork in the immediate vicinity, thereby causing the fire. Sump pressurisation
problem is still being addressed. Platform hydrocarbon pr cess remains shutdown in accordance with firewater pumping contingency matrix.
A section of the main oil line export riser pipework was being replaced. The site of the incident was at the open end of the existing 20" riser export bend which was being
prepared for a "golden" butt weld, the weld profile was being ground onto the pipe utt when sparks from the operation ignited hydrocarbons inside the bend near the closed
export esdv, a small flame was contained within the pipe which was extinguished by use of an extinguisher and firehose branch. The work was stopped and permit withdra n
and an investigation commenced. No plant damage occurred. No personal injury occurred. Atmospheric conditions dry and windy. The platform wa shutdown at the time for
major maintenance and construciton activities and the export pipeline had been flus ed prior to the work using an apprroved procedure.
During a routine operation to "top up" the lubricating oil sump level on k02 a strong smell of smoke was identified by the operator from the area of the exhaust diffuser and the
gearbox. At this time there was no indication of an actual fire. To assist urther investigation the turbine was shutdown. During investigation by the fire and safety officer to
locate the source of the smoke a section of exhaust lagging around the diffuser was disturbed and at this point the fumes caught fire. The fire was imm diately extinguished by
the fso using a hand held type extinguisher
Repairs were being carried out on the guide vanes which involved welding in place the replacement vanes. A hot work naked flame permit was in force and a void entry
certificate as part of the permit allowed the welder internal access to the trunking. He had welded in place three vanes when it was noticed through the trunking access panel
that a small fire and smoke was coming from the lagging behind the steel cladding. This was immediately extinguished using a bcf extinguisher and the effected lagging w s
removed from behind the steel cladding and doused with water. There was no detection on the platform fire and gas system, a strong draft quickly dissipated the smoke.
The <...> hot oil flush line was perforated by the action of an angle grinder. A hot work naked flame permit was in force for replacement of structuaal stelworkafter the
installation of a manifold spool. The associated scaffolding obstructed the refit f a section of steel beam. To allow access, it was decided by the workmen on site to cut the
obstructing scaffold tubes. The oil line was cut by a grinder used for this purpose when it was mistaken for a scaffold tube, a number of tubes had already been ut by the time
the oil line was perforated. Oil escaped the line under static head pressure. Work immediately ceased and all hot work permits withdrawn. The line was isolated by a shift
production personnel, a foam blanket was laid over the spill.no ga leakes indicated on the platform fire and gas system. The platform was in a shutdown condition prior to the
incident and general shutdown activities were underway.
During routine n2 lift operations, contract crew had to vent pumps for liquid pumping duty. They vented with no warning tannoy. This type of unit vents n2 at the engine
exhaust point. Due to the shuttered location of the unit, the n2 entrained exhaust fum s and dispersion was slow. Member of crew saw and smelled what he thought was smoke
and correctly raised the alarm. Full emergency procedures were activated and production shut-down until we had confirmation there was no fire.
A fuel change over from diesel to gas was attempted on gt2 but the turbine resisted the change over and tripped, the turbine was reset and restarted on gas. The machine was
manually shutdown about 15 seconds later after abnormal speeds and temperature we e observed. High temperatures were noted on the exhaust stack and when checked,
flames were seen to be emitting from the stack. The general alarm was sounded and fire parties sent to the seen.
A mechanical failure of the shaft on an hxac (ventilation impellor) resulted in fan belt friction/smoke production into the utility air ducting. Two smoke detectors were set-off
in the switch gear room. This resulted in a yellow prodution shutdown and fo r no by 75kg halon cylinders to auto-release into the switch gear room (halon 1310) a p;atform
general alarm, muster and bop confirmation was conducted as a routine precaution. A physical inspection on the platform rooms/ modules was conducted, no fire p esent.
Muster was stood down.
Plant running under normal conditions with no2 gas generator supplying power requirements. A power shutdown occurred and within 10 seconds coincident smoke detection in
the generator room initiated the general platform alarm. The automatic surface process shutdown was also activated. This made safe the gas process and associated
dehydration packages. The standby vessel <...> and <...> control were notified of the alarm, two members of the emergency response team were dispatched to the scene to in
estigate the cause of the alarm. They safely ascertained that smoke was evident in the operator room but that there was no indication of an accompanying fire. The room was
clear for entry within 5-10 minutes and it was evident that the problem had been co fined to smoke production from the generator windings
After an automatic sps (surface process shutdown) initiation, the platform main generation failed on attempted change over to liquid fuel operation. Two machines were on line
at this time, g8210 & g8230 - both of which tripped on suspecxted flame failure
At 14.55 hrs on <...>, mr <...> cutting a redundant condensate line above the betis actuator, inlet to fws v570, encountered a condensate pocket which he was unaware of. The
line in question had been previously water washed thoroughly, followed by nitrogen purge cycle with sampling at various tapping points. Permit to work was in force. <...>
was designated picws and firewatcher, <...> was designated nrp. A ladder outside the working perimeter gave access to <...> and <...> who were preparing a butt for welding.
On ignition, the flames ignited the ladder which trapped messrs evans and foster above, who both managed to slide down a chain block suspended between the test separator
v510 and west windwall. <...> activated a dry p wder extinguisher, <...> arrived on the scene and attempted to stop the flow with his welders gauntlet. The combination of
attempting to stop the flow and the dry powder extinguished the fire immediately.
At 21:30 hours a production tech working nights reported to the oim that there was liquid on the floor of the dc-nb room around the main station batteries. The electrical rpe
was asked to go with the production tech to investigate the liquid. They reporte back to the oim that it was battery fluid that had bubbled up after a discharge test earlier in the
day. The rpe plus one other member of the crew were asked to go over and clean up the liquid. Whilst cleaning up the liquid some ran down the battery case and made contact
with the base frame shorting the battery to earth causing arcs, sparks and a smallfire between the batteries. The rpe was asked to isolate and disconnect the batteries while
members of the base crew extinguished the fire. After using 4 co extinguishers, the situation was under control, the fire was out and batteries disconnected. The area was then
cleaned down and made safe by 02:15 hrs.
The 'b' fire pump was run up for commissioning checks. The engine exhaust pipe work was supported part way along its length by two chain blocks and slings, this rig up was
hidden from deck level by scaffolding one set of rigging utilised a canvas sling, he other used a steel sling which had cardboard packing in place to protect the stainless steel
exhaust. After running the engine for 25 mins, the heat of the exhaust ignited the cardboard causing some minor damage to one instrument cable (not live), and elted the
canvas sling. The person discovering the fire attempted to extinguish, using a dry powder unit, which failed to work. Another dry powder also failed. The fire eventually burnt
itself out. No persons were injured, and the fire only lasted for a short period
Fire in switch room. Constant voltage transformer supply smooth 415v to ups system. Probable overheating of capacitors leading to overheating of adjacent cables. Smoke
and occasional flame. Knocked down with halon portable.
Lagging on crude oil dehydrator heater seen to be smouldering with possible flame at main deck level.muster called whilst investigation started.fire main water used to dowse
lagging.esd initiated.muster stood down 22:35.
The control room registered one smoke alarm in the locker room and contacted a production tech. To investigate. On entering the locker room he smelled smoke, then saw a
small fire in a metal waste bin on the floor. The fire was extinguished using an adja ent hosereel.
Due to inclement weather, rubbish was being stored temporarily in the west end of the corridor on level 1 accomm. One cardboard box was noticed to be alight. Immediately
the alarm was raised and the fire extinguished using adjacent hose reel. Personnel were accounted for at a muster
The general platform alarm gpa was filsely initiated at 1453 hrs on <...> platform suring an instrument loop check. A low level pressure switch pll66045 was being loop
checked from the central control room ccr by an instrument technician. All but the loo including the gpa from <...> emergency response centre had been inhibited on the fire
and gas panel in the ccr for the commissioning work. The installed loop (under external walkways) however was not as expected from the design ( and the other input points
being checked) and the lopp bypassed the inhibit key. Coincidentally, fire pump was being run for the first time during a commissioningtrial. At the same moment as the gpa
sounded smoke was observed from the turbo blower by commissioning pers nnel as a result of paint on the turbo blower heating up and flashing off. Mustering took place in
accordance with the emergency reponse procedures and was completed in 15 minutes. The visual evidence of smoke coincidental with the alarm gave cause to bel ve that the
smoke had caused the alarm.
Coolant hose from the overtemperature switch to the radiator leaked. The engine overheated along with air compressor. The air compressor unloader valves seized in the load
position, allowing air to be continually compressed and discharged, creating furth r localised overheating of the air compressor cylinderhead and discharged pipework. This
heat resulted in in embrittlement of the air discharge hose. On hearing a "bang" from the engine compartment, the crane driver investigated immediatley. On discover ng a
small fire, he isolated the air supply, which inturn stops the engine. He then proceeded to extinguish the fire using 1 x dry powder extinguisher.
Smoke was observed filtering from a vent on the <...> roof. Investigation by emergency teams established that combustable material was smouldering /burning in the deck
drain within the <...> locker room. This was extinguished using a hose reel. The drain is partially covered by lockers and combustable debris had accumulated. The source of
ignition is suspected to be a carelessly discarded smoking material, this area is a designated smoking area.
After turbine trip on platform, plant reinstatement was in progress. Turbine "b" was started at 0030 hours. At this time, a smoke alarm indicated trouble within module 09.
Investigation showed smoke within the module with water injection pump "b" runnin . Attempts to stop the pump locally failed. The pump suffrered severe vibration
problems causing major failure of drive couplings
Nightshift steward removed some dishcloths from the drier in the laundry and placed some on top of a metal workbench, then left. Later two smoke detectors situated in the
laundry extraction duct initiated, causing the gpa to sound. All personnel were full mustered. The smouldering materials were extinguished by hand held water extinguishers.
1 control room logged small power failure at 00:23 hours. 2 various areas subjected to a 'dip' in power. 3 elect. Technicians checked e.c.p recitfier. Fault lights were
annunciating, these were accepted. 4 elect. Technicians then went to emergency switch oom. This was found to be full of smoke. The source of smoke was cubicle 4a 10a
which was isolated and removed. 5 the switch room was monitored to ensure no fire developed. 6 control fuses blown, 8 contactors burnt out. 2 cubicles burnt out from u.p.s
system
The nightshift cook/baker removed a tray of cooked sausages from the oven and placed it on a workbench nearby. When he turned around to close the oven door he noticed that
a quantity of fat had spilt from the tray onto the oven door and ignited. He shut t e oven door and switched the oven off. The fire was extinguished using a portable co2
extinguishe at 05:11 the smoke detector in the galley initiated a g.p.a at 05:13 the incident was established as being under control and personnel stood down.
Gpa was initiated at 13:23 on smoke detection from the drill floor sub-structure electrical switchroom. This resulted in a full muster. On investigation, it was determined that a
problem had occured on 3k854ob wher the fanbelt was slipping and the guard w s loose. The friction had caused the fanbelt to smoke and this activated alarms in the trunking.
The fan shut down on high vibrations.
Naked flame hotwork was ongoing on module "b" mezzanine level, adjacent to (and just above) t15 choke. During the welding of a pipe support, <...> noticed a flame around
the collar of t15 choke valve. He immediately extinguished the small "gas ring ype" flame with a fireblanket and then informed the control room via nearby telephone. An
emergency muster was initiated and the area then checked out all clear by the emergency teams
Thew drilling inspector wanted a small inspection hatch cutting in the ducting of the mud pump room hvac system. This was to enable him to carry out a minor modification
to an air sampling line. The hatch was approx 12" square and was cut using a hand h ld grinder, approx. 15 min after the work site had been cleared away and the permit
signed off, smoke was detected by the electrician who was by this time in the driling switch room. A subsiquent investigation showd that slag from the grinding operation ad
become embedded in the polythene coating of the acoustic muffler, starting a small smouldering fire. The fire was reported as officially out by the fire team, having been
extinguished by means of a dry powder extinguisher
The exchanger overheated decomposing water/glycol and discharging considerable amounts of smoke/steam under and around cellar deck incident contained by isolation of
affected unit. Infield and coastguard sar launched but not required later precautionery d wnmanning of non-essential personnel to <...> and <...> took place due to continuing
power outage (no safety implications - personnel comfort only) main generation restored just after 1800 hrs all production systems returned to normal by 2400 hrs weather as
follows: wind sw at 15 knots, visibility +13 miles, wave <.5m
Joint in welding cable, which had been left live, was arcing to the deck plate, in a pool of water, causing sparks and the insulation caught fire
A pipe support was being welded below deck and due to the heat transfer through the metal, a small cable drum, directly above, on the roof, caught fire.
<...> diesel powered generator (no.2229) suffered failure in alternator causing smoke to be produced which indicated a halon release. (15kg. Halon 1301) nb. 1 of 4 units
currently used to produce platform power.
At approx 09:40 on <...> an electrical short circuit occured on the essential utilities switch board. This is the normal feed to the well head area turbulating fan which is rated at
75kw and fitted with 250a fuses. Ip heard the cubicle buzzing abnormally and decided to attempt to rectify the situation by first opening the fuse switch and then closing it
again. It was during the reclosing of the swittch that a large flash occurred. This flash caused the injuries noted in form and irreparable damage to the cubicle. Adjacent
cubicles were not damaged.
Cubicle l303 had been isolated since <...>. Ip was detaild to prove the cubicle indication back to the vdu on prismic, via dats squeezer outstation 4a. Ip opened the door with
the key from the keysafe and pulled out the chassis replaced the control cir uit fuse and link fuse and closed the cabinet. It was at this point that a large flash occured on
investigation it was ascertained that a bundle of 3 fuses occured on the isolation of <...>. Had rolled toward the live terminals at the rear of the cabi et due to the replacing of
the cubicle one or more of these fuses bridged the live terminals at the rear of the cabinet which gave rise to the flash which severely damaged the cubicle and inflicted the
minor injury to ip noted on form.
Mechanical testing of motor feeder pump on entergising there was a flash over on terminal box at the yellow phase. Smoke set of f & g system and stopped main generator . No
one was in the area at the time. When the cabinet was opened it was discovered tha the red phase surge arrestor had blown out. No fire. No injuries. Investigation started with
vendors reps etc,
During normal running of the compressor a heat alarm inside the enclosure triggered a halon discharge. The unit shutdown automaticallt (2 x 42 kg cylinders tined) during the
cylinder replacement, another one was discharged in error ( 1 x 41kg)
O wind, gas leak discovered during inspection by hse. Grease plug left not fully tightened after injection of sealing compound.
Well c14 willis choke valve on crude oil manifold. 2" split developed on downstream spool side of choke valve assembly discharging crude oil/ water and gas into b module.
One gas detector alarmed. Manual shutdown initiated by area operator.
Well c14 willis choke valve on crude oil manifold in b module developed a 2" type split on downstream spool side of choke valve assembly resulting in gas/oil and water being
discharged into the atmosphere in b module. This valve had been removed from c04 anifold valve slot after failure of that valve in the same circumstances - valve has been
washed with sand from produced fluids within 5 hours of being put back in service, area operator initiated manual shutdown, three low level and one high level gas al rms
activated.
After making a connection wilst drilling 12.25" hole the driller started to bring his mud pumps up to the drilling rate. He then received an instruction by telephone from the
derrickman to shutdown the pumps, which was done immediately. The psv assembly h d sheared at the threaded joint on no. 1 mud pump which was then isolated, allowing
the well to be circulated with no.2 pump.
Location and details of leak are as per attached diver inspection report (3 pages). Depth of water at this location is approximately 3608.
At approximately 16:50 hours engineering personnel and production operators were to begin the oil decommissioning of the 10" <...> pipeline. When the pressure behind the
pig in the launcher equalled the pressure in the pipeline (100 psi), valve hov 5074 w s opened to allow the pig to be pumped down the 10" pipeline. As the valve opened, there
was gas break out from the pipeline back through the 4" hose and fill pump, causing gas to pass through the break tank to atmosphere. 2 gas detectors were activated a d
initiated a general alarm. No injuries or other damage occurred.
Gas, at 2070 psi, escaped from inner annulus. Initial investigations confirmed gas leak to be in the area of m22. Several valves were closed but leak continued. Men with
specific wireline skills located leak and closed a 1/2" needle valve, stopping the leak
Glycol bubbler was being loosened from its position at the top inside of a fire and gas panel in control room. The bubbler came apart due to incorrect dismantling procedure
and glycol leaked out cascading down onto the live fire and gas panel cards. The glycol caused short circut to occur in the card pannel.
<...> was manned at 1900 hrs on <...> to reset esd 301. Helicopter <...> rotors ran until 1925 hrs when it was decided to release the helicopter as remedial work was going to
take longer than planned. Whilst recommencing <...> flow at 1949 hrs, well b2 (slot 4) was opened in error, resulting in the flowline being pressurised to 207 barg and hence
tripping the well on flowline pahh. Simultaneously, a lound bang was heard, followed by the sound of venting gas. At the time of the incident, all three pob were in the control
room approximately 10 seconds after the inital noise, various gas heads in the process area came in to alarm and the production shutdown on a level 301 due to coincidence ga
detection in the process area. Initial investigation found la ge clouds of gas coming from the process area, wind direction blowing the gas towards the control room and life-
boat. It was decided that the safest place for all personnel was inside the control room. The stanby vessel, <...> was contacted at this poi t in time and requested to come in on
close standby and the vessel skipper responded by saying that he would do his best but was experiencing problems with the rough seas and high winds. The process operator at
<...> base was also contacted and inf rmed of the situation and told to pass detail of the situation on to <...> (production superintendent).
During routine utilities check the production technician observed what appeared to be a small liquid fire in the base of the main fire of no. 1 glycol regenerator. The unit was
shutdown and the fuel gas isolated. The small fire continued burning, confirmi g the source was due to glycol entering the fire tubes. The fire was extinguished with a dry
powder fire extinguisher.
As the operators commenced bringing well a9 to flow, the manual choke on the gas inlet to the seperator was opened quicker than the flow contorl valve on the seperator outlet.
The contorl room operator seeing the pressure increasing instructed the process operator to back-off the manual choke. It was at this time 02:10 hrs the p.s.v. On seperator no.7
lifted for approximately 5 seconds. The process operator immediately closed the manual choke. As the operator closed the choke he noticed a strong smell of g s and the
control room received a 20% gas alarm. On investigation the cause of the leak an area of corrosion and hole was discovered in the vent line downstraem of the p.s.v. The gas
detector which alarmed was 6 feet from the leak.
Suspected rupture of <...> export riser below water
An 8" check valve was being changed out for a serviced unit. On opening up the flowline to remove the check valve, vapours were released under atmospheric pressure which
were detected by the gas detector located within 3 feet of the check valve. The wind at the time was light and variable.
Platform <...> was in production with both glycol skids in service. Glycol was seen coming from the top of gas/glycol exchanger e 502a. The leak appeared to be coming from
a pipe to vessel weld. Wind 19 knots, wave 2mts.
Psv 615 relief line back to condensate pump suction was being cut by electric powered cutting disc to facilitate removal of pipework section for modification. A flance on the
line above the point to be cut had been broken prior to work being commenced. Wh n the pipewall was penetrated there was a small release of condensate.
<...> liquid handling pump (306-1501) was found spraying condensate from the centre ram area. The equipment was isolated and on investigation the middle ram was found to
have seized in the gland box. This resulted in the gland box bolts shearing causing he packing and produced liquids to spray out. Approx 5 barrels of condensate/produced
water/methanol was spilled into the bund. No gas detection was alarmed.
During the night of <...> it appears that the solenoid valve located in the fuel line to the day tank on the emergency generator failed in the open position, diesel fuel overflowed
into the generator enclosure, through a drain hole, on to the pla form deck and into the sea. "approx 22 tonnes". The incident came to the notice of platform personnel during
routine dipping of diesel tank at 0600 hours on <...>.
Upon investigation of bc2 compressor vent system pipework icing up indication of discharge valve passing ) it was discovered that the process gas discharge non-return valve
downstream flange had a small leak. Production operations personnel then checked t e compressor discharge valve (borsig ball valve ) to ensure it was in fact fully closed.
Hand pump operation of the valve managed to close the valve a few degrees and this stopped the gasket leak. Operations group then took steps to isolate and depressure the
system to allow remedial action. Weather conditions at the time were strong north east wind (46 knots) blowing through the open mezzanine area, driving rain , sea state 5
metre swell with good light conditions.
At 21:52hrs on <...> <...>, operator 1 was on duty in the <...> cellar deck when detected a very minor gas weep from a stainless steel union on the feed to k4000's suction valve
from the ledeen operator (outside of the cabinet). <...> attempted to n p the union up with an adjustable spanner and whilst doing so the tubing came adrift from the union.<...>
immediately isolated the supply to the ledeen operator and contacted the control room chief operator <...> who initiated an emergency sh tdown of the unit via the ucp esd
p/button. The incident was over in less than a minute. The 1/2" stainless steel tubing was pressurised to 220 psig and the release was stopped in less than one minute. The leak
was so small it was not detected by local ar a gas detection devices in the area. Further investigation indicated that the tubing union had been over tightened and the tube firced
through the ferrule
The leak was discovered by instrument technician whilst looking for a spanner dropped from the deck above.
Normal platform operations. Reboiler tube failure resulted in golycol leaking into tube flame enclosure which was ignited by normal heating flame. Glycol formed a small pool
below the fire box approximately four feet in diameter, i.e, a pool fire. This wa extinguished with dry powder followed by operation of reboiler halon system and deluge of
area the fire now contained to inside the reboiler was extinghished with dry powder. Damage appears to be limited to the reboiler tube and paint burnt off the fire ox.
Conditions at that time wind 5 knots at 30 deg sea state, waves 0.5 - 1 metre night time therefore dark.
Half inch stainless pipework from suction header to k104 suction valve differential pressure switch parted at a compression fitting. No damage, fittting replaced. Wind speed 26
knots gusting 39 knots direction 26 deg. During past construction work the pip brackets supporting the half inch stainless steel line had been cut. The line was then bent away
to clear the ongoing work. Cutting the brackets also allowed the horizontal section of the unsupported line to drop with the whole load supported by the fail d fitting. When
construction work was finished the pipe brackets were re-welded in their new position. The current failure occured during work to repair the pipe brackets and restore the
stainless steel line to its correct position. The fitting failed whe the pipe brackets were cut free prior to being re-positioned.
The installation was restarted after shutdown work the condensate pumps were started. A leak was then reported on the condensate line to the duty operator. Duty operator
shutdown condensate system. On investigation a split in the pipework was found on a b acket on the bridge between the <...> and <...> platform. The pipework was manually
isolated. The condensate leaked into the sea. The pipe is a 3" line
While isolating psh-f-150 to recalibrate pressure switch the isolation valve developed a stem seal leak on being closed. The valve was opened and the leak stopped. The
platform was shut in, the production header was isolated, depressured and the valve was changed. Loss of production was 85 minutes.
Whilst attempting to recharge the nitrogen accumulators on the m254 hydraulic package it was necessary to bleed off the hydraulic pressure on the accumultors. Whilst doing
this the drain valves were opened too quickly and releasing 200 bar of hydraulic oi into rervoir which caused the filler cap to pop off and cause a slight crack on the lower
seam.
At 13:24 gpa sounded caused by 2 x 20% gas detection in area a. Deluge fired. Personnel to muster stations. Investigation revealed 0.5" impulse line from tubing port on tree to
pressure transmitted in area 4. No injuries or damage. This minor gas release approx 4m3) led to detection at two closely spaced detector heads- one at 22% lel and one at
30%lel. On <...> platforms logic has been modified to provide platform wide alarm and executive action whenever two detectors reach 20% lel
During work to isolate the pig launcher for pigging operations, a minor leak was detected from the top of the bonnet on valve mov 5004. (nb detection was by personnel gas
detection equipment did not show any release). After examination, it was found that as was escaping through three adjacent stud bolts on the bonnet. (nb : the leak occurred
on the top of unmanned structure which is freely ventilated and allows maximum dispersion in an area)
Well bo4 was shut at 2245 hours for a plt logging programme to be carried out. A recompletion had been completed on this well on <...> and well had been producing from that
date. <...> well services completed a drift run at 0625 hours and had pulled ut of hole.they requested the well shut and lubricator vented down. The operator closed the swab
valve to ensure they were out of the hole. He then cracked open the swab valve the lubricator pressure via the tubing kill v/v to the aux flare. He heard a no se like an air hose
blowing off. He observed gas escaping from between the production wing v/v and the christmas tree. He ran back to the tree an closed the hand master valve. He informed ccr
of the leak. No gas alarms activated in ccr. He the depressuris d the tree to the south east aux. Flare depressurisation of tree and lubricator took approx 5 minutes. Three hand
tight bolts were found when flange was checked.
During compressor recommissioning after annual shutdown, gas release 2 x 20 lel occurred in module 4. Class 2 shutdown, automatic releases at deluge and gpa were
atomatically activated. Muster stations stood down at 21.33. It is known that multiple gas he ds on three seperate circuits activated the highest level detected being 47% lel
(actual head unknown) 4 heads - 59 d.j.k. Were reported at 20%. Nb the <...> feild has the most sensitive fire & gas detection system in the north sea, ie gpa, muster and shu
down occur at 2 x 20% lel. The above level of detection would not have caused a gpa/muster at <...> previous gas detection action points of 2 x 60%.
Flight<...> overflew oil slick at coordinates <...> north and <...> east. Weather 30 kas 264. As a result, subsea wells in the vicinity were subsequently shut-in. Established leak
originating from flowline p1 <...> which runs from well s bsea 38 to platform. Also oil spill finger print sample taken which confirmed within 24 hours that pipeline was
subsea 38. Nb: pipeline fluid was 80% water, 20% oil.
Hot work was being conducted at the void between n4/n2 45.5 m level. The site had been sheeted in with fire blankets and a firewatcher was in position. However, some
sparks were able to descend to n1 level 3/2a where an <...> generator is sited. The w tness, whilst passing the generator noticed a small flame aprrox 6 feet above the deck
level on a unistrut support of a cable tray. This flame was approx 2" high. As he approached the generator, he noticed two other flames at deck level approx 6" high. He
immediately raised the alarm and then extingished the flames using a locally situated co2 extinguisher.
Pv 5007a process flare valve on the gas test separator dismantled to investigate reason for jamming. The gas test separator was drained and purged. A 16 valve downstream of
the pv was used to isolate it from the flare header. When well n11 was brought on tream a back pressure was created in the flare system through c101 the first stage oil
separator back pressure was sufficient to cause isolating valve to pass. Gas escaped from dismantled pv. Pv was immediately secured and bolted up. Six fixed gas dectect r
heads were activated during the leak
During live annuls checks wellhead operator <...> heard gas venting from a tie-down bolt on n11, he raised the alarm to <...> technical room then made an unsuccessful attempt
to re-seal the leaking tie-down bolt using an ajustable spanner. On arrival of ell team leader and well supervisor a 1/22" hp hose was connected to the 9 5/8" annulus outlet to
vent the annulus pressure . The leak reate began to increase and further tie-down bolt started leaking. The platform was already in a shutdown condition due to an unrelated
trip. The panic button was operated by well heads personnel to ensure all dhsvs were closed. A chicksan was rigged between the 9 5/8" annulus and the n11 kill wing valve. The
preasure was then bled down to the production header stopping th gas leak. N11 was futher secured by brine and a wireline plug.
Hand valve ci802 had been removed to allow the topsides to be nitrogen purged prior to hot work. Due to a down hole valve passing the purge could not be carried until
rectification of the down hole valve passing problem. The valve ci802 was installed back into the pipework until the purge could be achieved. Due to nomination requirements
the installation was recommissioned for production and at some point in a two period started to leak methanol from one of the valve flanges.
Whilst stroking esdv 2203( the riser valve from the new subsea completion) there was an hydrocarbon/nitrogen gas release and the area was evacuated, the lock ceased after
approx. 30 secs. Both fixed and portable gas detection operated, registering 47% to 120% l.e.l. All personnel were mustered and accounted for. On investigation, it was found
that the valve body plug had been removed during nitrogen purging of the pipeline 7 days previous and had not been re-instated. Prior to venting the pipeline was at 5 bar
When stroking the hydraulic master valve of well <...>, there was a leak of hydrocarbon gas from the telltale on the side of valve body, indicating the failure of the lower stem
seal. The dhsv was already closed. The manual master was closed and the pip work vented to zero from the flowline drain and swab connections
The <...> high pressure pumps were being used to bullhead kill well <...>. Prior to killing at approximatley 1000psi., All lines were tested to 5000spi.. The pumping medium
was 480pptf nacl brine. At the end of the programme killing procedure, he bleed valve was opened to the barrel tanks to confirm zero pressure, as shown on the guage. A
small amount of gas percolated up the line at low pressure and escaped from the barrel tanks setting off an alarm via the nearby gas detection head. The gas v ry quickly
dispersed and no injuries or damage were sustained. All relevent safety systems ativated as designed.
During normal operations, gas was detected by an operator in the area detailed above. A leak was traced on the fuel gas line up to c turbine which runs through the module.
The turbine was changed over to operate on diesel and the line was isolated.
Small pin hole leak discovered in test seperatorpump recycle line. Pump not in service at time. Line pressurised via tie-in to main inlet conection ie main inlet to test seperator.
Test seperator in use in normal flow mode. Soillage predominatly format on water with normal amount of oil and perhaps some gas. Spillage contained in test sep. Bund no
more than actillon in volume.
Following bullhead tip of well in an attempt to explode blockage of lobe pump, 40 gallons of seawater habing been injected a residual pressure of 250psi remained. This was
then vented down into the trip tank. A gas detector above the trip tank was activ ted at high level during this operation.
Weather conditions at the time of the incident were sry and clear. The equipment in use was a diesel driven air compressor. No persons injured. At 2024 a fire was discovered
on the platfor, involving a temporary installed, diesel driven, air compressor. The general alarm was initiated and the fire extinguished swiftly by personnel using extinguishers
and hose lines. Damage was contained to the air compressor.
Hydrocarbon leak observed from hazardous drains return line at production manifold tie-in point, leak consisted of oil, water and gas mist. Open module therefore gas
dispersed, liquids contained within bunded area. Note:- equipment not in use at time of ncident. Three wells producing to production manifold.
Gas leak from flange on annulis. Helicopters mobilised, coast guard and police informed. Crew mustered but not evacuated. Bolts tightened under pressure.
Ti probe no0354 blew out its thermowell causing a gas release into module 03. The termowell was located on the down streamside of ex 0103a j.t. After cooler the resulting gas
release was detected by numerous gas heads in the module going a level 3 shutdow .co-incident smoke detectors brought in by the gas could effected a dulge of the module and
gave an esd fire output.
The process was in a shut down condition. Approximately one barrel of crude oil was released into production module 03. Two operators were trying to prove a mechanical
isolation to a control valve in preperation for maintenence. The upstream and downstrea block valves were closed and the drain valve cracked open when suddenly what
appeared to be a blockage in the drain cleared and crude oil was discharged into the module. The drain was quickly closed. Several gas detection heads were activated and
picked p by the ccr fire and gas panel. All hot work on the platform was stopped and a foam blanket applied to the spill. It was subsequently found that the down stream block
valve was damaged internally and the valve was not fully closed. This valve is now bein changed out.
Gas injection compressor <...> running up after maintenance a leak occured on the greylock clamp on psv 2612. The release of gas caused 2 x smoke detectors to alarm and
initiate a level 3 shut down condition. (fire area 101 smoke dtectors sm 9400 sm9 02) investigation found that the pipework was misaligned causing distoration at the invet
clamp on psv 2612
The two gas detectors, situated in the fuel gas wing, came into low alarm. The gas leak was traced to a spindle gland on the secondary high speed shut off cock.
A ti probe no 0354 blew out of its thermowell causing a gas release into module 03 the thermowell was located on the down streamside of ex01 0 3a jt after cooler the
resulting gas release was detected by numerous gas heads in the module giving a level 3 shutodwn. Co-incident smopke detectors brought in by the gas cloud erected a
deluge of the module and cave an esd fire out put.
During removal of suction strainer, a release of of condensate and gas 0ccured when the strainer lid sprang open under pressure trapped in the line. The metering stream had
been isolated and drained down but slight pressure remained in the line due to the master drain valve being closed
15% hcl was being transferred from one tank to another, on the skid deck when the air driven pump was started up, the discarge hose leading in through a top hatch of the
receiving tank back fed itself through a tie line which was holding it in position. A a consequence of the pump stroking - the acid solution was splashing off the top of the
hatch and over onto the skid deck - it is estimated that between 5 to 10 gallons was discharged. The spillage was neutralised with soda ash and flushed with copious a ounts of
fire water. No injuries or damage sunstained. Weather was clear with light e.n.e. Breeze.
The produced water line had been drained, flushed with water, drained again and isolated. Prior to commencing to cut the pipe with a cutting disc a gas check was carried out at
the open end of the pipe. This was 2-3 mtrs from the point of cut and showed 0 lel. The jobs copmmenced but as the cut approached the top of the pipe gas was encountered
and ignited the flame was rapidly extinguished by the pipe fitter who smouthered it with the gloved hands. There was no injury to personnel, or damage to equipment
Following water washing of the rb211 gas compression engine minor maintenance had been undertaken on the third stage discharge valve (xxv 1364) pilot valves. After
starting the engine/compressor xxv 1364 was stroke checked in order to ensure satisfactory pening and closing. During this operation gas was detected coming from the gland
area of the valve, this being observed visually and detected on the fixed gas detection systems.
Whilst shutting down power generator ax 5401c after maintenance checks two gas heads came into alarm, one showing 22% lel and the other 19% within five minutes both
were showing zero on the panel in the central control room. On investigation it was found that the secondary high speed shut off cock (ov6303c) was leaking from the gland
packing whilst going from the open to closed position.
The release of gas & condensate occured as a result of trapped pressure between a discharge valve and non return valve. Leak occured whilst operator specificaly checked for
trapped pressure when isolating the pump for maintenance. One detector alarmed in ire area 03:01 low level gas.
Gas generator on b power gen. Was being changed over from diesel fuel to fuel gas when coincident gas detection within its enclosure caused a level 3 shutdown of the
machine.
Preparations were taking place for the start-up of b compressor train. This involving pressurisation of the system. During the operation the low level gas alarm activated and the
train was depressurised from the central control room. On examination it was found that a blanking plug on flow transmitter ft 1430 was not fully tightened
Production was stable. The 'a' injection train was on line with 'b' shut down for maint pmr. One gas head g9576 went into low alarm, then high alarm with g9580 going into
high alarm some two minutes later. G8914 and g9572 went into low alarm at the same t me. Procuction operators <...> and <...> had gone to module 16 to investigate the first
alarm - they reported a strong smell of gas at the lower mezz level increasing towards the stairs leading to the upper mezz. The operators vacuated the module a the platform
sustained a level 3 shutdown as a result of coincident gas detection. The shutdown initiated the de-pressurising of 'a' comp train and all gas heads returned to normal levels
within 10 minutes. The module was inspected but no obvious source f leakage was found and it was decided that leak testing should be undertaken using nitrogen.
Operations personnel had just commenced pressurisation of the gas skid and had reached a pressure of approx 3 bar when a gas alarm was initiated in the analyser house.
Investigation revealed the source of the leak to be an open ended section of 1/2 instru ent piping. The open end was present due to construction personnel. Some 12 days ealier,
having removed for repair the vacuum pump to which it would normally have been connected.
As above.followed by vessel was being depressurised for further maitainance when seals failed at 50 bar, followed by controlled blowdown of vessel with platform brought to
hazard status.
Work had been completed in changing the fuel gas system on g-850 from gas to liquid fuel. Initial commissioning had been carried out under the supervision of the service
engineer. Earilier starting problems had been caused by blockage of the fuel filters nd the machine was on its second start attempt within an hour. During this start attempt
24ird10 activated and subsequently reset whereon 24ird12 activated. The control room contacted the power technician after the first detector had activated, who upon c ecking
inside the enclosure noticed smoke and flame within the transition piece between the gas generator and the power turbine. After checking that the enclosure doors were closed,
the halon was released manually from the local control room. This caused he platform to go to hazard status. The executive actions were then confirmed i.e. Fuel supply
isolated and air supply damper closed. No fire could be observed looking through the enclosure window but checking the rest of the unit revealed that the fire w s still burning
within the power turbine exhaust ducting. The unit exhaust and inlet dampers were then manually closed. Meanwhile the emergency support team laid a foam blanket under the
machine prior to extinguishing the fire using halon extinguishers an water cooling
Following maintenance work on recip compressor the machine was started up in injection mode. While still bringing the machine up to full operating pressure, a low level gas
alert was activated in module u4e. The compressor was shutdown manually and automa ic blowdown initiated but 2 gas heads detected high level gas and initiated a full
surface process shutdown (inc esdv closure). The module was clear of gas 10 mins after the leak was found to be from a suction valve cover on cyl no 5
Following maintenance work on recip. Compressor the machine was started up in the injection mode. While still bringing the machine up to full operating pressure, a low level
gas alert was activated in module. The compressor was shut down manually and auto atic blowdown initiated but 2 gas heads detected high level gas and initiated a full
surface process shutdown (inc esdv closure). The module was clear of gas 10 mins after the first alert and the leak was found to be from a suction valve cover on cylinder
Following a train shutdown two technicians injecting grease into a newly installed gas entry block valve partially unscrewed a grease fitting which suddenly blew out releasing
gas into the wellhead module. Pressure on the separator side of the valve was 8 bar, the upstream valve was closed. After the initial burst of gas the flow stopped. The platform
shutdown automatically on high level gas detected by sensors sited near the valve
As part of the operations agreement, all main block valves on the prover loop have to be leak tested.this is a routine task carried out by the oil export technician. To test the
valves, they are closed and the cavity between the seals is bled down and a v sual check for leakage is carried out. The export technician had completed this check on stream 2
main stream valve but had failed to fully close the drain valve. When the main stream valve was returned to service, hydrocarbons were released into the modu e through the
slightly open drain valve. The platform went to alert and then hazard status. The drain valve was closed. The gas head indication decreased and the platform was left on alert
status until the small hydrocarbon releasewas cleaned up. The plat orm was then returned to normal green status
Minor gas release from valve over joint on compressor.yellow alert - red alert onto blowdown returned to normal 10:55 <...> at 1040 hours the installation went to yellow alert
status due to llg in um4e approx 1 minute later hlg alert was activated whi h put platform on red hazard status. Investigation by area technicians found a gas leak from valve no
8 cover joint to cylinder no 6 of k9320 recip compressor. The machine was manually shutdown and auto blowout and isolation initiated the f&g panel was mo itored during
the incident with 1 gas card rising to + 80% lel and 3 gas cards rising to +40% lel as soon as the machine was blowndown the gas levels quickly dropped to zero the platform
was returned to green normal status at 1055 hours weather at time wa 130 degrees at 22 knots, air temp 8 degrees
Gas release emanated from k9310 4th stage discharge pressure gauge impulse line. Machine manually shut down and impulse line root valves were isolated by the area
technician. Witin 4 minutes of incident all affected gas heads had dropped below 25% lel.
K9320 was being brought into service after the platforms annual maintenance shutdown. On 2 previous start attempts the suctin valve had failed to open. The fault was
corrected and the machine started at 0608 hrs. It tripped at 0610 hours on a faulty low s ction pressure trip and began auto blowdown. At 0612 hours the cylinder no 1 head
gasket developed a leak. Low level gas alarm was triggered (yellow alert) followed by red hazard status on high level gas.coincident high level gas produces an sps,as design
five gas heads in the area registered > 75% lel. A further 20 heads in the connecting modules indicated between 25% and 75% lel. 2 gas heads in column 3 indicated between
25 and 75 % lel.hvac remained on and the compressor continued to blow down until th area was clear of gas and platform returned to normal green status at 0639 hours. The
gasket was replaced no evidence of cause was found. It had not been disturbed during the maintenance shutdown. During the red hazard status a full muster was held.
K9320 had been running since 2200 hrs on <...> following an earlier joint replacement. High cylinder temperatures were detected in cylinder no 1. The machine was shutdown
at 1842 hrs after checking all other cylinders in order to change out identified f ulty discharge valves on cylinder no 1 as per design the machine began to blowdown within its
boundary isolation. At 1842 hrs low level gas was detected in that module and the adjacent inter connected module. At 1854 hrs high level gas was detected an sp and red
hazard status were automatically triggered. Gas compression auto blow down activated,as per design ny 108 the gas had dissipated sufficiently to clear the red hazard status
and the platform was stood down to yellow alert status.at 1920 hrs with a l gas heads clear nirmal green status resumed. A full muster was called at 1854 all personnel
accounted for at 1908.
Failure of lean pump p9415 mecahnical seal caused a release of hydrocarbons resulting in an sps of the platform. All auto systems operated correctly and the module
ventilation cleared all hydrocarbon gas released. Checks were carried out in other modules o ensure no migration of gas the lean oil pumps shutdown and automatically
isolated. The failure of the seal is subject to further investigation.
High vibrations from p4030 seawater supply pump indicated in alarm. 0649 hours vibratins peaking above trip point. 0650 hours smoke head s878 activated in column 3 and
platform went to red hazard status. Platform personnel being mustered. 0651 hours repo t of buring oil smell (appeared as smoke/vapour cloud in column 3). 0703 hours 2
technicians entered column 3 to investigate. 0707 hours report from technicians that area around p4030 safe and some oil/water mix found around pump bedplate. Bearing
housing was hot. 0709 all personnel accounted for and platform returned to normal green status. Inspection of pump p4030 found that the pump bearing failed due to ingress of
cooling water from leaking bearing housing cooling coil, causing oil to emulsify. Subsequ nt oil viscosity loss lowered ability to lubricate bearings and therefore led to
overheating of bearing causing hot oil vapour/mist to be emitted activating smoke head s878.
A well was being flowed through the test seperator bc-v-3150; the lcv by-pass line failed, downstream of the by-pass valve 3p2008, releasing oil and gas into the module.
Cd8/9/10 low level gas detection operated followed by high level gas detection about a minute later. This resulted in an automatic surface process shutdown. The test
sepearator was depressurised via the control room, hvac remained on and cleared the gas. There is normally no flow in the by-pass line. Preliminary i examination indicate
corrosion as the cause.
Worked over in <...> it was decided to disconnect the flowline,when the train was shutdown the tree was disconnected from the process by removal of the choke and fitting
blanks to the tree and flowline.the choke was removed and a blank was fitted to he tree.before the technicians fitted a blank to the flowline a quantity of water was ejected
from the open end of the flowline.this quickly stopped and was followed by a smal release of gas
Stem seal on xcv-2136, train 3-1st stage gas blowby valve,failed in service releasing oil and gas into the module.sps initiated by area technician on discovery of the leak. Oil
trains immediately depressurised from the production control room on confirmat on of the leak.low level gas was then detected in the extract ducting by two heads g771/g772,
very quickly reducing to around 5%lel. Extract duct situated directly above the valve. The gas was dispersed by hvac initially and then assisted by natural venti ation. The oil
spillage was contained in the module and cleaned up.
Platform raised to hazard status on detection of hlg from the crude oil cooler enclosure on m1w roof. Upon investigation a pressurised oil leak was reported to be spraying
from the oil inlet pipe to crude oil cooler. The leak coming from the sealing comp und at the deck penetration. The process was immediatel;y shut down and de-pressurised.
The leak wa scaused by external corrosion of the pipe with a hole approximately 50mm
The platform was raised to red hazard status by high level gas detection in m3e and d3e. Gas was seen to be escaping from bd31 swab cap bleed nipple. The bleed valve was in
the open position and the release occured when the upper master gate valve was ope ed. The instance of release was observed by the technician in the wellhead who straight
away instructed (by radio) his colleague at the hydraulic skid to re-close the upper master gate valve. This instruction was immediately actioned and the leak was stop ed. The
action to isolate the release was taken before the gas detectors raised the platform to hazard status.
1/2'' swagelok, deisolation of lean oil system. Technician noted leak, this did not actuate any sensors. Isolated by technician.
Work was ongoing in d1cs to decommission the existing d2c deluge valve set and replace with new spools and valves. During the course of removing a section of 6" deluge
pipe spool it came into contact with a 1/4" oil sample test point that was in close pro imity to the deluge set. This caused damage to the tapping point which in turn allowed loss
of containment and prompted a manual shutdown of train 2. Approximately 4 gallons of 50% oil/water mixture was released into d1cs at a pressure of 0.5 barg
Power technician, whilst carrying out checks on the fuel gas system in d2e noticed a hydrocarbon drip from a flange on an adjacent system he immediately informed the system
supervisor process. The ssp identified the leak as being on the hihi drains return from gas compression to 2nd stage separator (normal pressure 20bar) the train was manually
shutdown. Upon inspection it was found that a 6" 150 gasket had been fitted in a 300 class system. In addition the gasket was not concentric with the flange.
Oim,ops, supervisor and ssp whilst on a process module inspection observed a water leak from a pipespool. The leak proved to be hydrocarbon contaminated water from an 8"
to 6" reducing spool on line <...> directly upstream of lcv2231 (train 3 2nd stage) the control room was contacted and instructed to shutdown and blowdown train 3.all other
process interfaces with train 3 were checked and confirmed isolated
Train 3 trip and alarm testing was in progress. The first stage high level kdg switch required resetting. An instrument technician, a member of the test team, electrically isolated
the switch and proceeded to d2c to make the adjustments. The kdg cap is sc ewed and while the technician was unscrewing it the whole assembly unscrewed (appx 15 degrees)
the kdg switch assembly is screwed into a flange and is sealed by a joint. This joint began leaking. The technician immediately re-tightened the switch which re uced the leak
but did not stop it. An area technician, one of two in the module contacted the control room and the shift supervisor process (ssp). The ssp went immediately to the module
while the two technicians monitored the leak (gas detection did not d tect any rise in gas level on any detector in d2c). On arrival in the module the ssp assessed the situation
and instructed the control room operator to shut down and blowdown train 3 isolations from the remaining process were checked and confirmed
Well <...> - hydraulic oil with traces of crude was discovered weeping from the connection between the wellhead and adaptor spool above. In addition a small amount of gas
accompanied the leak. This indicated a loss of integrity requiring investigative nd remedial work. The well was closed in and being the oinly produvtive available, all
production was shutdown.
While commissing the platform fuel gas distribution system gas was released from a nitrogen leak test injection point which had not been blanked on completion of the leak
test. The majority of gas released was nitrogen but hydrocarbon was present in suf icient quantity to activate gas heads in the area.
Whilst carrying out the task of drainin down an ethanol distribution line a spillage occured. Hot work in the area had been suspended to allow draining of the ethonal system.
On completion of drain down the hotwork was re-instated. At this point a mino spillage occured almost immediately caused by a hot welding spelter falling from above. The
fire was extinguished using a dry powder extinguisher.
Two gas detectors, zones 32e (12) 32e (24) indicated presence of hydrocarbon gas in above area. Area thoroughly checked but nothing found. By this time, detectors had
reset. General alarm initiated muster procedured and recall for construction personnel
Gas condensate escaped from a drill line an a condensate line between hp seperator and lp seperator. Pressure in the line was 12bar. Valve on drain line was fitted with a blank
which was trapped and fitted with a swagelock nipple and adaptor. The drain was used as an access point during recent leak testing and this was the first time this train had
been livened up. The swaglock nipple appears to have been covered with a plastic cap and the valve was passing pressure build up behind the cap blew it off, and condensate
escaped.
A 3/4" plug blew out of the seawater side of the lube oil cooler 8 to 10 barg. Due to use of dissimilar metals.
The seal at the freasehead on an <...> wireline lubricator failed causing loss of containment and subsequent release of hydrocarbons, the system failed due to an obstruction in
the choke valve on the grease supply line. The incident happened on a further three occasions as the tool string was being pulled from the well. On each occasion the b.o.p's
were closed the lubricator vented and the check valve removed stripped and cleaned
A flow controler on a dew point analyser had failed and gas was escaping through a bleed hole on the body of the regulator. Smell of gas detected by someone passing the
location and subsequent search found the cause.
Leak was observed from impulse pipework conected to a pressure switch on the oil export system. Leak was traced to npt fitting that was only hand tight. Instrument
isolatedand have elimminatted when fitting tightened properly
Gas detectors in the wellbay area acivated by a minor leak from a vent valve on a pressure gauge tapping the gauge was connected to the non active side arm cap on the area
the xmas tree of the well. An operator was in the area and isolated the leak quickl . The deposit dispenced and caused valve to leak.
A pressure guage on a riser attached to wellhead, blew off whilst a routine pressure test was underway, to prove integrity of riser & lubricator seals. At the time of the incident,
the swab valve was closed and the hydraulic master and sssv were open. The riser was being pressurised by a gas supply from the service wing valve. The pressure above the
swab valve had reached 303.5 bar. At the time of release, and above the sssv it was at 315 bar. Gas pressure blew the guage to the underside of the main deck w llslot
temporary tread boards. The wireline supervisor, <...>, quickly shut off the supply gas needle valve to the riser. He then contacted me,informed me of the situation and
proceeded to close the master and sssvs on well-slot 8. He then return d to the mezzanine level to close the needle valve on the supply manifold to the guage connection.
Whilst this was ongoing, my action was to monitor the gas level being sensed by gas detector g.d.1103 situated on the east side(high route) of the platform. The incident
occured at 14:15 hrs approx. At 14:17 the % lel had reached 27.4% and by 14:18 hrs this had decayed to 5.9% lel. G.d. 1103 was the only detector to show an increase in gas
levels. The situation was monitored closely throughout its duration an i had the option of shutting down production had conditions dictated
Walking past flowline from wellslot 10, i heard a 'different' noise which turned out to be a gas leak coming from a 'graylock' type flange coupling situated on the flowline from
wellhead slot 10 immediately downstream of the wing valve. My immediate actio was to inform <...> control room & asked them to shut in wellslot 10. I then closed the
wellslot upper master valve and all the associated manual isolating valves on that particular wellslot. I depessured the pipework via the vent header and atte pted to tighten the
coupling bolts, after which i re-pressured the pipework for test purposes. The leak persisted and i again had <...> shut in the wellslot wing valve. I closed the upper master
valve once more and shut in the header isolation val es, informing <...> control room and my immediate supervisor
Gas vented and a plug blew out of a flange fitted to the vent header (p101). Drilling work ceased, the 49/27a rig oim was informed and the deluge system activated. No gas
alarms operated as it was very windy when the blow down was complete and all the gas vented, the platform was left vented and depressured.
Incorrect flow indication from pw-09 well flow transmitter fi-0500. Suspect liquids or hydrate. Gas lock-out for pw east well bay for depressurising flow transmitter. The
isolation and vent valves situated on instrument control block were operated by clos ng high and low pressure supplies and opening both vents. One isolation valve stiff to
operate. Exercised several times to close. Opening vents on control block. Small discharge of gas. This being normal, operator called to relieve desk control operator f r short
period. Gas lock-out removed for protection. 15:10 hrs low level single head gas alarm indicated from east well bay followed 5 minutes later by low level coincidence gas
alarm same area causing g.p.a. Investigated area, small discharge of gas from pw-09 control block vent. Closed valve which had been stiff a further 3 turns stopping any gas
release.
A pinhole leak occured from the weidolet chemical injection stub on the flowline. Well fluid was seen running down the flowline by an operator whilst carrying out routine
wellhead readings. Well was immediately shutdown manually at local panel. There were no injuries
Normal process operations, with no untoward alterations were ongoing. Condensate pump "c" was the single duty pump. A mechanical working in the area noticed a spray of
condensate coming from under the ram box cover. He informed operations and the area ope ator shutdown the pump, isolated the system and vented the residual to drain. On
investigation it was found to have been caused by a pinhole leak from the outer radius of a 6mm dia s/s tube which is part of the condensate throat bush flushing system ram
packings.
A condensate leak was discovered on the lubricating system of condensate pump "c". This was similar to a previous incident when the pipework had been replaced. It appears
that the replacement pipework had been used before and suffered a common mode failur producing a similar leak. The pump was s/d and drained.
Routine operations ongoing operator tasked with lining up <...> separator liquid outlet to the surge drum header. On arrival he saw a liquid release from the water/methanol lcv
bypass valve, the main control room was informed and a controlled shut own initiated and the offending pipespool isolated and depressured. Wind speed 20 kts, direction 180
c.
2 x 20% gas detectors initiated on pp cellar deck, on arrival, condensate release was seen to be coming from condensate pump 'c', control room informed and pump stopped and
isolated.
During a planned shutdown liquids were being removed from the production systems using residual pressure. After pumping out the condensate surge drum to its minimum
level it was decided to utilise the closed drain system to fully drain the vessel. The ope ator, having operated the appropriate valves heard a change in noise level and upon
investigation saw a slight mist on the mezzanine level below and immediately isolated the line. Simultaniously the control room operator reported a single 20% lel detectio in
the same area. On investigation sand was evident on the cellar deck floor and the hole in the process line identified.
Gas generator for compressor no 3 was shutdown to investigate a fault in the fuel gas supply to the starter. The fuel gas supply was isolated and depressurised. When the inlet
strainer flange was split, gas was released and activated the gas detectors in he enclosure hood. Subsequent investigation showed that no valves were "passing" and that the
cause of gas being present was most likely due to insufficient time being taken during depressurisation. After the one time release, no further action was necess ry to make safe
the area. There was no continuous release. The isolations and depressurisation was safe before work recommenced.
A 20% gas alarm brought the release to the control room operators. Attention. He immediately contacted an operator who went to investigate. He discovered a leak on the
lubricating system of condensate pump a. (partially contained and deflected by the pump ram cover), stopped the pump and shut the discharge value which reduced the
discharge. A second operator arrived and together they closed the suction valve and depressured the pump. The total time of discharge was 5 minutes.
At 0300 hours on <...> during normal production operations, a 20% l.e.l gas alarm from pp cellar deck (zone 1 hazardous area) fixed detection unit came up on the control
room operators panel. A mobile operator in the vicinity of pp cellar deck was i mediately asked to investigate. This confirmed a jet spray leak from the <...> produced water
lcv. Bypass line. Prompt communication resulted in immediate tripping & venting of both <...> & condensate systems plus a general platform alarm. This led to a muster. The
separator 'produced water/methanol' outlet shutdown valve & closed. The leak virtually ceased at this point. Further manual isolations secured the site. On examination, the
principle damage was sustained by the 1 1/2" by pass val e which exhibited a 1/4" hole in the body. The immediate vicinity was covered with sand, indicating liquids
contamination. The area was well illuminated. External weather conditions- wind 12 knots dir 042 c temp 11 c. Rainy
At 1439 hours the platform status changed to red, indicating fire at p4250 turbine. 2 technicians sent to investigate. P4250 confirmed by technicians, had shut down and flames
could be seen inside hood of turbine. Technician operated btm system by removin pin from bottle and striking. After discharging btm the emergency response team arrived to
continued investigation. Fire confirmed as out after btm had been released. Cause of fire was hydraulic oil being sprayed onto hot exhaust casing under turbine hoo . Source of
oil was from the hydraulic start pump which had been suffered an o ring failure. 2 of the 4 hydraulic pump holding down bolts were found to be slightly slack.
At approx 1825 hours 2 gas technicians entered module m2e to check k2280 and located a gas leak on a .5 inch needle valve on the third stage discharge bottle. After making
an initial assessment of the leak they both decided the machine required to be shu down. They informed the control room of their decision and stopped k2280 and
depressurised it. The leak was detected by smell, the fixed gas detectors did not register any gas level.
An ives 1/2" npt stainless steel gauge coupling connecting 6" diameter stainless steel gauge (0-160 bar) to 6" fuel gas line failed with a resultant gas release into module.
Platform automatic shut down system operated with deluge release into module as er design. Fittings and gauge damaged - no other damage or injuries sustained.
A gas leak occured on the production separator v4201 when the pressure indicator pi42705 blew off from a 12mm dia. Compression fitting. Cause unknown.
Leak occurred in the oil process line from oil cooler to third stage separator <...> train 1 (operating at 2 bar). Immediately spotted by worker close by, who raised alarm. Train
manually isolated and pipe work depressurised. Pin hole leak found to be a 6 oclock posistion on weld. Leaking hydro carbons (85% bs+w) retained within module. No
indication of gas from either fixed or portable gas detection monitor
The cement untit was being used on well e2 'a' annulus in order to complete a prelimary 3,000 psi pressure test on same. The rig up to allow this task included a third party
rental hose run accross mod 21 rig fllor which connected the hp cement line to th rig choke manifold. The rig up allows pressure to be applied to the annulus and bleed off
back to the cement unit. During the course of the pressure test, the hose failed at 2,800 psi causing the release of the pressurised test medium, (seawater) to be s rayed into the
rig floor area.
During the approach of a helicopter to land on <...> helideck the south firewater/foam monitor started to discharge uninitiated by the attendant fireman. Before full discharge
could take place the fireman averted the monitor away from the deck and man ally isolated the appropriate valve.
Following leak testing of the m.o.l. And oil metreing skid pipework, personnel were instructed to remove a valve. This involved removing grayloc clamps. The test medium
was nitrogen. During the removal of one of the clamps, a small explosion was experienc d accompanied by the noise of high pressure release. Subseyent investigation
identified the line between the valve to be removed, which had been in the closed position, and the downstream spade, in position as phased isolation, had not been de-
pressurised due to an oversight. This resulted in the release of n2 pressure of possibly 120 bar. Conditions: good lighting, cramped worksite due to location, oil free.
A quantity of crude oil was carried over from the production separator (vo2) to the flare system via the production scrubbers vo4/v05. Production from the sattelite platform fe
was being established at the accident, a large slug of liquid was received fro the fe production line, which tripped the separator. However, liquid was carried out through the
separator gas off take into the flare system. Some of the oil was not burned in the hp flare and fell as droplets on the main deck (west). No injury to pe sonnel. No damage to
plant.
During normal operations flowing well fluids from <...> to <...> via the 12" flowline a small leak was observed on a 12" nrv in the <...> reception area on <...>. The leak was
immediately reported to the ops supv who then shut down <...>. A foam blanket was put down o the deck under the leak as a precaution and a fire tam was in attendance as
the then isolated pipe section depressurised. Eventually the liquid (oil and water) leak subsided and then small 'puffs' of gas were observed coming from the leakage area for se
eral minutes until the isolated system fully depressurised. Any evolved gas was being carried out of the adjacent module door duw to the prevailing air currents.
Pin hole leak detected on 18" l.p. Manifold at point of entry of 1" demulsifier injection line. Lp manifold shutdown and prepares for repair - during this period production plant
shutdown for other reasons. Decision taken to leave plant down for duration of repair to ensure security of isolation. On achieving gas free status, offending pip nipple cold
cut off revealing wastage of 18" dia manifold local to point of attachment - cleaned back to sound metal - including ultrasonic inspection and 1 1/2" sockol t fitting welded in
place. (oversize to original to compensate for metal loss at attachment). - note originated as "weep".
A contract electrician was passing the main export pump and noticed a small quantity of oil leaking onto the deck. He reported this to the adjacent control room and an
operations technician was called to investigate. The leak has developed into a spray y the time the technician arrived at the pump. He immediately returned to the control
room and pressed the manual plant shutdown.
Aux generator (dg 6) had been running for almost one hour as part of normal sunday runs. (machine is normally stopped, but on standby). On checking machine from outside
the enclosure,the technician on duty noticed lube oil on and around the machine and i mediatly pressed the local stop button, shutting down the machine. On entering the
machine enclosre he noticed a small a small fire under the exhaust manifold heat sheild. He extinguished the fire with a hand bcf extinguisherand informed the central con rol
room
The corrosion inhibitor injection line was to be tied omtp the modified p13/14 pump discharge line. The line is 1/2" ss tubing. The pump end of the line was valve isolated
and the pumps isolated. When the cap was removed at the delivery end of the line to check the line was free of fluids a minor oil and gas release took place. Opertion staff
were on scene and the fso and fire team were called to support if required. No fire and gas annunciation or action took place and a muster was not required. The ource of the
oil was not readily found so the operations supervisor shutdown the plant on a controlled mol sequence 2. The line was re-plugged and the source found at an old collector
header tie-in point. The tie-in to the chemical line in question was ifficult to see or fine amongst pipework and cable trays. The line was being proved free of fluids in order
that an icc could be applied to the line for maintaenance staff to tie it back into the oil line at the booster pump discharge line.
Small fire reported inside hood of gt2, precautonary muster of platform personnel. Fire extinguished using dry powder. Personnel stood down. Preperations had been in hand
towards end of night shift for man entry into diesel day tank t05 north for major i spection. To avoid draining off residual deisel into lp closed drain tank, which is pumped out
to the producton seperators and impacts on water quality in the effluent disposal system, an unapproved method of draining down was utilised. The main drain he der from the
diesel tanks was plugged with the intention of draining the residual diesel into drums. A transfer of diesel from the storage leg to the south tank was then undertaken which
resulted in he south tank being over filled, diesel from the tank o er - flow had no drainage rout. Diesel backed up bthe booster pump 1" bund drain which overflowed,
indications are that a small quantity of diesel migrated back up the small bore drain to the power bearing housing assembly and dripped onto the exhaust
The auxillary generator dg7 had been started for its weekly test runs at 21:35hrs and all was satisfactory. At 22:28hrs the smell of diesal alerted an operations tech to
investigate the generator. He discovered diesel leaking from the fuel supply sytem t the machine. The operator shut the machine down and isolated the diesal supply. The
failure occurred in the fuel oil reservoir (a small pot designed to ensure no air is entrained in the diesal supply). The securing bolt which holds the fuel oil resovo r together
had sheared at the neck above the threads the incident was discovered quickly and consequently. Relatively little diesal was spilled approx 7 litres.
<...> had been found to be passing, preventing access to the <...> receiver for pig removal and inspection. Furminite were bought out to inject sealant into the valve to enable
isolation. Sealent was injected on the west side of the top seal of the valve. On attempting to access the injection nipple on the east side, a small leakage of oil under low
pressure occured from the nipple threads. Cautios attempts to tighten the nipple did not stem the leak. <...> were asked to shut down in a controlled manner. A foam brqnch
was laid out and an lp fire hose used to wash the spillage to closed drains. Welding feeders were tripped fd esdv 21561 on fc was closed and <...> a fully isolated and depress-
ured/drained. On attempting to remove the nipple the threaded sec ion fractured. It was evident that the threaded section had been prevously partially fractured. The <...>
sealine and <...> infield production header was in operation at the time at a pressure of arround 55 bar. The incident occured in package 3- pig rece ver area, a module with
louvred east face, open door to east face of platform and passage and to mol package 2. The wind was light, from the north-no gas heads in the area were activated by the leak
Pinhole leak discovered by operator in well 2-2 flowline on a short section. Leak was discovered by a production technician recording nightly well annulus pressures. The
well was immediately shut in and the flowline depressurised. On inspection the lea was caused by internal corrosion. The inside of the flowline had a scale coating
approximately 3mm thick, at the point where the pinhole leak developed the scale coating had flaked off. It is suspected that the scale was of a barium sulphate compositio , a
sample has been taken for analysis
An oil leak was spotted by production personnel who alerted the shift supervisor and fire and safety officer. Immediate investigation revealed an oil leak from the pipe work.
The platform was shutdown immediately ceasing oil production and the live work was isolated and depressurised, the oil leak turned into a small low pressure gas release that
was contained manually. There was no detection of gas registered on the fire and gas protection system. There was no pollution, the oil being contained in the drain system.
No personnel injuries were sustained.
An instrument technician was working near the gas lift feed pipework when he noticed a small vapour release and icing on cover joint/valve stem of a 1' nominal ball valve.
No gas heads were activated due to the combination of leak size and exposed wind ocation
During normal production operations the duty operator observed a small crude leak from the valve bonnet and on the recycle valve on po5. The stand-by machine was started
and po5 shutdown in a controlled manner to inverstigate and rectify the fault.
A diesel day tank was filled beyond its capacity. The overspill was routed to the process open drain tank, t-71. This resulted in a displacement of crude oil/diesel from the
open drain loop seals onto the floor of the mol pump area in front of p-o5. A roduction shutdown was manually initiated as a precaution.
Painter, noted a smell of gas when working in the roof space of package 5, seperaror module. Ops. Supv. And oim notified. Small leak found on spindle end cap of 12" nrv.
(detected visually only by leak test solution) on off gas line to ngl compressor s ction.
Low then high gas alarm, gas head g11, activated in wellhead area eggbox 3. Upon investigation, gas was found to be coming from the 1/4" npt vent port (actual aperture 4mm
diameter) of a "block and bleed" valve assembly located just off the non-active win valve on the gas injection side of well 3-3. Block and bleed assembly was isolated and
depressured. Gas injection pressure is monitored by local pressure guage via this assembly which was under 90 bar pressure at the time. The normal condition for the ve t port
is needle valve (integral to the assembly) closed and the vent port plugged
All instrumentation on the dgl skid was being checked for gas leaks following notification by <...> of a gas leak on their ft 3205 earlier in the week. Inspection of psl 3222 on
<...> revealed a minor gas leak from the body joint just abov the screwed tapping. Psl 3222 manufactured by <...>.
Following ngl plant trip at 1535 and loss of dgl, a routine plant start up was underway at around 1915 just prior to a dgl start-up. P97 was stopped as condensate make was
low. Operations team shutdown p97. High pressure vapour then began to leak from th gland on the suction valve. Platform put to muster as a precautionary measure at 1922.
Successful isolation reported at 1927. Gas leak under control 1934 hours stand down at 1949 hours after oim site inspection. Wind 10 knots,220,daylight. Visibility 10n+ bar
pressure 1014 mb. I424:i425'
During the annual internal igloo inspection of the gas pipework & valves within the gannet igloo by the dsv subsea mayo. A minor gas leak was observed coming from the 20"
neles ball valve fv10, at body plug (part 159.1) reference attached drawings. To g ve an indication of the leak rate, it took 81 minutes to fill a one gallon container.
A fine oil spray was noted by the assistant operator coming from a flow line. He identified the leak to be coming from well <...> flow line. He immediately shut the well in and
contacted the control room. The flow line was then depressured to the well clea tank. Flow line pressure at time of incident was +/- 185 psi.
Prior to the incident, fault finding was on going to determine why the turbine would not run on fuel gas. Mechanical checks were exhausted and instrument tests continued
within the turbine enclosure. Two electricians and one instrument technician were i attendance. Solenoid valves and pressure switches were removed from fuel gas supply
lines and bench tested, then refitted. The turbine was run up but failed on the same fault. The junction box for the solenoid valves power supply was opened up. An inst
ument technician placed a fluke d.v.m. Over the contacts of a pressure switch to monitor for any change when the turbine was running up. When the turbine was running up
the technician dislodged an adjacent crimped lead and this touched the side of the ju ction box creating a spark. The spark ignited fuel gas and there was a ball of flame
approximately one foot in diameter, this quickly reduced to about six inches then was extingiushed after approximately twenty five seconds by a hand held co2 fire exting
isher. The heat singed the hair on the forearm of the technician. There was no damage or scorching marks on the equipment. Initial checks for gas leaks following the incident
failed to highlight any fuel leaks, the unit has been kept off line to test th integrity of the fuel gas system. A general work permit number 39036 was in force when carrying out
The leak was identified by the area assistant operator at 16:35 hours, he had been in the area 5 minutes previous and there was nothing untoward. The leak wasw from the
threads on a 1/2" npt test port on the tubing bonnet. It was a vapour (gas and hydra lic fluid) spraying upwards approximately 4 feet. With assistance from the area operator
he closed the sub surface and surface safety valves on both the tubing ans 7" annulus. It appears that the leak was being fed from the 7" annulus via the tubing han er seals, the
annulus preesure was 1400 psi. The annulus was then operned up to the flare system. The leak continued but was surging rather than a continuous flow, but still approximately
3 to 4 feet. It was dispersing very quickly due to the module bei g partly opened to the elements (25 knots winds 345 degree). There was no build up of gas in the module or
alarms activated, the nearest gas head was directly above the xmas tree approximately 10 feet. The leak gradually reduced as the 7" annulus was
The fire was reported at 06.35 hours by a workman in the area. The flames were approximately 1 foot high with a spread of 2 to 3 feet. It lasted less than 2 minutes and burnt
itself out when the hydraulic oil was prevented from falling on to the exhaust. Personnel stood byo
The assistant operator was draining down prover loop to closed drain system, on completion he opened the drain valve to tundish to make sure it was completely drained down
after the pressure gauge showed zero. The tundish suddenly overflowed causing crude oil to flow onto the floor under the skid and between two beams. The concentration of
crude caused the annunciation of gas heads within this confined area which initiated an sd/.
Whilst demonstrating pressurisation loss alarms in the generator room, to the certifying authority, a general alarm was initiated (1st level gas in generator room). Susequent
investigation identified a broken pipe clamp on the fuel gas line to the generat r carburettor, causing a minor gas leak sufficient to give a single head 1st level gas alarm
During watchkeeping duties the area technician observed a small gas leak the shipt supervisor was called and initiated a manual shutdown of the gas system and a manual
blowdown.
Following routine emergency shutdown function testing, the platform was being re-installed in accordance with "blackstart" procedure. The fire and gas panel was activated
when carbon dioxide was erroneously released. The building was evacuated, all person el were accounted for and the areas effected were ventilated
During normal operation of bk unit 040 avon gas generator/cb compressor the general platform alarm sounded due to low level gas detection in zone 2 (u040 gg enclosure).
There are 3 gas detector heads within the enclosure but only 1 was indicating low leve gas at 20% lel. The unit was immediately reduced to auto/idle speed and the gas level
reduced to 85 lel. On investigation a small gas leak was found on a 1" valve flange the unit was immediately shutdown (manually) and the unit fuel gas was blocked and t e 1"
valve, which is on the unit fuel gas knock out pot liquid drain line, was removed and examined. The neopene flange seals were inspected and the downstream seal was found to
have hardened with age. The seal was replaced and the unit fuel gas system pr ssure tested. During the pressure test another small gas leak was found on a 1/2" tube fitting to a
pressure gauge. The tube fitting was replaced and pressure tested. No damage sustained. The unit was returned to service at 1700 hours.
<...> supervisor <...> was preparing to vent down well fo6 via the kill manifold. He had closed fo7 kill wing valve and fo7 2 in. Kill manifold valve. He had opened fo6 kill
wing and fo6 2 in. Kill manifold ready to vent fo6. He was then awa e that gas was escaping from the kerotest bleed valve which was open. <...> then closed fo6 kill wing
valve & opened fo7 kill wing valve with the intention to vent fo7 gas away from the valve that was open. He then proceeded to vent from the kill skid at this stage the alarm
sounded and he proceeded to the muster station. The area quickly ventilated and the platform returned to normal status.
The platform is currently in a construction/commisioning phase. A major leak testing programme of all hydrocarbon pipework/systems is ongoing using nitrogen/helium. A 69
barg test was ongoing on part of "train 2" gas compressor pipework. 3 leaks were ide tified, so the nitrogen/helium was transferred across to the equivalent pipework on "train
1". (transfer of the nitrogen would result in +/- 34 barg in train 1 pipework, although it was planned to increase the pressure of the 69 barg.) The boundaries for the 69 barg
systems were clearly defined, using marked up p&id's, and agreed upon by <...> and contractors(s) engineers. Whilst transferring the nitrogen from train 2 to train 1, a 2" valve
which had been defined as part of the boundary, was observed to b partially open, and the glycol skid was pressured to +/- 10 barg (normal pressure 3.5 barg).
An insulator was refitting an insulated box over a flowline pressure transmitter liquid knock out pot when an instrument pipe fitting on the drain valve parted at the union,
releasing hydrocarbon gas into the area no injury was sustained by the insulator. The leak was detected by local gas detection but the leak was isolated by production personnel
before co-incident alarms were activated. A proccess shutdown was initiated manually as soon as the release was visually confirmed. The platform is in the co
missioning/post hook up phase and all instrument pipework had been pressure tested. On inspection of the fitting the ferrules has slid off the pipe, however, indications were
that the ferrules had gripped the pipe.
Concurrent events were taking place: 1. Maintenance on the drains caisson pump, and 2. Working process vessels18s, attempting to resolve level control problems. The drains
caisson pump had been removed under permit and isolation control. The pump was fou d to be defective, and the job suspended overnight. The caisson top was left off.
Throughout the day problems has existed with level control in the separators. The vessels had been manually dumped when neccessary, which eventually filled the closed drai
sump tank with water. To dump the water from the closed drain sump tank, a manual valve was opened, allowing water to dump into the caisson. The manual valve was left
open from 0930 until the time of the gas escape. A few minutes prior to the gas rele se, a gas compressor was shut down. During the shut down the compressor vents-off to
the flare header during this venting off, gas back flowed to the closed drains sump tank and the open manual valve to the (open top) caisson.
A 60% gas alarm was initiated in x7001a generator turbine enclosure shutting the unit down. On investigation the source of the gas release was found to be from a rupture in a
temporary length of nylon pipe fitted for the purpose of fault finding on the fu l gas system
Prior to a flash gas train 2 start up, it was discovered by personnel in the vicinity that gas was leaking from the body bleed plug on 23 pcv0013 bypass valve.
The casing of the cleanout pump in module 8 split. The pump was not in service at the time. A production technician in the module witnessed what had happened acitvated the
platform esd and telephoned the control room. At the same time gas was detected n sufficient quantity to automatically release the alarm. Both these actions automatically
shutdown, isolated and depressurised the production facilities, manual isolation was effected within minutes of the initial leak. Platform personnel were brought t muster
stations and a foam blanket was laid in the module by the fire team. When the gas concentration was detected initiallly to a safe level the module fans were started to disperse
the resdual. Platform personnel were stood down. Investigation in o the incident was started immediately.
A pinhole leak was discovered on the motor coolant return line of a condensate pump. (on this type of motor, cooling is via the condensate) the leak was relatively minor (ie
frequent drips at worst). The pump was isolated and a section of pipe removed. S a precaution hot work in adjacent module was stopped on discovery. No injury. No other
damage, no spill since small quantity evaporated quickly. Leak was at weld on weld neck flange of one inch line.
When commissioning the train (1) gas plant after the total production shutdown due to <...> shutting the magnus riser valve, <...> a slight smell of gas in the area of the
discharger drum was noticed by one of the production technicians. On investig ting, the lower vessel sight glass top vent valve body joint was found to be leaking slightly.
Oil was noticed on the surface of the sea, coming towards the platform from the south. The weather was misty and the source of the slick could not been seen. The standby
vessel was informed and asked to try to identify the source. The leak was identifi d as starting from above d8 subsea wellheas approximately 4km south of the platform. This
well had been shut in in <...> as unable to produce oil to the platform and was planned to be worked over and turned round to water injection next year.
A slight oil and gas leak from e2001, train 2 interstage oil cooler thermowell 20 tw008 oil inlet pipework occurred when an instrument technician unscrewed the protective cap
from the thermowell to carry out a temperature survey. Re-tightening the cap fa led to completely stop the leak. No fire and gas systems detected the hydro carbon release.
All hot work permits were cleared withdrawn and non essential personnel were cleared from the area, on duty fire team in attendance. The by pass was opened, then the inlet
an outlet block valves on e2001 were closed, vessel depressured to closed drain system. No injuries to personnel occurred. Total volume of oil spilled approximately 10 litres,
contained at site.
A1 choke valve stem leaked small amount of gas while using flowline to depressurise wireline lubricator.
Survey vessel, <...> reported a noise in the <...> of d7 water injection flowline. Further chocks by the vessel confirmed there was a leak.
A small pin hole leak was observed coming from pipe spool . The section of pipework was isolated and drained after the associated oil prodution train had been shutdown.
During routine plant inspection in module 5 deck, an operations technician discovered an oil/water spillage. On investigation the leak was traced to the pump seals on
gm1503b oil launder pump. The pump was shutdown which stopped the leak, approximately 5ltrs had spilled onto the deck. Spillage was cleaned up.
An operations technician was performing routine plant checks when he observed a small pool of oil (<0.1kg) from under well b1 chemical injection line. Close inspection
revealed a pin-hole leak (split weld) from a welded joint at the first weld under the rvc (non return valve). Knowing that the chemical injection line was not in use the operator
isolated it. Oil was coming back from the well via the nrv which was passing. The most probable cause being due to fatigue because of excessive movement/vibration
Operations were in progress to bring well a7 on line both upper master and wing valves were opened gas was detected as the jet of gas deflected off the choke body directly to
a gas detector. A7 choke was closed immediately stopping the leak on detecting t e leak the fire team was in attendance as a precautionary measure. At 02:52 the incident was
under control.
An oil slick was observed, so the produced water treatment package was checked. This was immediately shut down and investigation showed that the train 1 low pressure
seporator produced water level control valve was sticking approximately 40% open
A slick was sighted on <...> which circumstantial evidence was believed to be coming from d6 flowline. The recommendation of the accident report <...> was to carry out a
sub sea investigation to confurm this. On <...> the <...> was brought into the field and the pipeline re pressured to 30 bar, at 11:40 hrs. In the initial search area no defects
were found by rov or traces of oil the surface. Line pressure was then increased to 100 bar at 13:30 hrs. The dsv reported a smal leak - estimated at 1 pint every 2 mins at
kp5.108 and a second leak at kp6.314. The first leak was reported at 00:55 hrs and the second at 03:50 hrs.
On pulling out of hole with a parted perforating cable, a limited gas release occured from the wireline lubricator greasehead. The flow check valve in the greasehead failed to
operate and the xmas tree upper master valve and lubricator stuffing box had t be closed when the integrity of the grease was lost. The possibility of the flow check valve not
operating when the broken wire was pulled through had been anticipated and precautions were in place to ensure that any gas release was limited. A low pres ure line wiper
rubber hose at the top of the lubricator was pulled off it's fitting at the time of release but no other damage was sustained. The duration of the gas venting was circa 1 minute.
Two infra-red detectors indicated 'confirmed fire' in turbine enclosure of peak lopper generator. Fire and gas system automatically stopped generator and released halon. Two
production technicians and the on shift fire and safety officer were sent to in estigate. No obvious signs of fire - no damage or smoke in the enclosure - but oil/diesal vapours
were rising from hot turbine surface. On further investigation a diesal leak was found at a loose connection to no 8 burner, therefore in all probability t e fire indication was
genuine.
Gas leak at nrv's on gas regeneration system. Leak detected by platform fire and gas system. (4 low level gas alarms, highest reading 46% lel). Fso and production techs
monitored locally and found leaks at 3 joins for double nrv's. Plant depressured, i olated and gaskets replaced.
Main oil line pump p3600 in operation. Pipeline esdv closed due to instrumentation fault. P36000 shut down on high pressure trip, but gasket blew in flanged joint in
common discharge header. (gasket blew in flanged joint downstream of p3610 discharge b ock valve - p3610 not on line). Fine oil spray from hole. Oil fell through grating
into the sea. Witnessed visually. Level 3 s/d on manual activiation.
Oil leaking from pump casing joint was vapourising on contact with hot surface of pump casing. Witnessed visually:- pump shut down under control operating conditions.
Test was to test run condensate booster pumps on diesel, then condensate pipeline pumps via condensate metering. Valve line-up was as per attatched p&id and was checked
against the p&id. Booster pumps had been run in recycle the previous day; to provide suction to pipeline pumps. Personnel remained at the skid to observe for leaks for
approx 10 minutes. Having observed no leaks, they proceeded to the pipeline pumps to bleed the casings. Some minutes later they were informed that there was a diesel leak
from the meter prever door. The leak was isolated, hot work suspended, and the area washed down. Diesel was found to have flowed into the prover loop via the drain valve.
No injuries. Subsequent investigation showed: 1. The planning of the job, with ma ked up p&ids etc., Was to a high standard. 2. The task had been double checked. 3. The
drain valves were awkwardly sighted, and painted black. 4. The drawings show only one connection to each block valve, when in reality, there are only two. 5. The exte
The process operators were in the process of bringing well t9 (slot 16) back to production. Operation of the wing and master valve, via the dcs system in the process control
room resulted in a gas alarm and subsequent automatic platform shutdown (plx). He emergency response team on arriving at the scene effected an esd to close all sssv's and
manually closed the manifold valves from all wells. The source of the leak was traced to the valve stem on slot 16 choke valve. The indication was that the valve stem sealing
had failed. (this will be confirmed by stripping the valve and investigation)
The production operators had observed a 'wisp' coming from the monitor port on the <...> tubing adaptor and had monitored it before seeking the advice of the <...> engineer
on board. (the <...> engineer was on board to check the integrity of all seals on the w ll head tubing hangers). The chief operator requested the <...> engineer to investigate
and advise; being familar with the probable cause he asked for the well to be shut in following his visit to the wellbay. Two <...> employees had indicated the source f the
leak to the <...> engineer. They indicated that there was only a very faint smell of gas noticable and likened the escape to a kettle boiling. The leak had obviously increased
although insufficint to set off any automatic gas detection. The master v lve and wing valve were shut, followed by the ssv. The tubing was then bled down to zero via the test
header to flare.
Wireline bop's being lowered into place onto the wireline riser. The <...> tool was already in place inside the riser. The manual master valve on the tree was in closed position.
The swab valve was opened before the bop's were secured. This resu ted in the release of gas at approx 2,200psi which had been trapped between the manual master and swab
valves, and in turn displaced approx 15 gals of methanol which had previously loaded into the riser. Three personnel were in the process of positioning he bop's onto the riser
and were caught in the resulting methanol spray. All three showered immediately after the incident and were examined by the <...> medic. Only one, <...> required treatment
to his eyes, of a minor nature.
While on routine platform inspection the on shift operator discovered a small leak of gas escaping from a 1" npt plug fitted at the bottom of a 12" non return valve fitted in the
<...> export line.
During production start-up it was noticed by operators that psv 02008b on hp separator was passing. The standby psv's were brought into duty by means of diverter valve, xv-
02008, and the plant brought on line. The flare islolation valve for the passing ps was closed as the plant was being pressurised. The closed port of the diverter valve must
have been passing allowing gas pressure in the 'dead leg' to come up to hp separator pressure of 60 bar. The upstream flange on the flare isolation valve failed a lowing escape
of trapped pressure. A production shutdown was manually initiated by operator arriving at the scene after hearing a loud bang. Insulation and cladding were blown clear during
the escape. The night was clear with wind
The seal on the oil prover loop door failed. This allowed oil and gas to pass to atmosphere. The leak was noticed by a worker in the area and noted by the ccr operator via the
fire and gas panel. The ccr operator manually shut down platform just before receiving a call from the onsite worker. The manual shut down was percautionery and was
before the set levels that would have automatically shut the platform down. All personnel were mustered as a precautionery measure. The leak was isolated by the ope ating
crew.
A gas leak occurred in the gas compression module. The 60% gas alarm was sounded and personnel were sent to muster stations. Personnel were all mustered by 1410hrs and
at that time the leak had been identified and the gas was clearing from the module. T e leak originated from a drain valve just downstream of the sdv208-2. The valve is on a
low section of the line that feeds gas to the sales gas compressors from the main train compressors and dehydration plant. It appears that a plug sealing this drain v lve blew
out/unscrewed and the valve itself was not shut. An operator in the area heard the vent of gas and contacted the control room who had already noted several gas detectors
tegistering above 20% lel and were in the process of initiating a 2b (proce s) shutdown. Other operators in the area also initiated manually the 2b shutdown using the
emergency stations outside the module. The ccr followed the 2b with a 2a(blowdown) this was effected befor the automatic system received enough input (voting) to nitiate.
The system would have shutdown the plant, however, if the operators had not have done so first. This was established from examining the panel and relays, etc, after the event.
The operator who initially heard the venting shut the drain valve a d the gas cleared quickly. The drain valve in question is not used al all in normal plant operations, start up
At 1500hrs a rapid pipeline depressuration on pl147 was noted in the control room causing a level 2c shutdown of the platform. All safety equipment functioned as designed.
Contact was made to confirm they were aware of the pressure drop. A helicopter w s sent to search for a leak. A leak was detected in the area where pl147 connects to the
western leg of the <...> pipline system. Subsequently diving operations confirmed pl147 had parted approximately 40 m from the intersection of these two lines in a m
chanical connector.
The reda esp. In the production caisson failed. The pump is suspended in the caisson viathe 10" drain ex v425 by a 3" flexihose, with securiy cable attached from pump
discharge to caisson top cover. A permit was isssued, and work commenced on pulling the pump. After approx 10 minutes the technicians reported seeing and smelling an
escape of gas. No platform alarms indicated any escape and further investigation failed to detect any gas escape/presence. The work was restarted and monit0red fully until the
pump was removed and blank fitted, no gas was deteced during this operation. The blank was removed to run in a new pump. The technicians reported to the production
operators and safty officer a cloud of gas escaping from the caisson. During the investig tion, after the escape had ceased, more gas began to flow from the caisson, this was
associated with a well surging into the separators where pressure control equipment released to flare. An assumption made by the production dept. That this was associated
with the gas escape resulted in the 10" valve ex v425 being shut. The final gas escape brought three level gas detections, on gd25, gd28, gd29 and a 60 per cent lel gas
detection on gd31. The gas levels indicated immediately began to reduce when v425 10" ine bv was shut.
During plug and abandonment operations on well a-37, the rig was displacing hole contents with sea water and 5bbls oil base mud with gas carried over bell nipple spilling
down riser skid deck and bop deck, 6 gas heads fired and 60% gas alarm sounded. The well was shut in and monitored. No pressure observed during shut in. After approval
from hse operations resumed circulating via choke and gas buster with no evidence of hydrocarbons remaining in the system. Pumped 50bbls hi viscosity sweep and displace
with 160bbls seawater. All fluids were contained on board by drain system.
Following a plant shutdown due to a main power outrage the plant was being brought back on line. As water fed to the igf unit <...> a 60% gas alarm was seen. This alarm
cleared within one minute. Gas source was inpection hatches on <...> Unusally ca m conditions winds 10kts from nw did not allow natural dispersion as usual. Muster was
called and completed as drill when alarm cleared quickly.
8" riser r10 was being pressure tested. A pressure of 250 bar had been attained when all pressure was lost from the system. There was no damage to topside facilities but
subsequent subsea investigation revealed a significant leak from the vertical secti n of the riser at the 25 to 35m level
The line concerned is a crossover line between the main separators which allows production to be routed via one of them if the other is shut down. The line is normally
isolated by valves but contains dead crude. It is thought that a valve had been passin causing the line to pressurise. A contract company employee noticed a small pool of oil
accumulating on the floor of the lower central corridor and traced the source to this line which lies between the grating in the upper central corridor.
During the warm up cycle, hot water is fed via the water injection system via the <...> production and test pipeline system to the test separator and on to the lp seperator via
transfer pump (ga 2582a) where it is eventually disposed of through clean up f cilities. However during this warm up cycle, an upset was experienced which resulted in the test
separator (fa-0708) water level rising to the high trip condition. This resulted in an increase in pressure on the pipeline and topside pipework which caused a number of minor
leaks and damage to certain instruments.
During routine wireline operations a small escape of hydrocarbons occurred due to loss of pack off around the wire. A fine spray of hydrocarbons resulted which was blown
over the skid deck and slops tank area. The escape was contained within approximate y 2 minutes by increasing the grease pressure within the grease injection tree.
A fire was reported on the turbine exhaust at 1406hrs on <...>. The turbine (<...> frame 5) was running on gas at the time with a load of 18mw. The platform alert was initiated
from the mcr and personnel mustered at emergency duty stations. The ire was extinguished within 1 minute of being obsreved, by the helideck firemen using an fb 10 foam
hose reel. On arrival at the scene the fire team applied additional cooling via the helideck foam cannon and the turbine was shut down. Personnel were sto d down at 1426hrs.
Inspection of the site confirmed at was a surface fire and further investigation indicates that oil from a half height which had been placed on the landing area above, had
migrated during cleanup/washdown operations to a channel section of the turbine exhaust. It had lain there against a collection of rust debris until conditions were right for
ignition to take place. No damage to equipment occurred, but the turbine remained shutdown until inspections by the platfrom, <...> were completed. Weather: wind 40
kts/300 deg, sea 3.9m, temp 2.5deg c.
Whilst on turbine log keeping routine an operator was using a hand operated pumping unit to remove lub oil which was leaking from no2 bearing and created a pool below,
containing some half a gallon of lube oil. Some splashed onto hot steelwork (frame/cas ng) the temperature of the steelwork being sufficient to ignite the oil. He collected the
nearest extinguisher just outside the compartment, this was a bcf, this failed to extinguish the flames. He secured the next nearest some 10' away which was a dry owder type
and successfully extinguished the flames with this. He then alerted the mcr. No executive action was required.
Worker heard hiss from pinhole leak on a weld on a 3" gas line to a turbine. Detectors didn't pick it up-very open windy area. Isolated line and now running on diesel. Will
remove spool with view to finding cause and then repair/replace gas escape at p nhole leak on fuel spool reported to main control room. Plant supervisor investigated and
instructed operator to put turbine over to diesel. Leak isolated, production shut in and spool removed, for weld repair. Blanks fitted and production back on line. Further
production shut down lead to reinstate repaired spool. System de-isolated and production reinstated to normal. Line checked for leaks and turbine put back on gas.
During a platform esd lpg systems had fully depressurised. Whilst the module operator was carrying out pre-start up checks he observed lpg esccaping into the atmosphere
from stream one and two plently filter door seals.
After completion of "a" turbine major overhaul/upgrade, there were five start-up attempts. All of these were unsuccessful due to various control faults. At the fifth attempt to
start the turbine, the unit fired and reached 2900 rpm. At this point, it w s realised that a fire had developed in the exhaust plenum. The fire was caused by diesel in the exhaust
space which was ignited by the hot gases of combustion. A full scale investigation has been conducted and it has been found that a valve in the exhau t plenum was closed,
thus not allowing any unburnt fuel to drain away.
Gas lift to the <...> test riser was opened up using 11 xcv 8071. The hp and lp vent trappings on the orifice carrier 11 fe 8018 were still in the open position and gas was
released into the module. The module operator heard gas escaping and isolated th upstream and downstream block valves. Low gas then one high gas was indicated on the
fire and gas pannel on the mcc. All hot work on the platform was immediately stopped and the immediate area cleared. High gas alarm cleared straight away.
At approximately 02:00 hrs <...> a general assistant was walking by the west side of module m4 (wellhead module) and smelt gas. It was reported to the control room and
immediately investigated. A positive indication of leak showed on meter coming from agging on the fuel gas header. The west system was isolated and the fuel gas users, 2 hp
water injection turbines were shutdown. The gas header was manually blowndown and purged with nitrogen.
Whilst carrying out normal duties a technician noticed a leak from the candelabra on oil well. The leak was seen to be coming from a pinhole in a dead end section of the
candelabra. The leak was immediately reported to the pss who isolated the well flow ine and depressurised the line via the test separator.
At 23:52 hrs low level gas alarm in mod 5 separation.full muster called cause was a one and half times half hole in the test sep 6 inch gas spike line to 2nd stage b separator
with release of crude.platform shutdown.approx 1m/3.possible cause-localised orrosion. Inspectors <...>,<...> and <...> aboard at time of incident. Preliminary details
obtained. 1.o.i.m. Factual statement 2.site inspection 3.examination of corrosion records
A drain plug brew out of the "c" <...> cooler with subsequent water spray deluging 2 smoke detectors in the compartment, poisoning the same this activated the gpa and halon
discharge. All personnel proceeded to muster stations
At approximately 03:48 personnel were involved in preparing for a nitrogen/helium leak test on system <...> pig receiver. The operation was to replace a spade in the 2"
blowdown line to the lp flare with an orifice plate. The spade was isolated f om the live process (lp flare) by a 2" ball valve, the handle of which indicated that it was in the
'closed' position. After all the bolts on the 8 bolt flange had been slackened, the top four were removed. As the spade was being removed, gas was relea ed and detected by two
gas detectors which were at a distance of seven metres and ten metres north of the flange. The spade was reinstated and the flange bolted up and approximate pressure in line
one p.s.i. The gpa sounded and all personnel mustered. A l personnel were stood down at 04:05.
At 23:24hrs a call was recieved in the control room and radio room reporting that the <...> exhaust was on fire. The onduty safety operator and on shift fire team leader went to
the area and reported that flames were coming from a <...> gas turb ne exhaust at an installation manway and also at the expansion joint. The generator was shutdown locally.
The gpa was sounded at 23:28 and all personnel mustered. The fire was extinguised as a result of the machine shutdown and co2 applied to the exhaust xternally.
Hydrocarbon gas was introduced to the dehydration inlet gas knock out drum for the first time on <...>. The objective was to pass gas through the dehydration skid and thence
through the ngl system in order to dry the pipework prior to chilling down th system in order to commission it. The gas exits the k.o drum via <...>. Shutdown valve (sdv)
3721/1 is positioned on this line and isolates the k.o drum from the fitter separator which lies immediately downstream. The system pressure had bee brought up to 29 bar
accross a period of approximately 2 hours. At 23:33, the gpa annunciated and the process shutdown as a result of two gas heads detecting gas at a level of 25% lec. On
examination of the valve it was conformed that the bleed screw on his valve was not fully sealed.
Whilst putting an orifice plate into a carrier, the gas operator opened up the flow transmitter valves which lead into the analyser house. The metering technician had left open
small vents on his transmitter causing the gas alarm.
An instrument technician was investigating a process esd caused by level switch low low 3721 bridle on the dehydration inlet gas knock out drum - to blow the bridle down (to
see if switch reset) the bridle isolation valves were closed, the closed drain is lation valve opened followed by the bridle drain valve. At this time (04:05) gas escaped from a
check valve due to the blanking end plug being missing. The line was immediately isolated by closing the bridle drain valve but a gpa had been initiated due to gas detector
being activated, this also caused a class 1 esd.
Hydrocarbon leak from 1" <...> clamp on slot 16 (b5) manifold. After completion of leak testing a permit was issued to loop check, calibrate and commission all
instrumentation associated with slot 16 (b5) and when the valve was opened oil was released from the <...> fitting. Further investigations show that the oil come back from
the test manifold - which was at 9.8 bar operating pressure via mov 1416 which was open.
The ice metering specialist was requested by the control room to investigate/recalibrate one of the two h2s analysers (at 3422-a) as its reading varied a great deal from that of
the b analyser. In the gas analyser room he isolated the supply gas to at 342 -a and removed the side mounted access cover. On doing this he noted that the lead acetate tape
was discoloured on both the 'feed' & 'take-up' spools, indicating that the tape was contaminated prior to it passing through the gas stream. He informed the ontrol room who
acknowledged and also advised him that they had 2x10% gas indicated. The lid was immediately replaced and the gas analyser room door opened. At 16:07 hrs the gpa
sounded due to 2x25% gas indication. All personnel went to muster. Checks ere made to ensure no leakage of gas was present.
Prior to starting of pressurisation, the system limits had been established as per the p&ids, the flanges taped by the technician, and hoses run out to the connection points, but
not connected. The permit was raised at 1715 hours and preparatory work was ommenced in the fitting of the hoses to the injection and the blowdown points vc 3207 and vl
32185. At 1915 hours the comtec pump unit was started and the pressure applied - this was monitored. At 1950 hours, witness was within the barricaded area and clo e to the
hose which exploded. He ran to the area of the pump skid and isolated a small valve on the pressure indicator 4022 c1 and informed the pump operator to stop pumping.
Generator p8001b was started at 11.10 for overspeed checks to be witness ed by lloyds. No problems were found after pre-start, external and internal checks were carried out.
After lunch, the jb engineer noticed smoke in the g.c.r and started to check each of the generators in turn. At this point, all four generators were running. When he entered b
generator accessory compartment, an oil leak was discovered at the vitaulic joint on the coupling guard feed/drain line. The turbine compartment was then checked and this
was found to be the source of the smoke. The engineer returned to the g.c.r where the density of the smoke had noticeably increased shutdown the generator and opened the
g.c.r doors to try and dispute the smoke. At this time the gpa was initiate upon hearing this he closed the g.c.r. Doors and proceeded to his muster station. All personnel were
stood down at 13:53.
At 21:48 hours the platform shutdown on an esdi initiated by the 16" gas export pipeline hihi pressur switch pshh 3411. Approximately three minutes later the gpa was
activated by 2 x 10% lel gas detectors indicating gas on compression level 2 mezzanine, i the vicinity of the gas analyser housing. The process systems were shutdown and
blowdown was initiated by the executive action of the esd1. The source of the leak was traced to the downstream flange on psv 1700a. The system pressure was decreasing as a
r sult of the automatic blowdown. The valve was isolated and the leak stopped. The platform returned to normal status at 22:18 hours.
During normal operations the 2" elbow downstream of lcv 55022 on <...> developed a leak resulting in a release of liquid (water with 1000ppm methanol) two crew members
working on adjacent filter package heard the leak occuring, identified th source and isolated the length of pipework. In addition a welding operation on going on the deck
above was stopped and permit returned to control room.
The non return valve downstream of production seperator 'a' was being removed to check for internal damage. The valve bolts had been slackened, some removed and the
jacks had been installed with the flange parted. While preparing to remove the check val e by means of chain blocks, gas escaped form the non return valve flange joints and
activated the platform gas detector, and subsequently the platform general alarm. The leak was not at full pressure or of a large volume. Blowdown occured in a controll d
manner. Cause at present suspected as demister pad from the slugcatcher coming loose and lodging behind the check valve. The mesh compacted with sand giving a gas tight
seal and false isolation indication. During removal of the valve the demister was isturbed allowing gas to escape. Passing valves in the plant allowed the gas build up to be
maintained behind the demister pad.
<...> was operating in normal production mode and was unmanned. Plant pressure was 90 barg. At 1900hrs <...> the main platform control room received indications of <...>
gas detectors above 20% lel. These continued to fluctuate until 2230 when <...> shutd wn automatically on confirmed gas detection. This requires 2 x 60% lel detections.
Wells were shutdown and export pipeline esdu closed. Wind speed had been falling and was only 5 knots when shutdown occured. Overnight windspeed picked up and turned
fr m ne to sse becoming 25 knots. Raining throughout. At 1000 hrs <...>, the witnesses led by satellite oim <...>, visited by helicopter. Plant pressure had fallen to 80 bar g.
Leak difficult to locate by sound with no background noise. A grease ipple on 2" plug valve attached to sand separator a was found failed. Lagging box was intact and iced
up. Local isolations applied and new nipple fitted. Leak path was 1/8" diam internal pipe.
11:28 <...> crd. Accepted a low gas alarm from <...> platform. Gas detector was sited in south well bat, platform was immediately shut in. No fall in "locked in" pressure was
detected. Investigation team to <...>. Landed at 14:02. Small leak which was diff cult to detect was traced to the second destec joint on the active side of well <...>. Well was
fully isolated and depressurised.
<...> is a n.n.m.i and was unmanned at the time of the incident.at 03.15hrs a single low gas alarm activated. The <...> carried out the laid down procedure,part of which was to
shut down the platform process.this was done at 03.26 h s.at 08.35 hrs a team of three persons visited the platform to investigate the cause.a dester flange was found to have
been leaking on a <...> flowline (the first <...> flange on the flowline downstream from the wing valve). Wind speed was approximately 0 knts.
At 22:06 hrs <...> control room received a low gas alarm from <...> manifold area, gas head no 5. An investigation party of 5 persons arrived on rb at 23:29 hrs. <...> had
commenced a shutdown at 22:20 hrs and this was complete. On arrival the g s head was in alarm state but was reading zero % lel. Numerous tests were carried out using a
portable gas detector and a positive leak was found on a 1/2" isolation valve flange leading to <...>. This joint was inspected tightened and proven gas t ght at approx 0120 hrs.
<...> was de-manned at 01:34 hrs.
An instrument tubing on the turbine lube oil system (turbine running, lube oil system at 9.5 barg) failed. This released into the alternative enclosure. Man detected the alarm in
the turbine control room, investigated then stopped the machine.
During commissioning activities on the gas treatment dehydration package, on inlet pipe gasket failed resulting in a gas release from the temporary gas sweetering vessel. The
gas release although significant resulted in no damage or injuries to persons in the vicinity other than a large gas cloud eminating outboard from the flange. The fixed gas
detectors activated and shutdown the plant automatically initiated gpa.
Upon reistatement of the oil production plant after a 24 hour shutdown a small hydrocarbon release was observed from the 2'' line to psv-03120. The leak was not significant
and did not cause damage or injury line isolated immediately and production ceased
During gas compression commissioning activities hydrocarbon gas was being introduced into the suction (27 bar) of the hp compressor via the inlet coolers and suction drum.
The leak was not significant and no injury or damage sustained after the leakage of gas vapour. The line was immediately depressured and isolated
A hydrocarbon oil leak was observed eminating from a 3/4'' drain line associated until the main 14'' oil export line. The leak itself was not significant and did not cause damage
or injury. The line was isolated and depressured immediately
A crude oil leak observed from a 3/4" drain line associated with main 14" oil export line.the leak was approximatley 25 litres in volume and did not cause damage or injury.the
oil export was shutdown immediatley ie level 2 from the central control room ma ually.the line was isolated and drained/depressured immediatley.the platform emergency
response team was mustered as a precaution,then stood down.
A .5" flange tapping severed, releasing hydrocarbons (live crude) into the area. Gas detectors immediatly detected the leak and tripped the process. Esdv valves closed,
isolating the point of leakage from the rest of the oil production train. A foam blank t was put down on the leaked oil. The oil was then washed down into the platform
hazardous area open-drain systems. A smaller leak had occured minutes previously from an instrument connection on the junction to the adjacent 'b' mol pump (it was not
runnin at the time). In this case a pipe had sprung from a compression fitting severed into a two-valve manifold.
Upstream of the gas sweetening vessel (v 1201) exists a flange system on the 12" process gas line and immediately upsteam of these flanges is a methanol injection point into
this 12" line, which is also flanged.under gas export conditions these flanges pa sed gas to the adjacent atmosphere and activated the installation g.p.a. With 2 gas heads at
low level going to alarm. The necessary executive actions were automatically initiated by the f+g/esd console
Crude oil leak from c mul pump whilst on normal export rate;circa 190000 b.o.p.d.leak was noticed immediately and pump system shutdown in response (po 301 c).cause of
leak appears to be a hairline fracture of a weld on an impulse line on discharge of said pump.this impulse line serves pressure shutdown intrumentation.mode of failure of weld
has not been positivley estabished
Flotation unit was out of service for maintenance, and the current process workpack for d22 requires that the minimum gas detection in the immediate vicinity be isolated due
to the possibility of small amounts of residential gas being evident. This was n t done and the subsequent gas muster the result.
Sales gas stream 1 located in mod b was onstream, when a gas alarm was indicated in the main control room. An area check was instigated, however, prior to any feedback, a
second gas detector activated and a a manual platform shutdown and muster was initia ed. The partial blowdown of plant followed. Production foreman reports source of gas
leak to be sales gas stream1 densitometer. This infomation was relayed to the emegency teams via the safty supervisor. Wind speed 37 knots, direction 210 digrees, visi ility 3
miles seas 3m. A
On start up of turbine, passing s.o.v. Allowed small quantity of gas to permeate through turbine. Hood mounted detector registered prior to rapid dispersal via forced draught
ventilation. On arrival all traces of gas dispersed by forced draught ventilation
Minor gas release during maintenance activity on produced water gas flotation unit d22. The unit has been isolated and nitrogen purged in line with written procedures and the
aerator lid raised to enable internal seal repair. Continued purging with nitr gen caused residual hydrocarbon gas to escape and register on 9 local gas detectors with the closest
one reaching alarm level of 20% lel. All work on the platform was stopped and the module cleared of non-essential personnel. The lid was closed and the essel further
purged to vent.
Gas detectors in process module b were activated at 0254. Three heads indicated showed 30%- 18%- 10%. Ir gas detector registered 100%. In keeping with platform
emergency philosophy full muster of all personnel took place. Process module b was checked out y team personnel with ba. Within 5 minutes of initial alarm gas levels had
reduced on detectors. Further gas sweeps were carried out without any trace of gas leakages found. No process work was carried out which could have damaged detectors. On
completion of the muster further tests proved negative.
Srv 87a on e12 fueol gas lifted. This displayed a plug from the body of the valve exposing an approx 1/4" orifice to the atmosphere. The resulting gas leak initiated a single
low level (20% lel) gas alarm resulting in stoppage of work until the srv was isolated
Export gas stream 1 orifice plated inspected by metering department. On completion a pressure test was applied and a small leak was discovered on top cover plate. System
was isolated and depressured. The metering technician replaced the top cover 'o'ring seal. Prior to opening orifice carrier both sunp drain valves were opened to check for
pressure/liquids. Leak testing system was carried out by the area operator after hot work in the module was completed. The system was pressured with hydrocarbons to 00
psi when an audible sound of gas escaping was heard by the area operator. He quickly ascertained where the leak was and isolated the two drain valves. Two i.r.gas detectors
and one pellistor type gas head picked up the gas release causing an automati plant shutdown yodels to sound.
B2 riser was hydrocarbon free and isolated for maintenance. A 1" drain valve on the annulus was routed to an open drain sump via a 1" hose for flushing prior to re-instatement
of downhole pump p-802. The flow of water to the drain sump disturbed stagnant as, which initiated h2s detector tg-13 to alarm (10ppm). The detector was sited immediately
adjacent to the drain sump. A full muster was called. The h2s level returned to zero within 10 minutes.
1/2" stainless steel closed drain line fractured, releasing low pressure oil and gas froim the closed drain. The fracture was due to "work hardining" of the line to vibration.
Low level gas alarm activated upon single head at 20%lel. All platform hot work stopped and module cleared of personnel. Area checked by production operator, who
discovered leak on valve cv46 gland. Valve located on compressor c-2a hot gas bypass line. Immediate action taken to tighten the gland packing which stopped thew leak.
Gas found to be present in module d laboratory and in module h drain sump. Plant running steady at the time. T14 well being depressurised to closed drain for removal of f2
conductor. Source of gas emission assumed to be caused by the coorosion of pipew rk in v-29 below water level , allowing gas to return to modules d and h through open/safe
area pipework.
Oil operator found high pressure produced water leak from corroded 3/4" nipple above drain valve on lt12 (seperator v3 water level trol). As he was isolating this, a high level
gas alarm was initiated from a gas head in the extract ducting local to the eak. One other head indicated 10 o/o lel. A muster was initiated. Operator completed isolation of
level trol, emergency teams checked area, all clear at 17:38 hrs.
The witnesses were in the process of changing out the orifice in fe 8010 prior to routing ps16 to v3 for a well test. Due to the current isolation philosophy and the fact that a
good seal could not be guaranteed on the orifice carrier, the procedure that as to depressure v3 to the lp flare which is at zero pressure, close the upstream and downstream
isolation valves for the orificecarrier and vent the orifice carrier down to the closed drain system via a 1/4" stainless steel line. The top plate was then r moved and the orifice
plate changed out. The orifice plate was refitted with a new gasket. Because of the possibility of a gas pocket lyiong in the top cover, the executive (shutdown) action of the
adjacent gas heads was inhibited prior to opening the car ier. The detection was still and would have given identification in the control room if a problem had arisen. This
procedure was followed and the plate was replaced with no gas indicated on the adjacent gas heads. The carrier was then slowly pressuried up via the hp flare and there were
no leaks at 60psi. When the pressure was increased to 100psi a leak was noted coming from the top cover gasket, which was the cause of the gas head 102 in the north extract
ducting, indicating a level above the low level ga alarm (40%lel). 102 is an ir detector and extremely sensitive to gas detection. The gas head returned to a normal reading
Metal worker in module "e" reported smell of gas at south end. Control room stoppe hot work. No indication on fixed detection system. Leak traced with portable gas
detector to gland of 2" isolation valve on v11 bridle. Gland packing adjusted and leak ured. Still being monitored. ( the leaking valve normaly contains ngl. Due to partial
gas plant shutdown, v11 was empty of ngl held only gas at approx.. 500 psi.)
Team leader detected smell of gas in v3 seperator. Hotwork suspended until source of gas identified and cured. (no indication on fixed detection system). V3 seperator
depressured and pcv15 gland packing adjusted. Subsiquently leak tested ok. To 300 psi
De-tagging of t201 process isolations was in progress in module b but with no associated valve movement. This activity was in preparation for planned nitrogen testing of the
dga plant. The open ended conneciton on the closed drain piping adjacent to t-2 1 referred to above had been noted (in accordance with the relevant isolation certificate).
Operators were collecting tools to close the connection. The air supply to ecv 8009 in module 'e' was recommissioned and the ecv left in its normal open operating osition.
The upstream isolation ball valve <...> was then moved to the open position with no significant audible indication of gas movement, or opening resistance reported by the
operator. This unexpected ease of opening and lack of gas noise in icative of a low pressure differential across the valve could not be explained. Approximately 1 to 2 minutes
after opening the valve, the platform yodels activated, at which point the gas oprerator locally tripped the ecv. In parellel to this incident, wo process operators in module b
identified the source of the gas release which was from an open ended 1/2" stainless steel drain adjacent to t201. Assuming this to be nitrogen, the operators reconnected the
line and left the module for muster stations. Full platform muster was initiated and emergency response teams responded at the scene as per the <...> station bill.
During annual inspection, slick noticed over position of <...> template, subsequent investigation showed leak from chemical umbilical at termination plate on the lower frame
level of the template
During the annual pipeline inspection a diver discovered a leak on the two flexible 4@ lines terminating at the "t" piece connected to the 8" water injection pipeline. The leaks
were discovered to be emminating from the graylock connections. As soon as the leak was discovered, water injection to the field was stopped.
Well <...> was being prepared for production, using lift gas. High gas alarm in module b. Control room responded by calling gas muster. Fire and gas shutdown
systems(psd1) and process operations shutdown. Using emergency teams with scba and portable ga monitors, the source of the leak was found to be from field panel 1,
hydraulic reservoir in module b. Well <...> hydraulic supply to subsea safety valve (sssv) was isolated and the gas levels was seen to reduce. <...> was identified as the
porbable sourc due to sssv tests being carried out joust prior to the incident.
During normal production operations a 1/2" drain line separated from the main 16" crude line to/from the crude oil storage tanks. A cleaner working within the module
immediately evacuated to inform operations techs of the incident. The resultant gas rele se activated the platform esd loop. The resultant cause and effects of these 2 actions
led to a full and successful platform shutdown. The oim ordered the muster alarm to be sounded and subsequently, the evacuation of non-essential personnel from the pla form.
This dully occurred in a calm, controlled and efficient manner, all persons being evacuated to the <...>. The responding fire teams, wearing compressed air ba, re-entered the
module to lay a foam blanket, whilst members of the operations team also wearing ba, entered to conduct further manual isolations of the associated pipework. The leak was
plugged and gas levels within the module were monitored. Approx 9 tonnes of crude oil were leaked over a period of 20 mins. When gas levels were below 10% lel,
remaining personnel were withdrawn from the module, the hvac vents opened and the fans turned on. The area was subsequently monitored and declared safe. There were no
accidents or injuries during this incident. All personnel conducted their d ties in a responsible and efficient way.
At 1330 hours the casing of the cleanout pump, in module 8, split, the pump was not in service at the time. A production technician in the module witnessed what had
happened, activated the platform esd and telephoned the control room. At the same time gas was detected in sufficient quantity to automatically release the halon. Both these
actions automatically shutdown, isolated and depresurised the production facilities. Manual isolation was effected within minutes of the initial leak. Platform personnel we e
brought to muster stations, and a foam blanket was laid in the module by the fire team. When the gas concentration had decayed naturallly to a safe level the module fans were
started to disperse the residual. Platform personnel were stood down at 1426 h urs. Investigation into the incident was started immediately. There were no injuries to personnel.
A gas alarm, one head at 20% lel, registered for mod 11a in the ccr. Control operator immediately informed safety and operations out on the plant, who responded to
investigate. Upon arrival on-site a gas leak was evident. The glc was shutdown from the cc r and the general alarm sounded. The leak was traced to the cracked impulse line
to the hp compressor pi 2898.
A gas head alarmed in the ccr (reaching 100% lel). The first senior prod. Tech. On the scene confirmed the gas leak to the ccr. The general alarm was sounded. The <...>
compressor was already shut down. Upon investigation it was discovered that the syst m had not depressurised as the vent valve, xcv 2846, had not opened. The boundary
valves were isolated and xcv 2846 was jacked open to depressurise the system and stop the leak.
Reported by prod tech while on his plant inspection of a gas leak from the glc hp compressor discharge cooler. No fixed gas heads in the mod picked any trace of the leak. At
the time there was a good air flow through the module. Operating pressure of t e cooler 2400psi plant condition stable. No persons injured. The leak was from the floating
head face joint on the tube shell type exchanger. Incident reported to the supvr who investigated then instructed the ccr to shut down the hp gas compressor. T e suction line
isolation block valve was also closed reported to the oim that the situation was under control.
A weld fractured on the nitrogen injection line on the compressor suction header pipework resulting in the gas release
An xmas tree had been installed on <...> well <...> foldwing completion <...> was testing the scsssv and control line utilising a tree connection. Simultaneously tests were
being carried out on the 5 1/2 bore of the xmas tree holding open the mast r gate valve and 3/8 hydraulic oil line fitted to the altuator manifold. The actuator was pressuriesed
and the hand pump removed. <...> completed his tests and removed his equipment from the tree, he turned away to leave the area when the needle valv assembly blew off of
the actuator manifold and struck him on the back of his upper back and head were sprayed with hydraulic oil but he was otherwise uninjured. Investigation showed that the
swagelok connector joining the assembly to the actuator had bee made up onshore before despatch but was only finger tight, another connection of the same design on another
tree tree not yet installed, was also found finger tight.
Whilst commissioning the heating medium system and waste heat recovery units some heating medium fluid trapped within the heat transfer coil of 'c' heat exchanger was
heated by the hot exhaust gases of the on line generator. The oil expanded and was eject d from a 3/8 vent line on a pressure indicator which had been left in the open position.
This oil contaminated the adjacentinsulated pipework on contact woth a hot unlagged flange the oil reached ignition temperature the small fire was rapidly extinguishe by an
engineer working on adjacent equipent using one 12kg dry powder extinguisher. Investigation showed that the fluid should not have been present within 'c' recovery unit
pipework as commissioning was confined to the off-line generator and system. Thi oil had been accidentally trapped between blockvalves by commisioning errors.
Nitrogen from the n2 utility generator/system was being used to purge/ dry the fuel gas make up line/from export manifold a hose had been used to connect unility take off to
the pipework. Due to a shutdown of the nitrogen generator back pressure from l.p. Flare allowed gas to back flow into the n2 header as there was no non-return valve at the
hose/ utility point. This header also supplies the n2 purge to the chiller. Hence gas migrated to this enclosure and was detected at the outlet lourves.
On arrival at not normally manned satellite <...>, a gas leak was observed during the standard pre-checks. It was from the flange connecting the actuator to the body of pressure
control valve pd1c on the outlet of the test separator. No auto dete tion was activated. The valve was manually isolated and the section of line was depressurised. Gas released,
dispersed readily beneath the windfall @ 1-2 away.
Sd 500 is a switch gear set located in the emergency generator room. This switch gear is normally powered via another board from the main generators. In times of main
generator failure the back-up (emergency) generators power this board to allow various ystems needed for maintenance of platform or emergency duties to receive power. It is
believed that snow was blown into the cabinet due to the squalls and unusual wind direction, this melted and when a diesel transfer pump was energised the water caused a
short circuit of the breaker to this pump set. There was no fire as a smell of burning was noticed by staff who were in the area. They immediately shutdown the system. A fire
alarm was manually raised but personnel were stood down when it was realised hat the situation was controlled. Work permits cancelled when the muster was called were not
re-issued pending investigation of the incident. The platform was not in production as production had been shut in at 2300 hrs <...> due to a diesel fuel shor age. Power to
platform was still being supplied by the main generator, this unit tripped at 0730 hrs. The cause of this was was later ascertained to be the run down of the 24 volt battery
which supplies control circuits. We were not able to effect a re ower of the system from the main generators, due to the isolation of the sd500 switch gear. As the platform was
As part of the offshore testing programme for the subsea facilitie, the 10'' water injection pipeline from platform to the east water injection manifold was subject to hydrotest.
The limits of the test were the topside piping of uq and the flowbase valves on the various subsea wellheads. Include the test therefore were the manifold and 5'' flexible
jumpers which tie back each wellhead to the manifold. At 2345 on <...> the hydrotest crew onboard the platform noticed a sudden loss of pressure from 519.7 barg (test
pressure) to zero a call was made to the diving support vessel <...> to investigate. At 0438 on <...> the <...> arrived on location and an rov inspection revealed that the 5''
flexible jumper connecting the manifold to wellhead ' h' had ruptured an investigation by rov and divers revealed that in addition to the ruptured 5'' jumper, the impact arising
from rapid depressurisation of the jumper had caused damage to the manifold and the wellhead flowbase.
A 2 flexable air supply hose parted at the coupling whilst being used to supply air pressurised to 21 bar to the 10 gas line pig launcher. Two compressors were sited on the
module roof and two supply hoses suspended vertically over a 35-40 metre section. He hose had been previously tested to 40 bar and were secured to adjacent steelwork and
handrailing at regular intervals and secured together. All equipment was shut down and the launch valves closed. Investigation showed minor damage to handrails and the hose
damaged beyond repair at the coupling there were no injuries to personnel.
During plt logging on b18 the production master and swab valve were closed in error - 15,00ft of wire and a radioactive source were trapped downhole.
Drilling department were doing a through tubing workover in <...>, an oil well which had not been flowing since <...>. A pes straddle packer had been set in the 5.5 tubing
from 4376 ft to 4428 in an attempt to straddle a leak in the 5.5 tubing at 4403 ft identified by running a plt log in <...>. To test the straddle assembly the 'a' annulus had been
lubricated twice by bleeding off pressure to the test separator then pumping inhibited sea water into the annulus. This operation was being monitored by rilling personnel in
the wellhead when a loud popping noise (similar to an air hose blowing off a connection under pressure) was heard and a plume of mist/gas was seen coming from the vicinity
of the gauge panel on bb-25-xmas tree. The hazard alarm was ac ivated within 2 to 3 seconds and all processes shutdown automatically drilling personnel vacated the area,
reporting to the control room. An operations technician went to investigate, identified the leak source, and closed the 'a' annulus pressure gauge r ot valve. Forced ventilation
quickly cleared the gas (all gas heads below 25% lel 12 mins after initial release) and oil production resumed at 0023hrs subsequant investigation revealed that a swagelok
coupling had failed under pressure and further examina ion indicates that the pipe had not been fully entered into the ferrule and the nut had not been fully tightened. The gauge
Casing had just been installed to a shoe depth of 4144m and the casing was suspended at well head. Preparations were then made to cement the casing in place. During the
cementing operation the casing suddenly sliped and the cement head manifold and surfac lines were sheared off. The casing slipped a total of 24m from the rotary table to 1m
below the wellhead.
Well e2 wireline work in progress. Wireline crew running in hole with armed perforating gun. At approx. 200' gas began to leak from within the brainded wire into the module
until the well was isolated at the sub surface safety valve and successfully dep essurised. Unable to pull out due to wire becoming stuck in the lubricator grease tubes due to
freezing associated with the gas release. After stopping the gas release, wire eventually freed off. Once temperture returned to ambient, toolstring recovered nd perforation
gun disarmed
Routine workover on well <...> (oil produciton) replacing tubing/ subsurface safety valve. Circulating undiluted water when a 'kick' occured. Well shut down platform went
into red alert coastguard informed later pin gas circulated and platform status no green
At the time of the incident coiled tubing was pulled from well 2 - 3 where it had been used for a gas lift trial. From a depth of 1300ft bsv tubing was pulled to 917ft bsv when
the operator heard nitrogen escaping from the tubing in the vicinity of the i jector gooseneck. The operator stopped pulling out of the well and closed the bops, pipe rams then
followed procedure contacting the central control room and well service supervisor. The nirtogen bled off completely over 5 minutes. The double check valv s on the bottom
hole assembly prevented any back flow up the coiled tubing. The well was shut in at the time and not capable of flowing naturally. Inspection revealed a fracture approx 1/3
circumference of the tubing at the mid point of the injector goo eneck. The coiled tubing was subsequently cut and spliced and recovered to surface.
While running out of the hole (t5) with coil tubing, the coil tubing tools pulled off the tubing in the stuffing box. This resulted in a release of nitrogen from the well and the
coil tubing at surface, as a result the well was closed in. A
Having drilled to td of the resevior section. The drill string was being puuled out of hole for logging. When pulled to 2673m it was observed that the hole had taken
inadequate fluid. Flow checks showed well to be static. The drill string was run back to bottom and the well circulated to remove any influx thru choke manifold. Gas in the
returns activated the platform gas detection heads and confirmed there had been an influx.
The <...> sub sea well had been shut in during spudding operations by <...>.at 2220 hrs gas lift was introduced to commence bringing on <...> well after being informed that
spudding ops completed by <...>. Gas lift flow dropped off to s bsea well and gas lift changed to kick off gas. Small amount of gas detected at vacuum breaker caisson was
manually vented to lp flare. No other damage sustained no injury
Wind: light visibility: good site supervisor: <...>. A ball valve of aprox. 3 tons was being moved on <...> main deck using the aw crane. An attempt was being made to re-
orientate the valve through 90 degrees <...> who was not involved in this work but was crossing the area was crushed against a cargo container. He was taken by stretcher to
the sick bay and a medivac flight requested. A helicopter which was in the area was diverted to thames and <...> and an attedant were flown directly to <...> hospital. On
examination <...> was found to have a fractured pelvis and was detained in hospital
West crane lifting unit (2.5tns) from small external platform on the drilling derrick to lower to the weather derrick. Ip on platform to connect up lifting gear on unit onto crane
and guide driver. Ip instructed crane driver to lift. During the lift th load swung ti tge left trapping and injuring the ip whose escape was obsrtucted by an empty drum and
scaffold tubes.
Injured person was stacking some heavy steel plate on the pipedeck and stacked two bundles in a vertical position against a sampson post. A third bundle wa being lifted in by
the crane. The ip was guiding this in with a tag line and he was about to stack this bundle against the other two. During the operation, the two stacked bundles fell foward and
hit the ip on the right side of his body. He sustained injury to his face, neck, shoulder and arm. Ip was transferred to <...> by helideck
<...> south crane hook was disengaged from cargo, landed on mv <...> deck. The banksman signalled for the crane operator to lift his wire. As this took place, the hook was
snatched from an <...>'s hands, and a bight in the crane wire hit an adjacent deck h nd in the face.
3 1/2 length of drill pipe slipped from bungle the end of whichf fell between sampson post. With the result of hitting injured parties left foot.
Heavy wall pipe spool for new riser instillation delivered to platform in half height containers. Spools removed and temporarily stored on scid deckprior to sorting and moving
to job sites. Injured man was looking amongst spools for some pipe supports wh n one of the spools approx. 4 1/2m in length moved and hit his left leg. Spool 4 1/2m x 8'' dia
x 804 kg.
Electrical technician was reinstating a motor control cubicle following modifications into the drilling switch board. The busbar shutter mechanism impinged upon the internal
conductors resulting in a severe arc. This arc caused considerable damage to the ubicle and truck in addition to inflicting injuries
Whilst removing actuator from valve bonnet, loosened slings to turn actuator through 90 degrees to disengage. Actuator dropped and crushed ring finger ting gear on unit onto
crane and guide crane driver. Ip instructed crane driver to lift. During the lift (approx. 2ft off the platform) the load swung to the left trapping and injuring the ip whose escape
was obstructed by an empty drum and scaffold tube
The ip and a colleague were lifting, by crane, bundles of angle iron from a 40' basket. The ip caught the crane safety pennant with his left hand with the intention of latching
the crane hook to a bundle of angle iron. The pennant was swinging and he ar ested the swing of the pennant this placed a strain on his left arm and elboe. He sustained fluid
and torn muscles to his left elbow.
On completion of lifting a seawater riser from the horizontal to vertical position on the weather deck with the platform crane, the riser swung and knocked over one of the deck
assistants who was positioned to steady riser. The ip fell and the riser crush d the ips left leg against a scaffold rack. The riser then swung backwards and the other member of
the work party went to the ips assistance. Lighting and wing conditions satisfactory
The drilling crew were preparing a29 well for a drilling operation, the job in work was nippling up a bottom riser section on the skid deck. The riser section of pipework had
been lowered into position and an instruction was given by the driller to <...> (lead floorman) to remove the pennant lines that had been used to lower the riser section into
position. <...> susbsequently positioned himself on top of the riser section and started to undo the shakles securing the pennants. While <...> was arrying out this operation the
driller and fllorman proceeded to lower a bx-137 seal ring on a soft line down from the drill floor above the skid deck. The seal ring was placed over the top of the guide string
prior to lowering. As the seal ring was being lowered from the drill floor the soft line rubbed against the guide string and snapped. The seal ring which weighs approx. 15lbs
fell approx 15ft stricking <...> on his back and left arm. At this stage the toolpusher was informed and the platform med c called to render assistance.<...> was subsequently
medivaced from the installation and after medical examination was found to have substained severe bruising to his back and left arm.
Due to oversight, elevators were in wrong position to clear chicksaw line. As elevators were lowered they hung up on the chicksaw momentarily and then came free. This
caused <...> to trap his finger between the elevators and chicksaw.
Whilst backloading containers ip was struck on the face by the crane wire. The wire had been caught under part of a skip, as ip proceeded to unhook the container the wire
sprung free due to the vessel movement.
Drill crew were laying a 15 inch pup joint of drill pipe out of the v door. The injured person was assisting to push the pup joint over to the north side of the v door in order to
land it in a clear area as the pup joint swung over the injured persons fi ger was trapped between the pup joint and the v door guard rail.
The drilling floormen were transporting cement from the chemicals store to the top deck. Whilse trying to fit lifting forks into a pallet loaded with sacks of cement, the trolley
supporting the pallet rolled towards one of the floormen, trapping his left foot. He rapidly pulled his foot out of his boot. Because the trolley had bent up the toe cap of his
boot, when he pulled his foot out. The inner edge of the protective toe cap scraped across his toes and damaged his big left toe nail. No equipment was damaged and the
atmospheric condition were not relevant.
Three technicians were removing the front cover plate of p302 electrical supply terminal box. Unknown to them at this satge, the backplate is fitted in two parts. The cable
entry side of which is not secured to either the pump motor casing or sideplate, ( o reference in manufacturer manual either). The bolts were removed from around the front
cover plate by the technicians who were positioned at either end and in the centre of the terminal box. As the cover plate was prised from the backplate/ motor causin , the
cable entry half of the backplate detached from the cover plate (backplate was held on briefly by the mastic type rubber compound used to ensure seal) and fell stricking a
technicians right foot lacerating upper of safety boot and causing severe bru sing and suspected broken toe.
A 1" drain hose had been lowered from the rig floor to the wellheads during the rig up for wireline work on slot 13. Subsequently the hose was secured at the rig floor. The
hose was made up of 2 lenghts connected by a h.p.'walter' coupling. During the ecuring of the hose the coupling snagged on the rotary table causing the quick connect sleeve
to disengage. The lower hose fell to the impact deck (approx 40 - 45 ft) and struck a scaffolder , who was erecting an access platform on the impact deck, on th back of the
left hand.
A bundle of 8" long scaffold tubes was being lifted from a half height container using the platform crane. Ip had positioned himself inside the container and was acting as
banksman for the lift, as the bundle was lifted the load swung towards his midrift, to fend it off he raised his foot, in so doing he incurred injury to his foot.
While running a <...> pack-off running tool on drillpipe from the drill floor to the wellhead,the threaded retaining ring 9upper-part of the pack-off assembly)fell off 25ft above
the casing head.the item struck and bounced off the wellhead and hit a <...> service enginneer on the right shoulder and upper chest. Some slight movement of the running tool
was observed while a connection was made. The threaded ring has an internal j slot profile,the ring was made up onto the running tool by the <...> engin eer on the rig floor
I.p. Was involved with moving pipework from fabrication area to construction work site. The type of pipework being transfered was cunifer which is easily damaged. The
pipework was slung with two wire slings shackled through the backing ring on the pip work(see the attached sketch). As the pipework was being lifted, the riggers attempted
to steady the load and prevent it striking other objects in the area. As the weight was taken by the crane, the pipework shifted slightly. In order to prevent it s riking nearby
objects the i.p. Took hold of the top of the pipework. As he did this the backing ring came into contact with the flange if the pipework, trapping his right thumb. The load was
immediatly lowered and his thumb could then be released. Pipe ork was 20" in dia. The load was lifted to a hight of approx. 3-4"
Ip was working on the pipedeck catwalk. This involved laying out tubing onto dunnage, using single joint elevators connected to the rig floor tugger. Once three joints had
been laid out. They were bundled up and set aside using the crain. As the single jo nt elevators were removed from the joint on the catwalk the ip was looking towards the
crane hooks prior to slinging the tubing. Joint at the north end of the catwalk rolled off the dunnage onto <...>'s right foot.
Ip was preparing to move a high pressure pump unit from the after deck into the test container adjacent to the work station. The vessel shipped a light sea over the stern which
displaced the pup unit, causing it to strike ip in the lower leg. This resulte in a 21/2" laceration as ip was unable to move away due to the presence of another pump blocking
his exit route. The wound required 5 sutures and 2 steri strips before sterile dressing was applied.
The air supply to the blast pot compressor had been shut off and depressured so that an investigation could be made to determine the fault on the grit blasting equipment. The
<...> line was uncoupled at the base of the pot, and although all pressure safety relief valves were open the pot did not depressure. Consequently when <...> uncoupled the the
ogar line high pressure air and grit was released hitting him on the back of the left hand. Upon further investigation a blockage in the nozzle was found to be caused by a small
stone. The equipment has been returned to shore for a full investigation.
When erecting a scaffold. A ledger tube slipped out of the hands of the scaffolder. As it came out of the fitting the tube fell vertically approx. 15' before rebounding off
pipework and deck and finally striking ip on the back of the neck. The ip was work ng approx. 18' horizontally from the base of the scaffolding. Light in the module was
satisfactory and since module is enclosed wind conditions are not considered a contributory factor.
The ip was returning argon gas cylinders to a transportation rack.as he turned his back to the rack a cylinder toppled over, the valve body of the cylinder striking him on the
back of the right leg just below knee level. On subsequent inspection the base late of the rack was found to be distorted.
Completed welding job, removed screen and was immediately hit on head by a piece of wood 9" x 9", which had fallen from above.
During commissioning work on the platform lifeboat no 1, some adjustments were made to the fall wires - this was under permit control including an isolation certificate
against power to the winch, so as to allow the wire falls to be adjusted using the man al operating handle. The watercraft represenative requested the power to be reinstated
so as to check the wires were lying correctly when operated,and also to check the davit limit switches were correctly set. The winch motor was "inched" whilst starti g the
checking of the wires. The manual operating handle had not been removed. As soon as the motor turned, the handle rotated at high speed, it made contact with a fixed part of
the frame and the handle snapped. The broken section "flew" some 20 feet, and hit ip on the shoulder.
The ip was standing next to a drilling mill which was standing on its pin after recovery from down hole. The tool pusher drilling supervisor and service hand were examining
the mill, the mill overbalanced and fell onto ip's foot landing above the protecti
Transportation of pipe spools was taking place on a barrow/trolly to a suitable location for radiography inspection. In order to negotiate a path through the module it was
required to swivel the spool on the trolly to pass an obstruction. The spool slip ed and fell to the deck trapping <...>'s finger.
During the rebuilding of a <...> pump the fluid end was being attached to the air motor by means of three stud bolts. The fluid end weighs approximately 25lbs. The fluid end
had been listed into position and one of the three nuts installed. The mechanic reached over to lift the second nut when the fluid end fell to the deck. As it fell over it trapped
the mechanics left hand between the fluid end and the bund that surrounds the pump assembly.
Employee was assisting in racking bundles of scaffold tubes. During the processof unloading a bull dog clip, wich restricted the wire slings from slipping, the bundle shifted
and traped the injureds foot. He sustained a broken right middle toe.
During the investigation of the incident frie hoses were run out on the south side of the cellar deck. As one length of hose was pressurised the female instantaneous hose
coupling connected to a jet/spray brnach shattered. This allowed the branch to bre k free, and resulting jet reaction thrust the end of the hose and remaining part of the
coupling into the ribs of ip.. On seeing the incidetn occur the hydrant operator immediately shut of the water supply to the hose. The leader of emergency team 2 and other
team members went to the aid of ip, and the medic and first aid team were summoned to the cellar deck to treat ip.
Manual unloading of 1" coil tubing from a 40' open basket on the pipedeck had just commenced. The contents of the basket also included 4.5" tubing. A man was positioned
at each end of the basket to remove the 1" tubing. As the first 1" tube was being r moved, the tubing slipped longitudinally, trapping ip's right index finger against the end of
of the basket. Ip went to see the platform medic for treatment to lacerations and contusions.
Whilst turning the isolator handle of the switchboard feeder to condensate booster pump p1202b to the off position, a fault occured within the cubicle, which created an
electrical 'flash' that came back onto the operators hand. Caused burns to left hand
Thirty-three personnel were evacuated from the platform when power was lost due to a generator failure. Power was restored later the same day. No damage or injuries.
Two workers, employed by <…>, were told to go up in the "cherry-picker" to grease equipment on the derrick. It was observed that the "cherry-picker" was moving too
quickly, and shortly after the hydraulic crane (which is assumed to be located on the platform) collapsed and the basket plunged 17 feet on to the deck of the support ship <…>.
One of workers died after receiving serious head and chest injuries. The other suffered broken ribs and neck and shoulder injuries. An inquiry was set up in order to investigate
the circumstances around the accident.
Pollution, mixture of sheen and solids, being one mile long and 4-5 ft wide was spotted close to the platform and running se. All production shut down. Source of pollution is
probably the pipeline between the platform and the <…> platform. It is planned for an internal pipeline check and pressure test.
At 1500 hrs a worker (scaffolder) fell off the west face of the platform and 30 m down into the sea. He was in the water for 2 mins before being rescued by a fast-response boat
from the nearby stand-by vessel <…>. Medical assistance arrived from shore, but after a short while they declared him dead. It was later revealed that the scaffolder was
struggling to get from the scaffolding on to a walkway because his safety line had become snagged, and hence his colleagues unclipped his safety harness, disentangled the
line and passed it back down to him, a 10 sec. Manouevre that was common practice. Before the safety line reached him, he started shaking violently and breathing heavily and
fell to the sea.
At 0743hrs on the <...> the mv <...> propulsion failed. A precautionary level 3 emergency shutdown trip (esd3) was initiated by the <...>. This shut the <...> platform
production and export facilities down. The loading hose was also re eased as a result of the esd3 and a small oil spil of less than <...> entered the sea. The loss of the tanker
propulsion system resulted from the emergency stop button being operated when the engine went full ahead in an uncontrolled manner a full invest gation of the underlying
causes in underway by a joint <...> team. Results of this will be provided when available.
Weather: wind 070o 30 knots, sea state 2.9m max wave 4.1m supply vessel <...> unloaded cargooon qp position south side of <...>. When ship lost power on the starboard
propeller the port quarter touched the sw leg(a1)on the ship some paint was stri ped off. On the south side of the leg a1. 1m above the water minor damage to the coating was
observed.
<...> advised <...> that the <...>,one of its <...> field standby vessels,had suffered damage to its bridge after being struck by a large wave and was disabled. Dropped anchor at
<...>. The <...>,an <...> standby vess l advised <...> that the <...> was dragging her anchor and was drifting towards the <...> platform.all <...> manned platforms were advised
of the situation. <...>,<...> duty manager was advised. <...> was advised that the <...> was 450 m tres from <...>. <...> was already shutdown. <...> was esd'd and vented.vessel
missed by a few yards and continued drifting sse.advised by coastguard that under current wind and sea conditions the <...> would miss the two <...> platforms by 2 3
miles.advised that the supply vessel <...> was due infield eta 1400 to assist in towing. Advised the dawn warbler had slipped anchor at <...>. <...> passed <...> platforms
comfortably. Weather conditions: wind 300 degs 40 knot
Psv <...> was offloading portable water and oil base mud at north side of platform when she struck shaft 5 just above sea level. Subsequently, in pulling away from platform the
vessel took two loading hoses, breaking them and dislodging the hard pipe lines at the loading station away from the platform structure. Wind speed : 30/36 knots:wind
direction = 210 degrees sea state = sig 4.7m max 7m, period 7.14 seconds
The <...> had been alongside <...>, on the east side since 0900 hrs, on <...> between 1315 and 1400hrs the platform cranes were in their rests because of helicopter operations.
The vessel remained alongside during this time. A approximately 1420 hrs whilst awaiting the final lift of backload and the accompanying manifest, part of the vessel's deck
fittings or deck cargo on the starboard quarter of the vessel became hooked up on the bights of the platforms bulk mud and portable water bunkering hoses which were hanging
in their normal stowage posistion. As a result of the vessel manoevering to extricate itself, damage was sustained to brent bravo as follows: 1 scaffold walkway external to m2e
badly twisted. 2 both bulk mud and po table water hoses were broken. 3 both hard piped loading lines were bent, and manifold valves were considerably displaced, to the
extent that one mud line approximately 50 feet away from the manifold was fractured. There were no injuries to any personnel,
<...> was standing close by <...> platform discharging cargo. A collision occured when the distance between the vessel and the no. 1 lifeboat station was misjudged. The
prevaillling conditions were as follows: wind: wsw 25 knots current: from west t 1 knot sea: 1.5 metres 3 seconds swell: light. The vessels navigational lampstand was
damaged. Damage to no.1 lifeboat is in the processs of being evaluated.
After picking up a line from the <...> the tug <...> allowed himself to turn and take the tide on the beam. The vessel was then carried into the installation <...>. The tug mast
came into contact with the sw corner navigation light station. The t g hull buffers made light contact with <...> west leg. Damage: 1. Structural damage to the sw corner <...>
nav light station north and south side support steel/cable tray. 2. Damage to lighting stanchion - south side of nav station. 3. Damage to mast of <...>.
The <...> was manoevreing on the north face of the platform when the mate who was in charge of the controls failed to maintain the vessel on station.conseqently it contacted
the platform leg and bent a ladder on the leg (part of the tertiary struct re).the vessel suffered a minor dent.
Standby vessel was called up by radio officer on the installation to come close to platform for close standby duties as men were working overside on west side of the platform.
Standby vessel was at that time approximately 0.5 miles from the platform. Th master manoeuvred the vessel until the vessel was heading 000deg on auto pilot with the port
main engine engaged and 25/30% pitch on bridge control proceeding to a point - 0.1 n miles from the nw platform leg. The master who at this time was doing some w rk at the
chart table found the vessel drifting underneath the installation overhang and before he could do any manoevring the nw structural support member came into contact with the
starboard rader mast and main navigaiton mast the the vessel. Damage to the vessel was confined to starboard railings around the monkey island, rader scanner and navigation
which were both demolished. No damage has been found the the structural member (n west) of the platform. The vessel then drifted off the installation.
Ne corner of platform struck a damaging blow sbv - damage to bow and railing platform paint scratched.
While tripping out of the hole on well no. <...> inwind speeds around 50 knots, the magnetic sensor, which was attached to the travelling block to activate the kinetic energy
monitor, hit an obstuction which sheared off the securing bolts. Subsequently, th magnet fell to the drill floor, llanding on the reserve side set back area
While picking up a joint of 5 1/2 inch tubing, a roughneck incorrectly latched the pick up elevators. (did not ensure the latch was in correct positio or instal the safety pin). The
pipe was lifted from the mouse hole to the 'v' door. When the base of t e pipe hit the v door ramp the top came free from the elevators. The pipe sliped down the v door and on
to the pipedeck. No injuries were sustained. Weather conditions were fine10 knt winds.
After picking up load from pipe deck the driver slowed the crane in a s.w. Direction towards the supply boat the boat was discharging water and diessel to the platform as the
load cleared the platform's s.w. Corner and was over the sea it began to free fa l the load fell 30ft before the cranes system brought it to a halt
Oil density probe weight approx 2 lwt being lifted by west crane from load bay. Load was double reeved and choked with3mtr 1 tonne wire strop strop parted at mid point
whilst over sea loosing probe.
Weather; wind 110 @ 18 knots, sea state: 4-5 feet, visibility: 10 mile plus, conditions : fine. Crane driver, <...> using platform east crane (manitowoc s.c. 70) to backload
nowsco diesel pump unit (weight 12.2 t) onto deck of supply vessel <...>. Load being positioned over deck of vessel involving simultaneous lowering and booming down of
crane boom. On reaching the appropriate position, the crane driver returned the boom lever to the neutral position. The boom continued to travel down ards and the load
descended approximately 25 ft onto the deck of the vessel. The vessel successfully manouvered to disconnect the load and pull away from the platform. Subsequently, the
crane " was found to be damaged no personal injuries sustained
On the morning of <...> at approx. 0840 i called in the <...> to commence back-loading all the coiled tubing drilling equipment. This back-loading included lifts in excess of
10t but initially with wind speeds of 30 knots and a sea state of 1.5 metr s we completed several small lifts to see how the boat handled the tide/wind. We back loaded an empty
n2 tank at 6t with no problems followed by several smaller lifts. I consulted with the boat and crane driver and also observed the situation myself. All elt that there were no
problems with the n2 tanks. The boat was happily holding station close to the platform when required. I took up position outside the accomodation door south to observe the
first lift going down. I observed the lift being slewed out o be positioned over the boat. The driver appeared to lower the load but it juddered down approx. 1 foot. At this time i
heard an alarm that i assumed was the mipeg. The driver then stopped and the boom went up and the lift was stabilised. Once the lift w s stable again the driver commenced
lowering and the load appeared to just pay out until it hit the side of the boat and the tank up-ended itself to finish pright on the aft end. There was no indication of n2 leaking
but the crane headache ball lodged its lf in the tank structure. The boat crew managed to free the crane hook and after discussion departed for great yarmouth to resolve the up-
The crane driver <...> was lifting the <...> crane boom out of the rest. At about 4ft up the boom stopped rising, he looked at the weigh load indicator and found that the whip
line had hooked up. He was about to lower the boom when the hook ca e free causing the pennant to come off the hook and the whip line ball to hook on the cat head access
handrail. The jaws of the whip line hook had opened allowing the pennant to jump off into the sea. The crane was lowered into the rest and taken out of s rvice pending an
inspection.
Lifted load off production deck. Weight of load 2 tonnes. Getting clear of deck turn, taking load over the side to put down on boat, when clear of the platform and lowering to
the boat the headache ball came adrift from the line dropping the load onto the boat. Wind speed 180/10 knots wave height 3ft visibility 2-3 miles
An empty container was being transferred from the helideck to the galley landing area using the whip line of the south crane. During the lift the "whip line limits" were
activated and the load payed out striking a helidack light and damaged a cable pressu e reducing valve on the valve on the whip line limits hydraulic circuit it payed out quickly
(faster) instead of inching out under control (slowly). On inspection it was found that the pressure reducing valve had scored a seal. Weather at the time of the ncident was:
wind direction 250 speed 17 knots. Visibility 8 miles general conditions rain/mist
Whilest lifting a half ton collection tank in a direct lift with two one ton slings one sling failed on the eye attached to the five ton shakle which was attached to a one ton chain
block.the load fell approximately six inches striking a fire hydrant and ending the valve spindle
Whilst backloading container approx 2 tons, crane operator posistioned load over mv <...> and applied slew break. Having lowered the load about 20ft he disengaged slew
break and engaged slew lever intending to slew left. At this point the crane sl wed right, operator successfully landed the load. Investigations showed shearing of the slew
drive shaft. Having no other means of arresting the slewing motion once the slew drive shaft had sheared,the crane responded as a weather vane in the wind.
Deck crew had been asked to transport two items into the utility leg, and land them at the 124m level. The items were an electric pum and a reel of electric cable. The pump
was rigged with two shackles and 2 x two ton wire strops. The shackles being secured to padeyes on the pump body. The deck crew fastened a wire strop around the cable reel
in a noose formation. Both items were then attached to the crane lifting hook by the strop eyes, and the lift was commenced. At the 124m level in the utility leg it was decided
to land the electric motor first then the cable reel. A member of the deck crew and a rigger then proceeded to pull the motor inboard,over the handrail, and the crane banksman
gave the order to lower away. (all comms between banksman and crane being handled via vhf hand held radio). In the process of of landing the motor its position on the
gratings had to be adjusted and several instructions were passed to the crane without any problems. The motor was landed on the 124m level and on of the shackles was
removed. The second was still under tnsion. Crane stop was then asked to lower away, to slacken off the tension on the shackle which it did.it was then asked to stop. There
was no response to this instruction and the crane continued to lower the load. Comms between crane & banksman was lost for several seconds. During this time the crane
At around 1330 hrs on <...> the east crane was backloading bundles of 7" tubing from the platform pepe deck to the deck of the supply boat <...>. During the lowering of the
fifth bundle of tubing, the load was stopped about 30' above the d ck of the vessel. When the brake was released to re commence lowering the load fell to the deck of the vessel.
The load landed across the beam of the vessel. A cargo container on the port side of the vessel was damaged and the guard/crash barriers on the tarboard side of the vessel was
damaged. No injuries no wind sea was flat calm there were no witnesses to the incident on the <...> other than the crane driver.
At approx 16:30 hours <...> and during east crane routines the boom hoist rope was to be changed out. Whilst lifting the new rope drum into posistion on the east landing
platform below the east crane, the crane boom was at a minimum radius of 13 metre .after lowering and releasing the lift the crane operator proceeded to boom out, but due to a
failure of the boom hoist clutch exhaust valve to function correctly. The boom hoist drum went into the hoist motion and the boom went past the minimum radius c t out limit
causing compression damage to the east crane backstops.
Well operations were centred around bc08 (a water well), with preparations in hand to prepare for a coil tubing circulation to brine. Weather conditions; 50 knot wind, gusting
from the south. The coil tubing bops were installed and the injector head (5ft was being lifted into position when the top drive torque tube parted at a bolted flange
connection. The sheared fastenings and one dowel fell from the joint onto the drill floor. A nut struck a <...> operator, resulted in a minor first aid injury. Th torque tube
parted at the third joint, allowing 15m of tube to rotate, pivoting about the lower attachment assembly and impacting with the derrick structure. A damaged cross-member and
bracing resulted. The upper section of the torque tube remaining su pended from it's linkages.
During the course of normal crane operations the nightshift crane operator was repositioning a 45 ft completion basket from one area to another on the pipedeck. He lifted the
basket and positioned over another basket in order to laydown. While slewing t e load to the left in order to position, he attempted to stop the load by returning the joystick to
the neutral position, the crane continued to motion to the left. He tried to compensate by manoeuvering the joystick to the right, this operation was to n avail as the crane
continued to travel to the left, hitting heavy duty handrails on the pipedeck which then fell onto the skid deck area below. The crane operator informed the pipedeck foreman to
move himself and his team away from load as the crane con inued to travel left until the crane driver switched the on/off key to the off position and the crane came to a
complete halt.
Failure of the emergency/parking brake actuators causing the brake to come on. At the time the block was travelling upwards empty.
A 16 inch cunifer spool had been replaced on a cooling water cooler, using a number of 1 ton chain blocks to position the spool and hold/lift the adjacent pipework. After
fitting the spool was filled with water and leak tested. The foot supporting the s ool was short so a packing piece had to be fabricated. A welder was tasked with this job. In
order for him to take a dimension to maje the packing piece he decided to raise the spool a few millimeters using one of the one ton chain blocks still attached o the pipework.
The block was operated and when it was still possible to get movement on the hand chain, a link in the lifting chain parted just inside the block leaving approx 2 foot of chain
still attached to the fabric sling. No damage was done to the ipework, no-one was injured.
During bulk loading operations a bulk loading hose was being returned to the bulk loading station when the 2 tonne sling holding the hose parted allowing the loading hose to
fall approx. 30 meters to a production deck walkway.
During routine crane operations a container was to be backloaded onto the <...> from the m5 mezz laydown area on <...>. The north crane was in useat the time. When
lowering down to attach to the container the 20ft pendant on the crane was allowed lay across the top of the container at which point it released itself from the main hook and
fell into the sea. The pendant fell directly into the sea. On investigation the safety catch retaining bolt was found to be sheared this allowed the pendant to come free when the
weight was taken off by lying across the container.
A seawater lift pump was being installed on <...> cellar deck using an air operated hoist. The hoist failed to react to signals from the control unit and the pump descended onto
a 2" pipeline causing a weld fracture. The hoist was isolated by turning off the main air supply.
Responding to an emergency call from the standby vessel <...>. It was decided to transfer the medic from installation to vessel by lowering him in a lifeboat to sea level and
reshipping in the vessels fast rescue craft. The lifeboat was low red ten feet above sea level and as the medic was attempting to transfer he fell into the sea. He was not
immersed for more than 5 seconds. The two crewmen of the frc acted quickly and professionally to retrieve him. Wind speed 33.77 knts direction 259.5 sea state 2
metres
Lowering canopy to normal position using tirfor as supplied for the job by vendor. After lowering the hood to past the halfway point, the tirfor wire failed allowing the canopy
to freefall to rest position. The wire snapped at 2/3" from the tirfor and rec iled in the direction of the boat. The canopy damaged the boat slightly as follows:- -1" hole at rright
hand side of door. -dents at door base. -deluge pipe bent.
During the unloading of drilling risers to the <...> one riser (approx 8 tonnes) rigged at both ends (approx 25ft long) with webbing strops fell at one end onto the deck when
one of the webbing strops parted. The distance of the fall was between 3 a d 6ft. The load was then lowered back onto the deck. Proper slings were passed to the boat and the
transfer completed. The webbing strops have been held for examination.
Whilst pulling out of hole, the bumper bar which protects the top drive drive hoses from snagging on the dolley track splice bolts and beam on the west side, became dislodged
by the extending/retracting hydraulic umbilical and fell approx. 16m. And landed 3m from 2 flooormen standing at the rotary table. At the time of the incident weather was
clear with a westerly wind at 30-35 knots.
During operations to recover the production completion from well <...>,a padeye support beam failed at the monkey board level in the drilling derrick.the padeye support beam
with sheave connected fell approx 80ft to drillfloor.the casing tong weighing 1.3 tonnes that was supported at the time fell approx 3ft on to the rotary table.six personnel were
working on the drillfloor at the time,none were injured although the power tong operator was at the closest point of risk.the only damage sustained was to th padeye support.
Crane operations of the west crane took place for about an hour,lifting backload on to supply vessel <...> then the east crane was used for some 20 minutes to move loads from
the east skid deck to the pipedek this included a pumping unit weighing 10 5 tonnes.subsequently operations of the west crane continued for again about an hour with lifting
of equipment from the <...> onto the platform.at the end of the operation the 10.5 tonnes pumping unit had to be lifted off the platform and backlo ded onto the supply vessel.
This operation took place within the capacity of the <...> crane using a single part hoist line.when the load was at the level of the d-deck,it could no longer be controlled by the
brake and fell into the sea. The p mping unit was drained of sea water and with the brake holding again was put on the platform deck.
Lighting good: air temp 50f: wind 15 knots 025 lowering bundle of scaffold tubes to module 56 mezz lay down area when load struck an overhanging scaffold structure. This
resulted in one scaffold tube ejecting from the bundle and landing on deck below, app ox 20 feet distance. No damage sustained, no personnel injured. Incident investigated by
platform safety department and report, complete with recommended remedial actions submitted to management.
Chicksan pipework was being temporarily supported by a 1 tonne sling connected to the west winch 3.0 tonnes swl at the v door. The chicksan was used for topping up casing
during running in. The kelly was tied back towards the sw corner of the drill floo during casing runs. During dumping operation via the kelly one of the kelly hoses stiffined
under pressure and pushed against the winch operating handle, causing the winch to reel in. This resulted in the chicksan being lifted up to full extension and u timately in the
1 tonne sling parting.
At 23.25 hrs on <...> whilst lifting cargo from the <...> the cargo snagged on the starboard safety hatch, protecting bars. This caused one of the slings to part. No damage was
caused to the vessel and there was no personal injury. The ships crew eleased the load and re-stropped the lift.
A drill pipe drift, approx 2lb in weight was connected to a line on the travelling block to be sent up to the monkey board. On reaching the monkey board the spliced 1/2" rope
parting resulted in the drift falling to the rig floor below. No one was injured in the incident and as personnel always stood clear of the drill floor when a drift is run no one was
put in immediate danger from the dropped object.
A wireline unit belonging to <...> was being transferred from the <...> to the <...>, whilst landing the unit on the deck the access door opened and was caught on another
container. This resulted in the door being forced off of he wireline unit and dropping onto the top of the container, the unit was landed safely and no injuries occurred.
The deck operators were removing a choke body from the wellbay mezzanine level to the west firepump room where it was to be stripped down for oie inspection. The choke
body was manouvered into position where it could be lifted by the platform crane. The position was wellbay mezzanine level, south side. One of the deck operators was
putting a wire sling around the choke body, in doing so he stepped around the choke body onto another section of the grating. The grating gave way falling into the sea 92' b
low. The deck operators feet went with grating. He saved himself falling any further by grabbing hold of the choke body. He then hauled himself up into a safe position.
After doing so he reported the incident to the oim. The deck operators only visibl injury was a graze to his left shin. This was recorded as a minor injury. The other deck
operator involved in the task went to the west firepump room to receive the choke.
The <...> was on station at the <...> platform and was being worked by the <...> crane. The whipline hook was being used to backload a watertight container.as the container
was being positioned,it glanced off an adjacent container. The boom was manoeu red to enable the container to be positioned correctly.the banksman located on the <...> main
deck then caught sight of the main hook pendent travelling down the whipline towards the boat deck. The banksman shouted a warning to the supply boatdeck crew via h s
channel 6 radio. The deck crew took evasive action. The main block pendent landed on top of the backloaded container and subsequently fell to the boat deck. No persons were
injured and the pendent was recovered from the boat for inspection.
After running 9 5/8 casing to the 13 3/8 window at 1078m a change of handling equipment to the varco 500tn power elevators and slips was made before entering the open
hole. 30 joints were run when there was a sudden loud noise heard while picking up the eight of the string. Fortunately, the slips had not released and the casing load was still
held. On examination it was discovered that one possibly two of the operating pistons had sheared.
Rigger was attaching a chain block to a 1 ton beam trolley situated on a lifting beam when the trolley fell 10ft onto deck.
Lifting equipment was being inspected and found to be defective. The bottom hook split collar retaining ring assembly was found to be loose further investigation found that
only half of the main load bearing split ring was fitted.
During crane operations a 10mt pendant was attached to the crane hook to assist in the operations. A container had been lowered down to a laydown area, when it was on the
deck, the crane driver lowered off to allow the container to be disconnected. Howeve , the crane hook snagged against part of the structure releasing the safety catch and
allowing the pendant to fall approx 40'. As the pendant fell, part of the rope struck one of the men working the container a glancing blow to the arm. There was no injur to the
man or damage to equipment.
At the time of the incident the 7" completion string was being pulled. During this operation <...> ssd 7" 200 ton side door elevators were being used. The elevators had been
latched on to the next joint to come out and the string was picked up. The slips ere set and the joint broken out. The roughnecks then proceeded to push the free end of the
joint out through the "v" doors, at this point the elevators unlatched releasing the other end of the joint which fell approx. 20' to the drill floor, bounced and hot out the door
and down onto the catwalk . No personnel were injured and no damage occured as a result of this incident.
The mwd tool failed and the decision to pooh was actioned, the string was pulled back to the shoe, and a heavyweight mud was applied. Tripping operation commenced, 3
stands were pulled and when pipejoints were broken the in rush of air indicated that the ipe was dry. When the 4 stand was broken, oil based mud issued from the joint
splashing 2 of the floormen this stand was then racked back to the derrick. The driller decided to attempt to chase the slug by raising the next stand. As the string passed the
onkey board level the derrickman engaged the pipehandler racking arm to the drillpipe, the elevators inpacted with the racking arm.
While rigging up the pressure control lubricator on a well in preparation for a routine logging run, the tugger hook became disconnected from the lifting shackle causing the
lubricator to fall across the deck at an angle lodging against the overhead deckb ams. The bottom of end of the lubricator was restrained from falling by the logging tools
which were inserted into the lower riser. The tools were severely bent.
When lifting a xmas tree from the stern of the supply vessel the crew noticed objects falling from the transit frame. These were later established to be spare tree lifting
accessories. The incident was not immediately reported, by the time it was the ve sel had left. Further investigation suggested that this equipment had been secured to the
lifting frame by two strps of metal banding. This had worked loose allowing the equpiment to fall onto the deck. No-one was in the immediate vicinity and no damag occured
to the vessel.
Equipment was being moved around the impact deck. After setting down the second lift the crane was travelling south when the cable catenary guide bracket weighing approx
5 kilos fell from it mounting a total distance of 6 meters onto the impact deck.
During routine tripping operations a bolt from the drill pipe racking arm fell approx 90' to the rig floor narrowly missing personnel working on the rig floor. (weight of bolt
0.8kg)
Part of guide dolly wheel bearing for the top drive fell 90' from monkey board level to the drill floor. The bearing part weighed approx 250 grams. No one was injured as a
result of this dropped object.
Wireline equipment was being rigged up on the drill floor in order for <...> to set a bridge plug. During rigging up the running tool got snagged up. This created strain to be
applied to the wire. The wire parted at the weak point thus allowing the tool to fall to the drill floor.
After backloading 7 containers to the <...> a 20' basket was landed on the vessel. After detachment the crane operator boomed back and slewed to the right at about 30' from
the deck of the supply vessel the 8 ton swl single penant fell from the hip line hook and landed on the deck of the supply vessel. Wind speed 35 knts, vessel pitching 20 to 25
degrees. Equipment in use, <...> hydraulic offshore mounted crane with <...> automatic safe load indicator. Swl at radii 31' to 129' 6.7 ton
South crane sustained damage to cathead and main block during a lifting operation over magellan deck. Debris (sheave guard) fell from crane on to magellan deck. Upper hoist
limits did not prevent this occurrence due to limits not being reset when falls ha been previously changed from single to three fall. Weather :- 10kt westerly breeze, bright clear
conditions, visibility 10 nm.
When lifting the riser a slight misalignment of the two hatches forces the riser to move off centre through the hatches. As the first collar on the riser came through the main
deck hatch it caught one side of access hole. This caused this side to lift pproximately six inches. The other side of then moved toward the centre causing it to come off its
supports at the corner of the hatch. The hatch cover then fell through the hatch and rattled down the riser to the intermediate deck. The operator saw the over falling and
moved back to avoid injury. His ability to clear the area was restricted by the scaffold safety barrier erected around the riser. He moved to the corner of the barrier which gave
him sufficient room to escape. The purpose of the safety barrier was to prevent uninvolved personnel from access to a hatch on the intermediate deck which at times is opern
without the riser in place, after the incidetn the area was made safey by laying the riser down on the main deck and replacing both hatch c vers. Work was then suspended
pending incident investigation.
While moving containers about the deck the after crane whip line sheave check plate came into light contact with the flare tower. The dsv was positioned parallel to the east
face on a heading of 033 degrees(t) with the centre section of the dsv positione under the flare tower, the closest point of approach to the riser legs was 15 metres between the
hull and the east legs. The dsv was in dp at the time with diving operations in progress. The wind was sly 15-20knots, waves 2.5meters, visibility good, pit h & roll 1 degree
heave 1 metre. Dp positioning port stbd within 1.5m fore and aft within 1m, heading within 1.5degrees. Damage sustained to <...> aft crane:- bent and buckled check plate
(non-structural). Damage to flare tower:- possible paint da age and slight dent to the bottom of an internal diagonal cross brace at +40m elevation.
The caisson terminates at minus 41 metres and the procedure called for 3 off lenghts of approximately 10 metres to be cut off and removed. The first length was secured for the
a2 caisson. The caisson was cut 1.5metres above the minus 33 metre guide and h d been partially lowered when one of the chain pulls released and allowed the section to fall
to the sea bed. The divers were above the seciton and therefore there was no injuries. The dropped section was then located on the sea bed and its line of dece t plotted, this
was inspected by rov for impact damage and two areas were identified where it has brushed off members and one are of impact which only removed some marine growth. No
other areas of impact were found. The operation proceeded without furthe incident with a revised rigging arrangement using a tugger operated from the spider deck.
A container had just been back loaded onto the <...>. As the crane operator moved the hook with pennant down to the deck for the deck crew to gain access to unhook the
container, the pennant came free from the main block hook and fell 8 - 10 feet to he deck. The hook and safety latch was inspected by deck crew and appeared to be operating
satisfactorily. After consultation between the crane operator and the vessel skipper it was agreed to fit another pennant and to back load another container, afte which the
other pennant could be retrieved. There was re-occurrence of the first incident during the operation to drop the hook for access.
Elevators on top drive lowered onto toe board of monkey board whilst lowering 5½ tubulars into mousehole.
While recovering the <...> rov to surface on its umbilical the unit was latched on to its dockking device attached to the recovery crane. This consists of a sheave wheel and and
docking tube with 3 latching dogs. The umbilical passes over the sheav wheel, throught the docking tube and down to connect with the rov. The docking termination locates
in the docking tube and is latched on to the docking dogs by means of an anular shoulder. As the rov was swung inboard, following docking, the rov disengag d from the
docking device falling approx. One foot (damaging the handrail). The load was transferred to the umbilical winch. Visual inspection of the docking mechanism and dogs
showed no damage, however an exess of grease was identified around the docking device which is concluded to have prevented one of the three dogs latching resulting in the
incident.
5" x 3/4" steelbar (latch indicator) fell off <...> 5 1/2" elevators whilst at top of derrick. Bar fell 90ft and just caught roughneck on the drill floor. Elevators removed,
photographed and quarantined. Ip assessed by a medic as fit for work on the next hift. <...> believe a weld has failed but item is not normally load bearing. <...> have issued
an 'alert' to their other crews. The compant propose an onshore investigation by the manufacturer.
During backload operations, a scaffold plank approximately 4m long was observed by the second officer as it fell into the sea approximately 5m from the ship's side. He could
not ascertain from which level the plank had fallen as it was only sighted on im act with the sea. Weather - slight/moderate sea, low swell wind - wsw 5/6
A 7" 29lb/ft x 42' joint of casing was brought onto the drill floor from the catwalk. (the catwalk is horizontal to drill floor) a tugger lowered joint into 7" sided door elevators.
The latch was closed and checked by a floorman. The joint was picked up with the blocks. When the elvator was approx 20' above drill floor the elevators opened and the
joint fell out. As one end of the joint was still on the rigfloor it toppled across landing on the tool room roof. Damage to equipment was to the box end of he joint of 7" casing.
A set of three ton test weights were being transferred from module 03 to module 05 via the lower central corridor. On lifting the second set of weights from the mezzanine
level, they were lowered to within 6 inches from the deck when the chain block faile . The chain block was a <...>, 2 ton s.w.l. Identification no. <...>
The final joint of 5 1/2" vam tubing was being made up to the completion string on well <...>. A circulating head and chicksan swivel union were made up on top of the joint
to tubing whilst it was lying in the 'v' door. The joint was latched in the eleva ors and stabbed onto the completion string. As the joint was made up with the "speedmaster
tongs", the chicksan swivel union caught the elevator rails. As the joint rotated to the right the chicksan hammer union unscrewed, causing the sivel union to fal 45ft to the
drill floor. The assistant driller was watching the top of the joint as it was being made up and shouted a warning just before the swivel union fell.
On completion of wireline operations on <...>, the bop were being rigged to take them from the wellheads to the drill floor via the bop deck. The bop was laid down on
movable cover plates to re-rig. As the bop was picked up, it swung round and caught the co er plate on which ip was standing. Cover plate moved causing ip to fall 10ft onto
the christmas tree below. He was not wearing a safety harness. This fall resulted in ip receiving a slight injury to his right knee (bruising). After seeing the platform med c he
went back to work.
Service engineer was working in the wellheads pouring oil on top of the tubing hanger of well n-28. Prior to commencing this job he checked that the covers over the
moonpool above his head were in place. At the same time, christmas tree for n-28 was pic off its side into upright position. This operation commenced after an announcement
had been made that a heavy lift was in progress in the wellheads. Whilst the christmas was being picked up it came in contact with the "c" plate covers over the moonpool,
lifting half of the plate over the lip and moving it approximately 8 inches. This movement allowed the 2 foot diameter circular top cover in the centre of the "c" plate to fall
approximately 15 feet to the wellhead deck below, after striking metalwork on the way down. The cover weighing approximately 64lbs struck the service engineer a glancing
blow, knocking off his hard hat and knocking him down. After medical attention the engineer returned to work.
After bulldogging 3 drilling shock subs weighing approx 470lbs, they were lowered to the deck. Not being satisfied with the position of the subs, they were raised approx 18"
to 2'. The banksman then instructed the east crane driver to lower the load, bu as the subs were lowered the banksmans left foot caught a deck pad eye, causing him to
stumble. Unfortunately at this time the subs hit and slid down the angled side of the of the pad eye trapping the banksmans leg between the subs and a 10' cargo basket
resulting in a crush injury to his left leg.
A 100ft section of 1 1/2" drilling blockline had been cut as normal and was to be transported to waste skip for disposal.the line was picked up by the crane via a nylon sling
attached to a point 15ft from one end.as the crane swung the lift round to the s ip,the line slowly started to slip through the nylon sling and fell to the deck striking the roust-
about pusher.the blow to his helmet caused a small laceration which needed 2 stitches.his ankle became painful the following day and he was sent to hos ital for x-ray on
6/6/94 where results showed only soft tissue bruising.
Whilst working the <...> the south crane pennant was unhooked from a load that had just been landed on the vessels deck by its crew at approx. 22:45 hrs. The crane operator
then boomed up with no load prior to slewing the load back in towards th platform. When it reached pipe deck level (approx.) A considerable swinging motion was noticed on
the the line by the crane operator. Upon starting to slew the load inboard, the pennant line, complete with master link, disengaged itself from the crane ho k and fell off, striking
a container in the aft section of the vessels deck before falling into the sea.
During pressure testing operations involving the top drive unit on the rig floor, the t.d. Unit became energised. The rotation of the unit's assembly wound up a 3" hp hose
connecting the unit to a manifold on the rig floor. This caused the failure of rigg ng which supported a saddle for the hose some 25' up in the derrick. The hose and saddle
assembly fell to the floor. A floorman involved with the pressure test operation was trapped between the hose and manifold until the support rigging failed, suffering minor
injury
The <...> launched its frc in order to collect mail and newspa- pers from the <...> platform.at around 10:09,a crewman was struck by the crane hook which swung across the
frc.at the time the crewman had just untied a mailbag from the hook.the mov ment of the hook and the movement of the frc relative to it (in the opposite direction)delivered a
strong blow to the crewmans left arm. At the time the sea was choppy and a fresh breeze was blowing.conditions were as follows:wind 350 17knots,sea 2.4m 7.1 sec
period,temp 8.1c.
The drill string had been pulled to change over the drill bit. The floor crew had commenced running in hole with 3.5" drill pipe and had run in approximately 9 stands of pipe.
The crew were 8 hours into their shift. The attached diagram shows the layou of the pipestands during this operation. Stands are removed from the rack in the numerical
order shown. Environmental conditions on the rig floor were normal. Wind speed was approximately 30kts. Two roughnecks had taken up position at what they thought was
the last stand of drillpipe in the row they had been working. As the stand was being lifted they noticed that they were positioned at the wrong pipe stand and they moved to the
area shown to work the actual stand being lifted. This is approximatley ten feet from where they had been standing. As a result of having to make this last minute adjustment
of position they were unable to control the motion of the stand being lifted. As a result of trying to control the drillpipe ip inadvertently placed his hand between the pipe and
the point of impact with the make up tongs, sustaining crush injuries to his hand. As soon as it became obvious there had been an accident the operations on the drill floor were
stopped. Ip was told to report to the medic. He was accompanied on his way to sick bay to report the accident. It was first thought that he nipped his fingertips, however,
Incident on rig floor, pipe spinner line tangled in main travelling block due to wind. Pipe spinner body (400 lbs) lifted 10 feet. Support frame sheared. Body fell to rig floor.
While unloading an 18tn coil tubing unit from the supply boat,shortly after the load was lifted a large wave caused the boat to fall then rise the load was hit by the side of the
boat sending it towards the deck where it was struck on one corner by the bo t on its way up.the load was put down and on the second try recovered to the platform.it was
found that the lifting frame had been damaged, the weld on one lifting frame pad eye had sheared and the frame had been distorted.
While backloading a skip from the n.e. Face of the platform the cargo runner on the crane whipline parted leaving the skip upended between a compactor and a coiled tubing
unit. On investigation it was found that the crane rope had become trapped between t e skip and adjacent cargo resulting in severe damage. The following lift caused the rope
to part as the load was applied.
While trying to remove wireline equipment stuck down hole at 100> ft using 3/16" braided wire a 2400lb bind was held for one hour. This was followed by releasing the bind
and pulling 1800lb on a power jar, after the jar fired the sheave side plates fractu ed and it fell to the rig floor. The area was barriered off and no injury sustained. The sheave
was rated at 2 1/2 us tons, and on inspection was found to have gouge marks from the wire on the inside of the side plates.
During cementing operations a rotating/cementing head was being racked back into the fingers. The rotating head has a sidearm and lo-torque valve attached to a 2" nipple
which protruded approximately 2 feet from the strand of drill pipe. The elevators wer unlatched and the stand pulled in towards the fingers by a tugger. When the driller
thought it was indicated to him that the stand was fully racked back and consequently clear. He sealed off on the blocks. The top drive unit came into contact with the si earm
and lo-torque valve assembly shearing it from the rotating head and allowing it to fall to the drill floor 60-70 feet below. No one on the drill floor suffered any injury.
A wire strop was required to lift a corrision inhabitor pump off the additional roof space. A strop was located nearby attached to a rigged down length of lubricator. Whilst
moving the lubricator it rolled up against a second section of tubular, trapping he injured party's rh ring finger the injuries overleaf were sustained.
Drill crew were breaking out the internal bop in the top drive unit, the driller left his console to assist in the operation and failed to apply the parking break. The drill line was
spooled off of the drum allowing the travelling block and hook which we e attached to the top drive unit to fold over coming to rest against the racked drill pipe in the derrick
the top drive did not move as it was holding drill pipe secured by slips at the rotary table and located within the guides. When the block came to r st there were 5 turns of cable
still on the drawworks drum. No damage was identified to any of the hoisting/drilling system. The travelling block was not in immediate danger of falling to the rig floor due
to rate of descent and connection to other components
At the time of the incident we had just completed pulling out of the hole with the 7" liner clean out assy. The next operation was to pull the wear bushing rom the wellhead to
allow us to set the test plug for testing the blowout preventors. To pull the the wear brushing we had to change the drill pipe elevators from 3.1/2" to 5". The tugger was used
to change out the elevators. The tugger was put back in it's normal stowage position on top of the tong snubbing post and tensioned up to take any slack o t of the line. It
would appear at this point that the line from the crown to the air winch was snagged up on the top drive. The tugger operator looked up to check the line but failed to see it was
caught up. The driller proceeded to pick up the blocks w th the intention of picking up a stand of pipe from the derrick. The tugger line tightened up pulling excess tension on
the air winch causing the line to part approx 50ft up from the winch. When the tugger line tensioned up it distorted the top drive mu hose causing it to split the outer sheath
and armour. The tugger line and mud hose have since been removed from service.
During flaring gas from production an apparent flashback in the lp flare system occurred due to the absence of purge gas. No gas compression running at time. On inspection
of pipework and flanges no damage was found.
When erecting scaffolding on the nw corner of the ba helideck, a 2i' tube was laid on the top of the accommodation whilst the scaffolder secured other materials, the tube,
which was pre cariously placed with a portion of its length (6') overhanging the ac ommodation, was then subject to vibration from a helicopter landing which caused it to
"walk" off the roof and fall 30' to the ba main deck.
Freight for use on <...> satellite <...> was placed outside the helishack on the open grating walkway (for weighing and manifesting to freight 'jd'). One item (tin of grease wt
approx 2kg) fell to the level below (12'-15'). It had fallen between a gap betwe n the steel kick plate and the guard rail. No person witnessed the tin drop, the wind at the time
was approx. 40 knot gusting 44-46 knots. Actions taken/planned to
After unbolting the valve and lifting it from the wellhead, the <...> crew were attempting to re-sling the valve in order to get into a posistion that would allow it to be lifted
through the wellbay hatch. During this operation the full weight of the wing v lve (approx 1.3 tons ) was placed on the scaffold. The scaffold then partially collapsed
Tower scaffold had been erected to inspect/repair main hoist limit switch on ap crane. Crane boom was across the deck of the ap roof. Crane boom had been removed earlier in
the day thus leaving the tower exposed. Winds increased throughout the day prevent ng the dismantling of the scaffold. Tower toppled on to handrail. No ip's, 1 light fitting
damaged, no damage to scaffold or lamp standard
During a routine function check a technician attempted to operate a chain operated firemain valve. As he did so the wheel-handle attached to the valve gearbox parted and fell
30 feet to deck. The technician was standing to one side when operating chain nd was not injured. The wheel-handle which was manufactured from pressed steel was found
to have corroded through.
Whilst erecting scaffolding on cp spider deck <...> was working in the centre of the middle bay between grid lines c & d. He was working under the horizontal diagonal brace
running from ne to sw in middle bay. The <...> wire came tight as he stood as he wire was running underside of the brace. <...> went back under the brace, detached his inertia
to run wire over the top of the bracing. At this point he over balanced and fell 5' into the waster. The lifejacket worn at the time inflated on contact wi h the water.
Coil lifting operations were taking place on well c-2 through the drill floor. A 2 7/8" motor and under reamer assembly was made up and lowered through the mousehole to
function test the unit. At that piont the coil tubing bop shear rams were activated losed, severing the assembly at the top connector allowing it to fall approx. 25ft to the bop
deck below no injuries to pesonnel were sustained and no plant damage incurred.
As helicopter departed helideck a wooden crate lid was blown from the helideck run off area down onto the pipedeck area. The wooden crate was situated within a half height
and had previously contained hoses which had been removed 2 days earlier. A
During a period of high wind cladding detached from the drilling derrick and landed aprox 70' away adjacent to m15 offices.
Formed steel protector from derrick main door fell 20 metres and landed on roof of hvac unit. Object weighed about 2o kg. Appears to be a vibration problem, however bolts
securing object also appear undersized. Both undid itself.
As helicopter approched the the down draft from the roter blades blew a section of the cable tray divider off the main cable tray and down to the cellar deck below narrowly
missing persons on the way down.
A bus stop type fire extinguisher sign fell from its mounting which consisted of a length of unistrut secured to the handrail extending to a height of approx 1.1 metre above this
rail.
During a routine photography inspection of the flare tip it was discovered that the trumpet part of the flare tip was missing.
On retrieving a rope tag line under the stairs on the <...> unit on the <...> pipedeck (elevation 52.2m) a section of samson post stored vertically in the same location toppled
over the kick plate and fell into the 2 metre gap between the drilling and accommodation modules. The post deflected off the turbine exhaust and dropped 20 meters towards
the west side and landed on a scaffold platform on the production deck (elevation 31.4). Note: 1. 1. The location of impact was i meter from the firemain. . A samson post is a
turbular steel section approximately 0.7m high, 0.15m in diameter, weighing approximately 20kg.
As the witness (<...>) was ascending the glycol tower he heard a loud bang. He turned round and saw that the temporary loading trestle had collapsed. As far as he could see no
one was in the immediate vacinity. He climbed down the tower to look at hat had happened and found the trestle & scaffolding bundles on ther deck.
Whilst carrying out replacement of air cylinder at finger board a toolbag full of instrument technicians tools fell from the monkeyboard level to the drillfloor narrowly
missing the personnel working on the drillfloor (estimated 6 ft).the clip holding the handle opened out and toolbag fell through the slots to the drillfloor.
During hot bolting of the production produced & ballast water flame arrester situated 100ft up the flare tower on the north face, a nut was dropped. The nut rolled across the
grating and fell down the gap by the vertical ladder, it then dropped down the lare tower, hitting the flare deck some 20ft to the south. The nut then bounced off hitting ip on
the ankle
Repairs to the 'a' <...> compressor exhaust ducting insulation had recently been undertaken. Shortly after 'a' <...> had been on full load an area of the exhaust started to smoke.
This worsened over a 15 minute period, at which point some small flames became evident. At this point, the unit was stopped and the fire extinguished with hand held
extinguishers. The area was then monitored for a further 3 hours.
After platform power outage, drilling personnel re-instating power to boards noticed smoke coming from panel km0011b. Returned to generator cubicle and opened breaker to
kill power then discharged 5.5kg bcf extinguisher into panel which successfully extin uished the fire. Damage to all internal components in cubicle km0011b and slight heat
damage to adjacent cubicle km0012b
Whilst an employee was burning away redundant bolts at the front of the filter house. A hot piece of metal dropped through the grated walkway and ignited the gas emitting
from the 2 inch overboard vent some 7ft below. The fire watch on location immediatel snubbed the fire by the deployment of the dry powder extinguisher. It is estimated the
flame was present for 10-15 seconds. The job was holted and the incident reported to the duty operator in the platform control room.
The surrounding area of the flame box was not damaged. No marks were found. On removing the outer cover there were no marks on the flame arrester. The flame arrester
looked in good condition. Photographs were taken of the surrounding area and flame arrest r.wind speed at the time was 50 knots with gusts to 65 knots easterly.
Small vent stack fire ignited by snow squall at 07:52. Fire extinguished at 07:58 by use of fixed co2 extinguisher system. 1 bottle used.
Small vent stack fire ignited by snow/sleet squall at 14:40.pm. Fire extinguished at 14:48 by use of fixed co2 extinguisher system- 1 bottle used.
Small vent stack fire ignited by sleet squall at 21-45hrs. Fire extinguished at 21-53 hrs by use of fixed co2 extinguisher system, 1/2 bottle used.
Smoke reported in level 1 plant room by teleephone to ccr. Fire team located the hvac supply fan hm6303b as the alarm source. It was already stopped & shutdown by two
members of the electrical dept upon their arrival. Using dry powder the fire was extingu shed & contained & area made safe. This set off the smoke detectors & gave indication
in the ccr of the event. This input initiated gpa as required. Initially, site of local stop button for hm6303b could not be safely reached
Several systems tripped at the final stages of bringing the plant back, on line after a shut down at 17.45 hrs on <...>. The resultant flaring operations resulted in initiating two
small fires on the nw side of the p04/05 weather deck. One fire was con ained in a waste skip and the other developed opn a pile of wooden sleepers. Damage occurred to two
protective trolley covers ond plastic safety signs. Fires were extinguished and the plant depressurised in a controlled manner. The flare was finally shut own at 17.00 hrs on
<...>.
At 01:48 the central control room recieved a message from a production operator that there was a fire in the hazardous hvac room on fan motor cm3201b. The fire was caused
by a bearing collapse on the motor, this ignited grease at the bearing side of the motor.
Whilst running in normal operating mode a thrust bearing on high pressure pump at the reverse osmosis unit (portable water maker) overheated. Smoke from lubricant on the
faulty bearing caused activation of a smoke detector and initiation of the local modu e alarm. The alarm was investigated by production personnel who immediately diagnosed
the problem and shut down the offending pump. Following discussion with safety the arae was then ventilated to allow clearance of smoke.
A team of platers were working at three sites preparing m3ee roof beams for reinforcement at the root of the lifting padyes. Unwanted steel from a beam flange at the ne site
was being washed out using an oxy-aceylene gouging nozzle which generates a consi erable amount of glowing slag. (far more than a cutting nozzle). Some of the slag sprayed
out through a gap in the fire blanket site enclosure. Bounced off pipework below into an open deck drain and ignited the seal pot contents. A yellow flame 1.5m high ad
reduced to 0.5m minutes later when extinguished by deluge. Uv fire detection was inhibited for the hot work. A materials controller passing through the module say the fire and
hit a gpa break glass. He exited the nearest door released the deluge manual y and raised the alarm. This resulted in simultaneous release of the linked east wellhead deluges
riser esdv closure and evacuation of the platform workforce to the barge.
During oxy acetylene burning within a habitat at the flare tower base a flashback into the acetylene supply hose occurred. The hose ruptured at two points releasing burning
acetylene into the habitat. Prompt action was taken by the firewatcher and plater n isolating the gas bottles and extinguishing the flames with a dry powder extingusher. The
pss in observing the fire radioed the ro with instruction to initiate a red hazard status
At 14:50 smoke alarm from overloaded earth cable in drilling module s.c. R. Led to muster.s/d equipment and secured.went back to routine and decided to start up gas turbine
which had been down for maintenance.on start up at 15:35 smoke alarm from under ood.determined due to oily contamination and stood down muster.back to normality
15:45.are working on earth cable overload.oir9a for both alarms will be submitted.
Umc invertor ca-l-2341 was unserviceable and fault finding to repair was in progress.after an interchange of components,as part of the fault dia- gnosis the unit was put on
test.ten seconds after the energising,the electrical maintenance technitian saw moke issuing from on of the unit cooling fan outlets he immediately switched off the power
supply,but residual smoke activated an adjacent smoke detector.futher investigation by the vendor has been organised.
On <...> a 2" meg line mc581908e2 was prepared for hot work. Both meg injection pumps were isolated using a double block and bleed arrangement. A drain valve was
opened on the cellar deck and the line flushed from its highest point for two hours. A gas t st was carried out with a 0% lel result. At 22.43hrs a hot work permit was issued. A
5" section of the pipe was removed by cold cutting. A "t" piece was tack welded into the line. One butt was root welded and the second butt 50% complete when the welder f lt
heat on his hand. He stopped work and observed a flame emanating from the "t" piece. The length of the flame was approximately 18". The fire was quickly extinguished with
a dry chemical fire extinguisher.
During grinding to prepare an 8-in. Decommisioned natural gas line for flange connection to a new 8-in. Spool, there was ignition of condensate resulting in a flame from the
open end of the new spool. The flame lasted only a few seconds and self extinguis ed. There were no injuries or equipment damage and no impact on production operations.
Fuel gas heater is built with two units in series (ex1601a and ex1601b) each bank heats the gas using electrical power. Prior to the incident flow control problems with fuel gas
required the system to be shut down and depressurised per design. Ex1601b fun tioned correctly. Ex1601a protection did not function due to incorrect wiring. Electrical power
to the exchanger was maintained, and with no flow to cool, the <...> overheating caused the insulation to smoulder. The smoke was seen and the alarm raised. Roduction was
shut in, a full muster called. And the emergency response team went to the incident. The electrical power was isolated, the insulation removed and the exchanger colled. There
were no injuries. Exchanger has been removed for recertification.
At 0139 hours on <...> the 'b' compressor seal oil pumps were electrically deisolated for a function test. Approximately ten (10) seconds after starting one of the pumps, a loud
bang was heard in the switchroom followed by loss of lighting and a plant hutdown. On investigation, a large volume of smoke was seen coming out of the switchroom and a
gpa was initiated. Once ventilated, smoke levels were reduced. No fires were observed. All personnel were accounted for, no injuries reported.
When the lab tech was flushing fluids through an enclosed sample loop into a waste container the top of the waste container flashed. He quickly contacted the ccr to explain
the cause of the subsequent deluge and gpa.
Investigation and test runs into failure of turbine to change from gas to liquid fuel supply on ko2. A final test run on liquid fuel (diessel) was attempted. During this start
sequence a loud bang was heard and a flash seen at exhaust outlet. The mahcine ripped on high exhaust temperature. Immediate presence at the turbine saw flames coming
from enclosure the fire was extinguished by an operator using a co2 fire extinguisher. All process plant was shutdown and made safe. Weather - dark, dry, wind - 14 kt at
102o, temp - 9oc visibility 10 miles, sea - 2/3 mtrs.
Mechanical deterioration of an air suuply fan shaft bearing resulted in fan belt break-up and smoke generation into the transformer room air ducting. Two smoke detectors were
set off in the transformer room. This resulted in an automatic production shutdo n and halon 1301 discharge to the transformer room. Work permits were suspended until
confirmation that the situation was under control; as a precaution.
Unit 060 compressor set whilst being commissioned after major shutdown experienced a minor fire in the cladding around the turbine exhaust. The unit was being visually
monitored at the time and immediate shutdown and vent was initiated. Initially smoke wa noticed. On full investigation a minor fire was observed and extinguished within 3
minutes. No damage occured. The general alarm was initiated manually and all personnel were mustered as a precaution.
The production operator was doing his 15:00 hrs rounds on power generation. Four gas turbine generator sets were on line at the time the fifth was under maintenance. During
his checks on the turbine hall roof he noticed whisps of smoke coming out of the b ttom of the cladded insulation on the exhaust of gas turbine 31-007
A diesel driven air compressor was in use to supply service air during repairs to the permanent air compressors. During normal running conditions between periodic checks by
the operator a fire occurred which caused damage to +/- 10% of the acoustic cladd ng inside the enclosure. Investigations have established there was no diesel or lube oil leaks
on the unit; the source of ignition appears to have been the exhaust heat transmitted to the cladding. Vendor states cladding is fire retardant.
Hvac ran, tag no. magellan, developed a bearing fault during duty operation. Heat from the bearing caused smoke to be produced inside the inlet hvac ducting to the production
conrtrol room. Smoke was detected in the pct by the fire & gas system , which in turn initiated an automatic shutdown/blowdown of everest and riser production facilities and
halon extinguishent release in the production control room. Power to hvac fan also tripped automatically at this time
The plant conditions on the above date was of a single main train/cold plant bypass operation with t102 being fuelled by diesel. No alarm conditions were known within the
operation at that time. Two maintenance personnel with the assistance of two opera ors in attendance were investigating vibration faults on k102/103 in the start up room
situated on module 5 mezzanine. A smell of smoke became apparent to all present. The two operators investigated checking out the immediate and surrounding area of the
module. The other two maintenance personnel present checked belts on the hvac system for signs of deterioration/burning. When the door at the gear box end of the t102
enclosure was opened by the operators to check inside, evidence of smoke was seen by th personnel on the mezzanine above. Access was gained into the enclosure and
investigations found evidence of a fire emanating from the area at the base of the power turbine casing/gear box transition shaft. The fire alarm and production shutdown were
ma ually activated. The fire was extinguished by manual activation of the halon unit system. No major damage was apparent during early investigations but this will be
verified by vendor rep inspection.
Main train to compressor driver had just been restarted after a number of false starts and adjustments to the fuel system. The engine had just entered the "warm up" stage when
indication of a fire was received in the compressor start up room and the engi e shutdown. The situation was quickly checked and flames were seen to emanate from the
transition piece between the engine and power turbine. The extinguishant was released local to the engine and the fire quickly extinguished. The after burning downstre m of
the engine was caused by unburned fuel from previous starts accumulating at the back of the engine.
A start sequence had been initiated to t102 engine, where the warm up speed had been reached. Personnel on the scene saw lagging covering the transition piece of the engine
to power turbine ignite. A manual activation of the halon discharge was initiat d immediately by those present. After initially appearing to be extinguished the lagging was
seen to re-ignite. The fire was eventually extinguished by the fire team using a foam branch after which damaged lagging was removed from the enclosure and washed down
On <...> at 1420 hrs a fire was discovered in the heavy tool store of the drilling sub-structure on the <...> platform. The alarm was raised in the following manner: a)the
welding foreman informed <...> control room by radio. B)a ma ual alarm call point was activated adjacent to the fire. C)a telephone call to the <...> control room was initiated
by a person adjacent to the fire. The platform gas and fire detection system did not pick up the fire as the fire zone had been inhibited o allow the hot work to be carried out
the fire was quickly extinguished by the welding foreman using his glovs no persons were injured and damage to the plant and equipment was very slight (restricted to a three
inch burnt section of welding cable.)once he control room received confirmation of a fire,a general platform alarm was initiated and all personnel at their respective muster
stations.
Fan belts on k8502a became twisted in 'v' groove, causing belt to rub on pulley guard. Resultant smoke detected and area halon activated. Gp initiated.
At approximately 20:40 smoke was observed coming from the ventillation discharge duct of 'a' <...> gas turbine load gearbox compartment by witness. On investigation, he
observed smoke coming from the area of no 2 bearing and informed the main contr l room. Another employee was sent to assist, and on further investigation, flames were
observed in the region of no 2 bearing. On this report, another employee was sent to the machine and asked to stop it - this he did, as directed by reducing the load on the
machine and applying the emergency stop. The flames were extinguished using a portable co2 extinguisher. After the machine had been stopped and allowed to cool down, the
area was inspected. The bearing area was found to be in good order and leak free
'C' water inspection tails pump bearing / mechanical seal over heated and its lub oil ignited. The fire was noticed by two platform personnel as it started and was extinguished
with a portable fire extinguisher, the alarm was raised and the pump shutdown.
During normal operation an operator smelled a gas leak which was confirm -ed by a mini gas detector. The operator informed the control room isolated the gasband rerouted
the vent line. The flange had been openeda couple of days before in connection with b inding work/ <...>. The gasket may have been re-used when closing the flange.
The pig launcher, m3, was pressurised to 125 barg. Aftre a successful leak testing the operator started to decompress by opening manually the two block valves to a 2" vent
line. Shortly after a gas leak was seen by the operator who immediately iscolated t e leak from the m3 by closing the valves. After having assessed the situation, was slowly and
controlled decompressed through2" vent line. During this phase the leak was closely monitered and it was ensured that no ignition sources were present. The leak as on the
upper level with no ceiling i.e. Good ventilation.
A 2.5 litre aceton bottle exploded/fractured in locker used for storage (in the laboratory) of chemical solvents, methanol, ethanol, chlorform, etc. This resulted in a chemical
spill in the laboratory. The central control room was notified of incident and the extraction fans were immediately set to full speed. The spill was cleaned and the room was
subsequently vented. After half an hour no vapours from the spill could be detected.
Gas detection on a jbgt air intake ducting on fuel gas passing gcv through the unit via combustion chamber and percolating through to the air intake ducting. In still air
conditions, gpa initiated resulting in full muster. No injuries or damage occurred.
Seal failure alarm was indicated on interstage condensate pump 2g105a. In iscolating the pump to investgate the problem, condensate was drained into the closed drain. Due to
a suspect hydrate blockage, back pressure affected the pump seal arrangement lea ing to joint failure. The volume of line drained was circa 6 litres.
On the evening of the <...>, 'a' gas compressor in c module was operating normally. At 17:45 a gas leak occured within the accoustic housing of the <...> engine of 'a'
compressor train. The gas ignited and the subsequent over pressure damaged th accoustic panelling and frame work. The modules halon and deluge systems were activated
aut0 matically. The fuel gas continued to burn within the compressor housing for a period of approv 17 minutes causing damage to pipework and cabling within the housi g.
The gas suppl was isolated and the residual gas allowed to burn off while the emergency response teams used fire hoses to cool the surrounding equipment. All non essential
platform personnel werw assembled in their muster stations on the <...> 20;07 and were stood down until 20:37. The gangway remained closed until the platform returned to
normal status at 21:43. No one was injured.
Pinhole leak found in gas compressor first stage knock out pot drain line return to separators. Approx. 20 gallons of fluid mainly produced water with small amount of
condensate/crude oil discharged into the module. Production train immediately shut dow for isolation, removal and repair of pipework.
Pipeline pump g1002b was started up at 07:32 in order to resume oil export. At 07:45 it was reported to m13 that there was a leak on the pipeline pump. The operators were
alerted and sent to the area. At 07:55 pipeline pump was stopped then isolated an depressured.
On starting the b oil export pump the mechanical seal failed allowing produced fluids oil/water to escape into module. The incident was reported to the main control room
immediately by the local operator and a contractor working in the area. The pump wa shut down and isolated
A routine observation was made around the pump and it was discovered that oil was weeping from a repaired weld. The pump was shutdown and a procedure formulated to
affect a repair.
Level in third stage separator passed through closed interface level control valve, during produced water flow checks. The xv which closes on lo lo level failed to close.
Investigation revealed that the lo lo level flow swithch failed to activate due to b ild up of sand in switch. Level indication of the interface remained steady but reloder also
found faulty. Once the false level was identified the xv valve was closed but level was dropped sufficiently to allow small amount of oil through.
Pipeline pump was being brought on line. Pre start checks carried out and pump started followed by esd valve being opened up. Immediate gas detection and investigation
revealed nde mechanical seal on pump had failed and oil was discharing into module the ump was immediately shutdown.
A malfunction on the oil production trainresulted in oil contamination of the <...> units. The only evidence of this was discolouration of the sea at the overboard caisson as
nothing unuasal was evident on the production train instrumentation in order to onfirm the problem each wemco unit was checked in turn by opening a hatchto view the level
oil was found in the 'a' unit and the level adjusted to skim the oil over weir whilst inspecting the 'b' unit a gas release occured resulting in a sd3.
During normal start sequence on the gas compressor on reaching gas gen lit, a loud bang was heard. On investigation some distortion was found on the exhaust trunking. An
expansion joint was found to be badly damaged also a flange appeared to have spread on the pipework. An internal inspection was carried out an accessable parts and apart
from the distortion nothing was found.
Water/gas release developed from a corroded grease/sealent injection nipple on the lipstream divert valve to the lp production <...> of m15 production well.
The unit level controller setpoint was adjusted in an effort to improve overboard water quality. The level overflowed releasing produced water and gas to the module.
Gas release from produced water separator units.

Hydrocarbon release from produced water separator units.
Samll volume of gas released from depressurisation of flowline after pressure test.
Pump had been running approx 3 hours after a process shutdown. A vapour haze was noticed by the module operator and identified as caused by crude oil leakage from a
pinhole on the balance line at the drive end of the pump. The pump was immediately shutdow . The leakage was estimated at approx 2 gallons.
A gas release occured from the gas lift pressurisation line. The flange is between 15-xv-1102 and the oirfire plate. The area requires ear protection and the weather condition
was windy. The module is not pressurised and is open
Two technicians were carrying out a calibration of the oil metering master prover. Verification that the master prover was full of water and that the vent valves were not passing
could only be achieved by breaking a union on the line from the vents into t e hp flare header, and doing a visual check of the flow or no flow. During the period where this
union was broken open. The lab tech was involved in sampling adjacent to this area. His task involved purging gas into the hp vent header. This gas was releas d out of the
open union causing twin gas detection and platform shutdown.
During routine operation of the test loop facility, it was necessary to vent the loop down to atmospheric px. At approx 7 bar the door seal on the sand trap began to leak causing
the two adjacent gas detection heads to go into alarm, causing a g.a. And mu ter. The test loop was allowed to continue venting down under supervised condition until safe.
During a routine utilities check a production technician observed via the inspection window that in addition to the normal burner flame picture, a substance was burning in the
bottom of the firetube, and also a flame was present at around the 2 o'clock po ition on the fire tube wall . The unit was shutdown and fuel gas isolated. The small fire
continued burning, suggesting that fire was fuelled by the ingress of glycol. The fire was immediately extinguished using an adjacent dry powder extinguisher
The platform has been off production and depressurised for the past two weeks, to allow drilling and process modifications to take place. On the day of the incident it was
noted that pressure had built up in the isolated production header. This required t e production header to be manually vented. During this operation gas escaped from the h.p.
Vent adjacent to no.3 contactor, activating the platform gas detection and shutdown systems. The manual vent immediately shut preventing further release of gas.
The <...> wing valve actuator developed a leak approximately 2 hrs after it was operated. The production operator, while on an inspection tour, heard the leaking gas as he
entered the area. The noise was caused by the 200psi power gas passing through 1/4" bo e stainless steel pipe fitting connected to the underside of the actuator (the normal
actuator vent\0. The gas supply to the actuator was closed & leak stopped. The supply was then isolated until the actuator can be repaired. The <...> wellbay area is an op n
deck grated area with wind wall covering 2/3 of the height on the north, esast and west sides. Wind at the time of the incident was 14 knots at 240 degrees. Approximately 15
minutes before the leak and noticed, grit blasting was taking place about 3 met es from the wing valve. A portable gas detector was being utilised and no gas was detected.
None of the fixed gas monitors in the area detected a leak.
During normal operations leak observed coming from weld on the drain valve assembly on condensate pipework by opertor monitoring the area. The section of pipework
involved was the victor condensate export line downstream of the export pumps. The pumps and liquid metering. The line was operating at a pressure of approx 1300psi. The
control room operator was called to the scene and immediately stopped the duty export pump which reduced the leak. The operations supervisor was also called to the scene
and ass sted isolation and de - pressurisation of the system. The total leakage into the celler deck was approx. One gallon maximum of a water/condensate mixture.
<...> satellite was brought into production at 19:40 hrs by opening the wing valves on <...> cellar deck at approx 20:40hrs. The operator, while doing his rounds & routine
checks noticed the noise of gas escaping from <...> wing valve. He immediately shut the win valve in and isolated the power gas. The <...> wellbay area is an open deck grated
area with wind wall covering 2/3 of the height on the north, east and west sides.
During normal routine rounds the section leader became aware of escaping gas from actuator on valve 303-sdv-6. This gas appeared to be escaping past the piston 'o' ring seal
inside the actuator. Valve 303-sdv-6 is the shut down valve on 2" liquid dump lin from bc2 wellheads seperator and is located at the south end of bp cellar deck. The fire & gas
system was operational - however due to the small quantity of gas - did not alarm. The bp cellar deck is an enclosed area, with forced air ventilation on four corners
While construction supervisor was reviewing forthcoming annual shutdown workscopes in the area, he discovered the gas leak - he called the area operator to investigate who,
witha n instrument special, isolated the gas supply. Weather: wind 18-20 knots, 0 0 degrees, sea state 1.5/2.0m
During routine operations, metering technician heard gas escaping. On investigation, found body bleed plug on inlet valve to victor metering stream no.2. No equipment in use
and no damage sustained. The weather at the time of the incident was overcast wit heavy rain. Wind speed 24 kts at 050 degrees
No discharge pressure was evident on the <...> methanol pump discharge on the <...> platform. After proving the operation of the pump and the associated equipment, it was
established that the loss of pressure was likely to be due to a leak on the 2" p peline from <...> to the ed satellite. The dive support vessel <...> investigated and found the line
parted some 1180 metres from the ed jacket. It appears that the 2" methanol line was snagged by a trawl board from a fishing vessel an dragged away from the 12 inch gas
pipeline until a point was reached where it could no longer move, at which point it 'necked' and failed.
Following a planned platform shutdown during which the process system was vented, upon re-pressuring, a leak occurred at the base of the damper where the "c" ring meets
the body. Weather conditions at the time were clear with 10.20 kt winds @ 300 deg.
While completing post shutdown tests, and prior to starting avon gas generator, bci compressor was undergoing a purge and pressurisation cycle. During this activity the
operator noted some operational inconsistencies. Prior to shutting the unit down a mix ure of hydrocarbon gas and seal oil was released into <...> compressor house from the
seal oil reservoir tank (dipstick oriface). This caused three gas detectors to alarm on the fire and gas panel in the <...> control room. Weather conditions at time: heavy ra n,
wind at 24 knots, north, 3 metre seas.
While attempting to take a produced water sample from be2 wellhead seperator, the sampling valve failed, i.e. The stem packing assembly sheared allowing the release of a
mixture of process liquid. At the time local manually operated isolation proved unsat sfacty. <...> production shutdown was initiated one hour later allowing the isolation of
the liquid handling system. During this time approximately 40 gallons of mainly water was put into the open drain system. No gas was released from this incident. No gnition
sources present in area.
Reboiler tube failure in module 4.
Diesel fuel was leaking from the transfer pump on the diesel generator engine. The cause of the leak was worn shaft seal which eventually failed. The diesel oil ran onto the
steel floor and ran down a nearby drain into the sea. The area of dispersion was bout 1 sq.metre in the generator room. The platform was unmanned prior to the leak. The
standby vessel had any discharge from <...>
A slight smell of condensate/gas was noted to be coming from the vicinity of the manway doors on inlet scrubbers v152/153. The vessels were pressurised to 230 psi at the
time of the incident but the platform was shut down). The vessels were depressurised nd the doors were flogged up. The vessels were pressurised to 480 psi and leak checks
revealed no further problems.
A condensate/gas smell was detected above fuel gas skid on <...> cellar deck by <...> electricians working on scaffold removing/replacing cable trays.msa detector reading of
0-1% lel in this area. It appeared the wind blowing through the module was carrying the gas from around k/100 k/200 suction/discharge pipework. Gas tests in area of k100
discharge header psvs resulted in readings of 0-40% lel. Escape eventually identified, after removing lagging, as coming from a 1/4 npt nipple between the relief valve ilot
valve and bleed down valve on psv 309 k100 discharge header. Unit k100 was cool stopped (normal stop including 10 min. Cool down timer) to effect repairs. Investigation
revealed that the nipple was craked around approximately 230o of its circumferenc an attempt was made to remove the nipple but it sheared in the body of the pilot valve. A
replacement pilot valve was fitted to the psv, leak and pressure tested and the unit put back on line.
On the <...> 11.48 hrs, an esd and blow down occurred. The activity on the platform at the time was the completion of the pre annual shut down checks. The complex was
pressured in a ready to run state with the exception that the main <...> generators ituated on the <...> had been shut down and power was being supplied by a temporary diesel
unit on the <...> platform. During the blow down a quantity of condensate was vented in the gas stream from the <...> stacks. This condensate spilled to the sea but a pr
portion also fell down onto the <...> control room/generator roof, no escalation of the incident occured, further more no hot work was going on as all staff were on <...>
(lunch). On the esd the ga sounded, a muster was progressed and the emergency respons team called into acton. Once the venting ceased the inspection revealed the reason for
the esd was the activation of the signal from a loss of <...> power timer running full term.
<...>, a <...> scaffolder working on the <...> expansion project, was preparing to pass some scaffold tubes up to a colleague who was positioned on a hanging scaffold located
approx 4 mts above the ac end of the <...> lower bridge. The sca fold was built under an overboard scaffold work permit and was complete except for some handrails.
Performing authority <...> requested an inboard scaffold work permit at 07:00hrs on <...> to erect/dismantle inboard scaffold including the ne previously mentioned. <...> left
the confines of the platform to pass poles and stood on the 1" drain valve to obtain purchase and in doing so broke the valve of its screw female connection.
Whilst at work dismantling scaffold which had been used for access to paint the well flow lines, a scaffolders tool belt snagged the 1/4" stainless steel pipe fron the low flow
line pressure sensing tap off point. This resulted in the pipe being pulled ou of its compression fitting and gas released into well head area. This activated the gas detection
system to 17% lel. The low gas alarm sounded in both main control room and radio room. The scaffolder immediately reported the incident to the radio room. T e platform
crew were already responding to the gas alarm received in the control room. Duration of gas release approx. 2 minutes. Isolation made by platform crew. Pressure in the
flowline 1100 psi and platform was off-line, not flowing. Wind direction 250 wind speed 15 knots, air temp 59 degrees f.
During a routine venting operation to depressure <...> via <...> discharge header vent v/v xv-10-7. After approx. Two minutes of venting the outside operator noticed a small
gas leak from the top of the hp vent boot sight glass. The venting was stopped and th leak reported. The fire and gas systems were armed and no detection annunciated.
Inspection revealed the top nipple had sheared. The sight glass was removed and plugged for repair by the mechanical technician. No persons were working in the vicinity and
he station off-line.
All process operations were shutdown prior to incident. Daylight hours, wind 200o at 15 knots. At 19:27 cold work was in progress on the main deck of <...> (production) in
the area of the redundant separator/ contractor towers, this involved the swinging o a blind in a " crossover " line between main flow lines on the platform side of the esdv's.
<...> was cleaning the threads in the area of no.2 contactor separator towers. He moved around to the east side of the towers and became aware of the ound of escaping gas on
air. He was unable to locate the location of the leak but decided that it was gas due to the smell. He immediately informed his supervisor who was working in the immediate
area. <...> and his supervisor, <...>, searched or the location of the leak and found it to be a " pin hole " on the outer diameter of a 2 " pipe bend. <...> contacted the <...>
control room by telephone and reported the gas leak.
K104 compressor while on test run was being cheked over by inst tech and in doing so detected a small gas leak, upon further investigation the leak was found to be at a weld
where the gas balance line joins the compressor drive end. It was decided to shut the unit down in a controlled manner to save further disturbing the pipework. Actions
taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
K103 while on line (compression). A small fire in power turbine enclosure was detected by internal uv detectors setting off halon system and shutting down compressor. Leak
found to emanate from rtdi fitting on power turbine bearing oil had gradually satur ted lagging and as power turbine extremely hot ignition had occurred. Oil found to have
seeped rather than sprayed down conduit and then onto lagging. No damage found to equipment as fire extinguished rapidly by halon system.
While checking for trapped air to pressure switch 1w 143 psl 206f, employee slackened off the union nut approx one eighth of a turn. The pipe blew out of the olive and nut
discharging the hydraulic oil from 2600 psig to zero psig. The system was installed during the <...> esdv modifications and has been in service since. No-one was injured and
the pipe was the only item damaged. The wind was from the south east estimated at 20 knots, light was good, mild condition and no noise.
Wells f6 and f9 were brought on stream. The production operator detected a gas leak, identified the source, shut the wells in and isolated the power gas to the two well esd
valve bettis operators. A further gas check was carried out and the area was clear the production operator detected a gas leak coming out of the vent from the bettis actuators
on the outlet header for wells f6 and f9. The wells were immediately shut in and the power gas to the valves were isolated. Further gas checks were carried out a d no further
leaks were found. The gas was leaking for approximately one minute. The volume was very small. The gas was not detected by gas heads however, the valves are positioned in
open deck.
While carrying out gas tests during hot work preparation procedure, a small gas leak was detected at the stem seal on well f6 top master on well f6 xmas tree. The well mudline
safety valve was closed and the well vented from the mlsv to the flowline vent n the production platform. The top and bottom masters and the wing valves were closed. A
further gas check was carried out and the area was found to be clear
At 16:26 start sequencewas initiated on k1602. At 17:06 unit fully on-line and running normally. At 17:45 black smoke was noted coming from exhaust exit and emergency
stop initiated. Smoke continued tom exit exhaust. Inspection inside turbine enclosure fo lowed. All non essential personnel were told to leave the area. Heat from the internal
exhaust fire caused the flexible bellows above the enclosure to ignite and small fire followed. Fire was detected automatically & g.a. Sounded. Fire team put the fire o t while
all others mustered. The fire was extinguished immediately and hoses played on the exhaust until cooled. The source of fire traced to oil in exhaust base.
Small fire ignited on the outside of the first stage exhaust bellows. Source was oil being blown through from the turbine. Faulty/worn compressor drive end seal. Fire
extiguished with a hose reel within compressor module.
A technician was checking the valve positions on the line from bc35 thp tapping point, to the <...> transducer and local gauge. As he checked the first valve in line from the
tree, the stem blew out of the valve body releasing oil and gas into the module. E immediately had the well closed in. The fixed gas detection in the area operated, raising the
platform through yellow alert to red hazard status. An auto sps occurred and bc35 xmas tree depressurised via the valve body in question.
During the annual inspection of pl43/43a a small leak was detected in the 6" nb coflexip oil production pipeline. A tear, approx 4" long, was visible in the outer sheathing of
the pipeline approx 100m from the wellhead. Small amounts of gas with possibl traces of oil were visible. Approximate measurements of the leak suggests leak rates of 50ml
every 30 minutes.
On recomissioning, sea water lift system, utilising g119a to commission utilities, a very small amount of gas was released from a sea water line at 2" valve in the rig shaker
area. Gas dissipated to atmosphere. The gas was not detectable at distances grea er than 20" from the pipe. None of the fixed gas detectors in the area were activated. No
damage and no injury.
Cause of release was a leak from a flange fitted with a blank. The flange was on the line ao5 to the backflow system. At the time of the leak the pressure within the line was
increasing due to increased flow in ao5. No damage or injury sustained. Internal module
Gpa and muster called when gland leak occurred on fuel gas controller pv333.7,2 gas detectors momentarily read 20% automatically initiating a class 2 shutdown. One minute
later readings fell to 10-11% and six minutes on read between 4% and 6%. The gas det ctors were situated in the extract ducting and upon shutdown immediately started to
fall. Nb the <...> field has the most sensitive fire and gas detection system in the north sea, ie th gpa and muster shutdown occur at 2 x 20% lel.
During annual shutdown preparation for replacing isolator valve on the kill manifold,residual annular gas leaked across valve and vented via sample point in area 6b.
During work to isolate the pig launcher for pigging operations, a minor leak was detected from the top of the bonnet on valve mov 5004, (nb detection was by personnel,gas
detection equipment did not show any release). After examination, it was found that as was escaping through three adjacent stud bolts on the bonnet. (nb the leak occurred on
the top of unmanned structure which is freely ventilated and allows maximum dispersion in an area.
During a class ii shutdown the esdv xv-001 apparently failed to close as a result of the telemetry trip. Initial investigation revealed the valve position indicator to be displaying
incorrectly. Subsequent investigation revealed that the valve was also assing. The pipeline was then isolated and depressurised to allow access to the compnents within the
valve for maintenance.
Fuel gas to 'b' generator flanged joints were insufficiently tightened which resulted in class 3 shutdown.
During routine purging of mp compressor following annual platform s/d the compressor belly drains were left open longer than normal when removing any condensate . Gas
was blown through the belly drains and into the atmospheric vent header. Gas pressure ba ked up in the open drains system and was released through the drains into the void
below the mud pits. The drain line from the mud pit room(maintained at a negative pressure) was open, this combined with gas was sucked from the void below the mud pits.
Ga was sucked from the void up into the pit room
Sparks from welding of pipe supports above k201s overhead seal oil tank c212s ignited small gas leak emanating from lagging around c212s sight glass isolation valves and
pipeworks. Two "small blue flames" (eye witness description) <2-3" long were immediat ly extinguished by fire watcher using one 9kg dry powder fire extinguisher. There
were no injuries. Personnel were not called to muster stations. One uv detector was activated - no plant shutdown or deluge which requires two detectors to be activated. Fol
owing the incident the lagging was removed and a minor gasleak was detected local to the isolation valve stem.
Coincidental heat detection inside gas export compressor k201a shut the unit down and discharged 50kg of halon into the unit enclosure. During investigation as to the cause of
the shutdown momentary re-ignition occurred and a further 50kg of halon was dis harged manually . Seal oil leaking past labyrinth seal ignited on contact with hot engine
component. No fire damage occurred only slight discolouration of a small section of pipe lagging in close proximity to drive shaft.
Methanol injection to the <...> subsea well was recommenced at 10:30 following a planned shutdown during b2 drilling ops. The platform oim & mech tech were present and
pumping methanol to equalise sssv/reduce the possibility of hydrate formation durin b1 start up. At approx 14:00 the mech tech observed a small leak of methanol from the
instrument pipework the oim was informed & shutdown the methanol pump from the control room workstation. Approx 2 litres of methanol had been released by the time the s
id depressured. On visual examination the pipework was observed to have parted adjacent to a parker a-lok 316 ss swage ferrule connection.
At o540 hours it was observed that there was a leak of hydrocarbons between v8010 (test separator) and the west bulkhead, as it was too difficult to determine where exactly
the leak was coming from, due to the fine spray forming a cloud and partly due to he light at the time of day, a level 3 shutdown was initiated by phoning the <...> control
room. It then became obvious that the half inch chemical injection line going to well t15 had parted at the elbow fitting, this was immediately isolated. On in estigation into
the problem it was apparent that the half inch olive threaded connection, attached to the right angled elbow and the pipework, that passed through the bulkhead to the wellhead
area, had parted. Further investigation discovered that the n.r v. On the pipework prior to the injection point on t15's flowline had been installed in the wrong direction allowing
backflow of hydrocarbons along the injection line. The 1/2" elbow and connections were replaced and the n.r.v. reinstated.
Slot 4 xmas tree wing valve was operated remotely by <...> main control room to bring slot 4 into production. After operation a small gas leak was detected through the 'tell
tale' on the wing valve body. The well was then shut in. Wing and master alves were both closed and the slot ws isolated at the hydraulic control panel.
Gas alarm indication on ccr fire and gas panel fire area 101 module 13. Investigation revealed crack in pipework downstream of fcv 2602b on gas injection compressor
intercooler.
Blockage in pump seal drain line caused a small gas leak from the export pump seal. This was detected by the gas detection system which initiated a level 2 plant shutdown.
A <...> clamp on the recycle line failed on the joint between valve fc2602b and the injection compressor intercooler. The clamp failed at an operating pressure of 352 bar
during normal running conditions. The mode of failure was that both bolts on one s de of the clamp sheared. A significant gas release occured within the module, a full gpa
emergency actions taken and platform made safe by depressurisation. The incident was declared safe and personnel stood down at 08.28.
Seal leak at pump drive end resulted in a small discharge of crude oil leak discovered by senior operator after approx 5 minutes duration. Pump was shut down from tdc in
control room and isolated on suction + discharge valaves. Oil spillage continued to h zardous drains and area cleaned.
A discharge of condensate from <...> pipeline pig receiver outlet block valve, grease/sealant port occurred when nipple was removed to replace with new.
2 x low level gas alarms registered on the f&g panel in the ccr. The ccr contacted the area operator who immediately investigated and found oil/gas emmitting from a
swagelock connection on export pump b (impulse line) the machine was immediately shut dow
Pse-1448 (cooler ex0205b shell side relief to lp flare) had been removed by maintenance for renewal of bursting disc element, isolation from the flare header having been made
at a swing check valve. Whilst the pse was removed gas discharged from the lp fl re side causing high level gas detection within the module and subsequent level 3 shutdown.
Cause of gas release subsequently identified as flapper of the swing check valve being manually held off its seat allowing gas from the lp flare to flow into the m dule. Due to
high level of gas in module 16 the gpa initiated and personnel mustered at altenative muster points.
Following a previous level 2 shutdown caused by high pressure in the inlet gas scrubber the plant was being restarted when a local module alarm was activated from the fire &
gas panel, this being caused by a low gas alarm (g.9115). An operator went to in estigate and reported 2 or possibilty 3 of the psv's opn the igs had lifted, one of which (pvv
0156) was leaking gas into the moduke from its tell tale. An attempt was made to put the "off line" psv into commission and take off the faulty psv (0156) but t is was not
achieved quickly enough and two gas heads went into "high level" alarm. A level 3 shutdown then occured. It is suspected that the psv's had lifted on the previous ( level 2)
shutdown and had not fully reseated.
At 20.34 a gas head in module 16 came into low and then high alarm. Upon investigation the operator found the gas to be coming from a drain gulley but whilst re-establishing
a water seal a second head went into high alarm causing a process plant shut-down the water seal was resorted and gas heads returned to normal by 20.42. At 20.44 a gas head
came into low alarm in module 04. The source was not readily apparent but was pinpointed, using a portable gas detector, as coming from a lute drain seal. This was topped up
and the gas heads returned to normal by 21.13 hours. (a total of three gas heads went into low alarm at various times during the investigation to pinpoint the source of the leak
in module 04). Following these releases, all drains in process area were checked and topped up as appropriate. Checks were also made on the open drain caisson. Permission to
re-start production was given by the oim at 23.oo hours.
<...> engine no.ax7401h was being given a routine test run. At 10.56 when the engine had been running for approx 25 minutes, co-incident u/v detection occured (3 off u/vs)
and extinguishant was released automatically into the generator room which is protected by a halon system. On attendance by the safety officer and drilling personnel water
was applied to the exhaust insulation adjacent to the engine's turbo charges as the lagging was smoking and very hot. Removal of the insulation that were were two small holes
in the flexible section of the exhaust. Oil had contaiminated the mineral wool insulation which had ultimately ignited.
A very slight leak was detected by the gas detectors 9922/9921 when the fuel gas wing enclosure ventilation fans were shutdown for maintence to be carried out, on 'c' power
generator ax-5401c.
The 'c' injection machine was being put back into service following replacement of the fuel gas throttle valve when two gas detectors within the gas generator enclosure went
into alarm. The caused a level 3 shgutdown of 'c' injector and closure of fuel ga supply which shutdown the adjacent 'd' machine. On investigation it was found that the fuel
throttle valave had been supplied with the valve position indicator missing form its base. Gas had therefore been able to escape from the valve via the open "trap ed hole in the
base of the valve.
Whilst the gas turbine logic was carrying out pre-start sequence checks two gas detectors within the fuel gas wing of the turbine enclosure went into alarm. On investigation it
was found that a fitting on the fuel gas line between the throttle valve and t e high speed shut off-cock was leaking, whilst the fitting had not been disconnected for the throttle
valve removel/replacement it may have been disturbed resulting in the subsequent gas leak.
Gas leak was extremely minor. No gas detection initially but when hvac fans were stopped for work by instrument department gas heads were activated.
Work was being undetaken on the logic power supply of 'c' power generator - this resulted in the shutdown of the vent fans in the fuel gas wing of the gas generator. Two gas
detectors within the fuel gas wing compartment went into 'low alarm and on invest gation it was found that there was a minor leak on the secondary high speed shut-off cock.
Leak was from blind flange fitted to fuel gas outlet line from fuel gas k.o. Pot. (line had been removed to allow engine removal)
Two gas detectors were activated (at low gas alarm) when a release of gas occured which, on investigation, was found to be coming from the flow transmitter (fth 0002) on
injection well b10. Flow transmitter was isolated pending change-out for another unit leaking unit to be sent ashore for investigation.
Whilst pulling out of hole with wireline equipment on well b21 a gas release occured due to leak of the grease seal in the lubricator. This was due to a fault in one of the pumps
supplying grease to the lubricator. Whilst the gas release was detected by a single gas head and an alarm indicated in the central control room, the leak had been noticed by
<...> operatives who undertook immediate corrective action.
Whilst running in hole with wireline (perforating gun) a minor gas leak occured at the lubricator. This was noticed by the <...> operative on the drill floor but also caused the
activation of one of the gas detector (g9874) in low larm. The problem was diagnosed as being due to the lubricator pump failing to maintain prerssure. Back-up pump was
started and the lubricator seal reinstated. Suspect pump was checked and the problem found to be to be due to a regular adjustment
Whilst running in hole for perforation, gas leaked from the lubricaor on the wireline equipment causing the activation ( in low alarm) of one gas detector. The leak appears to
have been caused by the two duty pumps on one of the elmar skids having stalled and thus the grease pressure in the lubricator dropping to a level where gas was allowed to
pass.
At 14:52 on<...>, alram in the ccr indicated pressence of a low level of gas in the cooling medium header tank, fire area 16-08.
During a restart of the production facilities following a pipeline shutdown, high pressure occurred in the igs and psv 0157 lifted. This resulted in the failure of the bellows on
the psv and gas was released into the module via the bellows tell-tale. Gas as detected on five heads ( 1 in high the others in low alarm) and a level 2 shutdown initiated.
Instrument technician and production operator blowing down flow transmitter impulse line to clear liquids. Small amount of gas drifted into analyser house setting two gas
detectors into alarm.
During routine operator checks a very slight leak had been detected in 'a' inj secondary h.s.s.o.c. The machine was shutdown, the gland tightned and the system depressurised
without problems. Whilst carrying out pre-start activities on the inj. M/c the tw gas heads in the wing cell came into low alarm. Investigations with a portable gas detector and
snoop were carried out on all fuel gas connections and glands in the wing cell. Nothing could be found. The two gas heads returned to zero after about 30 seco ds. Lower alarm
is set at 10% l.e.l.
Draining down (via a valve) was taking place in order to permit the removal of psv 0783. The block valve forming the upstream isolation was passing and thus the quantity of
gas condensate vented caused the activation of a local gas detector and module lo al alarm. Venting ceased immediately.
A production operator was tasked to blow-down well b18 tubing head pressure which had approx. 280 bar in the line, the correct isolation procedure had been carried out. As
the operator opened the vent valve, liquid started to drip from the drain line and the impulse line blew out from the swagelock 't' piece causing a very minor injury to the
operators elbow. No alarms activated in the area.
During start up b gas injection compressor a low alarm came in on f&g (g9575). The production operator checked the area and found a very minor leak on 3rd stage recycle
valve gland packing, the machine was shutdown from ccr and depressurised, maintenance tightened the gland and compressor started up with production monitoring for
further leaks. No leaks detected.
One gas detector went into alarm. Area was checked and it was found that a nylon seal ring on the pilot pipework assembly to psv had failed. On identification of fault psv was
isolated and depressurised.
Multi-discipline planned maintenance work had been completed on b fire pump and it was given a test run with production and maintenance personnel in attendance. Having
run for some ten minutes oil leaked from the vicinity of the turbo-charger and ignited. He engine was shut down and the fire was shut down and the fire quickly extinguished
using portable dry powder fire extinguishers. The cause of the lub.oil leak and susequent fire was traced to a pipe connection on which the compression fitting 'olive' ha been
incorrectly fitted on original installation.
Vx 5401a fuel gas k.o. Pot:leak detected attop of union on fuel gas k.o. Pot sight glass,detected during deisolation following maintenance work o.v. 6103a secondary high
speed shut off cock:very slight gland leak detected during deisolation operation foll wing maintenance work. Both of the above leaks were detected by the platform fixed fire
and gas detection system.
At 1010 on <...> an oil/gas leak in module m2e was reported to the control room by the shift supervisor process. As a result the platform was put on hazard status from the
control room, and a shutdown and blowdown of oil train 2 was initiated from the p ocess control panel the fire and gas system was checked, but there was no indication of a
gas release. Oil train 2 was then isolated from all sources of hydrocarbons. A full muster was achieved on the platform in 23 minutes the cause of the leak was found to be a
pinhole leak on a "10" x "2" stub weld downstream of lcv 2121 block valve on train 2 oil outlet pipework from the first stage. The pipework had been inspected on <...> by
<...> and <...> testing, and no defect found.
Examination of the valve concluded that the locking nut holding the stem thread in the valve body was loose, causing the stem to unscrew when the valve was operated. It is
not possible to determine how or when the lock nut became loose
K9320 developed an imbalance of interstage pressure. Cylinder 2,4,6 side was 250 bar while 1,3,5 side was 195 bar. The head end discharge pipework was also considerably
hotter than the other five cylinders (100 degc), it was deduced that there was a probl m with a valve on cylinder no 1. The machine was shutdown and started auto-blowdown at
0402, at 0416 low level gas indication in um4ee followed by high level gas and surface process shutdown at 0418, subsequant investigation revealed a leak from the cylin er
head joint on no 1 cylinder.
At 15:15 hours on <...> the platfrom went to red status accompanied by a gas compression shuttdown. Personnel to muster stations. Production investigated and found a
genuine gas release within module m3ee. During this time process shutdown and closure o the esd valves occurred at 1523 hrs. Production personnel found the source of the
leak to be from the differential pressure transmitter tag number pdzt 49917. This was duly isolated and the gas heads monitored. When the gas indication dropped below 25% l
l the oim instructed the control operator to put the platform on yellow alert status.
Due to a previous incident of bcf release, under the hood of g-4700, two supervisors entered the avon enclosure to try and visually identify any hot air leaks. Once inside the
enclosure the machine was subject to increased load from its original idling co dition. As the load increased a leak from no.2 burner pig tail was immediately apparent. At this
point the avon was manually shutdown.
Oil technician was changing out the pressure gauge. A hoke 3 port isolation valve was installed upstream of the gauge between the hoke valve and the main oil export was a
3/4" plug valve seized in the open position. The technician was aware the 3/4" plug alve was seized. Isolation using the hoke valve (proven single valve) is acceptable. The
technician could not get a reading on the gauge so he changed the gauge for a second time still no reading. The hoke valve was closed and the technician was checking he
ports of the hoke valve when it detached allowing a hydrocarbon escape. This activated the hlg and subsequent sps. The platform shutdown and blewdown automatically. The
technician assisted by 2 others isolated the section of line and as the pressure de ayed plugged the open tapping
Oil mist leak discovered coming from the valve stem of 006/23 (lkv2214) 1st stage oil outlet block valve on train 1. It was reported to the control room operator who
immediately shutdown and blew down the train. The oil mist was not detected by the fixed etector system and therefore there was no change of platform status. This was due
to the relative significance of this leak and the effectiveness of the adjacent hvac extract.
Oil technicians were preparing to open bd38 to open for the first time following a prolonged platform shutdown, as the oil flow wing valve fwv commenced opening, a leak
occurred from a flowline coupling joint releasing gas into the wellhead module. All oi and gas production was shutdown and depressurised. The gas in the module was
dispersed naturally. There was no personal injury or significant equipment damage. Two technicians were involved in bringing on the well. One positioned at the tree in module
d3 and the other was situated in m2w at the hydraulic skid. Immediately prior to instructing his colleague in m2w to pump open the fwv, the technician at the tree 'cracked'
open the choke. As the fwv commenced to open,a surge of gas was heard entering the f owline and almost immediately a loud bang was also heard by the operator at the tree.
He then observed a gas cloud forming above him in m3e and quickly reclosed the choke, contacted the control room to shutdown the trains and vacated the module.
The isolation of the fuel gas knock out pot v3820 and inhibition of the halon system were applied for and carried out by <...> ops tech. After discussion it was decided to leave
to halon on auto release mode. The logic for this that the work could be carr ed out from outside the avon hood with door open. Upon loosening the bolts on the regulator a gas
release occurred. Re tightening the bolts did not stop the leak as the sealing 0 rings were dislodged. The platform went from green to yellow to red status. Ps technician arrived
at scene and checked the isolation of xev3820 (fuel gas auto isolation valve) he ascertained this valve was closed and that the pressure was locked between in the downstream
line to the regulator.he proceeded to the fg purge line and vented pressure from the line. During this time hl coincident gas was initiated in the avon hood and the halon release
was initiated as per platform f&g logic
A technician had refitted the pigtail pipes to the gas fuel burners following cleaning of the latter. The specified tool for this procedure is a 6" spanner. All the pigtails were
refitted according to procedure. The generator was synchronised and on the bars at 12mw when platform status changed from green to yellow due to an indication of low level
gas on the avon alarm annuncator panel. The machine was immediately shut down. Later inspection showed the source of the leak as being at one of the pigtail connections
When carrying out pigging operations on <...> to <...> pipeline a small amount of residual oil spilled out.
The rotary table kelly hose failed at 1m below the goose neck conection actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
A leak at one of the pin retainers on non return valve at the inlet manifold to the hp seperator was reported. The leak stopped at 17:00 when the pressure in the system was
dropped after isolating the a train.
One high and 2 low level gas alarms were activated in the enclosure of the c export compressor which was isolated for maintenance. Single valve isolation had been used
against the flare system and one valve had passed a small quantity of gas when the pre sure in the flare system had increased when the b export compressors fuel gas had blown
down. Double valve isolation was immediately put in place and the system tested for gas. Work was stopped. Examination of the isolation conformation certificate rev aled
that the comment 'not required' was written next to the blow down valves that were not closed, although the drawing accompanying the icc had these valves marked for closure.
The double valve isolation established at the time of the incident was achi ved by closing these valves. The method used was to take an air supply to the valve actuators
bypassing the fail open control system of the valve.
Hydrocarbon leak at a retaining plug on a non-return valve next to xxv 10900, on the flowline of well slot c5 at the <...> manifold. This was at the north end of the platform in
an open area. The prevailing wind was at 190 degrees,8 knots which disperse the gas away from the platform. This was a minor leak and was observed, the platform fire and
gas system did not detect it.
Gas metering technician was carrying out a densitometer vacuum test and was in the process of putting the densitometer back into service. He had disconnected the common
vacuum/vent header from the vacuum pump (for protection) and placed a blank cap at the end of the line. Upstream and downstream isolation valves (located in the analyser
house) were opened. On returning to the analyser house technician noticed gas issuing from the end of the vacuum/vent header. The leak was isolated immediately and the plat
orm central control informed. Technician noticed that the common vacuum/vent header isolation valve was not closed and the blank cap was not tightened sufficiently. 3 gas
heads which are located in the analyser house went into alarm no one was injured and no plant damaged. No control action initiated as gas heads in the area were inhibited for
an adjacent de-spading task.
Condensate leak from flange on maintenance valve on main oil riser . The flange is located on the valve body and is connected to the lp flare system to allow depressurising of
the valve cavity for leakage checks. Normal production activities were in opera ion at the time of the incident including liquid export
The wire line lubricator had been attached to the sweab on slot 6 and was ready for pressurisation. This is done by equalising around the swab valve from the service wing
valve through a needle valve to the swab flange. The service wing was open six turns and the instrument tubing pressurised upto the needle valve. When the needle valve was
opened the pressure dissipated. The personell didn't have time to assess the loss because pressure returned suddenly and the 1/2" instrument tubing flewu out of its com ression
fitting at the service wing valve. The operator immediately closed the service wing valve followed shortly after by the hydraulic master valve closing, initiated by personnel at
the wire line well control unit.
During pressurisation of pt-v-2520 sphere launcher, sphere launcher vent valves vpx2502-01 and vpx2502-02 were closed, pipeline blowdown valve vpx2506-02 and 3" choke
vpx2506-01 were closed and valves vpx2504-03 and vpx2504-01 on pressurising line to spoo cavity between launching valves hv-2502 and hv-2504 were opened. Valve
vpx2503-01 on pressurising line from t/l was opened. Valve vpx2503-02 was slowly opened to pressurise line from 3" choke to the launching valves cavity. At 0716 hrs the
plant tech was informed by the control room operator that there was low level gas indication zone 229 relief valve area mezz deck. Plant tech immediately closed pressurising
valve vpx2503-02. At 0717 hrs the gas level went to coincident low level and initiated a gpa. Th tech proceeded to the relief valve area and found the 3" choke leaking gas
from its stem. At the time was 20 bar. The choke valve opened to vent and the leak stopped.
Attempts were being made to unblock lcv 2402 by stoking the valve from 0-100% open to closed from the control room. On the 3rd attempt the blockage cleared followed by a
high pressure (70 bar) produced liquid/gas from a hole eroded in the bottom of the va ve body. The ops supervisor and plant technician were standing next to the control valve
and were able to isolate it immediately before any alarms or detection was activated.
<...> were carrying out a coiled tubing plt survey in well pw21. All pre-running checks had been carried out and they were running coiled tubing down-hole when they stood
up at the sssv. It was during retrieval of the coiled tubing he incident occured. Pulling coiled tubing to surface in well pw21, a small gas leak started at the injector head, the
operator on the tower was brought dwon and the coiled tubing was pulled up further. At this point (0530 hrs( <...> the gas blew out t the stripper. The well was closed in at
the swab valve, this stopped the gas leak. The top master gate on the well was closed and the well opened to vent via the kell skid. The swab valve was re-opened to vent the
remaining n2 from the coiled tubing eel. The gas leak lasted for 4 minutes, the well was contained and the wellhead secured in a total of 10 minutes. The swab valve was
closed in preference to the master gate to ensure that tools were not stuck across tree.
At 14:00 hrs on <...>, train 1 turbine was being run up after maintenance to the fuel gas system. At 14:10 hrs the general alarm sounded with indication of gas detection in the
turbine enclosure. All personnel were mustered and confirmation given that ow level coincidence of gas detection had resulted in shutdown and depressurisation of the pc/pm
platforms. On investigation it was found that the leak was from a 3/8" stainless steel compression fitting disturbed during maintenance on the fuel gas system the leak was of a
very minor nature and detectable only by the nature of the air flow in the enclosure and the positioning of three detectors in the mouth of the extract duct, set at 20% l.e.l.
Slot 14 was recommisioned following wireline work and it was noticed by a wireline ops. Tech in the vicinity that gas was leaking from the service valve connection on the gas
string. The well was closed in immediately by operations. The gas flowline was isolated and depressurised. No persons were injured. No plant damage occurred. Weather
conditions were dry and windy.
Painters had been issued with a permit and an entry certificate to clean /paint the intervals of the skirt supporting the hp suction scrubber. They noticed a weep from the drain
line just after the elbow.they reported this to the outside senior operator w o told them to stop work and come out of the skirt until he investigated.he confirmed the leak and
reported to the central control room.the ccr operator shut down the gas compression system manually.
During recommisioning of pc2 compression train, as part of the procedure manual juction block valve (10 hcv 12081) was to be opened. Prior to this all pressure across the
valve had been equalised. On commencement of opening of this manual valve j.reed det cted a small emission of gas from the face between the valve bonnet and body, on the
east side of the valve.
Whilst preparing to carry out a leakage test on esdv 3026 (<...> export valve), the methanol system was shutdown from the main control room pushbutton. The action of the
pushbutton is to close all the methanol system sdv's (including methanol pipeline sdv' ). The methanol system was shutdown at 0555 hrs. At approx 0855 hrs, a platform
electrician alerted the main control room of a methanol from a 6" blind flange in the area of the <...> methanol pumps (p.p cellar deck s.e. Corner). Two operators checked ou
the leak.informed the main control room of the exact nature of the leak. The control room operator checked the pressure in the system and opened the audrey methanol pressure
controller, the system pressure was 83 barg at this time, at which time the leak subsided. The pcv was closed again and the cro noticed the pressure increasing again. At this
time he checked the gdt screen and noticed that sdv 9807 ( <...> methanol export sdv) was indicating "in transit".
Day shift operations had loaded sphere launcher. Night shift operations staff were re-pressuring the launcher to make it available for use. A short time after pipeline pressure
had been reached (79 barg) the door seal failed causing the release of the (is lated) inventory - a total of 7m3. Operators were on the scene. The release was reported
immediately and followed by a gpa + shutdown. Dispersing gas entered air intakes of <...> generator turbine, detected by sensors, halon discharged and generators shu down.
Wind wsw 250 degrees, 10-15 knots. Illumination good. Temp. Approx. 11 degrees c atmosphere.
On the nightshift of the <...> was on low nominations was no compression required. The 5 man operations shift were given a few isolations to carry out for next day. At 03:30
hrs i left the control room with <...> and <...>, the two tside operators, we went to the pp celar deck for checking of an isolation. After checking the isolation i decided to go
on a routine plant inspection at 03:45hrs whilst checking the area around the chemical injection pumps i became aware of a hissing no se from the area of the bypass manifold
which was about 2 1/2 metres away. I then shouted to <...> and <...> to join me at the compressor bypass valve pg 316 which i had identified as leaking from the bonnet. I
assessed the leak and instructed the control oom operator via radio to stop production from the two fields which had no facility to flow via the bypass manifold. I then
instructed <...> to go to the control room and bring back a portable gas monitor. On <...>'s return i left the cellar deck and went t the main control room and phoned both the
oim and production supervisor. I then returned to the valve and was joined by the oim by which time all production had been switched to the bypass manifold. We then decided
to close the valve to try to isolate th bonnet by using the valves' ball seals. After the valve was closed the leak dissipated considerably. The valve was left in this position with a
Whilst production operator was touring the production facilities during routine operations he heard an unusual noise. On investigation he discovered that <...> separator
production water outlet lcv bypass valve was spraying liquid from its body. The cont ol room was informed and <...> process was shutdown, vented and then isolation.
The kca assistant driller was attempting to relieve pressure trapped (approx 800 psi) within the cement pump discharge piping whilst preparig to carry out a formation integrity
test. To facilitate the release of pressure the assistant driiller had first r lieved the cement unit piping back to the pump header tank and was pr- oceding to back off a 2" weco
union connecting the cement pump discharge to a high presuure flexible hose. An amount of hydrocarbons gas which had been released from piping into the pu p header tank
migrated to a gas head situated directly above causing a change of platform status.
Solar generator g1040 was being restarted after tripping. During start sequence the machine shut down automatically on fire detection.it was discovered the turbine ultra violet
detectors caused alarm. Power tech noticed smoke inside the turbine hall. The urbine btm system was prepared for immediate release and co2 extinguishers taken to scene a
hood access door was opened and a small fire discovered in area above titan starter turbine exhaust unit. Fire successfully extinguished and co2 was used to cool t e area and
avoid reignition.after ventilating the area inspection revealed a blanking cap on a small bore fitting on the hydraulic start pump return had detatched. No damage was caused to
the turbine package.
The compressor was being repressurised with process gas after having been deisolated following a maintenance repairs to the valves on no.2 cylinder.shortly after starting
repressuring the machine a gas leak was detected by the fixed gas detection sy tem and the operation shutdown automatically.all safety systems functioned correctly.the
investigation found no evidence of poor maintenance.it has been concluded that the operating procedure needs to be revised to have more personnel present during this type
of operation to monitor the machine during the repressur- sing operation.
Plant on line, intercooler in service at 97barg. Operator detected noise within g10ft and then smell when moved in closer. Operator located leak on joint area by feel, called for
supervision. Supervisor inspected leak and unit was shutdown and blowdown
A release of oil occured on <...> at 04.35 hours on m3 roof area of cpc. The release was from an incorrectly fitted blank flange on a 3/4" valve on the hot oil system cpc. The
system contains santotherm 60. The blank flange had been used to provide the bleed of a db&b isolation to facilitate the recertification of a p.s.v. On re-instatement of the
p.s.v. The oil was circulated through an off-line w.h.r.u. The system appeared to be intact. However, when the oil was circulated through an on-line w.h.r.u. He flange
developed a leak through which a total of 50 gallons of oil was lost.
A pinhole leak developed in a branch leading from a production riser carrying crude oil/gas and produced water at approx. 25 bar pressure. It is estimated that 0.6 tonne of
fluids leaked before the pipeline could be isolated and depressurised. Wind; 15 k ots, 360 degrees. Sea: 2m waves, 6.3s period. No photographs or samples were taken.
Normal production of <...> crude to storage was in progress.during our routine twice daily leg checks a pin hole leak was found in line p065 oil to storage at first weld on the
line immeediately upstream of the of the import manifold connecting flange.se arated crude in the form of a fine spray was emanting from the leak.there was insufficient gas to
- activate the fixed low level gas alarms. The platform was shutdown to isolate the leak and effect a repair.
Normal production of crude was in rpogress.during normal watch keeping duties the area technician found a leak on the outlet spol on train 1 1- stage separator down stream of
the lcv line no.p-059-3106y. Approx 10 litres of produced fluid was released(bs w 77%). The platform was manually shutdown and depressurised ,personnel were mustered as
a precautionary measure.train 1 was isolated to enable repairs to commence.
The normal production of <...> crude was in progress.during normal watchkeeping duties the area tech found a small leak on the outlet spool of e2610 crude oil cooler on
train 1. Approx. 100lt of produced fluid was released.train 1 was manually shutd- o n and drained prior to repairs being carried out.
During platform tour,seepage was noted on the affected pipework.on rubbing the pain a pinhole leak occurred.the leak was immediately reported to the pcr and the train
shutdown and depressurised for isolation of the crude oil cooler,in order for replacemen to be carried out
During area technicians watchkeeping duties a pin hole leak was found to be causing a hydrocarbon loss of containment.the equipment was locally isolated and de-
pressurised.as a precautionary measure the platform was placed on alert status by a manual init ation.. No shutdown,blowdown or muster caused.
At 14.25 on <...> a low level gas alarm was indicated within module 02. Exceeding 20 l.e.l. This initiated a local area alarm. Subsequent investigation identified the source of
the gas emission as a 3/4 blled of ve-03-2003. The bleed had previously bee opened as part of a blowdown exercise when repairing a graylock joint on ve-2001. The source of
the gas emitting from the 3/4 bleed has been idenfified as originating from the h.p. Flare, backflowing through p.v. 1944 into the glycol contractor, on to th injection
compressor suction manifold and venting at the bleed valve. Upon discovery of the above, all the necessary isolation were made, and at 15.03 gas levels commenced dropping.
During procedures to shutdown the glycol contractor, pressure control valve pv 0354 could not handle the required gas volume at 100% open, because of hydrate formation.
Pressure started increasing and was not detected by hshh 0360. Psv 0381 lifted to reli ve the pressure. As the plant did not immediately trip, an extended relief period took
place. Chattering of the psv caused the bellows to fatigue releasing gas down the bellows reference line. A gas detector local to the discharge point of the reference l nes alarted
operators to the problem and appropriate actions taken. Pshh 0360 did not detect the high pressure for two reasons: pshh 0360 had drifted to 80 barg (1 barg above set point)
transmitter replaced as it would not hold set point on recalibration. 3 way valve marked incorrectly to piping configuration, therefore pshh 0360 was isolated. A programme to
check all 3 way valves of sililiar arrangement was immediately put in place.
During gas inspection operations a p.t.f.e. Sealing 'o' ring failed between the adaptor flange and manifold on flow transmitter fih 0002 well e1 causing a gas release. The flow
transmitter isolation valves were closed. The discharge valve was closed on 'c gas injection compressor. The compressor was placed on recycle. The injection manifold and e1
flowline were depressurised. Weather 40k 168 6m wave.
Gas was seen to be emitted from a flange between a n.r.v. And block valve downstream of vent vx 0215 e/f. When this was observed the 'c' injection train was manually shut
down. Prior to this incident this system has been n2 tested to 312 barg successfully with no apparent leaks. Subsequent examination of the system identified no backing off of
falnge nuts and bolts.
A crack occurred in a 1" branch connection on unit 12-p-024033. This 12" line carries gas from the 1st stage aftercooler (ex0215c) to 2nd stage suction scrubber (vx0212c) on
injection compressor train 'c'. Gas was released into the module. The smell was n ticed by a start-up engineer and the source of release was found using a hand held gas
detector.
A leak from ex0104b, m.o.l. Suction coller plate exchanger caused a discharge of condensate into the surrounding area and the initiation of two gas detectors.
Whilst preparing to run a wireline set bridge plug in well e7 the viscous seal of the atlas grease head was lost. This resulted in a small gas release into module 01 through the
return hose to the grease injection skid, and the initiation of 2 low level ixed gas detectors. The cause was determined to be the incorrect connection of gease injection hoses.
Light - good. Wind from the north. At 1920 hours <...> platform production was automatically shut down as a result of a level 3 initiated by extra high level within the slop oil
vessel. Following the shutdown the level continued to build within the slop oil vessel subsequently discharging a small amount of oily water on the platform deck and helideck,
via the slop oil vent located at the end of the flare boom. Investigations identified the primary cause of the slop oil vessel inventory build up to be def ctive valves on 2nd stage
seperator drain system. On identifying passing valves, the level 3 was "reset" and the 2nd stage separator inventory was passed forward to the 3rd stage separator followed by
depressurisation. Slop oil vessel level control was re nstated shortly after.
Cap on the drain sump had not been fitted correctly and the seal not flooded. This allowed gas blow back from the open drain system. Gas was detected by the fixed platform
system.
Pressure in 1st stage seperator at time of incident. 5 bar minor gas leak observed at p.v. 0150 gland packing for the stem. Leak also detected on fixed detection system.
Condensate was seen to be leaking from mol suction cooler ex0104b. It was apparent to personnel in the area that a seal had failed and steps were taken immediately to isolate
in the area that a seal had failed and steps were taken immediately to isolate a d drain down the exchanger. Gas evolving from condenser was detected by fixed detection and
local alarm initiated automatically. Once the exchanger was isolated, the leak stopped.
Gas release near 3rd stage flow transmitter on c compressor was detected and isolated at 1437 hours <...>. The compressor was shut-down and transmitter removed. No fault
could be found at that time. Spare transmitter was fitted and equipment recommision d. Gas release near a similiar transmitter on compressor. A occured 1442 hours <...>.
Transmitter was isolated, but the machine was kept on-line in full recycle while the investigation proceeded. At 1536 hours <...> a gas leak occured. Operator on site
informed the ccr who initiated a shutdown and a general platform alarm (g.p.a.). The compressor was depressurised on shutdown to stop the gas release. Personnel sttod down
at 1603 hours.
Operational mode: full production and gas injection. Gas detector in module 02 comparession arae indicated low level alarm at 20% for a few seconds then reduced to 1-3%
lel. Sebsequent investigation identified leak on compressor 'a' blowdown valve (xx1314 cavity vent. Vent port was repaired.
Gas was detected at 20% lel by a single detector. Problem traced to bellows vent of psv 942 ( relief psv on teg contractor ). Gas detector is positioned near rear for early
warning of bellow failure. Psv iscolated using interlocked valves after standby ps 1943 was made operational
During a compressor shutdown for maintenence, gas was detected by a fixed detector coming from a valve actuator body. The valve was in the closed position. On
investiagtion, the gas leaking from the valve stem seals. Wind 28k - 169 weather good, lighting good
Gas released from psv tell-tale pipe during a process shutdown was detected by the platform fixed detection system. Personnel in the area did not notice any gas, therefore,
conclusion was a minor gas release.
During cementing operations a weld failed on the cement head top cap allowing high pressure mud to escape vertically inside the derrick. The union/bull plug came to rest on
the east side of the drill floor
After breaking the joints prior to removal of a valve, a small amount of residual vapour leaked from it. This caused two detectors to register for a few seconds. The system had
been isolated, depressurised and checked for residual pressure before breaki g the joints.
During controlled venting to depressurise trapped gas between isolation valve and nrv, gas head went to low level alarm.
Leak developed to well e5 flowline nrv seal ring during production. The flowline has been in service for 6 months.
Two gas heads came into low alarm when gas leaked from gland on fv 1400 b injection compressor. Leak stopped by tightening gland follower.
An operations technician was performing maintenance on south 1 lifeboat when he observed through the grating what he described as "a whisp of steam" emitting from the
vicinity of the 12" fe riser. He went to the 66' level for a closer view and concluded there was a small leak from the riser. He immediately informed the mechanical
supervisor and operations supervisor via the crt. This was at 1330hrs. The oim and ooe wee also called to the scene. A fine gaseous light spray was observed at the time emitt
ng from the riser about 10' - 20' above sea level.
During removal of de-commissioned gas detector local to condensate pump 75, the support bracket bolting had to be hacksawed. While cutting the last stud, the lp impulse
line to pdi was "nicked", resulting in a 2 litre leak of condensate.
A leak occurred in a 1" diesel supply hose used to fuel well service equipment.the hose had a local isolation valve located immediately upstream of the fuel dispensing
nozzle.this valve was in the closed position.the leak occurred in a section of the hose just upstream of the local isolation leak.
Oil drops noticed by electrical supervisor onto module floor. Leak source immediately identified, isolated and depressurised. Oil weep seen at above weld.
At 0325 hours a fire and gas logic action, high gas reading at detector g5221, automatically caused a platform yellow shutdown. All hot work was ceased. Manual checks
conductedin the area did not find any gas present. Instru checks on g5221 confirmed that there was no detector malfunction. Ongoing operations - prior to the event normal
production operations were in progress. Approximately one minute prior to the high gas reading a routine shutdown on mol export pump p05 had occurred. No equipment or
pipewo k anomaly was found; at po5, the production scruber pumps on the open drain tank and associated pumps (t71 area). The gas detector is stiuated adjacent to produciton
scrubber pumps and open drain area. The reason for the high gas reading is therefore inconclusive
Platform was in normal oil/gas production. An oil leak on the pig launcher door was reported. The platform productions was immediately shutdown and general alram
sounded. All personnel with exception of the emergency teams were sent to their appropriat muster stations. The pig launcher was isolated and area cleaned up.
Whislt carrying out routine monitoring of plant, operations technician noticed a smell of gas. It was subsequently traced to a pinhole leak on a weld on hydrocarbon condensate
line from vessel v16 to v18. Supervisor was informed, plant was depressurised a d shut down. Note: v17 - low temperature separator which separates "second stage" chilled
condensate. V18 - flash separator which mixes two condensate streams at 25oc prior to pumping to the main oil line. The light ends flash off to flare and fuel gas.
Well 3-2 flowline developed a pinhole leak at the weld of the promat fitting which is used for the injection of the scale inhibitor. At the time the leak started two <...> hands
were in well compartment 3 conducting routine wellheas maintena ce. They noticed a fine spray of fluid and reported it immediately to central control. The well shut in by the
operations tech within 3 mins. No gas was detected . The leak was predominantly water (well water cut 67%) - a minimal amount of oil (> 2 lit es) was spilled. Initial
investigations shown there to be some metal loss at the promat to flowline weld - possible associated with chemical attack.
During previous shift, p14 had undergone a seal oil cyclone inspection, necessitating dismantling of pipework. After re-installtion the system was leak tested with water to 16
barg and then test run for approximately 5 minutes at 2110hours. Pump was the shutdown and placed on standby. At 2222 hours the pump was placed on line, using local
start facility. After reporting the pump on line to the mil control room, the technician returned and noticed a leak of crude oil from a 1/2" flange. Pump was immed ately
shutdown, isolated and depressurised. It is estimated that the leak lasted a total of 2 minutes.
Whilst carrying out routine checks around compressor k02 a technician smelt diesel vapours. On closer examination through the turbine hood windows, he saw liquid on the
diesel pump drip tray. On closer investigation having gained access to the hood he saw that the pump casing was shut down the machine using the emergency stop button.
Operating problems on the pipelines system had resulted in the field and the third party pipeline system shutdown. This resulted in the <...> pipeline shutting down with 159
bar after line packing up to the riser. In due course <...> operational control c ntre for fps requested the <...> to equalise the <...> riser to the <...> export system via the <...>
pig trap. To do this it was necessary to reduce the system pressure by carrying out the <...> riser start up pressure equalisation procedure. It was during the nitial steps of this
procedure that the incorrect valve sequence was selected and fluid pressure was bled into the pig trap without a vent path open to the platform export system. The resulting
pressure rise caused the door seal to fail and a small quant ty of water and oil escaped to the platform drains and to the sea.
Platform was operating main oil export on one pump, the other units being under turbine maintainance. An operator smelled diesal and saw a spreading pool at the rear of the
machine. The machine was shutdown and the leak stopped. Repairs were carried ou and the platform restarted after notification to the hse duty officer.
Low and high gas alarms from well compartment 3 were received in the central control room. The control room technician informed the mol control room, operated the yellow
shutdown system and operated the general alarm. At about the same time the ops tech in the mol heard a bang and received indications of low pressure and shut in from well
3- 4. In view of this and having received reports of high gas from the ccr they also elected to operate the yellow shutdown. The ops supv, fso, ops team and fire te m went
immediately to well comp 3 where it was observed that the swab isolation valve bonnet of xmas tree 3-4 had completely been blown off. A large hole was observed in the
south wall of the compartment and other superficial damage was apparent. The well had been safely shut in and no further loss of hydrocarbons was taking place. There was
no fire or explosion.
P06 diesel fuel block valve sprayed fuel inside the hood. No fire and gas action and no ignition. P06 shutdown and platform shutdown as p05 is not available due to major
repairs.
Crude oil sprayed from mol pump (po5) casing drain l ine. Po5 is located in package 2 level 1. Louvred module.
Gas leaked from a non return valve flapper hinge retaining plug on 12" class 150 swing - check co angle valve. Louvred module. Wind 30kts @ 288 degrees.
A <...> gas turbine had been changed out and was in the process of being commissioned. Earlier in the day it had been running with 8 mw load. After a short stop it was run up
to 8mw and, with the cell doors open a final check carried out for gas leaks. Wh n satisfied the machine was gas tight the area technician and vendor rep. Exited the cell and
closed the door. The platform immediately went to red hazards status with 3 cell gas heads in high level alarm. The machine shutdown automatically and on subsequ nt
inspection a fitting on the fuel gas rail was torqued up a further 1/4 - 1/2 turn with a 'c' spanner and mallet ie the joint was not slack.
Rov detected gas coming from seabed on <...> during routine survey. Pipeline already shut doun due to maintenance work on <...> topsides. Following excavation rov
discovered small flange leak on <...>. System remains shut down.
Gas turbine had been changed out and during re-commissioning it was deemed necessary to inspect/repair the pilot regulator and axial flow control valves. After re-installation
of the valves the fuel gas supply was deisolated, very shortly afterwards the latform went to hazard status, the manual block valve was immediately closed. Three gas heads
in the exhaust ducting were indicating 100% lel. The leak was traced to a flared fitting on the sensing line for the axial control valve, some tightening of th s fitting was
achieved, but further leak testing revealed there was still a leak path. The fitting was then replaced by a compression fitting and was tested gas tight.
A limited fuel gas release from (probably) failed bellows on rv8064 initiated a high level gas alarm within generator g8010. This in turn activated the halon protection and shut
the machine down, bringing the platform to a hazard status. No damage was sustained
At 17:30, fd 6568 (power turbine acoustic hood) indicated in the control room(ccr). The area technician was sent to investigate. He reported back via radio to the ccr that there
was a fire in the power turbine(pt) acoustic hood. He was told to clear the a ea and halon 1301 was manually released from the ccr which shutdown the generator g8010 and
put the platform on hazard status. Subsequent investigation, after the halon had been cleared, revealed that the area of the fire was confined to a small area of t e pt shield
adjacent to the pt pedestal at around 210 deg. Somehow, oil or oil mist had been entering the space between the inner volute lagging and the lagging heat shield. At high load
the pt exhaust temperature and hence the inner volute, was was above the flash point of the lub. Oil, and the resultant oil vapour ignited as it vented from the lagging heat
shield jointing
The problem was originally identified during the annual rov survey on <...>, carried out by the support vessel. Initially it was assumed that the gas bubbles were as a result of
the rv on the coflexip connection relieving pressure in the carrier pipe. However, review of the video on <...> would suggest that the escaping gas is coming from an "araldite"
injection port, at the 5 o'clock position.
The gas leak was detected by the production operator carrying out his routine duties. Heard a noise, and on investigation detected that the leak was from a 4" <...> orifice box,
tag no<...>. He had to move his hand to within 12" of the leak to detect its exact location which was from the cover plate for orifice removal. The systems operating pressure
was 1820 psi. It was shut down manually and depressurised. On strip down and inspection the cover plate 'o' ring was found to be damaged. There was insuffici nt gas release
to activate a gas detection head which was 12 feet above the orifice box.
A fracture had occured on a 3/8" stainless steel line to pilot valve on psv-029a which was the on line psv on the 1st stage discharge of gas compressor kt-03. This fracture
caused a gas leak into module c1 which was detected in the control room by gas mon tor gse-1194, showing 20% lel. This gradually increased to 60%. During this period the
cause was being investigated by the area operator who quickly identified the source of the leak and isolated psv-029a.
The leak was not visable when the turbine was shutdown, it was ran up to 60% speed and the leak was detected at a joint between two halves of a ring mainfold. Following
strip down and inspection, the gasket was found to be brittle and parts of it had brok n up. System pressure was 180 psi. The gasket was replaced with one of different
specification and the turbine was subsequently run and tested satisfactory. The turbine had only recently been installed and had 250 running hours.
The hot work being carried out was a deck penetration (4" diameter hole) in module x1 at cellar deck level. Only acetylene burning equipment was being used. Below deck
level scaffolding with fire blanket had been erected to contain the sparks, a fire watc with extinguisher was present. During the burning sparks escaped the blacket and ignited
a small gas leak approximately 10ft below deck. The gas leak was from the top of a 10" plenty filter which is connected to the atmospheric vent system. The flames es imated
approxmatelty 2" around 2" of circumference and were extinguished by use of a hand held extinguisher.
Problems were being experienced with the production seperator level control, of both water and condensate. Visit had occured on <...> to solve these problems. On leaving the
platform it appeared that level control had been established and no condensate as being discharged. On <...> although water and condensate appeared to be controlling (based
on remote control indication) there was a report of condensate discharge - slick observed from helicopter. Nt
On arrival at <...>, not normally manned installation, personnel were conducting routine arrival checks. During these checks a condensate leak was discovered in the 1"
condensate outlet line from the production separator. The leaking condensate did no activate the platform gas detection systems due to the pin hole size of the leak. The <...>
and <...> platforms were shut down. The <...> wells and esd valves were shut and the platform vented down. Weather: wind 333 degrees at 28 knots; sea 5 metres
The oil leak was found to be a small drip from a transition casing. This drip accumulated underneath the compressor. A drain hole was found to be blocked. This would
normally drain any drips to a cool and safe position the incident occurred after a unit s utdown when on restart the natural temperature rise flashed off the pool of oil. The
volume was estimated at half a pint. The fire detectors picked up the flame and triggered a general alarm. The fire was extinguished by dry powder extinguishers within ap
roximately 3 minutes. The unit was shutdown and vented to investigate the oil leak and subsequent blocked drain point. All other similar units were checked for similar
problems.
Whilst loading the compressors prior to coming on line, unit ak-k-040 indicated high gas generator vibration. At this stage the discharge pressure from the machine was in
excess of 600 psig and a surging of some description was experienced in the control oom. Unit ak-k-040 shutdown on high gas generator vibration. During the investigation
into the shutdown, it was noticed that some fuel gas pressure was still indicated on the 3 way valve pressure guage and that the newly installed automatic vent valve wa half
open. Fuel gas block and vent valve operated manually by the technicians. Exhaust stack fire indicated in the control room. Fire extinguished by manual operation of co2
snuffing system.
Gas generator g600 was operational and onload. At 1148 2nd level gas detection was annunciated by the fire and gas detection system. Subsequently a ga and muster was
initiated along with the automatic shutdown of the unit. The fire and gas system detect on also initiated the block and vent of the fuel gas system to the unit. All persons were
accounted for at muster. When deemed safe to do so the unit was investigated to identify the cause of the loss of containment. It was found that a fuel gas pressur switch
diaphragm had ruptured thus releasing hydrocarbons into the enclosure. The normal operating pressure of the fuel gas system is 8 barg.
During normal pumping operations it was brought to the attention of one of the production technicians that liquid was escaping under pressure from a pipe on the ak to ap
bridge. On further investigation it was found that a jet of condensate was escaping rom a hole in a 90 degree bend on the ak to ap condensate discharge pipework. The
discharge pressure from the pump was 120 psi. The location of the leak was on the north end of the bridge and 2 feet below the walkway. Approximate discharge to sea 10 ga
lon max. Sea state wave height 3.7m, wind 33 knots. Preliminary investigation indicates corrosion being the underlying cause , to be confirmed once access scaffold in place.
Diaphragh on pressure switch failed allowing minor leak of condensate into module the pump was stopped preasure switch isolated, system drained and repressured.
Turbo expander was being started up following a planned s/d to test export riser. Riser of the plug was immediately noticed by production tech's on the scene who shut the
expander down.
A compression fitting on the platform well a6 annulas drain parted releasing a small quantity of oil and gas to module. No work was being carried out on this equipment. The
release was first spotted by the lab technician who was carrying out sampling from another well at the other side of the module.
Technician spotted small leak in train 2 oil pipework, contacted control room and isolated the section. Plant was tripped and fire team despatched and information tannoy made.
The line was depressured to the closed drain.
Simultaneous operations were in progress, drilling and well services, when seawater contaminated by traces of oil based mud overflowed a cutting discharge chute, due to
swarf debris, onto a impact deck below, including a metal handling pole. No injuries ccurred to personnel working in the area. The wellservice operations were suspended,
drilling operations continued
During an rov survey, a large hole (circumference app i metre) was observed in the sea bed around d3 flowline. The rov camers picked up a jet flow from d3 flowline directed
at the seabed. The rov survey was to ascertain the depth of the hole due to turb lence from the leak. The well was shut in at 06:55 hrs <...>. After discussion with <...> and
hse, a flow test was performed against the shut in tree valves, which indicated that app 3 mbd was leaking from the hole in the flowline. Wind: varib e 7 knots, sea; slight;
swell: 45o 8 sec, 1.5 m.
Following overhaul the gas turbine was started up with an operator in attendance to check for gas leaks in joints which can not be leak tested prior to re-commissioning. A leak
was found on no.8 can and subsequently 8 low level gas alarms were annunciated in the ccr. The machine was then shut down by the operator on site.
During routine watchkeeping operations a tech noticed a pin hole leak in the reference line from flow orifice to 10 ft booster pumps total flow internal weather not significant.
Controlled shutdown of train 1 plant initiated.
At approx 03:30 hrs ops. Prod. Tech. Saw crude oil leak from recovered oil system. No gas detected. Leak isolated, fire teams mobilised and blanketed with foam & washed
down. Suspect cause corrosion. Production on 1 of 2 trains continues. 1/2 bbl lost.
The train (1) plate pack separator, y1501, became overloaded resulting in the psv lifting allowing oil into the drainage relief header and down into the sea. At the time,
produced water was on line from both lp separators, both flash drums, train (1) plat pack and down to train (1) wemco. 10-lcv-0013a on separator c1002 was found to be stuck
open 50% although the controller in the ccr was indicating fully closed. At the same time, there was a considerable problem with well b7 in the test separator sluggin . This
caused severe water level variations in the lp separator downstream of the test separator. The low level trip in the separator was not activated (no fault found when tested). This
has led to an assertion that sand build up in the lp separator caus d a vortex at the water outlet, through which crude was carried under to the produced water system.
Following a plant shutdown the plant was being brought on line. An operations technician, carrying out routine final checks, noticed smoke issuing from the drive end seal of
the booster pump (g1001b). He warned the ccr, stopped the pump locally at which t me seal oil started to leak subsequently igniting. He informed ccr, production was
immediately shutdown and vented, fire team summoned. Another ops tech extinguished the flame using a 9kg d.p. Extinguisher. Damage- shaft was scored, stationary seal ring
s lit when it was removed
At approx 18:30 production operator observed smoke in the south east corner of the lower deck. When he got closer to the scene he found that the seal had blown on hot oil
pump 67-089. Hot oil (castrol perfected) was seen to be running into the drip tray b neath the pump and dripping from there onto the floor below. Flames appeared to be on the
surface of the pump bowl to which dry powder from an extiguisher was applied the pump was shutdown by production operator who then osolated the suction & discharge v
lves and drained the pump. He slipped on the oily surface injuring the back of his right shoulder. (first aid only)
Low gas detected by f&g system. Gas card 40106 in alarm followed by gc40114 and gc40105 low gas detected by f&g system. Gas card 40106 in alarm followed by gc40114
and gc401005
During plant restart a small leak of condensate occurred on the bonnet of a level control valve from the hp gas scrubber. Combustible gas was detected by 2 gas heads in the
vicinity and plant was automatically shutdown and depressurised. The source of the leak was a flanged joint on the body of the valve. The section of the line was valve
isolated and drained
The defect identified by the <...>: position 12 o'clock depth 24% wall thickness (approx 5.5mm) axial length 37mm circumferential width 58mm the rov confirmed damage at
fj 19550 to the field joint bitumen at the pipe crown with evidence of exposed pip steel which corroborates the <...> data. The rov was not able to establish the dimensions of
the defect, although judgement is that it is of the order reported by bg. Adjacent to this location there was also minor weight coat damage. Structural/pressu e integrity of the
pipe is not compromised. Defect analysis has been carried out using the defect information given above to confirm this.
Hose being used for flush slot 13 flowline was subjected to a pressure of approx 70 bar it subsequently failed allowing a release of gas to atmosphere. This gas release was
detected by the f&g system which resulted in a process shutdown. A gneral alarm an muster of personnel
While bleeding down the wireline riser to the "poor boy" degasser vent, 2 high gas alarms annunciated in the roof space of the shale shaker area in the rig substructure. This
resulted in an automatic production shutdown and the general alarm being sounded those immediately on the scene in the shale shaker area could detect no gas in the vicinity
with hand held metres, indicating that the volume of gas involved was small. The most likely source of gas was identified as the liquid seal loop on the deganer d um which
dumps into the shaker chute. Following the general alarm a muster was completed as a matter of routine before those not on duty were stood down. No damage was sustained
nor personnel injured.
Actuated 4" wing valve had just been replaced, and leak test carried out on wellhead using nitrogen. Nitrogen injection point was through tapped hole in blind flange in 2"
wing valve. Tapped hole not plugged on completion of leak test. Master valve ope ed to bring well back on production. 2" wing valave in open position and gas released
through hole in blind flange. Operator immediately closed master valve. Two gas heads alarmed. Production s/d automatically. Full muster carried out.
A small flash fire was discovered by a gas operator on routine operations. The compression unit c5010 was running and the fire was identified as coming from the drive
coupling between the power turbine and compressor. The uv sensors at the time were ove ridden to allow hot work to be carried out in adjacent areas. The fire was knocked
down and extinguished using a dry powder extinguisher. The fire was caused by a release of power turbine-compressor mineral lube oil coming into contact with the hot surfa
e of the power turbine exhaust cowling. The leak was from a leaking oil seal on a cable gland on the side of the coupling between the power turbine and the compressor the
braded armour cable passing through the leaking gland carries the signals for the p wer turbine vibration monitoring insturments.
High gas larm caused by deliberate venting of sight gas local to sensor head. A local panel alarm indicated a high liquid level in the fuel gas knock-out pot on p3610 gas fired
mol oil export pump. In normal circumstances liquid level control is via a sw tch which activates a solenoid controlled dump valve to drain the vessel to the drains sump tank.
In this instance the oil operator to investigate why there was a high level in the vessel. With the vessel sight glass isolated from the vessel, he removed the sight glass drain
plug and drained a small amount of hydrocarbon liquid from the sight glass. The hydrocarbon was drained through the grating into the sea. The operator then cracked the
lower level isolation valve between the sight glass and vessel nd confirmed there was liquid in the vessel up to this level. The operator at this point was joined by the chief
operator. The operator at this stage went to collect a bucket in case the knock-out pot needed to be drained. Whilst the operator was away the chief operator cracked open the
top level isolation valve between the sight glass and vessel to confirm there was liquid in the vessel to the top of the sight glass. Some of the liquid hydrocarbon spilled on to
the beam below the knock-out pot. Gas wa released and activated the gas heas supported on this beam approximately 18 inches below the sight glass. On hearing the alrm
Whilst running into well a7 with an electric wireline toolstring through the lubricator, rigged up on the drill floor, a gas detector on the bop deck below recorded above 60% of
lel of methane. The platform alarm sounded and the platform was mustered. W reline operations were suspended. A 2 man investigation team in full ba gear confirmed a gas
release in the bop room. Gas alarms returned to normal within 17 minutes. The incident investigation team concluded that: prior to running wireline, and during wireline
lubricator rig up and testing, a a small volume of gas from the well trapped in the lubricator, later passing into the lubricator bleed-off line when the lo-torque valve on this line
was opened to ensure no pressure had built-up in the lubricator when the tree was opened up to run wireline into the well, the rise in pressure forced gas through the bleed-off
valve in the bleed-off line above the trip tank in the bop room, causing gas to escape into the bop room. The bleed-off valve at this time as providing single valve isolation to
the lubricator and well.
On opening the door to oil pig receiver v1600 some gas (approx 1m3) was released to atmosphere and caused a 60% alarm condition on gas head no 14 which is located +1
metre from the point of release. No other alarms were activated. Production to both tra ns was automatically shut down. The alarm condition cleared immediately after the
door was reclosed. The system is presently being operated under permit to work (using a written procedure) until a suitable replacement interlock system has been evaluated.
Alternative systems are presently installed on v1610 gas pig receiver and on <...> vessels. Subsequent operation of v1600 to remove the pig passed without incident.
Conclusions: the atmospheric vent valves were not opened as per procedure, thereby leav ng a quantity of gas in the pig receiver after draining of the oil. The test point on the
door and the local indicators showed no pressure was present prior to the door being opened so it was wrongly assumed that all hydrocarbons had been drained.
On restarting production following a shutdown, caused by a turbine trip, the suction line for shipping pump p3410 was pressured up to normal working pressure (120-130 psi).
The operator on checking round the pump area found the seal on the lid of the suc ion filter to be spraying a fine oil mist. The pump was isolated; all hot and electrical work
suspended and production shut down manually. No platform alarms were activated and there was no damage other than oil on surrounding areas. The oil contaminati n was
cleaned up, an air purge of the pump motor enclosure carried out as a precaution, and all electrical junction boxes checked for contamination (none found). The cover was
removed from the suction filter housing and all surfaces and seals were inspect d, no damage or contamination was found. The sealing 'o' ring was renewed and the lid
replaced. After obtaining hse consent the production process was opened up and oil export resumed. There was no sign of any leakage at any point.
An operator was reducing a high water level in the electrical crude oil dehydratror vessel v-1040 on the <...> production train by opening up a vlave on the water leg. The
water leg from the dehydrator feeds into the <...> flotation oily water separat r vessel v-1200. As a result a small surge of water entered the flotation vessel. The surge of
water resulted in a small leak of gas via the seal from under one of the flotation cell hatches out of the vessel. The gas leak was picked up by gas detector g-169 attached to the
body of the flotation cell on the north east side. A 20% of lel gas level was initiated. The production control room observed the gas head registering a gas level. Two operators
with a gas detector were dispatched to module 3. The gas alarm climbed above the 60% lel level inititating an automatic level 3 esd of the production plant. The operators at
the scene confirmed a gas leak from one of the flotation cell hatches. They tightened the hatchg and the gas release stopped.
On closing esdv1511 on 14" oil export pipeline, pressure surges displaced 'o' ring seal on pump p3410 suction filter. Apporx 5 bbls crude oil spilled on deck, approx 50%
spilled to sea. Leak was observed by operator and system shutdown took place automa ically. Gas levels cleared rapidly due to open module ventilation. There were no other
persons in the area or on the spider deck below. Slick on sea was dispersed by standby vessel. Similar 6" hayward duplex filter on adjacent pump was not affected.
Level control valve lv1021 stuck in 40% position. Allowing crude oil to flow from train 1 dehydrator to train 1 flotation cell v1200. Gas escaped from train 1 flotation cell
hatch cover activating gas head adjacent to hatch.
Gas escape from flotation cell v1200. Seal on hatch cover leaking, gas head located on side of vessel, approximately 2 feet from hatch. Only one gas head activated. No
damage done. Gas dispersed quickly following production shutdown. No ignition. No injury. Faulty level control valve lv102 from train 1 dehydrator caused influx of oil
into flotation cell.
Additional indepth report to follow. Note: <...> rig is physically located on the <...> platform. (no report received).
Generator a had been running on line with no problems. It was shut down for approx 10 minutes in order to change two vibration monitors in its control panel. These monitors
are external to enclosure (in generator start-up room). On start up, with gas fue , (as per normal) the unit was run up and then synchronised onto the board. Approx one minute
later the low level gas alarm (25%lel) initiated on the fire and gas panel in the control room showing gas present inside the enclosure. With the unit still run ing, two men
inhibited the halon, opened the enclosure and checked for gas with a detector. A level of 4% lel was sensed, at the same time the general alarm sounded ( due to detectors
registering 25%lel). The unit was then shut down automatically (the l cal emergency stop button was also pushed at that time). On investigation xv51271, diesel manifold
drain valve was found to be passing to the drain tank. This had allowed the gas fuel, which purges the diesel burners during gas fired operation, to flow i to the drain tank and
exhaust into the generator enclosure via the tank vent.
Following a 'prx' shutdown on the gas compression at 1810, 'b' and 'c' generators both automatically switched from fuel gas to diesel fuel supply to burners. At 1845 whilst
approaching the glycol skid on the main deck to re-establish the process, the oper tor detected excessive fumes from 'c' generator enclosure exhaust. He reported this to the
pcr. Further investigation by other operators found diesel being discharged in a fine spray, towards the floor of the enclosure, from a screwed manifold connection on the diesel
distribution block. The oeprator took immediate action and stopped the machine at the emergency stop button. Approximately 2 gallons of liquid were recovered from clean up
of enclosure floor.
60% lel gas alarm was activated by gas detector gd22 which is immediately above the <...> unit. The unit was not in use at the time. Gas was detected escaping from the
wemco lid by the chief operator. A manual valve was used to isolate the vessel from th suspected gas source, the lp vent system, and hoses used to dissipate the gas. It was
suspected that psv580 (diaphragm low pressure type) had failed and gas from the lp vent system backflowed into the <...> unit. No production shutdown occurred as only ne
detector activated.
At 17:30 hrs during a power failure the fuel gas filter pots were isolated to main generation and opened up for inspection. On completion of inspection they were reinstated.
At 20:26 hrs after compression start up there was a gas release from the on lin filter, supplying gas to main generation, in module 3 cellar. The gas detection system picked up
the gas release and a production shutdown was initiated immediately from the control room. This was followed shortly by a master blowdown and activation of module 3c
deluge. Within a period of 6 minutes the gas was dispersed and the gas detection system was reading zero.
Train 2 gas compressor had just shutdown on a high condensate level in the dehydrator. Simutaneously the drain plug on the bottom of the condensate level transmitter lt41-2
came out which resulted in a gas release. All production was shutdown and the le el transmitter isolated, no damage or injury was sustained
At approximately 06:06 hours a 20% gas alarm was activated on the fire and gas panel from a gas detector located in mm2 mud pit room. Personnel were dispatched with
portable gas detectors to investigate the cause of the alarm. At the same time a platform announcement was made warning all personnel and for all hot and electrical work in
the area to cease. Personnel dispatched to the area with portable gas detection equipment confirmed presence of gas in the mezzainine of the mud module but were unable to f
nd a source. Before the source of the gas could be identified, a 60% gas alarm was activated. All platform personnel mustered as per station bill. As a slow build up of gas was
indicated by other fixed detection systems, a 28 shutdown was initiated manu lly from the ccr. Initial investigations carried out by the personnel at the scene of the gas alarm
found that the hvac and vent fans within the mud pit room had been isolated for maintenance purposes. After ensuring that it was safe to do so, the hvac nd vent fan systems
were reinstated to assist with the sidpersal of accumulated gas. No source of gas could be found in the vicinity of the mud pit room. Investigations into the source of the gas
leak continued after the gas lel had dropped below 20%. Th investigations found gas building up from a drain in the cp room which indicated 45% lel on a portable gas
During backflow operation of <...> gas line, gas condensate from h.p. Flare k.o. Drum spilled into flare tip platform and ignited
During pressure testing no. 5 flowline a plug blew out.the test specification was 333 bar for six hours.the failure occured three hours into the test. Subsequent investigations
identified an incorrect specification of plug was installed.it was a "fusabl loop" type plug,which is normally used to trigger deluge system,of pressure rating 7 bar.
Pump p1030 m.o.l. Started up and pipe vibration was identified by personnel in the area.p1030 was shutdown manually from the ccr under instructions from the plant
supervisor.at that point oil was noted leaking from insulation near 3/4in stub on the re ycle line low point above m.o.l. P1030. On removal of the insulation,a crack was
identified around the 4 3/4in stub.approx 5 litres of hydrocarbons had spilled on the deck.
Minor gas leak on <...> during commissioning run of gas compressor at 6 bar. Dry seals on gas supply pipework at drive end of compressor. Auto-surface process shutdown
initiated. Alarms and muster. Leak path identified and muster stood down.
At 13:41 a single gas head in fire zone 02 was activated.this was followed at 13:45 by co-incident gas detection to 40% lel with ensuing gpa and production shutdown.at the
time draining operations of condensate from 2nd stage discharge scrubber,was bein carried out by commissioning the operation stopped upon activation of the initial gas
alarm.gas from the condensate had vented to atmosphere from the vessel activating the detectors.the operations being carried out were considered to be normal commisioni g
operations and the vessel level monitored as 60% full.there was no liquid spillage at anytime from the vent.gas detection fell below 20% lel at 13:55 and was clear at 14:05.
Closed drains flash drain v6000 overflowed whilst draining,hydrocarbon oil from main line pump p1032 to allow removal of suction filter.this resulted in oil and gas being
emmited to atmosphere and sea (less than four gallons of oil to sea) via v6000 atmos heric ventline.due to the wind direction gas was blown back toward gas detectors,which
initiated an insatllation surface process shutdown and general platform alarm. A breakdown in communication/procedure was the root cause of this incident.
At approx 16:25 on <...> during commisioning of the gas compressor a leak was witnessed coming from the body of rv 20019 this caused an initial estimate of 1m3 gas
condensate to be released to atmosphere .rv20019 is fitted on the discharge line of the condensate pumps. The gas process was going through the start sequence when it was
noticed that there was a 60% condensate level in the first stage suction scrubbr .it was decided to lower the level using one of the condensate pumps which transfers conden ate
from the 1st stage suction scrubber to the oil export metering skid. Approx 5 mins after the condensate pump was started the control room operator started to experience an
increasing level in the lp flare ko drum at that time the two events were ide tified as being related.afetr apprx another 5min's a witness reported to the control room that gas
condenste was spraying from the body of the releif valve.it was at this stage that the control room operator shutdown the condensate pump then later depressurised.
Tests were carried out on main oil line export pump p-1030,to fully identify the source of heavy piping vibration at a recycle valve posistion. Results indicated a region of
high vibration at the pump discharge recycle line when the recycle valve was pprox 50% open.outside this region no adverse effect on the pumps performance was
identified. During the early hours of <...> the third (of three) mol export pumps p-1030 was started to test the integrity of instrument repair work,with it's recycle valv fcv
10005 set fully open on manual control. To accommodate the increased pumping capacity fcv 10003 on mol pump p- 1030 moved under automatic control to approx 50% open
and ran in this c condition,heavy piping vibration ,for 20 mins. During this time a f ilure of a small bore drain connection weld was observed,oil was witnessed leaking from
the failure under pressure3,approx 10litres. Mol p-1030 pump set was immediately shut down and isolated.a slight leak was then observed on the identical drain line o mol p-
1031 pump set:this was also immediately shut down and isolated.
A single infra red detector within <...> gas turbine enclosure (generator package g8003) alarmed in central room. An operator was dispatched to investigate locally, obsrved a
small flame from burner no. 7 area, requested control room operator to manually shut down unit. The flame was subsequently put out due to fuel starvation. Subsequent
investigations identified the alluminium washer used to provide a seal between the burner and supply diesel fuel line was found to be damaged. This allowed pre surised
diesel fuel to spray onto hot surface of gas turbine, resulting in a small flame at the point of loss of containment. Note: automatic shutdown of unit and activation of co2
system requires 2 coincident ir detectors. The flame was small hence onl one detector saw flame.
A single infra red detector within <...> gas turbine enclosure (generator package g8003) alarmed in central control room. An operator was dispatched to investigate to
investigate locally, observed a small flame from burner no. 6 area, requsted control oom operator to shut down unit and activate co2 fire extinguishing system. The flame was
subsequently put out. Subsequqnt investigations indicated the co2 system did not operate, cause attributed to operator unfamiliarity with manual operation. Hence fl me was
put out due to fuel starvation. The alliminium washer used to provide a seal between the burner and supply diesel fuel line was found to be damaged. This allowed pressurised
diesel fuel to spray onto hot surface of gas turbine, resulting in a smal flame at the point of loss of containment. Note.automatic shutdown of unit and activation of co2 system
requires 2 coincident ir detectors.the flame was small hence only one detector saw flame.
Confirmed gas was detected at the hvac duct which supplies the local control room for gas compressor system. This resulted in automatic surfac- e process shutdown and
blowdown of production and gas comporession systems, and power to the local control oom, and initiating of gpa. The area was tested for traces of gas, but none recored.
Initiall observations identified vapours emitting from lube oil system vents in this area (system part of gas compressor) and heading for hvac. It was initially assesse this was
the potential source. However, subsequent investigations identified a further potential source of gas release. Just before the gas was detected, the gas compressor had changed
over from fuel gas to a process surge. As part of the normal oper tion of the fuel gas system pcv 20264 cloces <...> and xy 2013 opens to vent surplus locked-in fuel gas via
an atmospheric vent which terminates in the same area as above. Its was noted that pcv 2026, by virtue of design, wa not a positive means of isolation and could have
continued to allow a small quantity of gas to pass until the system was depressurised. Furthermore, the enviromem- ental conditions may have contributed, by not adequately
scouring the gas away from this
At 16:06 g8 001 was in the process of being changed over from diesel to fuel gas when there was an indication of h1 gas from the gas detection system in the turbine enclosure
vent exhaust ducting. Three gas detectors were in alarm condition from fire zone 30,one reaching 27% this caused the machine to shutdown,the fuel gas to be isolated and a
platform gpa.when the machine shutdown the gas detectors quickly returned to a healthy status. G8001 automatically shutdown on seeing hi gas and isolated the fuel as from
the machine.the shutdown does not initiate a process sps on seeing hi gas,this being due to the turbine being self-contained and protected by co2 extinguishant system. The
platform went to muster stations and remained there until the gas release w s investigated.the incident co-ordinator attended the scene and investigated the gas release.on
opening the enclosure,the area was checked out with a portable gas detector where no gas was found.
3 gas heads indicated high.machine logic shut it down but no esd.platform went to muster.fire team investigated inside enclosure but can find no faults. Platform now
running.investigation going on.oir9a to be sent.
Confirmed gas release was detected in hvac duct to local control room for gas compressor. This resulted in an automatic surface process shutdown and gpa initiation. Gas
detectors immediately reset themselves. Subsequent investigations identified fuel inle valves had not been iscolated. This allowed gas to pass through vent line which
terminates at the gas processor module roof. Due to enviromental air conditions at the time, gas was not effectively diluted/dispersed resulting in ingestion into hvac inlet
Platform personnel were sent to muster stations when a release of hydrocarbon gas in c2 well bay area,activated the gas detection system.using a portable gas detector the
source of release was found to be the hazardous drains. Subsequently gas levels n the area returned to safe levels.the muster was stood down. Subsequent investigation found
that gas had migrated through the open hazardous drains pipework into the well bay area,due to draining down operations on mol pump p1031 (this was terminated whe the
gpa/muster initiated).the gas was able to escape from the drains into the area,due to a missing drain seal cover.
Crane driver observed smoke coming from engine compartment. On investigation he saw hydraulic oil leaking from a pipe coupling and onto the engine exhaust. He shutdown
the engine and extinguished the fire using a dry powder extinguisher.
During incident investigation in module 01, gas was seen emitting from an open 2" flange on top of the redundant glycol reboiler column. The 2" atmospheric vent line had
been removed and the flange not blanked. At this time it is not known when or by who the vent line was removed. A blank flange has been fitted.
Two mechanics were investigating an air leak on the lpg prover in module 30 during the removal of a component on the actuator piston, the lpg in the prover body was vented
to atmosphere. Two gas heads were activated giving a low gas alarm. The release wa stopped by a plant operator opening the flare blowdown line. No injury was sustained by
any personnel.
Fuel gas controllers on scada wre lined up so as gas from module 38 could be used. As the pressure increased in the system, safety relief valve/valves were heard to lift in mod
03. This resulted in two low gas alarms followed by one high being indicated n the main control room. On investigation of the control system it was found that a pressure
indicator controller pic 8639b had failed open.
During preparations to start @a@ export compressor and commence production from a <...> well, the hp compressor tripped resulting in all the offgas from hp separator being
routed to the hp flare via the hp flare knockout drum. An operator in module 06 control room heard the gas and liquid coming from the area of the hp flare knockout drum. He
found a pinhole leak on the instrument bridle of one of the level switches (lsh-06-247). He notified the main control room then isolated the bridle.
The <...> production was shutdown but pipeline at pressure of approx 85 bar g. Problems experienced wtih choke valve 25hvc 8016. On examination it was found that the
actuator to vlave spindle nut was loose, also thread damage. It was decided to remov the actuator form the valve body for inspection/repair. The actuator was pre-rigged. A
mechanic started to remove the actuator. Once the actuator was pre-rigged. A mechanic started to remove the actuator. Once the actuator securing clamp was removed the
vlave spindle blew out, and released gas. An operator in the area isolated and depressurised the pipework.
Failure of 'o' ring seal that seals product from atmosphere between sleeve and shaft on none drive end of lpg export pump ga304a allowed hydrocarbon to be released into the
module. Pump had only just been run up and was shutdown immediately by operator in attendance. Seal damaged on assembly.
Low gas levels were detected in several modules by fixed detection systems. It was traced to a breakthrough of gas at the seal pots on the surface drain gulleys. Lp flare purge
gas was reduced and gas levels continued to fall to normal conditions. However the low levels of gas reoccurred the following day, by which time it had been established that
the most likely cause was a primary seal failure in the oily water caisson.the systematic checking of plant revealed that the glycol reboiler vent water seal ha been lost
allowing gas/steam to enter and pressurise the drain system.
Low level gas was detected in several modules by fixed detection systems. It was traced to a breakthrough of gas at the seal pots on the surface drain gulleys. All hotwork
suspended. General pa announcements were made to inform platform residents.
A score mark was discovered on a 1" socket weld. The line was isolated and ndt showed depth to be 2mm of a 4-5mm wall thickness. The score mark was not new. Risk
assessment concluded that sufficient wall thickness remains to contain highest possible press res. Pipeline returned to service.
During well testing operation, an operator technician discovered produced water leaking from a small hole on the oil level instrument bridle.
Heard and smelt gas when walking along the pipedeck adjacent to 02/03 void. Traced leak to 1" condensate line running between the turbine knock out pot and the flare knock
out drum. Hot work and vessel entry permit in adjacent area suspended. Turbine switched to diesel and gas line isolated and flushed out.
The vessel <...> was discharching oil base mud via the platforms east side hose handling station. The vessel was lying stern to a moderate sea and swell heading 060t, wind
was swly 20-25 knots, occasionally 30 knots in wintery showers. At 0348hr a cloud of the product was blown over the deck of the vessel from the platform manifold area.
Pump was stopped immediately and platform informed. At 0418hrs marine control were informed by the vessel of the events. It was agreed that the vessel's deck should be
washed down thoroughly before any cargo operations could be safely resumed. The hose had split approx 4' from the manifold. Approx 1m cube was lost, mostly onto the
vessel's deck.
During installation of replacement pipe work for 1" hf 060036b1a turbine knockout pot drain line to hp flare knockout drum, a pin hole leak was found by the construction
supervisor in the existing pipework at an elbow over the side at n25 nearby closed dr in sump tank. The turbine was switched to diesel, the line isolated and depressurised.
New line is being installed, prior to turbine being operated on gas.
Gas compression facilities in export at circa 7000 scm/hr when vendor representative noticed a shimmer from hp aftercooler cn-e-3114 outlet flange. As no smell was evident
he informed the area technician, who on confirming the leak to be from gas pipework contacted the shift supervisor. On arrival at module 6 and observing the leak the
supervisor ordered an immediate shutdown and blowdown of the process.
The gpa activated at 1757 hrs. By coincidental high-high gas alarms in the drilling hazardous hvac room (hhhr) the presence of gas was confirmed by the emrgency responce
team deployed to investigate the alarm. The gas alarm cleared and the platform f&g pa el was reset manually after approx. 20 mins the ert could not identify the source of the
gas. The platform returned to normal status after approx 40 mins. Approx 5 mins after the all clear, a 10% reading was deducted in the drilling sub-structure. This wa
investigated , but again the source of the gas leak could not be found.
Venting down operations were taking place on c3720. Five gas alarms came up in sequence - the two alarms nearest c3720 registered 25%, the others 10%. Gpa initiated. Two
sweeps of the area immediately afterwards indicated no gas present.
Whilst a pipefitter was installing a spool piece into the high pressure flare system, he heard a rumbling noise from the pipe and he immediately left the area by means of a
vertical ladder. When he was halfway down the ladder his left side was covered in black liquid which had started to discharge from the open end of the flare header. This
caused him to jump from the ladder and land on the deck below: a distance of + 4ft. This action resulted in minor back pain, but he has not required to be absent from work.
The initial discharge was followed by a series of bangs and rumbles in the hp flare system, culminating with a further discharge of vapours. Production was shutdown and a
precautionary evacuation of non-essential personnel was instigated.
Having experienced operating difficulty at low flow rates, a new condensate spike pump minimum flow control valve has been fitted. Consequently, it was decided to test run
the pumps. System operators were instructed to closely observe the pumps and pump s als and to initiate a stopif any abnormalities were observed. At 06:10 hrs. Mcr recieved
indication of 2 low low level (10%) gas alarms in the area by "b" pump. The pump was trapped by mcr and the operator called by radio to investigate. This was followed by
one 25% lel gas alarm. At 06:12 hrs. A second 25% lel alarm indicated - gpa initiated.
A leak of amine from plate type heat exchanger e3550 was discovered by the production operator. The unit was shutdown, the area barriered off and the spillage hosed away.
Release of gas when the repacking of a gland involved the removal of the top part of valve assembly from body on kv 3742 - b.
Platform shut in 11:27 <...> . Platform manned <...> for routine maintenance . Production operator found leak on <...> flowline 1st active side. All non essential personnel
mustered in safe area platform staff isolated well & flowline & vented <...>.
Bleed screw worked loose on instrument pressure tansmitter manifold at pt2652 on oil export line <...> resulting in a fine spray of crude oil escaping into the mezzanine deck
(n.e. Corner). The leak caused two gas detectors in the area to activate - one at hi-hi level, the other at hi level. Upon investigation and confirmation of the leak, a class 1 esd
was initiated by the control room.
The wellbay kill system was to be used for the pressure testing of the well j1 annulus,and prior to commencing the pressure test a flushing programme was initiated using the
drilling package cement pump (high pressure unit). Whilst flushing out the kill l ne to be used for the pressure test a quantity of hydrocarbon oil/gas was released from the split
flange, resulting in amist cloud engulfing the east side of the wellbay area. This resulted in two coincident high level gas detectors activating and initiat ng a gpa level 3
shutdown.
H.c. Gas leak from 3/4" weld-o-flange on h.p. Flare line from p.s.v 15068a
The exchanger e-6 had recently been ressembled agter replacement of a failed tube bungle. Prior to being returned to service it had been successfully nitrogen tested to 1800
psi. On completion of testing it had been on line for a period of five days bef re the leak occurred. Just prior to the incident the platform suffered a <...> shutdown and the gas
plant was put into recycle mode of operation. A low level gas alarm was picked up by the gas detection head in the vicinity of v-9.r.oswald, gas plant o erator, entered module
"e" to investigate the situation and discovered a bisible and audible gas leak from e-6 bell end-cover. At the same time as this investigation was being carried out, two other
heads came into low level alarm. <...> determined hat the leak required immediate action and consequently the control room operators shut down c1, c2 and c3. On leaving
the module <...> activated the manual call point to alert the platform to the incident and reported in to the control room to advise.
During recommisioning of well <...> following planned shutdown, t10y was being made ready to flow. The sub-surfacer valve, lower master and upper master valves had been
opened in that order. The choke was closed and the flowline wing valve closed. Durin opening of flowing valve (which progressively pressures the flowline up to choke) a
rupture occured in the flexible flowline (coflexip) som 3 feet from it's connection with <...> xmas tree. The gas cloud generated by this release moved north ward to a di tance
of approx 30 feet activating three gas detection heads. The well was immediately closed in and the area made safe. Module force ventilation removed gas within approx 2
minutes.
The plant had been shutdown on an sps prior to this incident.the blowdown valve xzv-2230ont he hp suction scrubber and barrel did not open fully.this resulted in pressure
remaining in the system,afetr the overhead seal oil reservoir had been depleted. Ithout seal oil,the pressure in the barrel caused gas to leak across the seal and into the module
via the atmospheric vent on the seal housing. Two gas heads detected the low level gas and initiated a yellow alert.as a precautionary measure the platform w s manually taken
to red hazard status at the request of the oim.
A small gas leak was reported to the ccr form a pin hole in a redundant test burner line, ref no <...> the test burner line is a spur off <...> this is the oil outlet line (header) from
the clean up separator, which at this time was not in service, but condensate returns from the fuel gas system tie into the same line via <...> and was routed to a train 2ndstage.
Wind speed 15 knots, wind direction 10 degrees. No immediate isolation method was available, c turbine was swi ched to diesel fuel and fuel gas and lp compressor were
shutdown. Fuel gas system depressurised then isolations carried out. The pipeline was banded for immediate containment, whilst the line was depressurised.
Following an unsuccessful attempt at flowing slot 43 for a period of 24hrs the choke was shut back to 5 degrees then to 2 degrees to try and establish the problem. The tubing
head pressure slowly raised to approx 450# over a period of an hour. The oil s de of the tree and flowline were covered in a thick coating of frost. At 01:00 hrs the oil manual
wing valve and gas choke were shut as the problem was thought to posibbly be a hydrate in the oil string. The oil tubing head pressure started to rise towa ds the gas tubing
head pressure of 2400# over a period of 20 mins. A decision was made to de-pressure the gas string to flare with the intention of dislodging the hydrate backwards. At this
time a leak was observed at one of the tubing hanger packer ins ection ports.
Local f&g system indicated leak in hydrocarbon system.announced in central control room.technician investigated.on finding genuine fault telephoned ccr who immediately
sounded gpa (muster) and shut down process plant.personnel stood to muster for 58 minut s whilst isolation took place.breach support emergency response team assembled at
<...>. Coastguard supported with aircraft.(later stood down).failed section of plant:6" 150 rated shed. 80 carbon steel line used to route an oil- water-chemical 'cocktail' f om the
drains system to the process plant (for further treatment)
N gas turbine generator was started up at approx 12:10 hrs following commissioning checks and run at idle speed. The unit was loaded up to 5kw and final checks were in
progress flames were noticed in the vicinity of the free turbine output shaft coupling area. The unit was shutdown on emergency stop and the ccr informed. The general alarm
was sounded, all personnel went to muster and emergency teams and and fireteam responding to the incident. The fire was extinguished using a dry powder extinguisher, he
fireteam remaining on site to secure the area. B turbine was isolated from source or fuel. No personnel were injured. The extent of damage to this unit is currently under
investigation however the cause is considered to be ignition or lub oil mist.
<...> at 1700 hrs a swagelock fitting on nlgp gas inport system in module 5a failed allowing high pressure gas to escape. The fitting which failed was associated with pressure
switch dpsh 2936. The mode of failure was the instrument pipe w s pushed out of the fitting by gas pressure. Two <...> technicians, <...> and <...> were working in close
proscrimity at the time of the failure fitting hert shields for valve solenoids. The technicians were unhurt by the gas escape. They infor ed the ccr who set off the general alarm.
<...> incident and met j<...>(production technician) and agreed to shutdown the platform on an esd. The high velocity gas escape was isolated by teh fire/production team and
subsided very quickly.
The a cost tank was being emptied by displacing the oil with water from the low pressure seawater lift system. The system pressure is maintained by a seawater dump valve fcv
3203. This valve was leaking & so the manual block valve upstream had been almost closed to ensure sufficient water was flowing to remove the oil. Five water injection
pumps were running. The c turbine, which drives one of the three power generators, tripped automatically following smoke detection in the area of module 21 immediatly
outside the turbine enclosure. It is likely this smoke came from oil residue on the engine casing following maintenance as the machine had only running for 10 minutes since
start up. Smoke had been detected a few minutes earlier but the dectectors had cleared themselves without any operator action. The general alarm sounded & the crew went to
muster. Loss of power resulted in automatic load shedding of water injection & the 5 pumpsran down to a halt. The low pressure system then had no forward flow to the de-
aerator towers & the lack of cooling in the gas lift system caused temperatures to increase. To prevent shutdoun of system due to high temperatures, a process operator was
despatched to open the manual block valve on fcv3202. Once this was done temperatures in the gas lift plant returned to normal. Five minutes passed during which c turbine
Following a previous power outare and prior to recommending oil production to 'c' 1st stage seperator a leak of water vapour (gas was spotted), the release was found to be
from the test seperator hp flare vent line. The alarm was raised by the ots via a 3 3 (emergency call line) call to the ccr, the platform then went to general alarm status. With the
aid of ba, isolations were made and the hole covered. The maximum level of gas recorded was 6% lel.
Two people were carrying out tubing head pressure checks on <...> well heads using equipment set up as per the attached stetch. The checks nelessitated the removal of the
tubing head pressure impulse line from the pressure monitor production block on th tree and the fitting of the calibrated test guage mentioned earlier as equipment. The checks
on three wells had been successfullycompleted and the reading taken on the fourth (a4) as the compression fitting attsching the assembled equipment to the block as being
slackened off to bleed the pressure from the test equipment the tube, stil connected to the guage assembly, came out of the compression fitting with some force. The pressure at
the time in the line was approximately 180box. The fitting had as on he previous well heads been made up hand tight and then nipped with a spanner.
During steady state production, a failure occured at the connection point between a 2" and a 16" gas live. This resulted in a total disconnection and gas release . A level 3b e.s.d.
Was initiated and the plout was blown down (executive action).
During nornal production it was noticed the 8 no vlaves and blank flanges had been left open to atmosphere. Three of thses vent lines were releasing gas under pressure of one
bar for approximately one hour. The system had been left in this condition contr ry to the companys safety standards and procedures. Instruction and training.
At 1627 the fire and gas system caused the platform to go to yellow alert status following detection of the low level gas in module 1 level3 gas compression area. The leak was
traced to the pressure tapping at the flanged connection downstream of the bloc valve (approx line pressure 140bow). A production shutdown was initiated and the compressor
blow down valve opened from the control room. Access to the pressure guage line was provided and the upstream block valve isolated. The leak was coming from the t ead of
where the 5/5 1" pipe is tapped into the mild steel flange fitting.
During a start up sequence of the "a" <...> and associated compressors, a production tech was standing by at mil5 mezz @ the export compressor psv's to monitor the same. It
was suspected that certain psvs may be lifting early. It was during onitoring, at a time when the export compressor was up to 90.6(140barg) that it was noticed the psv 36200c
was iced up. Further investigation showed up a minor gas leak at a 1" stub on the downstream line. The production tech contacted the lead production tech contacted the lead
production teach who gave the instruction to shut down and blowdown the "a" compressor.
A grease nipple on the discharge side of the main oil line pump was leaking oil onto the floor of the module.
A high pressure lube oil hose was leaking and the high temperature inside the enclosure ignited the vapour.
The crude oil cooler was seen to be leaking oil onto the deck of the module. The plant was shutdown and the seals were removed.
During normal operations of the gas compression tank it was necessary to close the gas export control valve to prevent off specification product entering the pipeline. During
this action the export compressor discharge pressure continued to rise resultin in the pressure relief valve, which is of a bellows construction, activating. Failure of the bellows
resulted in gas being released via the psv vent port to atmosphere.
Production operator discovered a pin hole leak on hydrocarbon pipework from chiller liquid flash drum to peed-peed exchanger. Position of leak being on weld at point of
attachment of pipe support to an elbow.
The fire and gas system detected high level gas in the pgt10 turbine enclosure resulting in an esd 3 shutdown accompanied by the initiation of a red hazard status and personnel
being called to muster stations.
The night safety officer noticed a minor gas escape from a loose blank on module 1 level 4. The vent downstream of a psv was open and the blank flange not fully secured. Lp
gas at low level was escaping. Operations personnel isolated the ball valve and tightened flange
A psv sited on the discharge pipework of the c crude booster pump discharged crude oil to the module from the bellows port on the upper section of the relief valve. The pump
was shut down and the psv isolated. At the time of the incident the pressure in the final seperator was less than 1 barg and as such the crude had a relatively low vapour
pressure. No automatic gas pressure occurred.
High gas alarm, coupled with visual report of slick alongside platform. The manifold was shutdown effecting a shutdown of all riser platform's entrants. Since the leak
appeared to continue a full system shutdown was initiated. The platform and system wa monitored from the docc and the helicopter until it was judged safe to land on the
platform at 1532. It was then discovered that the leak had come from the pig receiver door. Approximately 1 barrel of crude oil spilled to the sea. Wind in excess of 30k ots,
easterly wave height in excess of 4metres. Air and sea temperature approximately 2 degrees celcius.
During decompression of a pressure vessel on <...> liquid entered the ventline. Some hours later the psv on the same vessel lifted and a high flow of gas accellerated the liquid
in a 16" ventpipe between <...> and <...>. The slug hit a bend and caused substa tial movement of the pipe. After inspection of all parts of the line a crack was found in the
weld of an 8" branchline.
The diver's hose (air diving) formed a 'kink' which totally stopped his air supply.he went on bail out and was brought back to the surface in the dive basket. No injury.
During pigging operations, pigs stuck in the line between the trap and the inlet valve. To remove the pigs, the spool piece between the trap and valve had to be removed.
Reinstatement of the spool required a pressure test to confirm pipeline integrity. D ring this operation, the inlet valve failed the pressure test and started leaking at 20 bar.
During visual inspection of riser corrosion detected emerging from under neoprene coating. Critical engineering assessment proved riser's fitness for purpose with defect insitu.
Defect ground to a smooth profile with no cracks or pitting detected.
The fire and gas system indicated fire in fire areas fa-01, fa01-02, fa 56-03, fa 56-13. The platform general alarm was sounded by the ccr operator. All personnel mustered at
their primary muster points. The fire and gas system indicated fire due to low a r pressure at a deluge control station. The cause of the low air pressure was due to pcv 2907
failing to control the air pressure. All areas were checked by the emergency response teams who confirmed there was no fire.
At 23.11 hours the g.p.a. Was sounded due to an emergency call being recieved by east brae central control room. An announcement was broad cast informing of fire on the
skid deck. The attendant vessel. Safe britannia also went to muster. The duty emergenc response team mobilised to the skid and confirmed no fire. The alarm appeared to have
been raised by a man who had mistaken the venting of nitrogen with the refection of the flare in the background as fire. Production and drilling operations were shutdow as a
precautionary measure. H.m.c.g. And shorebase were kept informed of the muster.
On <...> at 19:56hrs generator 'c' was running at 10-11 megawatt load, when the machine automatically tripped on indication of low lubrication oil flow. As no other generator
was running this caused a total power failure with the engine compartment cool ng fans and generator dampens also tripping the temperature within the compartment rose
sharply from the engine surface temp and the rate of rise heat detector within the arae actuated the general platform alarm via fire and gas control panel and halon 13 1 (82kg)
was released as executive action. The emergency generator cut in immediately but fans and dampers are not connected to essential services supplies.
During routine maintenance of the wellhead of b7 it is required to vent the gas down to zero psi above the sssv. The flowline was open to atmosphere via the vent header. The
wing valve was open, top master opened 5 turns to depressure above mlsv. It was d ring this operation that a loud thud was heard, suggesting the sssv had become dislodged
and moved up the tree. The bottom master was closed approx. 6 turns to hold the valve from slipping back. The work permit was withdrawn and the area made safe.
After platform esd at 17:40 on <...> <...> sssv's were repressured with the exception of wells d1 and d5 (long term isolations are in place on well d1 wing valve/xmas tree).
Insufficient time was available to pressure up well d5 sssv. Well d5 s sv was isolated at the hydraulic annulus wing valve in order to make the well safe overnight. The platform
was then demanned. <...> - at 11:50 well d5 hydraulic annulus wing valve was de-isolated amd attempts were made to pressure up the hydraulic annul s with no success. On
further investigation at the xmas tree it was found that both the upper master and lower master valves were obstructed and only able to be closed by 1 1/2 turns. It was then
assumed thast the sssv had become dislodged from the sssv n pple and was now sitting in the xmas tree across both the upper and lower master valves. The status of the well
was then discussed and isolations implemented.
Drilling circulating bottoms up after cement squeeze above b19 perforations. A small pocket of gas was picked up resulting in the above
While displacing b34 of mud and pumping sea water based clean up pills (in preparation for completion operations), gas entrained in the sea water system broke out at the
shakers. The driller noticed a positive flow on the flow indicator, shut in at the hy rill and personnel attended muster stations. With the well secure at the bop and the muster
complete all personnel were stood down at 053s. The stabilised shut in pressures were sidpp200 psi, sicp 300, psi. The well was circulated to 9.5 completion fluid, flow check
and found to be losing fluid to the reservoir at a low rate. Weather details - wind 010' speed 30 knots sea 2m visibility unlimited generally good
Choke(slot25)was opened to flow well, a small valve stem leak was noticed. To remedy this the choke valve was opened and closed several times to improve condition. This
operation worsened the condition of the leak and the well was closed in. There was o plant damage or persons injured and leaking oil was contained.
The bop test string was installed in the wellhead with a test plug to seal off against the wellhead.the bop annulus was pressurised above the plug using the <...> pump.as the test
pressure of 3000psi was approached the test string was pumped out of the well until restrained by the pipe rams.due to the upwards movement also being restrained by the top
drive unit the pipe buckled severely forming u-shape and protruding through the v door. Note that the well was cased off with cemented liner and mud in the hole
Circulating bottoms up prior to begining coring operations when gas reading were detected by gas heads in module 21 drilling derrick substructure. This initially caused a local
module alarm and eleven minutes later a level 3 platform shutdown. The well e7 was shut in on the annular just prior to the level 3 shutdown. No pressure bulid up under the
annular.
At the time of the incident a check trip was being carried out to condition the 6" hole section prior to running the pre-packed screens. The drillstring had been run to 11450 and
the well was being circulted clean. A bottoms up was reached, trip gas level recorded at the shale shakers by the hrh gas detectors increased rapidly. At the same time, seven of
the platform gas detectors in the shaker deck tripped, causing the platform to go to red hazard status and initiate a process shutdown. Within three minu es of the platform
going to hazard status, operations techs carrying out gas checks in the shaker deck could find no gas present. After communication between the platform control room and the
drill floor the well was closed in at the bop's. After monitori g the well and establishing zero surface pressence circulation was recommended going across thr choke minifold,
and through the mid gas seperator. After 20 minutes, circulation was stopped and the well checked for pressure and flow. Both checks were neg
The pump was lined up to well <...> 5/8" casing which had been filled with sea water, however some oil had percolated through to surface. The chp was 100 psi. The casing
valves were opened and the pump man was instructed to start the pump and increase th casing pressure to 300 psi. The pump man closed the bleed valve which returns flow to
the feed tank and opened up the discharge line to the 9 5/8" casing. At this time oil/water back flowed into the feed tank. The pump man checked the pump valves anf fou d the
2" x 1" bleed valve was not fully closed. He closed the valve and noted that there had been an increase of 1 1/2 barrels in the feed tank of which 1/2 bbl was crude oil, there
was also a very strong smell of gas. Gas head gse-1145 which was 1 metre bove and 3 metres to the side registered 30% lel in the control room.
Gas levels being experienced in well was at low level initially but slug of gas came up well,resulting in red alert.closed in well to contain gas.situation under control. N.b.
Caller confirmed above stating all systems operated in accordance with proced res.platform returned to normal.
While making up the top drive system to the stand of drill pipe the a.d was pulling out of the slips when a 'bang' was heard. The rig superintendent and the a.d went to
investigate, and discovered the connecting link to the counterbalance had sheared.
During well preparation t16 the <...> packer set had to be recovered at 11000ft with fishing operations due to mechanical problems. The hurricane plug lower body was milled
over to a size of 4 3/4" to enable recovery with a 4 3/4" grapple. Theis ethod does no allow ciculation below the packer. Drill crew were briefed on what "swabbing" effects
have on a well whilst pulling out packer. Caution was exercised while pulling out of the hole (1) monitor hole fill up, while pulling pipe. (2) slow pip pulling until
indications of the packer rubber elements being dislodged from the tool. Packer was recovered at 05.00 hole fill up was correct, no indication of formation fluids to the well
bore. A clean out assembly was run in the hole to 11,200ft to ci culate out any debris left in the well from fishing operations. Displacement returns were monitored while
running pipe in the hole no discrepencies were noted. The driller was further advised of the possibility of increase in flow returns while circulat ng bottoms/up from 11,200ft,
circulation started at 13:30. The driller noticed an increase in flow and moved the drill string into position for closing the b.o.p. The rapid near surface expansion of the gas
caused the expulsion of well bore contents. D iller then sutdown rig pumps and closed the annualr preventor to secure the well. Gas monitors in the b.o.p. Deck area detected
As in 2) followed by implemenation of "kick" procedure. Platform production process shut down and vented in order to extinguish platform flare as a precaution. Well contents
occurred conditioned as per procedures/control measures. No gasrecieved to surfa e and integrity of well secured without incident.
Laybarge being backloaded along side platform. 2 bundles of pipes landed on deck by crane. Sea swell 2m with bigger swell now and again. The ip had to step into the gap
between the two bundles to unhook his wire. At this point the ship rolled and one o the pipe bundles rolled onto his right ankle/leg. The ip fell with the bundle across his leg.
#he crane driver noticed this and immediately lowered off the crane slings instructing the deck hand to re hook the pipe, he then lifted it clear of the ip.
The west crane was taking a lift from the <...> crane boom went into free descent and a deck crew rigger received a leg injury. The boom collapsed over the side of the platform
and damaged lifeboat no. 6.
Ip went up to the derrick to relieve his assistant during pulling 6.5/8" drillpipe out of the hole. After a few minutes of him working, the blocks were lowered and accidentally
hit the top of the drillpipe stand. This caused the drillpipe stand to bow and spring out hitting the ip in the chest. The impact winded him and caused him to lose his balance
and slump in the safety harness. The assistant derrickman, who was still in the derrick, checked his condition and helped him to regain his composure. After a period of approx
10 minutes he confirmed his condition was satisfactory enough to decend from the monkey board unassisted. The assistant derrickman continued with the tripping operation. In
the morning ip went to see the medic, complaining he had not slep well as a result of pain in his right chest area. He was checked, treated with pain killers and told to rest for
the next shift. After a period of 10 days into his field break, on <...> he notified the <...> office that his doctor diagnosed a crac ed rib and was therefore not available for work.
Two pieces of support steel framework were being lowered into position by the nw crane for use outside the ccr (central control room). As the two pieces were finally being
positioned the ip's arm was between the two pieces and became trapped in a scissor type movement between the 2 sections
An <...> diesel driven hydraulic power pack was starte up by a technician to enable platform oie to caryy out a 28 day bp200 check on the unit. A technician was in attendance
observing the test. The diesel engine had been running approx 15-20 seconds wh n a centre cone sealing unit of a hydraulic coupling (situated on the hoses manifold) blew out
striking injured person on the right knee cap. Note:- this hydraulic power pack was being run as a selfcontained unit the unit should not be started up unitl hy raulic hoses are
connected between the power pack and wire line unit. Operating instructions posted on the power pack were not correctly followed.
Train 1 <...> fuel gas system was being flushed through with natural gas using a temporary connection into the lp vent line. This operation being part of an approved
commissioning procedure controlled via permitry. During the removal of a fuel gas regulato on train ii. The gas supply to the regulator had been blanked off and a pair of 1/2
inch instrument tubing lines had been disconnected but inadvertently left uncapped leaving 2 openings at the cab end of the lp vent line. The flushing operation on train fuel
gas created sufficient back pressure in the common lp vent system to cause a small release of gas through the open ended vent pipe in train 2 <...> cab. As the avon cab
ventilation was shut down ast the time the amount of gas was sufficient to activa e the gas detectors in train ii cab only which was picked up in bd control room by the fire and
gas event logger.
On the drill floor syandpipe manifold chicksaw connection for dog house pressure gauge-the pressure sensor unit had failed giving no pressure reading.the sensor unit was
removed and a crossover and bull-plug were fitted in order to repair the pressure sen or. When the mudpumps were started and the pump pressure reached 2500psi the thread
half bull plug blew out of the wing half of the crossover.there was no damage to equipment or personnel. However oil based mud was sprayed over the area and one person suf
ered oil based mud in eyes whilst wearing safety protective specs. Oil based mud in both eyes.washed ouy with local eyewash.examined by medic,againwashed with sterile
water and given drops and cream to apply.
When pressurising the fuel gas system for g8020 generator a leak developed on the fisher 310 gas pressure control valve pcv - 2211. The generator had been running on gas
fuel one hour before the incident with no indication of gas leakage from the fuel g s cabinet. The machine had been changed to diesel firing during gas exort commisioning
trials and was being returned to gas firing at the time of the in- ident.no ancillary equipment was in use and atphospheric conditions were not a factor.
The vessel was coming along side the platform to discahrge cargo on the west side. Whilst manoeuvering into position the vessel collided with the structure casuing damage to
mb21 and mb41 bracings. The damage was minimal. The wind was wnw 21kn swell, 3 , light was from the vessel and platform.
Due to long tool string length a spade had to be inserted into the wire line string at a pre-determined point to allow the breaking of the string into more managable lengths.
Afterinserting spade while tool string was being lowered the tools appeared to h ng up. The injured party shook the tool string with his hands on the spade when suddenly the
string dropped, trapping his thumb between spadeand top of bop.
The ip was assisting in locating materials and equipment for the dive programme. A compressor was being lowered by crane onto the laydown area adjacent to the dive skid -
the ip was trying to guide it by hand as it was in close proximity to another piece of equipment. The moving load swung and trapped his hand between the compressor and the
adjacent stationary piece of equipment.
A diver returning to the bell and stage was pulling in diver 2 umbilical the bell and stage dropped sharply several feet. The bell struck the diver on the right side of his back.
The bell and stage heaved up and struck the diver again, impacting the ribs n his left hand side. Weather force 6/7.
Whilst running 31/2 completion tubing the stand being drawn into the drill floor by the hustler and balis snagged at the pin end projector on the hustler. The floorman moved
position to signal to the driller to stop the bales being raised. The floorman wa ked in front of the tubing which became free, at the pin end the protector allowing the tubing to
continue in an inwards into the rig fllor. The shoulder end of the tubing struck the floorman in the lumber region of his back, knocking him to the drill floor
Ip had been using a 12.5 gantry hoist to lower equipment down to the scaffold. The last load had been lowered and he proceeded to secure the hoist chain to the scaffold hand
rails. As he did so, he was struck in the back by the chain stopper from the hois which had become detached from the chain some sixty feet above ip. The chain stopper was
made of metal in a rubber compound coating and weighing 2.4 kg. The stopper had become detached due to the failure of the steel pin that secured the stopper to the c ain. The
blow winded him and he collapsed to the floor of the scaffold. His workmates contacted the radio room, and the medic, emergency response team and stretcher party were
mobilised and sent to the scene. Ip was carefully examined by the medic. The me ic then deemed it acceptable to move ip and he was placed onto scoop stretcher, and
transported to a nearby permanent walkway. In the meantime, the doctor on the <...> had also been mobilised and was on his way to the scene by helicopter. After exam nation
by the doctor ip was transported by stretcher to the adjacent flotel and from there by helicopter to the <...>. After tests and a night under observation, ip was pronounced fit to
return to work at 0900 hrs the next morning
A party of four riggers were removing redundant flowlines. Valves and other equipment from m3e. A 6" non return valve (nrv) needed to be removed from underneath an
elevated walkway on to a trolley to be transported out of the module close to the valves lo ation, a one tonne chain block had been secured to a beam by a beam clamp. The
clamp and chain block had been installed some days earlier, and had been used to remove flowlines from the vicinity of the walkway. The beam was designed as a load bearing
beam and had until quite recently supported flowline <...> via a constant load support. The flowline had been removed but the constant load support was still attached to the
beam. The load bearing beam ran east to west and was secured to two beams running nort to south, by an arrangement of lindaptor clamps the chain block was secured to the
valve by a strop. The valve was some 11ft (one foot) south of the beam centre line. One of the work party took up the slcak in the strop, and ip ducked underneath the elev ted
walkway to assist in landing the valve on the trolley. At that moment the load bearing beam fell without warning. It hit the handrail on the elevated walkway, then glanced off
the right hand side of injured person's hard hat. There are clear marks on he supporting beams and pipework in the vicinity showing the path of the falling beam. It would
Whilst removing a 2 mt 20",90 degree bend from the c1 void the load was initially supported by three chain blocks.as the load was being transferred from the north 1 to north
2 the north end of the load was temporarily landed on the steel deck in order to disconnect the north 1 chainblock. As the employee was about to raise the end of the load off
the deck using chain block north 2,the load rotated on the sling,with the lower end slipping approx 10" west across the deck trapping his ankle against an adjacent pipe
section.
The wireline cap had just been removed from the xmas tree on well fb 4-2 using a rig floor tugger and the hook then pulled back to the rig floor to collect a 41/2 " drill pipe
lifting cap. The cap was to be lowered to the bop deck to pick up the xmas tree lifting sub. Once the hook was attached to the lifting cap on the rig floor, the slack line was
manually pulled to drag the lifting cap on the rig table. As the hook went over the rotary table void, the now detached lifting cap fell, glancing off tehshoul er of the assistant
driller who was waiting on the bop deck below to receive it. Weight of cap - 11 lbs. Approximate distance cap fell - 40 feet.
A 9-5/8" casing cutting and pulling operation was underway. The platform cranes were weathered down, this meant it was decided to leave the casing cutter assembly on the
rig floor after it had been used. It was positioned so that the bottom of the "v" d or ramp would be clear for laying out 9-5/8" casing. The next operation was to pick up the 9-
5/8" casing spear assembly which was racked in the derrrick. As the stand was picked up the injured party and two others restrained the lower part of the assemb y. The
assembly started to move towards the rotary table came into contact with the casing cutter assembly lying on the deck. The cutter assembly was pushed towards the rotary
table and caught the right foot of the injured party between the cutter and r tary table raised plinth.
Whilst breaking out connection with the rig tongs the floorman pulled breakout tong back to allow others to pull slips. As the driller picked up the string the breakout line
reeled in pulling the tong and ip towards the drawworks. The snub line tightene and limited the travel of the tongs but the floorman continued backwards and struck the
drawworks casing. Subsequent mechanical and function checks found no system defects. It is suspected that the clutch lever must have been inadvertently operated by he
driller's arm while carrying out other operations.
Bj type single joint elevators were in operation for running 9 5/8 casing.the elevators were used to raise casing to the vertical posistion and lower to engage and be made up
with previous joint.prior to torqeing up, the split pin was pulled free from t e elevators latching mechanism and the elevators unlatched.the link-tilt was operated to clear the
elevator from the string,as the string was lowered the link-tilt was returned to vertical and contact was made between the elevators and casing section, res lting in the retaining
chain being severed and the split pin to fall approx 14ft to the drill floor. Damage to the chain may have been sustained during pick-up from the dril floor(the chain becoming
trapped between the elevators and casing collar ),but th final parting of the chain resulting in the dropped object occured as described above. The retaining chain was
inspected after every five casing joints and tested for freedom prior to each lift.
No pad-eyes on line slings wrapped around.caught or jammed on deck.sling parted.(2 deck crew on deck.area cleared.no injuries)photos to be taken.
Four joints of 51/2 tubing were slung between two three tonne wire slings (single wrapped) to move the tubing from the pipe deck to the catwalk ,whilst running the
completion.this involved lifting the tubing approx 10ft over the deck posts. As the bundl was lifted from the deck at a height of approx one foot, one of the slings failed
(parted) and the other partly failed (several strnds parted).one end of the tubing bundle then fell onto the deck.the total weight of the bundle was 2.2 tonnes.no-one was injured.
Various drilling string tools were being reposistioned on the east side of the pipe deck on the dp platform.witness was driving west crane and the lifting operation was being
directed by banksman with other witness assisting. The equipment was being lifte on a set of brothers attached to a hook on the overhaul ball of the crane. The stabaliser had
just been reposistioned close to the east crane pedestal after being transfered from one of the bays and had been unhooked. As the roustabouts cleared the are the crane
operator hoisted the ball and boomed up to clear the area.during this operation the overhaul ball arrangement banged against an obstruction,belived possibly to be one of the
east crane hand rails or a samson post,the jolt was sufficient to caus the safety latch on the hook to open and allow the master link on the brothers to pass through the gap,the
arrangement fell to the deck narrowly missing witness who was carrying the hooks on the brothers at the time. The master link fell from a height of between 2.5 to 3.0 metres.
Whilst lifting a 4 tonne half height from deck of platform during supply boat operations, when 6' into air, the auxilliary hoist began to spool off out of control dropping 4 tonne
load onto the pipedeck.the failure is believed to be due to a failed hydrau ic hose. No personnel were injured and no damage sustained by plant or equipment. Weather
conditions were, at the time , calm, dry and clear in twilight conditions. Sea state 1.5m.
<...> was cleaning up on pc platform when he heard a section of windwall flapping in the wind. He went to investgate and make safe when a gust of wind pulled the section of
wall off the steel work, hitting <...> in the ribs.
Scaffold was being erected for a ne crane slew ring change out. Some tubes were standing unsupported against the side of an adjacent container. A pneumatic windy gun was
being used on the crane for the slew ring change which appeared to cause some struc ural vibrations. The tube slid down the side of the container and struck the passing
steward a glancing blow on his safety helmet
When backing off the thread protector on the end of the lubricator it became detached from the bottom of the <...> bop. The <...> tool inside the bop dropped approximately 4"
causing an impact shock to ip's fingers as it struck the thread protector in ip s hands. Conditions on the bop deck were good at the time being well lit and protected from the
weather.
The scaffolder was lowering down a 20' ladder to the deck below. One of the rings caught a protruding pole and caused the ladder to spin out of his hands. The ladder began to
fall towards technicians who were working in the area. He leaned over the sca fold rack tail to try and catch the ladder and toppled head first over the rail. He fell approx
12/15 feet striking his head on the way down and landed on his feet.
While erecting scaffold in the ngl one scaffolder was passing tubes up to his colleague, who was in the process of levelling a section of the scaffold. A tube was dislodged
which fell and glanced off a vessel and struck ip on the chin and left shoulder.
Heildeck windsock blew away in high winds. Metal tubing frame broke away and fell to deck below. Wind conditions at the time were in excess of 50 knots in the gusts
Crude oil which was being drained into an open top metal container ignited. The operator holding the now burning container moved it to an adjacent walkway. Another
operator attacked the fire with a 5kg co2 extinguisher and the fire was extinguished just b fore the automatic deluge began to operate. No-one was injured and the fire was
confined to some electrical cable and a pressure switch
P27a maintenance was carried out. This involved changing out the thrust bearing gland packing. Following this, the pump was test run for approximately 20mins by a
maintenance technician. The test run proved satisfactory. As part of normal daily routin checks, the pump thrust bearing lub oil level was checked on the morning of <...>
and reported to be satisfactory. On <...> at 1400hrs as stated above, p27a was run up to test fire main pressures etc. Approximatey 20mins later a smoke head activation ame
up on the control room annunciator panel. This was immediately investigated by a uilities team leader. On his arrival at the fire pimp enclosure the area was full of white
vapour. As he was exiting the area, the enclosure halon system activated aut maitcally at which point, the platform responded to a full muster as per the <...> staion bil.
Following the incident, the pump bearing housing assembly was stripped down and it was found that no lubrication oil was present and that the bearing had suff red
catastophic heat damage. The bearing has been returned jto the manufacturer for a through investigation and a report on findings and recommendations will follow.
Welding was being carried out on module g blast wall from a scaffold at a height of about 12 feet and separated horizontally from p6b oil export pump by about 6 feet. P6b was
running on load at the time of the incident. Lube oil had accumulated in the save ll underneath p6b. This oil was ignited by a stray welding spark from work ongoing at mod g
blast wall causing a small fire which was restricted by the saveall. Two welders working at the blast wall tackled and extinguished the fire using portable extingu sher and the
firewatcher contacted the control room. There was a delay in raising the alarm due to a breakdown in communications. The firewatcher said he informed the control room of
the fire but the control room say no mention of fire was made in the ini ial call. A second call was made to the control room by one of the welders asking why no response had
been made to the reported fire. The fire was reported extinguished at this point and the area was investigated by a utilities team leader.
A well clean up package was being installed on the top of the <...> platform in preparation for a well clean up task. At the time of the incident work was taking place to prepare
for a pressure test on this equipment. As part of the requirements for this work, isolations had been installed on the xmas tree of the well to be tested. A technician involved in
this preparation removed what he thought was a plain nipple from the armpit valve of the xmas tree in preparation to install a pressure detector, the t ee being isolated and the
cavity vented down via this route. However, the plain nipple was in fact a grease nipple with an integral check valve that had stopped the cavity pressure being released. This
situation had not been identified when the initial is lation had been applied to the tree. On removal of the nipple the pressure was released and a stream of gaseous fluid at
pressure struck the technician on his forearm and to lesser extent his knee. Because of the limited volume, the release quickly subsid d. The technician was wearing overalls but
the force of the straem caused bruising, and there were concerns that due to the pressure of gas or fluid, some may have been forced into the tissue.
At 20:10 a g.a. Sounded. Uv indication on the <...> drilling platform sequence panel showed detection on top deck production reboiler area. A team was sent to investigate the
area. They reported a pool fire adjacent to rebolier no.3. The fire was tackled by members of the fire team, extinguishingthe pool fire in 7 mins from general alarm then
tackling the fire contained within the reboiler. Fire extingiushed 36 mins after initial g.a. During the fire fighting, <...> was overcome by smoke/fumes and was subsequently
medicared to <...> hospital. He was released shortly after arrival. Ecr procedures were adopted, but were not required.
While taking sand sample from the filter pot on which the pressure gauge read 10-15 psi, the drain point appears to have been 'sand plugged'. This plug gave, and the blast
caught the wrist of <...> causing some cuts and abrasions. The equipment, except the filter pot, from the christmas tree swab and top master valves to the overboard vent was
depressured to zero. The sand filter bypass line was open and the filter pot isolated but not completely depressured.
As part of the re-instatement of pl147 gas import line dewatering was about to commence, as the gel pig was being loaded into v307 launcher and removed from it's can it was
blown back out of the launcher and struck the attendant operative in his right low r chest region. This man in question was removed to sick bay, inspected by the medic and
shortly after by the in-field doctor. He was subsequently moved to <...> hospital for further observation and tests. He was later discharged
During <...> start-up operations, the composition of fluid entering the lpg export pumps was subject to change, causing an increase in density and subsequent increase in
discharge pressure of the pump. The high pressure pump trip had been overridden as the system operating parameters were being assessed at the time). On starting export
pump ga 3004s, the area operator observed a leak from the lpg metering package. He immediately shut down the pump and investigated the source of the leak. On investig
tion, it was found that an instrument compression fitting on the manual vent line from the on skid densitometer had parted. The vent valve was in the closed position. Due to
resrticted access and fixed lagging it was initially difficult to ascertain the xact source of the leak. Sections of lagging had to be removed to allow full operation of isolation
valves. During the process of isolation, it became obvious that the leak had been in the reverse direction of normal flow in the vent line and was now (a proximately 15
minutes after the pump shut down) observed as a slight vapour escaping from the parted fitting. Approximately 2 feet from the leak, the instrument line ties into a 1" lpg
manifold leading to a 2" lpg flare header. There are no isolation va ves on the manifold. Adjacent on the manifold is a 1" tee from the metering stream safety valve 30-3v-
Apparent heat exchanger failure. Relieving pressure through relief valves. Spade in relief/blowdown line did not allow inventory to be released. Cooling water discharge
from ea 3805a developed a flange leak, allowing pressure in line to escape. Atmosph ric conditions: wind 35 mph, direction 270 note: subsequent investigation confirmed that
the heat exchanger had not failed. Source of gas was from the module c38 fuel gas make up supply which was routed to flare via an open lcv on the ko drum. Closure of this
lcv prevented gas escape to flare due to 16" spade remaining in the main flare route. <...>
Ga-0701-g discharge check valve, type <...> mission, style <...>, on water injection low pressure header, was discovered to be issuing out water. System isolated and
investigation revealed that a plug which retains a guide pin within the checked valve bo y was missing. The check valve was then removed and replaced.
Pinhole gas leak from redundant 2" drain line (closed drain) from heat exchanger. Small leak, no alarms. Production shutdown and line isolated.
Small gas leak from hatch cover on da 1101x glycol absorber. System isolated, swept with n2 and repair carried out. System pressure tested prior to returning to service.
The produced water outlet from the hydroclones was being re-configured for disposal in the sea sump. One of the 14" spools was found to be misaligned. And a section was
cut out from the pipe. The spool pieces were then joined by a <...> coupling to all w completion of the reconfigurat -ion. 7 hours after process startup one of the cut sections of
the spool eased apart from <...> coupling due to the axl stress on the spool. This resulted in a release of produced water with some entrained gas. The releas of water broke a
deluge trigger line frangible bulb causing a red alert and deluge release. The gas present activated some gas heads . The process shutdown and blewdown automatically, thus
stopping the leak. The gas dispersed naturallyand the platform re urned to normal status after 1 hour 9 minutes.
Two electrical technicians and one operator were removing a plug from a <...> access fitting in order to insert an extension probe. When the plug was removed, gas started
escaping. The three men immediately left the area. The gas detection system operat d the gpa and platform esd system. Actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
A report was filed by the power ops that p27a was spraying seawater which had travelled up the shaft, through the gland packing and out of the head assembly. A work permit
was raised and work commenced at 19:45 on the same day. The work consisted of rep cking the gland, cleaning of the packing follower, re-bedding and lubrication. The pump
test run for approximately 15/20 minutes and returned to service. The lubrication sight glass was checked and found to be normal before and after the test run, it wa also
checked on the morning of the seventh as part of the daily routine checks, the level was found to be normal and the oil appeared uncontaminated. Category one maintenance
was carried out on the pump during week 4, records of which are held by <...> maintenance department. A request was received by the rp to issue a verbal permit to <...> techs
to run p27a fire pump in order to carry out flow and pressure checks on the platfrom fire hydrant system. The pump was brought into service at 14:00 a per normal operating
procedures and ran for approximatley 20 minutes when a single smoke head in the pump enclosure was activated and investigated. It was enclosed with white vapour. He
switched the pump off manually and made to leave the enclosure, as he left the halon release alarm sounded, the halon system operated at which point the platform went into
P6 recycle control pcv80818 had been imperative for 30 days. As a result p6 recycle was being iperated manually. During highlander unstable operations, surges occurred and
the p6 suction flow became unstable this caused p6 to trip on low suction pressure. Simultaneous operations were taking place in preparation for opening b3 and highlander
restart. At 1130, prior to the incident the first half of the crew were stood down for lunch. At 1150 p6 was restarted. One man had been sent to monitor v6 level, and informed
the control room that level in v6 was 25 ins. & rising, also that lcv26 was closed. The man was was instructed by the relief team leader via the control room opertor to open the
by-pass around lcv26. This system has 3 valves. The first of these is permanently open & has no valve handle. The centre valve which would normally be closed was opened
fully by operator. The third he "cracked" open by 2n turns.the operator stood by for a further 3 minutes (approx.) Before going to module 'g' where he handed over to oncoming
operator & proceeded to lunch. During handover, situation on v6 was discussed. While starting up p6 a second operator had been detailed to monitor pcv8010. At
approximately 12.40 he was instructed by the control room to go to module "a" & close lcv26 by-pass. While shutting down the by-pass he was informed that a slick had
Work was in progress to remove p801 from its caisson (b3 riser). The tubing hanger was connected to the drawworks block via 7" vam casing. As the weight was taken the
hanger moved upwards, and as its 'o' rings cleared the riser topgas was released. This was detected by various gas detectors. (infra-red and catalytic), all in close proximity to
the riser. One detector (g162) went to 100% lel, and another (g167) went to 25% lel. Within a short period (5-7 mins) the highest reading on any detector in the area was 10%
which continued to delay. N.b. Prior to the issue of a work permit, b3 riser had been purged with nitogen and sampled until a reading of 0% was obtained.
'A' turbine was running normally on gas fuel when smoke was indicated in the ccr in the turbine alternator and main area of the module. The turbine was shutdown and halon
was released (automatically) into the gas generator enclosure. The platform genera alarm was activated manually from the ccr. Safety advisor and the fire team immediately
responded and although smoke was in evidence, no signs of fire were obvious. Neither is there any damage to the free turbine evident at this stage.
During planned reduction of production from 62000 bopd - 25000 bopd, the choke on <...> well <...> was reduced from 50/64 - 35/64 and after stabilising fully closed to
further and reduction the wells tiffany. A1 and a3 were reduced from 120/64 - 80/64 and 50/ 4 respectively. At this time a leak occured on the hi-lo pilot box on <...>. The plant
was manually blown down via a psd 2 push button and the leak depressurised by manual blowdown of both test and production manifolds. At this time the ball valve beeat the
hi-lo box was closed and the leak isolated.
It was reported to the ccr that the flare appeared to be burning abnormally. Aninitial investigation was carried out and the oim informed. On inspection the oim found the flare
to be burning with an additional plume which was impinging on the upper flar boom structure. The oim took the decision to shut down the process and a psd 2 was initiated
from the central control room.
When a hydraulic coated line valve was opened, the piework failed at a connection and there was an escape of fluid @ 400
At 2233hrs on <...> two gas detectors in fire zone 46 detected high level gas,this caused the platform to go to sps/gpa.the source was assumed to be from the fuel gas vent line
on the gas compressor roof,as in a previous incident. At 0120hrs on <...> the gas compressor was restarted whilst monitoring the same gas detectors.at 0219hrs as the
compressor was entering load stage the detectors were observed to be rising as before,the gas compressor was manually shutdown.the production supervisor again i vestigated
the leak, but was unable to identify the source, however he did confirm that the leak was not relatede to the fuel gas vent line. When the compressor was shutdown the area was
cleared of gas, and remained shutdown for investigations to be carri d out. At approximately 0830 hrs. Investigations found that the dry gas seal filter packages for the 3rd stage
of the compressor was leaking gas, though the compressor was shutdown, the leak areas were identified and the dry seal filters isolated.
Vessel was providing saturation diving support on the field subsea facilities. A routine ndt survey of the pipeline and manifold revealed two small gas leaks - both identified by
visual examination. Divers reported the leaks to be at the joint between va ve bonnet and body on vo22 and vo23 (2" isolation valves on 2" instrumentation branches off gas
export pipeline (pl823), within the manifold). A video record of the leaks was taken. No attempt was made to repair the failure. Gas export pressure was norm l at approx. 170
bar.
At 1550 hrs, pressure began to build up in well no. 4 and gas started leaking. The pressure build-up was detected by sensors in the annulus. The trouble arose during wireline
operations when a ball valve became blocked. Since this well is an old well, corrosion could have caused the valve failure. 130 non-essential personnel were transferred to
adjacent installations in the field, while 39 remained onboard to bullhead the well, i.e. fill it with mud. The 10-hour operation was started the next morning. By the evening the
well was killed successfully and crew returned to the platform, and the platform was back in full production some days later.
Drilling vibration caused downhole equipment failure during drilling of the 11 template wells on the <...> field. Drill bits, mwd tools and drillstring were particularly affected.
The problem is estimated to have a cost about <...> million us dollars in lost rig time alone. No further information available.
A wellhead marker buoy were reported drifting and position being monitored by rig <...>.
The <...> vessel <...> was fishing when it collided with the <...> satellite at 14:20 hrs on the <...>. The weather conditions were wind ssw, 10-12 knots, sea 3-4 metres,
visibility poor (fog). The satellite was unmanned at the time and the only visible damage is paint scraped off approximately 5 sq feet of leg b2. The occurrence was reported to
<...> on the <...>y at 13:30 hrs and the v<...> was dispatched to investigate. The <...> standby vessel reported the visible damag and confirmed that all navaids were working
correctly. The vessel has been reported to have incurred damage to its hull but was able to make port under its own power. There were no personnel injured. The vessels report
states that it was fishing in the f g, near the platform, relying on autopilot, radar navigation with a human lookout. Much attention was being paid to sonar and locating fish.
Collision of platform lifeboat with jacket brace during lifeboat sea trials.
M.v.<...> was approaching <...> platform to assess if weather conditions were safe to work cargo. Approx. 100m east of <...>. platform two items were washed overboard by a
larger than normal wave/swell. Items lost are 1 x 2,700 litre helifuel tank (full) and one other container, possibly a waste skip. Weather conditions: wind 330 35kt tide 145 1.5kt
sea state 2.5-3m swell.
The incident involved the supply vessel <...>. When lowering an empty container onto the deck of the boat, the skipper of the vessel informed us that he had come into contact
with the <...> spider deck. Wind was approx. 30 - 35 knots, sea state approx. 2m, which was within normal crane operating parameters.
Standby vessel <...> was approaching production platform from north easterly direction at approx 5 knots and appeared to be on a collision course. Contacted vesel on channel
8 – no response. With about 50 metres to go vessel steered course away f om platform (heading approx n.e.). Stern of vessel 'brushed' riser protection guard and went clear of
the platform. Radio contact was then established and the vessel reponded that he had lost all steerage and had now regained it. Sea state was calm, no wi d. Weather: fair and
sunny. Please see attached vessel report.
While the supply vessel <...> was being unloaded the vessel sustained a mechanical failure. As a result the vessel drifted into the south east leg. Upon inspection only slight
abrasions to the outer coating on the leg were found.
Standby vessel apparently lost control and drifted backwards between <...> platforms striking the connecting bridge. Standby vessel sustained minor damage to aerials. No
damage to bridge evident. Vessel was manoeuvring into position on the east side of ad to enable diesel oil to be discharged.
Mv <...> came into contactwith east platform central structure whilst positioning to commence discharge of cargo wind speed 25 knots from 010 degrees sea state 3.4 mtrs
mean wave periods 8.3 seconds
The <...> was manoeuvring to take up a position alongside the north face of the platform for routine cargo transfer when the starboard quarter swung toward the platform and at
low speed struck a glancing blow to the nw leg protection fender. Woode protection fender suffered some splinter damage and the <...> has a small area of impact damage.
Weather conditions at the time were good. Wind 8 kg wsw, sea 1m with 1-2m swell, visibility 10nm
0020 hrs <...> platform receive <...> loading buoy trip initiated by the <...>shuttle tanker <...>. 0024 hrs <...> reports to standby vessel mv <...> and <...> control room she has
failure of main engine and power and has bro en away from the <...>. 0025 hrs standby vessel dispatched to attend <...>, <...> adviseo potential collision course with
platform,until direction of drift could be confirmed. 0026 hrs control initiate red hazard staus and precautionary muster and inform oim and oic.
Whilst the supply vessel <...> was positioned alongside the <...> platform south east corner main structural leg. (leg 11 b2). Causing the removal of surface coats of paint in
two areas. One above sea level and one below. The wind speed was 25-30 knotts gusting 35 knotts. The wind direction was 320o abd the sea height was 4 meters with a sea
swell of 4 to 6 meters. There were snow showers at the time of the incident reducing visibility considerably. It was also dark.
The mv <...> was positioned at ne corner of platform, carrying out an rov survey using 2 rovs. The vessel was utilinsing its dp facility. A sudden squall developed. Weather
conditions were recorded as wind speed 38-40knots, sea state 3-3.5 m tres with a westerly direction. The decision was made to recover both rovs but it became apparent that
one rov had become entangled in scaffold debris on the seabed, so they relaunched the recovered rov to assist witht he recovery. The dp system failed ausing the vessel to
move astern, at which point manual control was regained by the master. The decision was made to cut the trapped rov's umbilical and abandon it. The other rov was retrieved
and as the vessel moved astern to clear the platform, it's m st aerials came into contact with the metal cladding under platform lifeboats 7 & 8. No damage to the lifeboats is
evident after inpsection. The vessel has been re-called to <...> to repair the damaged aerials.
Standby vessel was 0.65 m distant from platform in a stand off position mate on watch was attending to some administrative duties during which period the vessel drifted
toward platform. When in close proximity the mate attempted to take avoiding action b t failed - the vessel collided with n e leg of platform. No damage to platform structure.
Minor damage to vessel.
Whip hook with "weight ball" lanaded on top of a container on supply boat deck as a large wave lifted the boat. This resulted in the whip hook opened and the safety pendant
wire came off the hook and fell down on deck. Note the link on the pendant wire a parently pushes the spring loaded latch upwrds,see enclosure
The elevator was overloaded during loading of washing machine an truck. Door was open.the elevator sank 1.5.m,stopped by the emergegy brakes.no personnel injured.
When picking up a 1/4" tubing joint using the air tugger and a pick-up elevator,the tubing coupling slliped through the elevator as the bottom of the joint was about to reach
therig floor,and bounced off the rotary hand slips and slid back out the v door. he pick-up elevator remained fully latched.no-one was injured
While offloading <...> equipment from m/v <...> an equipment rack containing high prssure riser hung on an adjacent container causing a welded plate utilised as a retainer for
the riser to break off allowing one joint of riser to fall @ 5 ft to he deck of the boat and one joint to partially come out of the rack. After the rack was loaded on the rig the rack
was inspected and it appeared that the weld on the retaining plate had been cracked prior to this incident. This assumption being made due t very little 'gray metal' being seen
on the broken weld. Soa state @ 2 meters. Wind speed so knots.
23ac <...> roof python swing jib crane suffered wind damage causing the jib assembly to partially pull out of the bearing located on top of the main stanchion. Area roped off
and warning signs posted. Wind speed 45 - 55 knots 315 deg nw.
On arrival to <...> the drilling crane boom was found to have been moved presumably by recent high winds. The boom had been moved in a north easterly direction knocking
over the boom rest and damaging two light fittings, 1 - 110 volt socket, a.j.b. frame an associated cable tray. All these items are located across the north end of the drilling
platform. Wind speed on day of manning: 35 knots direction: 240 deg significant wave: 1.8 to 2.4 m
Well ci conductor tube sheared at screwed joint approx. 1m above holding cup located at spider deck level. Break located aprox. 19ft above lta. Wind speed - 31 knots wind
direction 245 deg significant wave height - 1.8m
During lifting operations with the centre crane, a load fell approx. 6-8 feet into the container into which they were being loaded. The nylon strop having severed through
While cross hauling a wellhead recepticle, the master link on rigging broke. 3 lift bags surfaced, clear of <...>. The load (wr12) was left hanging on a drill string (previously
used for lifting). 2 divers involved, neither injured. No damage caused. Only 2 bags were inflated, 1 of 5 tonne and 1 of 1 tonne. 1 of 1 tonne was empty. Lift bag inverters
failed, the cord breaking. Master link was 10 tonne swl. The <...> frc recovered all 3 lift bags.
While rigging down chicksans from coil tubing operations the crane was hooked on to a length of chicksans running from the west side of the skid deck to the pipe deck. When
the crane began to hoist the line a chicksan caught below the skid beam, causing t e 1 ton wire sling to part. The chicksans line moved east and landed against the derrick
causing minor damage to a light fitting. The load was made safe and the light fitting isolated.
As the joint was being lifted from the catwalk, the nubbin at the top of the joint struck the roller at the top of the vee door. Continued hoisting against the obstruction caused
the 2 x 3t slings to fail. The joint fell approx 25` to the loor and struc and damaged the joint in the table. All personnel were standing clear at the time.
The i beam ref 016-05 was to be fitted as the end stopper of i beams 016-04. The i beam 016-05 was tapped along channel of i beams 016-03 and 04 as it neared its final
position beam 016-05 toppled forward off beams 016-03 and 04 onto scaffold jarring the eam and the scaffold. This caused the retaining sling to come free off the chain block
hook. The beam then fell into the sea complete with the sling attached. Weather - winds variable 5-10knots. Visibility clear, job site well lit. Equipment 1 ton sling, ton chain
block, 2 ton sling and beam clamp, to restrain beam whilst it was being trapped along. No significant damage to scaffold - paint marks/scratches on a couple of tubes.
The incident took place in the hours of darkness, wind speeeds 20 - 30 knots with squalls / showers. The operation in progress was working a supply vessel. The crane at the
time had no load attached to the line. With operations temporarily suspended whils a squall passed. Following the squall the unloaded main hoist line was raised. The hoist line
having no load had been pushed to the right of the boom and caught under the roller retaining plate, because it was dark the crane operator did not notice this vent. This caused
the hoist line to build up on one side of the hoist drum as the line continued to be hoisted. The line then forced its way past the brake cover plate, eventually damaging the rope.
The crane was made safe, taken out of service and left u til a specialist engineer was brought on board to assess the damage and make recommendations to prevent reccurance.
During unloading operations on the <...>, a load being removed from the supply vessel snagged betweena half height container and a ring bolt that is welded to the ships side.
As the load was taken by the crane the supply vessel dropped 4 - 6 metr s due to a large swell. Two of the lifting lugs failed as the load released springing into the air. A further
lug failed and the load came to rest in the adjacent half height container. The seastate at the time if the incident was 4 - 6 metres swell, 10 t 15 deg roll with 20 knot winds, east
southerly direction.
On completion of the wireline operation the gamma ray correlation tool string was being pulled out of the hole.due to the failure of the depth monitoring equipment the tool
came out to fast and struck the upper wireline sheave at the top of the derrick. he tool fell from the derrick but following a search was unable to be located.it is likely it fell in-
to the sea. There were no injuries.
A wireline job involved rigging up a toolstring on the drill floor. While the jars were being made up, they slipped into the kelly bushing drive pin hole. At the bottom of the
hole there was a makeshift debris catcher welded across the hole to prevent ob ects fallling through. The jars broke through this plate and fell 20 metres vertically. The jars
impacted onto bb165 xmas tree, leaving a clear stamp mark on the tree body. During the fall the jars passed through an open deck hatch, removed to allow th lubricator to pass
through. There were three people working within 2 metres of the wellhead at the time of the incident.
3.5 mtr long x 14" dia, 344 kg, cunifer spool had been rigged with a 1 tonne polyester sling in readiness for lift, the spool was then lifted into a vertical position, with the spool
approx 1 metre off the deck (the sling was attached in a double wrap cho e rigging arrangement). At this point the sling failed mid lead end attached to hook approx 350mm
from eye. The spool fell and sustained damage to flanged end of spool. Actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
Whilst the temporary grove crane was extending the boom up to near maximum, the offside hydraulic cylinder which controls this action, failed. The seal retaining disc was
forced up and out of position. This offside cylinder safety lockout system operate immobilising the crane. The safety lockout system on the nearside hydraulic cylinder also
operated as per design.
Deck crew requested to relocate a valve for backload from laydown area to skid deck. Informed that estimated weight was 1 tonne swl wire rope sling sourced for lift (sling
was one of a new batch received on board <...> and had been previously used onl once for lifting a 400 kg drum. Sling double wrapped and choked round one end of valve
body behind flange. Lift hooked onto crane, slewed round and stopped about 20 metres above skid deck to align with intended landing area. At this point the ling par ed and
the valve dropped to the deck striking and damaging a bumper bar and staircase on the east face of the mud package.
A section of steel round bar (3/4" diameter x 3' 6" long), fell approx. 30 ft from east crane cab area piercing scaffold boards erected above walkway on the exterior of m2e
A 9 1/2" drill collar (weight 6,500lbs) was lifted into the drill floor, suspended at one end by a platform crane, and by a rig floor tugger attached to a 5" lifting sub at the other,
so it was approx. Horizontal. The 5" lifting sub was latched into the 6 5/8" elevators. When the driller started to lift the collar into the vertical position it slipped out of the
elevators and fell approx 6' to the rig floor striking a stabiliser joint in the rotary table as it fell. The elevators that should have been used are 5"are 5"
The primary drawworks brake failed to hold the string when attempting to clean and dress the top of the 5 1/2" x 7" liner top pbr. The string fell 10' or so, coming to halt with
the string sat on top of the pbr. No one was injured and any signs of damage ere not immediately apparent. On investigation the drawworks brake adjust mechanism was found
to have failed, owing to thread damage disabling one brack band. Replacement parts were fitted and a full check of the drawworks completed to ensure it fit for p rpose.
Detailed operational checks/test were carried out prior to continuation of the drilling operations.
While running 5" drill pipe out of the hole, stand 90 was in the process of being racked back in the derrick. The derrick had attached the pull back tugger wire to the stand and
had pulled the stand into position ready to unlatch the elevators. The drille lowered the blocks until the stand was set back by the drill crew. The driller turned to look at his tv
monitor to observe the derrickman unlatch the elevators. He continued to lower the blocks but was unaware that the elevators had not swung free from t e pipe. The updrive
came in contact with the monkeyboard and fingers causing damage to all three. The derrickman jumped clear and suffered no injury.
During function checking of the drop down fire panels, as they were lowered, the door in bay 15 went into free fall crashing to the deck. The wire rope, which is normally
attached to the drive mechanism, which hoists the panels up as well as controls thei descent, had failed approx 7-8 feet from the attachment point on the bottom panel. Only
damage was to the wire rope and the panel limit stops. The doors were left in the lowered position and the power to the electromagnetic latch mechanisms was isolated nd
locked. A three man platform investigation team (including a safety rep) was set up.
During modification of gas compression unit, the compressor end cover was being removed for back loading onshore for modification. A runway beam and 16 tonne air hoist
were being used for removal of the cover in a vertical position. When clear of the comp essor skid, the procedures require the cover to be reorientated to a clear horizontal
position for re-slinging and backload. Two 5000kg polyester slings had been attached to the crane and it was during the reorientation that the sling parted allowing the load to
swing, causing superficial damage.
The easet crane was being used to unload and backload the supply vessel after recovering and stowing the oil based mud hose. The operator attempted to boom down in order
to resume unloading. The boom could not be lowered. He slewed the crane down-wind and applied the parking breaks the crane mechanic was called to investigate the fault.
Meanwhile cargo unloading was completed using the west crane. Investigation revealed that the power room lower drive chain had broken, and the boom drum overspeed
brake had y overhead.he was casevaced on <...> actuated, preventing boom free fall.
Whilst breaking out joint of 5 1/2" tubing – driller was picking up blocks with single joint elevators on pipe. Elevators parted at swivel connection and fell down the pipe,
landing on top of the casing power tongs.
Removing sections of casing. The casing section was being lifted clear by means of a single joint elevator. The swivel failed due to overloading.
Whilst rotary drilling on <...>,a retaining pin weighing 3 kgs,fell to the drillfloor,landing 3 metres from a floorman who was clearing a drain at the time.he was the only man in
the area and the driller and the ass- isstant driller were in the doghouse. he retaining pin is one of four which secure the travelling block tothe dolly which runs on the vertical
track of the derrick. Drilling had been steady for 28 hours prior to this.operations were suspended whilst an investigation was carried out.it was a certained that the split pin
which holds the retaining pin in place had sheared and the latter had worked itself loose. The pin was replaced with a new split pin and the other 3 split pins were also
renewed.as the cause had been determined and remidial ctions carried out,the oim allowed drilling to resume after consulting the platform manager onshore. Weather
conditions were good with light winds. No damage was susteined. <...> will follow up recommendations to fit restraining chains or similar to the p ns and also to determine
whether there is a better method of securing the split pins.
While running a liner,a broken segment of the elevators setting weighing 1.2kg,fell 45 feet onto the rig floor between the iron rough neck and the drillers doghouse.the
elevators were being lowered over the liner collar in the open posistion and the setti g ring touched the collar.a retaining screw sheared and the setting ring broke in half.one
half fell to the rig floor.the screw and setting ring may have been previously cracked as they did not sustain a heavy knock.the sheared screw did not fall as it wa wired in place
through it's head. The elevators had been inspected in <...> and had only been used for nine hours since that date. There were personnel on the floor at the time of the incident
but they were not hit by the falling object.
While raising an over size 7" liner in single joint elevator that was attached to the hoisting block assembly with a 3 ton sling and lift elevator assembly, the box end of the 7"
joint came into contact with the v-door bumper bar assembly. This caused an xcessive overpull on the sling causing it to part. The length of the sling was too long which
caused the 7" joint to foul on the underside of the bumper bar assesmbly the joint fell to the rig floor and then travelled down the v-door and onto the pipe dec . In his haste to
escape from the actual area of the incident, the floorman tripped over an obstruction and hurt his knee. However the injury did not result in a 'lost time' accident.
A lifting operation was underway using the s.e. crane to transfer a 45 gallon lub oil drum from the drum store outside package 7 to the east end if the bop deck. The crane had
lifted the single barrel using a barrel chain sling and had sjued the load anti clockwise over the bop deck east end. The barrel fell from the sling moments after the load was
being lowered and after the sling had been completed. It fell, hittign the east top bop handrail, onto the bop crane runway beams and onto the bop deck, a dist nce of
approximately 60ft.
The <...> crew were performing wireline operations on well <...>. The lubricator was being lifted from the riser using the overhead bop crane (18 tonne swl). The lubricator is
lifted by means of a lifting clamp and two short (1 foot) 2 tonne swl wire slings. prior to making the lift the crew released the collar on the bottom of the lubricator crossover
from the riser connection to ensure the threads were disengaged. In spite of this action, the lubricator hung up on the riser during the lift, possibly due to hread re-engagement
or the seal face of the bowen threaded connection 'binding' inside the riser. This in turn resulted in one of the short slings parting under excessive load.
During recovery of the scab casing string 10 ¾" varco/bj 150 ton type slx side door elevators were being used to lay out a joint of casing after breakout from the string. The
elevators were rigging up with the latch mechanism facing the doghouse to allo the driller to confirm proper latching. As the joint was being lowered and tailed towards the v
door with a tugger it was noticed that the tugger tailed end was not being lowered quickly enough. When the driller stopped lowering the blocks to redress the situation the
elevators opened releasing the casing joint. ( it is unclear whether or not the elevators contacted the stabbing board immediately prior to release). The casing was prevented
from falling to the drill floor by hanging up in pipework. To the ide of the stabbing board and the tugger supporting the lower end. No injuries occured. As a routine operation,
no formal risk assessment had been carried out.
<...> 'cargo box' <...> was lifted off supply boat <...> at 09:45. Because of the 3 metre swell, it was a snatch lift. When the box was in mid air one of the lifting slings was seen
to be loose. Once landed on the platform deck on of the four l fting lugs was seen to have broken off. No other damage occured, no one was hurt. The box was weighed and
total weight (with contents as lifted off the boat) was approx 1 tonne. Max permitted gross weight of the box is 4 tonne. It was last certified on <...>. For further details see
attached report from <...> oie.
The drilling facility on <...> had been undergoing a major up-grade and one of the operations in hand was replacement of the rig floor tuggers. Therefore the ropes had been
disconnected from the tuggers and left hanging in the derrick, but tied off. On the night of 20th it was required to rotate the kelly swivel while it was hanging in the derrick, and
one of the disconnected tugger ropes was used for this task. From below, one end of a tugger rope was flicked round a kelly bail ear and pulled by hand to ma e the kelly turn.
Once this had been achieved, the rope was released. However, shortly after this it was noticed that the released end was rising in the derrick. It continued up the derrick, and as
it was the plain end, it went through the sheave at the t p and fell to the rig floor. Once the end was observed to be rising, the rig floor was cleared, long before the end finally
fell down. It is thought that the end that went through the sheave was only tied off with a piece of rope, and that either the knot undid when the wire was shaken, or the rope
broke. No no one was hurt and nothing was damaged. Atmospheric conditions were not a factor.
Wind wsw 24->28 knots. Waves 2 metres. Roll 0.2m pitch 01/m. During transfer of 10 personnel from <...> to <...> by personnel basket, the basket fouled the main hook (see
sketch) and became entangled and tilted. Basket then fell 6"-12" before ecoming free. It was then lowered to installation weather deck with no injuries occuring. Vessel had
been laid off from installation for heavy weather. Conditions were not improved enough to deploy bridge but s/by vessel master wqas confident he could l unch rescue boat.
Personnel had been lifted previous evening to attend to generators but vessel had since moved closer to bridge position. Vessel was not in retrospect in ideal position and boom
elevation was lower than normal. Crane driver misjudged a ignments.
Following completion of a wireline tag run on w380 prior to a static survey, the lubricator was de-pressurised and preparations to rig down commenced. A wireline operator
attached the lifting strop to the crane main block and turned away to replace a ladd r. The crane operator, without receiving a signal to do so, raised the main block to take the
weight of the lubricator. As the strop moved upwards, it fouled a plug on the lubricator. The crane operator, unaware of the snag and concentrating on the positi n of the block
in relation to the luricator, continued to lift. The strop failed at the point of snagging causing the block to swing into contact with the stuffing box pulley shearing it off. The
pulley ran down the slack wire, hitting the deck and the da aged support bracket dropped to deck level. No personnel were in the immediate vicnity of the falling objects. The
whipline block, the normal lifting method was not available for use due to re-certification of components underway onshore.
<...> had run in hole to carry out a cement bonding log on well <...> (slot 4) using 0.46 inch o.d. braided wireline. A problem was discovered with the logging tool and whilst
pulling out of the hole the wireline caught on the line wiper, located on he rotary table. The line wiper (approx weight 6lbs) was raised along with the wire and made contact
with the top sheave. This caused the wireline to part with both ends falling to the drill floor (90 ft below) and the line wiper to the pipe racks at the monkey board (5ft below)
Whilst pulling out of the hole (<...>) to make a connection at the rig floor and lowering the blocks in a retract position the elevator hinge pin came loose and fell to the rig floor.
During routine tripping operations part of the latch trigger mechanism the latch pin, approximate weight 0.5kg - broke off and fell approximately 22 metres to the rig floor
below narrowly missing , by 1.8 metres, a santa fe floorman who was working on the rig floor. On inspection an area of impact was evident on the latch pin and a lack of both
penetration and fusion at the weld point was discovered.
Incident occurred when backloading a <...> iron basket (no <...>) onto the stbd side of the supply vessel <...>. The vessel was steady on position on the north side of the
platform but side on to the swell and rolling. The basket weight was appprox 4.5t and contained miscellaneous crossover pipes and low torque valves. Items within the basket
are secured by means of removeable vertical post either side of the basket which locate into pegs at the top and bottom of the frame. These had been secured in this position by
threading a wire rope through the holes at the top of the post in a continuous loop. The basket was lifted onto deck ofthe <...> adjacent to the nitrogen pump & mixing tank.
When the lift landed it was not sitting on the deck correctly & so the crane operator eased the lift up in order to position it correctly. At this point the vessel rolled away from
the platfrom &the basket "snatched" up approx 5 feet while at the same time the aforementioned retaining wire appeared to catch on the mixing tank. The crane operator saw
two pieces of equipment fall onto the deck of the vessel. These were later identified as lo torque valves weighing 18kg each. The vessel then dropped away so the crane
operator picked up the lift. At this time the lift was over the sea and the crane operator observed another unidentified object fall into the sea. The crane operator then let the
A section of wireline stem bar (iron bar 1.25" od approx 30lbs 5ft in length) was propped against the side of the wireline doghouse. The base of the bar was resting on the
wooden board covering open grating. The bar became dislodged from the side of the d ghouse and went through the grating of the production deck and landed 40ft below on
the cellar deck passing through the cellar deck mezz grating. The bar landed approx 20ft from two persons working on a small gantry to the side. The position of this gantr was
not in line with the bars path of descent.
During a rotation of drillpipe with the lower jaws of the torque wrench still engaged the elevator and pipe handler swung violently into a stand of 5 1/2" automatic elevator and
pipe handling system.pieces of the elevator (3*1-4lb in weight) dropped app ox 20ft to the drillfloor. On investigation it was found that a modification had been made by the
drilling mechanic to the torque wrench which caused the lower jaws of the wrench to have hydraulic pressure locked in and being engaged when normally they wo ld have
been disengaged.this was not seen by the driller due to the jaws being hidden from view.
While tripping out of the hole for changeout of a failed mwd(dir/ logging tool) a 6 5/8" stand of drill pipe (approx 90ft) had been backed out of the sting ready for racking back
into the derrick. At this point the upper racker arm was connected to the s and still being supported by the elevators/top drive. With the drillpipe as above, the driller with the
parking brake off, removed his hand from the manual brake allowing the top drive to move down sufficient distance to contact the top of the stand of pi e causing damage to
the stand, topdrive and upper racker arm head. On futher inspection of the upper racker arm assembly, it was found that a section of the racker assembly, approx 10lb in weight,
ahd fallen approx 86ft to the drillfloor. This was though to have occurred when the topdrive and drillpipe contacted. No persons injured.
Wind 250deg, 24knots, sea state 3m, vis 3nm, temp 10.2c, dull/cloudy a bundle of 5' scaffold tubes were landed on a gantry on the north side of rig 81 at teh 35' level. Once the
bundle had been landed on the gantry walkway, the banksman attempted to retri ve the lifting strops by coming up slowly with the whipline on pull the strops from under the
bundle of tubes. Whilst pulling free, on of the strops caught a scaffold tube and dislodged it from the bundle, the tubes rolled off the edge of the gantry and f ll to the drill floor.
The scaffold tube landed vertically in the centre of the make-up longs which were not in use at the time, the tube then bounced out of the tongs to land and come to rest near the
north side wall of the drill derrick. Drilling were p lling out of the hole at the time and three roughnecks were working on the drill floor approx 8 to 10 feet away from where
the tube landed. 3 men were in the doghouse. There was no injuries to personnel and no damage to property or equipment.
<...> xmas tree was being removed using the <...> crane. As the weight of the load was being taken up the chain parted at the top of the air hoist fixing point and the chain fell
through the well slot in module 'b'.
The activity had been ongoing for approx 4 hours.the drill pipe was attached to the drillfloor winch by the lifting cap.as the drillpipe was being winched up the v door to the
drill floor.the lifitng arm fractured resulting in the drillpipe sliding appr x 5 feet back down the v door and coming to rest on the catwalk approx 5 feet from the bottom of the v
door.no damage sustained,other than the failure. Investigation showed that the lifting caps specifically for this job were correctly manifested and had omplete lifting equipment
certification.the failed lifting cap,and two similar caps,were neither manifested nor certificated.it is considered that they came out of the platform already screwed into the
drillpipe,possibly having previously been used as end protectors.
The wireline shooting nipple/lubricator assembly was to be picked up 2 feet to confirm that it was above the bop shear rams. The upper pipe rams that were closed aroung the
shooting nipple had to be opened to allow the shooting nipple to be picked up. T e driller operator the rams from the remote bop control panel on the rig floor. Although the
green light on the control panl indicated that the rams were open, the rams were in fact prevented from opending by the locking screws which the driller had forgo ten were
engaged. As the shooting nipple was still anchored in the bop, when the driller attempted to pick it up with the draw-works, an over pull was put on the ligting chains causing
them to part. One link on each chain parted and felll to the rig flo
A new 75' x 3 1/2" standard rotary hose was being transferred from the pipedeck (m4roof) to a temporary storage area in the void between the drilling mud module (m4) and
the drilling derrick (m5). The crane rigging for this operation was single fall with a 15'/8 ton safety pennant and swivel hook. The rotary hose was laid out diagonally across
the casing on the pipedeck from the nw corner to the se corner. A 30'/3 ton sling was attached to the nw end of the hose and the hose picked up until it rested in the vertical at
the se corner of the pipedeck. The hose was the positioned over the w end of the void and under the direction of the banksman (<...> deck foreman) slowly lowered. The <...>
deck foreman, with the assistance of a roustabout, walked the free end of the hose as far as possible along the void the e before instructing the crane operator to slack off the
remainder. The 30' sling was removed from the w end of the hose and re-attached to the e end. The crane was repositioned to the e of the catwalk and the pennant lowered to
allow the eye of the 30' sling to be coupled up. This was done &the crane picked up and took the load. The <...> deck foreman determined that further use of the crane was of
no advantage and requested the crane operator to, onc e again, slack off. The e end of the hose had been landed but when slacking off further to enable the sling to be removed
The fastline 'kite' is an assembly suspended within the derrick and designed to dampen the oscillation of the drilling fastline as it spools on and off of the drawworks drum, this
is effected by passing the line through a series of rollers (8) arranged on 4 sides and applying side restraint via wires or springs. The drill crew were pulling out of well a7 with
the 7" cement clean out assembly whilst 'running down' the empty travelling blocks a roller (approx 1kg) fell to the rig floor from the kite (30 fee ). Investigation showed the
the roller bearings had disintegrated allowing the roller to wear and snap the retaining pin. The assembly wires and rollers are maintenance free, checked weekly and were
changed out 3 weeks ago.
The sea state was very calm, the wind about 3 knots. Little noise, full daylight and the temperature at sea level was about 20c approximately. In <...> scaffold was erected to
examine the state of the clamp holding the riser to the structure. The scaffold was erected during low tide to fit as low as possible on the structure. Just above the minimum sea
level. Before the scaffold could be removed the weather changed, making it impossible to remove. It was decided to leave until better weather in <...>. It was left fitted during
summer because it was known that there was work to do on the production spider deck before the end of the year. On <...> whilst welders/burners were available it was decided
to remove the redundant scaffold. <...> (scaffold foreman) raided a p.t.w.,called in the standby boat <...>, donned a life jacket and harness and proceeded to the spider deck. The
<...> launched the fast rescue craft 335. <...> descended onto the scaffold but noticed that part of it was loose so withdrew to a safe part of the scaffold. He attached his safety
whip line to a secure part of the scaffold. Some of the scaffold clamps had to be burnt off because they had seized after a long spell in the water & being battered by heavy seas.
He had decided to work from one end & dismantle as much of the scaffold as poss before dismantling the rest from a safe area above the walkway ie. Pulling the hangers up
During construction of blast walls, the welder was welding up the seal plated at the top of the new blast wall when welding spatter fell through a 3mm gap and ingnited the
insulation tape behind the blast wall
All scaffolding equipment stowed at m3ww storage area requires removal and dismantling as it forms part of the blow-out path from the west wellbays. During the course of
the nightshift up to eleven scaffolders had been involved in the systematic removal f tubes etc. At 0430 hrs, two electrical technicians entered d3ww on route to work area.
Both men heard the noise of something falling from above on of the men looked up and saw a scaffold tube fall and land in between them. No one was apparently worki g
above them at the time. The two metre long scaffold tube falling in uncertain circumstance. No injuries were sustained by the men.
While working to remove scaffolding from the crown block of the derrick it was noticed that there was some wood secured to a beam which had the purpose of protecting the
beam from rope chaffing. It was decided to remove the wood and the abseiler did this lying down passing the wood behind him to a scaffolder who stacked it against the kick
plate. The abseiler had removed four pieces of wood and was holding the fifth and last piece when a loud bang was heard from a falling object hitting the derrick. The bseiler
and scaffolder secured the last piece of wood and descended. On later inspection, there were only four pieces left on the crown block, and it is thought that the abseiler
inadvertently managed to kick one piece over the kick plate.
Whilst the deck foreman was cleaning up on the top of the red shack in orderto gain access to the dc motor stored there, bits of pipework and a set of bales were removed. In
the process of moving the bales with his boot, one of the bales twisted around, s ipped through the bottom gap of the of the handrail and landed some 30ft down on the valley
deck, thereby denting the canopy above the door to the bulk silo module and the deck-plate of the valley deck. At that moment there was no body in the vicinity. Ha ing
ensured tha area on top of the red shack was safe and secure and observing no ip and minimal damage, the foreman lifted the bale with the crane back to the pipedeck after that
he informed the night pusher of the incident.
During high winds 2 stop chocks 450mm x 160mm x 90mm weight 12 kilograms fell from the top of the main generator (a) exhaust onto the weatherdeck and level 4 (58.1m)
walkway and to sea. Nuts/bolts had backed off due to weather/vibration. High winds for se eral days prior to incident.
Routine inspection revealed sections of lagging had fallen off po4 and po5 turbine exhausts. Recent bad weather is thought to have been a contributory cause, along with
possible interference of skirt on top of exhaust stack and lagging s.s. cladding when tack contracts.
A section of flat bar was found on walkway on the south west corner of level 2 at the flare base. It was curled into a semi-circle and burned by extreme heat. A check on
dimensions confirmed that it was most of a deflector vane from llp flare. A visual in pection was carried out from the platform and from helicopter of flare by binocular and a
video was taken. No loose debris sighted on flare top.
Following completion of the escape to sea project works, the access scaffolding below the south truss accomodation was being dismantled. Whilst dismantling the final section
a hanger unseated from the overhead support beam resulting in a partial collapse. the scaffolder conducting the work was suspended by safety awareness and inertia reel.
During the installation of north mousehold scabbard it was necessary to lift a hinged hatch on the substructive walkway. The operator lifted the hatch, believing that the grating
and support plate underneath were attached. This was not the case the steel late (17" x 28" weighing 66 lbs) subsequently fell the bop deck below. There were no injuries and
no plant damage occurred.
A section of unistrut 6 metres long was being removed from a temporary scaffold rack. The length slipped from the persons grasp and fell down to the level below. It landed on
west 1 lifeboat punching a hole 4" square through the roof.
Whilst returning scaffolding boards into the storage rack, siuated at the edge of top deck north side, one of boards fell through the rack landing on the deck below.
Bolt attaching support strut to the rest platform loosened off and fell to the ground during severe weather.
During the initial stages of rig skidding, the rathole was being raised to the rig floor. An object dropped to the bop deck and on investigation was found to be retaining t-bar.
The procedures for rig skidding prohibit personnel access to the bop deck and therefore no injuries were incurred. The t-bar function is to retain the rathole in the positioning
pivots during drilling operations. It appears that the rathole was landed on top of the t-bar instead of in the pivot seat.
A pipe clamp weighing approximately 5 kg fell from the po6 recycle line onto the walkway in front of pump po6. The recycle line is approx. 25ft above the walkway. The bolt
for the clamp was found lying 2ft from the clamp. The clamp was discovered by an ops tech carrying out a routine tour.
A piece of angle iron approx 18" long fell from a scaffold narrowly missing scaffolder. The angle iron was discovered accidentaly by a colleague who was pulling on a 110v
extension cable.
The vacuum breaker on the seawater outfall from g4403 fire pump fell approx. 2 metres on to the firepump causing damage to the blower pipework. The failure was the 3" cuni
line supporting the vacuum breaker fracturing
On <...> at approx. 0800hours simops (drilling and wireling) was taking place. The wireline crew were working on the impact deck within the footprint of the drill derrick
when a 10" shifting spanner fell approx. 30' narrowly missing personne working in the area. An investigation team was set up by the oim to try and ascertain where the
spanner fell from . After the investigation the conclusion was that the spanner could not have dropped through the drill derrick approx. 50' above the impact deck but that it
had been left on either a support or gantry crane beam approx. 30' above the impact deck.
Wire mesh cover from gas turbime exhaust stack (approx 4'6" dia) became detached during high winds (gusting 75 knots).falling approx 20 metres onto the external walkway
outside the drilling module switchroom on the east side of the platform.
Follwoing high work activity, vessel inspections, relief valve recertification, an individual was ontop of the brent high pressure separator <...>. This is a grated walkway some
20-25` above deck level with handrails and kickplates. As he approached his work area 9to flog up top manway hatch) he displaced a 12" dia 2" thick blank weighing 30lbs
approx which was laid on the walkway. The displacement caused the blank to pass between the bottom of the kick plate and the grated deck. It then fell to the dec below,
breaking a scaffold board enroute.
During a severe storm a section of grating (approx 3' x 2'6") plated with 1/8" steel was dislodged by the wind. Section fell approx 30' landing on a lower access platform
causing damage to the platform grating. Actual fall object was not witnessed.fallen object was discovered some time after the event. Winds:- 70kts gust, 55kts mean seas:-
11-12m.
During removal of scaffold platform from crown, a scaffold clamp was dropped through the perspex roof of the rig floor drillers dog house. While the scaffold crew were
transferring scaffold clamps the bag in which they were contained burst. This resulted n one of the clamps dropping approx 100ft from the monkey board area onto the roof of
the rig floor drillers dog house. The rig floor had been barriered off and cleared of personnel.
<...> personnel were trying to restore electrical supplies,derived from cpp 13.8kv switchboard after supply breakers had been tripped.the <...> feeder oil circuit breaker had
been closed,but the voltages at <...> were unstable,preventing the closure of <...> 440v incomer breaker b. Consequently, the feeder oil circuit breaker tripped. When electrical
personnel tried to resolve the problem by operating the closing switch on cubicle 13 of the 13.8kv switchboard, whcih was extinguished by fixed halon system. The oi circuit
breaker yellow phase moving contact assembly had come adrift from the associated operating mechanism by a mechanical by a mechanical failure of it's security bolts. A gpa
was sounded, and a full muster held. Personel were stood down at 21:40
During routine daily flame failure/hot spot checks <...> & <...> observed a small hot spot/internal fire within reboiler no 3. Unit had been shutdown at time of inspection and
oim was called prior to removing inspection port and extinguishing with a small quantity of dry powder foam 12 kg extinguisher. Fire and liquids had been contained within
furnace tube and no smoke was visible from stack until fire was extinguished. Teg from furnace section was then drained into surge/storage vessel and hse duty officers r
beverage and <...> were informed and permission requested to remove no 3 reboiler tube no 25.
A fire broke out on <...> behind a welding machine. Fire was coming from an extinguisher cover (orange plastic) which was wrapped behind the welding plant. Several riggers
were on site at the time, one of whom pulled the cover from behind the welding plant the others extinguished the fire using dry powder. The fire was out in seconds. Nobody
was injured. No significant damage occurred. An investigation ensued and the duty production hse was contacted. Note:platform is totally depressured with boundary isolations
in place.
At 15:00 hrs on <...> a small localised fire was noticed on some welding leads laying on the cellar deck (s.e. corner) of <...> by three scaffolders working above the deck. They
promptly extinguished the fire using a portable hand held dry powder extingu sher and reported the incident to the <...> control room. Subsequent investigation showed that
there had been an electrical short circuit of the welding lead at the connector, which was laying on top of the earthing lead. This caused the earthing lead insu ation to ignite.
The welding lead connector appeared to have "broken down" allowing the short circuit. <...> is currently undergoing major construction work. The platform is shutdown,
depressured and nitrogen purged. There were no combustible materials in the vicinity.
Small fire caused by sponge cleaning a diffuser.
On <...> commissioning test runs of k400 were being carried out after the machine had been out of service for 7 months due to construction activity. During the afternoon some
smoke had been noticed from the power turbine area but this was not co sidered particularly unusual since the machine had been down for several months. The machine tripped
and on run down some oil was noticed running out of the cab drains adjacent to power turbine. The oil leak was investigated and after discussion some furt er tests were carried
out showing the leak being caused by a vent problem. The unit was successfully run and cool stopped at 22:32. Staff remained observing the unit following shutdown and then
returned to the control room. The mechanical tech. Noticed sm ke coming from power turbine end at 22:45 and called for assistance and with the aid of co2 and dry powder put
out the small fire by 23:10 hrs. No muster took place - all personnel were informed of the incident. Hse were informed on morning of <...>.
On <...> at 1945 k400 was being prepared for commissioning checks. The pre-start checks were carried out without incident. At 2058 the unit was fired up ok and was run in
idle for 30 mins without incident. 2127hrs k400 was brought to minimum peed again without incident for approx 5 - 10 mins. Smoke was then seen to come from power
turbine exhaust diffuser. The unit was left on line for a further 10 minutes to see if the smoke would abate. It did not so k400 was shutdown at 2150 hrs. Operation staff
observing took a closer look at exhaust diffuser and noted a small fire in a similar position to previous one <...>. It was extinguished using 3 short blasts of dry powder
extinguisher. No muster took place. Hse were on board at time of incident and were informed.
At 10:18 hours <...> the platform general alarm was raised to alert all staff of two vent stack fires caused by a severe snow storm. The fixed fire fighting systems were used,
instantly snuffing the <...> platform fire but there were three attempts to ext nguish the fire on the <...> platform vent stack. This used 75% of the fixed fire fighting system
stock. Upon confirmation of the fires being extinguished, the fire fighting systems were returned to operational readiness and normal production commenced. Due o the
protracted nature of the incident the <...> emergency response process was activated and the <...> ecr manned.
At 03:43 hrs on <...> the <...> platform <...> shut down on an esd which is believed to have been instigated by a failure of the communications system known as serck. This
shut the main gas line esd valve, the mud line safety valves, the well wing valves and the diesel tank esd valve. The number 2 generator which was on line then failed to stop
causing a large amount black smoke to accumulate around the top deck of the production platform. Once daylight allowed the stand by boat to observe the smoking conditions
the main <...> platform <...> contacted the duty production person <...> and other key players to the potential of a fire condition. These key asset members then attended the
<...> main control room with the telemetry specialist at that point a further esd signal was sent to <...> via the backup known as meteor. Shortly after a satops crew assembled
at the <...> heliport along with <...> (satops team leader) and <...> (satops oim). A helicopter was scrambled en route to the <...> field where the <...> oim was acting as
emergency control centre co-ordinator, whilst en-route the helicopter made a fly past <...> to allow the team to make a close inspection of the incident at this time there was
observed a clear indication of smoke coming from the exhaust pipes of the number 2 generator only. The helicopter landed on <...> to clarify the action plan and take on
D117 vessel had been opened up and steam cleaned as part of '95 shutdown. Fumes and smoke were observed comming from vessel and responding fire team saw "a glow and
flames" withing vessel interior fire was contained within the vessel and subsquently put out.
Motor on seawater injection pump g117d short circuit on start up. Flash a phut! No fire, smoke or injuries.
During a test run on generator `b' after a faulty automatic voltage regulator had been replaced, a small 2" flame was observed emitting from a metal cable conduit which
contained wiring connecting the generator control panel and the alternator. <...> group incident report <...> refers to above.
During the presence of three personnel discussing arrangements to install an additional battery cubicle, arcing was heard and seen coming from ventilation areas of both ch7
and ch8 subsea control power modules after isolating both modules, further investi ation revealed a build up of conductive dirt had contributed to a breakdown of
insulation,allowing d.c. voltage in the paxolin control board to track across the area of a small capacitor. From the evidence as noted it would seem possible that it was the b ild
up within the capacitors that discharged to earth which caused the arcing.
During water pumping operations to displace well a18, pump no. 2 on cement unit failed, creating smoke which was sensed by two smoke heads and subsequently triggered a
production shutdown. It is thought that the pump clutch unit may be the cause.
During start-up of the hp compressor pipework exceeded normal operating temperatures due to failure of a cooling medium vlave to reset, resulted in the activation of 2 smoke
detectors prior to compressor being shut down.
Multiple head smoke detection in module 05 (utility module) resulted in a platfrom shutdown. A precautionary muster was undertaken to account for personnel. No one was
injured, and all were accounted for. Module was ventilated and soource of smoke was f und to be "b" air compressor motor which had failed.
A small fire was observed in the power turbine enclosure near the pt front bearing. When visually confirmed the fire was extinguished by manual activation of the halon
system.
V belts on portable water maker drive pump overheated causing smoke logging in module which subsequently cause automatic deluge release. On removing the pump crank
dase it was found that the power end crank has been sheared across the stalling of the driv belts which excessive heat was a consequence of the power end crank shaft failure.
At 1745 hrs 2 x infra red detectors indicated confirmed fire in fire area 31e . A firepump room. The fso was alerted to investigated and the general platform alarm sounded. The
deluge system activated automatically in response to the f & g signal. Fire eams attended and isolated fuel to pump, ba team entered enclosure to ascertain that the deluge had
extinguished all fires.sytem fully isolated and made secure by 1809hours. Initial inspection revealed that the gear box had seized and the clutch had burn out.
The lifting of a psv on the gas compression system caused and increase in flare rate. The increase in temperature on the weather deck activated at least 2 heat detectors
(probable rate of temperature rise as opposed to reaching max temp). The 'confirmed fire' signal mitiated on automatic esd and the firewater deluge releae in that fire area.
G.p.a.'s sounded on confirmed smoke detection in <...> battery room. On investigation it was visually confirmed as a fire and the fire team was asked for. When the fire team
investigated internally using breathing apparatus, the room was full of smoke, but n flames were detected. This was because the smoke detection had stopped the hvac and
closed the dampers and thus starved it of oxygen. The room was then ventilated so a detailed examintaion could take place which revealed several batteries had exploded. D
ring the day a discharge test had been carried out for the<...>, the chargers had been re-established some 3 hours earlier to the incident happening.
At approx 23:00 hrs the tumble driers restarted to finish off drying towels which were still damp.they were put onto a 20 minute drying cycle a few minutes later the stewardess
left the laundry area to do other duties. At approx 23:10 hrs a fire was det cted by the oim when he heard a squ- eaking noise from the laundry and smelt smoke.oim observed
smoke followed by flame coming from the north east tumble drier.he killed the laundry power using the emegency shutdown button,activated gpa from local cal point and
fist aid fire fighting commenced. At 23:13 hrs smoke detected by fixed fire detection system and sprinkler system operated. At 23:20 hrs emergency response team with
breathing apparatus on scene and took over fire fighting.all other personne mustered and accounted for. At 23:30 hrs fire confirmed as extinguished though smoke logging of
laundry and immediate surrounding area persisted. At 00:18 platform returned to normal status and all personnel stood down from muster stations. Fire damage confined to
the tumble drier itself,no surrounding area affected except superficial damage caused by fire water.
The essential sservices switchboard had been isolated earlier in the day to prepare for removal of temporary feeder and pulling/terminating permanent feeder from dd. This later
work was to be done with boarad lie live since this board had ups feeders-ups atteries would sustain loads for only two hours. Wrap round insulation was added to bus-bars
connectors and a rubber curtain was installed in front of the bus within the cubicle to be terminated later. The board was then e re-energised after various check . All work had
been thoroughly discussed and carried out under a detailed procedure. Too-box talks were held and recorded. Approx 50 minutes after re-enegerisation an electrician smelt and
saw smoke coming from the cubicle. He alerted control room. Platfo m ga was initiated. Smoke detectors alarmed two minutes later. Time 1910 hrs. Fire team entered with ba
and manual c02 extinguishers. Difficulty in gaining access into board for co2. No d fixed fine system in area. After isolating all power to board fire inally secured at 2050 hrs.
Non essential personnel were relocated tos support barge <...>. Temporary supplies were re-established by 0200 hrs <...>. The rubber matscreen and cable insulation had
burned causing large smoke evoluton and considerable heat damage. Offshore personnel including a safety representative and electrical engineering staff supported by an
Derrickman no 2 was in the mudpit area when he witnessed a large bang and some sparks coming from the agitator at pit no1. After pressing the stop button, he contacted the
<...> nightshift electrician who, on arrival, detected a high temperature on the ag tator motor. He immediately proceeded to package 1 switchroom to investigate. When
approaching mcc6 observed smoke belching from some cubicles. He then isolated the feeder to d1-o3 agitator and contacted ccr on ext 555. The crt initiated emergency initiat
d emergency procedures. The fire was extinguished any supple isolate. During investigation and testing, the motor and cubicle serving the agitator, was found to be damaged as
follows. A) d1-o3 motor had insulation failure. B) cubicle mcc 6 c1 was electriclly burnt out.
At approx 0940 hrs a scaffolder was proceeding through module c1 when he noticed flames at the engine exhaust at the west bulkhead of gas compressor kt-03. He proceeded
with the assisstance of two workers to extinguish the fire and raise the alarm. On e iting the module it was noticed a fire was burning at the exhaust location external to the
module which was the source of the flames that were noticed internally. Again they tackled the fire using fire extinguishers and extinguished the fire which subsequ ntly re-
ignited. <...> operators and safety technicians arrived at the scene and prepared to extinguish the external fire and cool area down. The platform was shutdown at approx 0950
hrs and general alarm activated at approx 0955 hrs. All personnel mu tered and necessary authorities notified. The fire was reported extinguished and everything under control
at 10.00 hrs. All personnel stood down at 10.11 hrs and necessary authorities informed. The fire resulted in damage to 8 small cables which run in close proximity to the
exhaust, additionally external wall cladding was damaged by fire. It would appear at this stage that the fire was caused by heat from the exhaust igniting the cables.
Investigations are currently ongoing to determine if the exhaust is holed and hot gasses are escaping through the exhaust lagging.
Fire pump failed to start during routine weekly inspection. Rpe was checking for an open cct across start solenoid with a multimeter when engine started. It is assumed that the
start solenoid stuck in as the associated wiring burst into flame. The rpe rai ed the alarm, put out the small fire with a dry powder extinguisher and then disconnected the
batteries.
Post weld heat treatment was taking place at b1 leg 8" riser. During the course of this activity a heating element became dislodeed and came into contact with riser insulation,
this material melted and the heating element continued to slip and rested upon adjacent scaffold board which burnt and a tarpaulin erected to shelter the worksite was set alight.
The fire alarm was raised and dry power fire extinguishers were used to control the fire. A fire hose was directed at the worksite to cool the area. The fi e team took control at
the site and ensured all hotpoints were cooled and ember extinguished. Power to heating elements was cut off when alarm raised. Hydrocarbons had not been introduced into
the riser.
At 20:15 hrs the <...> helideck monitors were checked. The <...> diesel fire pump was called to run on demand. A nightshift production technician went into the firepump room
at approx 20:30 hrs. He noted that the engine temperature was still showing cold. the engine was left to warm up and complete a 1 hour weekly test run. Just prior to 21:00hrs
<...>,a crane driver,contacted the radio room on a channel 6 radio. He informed the platform staff that smoke was coming from the ak diesel fire pump room. A fire team was
sent out, they confirmed that there was a fire inside the ak fire pump room. The platform general alarm was raised. The fire pump fuel isolations were closed and boundary
cooling was applied. Supporting fire fighting teams were despatched. T e fire was known to be extinguished at 21:17 hrs. Boundary cooling continued. Initial investigations
indicate that the fan belts were slipping, they frayed and came adrift of the pulleys. The water pump stopped and as a result the engine over heated, poss bly seizing or having
internal damage. The sump presure blew engine oil from the rocker box and was sprayed onto the engine exhaust and ignited. Later inspections indicated that the diesel engine
electrics were damaged. The fan belts were frayed, and that the engine may be seized. Inspection of the fire pump enclosure indicates no structural damage (assessed by <...> of
Whilst <...> welder/plater was burning off hand rails on north side of p2300 (gas m.o.l. export pump), sparks ignited the fuel gas vent line 10 feet below cellar grating. P3600
was not on line when incdent occurred. Wind was approx 20 knots southerly wave height was 1.5 meteres max. Firewatcher <...> noticed flame, informed <...> and <...>, and
while <...> informed the control room <...> and <...> extinguished the flame.
During change over of fuel from gas to diesel on power generator g-8004 a single flame detector alarmed in the control room.on investigation a flame was witnessed at a
burner coupling inside the generator enclosure. A controlled manual shutdown of the generator was carried out.
After a wet test on the deluge system in module 05 (as per lloyds requirement) water ingressed into transformer tr05/4c causing a malfunction initiated from the hv cable box.
Damage was sustained to electrical cable and hv cable box cover plate.
Plant operator was requested to check fault alarm on auxillary seawater pump, (annunciated in main control room). On arrival he observed smoke and flame at pump. He
informed main control room of the situation. Operator then proceeded to shut machine dow , and extinguished fire with local hand held dry power extingisher.
Work was being carried out installing steelwork. This involved preheating steel prior to welding. Worker had been using preheat equipment. On completion he put equipment
down clear of his worksite, and commenced welding. After approx 5 minutes he heard a boom' and became aware of a source of heat in the immediate vicinity. He looked
round to see a ball of flame being fed open ended propanee hose, his firewatcher attempted to extinguish the fire using a dry powder fire extinguisher. Welder left the site to
isolate the propane cylinder. A hagen activated a mcp and informed the ccr of the incident. On site investigation revealed that the hose had become detached from the nozzle
and the welding work in the vicinity had ignited the gas pocket.
Arc air welding had been ongoing in mod. C north void from 22.35 hours with breaks until the time of the incident. Nightshift chemist <...> had been taking samples in mod c.
<...> was leaving mod c north door when he noticed flames coming from the cab es attached to the welding machine adjacent to the module door. He covered the flames with a
tarpaulin and contacted the ccr to inform them of a fire external to mod g. Alarm was raised by the ccr and platform went to muster. The area was checked out by t e emergency
team and fire was confirmed as extinguished on their arrival. The cable immediately adjacent to the welding machine had suffered burning to the sheathing and the short tail
piece at the machine was completely burnt through. Damage had also bee caused tot he machine shell by the burning cable.
The production supervisor had earlier advised me of the need to test run <...> crude oil booster pump and if this proved successful to run up <...> mol pump, as both these units
had not been run since they were handed back from maintenance. The rodcution technician checked the pumps over prior to the ccr starting the crude booster pump. When he
reported back that the line ups were correct the booster pump was started on full recycle with a flow of 175m3/hour. The oil operator stood by whilst t e pump was started and
all appeared satisfactory. At about 1015 i decided to check the condition of the pump prior to us starting the mol pump. As i approached the pump i noticed that the nde collar
was glowing red. I advised the control room operator v a the radio to stop the pump as a precaution i located a fire extinguisher as the pump rotation stopped a small circle of
flame appeared around the nde seal, this was immediately extinguished with the dry powder entinguisher. On investigation it was found that the "keyway tab" of the bearing
retaining nut tab washer had broken allowing the shaft to float. This caused excessive force to be exerted on the seal assembly causing it to overheat. It would appear that the
tab washer had been re-used following a previous rebuild due to a lack of the component at the time. This may have contributed to the failure of the tab.
A very small gas leak was detected on the body of a hydraulic 26" valve (valve hu m 281).the leak came from a 2" plug in the body of the valve. The leak came from a 2" plug
in the body of the valve.the leak was manually detected by an operator who discovered a small lump of ice on the valve.
A gas detector on <...> was activated and upon checking of the area,a gas leak from bolts on bonnet of esdv m3.1 was found.leakage confirmed with portable gas detector and
"snoopy". Platfrom side of esdvm3.1 decompressed(from 60 bar) and leak stopped. Seali g compound injected.total duration of leak 62 minutes,estimated quantity:1m 3.the
area is open to wind,the wind speed at the time:17.20 m/s,direction 210 degrees
Following a report of loss of pressure in the template wi system an investigation was carried out by rov deployed from the <...>. Damage to an 8" pipeline spool was found as
set out in the letter may/ingram of <...> attached. This oir 9a as been raised at the request of the pieplines inspectorate.
Prepartations were being made to load a pig into the main oil line (mol). A class 1 f&g platform shutdown occurred when the pig launcher was opened, due to coincident gas
detection at 25% lel at 2 gas detectors adjacent to the pig launcher in b module. he launcher had been isolated and depressured, and contained residual gas only. Wind
conditions were particularly calm at the time.
An audible leak was heard in the wellhead area, no work was in progress in the area. The leak was traced to a body joint on well 1 choke and the well and flowline were
immediately isolated. The well pipework was depressured and an isolation permit raised. the incident was reported and arrangements made to investigate further on a future
visit.
Weather: wind nw 15-20 kts, 6 c. Daylight well c5 process flowing 60mm via contactor v4 therefore noise levels very high. Passing e.side of v4 i noticed a condensate
smell.assistance in locating the source was given by <...> and <...> and traced to x701/4. Gas was found to be leaking from the transmitter end of the instrument due to failure
of the internal thermowell. C5 process was taken offline, depressured and isolated to allow further inspection / removal and eventual replacement of the thermow ll with a solid
plug. Failure had occured adjacent to the threaded section of the thermowell.
08:45 production technician reported a water leak on v201. 08:45 <...> control room informed. 08:47 vented separator v201. 08:52 separator v201 to 0psi.
Overflow of condensate from glycol storage caller quoted l100 gallons as quantity. Some entered sea.
09:14 general alarm sounded, <...> on <...>, broken by <...>. electrician who reported smoke and flames on <...>. 09:15 i initiated p-o shutdown from the central control room.
2222 to initiate <...> ecr. <...>placed on standby. 09:17 fire team espatched wap, muster completed, mustered personnel instructed to put on survival suits, advised of situation
and of possible evacuation. 09:19 fire team leader confirms smoke and small flames at 'a' skid reboiler thief hatch. Tackling situation with fire hose. Mustered personnel
informed, <...> ecr informed. 09:21 contacted <...> log-co via hot line. Helicopter evacuation of non essential personnel. Radioactive source brought to south helideck stairway.
<...> updated. 09:23 fire extinguish d, boundary cooling taking place. Mustered personnel informed. <...> ecr informed. 09:26 informed <...> log-co of situation. 09:30
mustered personnel instructed to proceed to accommodation lounges 09:32 radioactive isotope returned to safe location 09:45 <...> ecr informed that situation was safe,
boundary cooling continuing. <...> informed of situation. 10:00 permanent boundary cooling in place. Fire team returned to contro room. Dimlington ecr updated. 10:15 all
personnel involved, nstructed to write a report, on their part in the incident. Reports written in isolation of all personnel. 11:00 all personnel thanked for their prompt actions,
Water (entrained condensate) leaking from a pin hole leak in pipework from separator. This was the water dump line from no 1 separator and was at separator pressure- 510 psi.
Separator was isolated and vented. Production shutdown. Informed <...>. Snr oim on <...>. And snr oim on <...>.
Production operator noticed frosting around actuator of 355-sdv-6 upon investigation it was found that the gas was leaking up through the stem seal, the line was depressured
and isolated. A full isolation was put upon the system and the valve changes out, ventilation was good no fixed gas detection was activated and a portable gas detector only
showed 20% level from 2 feet away from actuator
Bc2 gas compressor had its vent valve 351-sdv-3 overhauled i.e. new gate and seats fitted plus a bonnet seal was fitted on the <...> On the <...> the machine was required for
service and was started at 15:00 on checks made after the machi e had been running a short while the operator noticed a slight leak from the vent valve bonnet joint, this was
monitored and was found to be deteriorating the leak was escalating to the size of a small plume approx 24" long and 10-12" in diameter. The pro uction supervisor was shown
the leak who then initiated a normal shutdown procedure for the gas compressor. The wind speed was 6 knots eastly which depleted the gas from the vent valve which is
located high and outside of the module from normal walk ways.
An operator was depressurising a short section of 12" pipework isolated between <...> satellite import riser esd valve and wing valve using an 1/2" valve with outlet piped
below the open grating in preparation for change out of corrosion coupon in the lin . The wellhead area is open on 3 sides and the floor open grating. There was a light
westerly wind blowing. The enclosed volume of gas at the start of depressurising was 0.2m3 at 150 psi approximately. The operator under estimated the conditions prevaili g
and depressured the line too quickly causing gas dispersion which was sensed by two gas detectors in the area causing a platform esd and blowdown. Extra gas detectors of the
i.r. type have been recently fitted in the area. The incident team checked the rea within minutes and found the gas detectors reading zero l.e.c. incident occured on the 1800-
0600 shift at 21:27 hours on <...>.
At 03:00 hrs the night operator went to vent down some pressure in the <...> liquid handling drum 306-1203. On opening the vent valve on the drum the operator noticed that
the venting was louder than normal. The operator shut off the vent valve and the n ise stopped. The operator then cracked open the vent valve and felt down the pipework, at
the deck level pipe support, a hole in the vent pipework was noticed. The operator shut off the vent valve and reported the condition to the duty section leader, the operation
supervisor and platform o.i.m. were subsequently informed (hole caused by corrosion). A temporary wooden patch was fitted over the holed pipework to minimise any gas
release from the pipework in case of automatic platform venting and during the lanned platform depressurisation. Platform production systems were selectively shut-in to
reduce platform gas inventory and controlled venting was commenced @ 04:20 hrs. The platform was fully depressured at 11:00 hrs. Wind 12kts, @ 20 c.
During the initial start up sequence on k300 the rb211 enclosure gas detectors (nos 2 & 3) indicated an 8% lel reading quickly followed by an increase to above 50% lel which
caused the unit to esd and the halon extinguisher to discharge into the enclosure at the same time it was noted that k200 & k400 compressors dropped in speed and gas was
heard to be venting up the ac vent stack. Investigations revealed that the k300 fuel gas block valve (ces tag no 20 fic) had not closed which allowed fuel gas from th running
units k200 & k400 to vent. The soleniod was found to be sticking and once tapped the block valve closed and the fuel gas supply to k200 & k400 returned to normal pressure
of 600 psig.
As part of the construction activity on the platform, a 2" valve on the condensate header system required to be removed. Prior to the valve removal work taking place the
system had been nitrogen foam inerted. After removing 6 bolts from the flanges by use of a burning torch, a gas check was initiated. Once this was completed satisfactorily the
job recommenced to burn through the last remaining bolts. During this process flames were seen to emanate from between the flange faces. The job was immediately stop ed
with the fire quickly extinguished by using a combination of fire hose and dry powder. No injury to personnel or damage to equipment ensued. Subsequent investigation
concluded that a trapped pocket of gas was probably ignited in the process to release he flanges. Hse were informed at 00:42 hrs.
Power gas was being restored to its normal operating pressure of 420-480 psi. The gasket on the door of the power gas reservoir failed. The failed gasket was detected by an
operator who was carrying out checks following reinstatement of gas on 23at. The g s detectors had not picked up the gas release because of the direction of the release, ie
directly through the grating and off the confines of the platform (6ft). There was also a following wind of 30 knots. The system was depressurised and the gasket rep aced.
There were no persons working in the immediate vicinity. Hse were informed following preliminary investigation.
Fuel gas system was pressured up with gas. A pressure sensor line from k200 fuel gas orifice plate parted at the parker fitting at the bulkhead between the cellar deck and main
deck. Gas escaped for 3 mins before being isolated by the operations staff. Al personnel were mustered by manually setting of the g.a. hse were informed.
K200 was being prepared for compression tests. Machine was pressurised and at the end of this sequence a start was initiated. The machine was ramped up to idle, during this
process an operator and an instrument technician did rounds to check that all equi ment was satisfactory. The gas leak from a 1/2" stainless steel fitting was discovered. It is
estimated this lasted 10 mins. Before the pipework was isolated. The gas detectors were live but did not pick up the escape, though this may have been due to the 30-35kn wind
in the compression hall. Hse was informed. An investigation team has been set up to review what happened.
At approximately 2300 hrs the platform esd'd. On blowdown some liquids which contained condensate were vented along with the gas landing on the accommodation
platform. All people mustered and were accounted for. Crews were sent out to wash down surfaces o aq with water. The hse were called at 0145 hrs following an investigation
by the platform team. A full investigation team from onshore will follow to prepare a full review of the incident and recommend preventative measures as appropriate.
Noise reported coming from contactor no 1 glycol/gas exchanger. On investigation it was found that gas was escaping from the lower area of the glycol/gas exchanger.
Contactor no 1 isolated and blown down. Noise reduced as pressure dropped, confirming location of leak.
It was noticed shortly after first manning this nnmi, that the teg pump 1a had failed permitting teg to spill into the sea. It was noticed at that time the packing flange studs had
both sheared, this permitting the pump pressure to push the packing out pe mitting a release of teg.
Whilst a painter was removing paint from a redundant 3'' vent line (still tied into main vent system) a trickle of liquid was observed from beneath the line. Work stopped on the
line and the paint supervisor was informed. He checked the liquid and thought it to be water. The incident was reported to the duty chief operator in the <...> control room who
visited the site with the paint supervisor. No liquid was running from the pipe, but the lower surface was wet with what appeared to be water. The paint supe visor's hot work
permit was withdrawn and the oim was made aware. In consultation between the duty chief operator and the oim it was decided to leave the <...> pressured up, primarily due to
the wind direction of 210 deg @ 35 knots. This could cause vented gas from <...> to pass across <...> or <...> plus lack of light to properly investigate the pipe and its
redundant nature. It was considered safer to draw up plans for a controlled venting of <...> and <...> with the necessary personnel to act as watch in the area of the 3'' pipe.
During daylight hours of <...> the area of the leak was cleaned using hand tools. Corrosion failure of approx. 5% of the weld at a 90 deg elbow was found. Isolations were put
in place and a controlled venting of <...> and <...> was undertaken
Immediately after pig launching operations were carried out on the <...> platform the normal process of isolating and then depressuring the 36''/30'' section of launcher
pipework was in process of being carried out. During this operation a slight smell of as was discovered emanating from a piece of pipework close to the launcher. No obvious
pipe damage could be found and the vent process continued until vessel totally depressured. The area of pipework was noted and a subsequent ndt survey later the same mo
ning revealed a pinhole type penetration as the cause of the leak. The vessel then being taken out of service until repairs could be undertaken.
At 10:00 hrs the turbine enclosure gas detection system alarmed with an 8% lel indication. The fuel gas system was immediately shut in and the cause investigated. The gas
leak was found to be coming from the covers of 2 psv's in the gas turbine enclosure. the covers were re-tightened and checked for leaks and found to be satisfactory.
During normal operations the operations staff could smell gas in the <...> turbine hall near to k101. Although no gas heads had picked up any signal the chief operator made a
thorough investigation of the area and found gas escaping from an instrument take off on the interstage discharge of compressor k101. The compressor was shutdown and
vented. The whole plant was then shutdown and k101 isolated and spaded off. Prior to this, the hse duty inspector was informed who allowed the site to be disturbed and
repairsto progress. A suitable repair procedure was agreed with the certifying authority.
During routine checks at 0320 hrs a smell of gas was detected by the duty operator who immediately returned to the control room informing the control room operator of the
situation and returning to the site with a portable gas detector. Starting at the ex t dampers of the gg enclosure for k104, ac main operating deck, enclosure gas detection system
linked to the fire and gas system was not in alarm. The gas leak was traced to a partly fractured weld on the fuel gas supply to the avon after the woodward gov rnor. The gas
generator unit k104 was then taken off line and shut down in a controlled manner and isolated for inspection.
Gas release occurred during normal platform operations. Px0102b pump was being primed after a 720 day planned maintenance routine. Whilst pressurising up the pump
casing, the operator noticed a leak from the dart union adjacent to the n.d.e cyclone sepe ator. He immediately closed the valves to the pump and started depressurising. Two
low and one high gas detector, in close proximity to the pump alarmed on the central f&g panel in the ccr. These reset quickly.
Mech fitter passed along the walkway between k104 oil cooler and exhaust stack and detected a smell of gas and heard a hissing noise. He moved to where the noise was
coming from and found that a union fitting on the <...> to <...> suction line pressure switch h d sheared and gas was escaping. He closed the adjacent valve and reported the
leak to the operators in the ac control room. Upon further investigation it was found that a parker a-lok pipe fitting attached to pipeline gp-4001-b (36") had fractured and she
red into two parts across the thread. Atttached to the other side of the pipe fitting was a sor-europe pressure switch. The atmospheric conditions were upon release 40 knot
wind, heavy rain, cloudy, good light and very noisey due to compressor usage.
On the evening of <...>, operator <...> was carrying out routine rb211 gas turbine water washing operations with the assistance of technician/operator <...>. During the engine
crank cycle <...> (as control room operator) not d 10% gas detection on the gas detectors situated in the unit cab around the rb211. The crank wash cycle was immediately
aborted. Individual gas levels dropped to zero within 15 seconds. No personnel were in the immediate area of the gas leak and no other work was in progress in that work
location at that time. The <...> control room operator was notified and the oim <...>, maintenance foremen <...> and chief operator <...> advised of the incident. <...> notified
the hse y telephone of the incident. Mechanical technician <...> investigated and identified the source of the leak as the joint section on the starter motor exhaust to the
associated vent pipework. As there was no defect of the mechanical components of the ssembly on inspection of the joints and gaskets was carried out. Although there was no
obvious defect with the joints and gaskets these components were replaced with new. The equipment was tested and proven gas tight after which the unit was considered
avalable for service.
Low level gas alarm received in main control room. Maximum indication of 10% lel on gd 517/1 inside solar no3 power generator cab. Investigation with portable meter
confirmed 10% lel in area of stainless steel (1/4") supplying ignition gas to ignitor of e gine. Unit given manual shutdown and fuel gas system isolated at manual block valves.
Complex oim informed of occurence and unit deemed unavailable until further investigation was allowed. Power generator set no3 is housed within a force ventilated cab wi h
automatic shutdown system on gas detection - alarm at 10% lel and shutdown at 50% lel. 1/4" stainless line found to have sheared - line to be sent for analysis to discover
reason for shear.
At 22:12 hrs <...> solar generator shut down and simultaneously indicated a 30% gas presence within the cab. This was investigated by the process operator and instrument
technician who discovered a 1/4" control line sheared. This was isolated and all g s escape stopped. The unit was then left pending an internal investigation and formal
notification to hse (out of office hours number 23:00 hrs <...>). The line was replaced and all similar connections checked visually and with a gas detector. No other faults
found.
During a routine operation to bunker diesel fuel from the supply vessel, a diesel leak occurred from a screw connection between two sections of flexible hose. An estimated 20
gallons of fuel was discharged to the sea. Weather overcast with good visibility 13 knot wind gusting 27 @ 210 deg. Significant wave height 1.2 metres -period 4 secs.
The test separator had previously been isolated and depressured to allow modification of the outlet gas metering runs and repairs to be made to a defect discovered during an
internal inspection. The de-isolation of the vessel had been started but then st pped as the correct bolts were not available to complete the manway securing. The main gas inlet
and outlets were still fitted with spectacle blinds. The vessel was open to the h.p. vent system.psv 301 on the <...> production separator, lifted spuriously at 93 barg, set
presssure is 129 barg. This caused a release of gas to the h.p. vent system. This caused a back pressure in the vent system. This back pressure was less than 1.6 barg as an alarm
at this setting did not activate. Gas then escaped from an o en drain connection on the test separator.
During normal stop of k1602 compressor, which is powered by a <...> turbine, a fuel gas relief valve lifted and due to a split in the flexible vent connection, gas escaped into
the enclosure. Detectors inside the enclosure picked up the high level of gas and initiated an automatic shutdown and vent of the compressor. The forced ventilation in the
enclosure quickly dispersed the gas to atmosphere.
At 06:37 hrs on <...> 19% lel was detected on fire and gas panel from k1602 turbine enclosure. At 06:43 unit was shut down manually as lel had risen to 22%. On investigation
it was found that the flexible fuel gas line to burner had developed a leak.
At 0707 hrs on <...> the platform was called to muster station because of co-incident gas alarms in the extract ducting within area 2. The gas heads within the ducting showed
40% lel and 30% lel before quickly declining to 5% and 6%1/2. At 0623 hours t e gas heads had declined to beneath 2% lel and at 0625 the platform stood down from muster
stations. At no time during the incident did any of the general area gas detection pick up any indication of gas within the area it was confined to the gas detectio within the
ventilation extraction system. The investigation established that a draining operation had been taking place within an adjacent area of the platform (area 4b) and the dissolved
gas had migrated through the open drains system into area 2. Both xtract ducting are within 10 feet of the open drain pots.
At 2023 hrs on <...> the platform was called to muster station because of co-incident gas alarms within area 5. The gas heads in the area initially read 20% before declining to
beneath 10% at 2100. No leak was found. The system was re-pressurised a 2115. At 2200 the system was up to operating pressure. No leaks were found at 2225. The source
of the leak was found to be the "tell tale" on psv 320.2 on the 10 bar gas header system. Further investigation found the initial seals on the psv to be passing.
Small amount of lazy gas released from open flowline shutdown valve opened was located just below gas head. 2 gas heads reached 20% and 22% lel then immediately
dropped to 3% and 9% lel flowline had been flushed and vented for 4 days prior to incident.
All gas alarms activated in area 6a. Alarms subsequently activated in area 6a. Emergency response team determined leak to be from a flange on the hp injection header. Upon
depressurisation the flange appeared to re seat. An estimated 100m3 of gas was released. No injuries. No damage.
During routine water injection into well 9/13a ss32 it was reported that an increased amount of water was being pumped along the pipeline. It is suspected that the pipeline has
developed a leak.
A pinhole leak was reported in a 2" weldolet branch line below the deck on the 6" water injection riser to the subsea injection manifold. The leakage was caused by
corrosion/erosion in approx. Top third of the weld in the redundant branch line which led to the pinhole leak
To enable sw1 to run during shutdown, a temporary hose was fitted to the deaerator vent and routed into module 5. When deaerator inlet valve was cracked open, blanket gas
was displaced through hose. Due to still weather conditions this was picked up by the gas heads. No damage resulted.
During a period of still atmospheric conditions fluctuating gas levels were detected on two gas detectors during increased flare loadings. Gas levels disappeared at low flare
loadings. After exhaustive searching, local corrosion was detected at a penetration of the low pressure flare line.
Background: the plant was already shutdown and depressured for essential work on lp flare relief line. Equipment and pipework were opened as part of preparations for the
repair of the work. A small amount of residual lazy gas discharged into module. Tw gas heads very closeto the work site activated the gpa and deluge. Gas heads reset within
one minute(indicating a very small release)
Installing additional instrument pipework. Present pipework had been isolated and vented off downstream sides of pipework. Pipework tested from primary isolation valve at
the carrier to isolation at transmitter for any pressure and pressure found on one side. Whilst tightening valve at the carrier a top section of valve parted causing a release of
gas.
Escape of gas from floatation unit h401a,north west hatch cover causedb by back pressure from the llp flare syatem following loss of level control on first stage separator
resulted in activation of several gas detectors.an esd2 was manually activated from nab ccr. All personnel were called to muster as a precaution and the fireteam muster in
breathing apparatus.modules p02 and p01 were checked with portable gas detectors immediately following emergency stations alarm with negative results,the small gas release
having dissipated rapidly. The fireteam remianed on standby until a full muster was acheived and all personnel stood down.
Approx one barrel of hydrocarbons was released from a 5mm hole caused by severe metal corrosion on a section of the 10" oill outlet pipework from the oil test seperator. The
quantity and concentration of gas released was insufficient to activate the gas detector alarms. 00
Incident occurred while platform was unmanned. When platfrom was manned the next day the generator room floor was found awash with lube oil. An immediate clean up
operation was organised and an investigation as to the cause of the incident. During the oil clean-up a stainless steel pin was found close to the "a" gen skid, this pin had fallen
out of the fuel lift pump rocker arm rendering the pump incapable of maintaining fuel to the injector pump whilst allowing engine oil to leak out of the engine crank c se. Fitted
a replacememt pump of a different type and checked the same pump on the "b" gen engine.
During wellhead operations it became necessary to bunker a portable diesel air compressor on the main deck of the platform from a bulk tank (about 6 tons). The operation
involved the use of a 3/4" id line. The platform was de-manned at 1740 hrs and re-man ed at 0755 the following morning. On arrival offshore a sheen was noticed on the sea
and its source traced back to the bunkering line to the compressor which had remained open over night. This resulted in about 5 tonnes diesel being spilled to the sea. Sea state
2m swell. Weather generally fair.
During normal running with no work ongoing or recently completed, a pool fire occurred in gt 3 turbine enclosure, sequence of events are as follows: itds in gt3 initiated red
hazard status and platform shutdown in accordance with cause and effect matrix ( ps). Power tech and sett were dispatched from ccr to investigate if alert was genuine, on
approaching the turbine a pool fire was noticed by the techs and extinguished using a hand held portable dry powder extinguisher. The ccr was informed.
During normal operations the returned oil tank (rot) collects oily water and drained gas condensate from the various operating processes, with liquid hydrocarbons pumped
back into the separator and flash off gas venting to the flare header. The ppd vessel which is currently not used, has an over flow line which also discharges into the rot vessel.
This overflow line has a lute seal to prevent vent gas in the rot from entering the ppd vessel. At approx 02:20 hours an operations tech discovered that gas was escaping from
the ppd vessel vent line, which discharges over the side, to the north of the <...> platform. Suspecting the lute seal from the rot tank may have a low liquid level, he attempted
to re-establish the seal by filling with water via the tungdish. owever, before he could effect a seal, sufficient gas was being vented from the vessel to initiate the gas detectors
adjacent to the ppd tank. At 02.25 hours, two gas detectors initiated the fire and gas executive action and shut down the process plant an wells. This automatically sounded the
general alarm and the emergency response teams were mustered the general crew were not called to muster, since within 5 minutes of the alarms sounding the gas had
dispersed and the situation under control. At 02.35 a Announcement was made that the situation was under control and all personnel to stand down. Permission to re-commence
Whilst carrying out a routine check around the test separator in module 231 upper the operator named in section 4 discovered a fine spray of liquid emanating from a pin hole
in the recycle line pipework. The operator contacted the control room and the te t separator was shutdown and depressurised. The test separator was flushed, purged and
isolated.
During routine checks of the area, production operator discovered a leak from the diesel coalescer package. Investigation showed the leak was due to a ruptured sight glass.
Approximately 0.5 tonnes of diesel spilled into the bund and onto the deck. There as no spillage to sea. The coalescer was isolated and drained.
A production and gas compression shutdown had occurred at 0500 on <...>. On the shutdown of gas compression c turbine automatically fuel changes from gas to diesel. At
08:20 on <...> maintenance technician <...>was in the area (<...> celler eck 222) he heard and smelt gas. Upon investigation gas was found to be escaping from a small hole in
the base of c turbine fuel gas solenoid block valve. He informed the control room, the main monval fuel gas isolation v/vto c turbine was closed and the ine was depressured.
The pressure in the system at the time of the gas release was 3 bar approximately. No injuries or damage was sustained to personnel or equipment.
Small gland leak after start up which put gas head gs9408 into high alarm.
Two gas heads, 9432 and 9433 (located at the pump seals) went into high alarm causing controlled action shutdown of "c" export pump.
Two gas heads went into low alarm. On investigation it was found that the diesel supply hose had separated from the diesel inlet supply nozzle causing minor gas release.
4000 hr pmr completed on this unit less than 1000 hrs ago. Low gas detect alarmed but no gas could be found. On shutting down the unit very slight leak was detected using
"snoop" at- 1. No.8 burner unit (union may not have been torqued up correctly) 2. anifold (fretting could have occurred in 1000hrs running period if bracket was not secure)
Gas was detected by the early warning aspirated detectors located on mol pump seals px0102b. The pump was in the standby mode. The source of gas was back-pressure in
the closed drains leaking through the secondary seal.
During plant start up the blowdown ring securing plug on psv 19030 unscrewed releasing crude.vapours were detected at high level by 1 gas detector and 2 at low.plant was
immediately shut-in.plant started once psv 19030 was isolated and standby psv broug t on line.
The platform was shutdown for a programme of work depressured. As a result of trapped pressure, gas was released to the module whena line was opened to remove an
isolation. The release occurred from a 3 12" flange on a 15m length of pipework. The volume f gas released was approx 4m3 with the potential for a localised event only.
After changing out the high speed shut off cock on 'b' power generator set, there was a slight leak of gas from one of the joints. This was detected by two gas heads at low
level.
While running up the compressor after a shutdown the lp non-drive end barrel leaked gas, due to a seal failure. Compressor shut down and depressured. Leak detected by the
platform fire and gas system bringing into low alarm three gas detectors.
Gas injection compressor a.x. 0201 d. Small leak developed from 3rd stafe discharge pressure transmitter impulse line cap. Leak detected from blank fitted a t the end of drain
blowdown line.
At 0205, 40 minutes after start up, a minor gland leak occurred at the 3rd stage recycle valve on ax0201c gas compressor. This gas leak was detected by g.9272 detector.
The central control operators were alerted to a problem in module 16 when a gas detector went into alarm condition. Investigation took place immediately and it was found
that the gland follower holding down nuts on the 'a' injection train third stage rec cle valve had worked loose thus allowing a gas leak from the gland. It is believed that the nuts
worked loose due to vibration.
Following a level 5 shutdown and with no hvac, a minor leak from the upstream swagelok union to lp flare activated a gas alarm at "low" inside the 'b' injection compressor gas
wing.
Injection compressor c had been isolated with no hvac in preparation for a two yearly maintenance routine. A minor gas leak build-up inside the enclosure activated two gas
alarms at low level.
Gas detectos picked up low gas in module 16 gas injection. On investigation it was found to be coming from the hazardous open drains.
During start up after a production shutdwon the f & g system detected gas in the turbine enclosure ax5401c. The engine had previously been removed and there was no hvac
on/in the enclosure due to maintenance. On investigation the leak was traced to a joi t on the lp flare side of a psv. Psv downstream block valved was closed and leak stopped.
Plant was in full production handling approx 616 km3 p.hr of gas through the contactor. Leak was detected at/from the body of the cavity relief valve xxv 1940, by sound and
smell. A platform level 2 shutdown was initiated in order to effect repairs.
During re-commissioning of 'b' power generator gas leaks were detected by g.9907 and g.9908. These were traced to 0/v 6203 a/b, fuel gas p/sh 55oc and p.t. 6213/2 fuel gas
p.t.
Whilst pressurising the metering stream after completion of pmr work on the pressure transmitter, the 'o' ring on the kidney flange inlet failed, causing minor gas release
activating two gas detectors (g9060 - g9061). On investigation it was concluded th t the 'o' ring was damaged during the original installation.
Upon pressurising the test separator presence of hl gas detected throughout l4, time 21.51. Platform to hazard status and all personnel to muster. Precautionary downman of
installation commenced. Module doors opened to clear gas after suspending gas x-ove blowdown due to concerns over size of flare. Downman of installation halted of
reaching llg l4. Platform to alert status, time 23.20. Upon clearing gas, platform to normal status, time 23.20.
On the night in question it was planned to despade v200 1st stage separator to allow train 1 to be recommissioned after installation of a replacement level transmitter. In order
to effect the necessary isolation to allow despading, it was necessary to cease gas backflow and depressurise the gas injection header shortly thereafter. In the days leading to
the incident well services had been carrying out wireline work on ba12. Work on the well was carried out under <...>. The well was correctly isolated from the process by
double block and bleed using the fwv, the gas flowline block valve and an 0.5" draine connection in u5w. Isolation was recorded on <...>. Well services informed operations
that they wished to carry out a leak off test on ba 12 sssv. A de-isolation for test (dft) no. 05424 was completed by well services to accompany request. The dft stated only that
reconnection of fwv hydraulics would be required. The ssp discussed requirements with well services & modified the [lan for the evening to depressurise above ba 12 sssv at
the same time as depressurising the injection header. This plan was discussed individually with the control room operator, who was also acting as nightshift permit coordinator,
& the area technician. The hydraulics on ba12 were then reconnected in accordance with the dft certifivate. After lunch, gas backflow was shutdown by tripping xev 206, train
A single smokehead alarm from m2e was activated on the fire and gas panel in the production control room.two production techs investigated and reported that m2e module
was full of hydrocarbon mist. The platform psl's were still on normal green status. The production control operator took immediate action by; a) manually closing down and de-
pressurising train2. B) manually acivating the "red" hazard status. C) manually closing down and de-pressurising trains 1 and 3. D) manually closing down and de-pressuri ing
the gas compression process m2e module was freely ventilated to allow gas dispersal by opening both the east side doors. Non-essential personnel were downmanned to the
<...>. When the gas had vented from the module and personnel were allowed to enter, it was discovered that the cause of the leak was erosion damage to train 2, stage 2,1/2"
stainless steel. This was caused by hydrocarbons containing sand content, flowing through this line. Well on test for sand content was bd42.
Crude oil cooler (coc) e2630 had been islolated to strip down and clean coc plates. Upon completion of work, the cooler was de-isolated by the dayshift operations team. The
nightshift operations team were then required to de-isolate train 1 and the test separator, and bring train 1 back into production. Having successfully de-isolated train 1 and test
separator, the test separator (acting as 1st stage separator), and the 2nd, 3rd & 4th stages of train 1 were brought on-line by opening up a well (bd16)to the test separator. The
well was only "cracked open" in order to introduce some gas pressure into the separators and push through a volume of water which was in the 2nd stage separator after
flushing operations, as part of the initial isolation. At this point the 2nd stage separator was 60% full of water and all separator stages were at zero pressure. The test separator
was allowed to pressurise to 1st stage pressure (94 bar). The water in the 2nd stage was pushed through to the 3rd stage and the pressure in each stage allowed to build up. At
the point of the incident, the vessel pressures were 94 bar, 7 bar, 0.8 bar & 0 bar respectively. A low level gas (llg) indication came up on the fire & gas panel in the control
room, indicating llg at m1w roof cocs. ( no change to platform status, single gas head only). The ssp instructed the oil tech to close-in well bd16. The control room operator
During lean oil system shutdown, the pas boot bypass valves were required to be operated to reduce the condensate level in the vessel. Drain valve p/5/37 failed due to
excessive internal erosion as a result of the pressure drop created across the valve wh n draining the vessel. The erosion of the valve body has probably occured over a period of
many years. The first indicatin of the valve failure was when the platform went to alert status (low level gas indicated in u4ee), whereupon 2 technicians were dis atched to
u4ee to endeavour to ascertain the cause. The technicians discovered the leak was in the pas boot area in u4e and reported the information to the process control room. The
platform alert status changed to hazard status on high level gas detecti n after a period of 5 minutes. The techniciams went directly from u4e to gas comp control room where
initiated "gas comp blowdown and isolate", followed by "gas comp dlowdown open". As a result of more that 1 gas head initiating hazard status, the platfo m then went
automatically into surface process shutdown (sps) mode. Entry into modules u4e and u4ee was then prohibited until blowdown was complete and the gas dispersed. The failed
valve has been removed for investigation, and has been replaced.
In order to unload sand from <...> this well was being flowed via a temporary chicksan flowline and choke manifold, located in m3w, to the test separator in d2c. A hazop had
been conducted for this arrangement and monitoring points for erosion established. In terms of the choke manifold and chicksn installed between the xmas tree and the test
separator manifold this functioned as expected with eroision being confined to those areas. The platform monitored pipework (bends and welds) up and down stream of he
test separator suffered no detectable material loss which was also expected to be the case. Installed in the failed straight section spool piece is a 'flow straightener', debris was
found on the upstream side which is thought to have caused a localise change of direction and velocity of the highly erosive fluid into the pipewall resulting in erosion to the
point of a small hole appearing in the pipework. This aallowed the oil/gas under pressure to be released into d2c and the migrate through and open door (a hose had been run
into the module through the door)into d2w. Note: this 'flow straightener' is not identified on our drawings or those onshore used for the hazop.
A mechanical technician carrying out micro-log vibratrion monitoring on pump p.9413, noticed drops of oil falling down around work area, upon checking, he suspected a
leak from the lean oil pump discharge header pipework around the 1" stub piece. At the initial stage, the leak was only a slight drip. The technician immediately contacted the
gas technicians and reported the leak. All three made their way to u4e, and when they reached the site, the leak had intensified to a constant stream of oil being sp ayed out
under pressure. One of the gas technicians shutdown the lean oil system in a controlled manner, whilst the other contacted the process control rollm by telephone. One gas
head directly above the leak (gd-323) did not respond to the leak as it b came grossly contaminated by oil as the leak developed - no other gas heads came into alarm and there
was no change in platform status. The failure was investigated by the ssm who reported a crack around the weld of a 1" stub piece on the discharge header downstream of the
stub piece hand valve. An isolation was them instigated until such time as repairs to the lean system could be effected.
Whilst investigating water injection well <...> annulus the annulus was lined up to the cement pump unit to enable fluid pumped and returned to be recorded. The operator
observed a pressure at the pump unit and thinking it was water pressure opened two valves resulting in hydrocarbons being released via a vent line into the module. On
observing the hydrocarbon release the operator immediately shut the isolation valves. The platform was brought to hazard status by the automatic activation of the gas
detection system.
Whilst preparing all the platform processes for annual s/d work an 8mm hole was discovered/created on the gas injection header blowdown pipework in u4ee. The loss of
hydrocarbon containment which resulted in a llg alert (yellow) occurred during manua de-pressurisation of <...> above the sssv via the injection header blowdown valve. The
leak was discovered almost immediately and the area technician closed the blowdown valve which reduced the leak to a small backfeed of gas from the platform flare syst m.
All processes were s/d at this time, however de-pressurisation was ongoing in various areas. The hole is situated on the first 90 deg bend on the blowdown line and 100 v 470.
It is approx. 250mm downstream of cv9324. The hole is attributed to sand erosion.
A hydrocarbon gas release occured in the north east corner of the u4ee while swinging a spectacle blind form the closed to the open position during gas compression
reinstatement following shutdown. There is nothing else invovled in the task of any significance. The spec blind concerned was isolating the gas injection manifold blowdown
tailpipe form the high pressure relief header (flare system). Isolation were in place and were double block and bleed with the o exception of the flare header entry valve 011/07
which was a single block valve. It was not possible to leake test this valve using an established bleed point as non esists between the non-return valve and the block valve. In
order to comply with operating standard 1.026 the procedure adopted, in consideration of the low pressure invloved (2.5 inches water gauge),m was to crack the spec blind
flange and confirm asatisfactory isolation prior to the opening the flange fully.. This allowed the option to re-tighten the flange if the isolation was not confirmed. The
possiblity of joint failure during opening was precluded by the low system pressure. The flange of the spc blind was cracked open and the isolation confirmed to be good. On
testing the crowcon triple meter. No gas was detected. The spec blind was removed for turning and a further gas check carried out with negative result. Shortly after this,
At 0335hours the gas injection compressor tripped causing all train first stage pressures to rise at approx. 132 bar. Whilst the gas technicians were investigating this platform
status change to "yellow" at 0342hrs followed by "red" status at 0344hrs. T e activated an automatic s.p.s. confirmation was recieved from the technicians that there was a gas
relaese from the pre-absorber seperator v9060. All oil and gas process systems were shutdown and blown down as required. The hydrocarbon gas release was c ntained in
modules:u4e lower and u4ee. The areas were ventilated by natural, controlled dispersion.
While preparing meter stream for maint (depressuring). It was noted that one of the pressure gauges from the isolation valve cavity was still indicating 120 bar, the gauge was
isolated and the gas heads in fire area 32a inhibited to depressure the gauge when the gauge was depressured the gas released was sucked into a turbulator fan containing two
gas heads, both heads went into high alarm and a yellow shutdown was initiated automatic. The gas head in the turbulator fan were on a different fire area f om the main area
32a. If they had been inhibited no shutdown would have occurred.
Condensate leak at mokveld control valve. Leak was found by <...> of <...> on an initial walk around the platform for mechanical survey. The leak found was at <...> valve,
condensate was seen to be dripping from the lagging box round the valve. L.c.v. 0221 (condensate from test separator). A1 well was shut in and condensate line isolated. The
test separator was then vented. On removal of lagging the leak was found on the valve body relief valve.
On arrival on the platform for an intervention visit the platform which was in a level 1 esd condition. Two people carried out a safety inspection and found that the generator
room was flooded with diesel. The visit was aborted until daylight due to safe y reasons. On return to the platform an investigation was fully carried out to find the source of
the diesel fuel leakage and it was found to have come from the glass bowl on the primary pump sediment trap on generator no.1. The engine had shutdown probab y due to air
in the fuel system as well as generators no.2 and no.3. The platform shutdown on esd level 1 which closed diesel esd valve, but the fuel continued to spill into the generator
room due to the bypass valve not being fully closed. The generator oom was bailed out then washed out with jizer bio to dilute as much fuel as possible to stop it vaporising.
During diesel bunkering operations the high level audible alarm failed leading to an overflow of the diesel tank. This overflow flowed via the closed drain system to the closed
drain holding tank. This tank apparently already full, overflowed into the sea causing the diesel and heavier oils already contained within the holding tank to form a slick.
Because of the small outlet on this overflow, this leak carried on to some extent for the period of approx 90 mins.
Low level coincidence gas detection during unit start up. Safety systems operated, unit and platform shut down and depressurised, all personnel mustered. Leak traced to small
bore tubing left disconnected after maintenance.
During start up of gas lift on well <...> a small gas leak was observed emitting from the 1" flange ring joint on the gas lift flowline corrosion inhibitor quill. (the start foloowed
normal procedures). The flowline was isolated and depressurised. Inspec ion of the flange did not reveal any faults with the ring joint or flange faces. However, the technician
indicated that although no loose bolting was found, he could tighten the nuts by another 1/2 - 2/3 turns.
Pinhole leak on weld of slot 18 connection to hp manifold was first noticed by noise of escaping gas and oil which vapourised into the air. The cause of the leak was due to
errosion/corrosion in the stub off the manifold.
Inspection of the gas metering oriface plate on gas stream 2 was taking place. Removal of the oriface plate had commenced when a gas release occurred, due to the isolated
section of line containing the oriface plate, still containing some pressure. Isolat on procedures to allow removal of the oriface plate had not been complied with. The
performing authority also failed to comply with permit conditions and had started to remove the oriface plate without the operations senior technician being on site. A ris
assessment had been done during <...>, which had been superceded by a procedure developed in <...>. The metering skid is in a well ventilated module which is partially open
to the elements. This incident was not notified to platform management until 2 days later
<...> fuel gas system was isolated to allow inspection of a fuel gas regulator the system specialist who had been assigned to the task of investigation into the fault began by
removing the regualtors top cover after two bolts had been taken out, a release o hydrocarbon gas occurred above the lowest action point. Leading to the activation of the
platform gpa. No damage to plant or equipment occurred, and there was no injury to persons caused on investigate of the fuel gas system a vent valve from the regulat r was
found to have failed to operate. This failure resulted in gas pressure being trapped in a 1/2 " stainless steel line approximately 1 metre long.
The compressor was de-isolated 4 days prior to the incident in readiness for n2 pressure testing. At this time all locks and chains were removed from the machine, no valves
were moved. After the testing was complete the compressor was prepared for service but the starter turbine exhaust to vent valve was left closed. When the gas was fed to the
starter the exhaust line over pressured, causing the securing clamp to fail. Gas was released into the enclosure and all six gas detectors alarmed and registered 1 0%. This
activated an immediated train s/d and general platform alarm. We are unclear as to whether the enclosure door blew open or was left open, but this caused gas detection within
the compressor house and at the fin fan level above(all raised 20% alar s). After 9 minutes the platform muster headcount was correct and gas detection levels had reduced to
below 20% level. All emergency systems functioned correctly. Wind ne 8-10 knots.
Commissioning the <...> injection to the gas metering and separator inlet for bringing the jupiter system on line. A leak was seen in the <...> module and reported to operations.
The methanol system was shutdown and depressured. On inspection the fitting was found to be only finger tight. Atmospheric conditions – wind 300 degrees 20-25 knots -
light good. - wave height 4 metres – noise low. - air temperature 10.5c.
At 17:00 hrs a smell of gas in the location of hcv 9850/b was identified as a leak from a steam seal on the valve.this leak was stopped by depressurising the downstream
pipework from the valve to carry out an effective repair on the stem xcv7356 was c osed and hcv 9805/b was to be opened,thereby depressurising the section of the line 16"
g1738 - 9106v. While opening hcv9850/b there was a release of hydrocarbon gas from the lower body joint of the valve.
Hot work was ongoing in um4ww which is now a construction area. After lighting the propane torch, the work party noticed a brief flame in the adjacent drain. The drain was
well covered with fire blanket and the flame self-extingusihed after a second. Th drain covers where not disturbed and there was no other visible of ignition. The hot work was
stopped and the drains flushed with water. Following a detailed examination, it was found that the open non-hazardous drains in um4ww were connected by a line ot shown
on the platform p&ids to the open hazardous drains in um4ww.
Plate heat exchanger had been subject to lomited leakage. Leakage rapidly deteriorated until decision was taken to shut down the skid for investigation and dismantling of
exchanger.
Instrument line provides pressure differential indication across a filter on the produced water outlet from the production 3-phase separator. Instrument line parted from pipe
fitting on pdi gauge manifold. Leak was heard and reported to <...> control room rom which a platform alarm and muster was initiated. Incident management team convened,
isolated the drilling platform and blew down the platform inventory. Guage and instrument line has been isolated and capped to allow guage, fittings and pipework to be
removed for further onshore investigation.
During routine blowdown of train 1 compressor pipework a gas leak was reported which emanated from a spectacle blind flange on the upstream side of isolation valve
v562135 on the blowdown line <...>. The gas release was terminated within a few inutes by stopping the blowdown. The back pressure in the system would have been of the
order 5 barg maximum. M5 is an open module with good natural ventilation. No gas detection registered on the fixed monitoring equipment.
On initiation of a full topsides blowdown, a gas leak was observed to be emanating from the vicinity of gas dehydration tower a. The blowdown was aborted within one minute
and the leak stopped. The leak was subsequently traced to an instrument line on the tower blowdown outlet pressure control valve (pv-62119-2) control cabinet. The line had
not been reconnected following planned maintenance.
During a platform topsides blowdown, the hose was subjected to normal hp vent back pressure, the compression train being shutdown at the time. A gas leak occurred from the
joint filling the turbine enclosure. Gas detection alarmed in the control room and the blowdown was aborted. The exhaust has been isolated pending investigation of the
joint/gasket.
The subsea umbilical termination unit (<...>) is adjacent to ellon wells <...> and <...>, 43m and 28m apart respectively. During inspection of <...> no. Methonal lines identified
as leaking methanol and gas. Methonal also identified as leaking from interst ces of umbilical at bulkhead termination for armouring. Leaks reported as minor.
04:22 red hazard status - m4w fire 04:27 fire confirmed in m4w by operations personnel. The on-load generating set g4400 developed a lub oil leak on the line to the <...> lub
oil was ignited, either by the hot p2 air line which runs directly below the lub il line or the hot exhaust transition pieces above and slightly west of the leak. The effect was to
cause a lub oild system pressure fed fire, which ignited the engine sump below the avon gas generator skid. The platform was brought to red hazard status w th fire indication
in m4w and shutdown both avon generator sets and process. Operations area technicians confirmed there was a fire and attemped to extinguish the fire using local fire fighting
equipment but had to withdraw due to the acrid smoke coming rom the oil fire and the electric cabling that was affected by the heat generated from the sump fire and direct
flame impingement. The support team and response teams tackled the fire using portable fire fighting extingushers (c02 and dry powder) and a fo m branch from a local fixed
foam unit. The fire was extinguished and the area cooled/monitored to ensure no reignition occurred. The resultant damage was local. Electric cabling in the immediate area
and the engine sump. There was also localised damage to the structural coating.
Hydrocarbons leaking from joint 1 gas detector activated at its lowest level. Pipework isolated and depressurised.
During a perforating programme on well e4 power failure caused loss of air to the grease pumps maintaining a seal on the lubricator grease head, resulting in gas passing
through seals activating two low alarm gas heads.
High seastate conditions caused back pressure variations from the sea sump to drain vessel (t71). Backpressure changes to the platform drain system resulted in the loss of the
water seal in a drain loop. The loss of water from the drain loop seal allowed minor volume of gas from the 80 millibar purge gas system to be evolved. Gas head 5238
registered high lel gas and executed an automatic yellow production shutdown. No ignition took place and the gas evolved was quickly dissipated. The loop seal was imme
iately topped up with water to regain water seal integrity the production plant was reset and production recommenced.
The ngl plant was shutdown and depressured, preparatory work for p98 despading was then carried out. A hp hose was being used to depressure and drain parts of the system.
The hose was being moved from one location to another. On disconnection the hose end was plugged and then unplugged on reaching the new location. When the hose was
unplugged a minute amount of condensate dripped from the hose end. This activted a high gas alarm and resulted in a production shutdown.
Diesel fuelling hose had been put into the void space between the ngl plant and moving pipe deck and not isolated. Nozzle broke free from the hose and the diesel flowed from
the open end. The hose has not been isolated following the previous fuelling op ration.
Whilst pressure testing the 2" discharge hose from dowell unit to 3000psi prior to a cement job, the hose ruptured resulting in the contents ( biozan spacer ) approx 1/10 barrel
discharging over the area. A roustabout in the area received minor splashes o material to the eyes but after washing and examination by the medic returned to work.
An automatic yellow shutdown occurred when high gas level was detected briefly by detector g5238 at the east end of vo2. The source of gas is believed to have originated
from the adjacent tundish drain to t71. This tundish drain had been topped up at the tart of the dayshift. The gas detection / yellow shutdown occured about 20 minutes after
t71 had been routinely pumped out. T71 had received cold fluids ex helideck just prior to t71 being pumped out.
Prodeuction seperator v01 was taken offline and was being drained to close drain v45. Gas detectors g118 and g119 indicated low gas in the v45 module. On investigation a
small leak was found in a 2" drain line immediately outside v45 module leading from v 1. V01 draining was stopped and leakage abated. A temporary clamp was fitted to the
8mm diameter hole to prevent further leakage and allow for controlled shutdown of the plant and isolation for repair.
Ccr reported low gas in v45 area (gas head g119) first indications the gas detected was coming from p119 leaking seal. Pump was isolated, gas reading in ccr continued up to
30 lel. Further checks in the area were carried out and a hole was found in an el ow on the 2" drain line to v45 leaking gas. A temporary patch and sealant were fitted.
Following an 18 day shutdown to carry out major planned maintenance, the oil plant was being brought back on line. 12 minutes after commencing export, the platform
shutdown due to gas detection. Checks were carried out and local tundish loop seals topped p then the plant was restarted under controlled conditions. Gas was again detected
and the platform shutdown. The release was from open drain valves on the test separator pump.
Informed by <...> that diesel bunkers would be taken in the early hours. At 02:10 the <...> arrived. On checking the diesel log book the s/e leg had 433 tons in and we were to
recieve 252 tons from the <...>. The bunkers system was pumped out prior o starting. Bunkers started at approximately 02:40. At approx 04:10 an interface was reached. The
captain of the <...> was called to stop bunkers, on a marine band radio. The time between stopping the bunkers pump on the <...> and the flow to stop resulted in an amount of
diesel overflowing into the sea sump. The <...> had given us 122 tons. The s/e leg holds 750 tons. The log was not correct resulting in a discharge to the sea sump.
Normal operating conditions. Operator on patrol of area noticed leak from under lagging on 2" water offtake from v16 gas separator to v01/v02 leaked onto deck. Had only just
occured as quantity of liquid on deck was minimal. Leak isolated immediately and vessel depressurised to affect repair.
The loop seals are topped up on a regular basis, this was a hot day, and evaporation of this seal occured causing vapour from t71 to escape back into pkg 5, where an adjacent
gas head detected it, and a yellow shutdown followed. Diesel bunkering was in pr gress at the same time. This may have had an effect on t71, but further investigations on a
similar nature failed to replay the event. We will do this again with millibar gauge on t71. Closed drain vessel.
The ngl plant had tripped and shutdown following selected well shut down in the oil plant. The plant had been re-started with compressor ko2 on diesel fuel. After approx. 2
hours the ccr reported an oil mist alarm to ngl control. On investigation, the tec nician smelled diesel and noticed a leak/spray in the turbine hood. The machine was
immediately shut down manually. The leak stopped and further isolation was made outside the hood. The fire team attended. After a period to allow the machine to cool, the
doors were opened, the engine checked and the spillage cleaned up. Subsequently a hairline crack was found in the bourbon tube of the diesel burner pressure gauge.
Failure of swagelock adaptor on the suction/pressure gauge of p99 condensate pump. Resulting in the release of condensate into the atmosphere.
Operations techs noticed main oil line pump po4 turbine exhaust smoking at the bellows section. Po4 shutdown, lagging dampened down. When removing some lagging it
ignited and burned for some 15 seconds before being extinguished. The central control room ( cr) was notified of the flare at 2154 and sounded the general alarm. Within the
minute the ccr was informed that the fire was out and the situation made safe. The pob muster continued and established correct @ 2202 personnel were stood down at 2206.
On in estigation it was found that a small quantity of lube oil had dripped onto the lagging from the ngl compressor turbine air inlet ducts drains which had inadvertently been
left open.
The drill crew circulating through the standpipe manifold in order to jet the wellhead and bop clear of cement debris prior to pressure testing the bop. During this initial phase a
section of chiksan line complete with a lo-torque valve was blown from its connection on the drain line of the standpipe manifold. A quantity of mud was expelled over the rig
floor and drilling equipment. The pressure at the time of failure was approx 2900 psi. Investigations revealed that a 2" hammer lock 1502 fitting on the ch cksan had been
incorrectly fitted to a 2" male 1002 fitting on the standpipe drain. A 1502 2"thread is a very slack fit on a 1002 2" weco thread.
Work on production seperator vo1 was planned in order to prepare for forthcoming maintenance and modification work. The seperator had previously been removed from
production service and was isolated by valves. The scope of work included draining the vesse of hydrocarbons, water flushing and purging. This was to lead onto a full
isolation by the application of blanks. The work had previously been the subject of a risk assessment and was subject to procedural control. During the latter part of the shift a p
rmit was obtained for blanking off the gas outlet. At about 1655 hrs low gas alarms were received in a central control room. These were followed shortly afterwords by a high
gas alarm which initiated a full production shutdown. In accordance with standing instructions from the control roomtechnician operated the general alarm and put all
personnel to emergency muster stations. The site was checked by the operations supervisor, the fso and the duty fire team leader. The site was declared safe. Production
remained shutdown for a further eleven hours. An investigation team was appointed by the platform oim.
An instrument technician was dispatched to the ngl area to investigate a fault on p98 condensate pump. A differential pressure switch was being inspected by the technician.
The switch was isolated and a bleed plug was removed. A small volume of condensate drained from the dp switch. An i/r point beam gas detector is located directly below the
switch. The release initiated a high gas alarm (a low gas alarm was also recorded on an adjacent detector). The production shutdown on this f&g action. The general al rm was
sounded and fd emergency procedures were initiated. The site was checked by the operations supervisor with fso and duty fire team leader in attendance. The gas quickly
dissipated and the site was declared safe. An investigation team was appointed b the oim.
The platform was shutdown but had not been reset for start up pending final inspections and notifications of incident in ngl earlier in morning. The downhole safety valve
control lines were therefore not pressurised. The control line pressure dissipated t rough time allowing hydrocarbons to migrate up the line from a production string into the
return storage tank of the hpu. Gas began venting from a gas vent line just below level 1. Two gas heads are located either side of this vent. One high gas alarm was recorded at
0700 hrs. The second high gas alarm came in at 0704hrs. With the platform already in shutdown status, the central control room technician activated the general alarm. All
personnel went to muster stations and fd emergency procedures were initi ted. The site was checked by the operations supervisor with fso and duty fire team in attendance. The
control lines were isolated in the eggboxes at the oliver panel. The gas quickly dissipated and the site was declared safe. An investigation team was appointed by the oim.
The report of oil leaking was given to the mol control room staff by a construction crew member. An operations technician checked the report and found oil weeping from a
tapping point on the daniel irifice box the operations supervisor and oim were infor ed. The decision was made to shutdown the plant to allow further investigation. A yellow
shutdown was initiated. The line was then isolated and flushed. Investigation revealed a crack in an a6 screwed nipple at a 1/2" tapping point on the daniel orific box. The
crack is suspected to have been caused by experiencing a force and then enlarged through time by corrosion. Further force may have contributed to the failure.
A pinhole leak in a sample point 2" weldneck flange on oil export pipework on pl 10009 was discovered by operations technician. The process was shutdown and pipe
isolated,drained and flushed with service water followed by nitrogen.
Worker reported a leak from ga 02 to the control room, on, investigation condensate was spraying out of a fine crack in a weld on the tapping point . The area was cleared and
the condensate injection changed over to ga 07. Ga 02 flowline was depressurised isolated and removed for shore repair.
Gas export had tripped due to high level in compressor suction scrubber. A report was received in the control room of a gas leak in c5. On investigation the leak was observed
to be form a corrosion probe installation on the gas export line. We were not xporting and the line pressure was 118bar. Gas export esd valve closed, line depressurised.
Provbe tightened half a turn. Pressure containment cap installed. Line service reinstatement pressure tested.
Whilst calibration work on pza 2063 hh was ongoing, an isolation applied in order to facilitate maintenance to the instrument failed, resulting in a gas release of some 2std, m3
which was detected by the fixed fire and gas detection system surface, proces shutdown then automatically occurred and the leak was isolated.
Gas leak from aluminium plate fin cooler on 2/3 stage of flash gas compressor. Gas detector into low level alarm. Operator checking area noted leak from cooler e2030 fire
protection enclosure. Manual shutdown of flash gas compressor initiated. Cooler isolated and depressurised.
During nitrogen purging operations of v1210 (d 1st stage separator), an instrument plug was removed from a level, instrument bridle on the depressurised vessel causing a
minor gas release. Due to proximity of fixed gas detectors and calam weather condit ons, the platform was raised to alert then hazards status with sps and blowdown. Gas
quickly dispersed naturally. On release of the gas, the nowsco technician left the scene to report the situation to a shell techniciean, who replaced the plug but due to the
prevailing conditions, the rlease was detected and executive action initiated. The vessel was fully depressurised and was being prepared for nitrogen purging at the time of the
incident.
When the alarm activated the area operator investigated but could not detect any leak. He continued to search with the aid of a portable gas detector and traced the leak to a gas
heater element. Gas was escaping past one of the element sealing arrangement which is compression fitting. The system was manually shut down and depressurised it requires
two 60% alarm for an alarm for an automatic shutdown. Normal operating pressure is 1850 psi. Gse 1182 is approx 7ft from the leak.
Gas compressor kt-02 was being re-started after having been taken off-line to carry out an engine wash. At 28% gas producer speed the engine ignition system was activated.
At that moment a loud bang was heard and the compressor skid enclosure doors blew o en. The engine start sequence aborted and the machine shut down automatically. On
investigation the exhaust collector in the enclosure had broken a weld on it's hotizontal plane, leaving an opening of 30" across and a gap of 1". There was no sign of any o her
damage to the exhaust or surrounding area. The cause would appear to be excessive fuel gas delivered to the combuster.
A pin hole defect was detected during a routine general inspection. The weep was initially very small and did not start to leak any significant amount until the paint/surface of
the pipe was disturbed by rubbing. The plant was manually shut down and depre surised.
While filling piping in fiscal metering package venting noise altered personnel to leak. Leak occured at a drain valve which had a blind flange partially loose in outlet; valve
was in open position w locking pin in place. A small amount of oil approx 2 ga , escaped before valve could be closed valve was inaccessible being underneath metering skid.
Spill was washed to open drain system and contained.
Whilst conducting a rov survey of the subsea connection a minor gas leak was discovered on a recently installed 24" flange connecting the 20" gas export line to the <...>
pipeline at <...>. This flange connection had passed the required leak test (1.1 x mao ) after installation. (the pipeline tee is <...> km from the platform).
Failure of instrument of pipe fitting on gas metering skid resulting in gas release.
During routine start-up of bk 070 compression unit, gas was detected in the turbine module after gas starter initiated. The start sequence was aborted. Investigation found that
1/4" tubing to a gauge fitted to show the starter gas pressure had sheared at a reducing fitting due to the unsupported weight of the gauge
A night shift technician <...> smelt condensate/gas in phase 1 knock out pot room on leman bk. He investigated but failed to find the source. This information was passed to the
day shift who further investigated. At 0900 hrs a crack was found in the 90 degrees elbow attached to nozzle "j" of the boot section of vessel bk-v-100. The gas leak rate was
very small and too low to quantify. A portable gas detector placed on the crack measured 6% l.e.l. n.b. the elbow is situated in free space under the module floor. Thus the crack
was in the open air outside the module.
<...> terminal reported a low level gas alarm on <...>, a not normally manned installation, during mid afternoon on <...>. An intervention team of 5 men arrived by helicopter at
17:41. Gas was discovered leaking from a sheared nipple connecting w345 ellhead to its associated pressure indicator/transmitter. The top and bottom master gate valves were
shut manually and the pressure remaining in the wellhead vented to atmosphere via the kill system - this reduced the leak to a very low level. Due to the navailability of
materials to effect a permanent repair, the source of the leak was plugged, the sssv shut and isolated and the well withdrawn from service pending permanent repair at the next
planned visit on <...>.
The hydrocarbon release was from t3 wing valve bonnet cavity check valve. Five gas heads detected the release instantaneously, one at 25% lel and the other four at 20% lel.
At the time of the incident the plant was being brought back on production after process shut down (prx). The plant was shut down manually via a prx button on the cellar
deck by the chief operator on his way to the scene to investigate. The leak ceased immediately on shutdown. No damage or injuries were sustained. The weather was wa m, sea
calm with negligable wind. The duration of the leak was approx 2 mins.
The gas leak was spotted by inspection engineer while carrying out module inspection. No alarms had been given, detectors not giving any reading. Leak was traced to a ring
type joint. The section of plant (export gas compressor) was immediately shutdown.
Escape of hydrocarbon gas from flange y 2501, plate separator, during routine draining of vessel. This was picked up by one gas head (gd 9100) in mod 5 mezz. Flanges on top
of y2501 were secured with 2 bolts, (8 bolt flange), this had been done due to the frequency of requiring to adjust oil collar weirs. (approx) once per shift. The situation was
exacerbated by prod. H2o from the test separator on manual control without correct level indication.
An oil leak was seen at the base of train 2 low pressure outlet valve production technician was called on arrival he witnessed the plug fall blowing out releasing more oil and
gas. He initiated a yellow shutdown locally and radiod the control room requesting that the fire team attend a foam blanket was laid down. Plug was found to be badly
corroded, with virtually no thread remaining.
Watch-keeping duties revealed a pinhole leak at the base of weld connecting the 1" chemical injection line to the flowline <...>. Salt had previously crystallised concealing the
defect, and when rubbed off a small amount of oil/gas was emitted, the flow was stopped with a rag pad, until the well was shut in and the flowline depressured, in a matter of a
few minutes.
During removal of cladding for pipe inspection, employee heard a hissing sound when he removed an eigth" self tapping screw from the cladding. He replaced the screw
immediately and informed the production department. On investigation the screw was found to have penetrated a 1" closed drain line. The cladding on this pipework has never
been removed since being commissioned in <...>.
New well b2 has just been brought on line at 07:25hrs. It was gas lifted between 08:55 and 11:30 to assist the well to flow. At the time of the incident preparations were being
made to shut in the well and rig up for a perforating rum. During this oper tion, personnel in the area were alerted tot he release of gas by the noise it created. They
immediately traced and isolated the leak. Investigation revealed that a 1/2" nominal bore instrument tube swaged fitting had failed on b2 well
Production plant being restarted following an earlier unrelated shutdown gas detected in m3 upper mezzanine level by fixed f&g equipment. Plant automatically shutdown and
de-pressurised as designed. Platform general alarm initiated from general control ro m. Personnel mustered - all accounted for. Sourse of leak found to be failure of top joint
gasket of pcv 5137.
Gas escape from leaking hatch cover seal on v1200. One gas head activated 60% gas alarm. Two other gas heads activated 20% local alarm in control room but did not exceed
25% lel. Gas dispersed almost immediately. Escape due to slugging action of water level control valves on main and test separators. No ignition. No injuries.
The <...> production train (train 2) had been closed down and isolated all day for remedial work on the water and oil level control valves. During re-start of production on train
2, after operating pressures and levels had been achieved, the manual bl ck valve on the 1st stage separator water leg was open - allowing produced water to move forward to
the flotation cell. Approx 2 minutes after starting to operate the block valve, the production operator became aware of a problem in the area of the flota ion cell, and informed
the ccr via the radio, whilst closing in the block valve - shortly after reporting to the ccr, the 60% gas alarm sounded automatically.
At 16:20 hrs on <...>, during the day to day activities of personnel on the cats riser, a slight sound of leaking gas was detected, on investigation a slight leak was discovered
from the north side of the check valve adjacent to the lower two plugs, he plugs being the sealing plugs of the check valve spindle ends. (the leak was detectable by ear due to
the riser`s low noise when operation os stable). The individual immediately contacted the pcr via phone. The duty chief opertator contacted the oim and the production
foreman. It was observed to be a leak adjacent to the bottom of the two plugs on the valve north face due to paint etc. Determining the cause - either the casting fault or the
plug thread couldn`t be agreed to. Immediately the decision as made to shutdown and depressure the cats riser. At the time the weather conditions were dry, sunny, wind 20/25
knots @ 182o.
At approximately 21:45 hrs on the <...> a gas release was detected by a 20% gas alarm (single head) at the channel end cover of exchanger e106b located in module 5 cellar
deck. As a result of this alarm steps were taken to immediately shut down and depressurise this train (train 1) to allow investigations and appropriate maintenance work to
proceed. Subsequent investigations highlighted that the channel end cover gasket was damaged around the 9 o`clock position. The gasket was replaced with a new one drawn
from stores and the vessel reassembled after ensuring that all mating surfaces were clean and free from debris. `hitorc` stud torquing procedures and equipment was utilised
duriing therebuilding of the unit. Upon reassembly, the vessel was pressure/leak tested using nitrogen in stages up to a final test pressure of 60 bar. Snoop leak detection fluid
was used at each stage to assist with the monitoring of any possible leaks. <...> on completion of all other associated maintenance tasks, the vessel was handed back to
productiondepartment who then commenced with the recommissioning of the equipment. During the recommissioing phase, the gas pressure was gradually increase and
suitable leak detection monitoring equipment was employed to monitor for any possible leaks. The equipment reached its normal operating pressure of 80-85 bar around
Routine preventative maintenance was scheduled for m400a turbine, this included inspection of the fuel gas filter inside the enclosure. Process and electrical isolations were
applied during the nightshift of <...>. The permit was issued and accepte by the performing authority at 0640 hrs <...>. At approx 0730 hrs he noted a small pressure reading on
the filter pressure gauge and began to open the vent valve to prove the system safe prior to removing the filter housing. With the gas head in very lose proximity to the release
site and the ventilation fans isolated, teh 60% gas alarm was activated immediately he began to open the vent valve.
After engine change and some modification work the fuel systems were being prepared for commissioning. As the fuel gas was being commissioned gas escaped into the
engine enclosure activating a platform 60% lel gas alarm. The system was immediately isolated and depressured.
At 02:44 hrs on <...> single detector <...> in fire zone 46 detected high level gas production operator sent to investigate. At 02:47 hrs on <...> single gas detector <...> in fire
zone 44 detected low level gas. Operator found flange on outlet of rcb dry gas seal filter (s-2015) lea- ing.control room informed,gas compressor shut down and depressurised.
Filter taken off line.
Following change over from fuel gas to diesel fuel a fire was detected in the turbine enclosure of g8004 generator by two infra red flame detectors.there was automatic
discharge of co2 extinguishing media into the enclosure.on investigation,it was found that a small section of pipe lagging was charred. The diesel leak was identified on the
main liquid fuel line at burner no.6.
Whilst an instrument technician was taking readings of condition monitoring equipment in g-8000 turbine enclosure he was alerted by cro that a low level gas indication was
identified at the equipment.the technician left the enclosure and closed the door the fire and gas system then indicated high gas levels (20% lel) in the enclosure vent intake
resulting in a total platform shutdown (gpa and muster).following the incident no unusual conditions could be identified and no elevated gas concentration were found.
At 17:50 hrs a loud noise was heard by <...> wireline personnel coming from gas lift manifold area. They contacted the control room. Operators and production supervisor
immediately went to the wellbay and located the noise which was due to a gas leak from the flow transmitter fitted on n15 well isolated, drained and vented. The transmitter
was removed and disassembled to identify cause of leak. The graphite gask, between manifold and transmitter, had a segment blown out.
During restart of the gas compressor gas was noted escaping from the body tell-tale port of rv-20007. The compressor restart was suspended. Initial investigations concluded
that the gas was escaping from the ltlp flare via a defective internal seal within the valve body. The leakage was controlled by isolating the ltlp flare header from the source of
pressure (lp flare header). The leak was detected by smell and then portable gas detection. The fixed detection indicated a slight increase on detectors close to release. The
weather conditions were 11 knots 230o.
Routine patrol by plant technician observed liquid falling from mezzanine level north side of module c38. Leak was found to be a flange joint on 11/2" <...> methanol
distribution line. All methanol injection points were isolated and the topside ethanol pump stopped and line depressurised.
Pin hole leak on 2" drain line from cp-17 production manifold, resulting in a discharge of 0.5bbls well fluids. The leak was observed to occur by an area plant technician who
instigated a local isolation of the flow line and production manifold. The line was de-pressurised to the closed drain sytem.
At 2030 hrs on <...>, an instrument assembly connected to a double block and bleed valve on cp52's 9 5/8" casing was blown off. This instrument assembly landed some 20-25
feet north of cp52 and oil was ejected to a height of 30 feet app oximately. This was all heard and then observed by a person working in the next connecting module. He left the
modules to find a telephone at a safe location to report the incident. Simultaneously the fixed gas detection system operated at its low alarm s t point of 20% lel. One head went
into high level, 60% lel for a short period of time. The control room operator dispatched the module operator to investigate. On his arrival he observed oil blowing upwards
under pressure from cp52 and proceeded to isolat the leak by closing the main block valve from off the 9 5/8" casing. Standard platform procedures were implemented, eg
suspension of hot work on the platform, pa's etc. As soon as practible the "dublok" valve outlet with the broken off part of the instru ent fitting still in it, was removed and
replaced, and a pressure reading obtained. This showed 147 bar in the 9 5/8" annulus. The 13 3/8" annulus space was then checked and it revealed zero pressue. The well was
not shut in at this time due to risk of co pounding the problem. On examination of the failed instrument component, it revealed that the first male connection screwed into the
During a routine inspection of module 11, the plant supervisor noticed a background smell of gas in the vicinity of gas compressor <...>. On close inspection he noticed a small
gas escape of gas coming from a suction pipe connecting on skid scrubber to suction pulsation damper. The failure of the pipe appeared to be a longitudinal crack at the 6
o'clock position on a right hand elbow. The release of gas noticeable in the immediate vicinity but was not sufficient to initiate a low level gas alarm. The nearest detectors are
approximately 4m distant. The <...> was shutdown and isolated. Apart form the apparent fialure of the pipe, no damage to property or equipment occurred. There was no
injury to personnel. There was no impact on the environment.
Whilst the gas compression operator was carrying out his normal duties he observed gas escaping from <...>. This was immediately reported to the plant supervisor and the
entire gas compression facilities were manually shutdown. The vess l was immediately isolated and vented to flare via the blowdown facility and the condensate inventory
pumped forward to the mol. At no time during the incident did the gas level rise above 5% lel. Within 10 mins there was no visible leakage. It was estab ished that the leakage
had developed form the valve packing and was escaping from a telltale plug in the actuator spacer sleeve. After a further 5 mins the area was gas tested, no trace was detected
and normal access was reinstated.
Whilst carrying out a 3 monthly ppm on sp39 the chemical injection flange on the well flowline developed a leak resulting in a mixture of gas/oil/water discharging from the
flange. The well hmv and sssv were closed immediately and the flowline was depres urised. The leak was contained using a washdown hose, mechanical isolation was put in
place and the flange removed for inspection. Upon investigation the rjt ring was found to be corroded, also the flange face cut out.
At 0255hrs an alarm on the main control room fire and gas panel indicated low gas detected in module 03 near the lpg pumps. Area operator informed who proceeded to the
location. He reported back to the mcr that he was unable at that time to locate the s urce of the gas escape. The plant supervisor and an operator proceeded to the area with
another portable gas monitor and on arriving in module 03 met the area operator who had found the leak on the discharge flow meter lp impulse line of lpg pump ga-0392.the
pump was shut down and the impulse line isolated at the flow element. The module was vented and gas free at 0308hrs.
Plant supervisor was carrying out routine checks around gas compressor <...>. He noticed a slight smell of gas around the suction supply (8") to the compressor. Close
examination revealed what was suspected as a pinhole leak near a weldo flange. The nit was shutdown manually and isolated. Ndt (dyepen) inspection revealed an 85mm
crack longitudinal below the weldo flange area. The spool piece was removed from system and returned to <...> for specialist analysis of possible cause of failure.
At approx 0015 hrs on <...> gas head 03g 35 indicated low then high gasin the module. At the same time lpg pump 0392a tripped. Investigation revealed module 03 was
partially contaminated with smoke. (later sourced from pump lub oil system). The pump was removed from service and mechanically and electrically isolated from platform
systems.
At 2025hrs a low gas alarm in module 03 was activated. Investigations revealed a small leak had occurred on the suction pipework drain line to <...> booster pump. The pump
was immedialtey shutdown and isolated mechanically from the oil systems in he module. Only one gas head had actioned and this was local to the leak. Controlled de-
pressurisation of pipe was monitored by plant operations personnel.
While performing routine operations in module 01 wellheads area, an operating technician shut in the <...> water injection well <...>. Having closed the choke, he was on his
way to the baker pannel to close the master valve. Hearing a `bang` he turned and saw the instrument piping assembly for the well pilot and tubing pressure transmitter had
blown off the kill wing of the xmas tree. High pressure water was venting from the kill wing into the module. He shut the kill valve immediately, stopping the leak. inspection
of the piping assembly revealed that it had been connected to the tree using a 12mm male compression fitiing screwed into an incompatible 1/2" npt thread hole in the blank
fitted to the kill valve.
Water injection to the <...> wells w2 & w4 being carried out when an increase in injection waterflow rate was observed via monitoring on capo. Print out shows a drop in
pressure from 180.8 to 133.8 bar.both w2 & w4 were closed in and pipeline pressures mo itored.a detailed test procedure was carried out and the leak positively identified as
being on the injection water flow line to w4 between the pfv904 and the umg valve 902 the pipework between the pfv and umg is some 3 km long,made up of 2.7 km of stee
pipe with 150 m of coflexip at each end.
Platform had been flooded by activation of deluge systems durin work on oily water separator.
During a routine plant inspection tour, a production operator observed a high pressure fluid leak from the base of lcv 53107. This lcv controls liquid levels in production
separator a <...>. A p &id of production separator a and associate piping is attached. Subsequent inspection revealed that the base plate of the lcv had suffered internal erosion
damage resulting in the formation of a small "through thickness" hole.
An operator on routine patrol and cheking on condensate level controller heard an escape from the downstream side of the condensate level control valve bypass. The leak was
increasing and was immediately isolated by operator. Inspection of the pipework revealed sand erosion.
At 0704 hours 25% lel alarm indicated in <...> control room, on <...> panel <...> was in normal not manned situation. The alarm drifted in and out. Standby vessel was sent to
check and reported a high noise level. Wind speed 25 knots. An auto atic shutdown followed. The platform was left to depressure until a helicopter was available to take a
work party over. The stainless steel impulse/support line to the pressure gauge on wel d11 was found to have fatigued. The wellhead was moving more th n others. Inspection
found that theconductor guides at 8m level were missing - only 1 of 4 in place. Pipeline renewed and platform put back on-line. Note: only manual blowdown is possible on
these satellites.
Oim arrived on <...> at 0737, and commenced walk around. He noticed a gas escape noise from laging box around d11 hi-lo pressure pilot. The well had shut itself down on
lo-pilot as the result of the leak and hence very small invento y was involved - no oir12 has been raised. Upon investigation the impulse/support line which is a short npt stud
fitting had fatigue failed. Cause excessive wellhead movement as a result of missing stabiliser in conductor guide. This incident is very si ilar to that reported on oir9a & oir12
for gas escape on <...>.
At <...> on <...> was in production and operating in the unmanned mode. The platform had been last visited on <...>. At 14:34 on <...> a low gas alarm was indicated in the
manifold area on <...>. The alarm was received in the <...> control room. The <...> oim was informed by the control room operator and the <...> platform was shutdown
remotely. A high gas alarm was received at 17:38 and the <...> platform was subsequently blown down remotely at 17:45. <...> was visited by an 8 man team on <...>.
Investigations found one gas head in alarm. Further investigation revealed 2 separate gas leaks originating from flowline to choke joints on wells <...> and <...>.
At <...> on <...> was in production and operating in the unmanned mode. The platform had been last visited on <...>. At 12:22 on <...> a low gas alarm was indicated in the
manifold area on <...> The alarm was received in the <...> control room. The <...> oim was informed by the control room operator and the rb platform was shutdown remotely.
A 5 man team visited <...> at 17:50 on <...>. Investigations found one gas head in alarm. Further investigation revealed a gas leak origin ting from the flowline to choke outlet
destec joint on well <...>.
2 offsmall bore connections were cut of main oil line pipework as part of a modification. Pipework had been left full of water to remove heat during grinding of wall of tapping
through partialthickness with final cut being completed using cold cut techniq es. Once tappings were cut off water began draining as expected after a short period of ime oil
began to drain instead of water. Residual oil had been trapped at high poin in pipework and flushing operations had not moved it. Hence, when pipework draine approx 1
barrel of oil was split. A gas head below the grating was covered with the spill and operated at its lowest action point.
12:55 requested to bring w6 on line. (w6 status - sssv shut, tree and flow line depressurised) 13:00 shut w6 flowline vent and opened flowline block. 13:02 commenced
pressuring up well 6 from well 5 via kill skid. W5 sssv, lmg,ung kill-open fw,swab,shut. 6 kill, umg, lmg.open,sssv,fw,swab shut. 13:06 commenced opening w6 fw to
pressurise flow line. 13:07 audible gas leak from w6 xmas tree. 13:08 shut w6 umg w5 kill valve. 13:10 g.a. caused by coincidental low level gas 13:14 kill skid to vent
manual va ve opened. 13:15 audible leak stopped. 13:16 g.a. reset. Icing observed w6 fw grease injector.
The pe, oil op, and <...> op proceeded to t11 in module 'b' and the oil op removed the isolation tags from the kill wing and upper master valves. The oil op then re-connected
the air supply line to the upper master valves. All three personnel then proceeded to fpi (t11 well control module) and the oil op looked for a further isolation in the field panel
on the well control module. There was no further isolation in place and he then moved the upper master valve to the open position. A loss of containment was hen evident from
t11 swab valve connected to bleed. The oil op immediately closed the upper master valve and then proceeded with the dga op to t11 tree and closed the swab valve and o/b
vent. Three gas heads in module 'b' went into high level alarm and th platform was immediately put into a confirmed alarm condition. The dga op went to his muster point at
his lifeboat station, as did the pe. The oil op went to the control room and reported to the etl that the gas leak was from the job he was working on. H told the etl that he had
closed the upper master valve, the swab valve and o/b vent. The etl then sent the oil op back into module 'b' to close the choke valves. On investigating the area the emergency
ba team saw the oil op in module 'b' and he informed them that the leak was from t11 and the relevant valves had been closed. Ba teams then checked out the area for gas and
Gas compression was shut down in preparation for e6 isolation. Import gas was on-line and selected production wells were flowing. Initiating alarm, activated in section c of
the gas alarm panel at low level then more or less instantaneously rose to high l vel. During this time two technicians local to the incident attempted to intervene manually to
shut off gas escape. These personnel identified the source of escape as the impulse line of pic 156 (later identified as a parted swagelok fitting). Platform st tus lights were
illuminated esdi was initiated automatically and personnel were called to muster stations. This was followed by rapid deterioration of situation indicated by 8 gas heads moving
to full scale in module e. Deluge and blowdown systems were ma ually activated and power was manually shutdown. Emergency teams were quickly on-scene awaiting deluge
isolation prior to entering module. A 4-man ba team entered the module with two men detailed to isolate the impulse line and two men to provide back-up. whilst the team was
in module e indications of gas migration were confirmed by high level alarms in modules a and b and gas detection in module f. This was followed by low level gas indication
in emerg gen room which was immediately checked and found to b clear. On completion, of pic 156 isolation full module was carried out in modules e/f/a and b. Venting was
Gilycol was being injected trough a tapped flange with threaded connection. The fitting started to leak and gas escaped into the module. The gas was detected by gas heads, the
platform went to alert status. Technicians checked the area isolated the flan e and reported the area safe.
On start up of p1211 and p1201 oil booster and main line export pumps, the area technician observed an oil leak on 1"pl1025,rv line on downste- am side of crude oil cooler
e1201.this operates at 13 bar and 65 c.after shutting down the pumps and isolating he lines the stainless steel lagging was removed uncovering t 1/8" diameter hole.this was
probably caused by underlagging corrosion.
Wind - 30 knots from n/w. A valve froming a block in a double block and bleed passed slightly. This was not apparant when the isolation was applied as the whole system had
been depressurised and it is thought that the bleed valve was blocked. 8 hours afte prssure was applied to the passing valve it escaped through the bleed into the module. Once
the block valve seated properly the leak stopped. The gas dispersed naturally.
During start up after a process trip, the liquid level increased in the gfu and tripped the inlet valve. The level then buil up in the tps which overflowed, releasing oil/water and
gas. The liquid and gas spread through the module. The north easterly w nd caused the gas to spread s/w. Towards m3 mezz and to the air intake of g8000 generator. The
genertor shutdown automatically. The gas compressor and oil process were then shut down manually. Gas detectors in p1 also indicated gas released from a small amount of
oil which spilled over the bund of the tps/gfu and onto the deck of p1 below. Technicians then hosed down m2 deck and cleared the module of gas. All oil/water was flushed
down the drains.
During commissioning or b train 1st stage separator after de sanding operations a small condensate leak was observed from the bonnet of a 2" n.r.v condensate line to b 2nd
stage.
A temporary hose split causing a leak of oily water to sea. The leak was caused by a pump pulsating causing the hose to rub against the deck gratings. The pump was not
running at the time the leak was detected, but oil was being exported from crude oil st rage tank putting the hose under pressure of approx 100 psi max. A task risk assessment
was carried out prior to use.
Process fluids were being introduced into a seperator which had been aligned to the glc suction flare line. At 07.50 hrs it was reported that rv 5202 had lifted. On investigation
the presence of gas was confirmed within module 7. One local detector regist red 20-25% lel. The source of the gas release was identified as being a parallel screwed fitting in
the body of the relief valve which had partially unscrewed from the body. The plug locking device, a locking wire and small screw, which would have prevent d this was found
to be sheared off the glc suction header flare line was isolated & therefore " dead headed with no means of forward flow and as a result the rv lifted.
Turbine a running on load fuelled via this fuel gas system. Enclosure gas heads detected low level gas (approx 10% lel), after initial investigation turbine was selected to run on
diesel fuel. Further investigation found crack on one of the gas manifold f el lines. Turbine was shutdown and gas line replaced. Crack in fuel line was found to be approx
60m/m long & estimated time of release was 10 minutes.
On activation of one gas head at 20% lel, in the ccr. The production senior technician was sent to investigate. On arriving at the scene and identifying the location of the leak,
he informed the ccr who shut down and de-pressurised the h.p. compressor.
During routine inspection & plant checks the production senior technician deteceted a smell of gas. On investigation he found a flange on the h.p. discharge cooler weeping
gas. He advised the c.c.r. of his findings who shut down the compressor to effect remedial repairs.
During coiled tubing retrieval frim slot 11 the coiled tubing was damaged by inadvertently closing the manual master valve upon it. A small amount of gas was observed at the
sturring box while recovering the coiled tubing at which time the operator closed the rams on his equipment until a safe method of recovery was determined.
After completing a pressure test to 1000psi and bleeding off sea water test medium, gas was observed in the <...> unit after venting +/- 2bbls into displacement tank. Valves at
<...> unit were manually closed in to prevent further release. The <...> unit displacement tank is open topped resulting in gas being released to module, fixed gas detection
system indicated 38% & 35% lel respectively on 2 deck head detectors.
While bleeding down the `a` annulus of well <...> via the choke manifold to the poor boy degasser using the auto choke, the choke was being slowly opened and the indicator
climbed from 1/8 open to 1/2 open, a slug of gas carried over the degasser and s t off the gas alarm. The manual valve was immediately closed and the well shut in within
seconds of the alarm sounding.
During normal operations an operator on his routine tour of the worksite noticed a grease nipple on a valve leaking. The offending valve was closed and the leak stopped. The
valve in question was off the header to b train from slot 2. Consequently the slo had to be closed in until a replacement nipple was installed. Approx 3 ltrs crude (97% water)
released.
During workover of slot 45 approximately 2 barrels of crude oil were spilled as the tubing hanger was being picked up. A gas bubble came to the surface and overflowed the
bell nipple. An investigation team was formed and an investigation was carried out to determine the cause of this overflow; procedures were ammended accordingly.
During start up of a turbine a gas alarm was initiated in the main area by a gas release from "a" turbine gas pipework.
A plug was found on the floor of a deluge cabinet after a production tech. Had investigated the flood of water from below the door. The threads on the plug were seen to be
worn and it is assumed that it blew out of the spool piece between two supply wate isolation valves on the firewater ring main. A new plug has been fitted.
The process plant was operationally steady and exporting approximately 73000/bbl/day of oil and 65 mmscfd of gas. The b compressor train (pgt10 turbine, high pressure
compressor) had been shut down for some days due to a problem with the lub, oil system of the turbine. It had been decided to perform and engine strip down to effect
repairs. Additionally the opportunity was taken to replace the rotating element of the export compressor due to a known under performance of the unit. The compressor train
was isolated to effect these repairs. The export compressor had been purged with nitrogen and subsequently tested as hydrocarbon free. The oim was was making a routine
visit/inspection on the plant wishing also to assess in particular the progress of work on the compressor train. While standing at the non drive end, west, of the "b" export
compressor he perceived a very slight smell of hydrocarbon and initially believed it to be residual vapours from ancillary pipe work which had been removed as part of the
work scope. On moving to the south side of the compressor the odour of hydrocarbons disappeared. In reviewing the status of the work he noticed that a dry gas seal leakage
atometer, a "rotameter type device", was missing from the exportcompressor unit and an "open" 1" flange was evident. It was immeditately realised, because it was known that
At 07:39 a small fire was discovered at the top of the still column of the glycol accumulator which emanated from the lagging surrounding the column and associated pipe
work. On the <...> the oim had been on a routine inspection of the platform he met ith the production supervisor and lead mechanical tech to review certain work
activities.during this period attention was drawn to a small amount of vapour emanating from the lagging where the subsequent incident occured. The situation was discussed
tak ng into consideration that no leak had been observed by those present since the work order tag had been placed at the location.the cladding was opened slightly to ascertain
if any liquids could be seen,which was negative,no gas could be discerned and th system operated under near atmospheric pressure.it was also noted that the leak appeared
following a charge of fresh glycol.in view of the prevailing circumstances it was assessed that a monitoring exercise would be instigated with further analysis onc the liquid
level had stabilised and/or the situation changed with regard to the leak ceasing or deteriorating.
Whilst starting up the plant following a production shutdown caused by a faulty low level transmitter in the inlet separator, a hydorcarbon leak occurred at the crude oil cooler
(plate exchanger) at the inlet to the final separator. Personnel were standi g by during start up and initiated a manual shut down immediately. Investigation showed that a plate
gasket on the cooler had failed. The supposed cause is that when shutdown occurs an esd valve at the crude oil exit from the inlet separator closes and he inlet separator to
crude cooler line depresurises. On start up the esdv opens quickly allowing a rapid build up of pressure to 16 bar. This entered the cooler and exploited a weakness in the plate
gasket.
Site inspection for evaluation of esdm3.1 repair.fire protection coating removed by use of chisel in a small area.should remove steel intension h mesh/operator used air power
chisel for tihis purpose.hit riser wall with chisel hammer with small sharp dent with a depth of 1 - 3 mm as a result
Deg loading hose got caught under the stern of the supply vessel <...>.
During construction activities on the subsea manifold, the 6" gas lift pipeline from the platform was slightly damaged. A tool basket was lowered from the diving vessel to the
work site. As the diver manouvered the basket into position, it became caught on the bolts on the valve at the end of the gas lift pipeline manifold. Due to the rolling motion of
the vessel, the pipework was then pulled vertically approx. 1.5 metres. No leakage was visible following the incident.
At approximately 08:25 there was a loss of all electrical power on the platform. This was reinstated within 1 hour. At approximately 10:30 there was another full electrical
isolation. This was reinstated. Unfortunately, due to complete loss of power, a l printers, pc`s and ic`s screens were shutdown. This left platform with no history to the trip.
Investigation is still ongoing.
Flare performance tests were being carried out to check the performance of a newly fitted high pressure flare tip and to compare actual back pressure readings with calculated
values. During the test at a higher than normal flow rate,the flare burning prof le changed suddenly,due to the loss of the coanda effect over the flare tulip.this lead to higher
than normal levels of heat radiation on the platform. Production was automatically shutdown and no damage was sustained.the test was conducted under controll d conditions
with additional data recordings made.essential personnel only were in the area and the fire team was on standby at the location.
Drain line from coupling was not fitted, mechanical technician was instructed to fit the line, at the same time electrical/instrument technician was requested to make the pump
available to circulate lube, prior to mechanical technician completing his work he was called to another job. Electrical technician unlocked the switchboard and turned on the
power preventing the motor from running by forcing the logic (soft ware) in the compressor control panel. The platform subsequently was shutdown on a blue leve shutdown
(loss of electrical power). This removed power from the compressor control panel. On re-instatement of power the logic focing was returned to normal putting a start command
to the lube oil pump, resulting in the pump starting to circulate. Drian was disconnected so oil drained down to deck.
During survey of mod 05 by ois it was picked up that the flowlines from <...> and <...> were rubbing together causing substandard erosion to both lines. It was established
after closer inspection that erosion to <...> precluded us from flowing the well unti a repair has been effected. <...> was found to be fit for purpose and is now back on line,
however repairs will be required.
On the <...> at 03:37 hours the msv commenced laying the flexible flowline from the manifold towards the plem in a north east direction. At 15:41 hours after approximately
1200 metres of flowline had been laid the dgps signal failed and the back up systems failed to operate. At 15:58 hours the vessel was brought under manual control until the
dgps and back up systems were restored at 16:08 hours. During this period an excursion of the vessel occured resulting in the flowline being laid 11.0 metres out of line for a
distance of 100 metres.
During overboard of the first flowline connection, a cp. Braclet anode came into contact withthe lip of the lay shoot and was dislodged by approx 6.0 metres, snapping the
earthing strops and slightly scarring the outer sheathing of the flowline. Inspecti n of the flowline and anode was subsequently carried out. The anode was left in its new
position and new earth strops installed, no damage to the flowline occured.
During a severe storm on the morning of <...>, the platform was struck by a very large wave which caused significant damage to underdeck and external walkways, scaffolds
and cable racking etc. The esdv underdeck failed closed as a result.
Amage sustained to brace is currently subject to investigation by specialist support. Initial report from chevron cptc san ramon has indicated to immediate problem with
sructural integrity of jacket.
An intervention visit was requested to <...> to carry out checks to try to ascertain if the sssv had travelled up the well into the xmas tree. The checks requested were to close the
top and bottom master valves and it was found that niether of these valves ould be closed indicating the possibility of the sssv in the xmas tree. The well operations department
were informed and a visit report to the satops co-ordinator.
During preparatory work on well b27, the well was lined up to pump seawater down the tubing and returns to the production train via the annulus kill line. The driller saw
pressure on the system and inadvertently bled off the to the drilling trip tank som gas from the line was detected by the shaker area gas heads and set off platform gpa.
Whilst drilling, within the reservior section of the pilot hole an 80 bbls influx was taken and the well closed in on the annular preventer. At a depth of 13911' an increase in
flow rate was observed, the well was closed in and zero pressure recorded on b th drill pipe and annulus. The well was opened and circulated for 30 minutes with background
gas levels of 2-3%. Drilling continued to 13918' whereupon a further increase in flowrate was suspected and the well shut in with zero pressure on both drill pipe and annulus.
The well was opened up and flow checked with no flow. Bottoms up was circulated and a bubble of gas arrived at the rig floor, the well was closed in with zero pressure on
both annulus and drill pipe. The well was flow checked by opening the a nular and connecting to the trip tank. However, inadvertantly the well was not connected to the trip
tank and was left flowing to the mud pits, where an 80 bbls influx was detected. The well was closed in with zero pressure on the drill pipe and 325psi on the annulus . Approx
80bbls of crude oil and gas cut mud was circulated out and a heavy 10.7 ppg mud prepared and circulated into the well.
Well <...> run of perforating guns from the pob deck -electrical cable broken while pulling out after survey –part left of the cable (around 645m) winched to surface -when
cable end came out from lubricator, lubricator safety check valve did not seal proper y resulting in a gas leak -<...> wisa valve immediately closed by operator -xmas tree umv
immediately closed by <...> operator -leak stopped when gas in lubricator was fully bled down
The completion tubing was being recovered form well <...>. At the time of the incident 4,450 feet of tubing had been laid down, when a backflow of calcium
chloride/bromide brine occurred, causing a flow from the top of the tubing. The tubing at the time as in the slips, the top being approx 4 feet above the drill floor. Normal
actions were taken to control the situation. Firstly, an attempt was made to fit the crossover and kelly cock, in order to stop the flow. However, the x-over cross-threaded and
ilst attempting to remedy this, a sudden flow increase occurrred. When the crossover was released, the splashing took place, contacting the men. The <...> and <...> were
contacted and immediately proceeded to the drill floor. On observing the seriousnes of the flow, and being informed that it had not been possible to stab the kelly cock, the
owe contacted the oim. The oim having been norified of the initial problem, raised the platform to yellow alert status, making an annnouncement that a problem exis ed on the
drill floor, and the medic was required, this was followed shortly by a red hazard status, again raised by the oim, production shutdown and a call for alll pob to muster stations.
Whislt asseessing the situation and cause of the flow, the drill r was instructed to prepare to drop the tubing and close the bop. It was whilst these preparations were being
Well 5-4 connected with a chicksan kill line to the mud pumps for bullheading operations. On opening up this kill line to the pumps hydrocarbons backflowed up the kill line
and lifted the prv on mud pump 2 which vented into the mud pits. This release of h drocarbons activated the fire and gas system. No injuries were sustained and no plant
damage occurred.
During drilling the <...> formation at 13248ft. The driller noticed a mus volume gain of 3 bbl. Influx confirmed, followed by implementation of "kick" procedures - platform
production process shutdoen. Flare vented, purged (n2) and extinguish as a precaution - well contents circulated and conditioned as per procedures control measures. No gas
received to surface and integrity secured without incident.
While working the supply vessel <...> a gas sample bottle rack, being lowered from <...> platform to the vessel, became enmeshed with the side of a 30ft cargo basket. The
boat rolled and the snagged bottle rack lifted the cargo ba ket, causing it to swing inboard crushing a member of the deck crew against an adjacent container. The deck crew
member was fatally injured.
At approx. 02:15 on<...> ip was sent from the drill floor to the stabbing board to releive the derrickman, by the night shift driller, prior to sending ip to the stabbing board, the
driller confirmed with ip that he was familiar with the requirements for the stabbing 13.3/8 casing. The derrickman then instructed ip on the mechanical operation of the
stabbing board (controls), after observing ip stab one joint of casing without problem, he left the drill floor for his tea break. Ip continued with the duties of stabber for the next
five joints. At joint 96 he latched the elevator to the casing joint and gave the appropriate hand signal to the driller to confirm the elevators were correctly latched. On
receiving this signal, the driller picked up the casing string out of the slips & began to run the string into the hole. Whilst lowering the string, the driller was observing the
weight indicator, watching the casing through the table, and looking up into the derrick, after running approx. 28ft. Of casing the driller heard a shout to 'stop' from the rig floor
and immediately applied the brake. On looking up at the stabbing board, he observed ip in a postition trapped between the stabbing board hand rail and the crash guard of the
tds. He immediately picked up the casing string to release ip and sent a member of the drill floor crew to the stabbing board to assist ip. The <...> medic, <...> doctor and
Two drilling centrifuges weighing 3 tonnes each were to be lifted from the frame on skid deck to the pipe deck. During the second lift the load shifted as it was being picked
up trapping left foot or roustabout beneath it fracturing same. There was a ca le boom above the lift. The banksman was aware the load would shift as tension was taken up
and placed the roustabout in a position to steady the load. The load moved faster and in a direction not anticipated trapping the roustabouts foot
A pressure test was being carried out on the drill floor stand-pipe manifold to test on the valves. The manifold was displaced to seawater using the test pump until returns were
identified from the topdrive, the vent was closed and pressure testing commenced. It became clear that the valves were leaking as no pressure increase was obtained and
returns were seen from the topdrive. In order to eliminate the number of possible leak paths an attempt was made to test the second stand pipe valves via the testpump hooked
up to another <...> connection. When the blank cap was removed from the <...> connection debris was seen to have settled out blocking the line. As it was likely that more
debris was present the manifold was bled down through the bleed-off line. All valves were overhauled, cleaned and reinstated ready for a second test. The manifold was re-
filled with seawater and when returns were seen from the topdrive testing re-commenced. Again the valves leaked with returns seen form the top drive and a drip from the
weco connection. This was beld off through the bell-nipple and the line left open. Work commenced on the stand pipe valve to remove the valve bonnet & assembly, with all
the nuts (complete with studs) holding the valve bonnet removed completely as the assembly remained stuck in the housing the assistant driller and flooman rattled the
Whilst surveying an electric motor with air mover attached for possible slinging methods the rigger pulled the equipment off it's mounting onto his leg.the equipment had been
partially dismantled however it was reported to have been lift in a secure/saf manner by leaving two retaining bolts in place.it is therefore unclear as to how this equipment
became unsecure.
Lifting a spoolpiece of approx. One ton with m8 crane from z11cd to z23ll.rails on top of inhibitor tanks platfrom hit by hookball,one end of the rail got loose and swung
down.hit marine operator on leg.marine was not in position to see crane operator.con act by vhf radio,good communication,calm weather.
Ip was assisting in th removal of a stinger from 9 5/8" offside caasing v/v on well c01.after assessing the existing rigging on the stinger,he altered it slightly before re-running
the wire strop through the walkway grating overhead and securing it to a c ain block,in order to acheive a vertical lift instead of an angular pull.as the bolts and the graylock
clamp were removed the tool came free.the ip was holding the back end of the tool which swung upwards,trapping his finger between the tool and the walkway overhead.he
was casevaced on <...>.
Having released the elevators from a long stand of drill pipe the ip was in the process of stacking same when the bottom block of the power swivel came in contact with the top
of the drill stand propelling the stand backwards striking the ip on the forehe d. The driller witnessed the ip being thrown backwards on the drill master cabin cctv monitor and
alerted 2 drill crew members who went to the monkey board to assist the ip. Following assessment by the medic the ip was lowered in a stretcher on the man ri ing winch to
drill floor level the stretchered to the sick bay for treatment prior to going ashore by helicopter for further medical treatment.
During the removal of a dummy test joint of pipe from inside the bop, a seal ring was dislodged and gell 16 feet hitting an engineer working on a scaffold platfrom below. The
injured person was hit on the ankle by a metal ring gasket weighing approximately 7lbs.
During racking back a stand of 3 1/2" drill pipe, when the derrickman pulled back the stand to tack it, the base of the pipe rotated off the timber and dropped into the gutter.
The stand was put back into the elevators and lifted to replace it on the tim er. The roustabouts thumb was crushed when the stand banged against the tong post.
Because of the weather conditions it had been decided to down man the platform in line with the adverse weather working policy. Three men were waiting for the lift to
descend to the 101 metre level in the utility leg in order to leave their worksite and r port back to the <...>, as they had been instructed. Whilst the lift was on its way down
from d1cs, the men heard a "crack", followed by the sound of a falling object bouncing of steel work on its way down. One of the men called out to his mates o take cover, and
he himself went underneath the stairs. The object then fell and grazed the face of ip before striking his right forearm then falling to the gratings. The falling object was seen to
be a guide wheel from the cab of the lift
Under work pack no. <...>, disc brake retrofit, the old "k" type draw works braking system was being destructed. The main draw works shaft had been removed and positioned
over the rotary table. The gears and bearings were them removed using hot work. Att mpts were then made to remove rims from the shaft using jacks and hammers. No
movement was seen. The rim was them cut half was through with a oxy/acetylene torch, and another atteempt made to manually remove the rim. Wood had been placed under
the rim o stop it from falling over. Again, no movement. On making the final cut the rim "sprang" up and fell over, striking ip on the left forearm.
A fan was being manoeuvered through the external windwall. A section of which had been removed to facillitate this operation. The opening was made as large as possible.
The fan was suspended on 3 chain blocks front, centre and rear. A tubular brace run ing across the corner of the opening was causing the base of the fan to snag. As the base of
the fan cleared the tubular bracing one corner snagged causing the fan to move to one side. In doing so the fan trapped the employers finger against windwall sup ort beam. As
a result the employers sustained a crush injury to left hand ring finger later diagnosed as a fracture.
Mech fitter and injured party were tasked with removal of redundant hvac ducting in mod cd.7 rigging equipment (chain blocks), were employed to undertake this task by
injured employee. Two chain blocks were used, one in the vertical with the second offse . These were attached to the ducting at roof level and some 3ft off deck level
respectively. The mech fitter, then released bolts holding the ducting together at roof level and supports at deck level, he lowered the ducting section using top chain block o
the level of scaffold staging erected for access, when it became jammed. At this point, the mech fitter, requested a scaffolder to remove scaffold boards causing jam, and
hauled up on the top chain block. During removal of boards it was apparent that the ducting flange bolt had snagged on the edge of a board, the scaffolder released this by
twisting the board over, at which point the ducting droped, causing a shock loading on strop affixed to top of ducting & attached to chain block. As a result, the chain block
attached by a strop to lower section of ducting (under tension in "off" vertical plane), pulled the ducting outwards & towards anchor point of chain block. The combination of
shock loading & tension applied by the chain blocks imparting unequal forces on the ducting, resulted in the ducting failing at its weakest point, (hvac cowling attachment -
Whilst attempting to put the casing power tongs onto the 18 5/8" casing the injured person was holding onto the tongs door handle. The tongs which were suspended on a
winch wire swung toward the casing and crushed the ip's left hand between the casing and the tongs.
Wind direction - westerly / visibilty - 10 nautical miles / wind speed 25-3- knots / temperature - 6 degress celsius / sea state 2-2 1/2 metre swell. * information as provided by
siby vessel <...>t and platform meteorological equipment. Normal car o backload operations were taking place. The lift being returned was 1 of 4 similar lifts also backloaded,
standard practice and lifting slings were used and in good order. In addition to the ip 3 other personnel witnessed the incident. The ip was visibly in pain immediately, which
was instantly noticed by platform deck crew. Crane of radioed vessel master who stopped work and pulled vessel of loc to investigate condition of i.p. medical treatment was
then administered and transfer to <...> hospital
While making a connection - torquing up the kelly to the joint in the rotary table, the ip was operating the back up tongs. The break out line went tight before the snub line due
to the break out line being jammed at the cathead (a fact that was not known at the time). The breakout line came free and the load went onto the snub line. The resultant shock
was transmitted through the tong handle causing injury. The ip was pushed up against the rig tong by the breakout line at this stage.
Whilst picking up 5" drill pipe from the mouse hole by means of drill pipe elevations, one of the two bail hooks which position the elevators around the drill pipe prior to
latching the elevator closed, failed due to incorrect positioning of the hook.
The replacement windscreen was packaged in a plywood box for transit offshore inside a shipping container. As part of the <...> work routine the lid was removed from the
front cab window transit box, the window condition checked and the polystyrene to packing removed. The lid was however not replaced on the transit box. This took place
on the west laydown area m3 roof adjacent to the containers in a wind protected area. The <...> crew requested the deck foreman to move the box to the scaffold st ging at the
east crane. The deck crew rigged the box in the correct method for using two wire strops. The crane operator was requested to raise the load to tighten the strops the load was
replaced on the floor and the operator adjusted the strops. He requ sted the load to be raised approximately 3 metres and again checked the strops for security. The load was
considered to be safe and the crane operator was instructed to lift the load, was under control for the first 7 metres, as the load traversed over th drilling package hvac vent fans
the wind caught the load, raising the flt lift to a vertical position. The load started to rotate and the glass panel became dislodged falling from a height of approximately 8
metres. The crane operator at the same time ttempted to lower the load to a safe landing position on the pipe deck on the safe landing position on the piepdeck on the south
2 7/8 tubing being laid out on double - wrapped and choked sling and tugger. 3rd party vendor attempts to cross catwalk with tool trolly. Sees danger to himself so leaves
trolley on catwalk beneath joint to be laid out and walks long way round to retrieve trolley from other side. Meanwhile, ip attempts to move trolley and manouvre pipe around
it, during this the weight came off the joint, the sling sprung open and when the joint moved it slipped through the sling and down the catwalk trapping the ip's foot against the
edge of the catwalk guide.
Whilst moving the bop set from the drill floor through the 'v' door, the bop set toppled over and landed on the left foot of <...>. The bop set was veing dragged by the catwalk
winch at the time of the incodent. Atmospheric conditions - good - no wind.
Whilst landing bundle of drill collars on pipedeck, the bundle opened up when weight came off the sling and trapped the injured`s right foot under one of the collars causing a
crush injury.
Temporary rigging consisting of 2 x 1 ton slings were used to secure air tugger line to bell nipple and housing. Due to the rigging arrangement and angle of pull undue strain
was applied to slings causing them to weaken & part. Ip who was controlling the ork was standing adjacent to the worksite and was struck in passing by one of the parted
slings.
Whilst pulling out of hole (s53) using top drive, a tugger line became snagged on the stabbing board. This in turn trapped the kelly hose causing to part at the top drive end.
The longer end of the kelly hose subsequently fell to the drill floor bouncing up and hitting the injured person. Weather conditions - wind gusting 50+ knots and light rain.
The wireline operator failed to secure the lower wireline sheave prior to rigging up the tool string suspended from the wirline. This caused weight to be brought onto the sheave
which eventually pulled off a snagging point. The operators hand was caught b the sheave as it propelled off the drill floor.
The inp and another banksman were carrying out material handling operations in conjunction with the south crane. The banksman had radio contact with the crane driver.
During lifting of a short drill collar, the ip stood in front of the collar. As the c ane lifted it, the collar began to swing in a southerly direction, towards the ip. He attempted to
avoid the swinging load, but caught his foot between the drill collar and a joint of riser.
An <...> pump unit at level 1,east laydown area previously posistioned, was loaded onto a 3000kg pallet truck.the pump unit and truck was to be lifted to level 2 east laydown
for use by comtec.a priority had been stated for the lift so other operations we e suspended to allow it to be instigated. The crane operation was carried out in full sight of the
crane operator ,another witness,who was observing the operation from level 2,where he was waiting to receive the units. The following sequence of events too place: 1.the ip
hooked the pump unit onto the crane pendant hook and had lifted and placed slightly to one side of the pallet truck. 2.a sling was then run through the triangular handle of the
pallet truck and the eyes placed over the crane pendant hook o that both items where now attached and ready for lifting. 3.he then instructed the crane operator to lift the
load.the pump unit cleared the deck first but as the crane head block was plumbed over the pump unit when the pallet truck lifted it it swung n towards it.at this point the ip
stepped forward to control the swing and either pinched his finger between wire truck or the truck and pump frame causing the injuries to his finger.
A loose retaining clip fell approximetly 25m from its resting position on part of the floor boom or crane rest structure. The wire rope or overhaul ball of the deck crane
dislodged the clip during operations to relocate a gas quad. The clip fell and str ck a member of the deck crew on the right foot, resulting in bruising which required treatment
with an ice-pack.
The task entailed rigging down a 2 inch circulation hose from the top of tubing. The floorman was in a riding belt, being winched up the tubing that was run in the hole. He
shouted to the winchman to stop lifting as the winch line has snagged. He grabb d the tubing ans instructed the winchman to lower off a little (about 12"). He freed the line,
took the weight off the belt, and then kicked off towards the kelly hose, the winchman was signalled to re-commence hoisting and then suddenly the floorman was seen to lurch
up into the air and drop back to the previous position, the floorman appeared to be injured and he was lowered to the drill floor. The riding belt was connected to the winch
wire by a length of chain, which featured a swivel at the end conne ting with the winch wire. A shackle was used to connect the the swivel/chain to the winch wire, it is
believed that the shackle pin fouled the guard fitted to the top dirve motor guard. The guard consists of a plate perforated by holes of approx 3" diam ter. It is considered that
the shackle fouled one of the holes in the guard, was freed by the floorman, and almost immediately snagged again without his knowledge.
Messrs. <...> and <...> were working on scaffold access on <...> mezzanine deck preparing a 4" butt on a 5ft length of pipe that penetrated the redundant helideck above. <...>
was positioned below the pipe squaring it for welding while <...> wa standing by the pipe aiding in the process. From the witnesses accounts it appears the movement of a
cable drum above collided with the pipe being released from an alignment clamp (at helideck level) and the pipe falling through the penetration hitting <...> on the chest. <...>
was sent for medical attention (bruising) and subequently went straight back to work. An investigation took place following the site being cordoned off.
Ip was struck on his left shoulder by a dropped scaffolding tube. 3 five foot tubes were dropped in all 2 fell into the sea and one hit ip the tubes fell from a scaffold being
erected approx. 30' above and to one side of ip.
Ip was kneeling to operate a valve on the blast kettle, when two sheets of plywood standing against the habitat fell against his lower back. Upon standing he felt pain in his
lower back, but thought this would go and did not report the incident, by mid af ernoon the pain had increased and visited the medic. He was given treatment and stood down
for the remander of the shift. The ip was medivaced on <...> and told to see his own g.p
Gas compression was being restarted following platform shutdown. After two unsuccessful attempts, elec. Dept. Were requested to check relevant trips in switchroom. They
identified and reset a timer trip and stood by to observe next attempted start. They s w breaker close, immediely followed by discharge of pitch insulation form top of breaker,
with associated arcing and flames. Smoke detection then activated halon release in the area which extinguished the fire. Ip was at the scene of the incident with a f re
extinguisher when the halon discharged, which resulted in the ip being hit in the face causing him a cut lip and his upper right tooth being chipped. He returned to work
immediately.
The equipment involved was in a cubicle associated with the emergency power distribution board.a 400a ccomtractor was being replaced.the cubicle was isolated but bus
connection at the base of the isolator remained live.during the task an electrical short resulted in an arc which enveloped a technician causing serious burns.after examining
many of the items left around the worksite and their possible involvement with the incident,the electrical equipment in the cubicle was systematically dismantled.part o the
plain washer,similar to those used in the bolting of the contactor connections,was found on the floor of the cubicle.a heat affected zone,on the rear panel,indicated that
something had shorted between the red phase and the cubicle.this escalated to a three phase short and the devopment of a high energy arc. The investigation concluded that the
washer had fallen down the gap between the equipment backplat and the panel and on to the live bus bar. This was shown to be possible by simulating with a similar plain
washer.
Drilling operations had suffered two power failureson <...> at 09:45 and 12:07. Efforts were being made to restablish this supply. Investigations centred on the breaker in the
switchroom. The <...> electrician, supported by the toolpusher were standi g in front of the breaker cabinet, with the door open, when a flash occured
Drilling operations had suffered two power failureson <...> at 09:45 and 12:07. Efforts were being made to restablish this supply. Investigations centred on the breaker in the
switchroom. The <...> electrician, supported by the toolpusher were standi g in front of the breaker cabinet, with the door open, when a flash occured
Si61 <...>, call sign <...> with 14 passangers and 2 crew onboard, were on final landing routine when the aircraft suffered control difficulties which resulted in severe
mechanical damage to the tail rotor blades. Aircraft landed with no personal inj ry being sustained to any passangers. However, the co-pilot was treated for shock and lower
back pain.
Following repairs and rebuild of b.p. sump pump the system was de-isolated for test running and return to service. On initial start up the sump contents issued from an open
vent/priming line. The attendant trademan's upper body and face were contaminated. this outlet is protected by a hand operated valve which was open.
As part of the procedure, a function test was carried out on the lower master valve to verify the pressure integrity of the valve. This was carried out to verify the operation and
pressure integrity of the valve. The function test failed, as the valve co ld not operate more than 3.5 turns, whilst a total of 27 turns is required to fully open or close the valve.
Believing the valve to be open, an attempt was then made to drift the well with wireline prior to running the plugs neccessary to make the well s fe for christmas tree
maintenance. The wireloine tool sting failed to pass through the tree indicating that the lower master valve was not in a fully open position. The <...> technicians were
instructed to cycle the valve in order to open it ful y. In the process of operating the valve, a safety pin(designed to prevent damage to the valve internals) was sheared. As the
cap to the final thread(s) it blew off due to the fact that the gland securing the seal on the valve stem had also come free. T is resulted in an uncontrolled gas escape from the
lower master valve stem commencing at approx 13:30 hrs. One of the <...> received a blow to the knee as the incident occurred and sustained a lost time injury due to severe
bruising.
Whilst investigating an overheating problem on 'b' generator a mechanical technician shut down the generator, waited approximately 20 minutes for cool down and cracked
open the radiator cap. A small jet of hot fluid hit the left side of his face and neck nd his left hand causing burns. He was using a cloth to cover the cap while opening it. The
cap was a pressure relief device incorporated in it which will be checked for correct operation. The overheating was caused by a leak between the oil and water in he oil cooler
allowing oil into the cooling system. See attached 2 engine information sheets.
At 0640 hrs the m stern-trawling fish factory <...> lost machinery cooling water during adverse weather conditions and started to drift some 6 miles west of the platform. Due
to the threat of the drifting vessel, 104 platform crew members were airlifted to the <...> platform leaving only 39 persons onboard. At 0840 hrs the tug/supply vessel <...> got
a towline onboard the vessel. At that time the vessel was approx. 1.9 miles away from the platform. From 1100 hrs the remanning of the platform commenced.
A 100m 5000ton barge was under tow to <...> by tug <...> when it broke free in bad weather . Downmanning started from the <...> platform to semisub <...>. The barge was
under control some hours later just 12 km from the platform. The <...> platform was put on standby for evacuation as it lay in the drift path of the barge, but the 50 onboard
were stood down once the rogue had been retrieved.
The rig had commenced off load of supply vessel mv <...> when he appeared to drift in towards the rig. After requesting he pull clear the vessel swung into the starboard aft
column he was conected to the rig by the portable water hose this burst as he pulled clear
<...> lost power 200m off the south side of the platform windspeed:25 knots wind direction:se wave height: 4m
Vessel <...> was in close standby at <...> platform positioned close to the north east corner. Nitrogen/glycol transfer to platform was in progress. At 1206 the vessels stern
thruster failed to 100% pitch to port. Vessel control was switched to manu l and thruster stopped but vessel port quarter touched the platform north east leg. Vessel pulled away
to safe location after discontinuing nitrogen/ glycol transfer. Visual inspection from platform and from vessel indicated no significant damage apart fr m paint scuff marks.
Weather at time was good. Wind speed 15knots from 180-200 deg wave height 1.5 metres, visibility 10 miles.
While alongside platform, discharging deck cargo, the automatic position control system on the sv <...> failed and the vessel struck the platform. Minor damage to vessel and
d2 leg of platform. Remedial actions: examine damage and repair vessel rect fy poscon defect vessel trialed off <...> <...> new joystick fitted. Software adjustments made to
system, resulting in improved reaction times to command instruction. Azimuthing thruster reaction increased to match transverse thruster time so bot act in tandem and not
against each other. Other adjustments made to overall system balance. Engineer sailed to field and joystick performance fully tested. Vessel worked in similar conditions to
incident without heading or position loss. Master satisf ed with performance. Vessel owners preparing full report for <...>. <...> man to sail on vessel to make complete
evaluation.
Probs assoc with <...> wellhead were reported. A dive vessel in the field was sent to inv and has reported 2 small leaks and movement of the roof panels.
Vessel damage = bent fender and split weld. No threat to safety. Installation bent boat fneder. Visible divers to investigate.
The <...> hit the a2 leg on the <...> platform. This sprung 3 bolts on the (redundant) 8" glycol riser approx 12' above l.a.t. investigation in progress. The vessel was apparently
in full working order.
Vessel on standby duties for <...> platform position 2nm north west of platform. Weather south east 45/50kts. Sea 6/7 metres. At approx 1800 hours large sea breaks over
bulwark, hitting and breaking bridge windows. Vessel oses electrical power, steering, communications and navigation systems. No personnel injured. Emergency services
alerted via mayday and hand held radio call to maureen platform. At a approx 19:30 vessel restores propultion and steering control. Process to <...>. Escorted by stand-by
vessel and then tug. <...> stand-by covcer provided by vessel <...>, until full cover resumed at approx noon <...> by replacement vessel.
At 10:15 hrs the vessel <...> entered on request the prd 500 metre zone and shortly after successfully completed one lift to the installation. While positioning herself to receive
a backload at approx 10:30 hrs from the installation the vessel skip er reported to the crane driver he would reposition the vessel head into wind. In the process of carrying out
the manoeuvre the vessel collided with the b1 leg.
The incident occurred when the <...> derrick was being operated on the <...> west flare. It had been used several times previously in the same location without any problem. At
the time of the incident the jib was in the raised position attempting to m noeuvre a load of about 0.75 tonnes, the wind was about 20 knts and the rigging crew found that the
jib would not slew. At the time, the attention of the crew would have been primarily with the load end. When the jib is raised near to its limit the link p n comes within the
radius of the pad eyes on the crown. When the jib is slewed, the bottom sleeve will turn and this turning moment will be transferred via the slew balance tube to the top sleeve,
to which the bottom of the link pin is attached. As the li k pin was up against a pad eye the top sleeve could not turn and the force applied to the job and bottom sleeve would
have forced and eventually damaged the pad eye. Once the problem had been analysed a clamp arrangement was installed to rectify the damag caused. The incident will be
discussed with all relevant staff to ensure they are aware of the need to identify any hazards associated with work they are involved in. Nb: we reported this incident when it
occurred, based on the information we had at that time. However, the final analysis proved that it was not a failure of a load bearing part of the crane and the incident was
A drilling sub was being removed from the pipedeck into the v door of the drill floor using the crane. When the sub was laid on the drill floor the crane hook was released, the
crane operator started to pick up the crane hook and the headache ball caught n a beam above the v door.a one meter section of the beam broke away and fell to the rig floor.
No injuries were sustained. The rest of the redundant framework from the top of the v door has been removed. The cross member, which has been left, has been in pected to
ensure that it is securely welded.
During drilling casing cutting and removal operations from the drill floor to the pipe deck using the drilling (central) crane, the crane was boomed up with the over-ride switch
operated resulting in the crane boom being driven against it's stops which resulted in damage to the lower section of the boom.
Dropped stones from <...> west crane. No injuries
Equip was being moved to a worksite on a cellar deck from main deck via a lifted deck hatch using the platform crane. A banksman was located on main deck. No personnel
were within cellar deck vertically below hatch. Equip items were being lowered in their wooden packing crates as supplied from onshore, using cert webbing sling several such
lifts had been successfully completed – whilst lowering a hydraulic pump inside its packing crate, the crate disintegrated causing pump to fall c 6 ft to cellar deck below and be
rendered inoperable.
Chain block failure whilst attempting to life a <...> electric generator from the solar room.
During operations aloungside the southside of the platform. A nut fell from the platform striking an a.t.k (jet fuel) bowser narrowly missing two deck hands. No damage or
injury
Deck crew were moving electric motor from south end of level 3 on agm to pipedeck when motor slipped from lifting strops and fell approx 10 m onto deck - no injuries -
damage to motor and handrail/stairway
Whilst pulling out of hole with gyro survay tool, winch drum on wireline whinch overturned. Wind direction s.e 10 knots. General conditions good sdc wireline winch
Whilst discharging vessel the crane overheated. When checking this problem load started to pay out very very slowly. No incident. The breaks adjusted and load tested.
Whilst clearing up piepdeck. Weather conditions good. Test weight was fitted with shackles and weight taken on north crane. Lifting point on test weight failed. No injuries
no damage. Equipment.
When lifting a piece of drilling equipment (shooting nipple) from the mv <...> to <...> platform, the vessel was pulling away from the platform as the item was being lifted by
the east crane. The pincher nipple was snagged on the ships rail ca sing a 3 ton wire sling to part. No injury to personnel occurred. Wind 20-25kts wave 1.3 metres light -
darkness mipeg printout shows peak load of 3.4 tonnes, swl was 3 tonnes.
Started working boat <...> at 09:00 hrs. 4 lifts had already been taken (6 1/2 t, 2 1/2 t, 1 1/2 t, 7 1/2 t) and a fifth lift of 7 1/2 t had been taken off the boat and was being placed
on the deck when a hose, on the right hand side boom ram, unctured resulting in the boom lowering through loss of oil pressure, down to its minimum position on the ram.
Approx. 50 litres of hydraulic oil leaked out on to the crane pedestal and main deck.
The east side crane was back loading onto the mv <...>. The container being lowered snagged on another container on the loading deck of the supply boat and tipped at a slight
angle. It was raised again to the upright position and placed on tubi g/drill pipe on the supply boats deck. The door of the container opened and part of heavy equipment fell to
the deck. The weather conditions/sea state were good during this operation. Personnel on the supply boat replaced the equipment. (mud pump module) weighing 4 cwt unit
into the container.
Ad west crane - right hand boom pendant line. Thimble has become detached from the hard eye splice at the tip end of the boom. The thimble slid down the pendant leaving
the splice exposed. The bare splice does not appear to be capable of carrying the req ired loadings. The crane has been isolated and will remain out of service until new
pendants are fitted. The offending pendants are 1 year into a 2 year certified life. Test cert <...>.
The only equipment involved was the west crane. The operator went to lift the boom out of the rest ready for use. On lifting boom approx 6" from the rest to dry out the clutch
and brake with the pawl engaged. He heard a loud bang from the boom the winch after checking out the brake and clutch and finding nothing he assumed the noise had come
from the rope jumping. He went back into the cab engaged the clutch to lift the boom and take out the pawl the crane boom went into free fall. The boom fell appr x 18" into
the crane rest causing crush damage to the main chords at a point where the cathead section crosses the boom rest.
Manriding winch failed to hold 3-man dive basket carrying 3 men when control lever placed in neutral. Basket ran away for a distance of approximately 1.8m before being
arrested by its own braking system. The 'fault' could not be replicated.
The derrick was in the process of being destructed with the use of an air powered saw operated by abseilers. Equipment was being hauled to the top of the derrick using a gin
pole and tugger winch. A 25 metre barriered exclusion zone had been set up arou d the base of the derrick. Safety signs were erected and two men patrolled the barriers to
prevent unauthorised entry to the area. An air powered saw was fastened to the hauling wire using 8mm polypropylene rope lanyard and the operator started to lift i up the
driirck. When the load was part of the way up the derrick, it became entangled in the derrick stell work. Before the operator could stop the winch the lanyard snapped and the
saw fell to the ground. Because of the safety precautions in place there were no persons in the vicinity.
South crane with an empty basket hooked on was booming up in order to load in a specific location. Boom continued to travel upwards until it came into contact with stops at
which point emergency stop was activated. 2 safety devices had failed to slow and top boom during its upward travel.
During the routine removal of a spool section of a flowline, prior to xmas tree removal, a wire sling being used to lift the spool piece broke. The sling that parted had a safe
operating limit of 1 tonne and had been rated to 2 tonnes as part of a batch t st. The approximate weight of the spool piece is half a tonne. Although having suffered catastrophic
failure. The sling showed no undue signs of defect.
During wireline operations, a drift run was being performed. When pulling out of the hole the wireline operator noticed an increase in weight, eventually being unable to move
the tool. Whilst investigatiing the wire parted. As a consequence the pressure i the lubricator forced the wire out through the lubricator stuffing box, resulting in a release of
gas. The lubricator stuffing box was fitted with a "blow out plug" which failed to operate properly. Gas release was limited due to the hmv closure securing the well & the bop
and swab valves were also closed. A senior production operator in the area was alerted and he routed most of the lubricator contents via the flowline to the closed drains. No
gas detection was activated as a result of this release.
Activities in progress - attempting to conduct 2 surveys for the mwd and observe perameters for the smith whipstock tool run. The toolpusher picked up the drill string to
conduct a second survey, 100 feet higher than the first unsuccessful attempt. Whilst using the "rigserv-crown-saver" warning lights (emergency braking system) as an
indication of elevator height, the travelling block made contact with the crown block assembly. At this stage the brake was applied and the toolpusher was unaware that contact
had been made. The travelling block was lowered and brake released. Investigations were commenced, but the full scenario did not become evident until closer inspection in
daylight. An investigation team was set up and the certifying authority and bis inspection asked to assist.
The east crane was lowering a container of chemicals through the hatch on the roof of mod 6 into the sackstore below, when the crane ceased to lower. The crane mechanic
found that the retarder pump drive spline had failed, causing the crane to stop in a f il safe mode. The load was transferred to the west crane and safely lowered. A new pump
was fitted to lower boom into the rest for further investigation.
A 3te adjustable beam trolley and chain block was attached to the east crane 4te swl maintenance davit. Whilst the davit was being rotated into position, the trolley started to
move along the beam due to wind conditions and davit motion. It was presumed t e end stops would prevent the trolley from falling off, but they did not. The beam trolley and
chain block fell to the skid deck, striking the expamet protective cover to the manway hatch of a transportable chemical tank. (containing tross scaletreat). Da age was limited
to the expamet, none to the tank, and the portable lifting equipment.
While unloading an interstage cooler from a mini container it was being supported 15cm from the ground prior to being lifted into position on the plant. The webbing strop
failed and the interstage cooler toppled over causing minor damage to the pipedeck. he cooler was known to weigh 1 tonne and was being supported by a strop with a 2 tonne
rating. The strop had been examined prior to use and judged t be in good condition.
The left hand threaded coupling at the top of kelly backed out allowing the kelly to free fall through the rotary table and carry on through the bop area removing the cover plate
and to pierce the cover plate on the skid deck. It was stopped from travelli g futher by the top of the kelly coming to rest on the rotary table, the bottom of the kelly was then
projecting approx 5 ft into wellhead area.
During an electric line plt the wire line units power pack was switched off and the park brake failed causing 1000 ft of wire to be spooled uncontrolled into the well.
The <...> slim line (bop) wire line unit is shipped with its long axis parrel to the deck, it has to be upended so that it can be transferred to the bop deck between the support
structure beams. This operation was being carried out by changing the our point bridle onto the top lifting lugs. The crane was being banked by radio. As the load became
upended and just "floating" on the deck it went out of control slid westward and struck a section of handrail which was forced from the deck support socket . It then fell to bop
deck below. The area immediately below the rail in the bop deck was barriered off and no-one was inside the barrier. However one operator was out of sight beneath the
overhang, the handrail landed beside him.
Whilst putting the newly supplied quick erect type scaffold onto its storage location at east end of top deck central walkway by means of the ne crane an adjustable leg slipped
out of its housing and fell approx 5 m narrowly missing the snr deck operator ho was banking the load. The screw adjustable leg is held in place with an interal seg- mented
plastic collar which is opened [release] end closed [locked] by a rotating circ collar on the main frame. The plastic collar in the locked position grips the th ead of the adjustable
leg and holds it in place. It is not readily noticeable whether the lock is in position or not and with no weight on the ext led the locking collar is quite free to move. Weather
played no part in this accident, at the time the weather was calm.
Lifting an elec motor onto a pump mounted in the vertical position, using chain block and tackle. No single lifting point was available to fit the motor in the vertical position so
3 lifting slings were rigged around the drive and flange mounting on the m tor frame. The motor needed to be sited slightly off centre of the lifting beam point, this being
accommodated by a 2nd chain block used for pulling the unit on centre. During the unnecessary re-rigging employed to get the correct motor orientation, afte initial
placement of the unit, the motor toppled when the weight was taken on the chain block and the momentum of the toppling motor put undue strain on the chain causing it to part
and subsequent falling of the motor 5 ft onto the deck.
Drill ops on well 1-2. Pulling out of hole driller heard something drop beside him in the driller's consol. Drill line spooler safety sling shackle found on rig floor. Shackle pin
found also on rig floor. Shackle pin retaining split pin not found. Split p n had snapped, been incorrect ly fitted or potentially had not been fitted allowing the shackle pin
retaining nut to work loose and the shackle to therefore fall off.
Whilst moving the wireline power pack using the bop crane a scaffolding clip fell from above and landed on the deck 2-3 ft from one of the personnel inv in the op. No work
was in progress above and it is believed the clip had been left either on the crane chassis or on one of the beams above the crane. The superstructure above the bop deck was
subsequently checked and reported clear of further foreign objects.
Trainee crane op driving the crane at the time. Backloaded lift tilted at a sharp angle and loosely stowed fittings fell out the container and fell approx 12 feet onto deck. No one
injured
The north west crane was unloading the supply vessel <...>. As the crane driver commenced lifting a drum of cable it rolled off the carrying frame and dropped approximately
four feet onto the deck of the supply vessel. No further attempts were mad to offload the cable drum. The supply boat returned the equipment to <...> for inspection. No report
that the skid caught or impacted other equipment during straight lift. Verbal report of skid damage after the incident.
The <...> crew were rigging down from <...> on completion of a scale squeeze. Whilst retrieving the speed-head(hammer union/chicksan crossover) the 1 ton sling parted due
to application of excess load. The immediate cause of the excess load was re-engagemen of the hammer union and tree cap threads when the union slipped during the lift.
Equipment being used was the bop crane 6 ton auxiliary hoist. The <...> operative working the hoist didn't hear the warning given by the operator positioned in the egg box.
The load was initially lowered from the top deck level over the water to a point above the supply boat prior to slewing the load over the deck of landing. The crane was then
jibbed down to position the load over the landing area just above the deck prior o attempting to box the load up to the previously positioned backload. It was at this stage of
the op that the crane operator saw the boat drop away and to one side of the load. When the boat rose on the swell it did not resume its orig position having oved location by
approx 4 ft causing on the riser the suspended half height to strike its inboard edge on the chemical tank the load was intended to be boxed up against.this caused the
suspended half height to tilt sufficiently to induce movement of the contents against the half height of the door thereby causing the door to open, dropping some of the contents
onto the boat's deck from a height of approx 8 ft.
Wind 6 kts, direction 250 deg, sig wave 0.7 mtr, max wave 1.4 mtr tide dir 338 deg, tide speed 1.5 kts (predicted only) vessel hdg 145 deg the standby vessel <...> was being
used to complete an interfield transfer from the <...> platform. This involved the offloading of 2 lifts and the backloading of 2 lifts. The <...> entered the <...> platform 500
mtr zone after gaining authorisation to do so. The vessel took up station on the south side of the <...> and lifting operations commenced. The first two lifting operations were
completed without incident. The crane hook was then attached to a watertight container and was being prepared to be lifted. As this occurred the bow of the vessel started to
drift to the portside (towards the direction of the a<...>) the vessel master was requested to come back on station and attempted to do so utilising his bow thruster. The master
was unable to maintain station and commenced to pull away from the jackets as he was concerned that the tide would take him onto the <...>. As the vessel attempted to avoid
a collision the crane operator followed the stern of the vessel with his boom and was at the same time paying out the rope. As the vessel turned north the crane boom was
prevented from following it due to the <...> vent stack support suructure.as a result of the angle of the vessel and the boom the crane jib began to vibrate as rope was paid out.
Whilst unloading scaffold material from supply vessel a clipbasket suffered damage with one of four lifting points fractured.
<...> fire pump string being lifted at time of incident. No injuries. Level 3 investigation being carried out by oim. Winch has been quarrantined for 3rd party inspection by
amec. No other winches on board.
Running-in-hole.the blocks were being run up for a stand of drill pipe when the tong fell to the drill floor.the hanging line was observed between frame and air blower
hose.the tong started to lift and witnesses on drill floor and monkey board shouted a warning.the line parted and tong fell approx 2 metres to deck.investigation suggests that
the tong travelled up due to tension on the wire,straightening 4 tonne shackle.tong then whipped upwards.when released by retainer chain,draw works stopped, so no onger
tension on wire.tongs fell back and momentum was sufficient to part wire when it contacted sharp edge of flange securing air blower hose.
Rigger had fitted a 1 ton beam trolley to beam to lift equip up to next level - approx 5 ft. He was running the beam trolley to site above the load when a screw and spacer fell.
He took the trolley back to ascertain prob and one wheel fell off. No injury to personnel occurred.
A container <...> taken off the<...> <...>, which contained 10 off 205 ltr drums of oil/chemical. There were all removed with the use of barrell clamps. <...> at approx 1840
this container was to be backloaded onto the <...>. During this procedure the container was in collision with several others whilst attempting to position on deck of the ship.
Finally in position crane op noticed that the door was now lying on the deck of the ship. It was no longer attached to the container. A investigation by the ships captain
concluded that the safety retaining pins fro the door hinges had been dislodged or not securely fitted. There were no injuries/damage to equipment. Door fell approx 2 metres.
Container certification was in date. Corr ctive actions: all container door hinges must be checked for locking pins prior to shipping. Deck personnel must check all doors
retaining pins are in places and in good condition before containers are moved about the deck or backloaded. To ensure all per onnel are aware of this responsibility a "poster"
will be sited on notice boards and message on cctv. <...> materials controller to raise service improvements document [sid] to <...>, highlighting the above occurrance and
need for intervention
Two hydraulic arms parted and frame dropped 2 feet onto bop site made safe. No injuries. The aim of the activity was to lift the bop from the riser using the bop lifting
equipment and to traverse it north to its stowage position, a normal drilling activit . During preparations to lift the bop from the riser the bop stack clamps and turnbuckles
retraining the bop were removed and the weight of the stack was taken by the two lifting rams and frame to support the bop prior to moving. On taking the weight, the bop
(weight 53 tons) was lifted approx 1-2 inches off the riser when the two rams fractured and parted at the connection to the lifting frame. The bop dropped back onto the riser
causing the riser to be pushed down approx 0.75 inches. The bop was immediat ly secured by the turnbuckle restraints and and securing clamps at the riser connection. An
investigation team was set up by the oim to investigation the immediate and underlying causes. After dicussion with the hse the rams and clevis pins were removed a d sent
onshore for metallurgical analysis to established mode of failure.
During pulling and racking of 5 1/2" drill pipe after running liner on n20 well, on racking back a stand, a roughneck on the drill floor heard somthing ratle down the drill pipe.
On investigation it was found that a guide block and bolts had fallen from t e racker head assembly 90ft to the drill floor. The block weighed approx 0.5kg. The block was
secured by two bolts, it is suspected the bottom bolt vibrated loose and dropped and the top bolt sheared, the block and bolts could not be located after they dropped.
During top hole drilling 2 x 1 1/2 bolts dropped 90 ft from the hydraulic (bj) elevators to the drill floor. On inspection the bolts had been checked approximately 30 minutes
previously as part of operational checks. The bolts had been secured with lockin wire. The cause of the bolts dropping is thought to be the excessive vibration on the elevators
during this top hole drilling phase. An increase frequency for checks was implemented and the hydraulic elevator was replaced by manual elevator.
During pulling out of the hole with the drill string after drilling in 12 1/4" hole section the derrick man was racking back a stand of 5 1/2" drill pipe in the derrick finger with th
derrick upper racker arm system as the drilled cont'd to pull the drill string out of the hole for the racking back of the next stand, the top drive link tilt hydraulic hose protection
bar contacted the upper racker arm head, shearing the 4 protection bar retaining bolts. The protection bar, approx weight 4 lbs, then fall a prox 86 ft to the drill floor the
original design of this system includes an audible alarm to communicate potential collision between top drive/link tilt and the upper racker arm. This did not operate in this
instance. A recent mod to the top drive link tilt system did not include a mod to this audible alarm sector sensor flag.
During drilling operations, when pulling pipe out of the hole on well np30, the main block over-ran the crown-o-matic safety device and continued on to impact with the
crown. Severe damage to the travelling block, crown sheaves and adjacent structural st elwork was sustained. No injuries to personnel occurred and no damage to the drill
floor was sustained. At this time drilling operations have been suspended until repairs can be effected. Also well left in a safe condition.
Failure of 3.1 tonne swl elephant chain block during maintenance operations on sea sump pump load on block at time estimated at 0.5 tonne was estimated ay 0.5 tonne was in
the process of beiong lowered when chain anchored end ran off the chain block. Load fell 6-8 feet untill the load chain locked in the hook pulley. This allowed the load to be
retieved another block.
Drill floor trigger winch (hydraulic) allowed suspended load to desend under gravity after power was switched off
Using tugs and a dsv, the caisson was floated into a position where it was to be hooked up to platform lifting equipment, to allow lifting into its final position. After it had been
pulled into its final 'sea' position and before it could be lifted, wave otion caused the caisson to heave considerably more than had been anticapated. This excess heaveapplied
repeated shock loads to the rigging and these loads were transmitted via the lifting wire 'a' to sheave no 5 as a result the side plates of sheave no distorted and allowed wire a
to come free.
The drilling drawworks was in operation pulling pipe out of the hole. Whilst pulling up in casing, in high/high gear the drilling line spooler lost tension allowing the wire to
oscillate. The toolpusher who was operating the drawworks responded by easing ff the throttle. As he did so the spooler assembly dropped 15 ft down the wire stopping short
of drawworks drum. Investigation revealed that the support line had failed as a result of running through a shackle rather than a sheave block. A retaining wire lso parted as the
spooler mechanism lost support.
Sbv was delivered interfield transfer cargo to platform, the 3rd and final lift had been hooked onto platform crane when vessel's stern thruster failed. Vessel could not hold
station and despite efforts to payout line whilst following her movements the cr ne operator determined he would need to activate the auto line payout and vacate the cab in line
with procedures this he did. Shortly thereafter he noticed that the 3.5 ton container had fallen off rear rail and insufficient tension having been generated o trigger the line
release mech. Crane operator saw the container floating and so returned to his cab to effect its retrieval.
Whilst lowering a heavy lift (load 26.2 tones - coiled tubing reel). To a boat, the crane experienced main hoist hydraulic hose fitting failure. The crane fail safe systems
operated as designed, the weight was then lowered to the boat using the emergency system. After a quick repair the crane was then re-tested and the load was then re-
positioned. (repair time 2 hours)
A memory valve on the crane hydraulic locking system failed due to a cable becoming damaged. This caused the crane elec systems to shutdown. The crane systems failed
safe. No load was on the hook at the time of the inc. Boat unloading op was in progress a this time but the vessel was not placed by risk when the crane came to a halt.
Druing change out of the bottom hole assembly to coninue drilling ahead on a8 the last joint of bha had been picked up from the catwalk and landed on the drill floor. The 'e'
tugger hook was then secured to the breakout samson post and the line tensioned by pulling on the tugger. It is suspected that unknown to the person operting the tugger that
the line had blown across the dolly track and became snagged on a joining plate prior to tensioning. As a result when the top drive was raised the tugger wire ecame entangled
in the blocks and was stressed beyond breaking point. The wire parted approx 30ft above the drill floor, allowing approx 275 feet of wire to fall to the drill floor 150' below the
top tugger sheave.
Well a5 was being prepared for well access operations. Hoses were required to be run from the halliburton pumping unit to the well bay. In order to minimise the routing on
the skid deck area it was decided to provide access via well a2 skid deck hatch. he well access hatches are 1.0 m square, approx., And secured to the skid deck with
countersunk screws. Prior to lifting the hatch a scaffold barrier was erected around the hatch location to provide personnel protection following removal of the hatch cove . A
two leg wire sling was attached to the hatch cover lifting points with the master ring inserted into the lifting hook of the west crane. On attempting to remove the hatch cover
the work party noticed that only one side of the hatch cover was raising ollowed by the failure of one leg of the sling. The cause of the accident was due to the fact that one of
the countersunk retaining screws had not been removed and thus the hatch cover was still partially attached to the skid deck.
The drill crew were changing elevators 3 3/8" to 2 7/8" on the top drive unit. Using the east tugger the 3 3/8" elevators were removed. As per procedure the end of the tugger
line was fastened to the adjacent securing post, the slack line reeled in and a visual inspection carried to ensure the line was taut and not snagged. Two persons were satisfied
that the line was freee and one signalled the drill (who is unsighted at the console) the 2 7/8" elevators were fitted manually and a few minutes later the op unit was moved
upward in the 'dolly track'. Somehow the tugger line was picked up by the top drive in in motion, strain applied in excess of the design, and the line parted approx 50 feet
above the winch on the 'standing' fall. Being released the wir unravelled over the top sheave and fell to the rig floor. No injuries.
Maint being carried out on deck crane to calibrate load indicator. Boom was being lifted to min radius to check boom marks with the radius indicator. At min radius the fitting
on the supply hose to the hydraulic rams failed causing loss of hydraulic flui to main deck. Boom lowered to max radius on the rams with partial control by hydraulic check
visits. Crane operator pressed the engine stop butto actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
Whilst re-instating main hatch cover handrail fell through open hatch to wellhead area below.
Whilst erecting a scaffold in the accommodation at level 03 the scaffolder placed a tubular on the walkway, as he turned round the rubular rolled over the edge under the guard
rail falling approx 25'.
Technician carrying lengths of 6m instrument tubing around walking on the north side of puq platform. Rested tubing at a corner on handrails. When he went to pick up the
tubing it overbalanced slipped from his grasp and fell to the next level landing at the access area for the interplatform bridge.
During routine testing the no 3 bay panels dropped down in an uncontrollled manner following the supporting wire breaking
A stainless steel shheting protective cover, approx 4' x 4', fell from the south bop crane approx 30' onto bop deck. Unknown numberr of cover secruing devices - pop rivets –
had been removed and the cover re-secured by plastic tie wraps. It is deduced th t to gain access to the crane drive motor for maintenance, the pop rivets had been removed to
allow the sheet to be folded back for access and re-secured with tie wraps. The folding would have caused deformation to the sheeting causing the sheet to foul t e underside of
the rig support beams, which, when currently fitted, clears the support beam by 1". The sheet fouling the beam caused the remaining rivets to shear and the edge of the stainless
sheet to cut through the tie-wraps, causing the sheeting to fa l, being unsecured to the frame. Upon inspection it was found that the cover of the north bop crane was in a similar
condition.
A scaffold was being erected on the north face of the drill derrick to allow access to replace, repair and secure the monkey board windfall. Whilst lowering a 20' tube into place
using a securing rope it caught on a check fitting slackening the knot (clov hitch) the pole fell hitting a handrail on the west side of the derrick and falling to the bop deck. All
areas had been barriered off and tannoys made prior to the work commencing, the pole fell into an area that was restricted to all personnel.
Repairs were being carried out to the <...> crane walkway, this involved cutting away old deck plate prior to installing new sections. Whilst waiting on scaffolding to be built
under the walkway, the work was progressed by "part" cutting the open sections of walkway, the open sections were then covered to allow persons to walk on the surface. It
would appear that a section was "part" cut too far leaving insuffcie- nt metal to metal contact to keep it in place. It then fell off when it was covered up or as result of vibration
due to persons walking on the walkway. The piece of metal was found some 5hrs 15mins after the was completed for that day, therefore the time that the piece of metal became
loose and fell is unknown. The piece of metal is 430mm long, mm thick and tapers from 50mm at on end to a sharp point at the other, it weighs 1lb and fell 20mts
<...> broucher capsule semi released 15' down causing significant damage to capsule rendering it unuseable. Being made safe by intervention crew. Platform not manned at
time.
Platform personnel were removing 6" blowdown line whilst working from a crane work basket. Basket was resting against blow down line, when the last bolt was removed the
blowdown line moved. This allowed the rtu ring gasket to fall to the platform weather deck. This work was observe by the platform mech. Fitter who immediately vacated
personnel from the area below prior to the incident.
Production operator proceeding to lower separation area when dropped object hit deck approx 7' - 8' away. Object retrieved and found to be the backplate half of a scaffolding
band and plate fitting. Upon investigation found sacffolding section being remo ed at upper deck level, but had gailed to barrier off area below.
Rigging up on well for coiled tubing work. It was necessary to modify the rig up to accomodate local pipework. Whilst manually handling the spm check valve
(approximately 80lbs weight) it slipped from the two operators hands from waist height and droppe approximately 13 feet via a deck penetration (for flowline) to the lower
wellbay area. The wellbay on both levels barriered off for the task in hand. Likely causes: failure to recognise options to eliminate manual handling. Failure to re-assess
manaua handling techniques in light of new heavier/bulkier check valve. Lack of awareness in relation to two man lifting techniques. Fatigue and personal circumstances
may have been factors. Personnel involved contacted safety department. Full investigation instigated.
During routine deck operations a deck operator found a small metal plate (200mm x 125mm) lying on the laydown area on the roof of module 1. The plate (weight 400gms)
was later established to be the identification plate from one of the <...> burners on the flare tip. Distance fallen 94.5metres. Wind speeds in the area for the preceding 48hrs
was 30-42knots, measured at sea level.
Scaffolders were positioning scaffolde materials on module 6 sub sstructure in preparation for erecting a work platform. Transoms and ledgers were being stacked on a grating
walkway several at a time, in a near vertical manner, leaning against a handrail during this operation a 2.5 metre length of culpeck quick fit scaffold tube slipped across the
walkway and fell through a 280mm gap underneath the handrail on the landing on the impact deck of module 5, approx. 12.5metres below. Personnel were working o the
imp[act deck at the time the nearest one apprx. 16 metres from where the tube landed.
Personnel preparing to commence work. Rolled out a section of 'fire blanket' which, unknown to them, contained a section of 'chartek' flame retardent cotaing approx. 9" * 4".
The section dropped from the scaffold working area to the deck 35' below. Per onnel descended from the scaffold, confirmed no damage to plant, personnel or equipment and
resumed work. The incident has been brought to the attention of all offshore staff, including ways of preventing recurrence.
Personnel were on safety induction tour of facility, walking along cellar deck when a scaffold fitting fell from above narrowly missing one person. Work in prog was
dismantling of over the side scaffold. Area below was not barriered as it was not envisage that any dropped objects could land on platform the work area being well out board.
This was a failur of rigging equipment of unknown origin on the telford caisson diving platform installation. In addition incorrect rigging practices which could have led to
personal injury and damage.
An unsecured offcut of module cladding material (est 8 to 10 ft long x 1ft wide) blown overboard from the scafolding outside f module and landed on the supply vessel <...>
that was alongside working cargo. No injuries or property damage were sustained.
During the evening coffee break the juice machine short-circuited, a small fire erupted in the machine which was discovered by the personnel present in the shop. The electrical
plug was pulled and the fire in the machine died out by itself.
There were two events running one after the other to be discussed. 1. Two <...> techs were completing planned maintenance on the air compressor starter located in
switchboard ps 4007 itself located in m8 deck. Part of the pmr is to function test various electrical items with the starter withdrawn. To function test these items a "test
supply" is required. This test supply was fond to be deenergised and during fault finding for this supply the fuse suppling the relay marshalling board was removed by mist ke
resulting in all closed circuit breakers on ps 4007 opening. This stopped the main hvac fans resulting in a production shutdown. The two <...> techs immediately informed
m13 control room of the cause of the production shutdown. 2. On restart of the ain hvac fans, safety supply fan b non drive end bearing overheated and collapsed. The
resulting smoke was drawn through the supply ducting via the other safe supply fans causing smoke detection to be activated in m9 and m17, resulting in the gpas sounding
and a platform muster.
Fire on temporary generator. Quoted to be a hot surface. Engine block was red hot fire extinguished at 06:55 hours muster on <...> + <...> at 06:55. No injuries: investigation
team mobilised: relevant hse inspector notified 10:30 <...>.
Due to a problem with the main gas generator the diesel generator was started and put on load at 11:42 hrs on <...>. At 11:57 hrs the generator room u/v detectors alarmed and
personnel mustered. <...> and <...> who were in the control room. On the production platform extinguished the fire within two minutes of the fire being detected using a co2
extinguisher. The engine was water cooled for a short time using a hose.
At 14:40 hrs the general alarm sounded with subsequent platform esd. While racking in the solar 3 breaker an explosion occurred within the cubicle, throwing the electrical
tech backwards and producing smoke and sparks. All personnel were evacuated from th building and a platform muster carried out. Fire team investigated the incident scene,
checked the area and pronounced it clear. During this time we also had a comms failure to <...>, and a partial closing of 27e esdv 2024.
Whilst starting up generator no 2 which was noisy and running eratically, upon opening enclosure doors a small fire was found coming from vent of alternator. The unit's
emergency stop was pushed and the fire extinguished using dry powder. Total duration of fire was one minute.
The <...> hlv was located on the west side of the platform having completed the lift of the cdm. <...> construction were cutting away the lifting frame, when a gauge attached
to an acetylene cylinder. The firewatcher in attendance extinguished the f re with the assistance of the plant supervisor, by isolating the cylinder. No fire extinguisher was
utilised. The above events were witnessed by osd operations inspectors <...>.
Normal production operations were ongoing when a heat detector activated indicating excessive rise in temperature in a turbine enclosure. On investigation an operator
discovered a fire and activated a co2 fixed system which also initiated a shutdown of t e turbine driven compressor. A general alarm was sounded on the platform and
emergency personnel attended to the incident. The scene was secured until the hse were informed and full internal investigation in accordance with company safety
management systems initiated.
Following shutdown of the machine for maintenance, the run up sequence was in progress when a small quantity of lube oil ignited. The lube oil was located under the
machine in a skid base. The fire was extinguished by the fixed co2 system manually activat d by operations personnel on scene at the time. Full platform emergency procedures
were followed including a muster and notification of hm coastguard. Investigations into the cause are ongoing.
During normal operating conditions with turbines on-load, a small fire occurred in gt3 turbine enclosure. Ird's in gt3 initiated red hazard status and platform shutdown in
accordance with the cuase and effect matrix (sps). Two technicians were dispatched from the ccr to investigate and determine if the indication was genuine. The power
technician was also sent to the area. On approaching gt3, a small fire was seen within the turbine enclosure, which was easily extinguished with a hand-held dry powder ext
nguisher. The site of the fire was on the top cover of the lub oil sump. The ccr was informed and personnel stood-by the site to ensure that re-ignition did not occurr whilst the
machine cooled. Further examination of the sump tank top revealed only a thin coating of lub oil.
A small fire occurred on the bed of the turbine under the bifurcated ducting, this was due to the accumulation of oil seeping into the lagging on the ducting and heat generated
by the hot exhaust ingnited the oil. The fire was immediately detected by the ird fire detectors, shutting down the turbine and process. Two technicians went to investigate the
fire. A small fire was extinguished with a dry powder extinguisher. Large amounts of smoke were released when the doors were opened, and detected by the s oke detection in
the turbine hall, the emergency support team monitored the area and used a co2 extinguisher to cool the area.
Employees observed a higher than normal volume of 'steam' emanating from the tumble drier located in the smokers tea shack. The door of the unit was opened to investigate
and the contents of the machine (overalls) burst into flames. The door of the unit was immediately closed and the alarm was raised initially by telephoning the control room.
At the same time the heat detector above the tumble drier activated the fire and gas system and put the platform nto red hazard status. Attempts were made by the e ployees to
extinguish the fire with a co2 extinguisher, but this was not successful. With the smoke levels increasing the shack was evacuated by the personnel who then proceeded to their
muster points. A drilling support team of four persons was sent to the scene with b.a. equipment and two of the team entered the area with two co2, one dry powder
extinguishers and b.a. sets to attempt to extinguish the fire. At this point the sprinkler head at the side of the machine operated. The two extinguishers we e operated but they
did not extinguish the fire. The b.a. team then withdrew to their b.a control point. At this time the platform support team arrived on the scene and took over firefighting duties.
All power to the shack was isolated and confirmation of this was received by the team leader. A three man team then entered the area with a fire hose & proceeded to the area
The assignments to both motors were adjusted in different combinations balance could not be achieved. The rig mechanic was called to rig floor for assistance, his first
reaction was to check the engine room. There was nothing abnormal and he returned to he drill floor leaving the motorman in the engine room. There was nothing abnormal
and he returned to the drill floor leaving the motorman in the engine room. The motorman in the engine noticed smoke coming form the vents/mud pumps and rotary table, he
o ened the door saw fire and set off the gpa then returned to the panel to extinguish the fire using a dry power extinguisher. The rig mechanic who had made his was to the
engine room from the rig floor to his muster point, arrived and isolated the stop bu tons on each of the generatos preventing the driller from assigning any dc.
Fire on <...>. A number of scaffold boards on a scaffold above the avon generator caught fire - possibly as a result of exhaust fumes. Fire spotted early and put out by
emergency team within 5 minutes. There was a muster and platform was shutdown no injuries no2 damage.
As part of a major refurbistment/enhancement of avon generator sets, a part de-isolation of g1010, to allow a 'dry-crank' test run, was in progress. A part constructed service
water system was pressurised against a closed valve. The system pressure over ame a relief valve (set at 4.7 bar) and discharged through an open ended line into cd17 switch
room. The area technician realised the relief valve had lifted and closed the supply valve. However, a quantity of water breached 6.6kv cubicles bcg 1020 and b k 9310 causing
a flash-over which resulted in damage to circuit breakers and bus bars.
Fire in sample skid in wellhead module. Extinguished. Platform shutdown. All accounted for situation under control. No report of explotion. Not a major fire.
Smoke was noticed to be issuing from door into the north fire pump module on pt platform. Reported to the icc who raised a ga and dispatched personnel to inv. The cause was
identified as smoke/steam issuing from diesel engine jacket water heater due to a ailure of control thermostat.
Whilst transfering oil drums, the crane's boom developed a small fire halfway along the boom. Fire was caused by overheating of hydrolic and pneumatic hoses, which were
close to the <...> compression turbine exhaust stacks also situated on m6 roof
Turbine po4 was being test run by the <...> engineers, and the machine had been running for approximately 30 minutes. The engineers were engaged in visual surveillance of
the turbine and observed a small flame beneath the exhaust coupling and immedi tely reported this to the mol control room. Po4 was immediately shut down and a production
tech responded to the scene with a portable halon extinguisher, assessed the extent fo the fire, estimated to be approx 0.1 sq metres with a 15mm flame height. The ent fans
were shut down, hood door opened and the halon directed at the flames with immediate effect. The turbine hood was resealed and the ops supervisor notified.
Supply cables flashed in terminal supply box to k10 air compressor. A flame and smoke alarm were activated. Compressor motor tripped immediately on earth leakage
protection. No fire present on emergency team's arrival on site, only some residual smoke rom the box. No fire or smoke damage to motor. Motor was an industrial unit and
not ex rated. All fire and gas equipment and control actions took place as per design.
2 maintenance technicians noticed a small flame on sp221 coalescer transformer on m3 roof east. The flame was on the north high voltage terminal chamber and an area
glowing red was observed on top of the expansion bellows. The cause of the incident was he failure of the high voltage, up to 22kv, flexible connection between the
transformer insulatior and the vessel high voltage bushing. The flexible connection which is designed to absorb therminal deflection served at about the centre. This produced
a park plug effect melting the copper from the transformer connection end. Eventually the gap was wide enough for the arc to transfer to erath. The control room was notified
and a surface platfrom intitiated.
Fire in a waste container within the stairwell of the accommodation module. This resulting ain smoke logging of 2 stairwell levels and required a precautionary general alarm.
The area was internal. The area is used for domestic activities.. No persons were injured.
During the morning of the <...> the south east navigation warning light equipment caught fire. This caused extensive damage to the batteries and wiring. <...> is not a normally
manned installation and the damage was discovered during a day tri to <...> on <...> where part of the work scope was to investigate a navigation aid common alarm which
had been activated on the <...> incident being investigated the relevant parties (<...> board and <...>) have been informed.
Hotwork was ongoing at the east side of the skid deck, which involved burning sections of 1" beam. The work was controlled by the permit to work system, uv's were
inhibited, fireblanket placed over the deck drains and a firewatcher nominated. Gas checks had been carried out and a portable gas detector was in use at the worksite. During
the burning operation, some gas migrated up the drains to the skid deck, and was ignited. The control room operator received two messages, one by radio and one by teleph ne
that the drains were on fire. Control room operator initiated the fire alarm. The platform went muster stations and the fire team responded. The people carrying out the
hotwork and the roustabout took the initiative to run out a fire hose. Within t o minutes of the alarm being initiated, the fire team leader was at the scene, and reported in that
he could see no evidence of fire on the skid deck. Weather conditions was 25 knots (nw), however, the area on the skid deck was very sheltered and was tot lly protected from
the wind. The work was progressing adjacent to deck drains. The drains had been covered with fire blanket, but no bung had been inserted into the actual drain. The
production operators had drained down instrumentation on process vesse s during the lunch break. No repeat gas check was carried out prior to restarting work after the
While welding out beam extensions on the south side of the platform, main deck, a small fire occured in the habitat in which the welder was working. The welder reported that
he heard a bang, saw flames and flet heat. He alerted his firewatch who was at th upper level, and also heard the bang. He descended from the middle to the lower levle of
three levle habitat and extinguished the flames. There was no injury to personnel and no damage to equipment. Causes:- inspection of the havitat and work site after he
incident showed one small charred area on the white tarpaulin and two burnt areas on the blue tarpaulin neither larger than two feet in the habitat. Blue and white are used for
simplicity of decription and also to indicate that two different materials ere used. Two checks for presence of hydrocarbons by different operations staff were negative. Bottles
containing gases used for cutting and burning were stored on the main deck adjacent to the habitat and were shut at main valves. Burn tests were done o samples of the two
tarpaulins under workshop conditions and both burned when a naked flame was applied, but neither exhibited the intensity of flame described by the welder. Flame from the
white tarpaulin was very weak while that from the blue tarpaulin as much stronger. The cause of the fire was not firmly established but is assumed to have been welding
Normal production conditions. All platform electrical load was being transferred onto generator 'a' at 11:34 by personnel. A loud & unfamilliar noise was heard closely
followed by shutdown on voted flame detected in the enclosure. Platform general alarm was activated automatically. Control room operator observed 'extinguishant released
indication' on f&f panel for generator enclosure 'a'. Interior of enclosure was inspected through viewing windows, observing halon mist. No fire/flame evident. Further
examination revealed that an igniter plug port blanking plate had burnt through this would allow hot combustion gases/flames to exit the engine casing, which in turn activate
the fire detection system. On close inspection/strip down it was found that part of the blanking support liner shank and cap had been burnt away. 2 associated gaskets had also
been burnt through. Signs of a hot gas flow path was evident on the engine casing, but no other damage could be seen. No damage to internal parts was visible through the
engine casing port. The engine vendors <...> were contacted for advice and guidance. <...> advised that they had seen this problem before but not oftem. Various precautionary
measure were discussed as a safeguard before returning the unit to operation. The remaining blanking plugs [3] have been examined, no defects have been found. A
During fault finding on diesel engine of <...> wireline unit, diesel fuel filters were taken off and disposed of in a compactor bag stored on the pipedeck. Shortly thereafter a
flash fire occurred in the void space between the living quarters and t e drilling module. The fire was effectively extinguished using a high pressure washdown jet. A fire hose
was later deployed to provide further cooling
Waste oil (probably lube oil) was disposed of in a compactor bag on the pipedeck. A small amount of oil leaked out of the bag and dripped into the void space and onto a hot
exhaust stack resulting in a flash fire which was extinguished using a portable dry powder extinguisher.
Electrical isolator in the off position for <...>. Dry conditio elect. Enclosure destroyed by fire, b.b.c. type g.h.g. 263 enclosure probable elect. Short circuit due to moisture
ingress. Picked up by one flame detect. Operator checked and confir ed portable dp extinguisher used same time second flame detect. Picked up and operated fixed system
(deluge) prod. S/d mustered until confirmed elect. Isolation.
The platform alert was sounded indicating a fire in the plq laundry. Upon arrival found smoke emitting from the door leading into the laundry two stewards were in the laundry
prior to the alarm sound. The smoke was quite heavy. A two man team wearing ba entered the laundry to find no 2 tumble drier with flames inside the drum. The flames were
extinguished and smoke dispersed.
Following the running of turbine z3150 for some 30 mins, the unit tripped the unit had been under observation following start-up having earlier had the skid cleaned of lube
oil. As a precaution against exhaust lagging ignition a charged fire hose had been run out and operations personnel advised to be extra vigalent at the unit, in addition to which
personnel were position to observe the exhaust stack for non-standing emmissions. Within one minute of tripping the operator observed a small fire at the botto of the power
turbine in the area of rock wool insulation, the control room was informed and the decision was taken to open the turbine hood door and extinguish the fire with the pre-
charged hose. The extinguishing of insulating material took less than 5 econds. The insulation was then removed to ensure no deep seated fire existed and that the fire was not
burning within the casing.
A metal 5 gallon drum containing mixed rigidon 503 (coating system). A paint roller used to apply rigidon p21 rolling aid, two rags soaked in rigidon t2 (actone) and a 1 litre
plastic container with an unknown quantity of rigidon catalyst c3 was thrown in o a general rubbish skip. Shortly after it was deposited in the skip the contents of the drum self
ignited. It was susequently confirmed by the supplier that c3 catalyst will ignite if it comes into contact with metals in sunlight conditions. Weather at the time was sunny
During restart ops after a production shutdown heater was found to be on high temperature. The heater was annunciating tripped and could not be reset. There was still a
supply to the heater element. This supply was then isolated. The heater tube instru entation and pipework were all subject to overheating.
As the main drive start on the gas lift compressor lp was initiated, it caused the bus zone 2 trip on the right hand side of the 13.8kv switchboard to activiate causing loss of
power generation and platform blackout.
A stove hotplate in the galley was operating at approx 300 degrees (f) although no cooking was taking place. A jug of oil placed on the workbench opposite was knocked over
and onto the hotplate. The event was noticed by members of the catering staff who isolated the stove and placed a fireblanket over the hotplate. Smoke from the blanket
activated the smoke alarms in the galley and the platform placed on red hazard status. The drip tray beneath the hotplate contained oil that had steeped down and with he
residual heat this ignited. A further fireblanket was placed over the hotplate and water used to extinguish and cool.
Hydrocarbon gas release minor leakage around bolts
At 1440 hours, 'b' <...> gas compressor shut down due to a high level in the interstage condensate drum. During the restart sequence,the condensate drum was pressurised to 85
psi. Condensate was being drained from level bridles on the interstage dr m to the closeed drain system when a leak developed at a swagelock fitting between the level bridle
and the drain. Low gas levels were detected by 3 low mounted gas detectors. The area operator and operations supervisor, who were carrying out the draining operation, were
unable to immediately identify the source of the leak. The operations supervisor instructed the main control room operator to shut down and depressure the unit. The leakage
reduced, and the source was identified and isolated. When the are was being washed down, the residual condensate was flushed towards the gas detectors, causing 2 of them to
register high levels, resulting in a class 1 shutdown and a gpa. Approximately 2 litres of hydrocarbons were released. The operation itself was saf and had been controlled. The
basic cause of the release was poor fabrication and installation of a compression fitting and associated tubing. The tubing is 2" longer than required and had been forced into
position causing the nut to cross thread on the f tting. The drain system was checked for any similar fittings before restarting the compressor. The pneumatic shutdown system
Red hot work to remove internal baffle sections was being carried out in a separator vessel (2010a) in b module number 1 baffle was being removed using air gouging
techniques, to gain access to the vessel shell areas in preparation for repair. This was th last of atotal of 8 sections to be removed. As the welder was cutting into the section in
question, a small fire started which was quickly extinguished by the actions of the air jet from the air gouging torch. He recommensed the gouging when a further fi e occurred
which immeadiatley spread up the the inclined fins of the baffle, involving around 5 layers of the baffle fins. The firewatcher and the welder attempted to extinguish the fire
using dry chemical extinguishers on site but were unsuccesful. They acated the vessel and raised the alarm inthe permit office. <...> alarm was initiated and all the personnel
were fully mustered and accounted for within 11 mins. 2 ert teams extinguished the fire, the gpa was isolated and instruction for all personnel to tand down from the muster.
An additional job safety analysis was held to discuss the remaining job workscope job particularly that involving red hot work. Further thorough cleaning of the vessel and
blasting of the remaining baffles was carried out. A cut ing disc was used to remove the last baffle section. The baffles were kept wept and a utility water hose was located
This incident occurred when commissioning the b <...> gas compressor. The suction cooler tube bundle had been removed for repair onshore and had subsequently been
returned and installed in the cooler shell. As part of the isolation for the removal of the tube bundle, the source water supply and return lines were isolated and drained during
the commissioning, it was noted that the level in the suction scrubber 2-c104b had risen, possibly indicating that there was a leak in the tube bundle allowing water to pass into
the scrubber via the shell of the cooler. To confirm this, the unbit was started in order to put gas pressure into the cooler shell; gas pressure being higher than water pressure, the
gas would leak into the water side if there was tube or tube plate communication. This proved to be the case, and it was confirmed that communication existed between the
water and gas sides of the cooler. The unit was shut down, the compressor depressurised and the water supply and return shut off to the cooler. Ten minutes later, gas detectors
in the vicinity of b dresser rand scrubber/cooler skid sensed gas concentration greater than 25% lel and generated a class 1 esd. Investigations showed that the drain valve in
the cooling water supply 'y' piece was not fully closed and had allowed first water and then gas to be discharged to atmosphere from the leaking tube in the suction cooler.
Inservice failure on weld at elbow down stream of 10 tcv 1215 (oil outlet line from ist stage separator, by passing coolers)
During normal prod ops the area operator for module 4 [sep module] noticed a leak of water from a section of pipe which formed the level bridle for c1002 the 2nd stage
separator. This leak occurred due to internal corrosion o as weld. Due to the water lev l in the vessel and the leak occuring on the bottom leg of the bridle only produced water
was being ejected untilthe bridle was isolated. The level bridle also contain approx 3 ltrs of condensate floating on top of the water which was also ejected under p essure
during depressurisation of the pipework, which was delayed several mins due to a blocked drain valve system operating pressure = 11.5 bar
Normal ops were in progress. The area operator was on a general insp on his return to the module cr and approx 10 mins after passing the same area he noticed the leak. He at
once isolated the leak changed over lcv and informed the main cr. New spools are lready on order to replace the ones in position. The contents of the fluid was mainly water
and oil with some entrapped gas.
<...> engines are in full operation to supply power during drilling operation for well. The diesel supply line to no2 cat. Sprung a leak at a point where it was clamped to the
engine. This caused diesel to spray across the top of the engine (hot) ausing ignition. The leak and fire were immediately spotted by the electrician and motorman in
attendance. The fuel supply was switched off and the fire was extinguished with a portable bcf ext.
Gas leak in process area of normally unmanned installation detected at bacton onshore terminal. Platform auto shutdown on high level detection initial pressure 123 bar. Leak
from pressure transmitter gaskelt [btwn transmitter and valve manifold].
Well pb 08 'o' ring failure on xmas tree loss of 100 litres of hydraulic fluid into sea from sssv circuit - sssv closed due to failure.
The a annulus pressure was 44 bar - over next 4 days the pressure fell to zero - initially this was believed to be a faulty p transmitter - the well was shut in and the annulus p
remained at zero - ops were carried out to check the p transmitter - tubing/ nnulus cross over valve was opened and immed annulus p equilibrated with flowline pressure - with
the annulus master valve closed there was no fall off in pressure - as soon as the annulus master valve was opened the pressure fell to zero.
<...> was shut i at the <...>. Pressure decline was observed in the subsea flowline and pinpointed by the the observation of bubbles by the standby vessel on <...>. Hse were
informed but oir report held back pending rov survey. Rov survey on <...> identified the exact flange within the subsea cage that was leaking natural gas.
A fractured occurred on a positive displacement condensate pumps lubrication system pipework the pipework was 1/4". A jet of condensate was released at a max of 40 psig
to a height of 4 ft veritcally into air. There was no gas entrained in the condensat . The failure was discovered by a passing worker who informed the prod dept. The pump was
shutdown and isolated. Failure was due to fatigue as the pipework had been inservice for numerous years. 1st failure of this type. Pipework on this and a similar p mp is to be
renewed.
During leak testing of an esdv valve pipework on platform side of esd valve was vented to allow a leak test against sealine pressure to be carried out - whilst pipework was
being vented liquid was seen to be coming from platform hp vent - venting was stop ed and a small amount of liquid was observed running down vent stack.
Fuel gas leak on start up of gas turbine. Part of fuel pipes had been removed. On start up system automatically shut down. Fuel gas at 7psi leaked for 10 secs. No gas detection.
No muster.
Jet of condensate coming from psv. Chief operator isolated psv, stopping the leak.
Gas was escaping from stem seal of valve - at this time flowline pressure was approx 600 psi. Flowline was isolated and depressured and it was noted that the leak appeared
to stop at around 300 psi. As the platform flowing pressure is normally around th s level this would account for the fact that this leak had not been noted earlier.
Rupture in pl 631, a 2" teg line between <...> and <...>.

Platform shutdown at 07:02 caused by a processing upset. In the procedure to restore the platform flow it was necessary to equalise the pressure across the platform esd valve.
The venting lasted 4 minutes. During the first minute the gas condensate mix ej cted from the top of the vent stack into the sea.
Platform was shut down and de pressurised - <...> freeflow line was flushed with water to remove check valve - during bolt removal with hand grinder the flange cracked open
- a small amount of liquid mainly water with some condensate spilled onto boards and ignited - immed extuing- uished with dry power - no injuries
Whilst conducting platform checks it was disc gas leaking from well b12 wing valve greasing point. Tightening fitting failed to stop leak. An isolation cert was raised and well
b12 was shut in. Minimal escape of hydrocarbon
Generator no 1 injector spill line had worked itself loose and parted. Diesel fuel spill due to system being under pressure.
Gas from production equipment pressurised the open drains system and escaped at various drain points around the deck.
At 1825 hrs on <...> a hole formed in 2" water discharge pipe from no 1 contacttor on <...> - mix of water, condensate and hydrocarbon gas was found escaping from hole -
well a1 flowing to contactor was immed shut in and the contactor isolated and vented
Gas detection activated – initiating gpa and platform shutdown - small gas release from d114 gas outlet flange observed by area operator.
Ccr received report that crude oil droplets were being discharged from the main flare prevailing wind carried some oil droplets across the riser access tower, shutdown work
activity ongoing and announcement made to clear the area.
After removal for repair of the waste oil recvery line on d101 a water/ oil emulsion escaped from an open end into area 9.
During routine testing of well a44 tubing to annulus communication in excess of <...> acceptable criteria was identified. A leaking gas lift valve is suspected to be the cause. A
forward programme for remedial action will be developed
Operator was venting via hard piping, a very small amount of gas migrated to g156/g157 casing causing 2b shutdown.
Crack identified in shell of separator. Actual leakage approx 200ml crude oil. No gas head activated. Leaks self sealed at pressure in separator.
During gas backflow operations from well b22 a weld-o-let failed at the point where the 2" psv bypass line joins the 6" flare relief line.
During normal produc when pinhole leak observed in inlet separator inv by area operator & prod supervisor initiated de-pressurised class 2 shut down. Total estimated volume
of leak 330ml. Nb. No f&g detection activated no muster no gpa.
During normal production, when 'pinhole' leak ovserved in inlet separator d3401. Investigated by area operator and production supervisor. Initiated a de-pressurised class 2
s/d. Total estimated volume of leak approx. 300ml. No f&g detection activated, no muster no gpa.
Oil observed coming from crude pump discharge line - loss of containment occurred during ndt prog to identify under insulation corrosion oil released amounted to 3-4 gallons
The well was lined up to circulate out crude oil via choke manifold and mud gas separator to test and clean up separator. No flow was detected so circulation was stopped and
well shut in to check line up and drain mud gas separator via shale shakers. Wh le draining mud gas separator correct line up was affected allowing test separator to de-
pressurise via shale shaker.
While attemptng to restore production following a train trip to coil in the waste heate recovery unit was overheated causing release of steam via local pressure release valves
and gaskets of the a & b coalescer heaters and dump cooler. A full internal investigation is being carried out.
Discharge pipework from heating medium distribution pumps burst, releasing system contents to atmosphere. (glycol treated potable water at 110 deg c. Heating medium is
circulated in a closed loop system providing a controlled source of heat for the coale cer heaters. Coalescer assist in removal of produced water from produced oil.
As part of a planned gas shutdown, the gas plant was depressurised to allow the removal of a section of pipework situated downstream of a normally closed isolation valve
sited downstream of esv 5129. In addition the 4" isolation valve downstream of esv 5 29 was being replaced as part of the same task. At approx. 18:50 while the new 4" plug
valve was being bolted up (4 bolts in place) gas was released from the open end of the valve and from the flange being tightened. The technicians quickly bolted up the flange
and afterwards closed the valve to control the leak. During this operation the central control room was informed of the gas release. The gas plant was restarted despite no
permits for the job being returned and signed off as complete. Incorrect ssumptions by production personnel about the status of work were made.
The dangerous occurence happened during the de-isolation of gas compressor k102a after the summer shutdown while the gas plant was in operation. The compressor was
isolated on the discharge side by the valve esv4965a and a spade. Valve integrity was prove when the compressor was originally isolated prior to the summer shutdown with
the gas plant in operation. The 10" joint was broken and checked for pressure build up behind the spade. When the spacer ring was being installed the plant back pressure
increa ed and the esv started to pass a small quantity of gas. To allow work to continue in a safe manner, the live system was depressurised downstream of the valve. The total
quantity of gas released was estimatd at half a cubic metre. Safe operating procedures for isolations were reviewed offshore and a section relating to the use of plug valves
(using sealant) was incorporated. This has to be reviewed by onshore.
A work permit was issued to carry out boroscope inspection of one of the two air receivers (kc6202a) of the diesel generators pneumatic starting system on the naa platform.
After de-pressurisation of the system, the 'a' receiver to be inspected was discon ected from the air header. This one was re-orientated and blanked in order to bring back 'b'
receiver into service. The header was leak tested by pressurising the 'b' receiver with air at 20 bars. No leak was identified. The 'b' receiver was being brought up to the usual
operating pressure of 30 bars, when at approximately 25 bars one coupling failed, resulting in one 1" valve/blank assembly being blown off against the module wall located at a
distance of approx. 2 metres. Three production personnel were p esent in the room at the time of the dangerous occurrence, away from the missile trajectory. A cause tree
analysis was carried out offshore. The following actions were decided:- - review the design and installation procedures of the type of coupling invol ed and their suitability. -
review training requirement for personnel involved in pipe fitting. - review the existing safe operating procedure for pressure test/leak test.
On disconnection of a greasing unit from a nipple, the cap of the nipple disengaged from the valve body due to being backed off too many turns prior to start of greasing
operation. This allowed a small gas release which was quickly stopped by isolation using the wellhead valves
Oil spill (<0.1 tonnes) observed on south side of <...> platform after draining of an oil metering line.
Tied back 20" & 13 3/8" casing. Observed gas bubbling between 20" & 13 3/8". This is on well <...>.
Prod ops had been shut down for approx 1 hr. Ops tech was carrying out plant insp around process area when he heard what he thought was a leak instrument air. On inv he
discovered an oil gas escape from the vicinity of a 3/4" stub situated at the top of t e inlet pipe pool to the hp separator. The operator activated the yellow shutdown system and
requested activation of ga. Ga and muster initiated. Pressure in hp separator reduced to zero by automatic blowdown.
Following a prod shutdown, a bursting disc on the inlet to the mol pumps failed. In normal circ the result of this would have been hydrocarbon depressurisation in a safe
manner. However in this instance a mono block vent in the pipework downstream of th failed bursting disc had not been fitted with a plug. The result was a low pressure crude
oil leak onto the adj deck of approx 4 litres. The leak was quickly spotted by an operator and isolated. The spillage was contained. Before recommencing oil prod re son for
bursting disc failure is being inv and all other mono blocks are being inspected that they have plugs fitted.
Installing new flowline - pressure cap blew off. Two men sprayed with hydrocarbon. Small release. No injuries. No gas alarm. No muster. Permit to work failure?
Normal prod ops were in progress at time of inc. The night shift tech was int he process of insp his area of plant when he spotted a hydrocarbon leak consisting of oil and
vapours from the flow line area of well on inv he identified the area of release o be assoc with a flange on the pipeline side of the flowline pressure sensing device. The tech
immed informed the cr tech who closed the well in.
As part of final commissioning for the desanding/dewatering skid a sand slurry injection programme ws initiated to verify solids removal/ detection probe performance (level)
and accumulator flush efficiency. This exercise had been in progress for approx 18 hours flowing this when it was stopped on the evening of <...> to enable personnel to vacate
the platform. Upon re-diverting flow through the desanding facilities on the morning <...> a release was heard by the person manually operating the valves. He imme iately
closed the valves and the release stopped. Upon inspection at the skid it became apparent that a leak was evident around the water lcv 3907. This was immediately isolated
upstream and the leak stopped. It appears that the sand probe failed to ala m allowing solids in to the discharge water line which drops pressure from operating circa 60 bars to
atmosphere before dumping produced fluids. Sand/water solution was released only-no hydrocarbons detected.
When carrying out op trials on descending system level in the separator was lowered below the lolo trip point manually in an attempt to drain the level bridle to lsll.
At 0602hrs 20% lel coincidence gas alarm was activated in the process cellar deck crude oil pump area and a platform gas alarm, muster ensued. 0608hrs 60% lel coincidence
gas was reached, effecting a level 2 fire & gas shutdown. 0609hrs fast response team reports an oil leak from the mechhanical seal on p8107 main crude oil line pump. 0610
hrs gas levels were noticeably falling and area was reported secure 0612 hrs all personnel were confined to muster stations until the clean up operation was complete. 06 0 hrs
personnel were informed that normal duties may continue. Note: platform production was suspended until all relevant parties had been notified and permission to commence
normal operations was given. The leak was not particularly high in volume, estim ted in the region of one barrel or less. Addition points: weather conditions: wind 8 knots,
340o. Calm hanging conditions with no breeze factor. No permits had been issued as personnel were only beginning their shift cycle.
Satellite installation feeds into logs complex 09:15 approach by helicopter observed "haze" 30-35 knot-wind. No gas detection. Shut down vessel approached. Gas escape
course unknown
During routine operational checks the operations technician and senior operations technician observed a pin hole leak and discharge of produced water from the 6 o clock
position on a weld in the bravo pigging tee dead leg. This was immediately reported to the ccr and the bravo platform was shutdown and the <...> platform pipeline
depressurised and flushed with sea water.
The <...> engine installed in the 'b' generator was being recommissioned after a full overhaul onshore. A fire was detected by the uvs and the unit shutdown. Cause of the fire
is attributed to an internal lube oil leak within the engine.
During start up of gas injection train ax0201d. Two gas detectors went into low alarm. The gas release was traced to a boom joint leak on ov7656b (secondary high speed shut
off cock vent valve) on the gas turbine driver fuel gas system. The machine was shutdown and fuel system isolated and the release dispersed naturally.
During test run of 'c' power generator after rb211 engine installed, two gas heads g9922/9921 came up in low alarm.
During start up of lp/mp compressor train ax-0207b, two gas detectors came into low alarm. The gas release was traced to a swagelock fitting leak on psll-1063 on the lp
compressor discharge cx-0201b. The machine was shudown and the psll 1063 was isolated on inspection the fitting was found to have stripped threads. The fitting was
replaced and the compressor out back in service.
The wireline crew were in the process of recovering damaged wireline from gas in section well no. B5. The wire was being pulled in a controlled manner through the grease
head the wire then parted either in or at the grease head. Gas then started to escap through the grease head. The well was shut in and depressurisation carried out in accordance
with procedures. The ccr were kept informed at all times of the status of work and were aware of the gas release before the gas panel (3 gas heads in high alarm nd 2 in low).
The executive action on the fire and gas panel then isolated the electrical supply to module 22. The operation of the grease head ball check valve is being invesitgated.
Well kill operations to b22 had been completed, xmas tree assembly removed and drilling personnel opened 'a' annulus valve to check for leakage during b.o.p. test. The
annulus valve was opened to atmosphere and allowed well kill fluids with entrained hydr carbon into the module (01), and initiated alarms on fire and gas detection system.
Persons involved failed to communicate to the ccr staff action and potential of local minor gas release. Actions: bother persons involved cautioned about the lack of awar ness
and communication breakdown.
During routine diesel transfer operations, manual isolation valves were set in the incorrect position. This resulted in diesel being discharged from an atmospheric vent above
hot turbine exhausts. On contact with the turbine exhausts the diesel ignited nd a flame was seen and extinguished by personnel in the area. A precautionery muster and fire
team attendance had been initiated. A reviw of the diesel system design and operational procedures is being carried out in order to prevent a re-occurrence.
Following a <...> shutdown, the pipeline pressure to the <...> increased and the platform was manually shut down. Shortly after, two gas heads in module 01 went into high
alarm as a result of an impulse line on a differential pressure transmittor on the main oil export line, failing at a swagelock connection. This resulted in gas/condensate
spraying from the failed connection. The gpa was sounded and the emergency response team affected an isolation of the damaged impulse line by closing a 3/4" isolatio valve.
Action taken: instrumentation inspected - incorrect make up suspected - to be confirmed by onshore analysis. All other connections of similar make up checked prior to
recommencing production.
In preparation to performing bullheading operation, configuration of chicksan lines was checked, valves to "a" annulus opened in error. This allowed hydrocarbons from the
annulus back to the pump and as the fluid ends is not designed to with hold has at annulus pressure, gas vented through pump to atmosphere.
K 9320 was in injection mode at 330 bar discharge when hydrocarbon gas release occured from hcv 9320 recycle valve. Two technicians in module pressed the emergancy stop
for the operational package and subseqeuant coincidental high level gas caused sps and auto blowdown of gas compression. K9320 was then isolated and then made safe. On
investigation of hcv 9320 it was found that the chevron packings failed the packings were replaced and the platform was satisfied that it was safe to return k9320 to service, a
full inv was carried out.
It is suspected that the hydrocarbon release was due to the parted coil being pulled out of the stripper rubber and not on failure of the stripping rubber on running the coil tubing
back into the hole. The stripper rubber was able to seal around the coil again and control regained.
Choke on well <...> shut in and depressurised then isolated during preceding nighshift. Tree pressure had built up again through the umgv and lmgv. Dayshift greased and
recycled both valves again to achieve tight seal, during depressurisation through blowdown hose gas was released from hose connection that had been left slack. Gas detected
initiated shutdown and blowdown of process. Hose was isolated by closing swab valve at the tree.
G4600 was started and run up on no-load without apparent incident. Upon placing a 5mw load on the machine, fixed safety systems in the hood detected a gas escape and the
platform status changed to yellow alert status. Onshift power tech and ssp immediate y converged on g4600 to investigate. First impressions were that gas was escaping from a
loose fuel gas pigtail coupling, causing the alert. A more thorough investigation revealed that a further 3 fuel gas pigtails were loose, specialist contractor pmd ar to be
instructed to introduce a checklist system to ensure all hydrocarbon systems are correctly reinstated following maint work.
The redundant rich oil line had been purged and water flushed. A permit was raised to remove a spool piece as part platform process isolations. An area technician was in
attendance with a portible gas monitor the line was drained as far as posible using t e drain points designed in to the pipework. The fitters then proceded to split the flanges. A
small amount of water drained from the flange and the area was cheaked and tested with the portible gas monitor. No gas was detected. The job proceded with the g s monitor
in constant use, and showing no hydrocarbons.after a few minutes, the platform went to yellow then to red status when two gas heads at the other end of the module were
activated.
The process tripped as the result of fire and gas systems testing. Two minutes later a gas realese was eported and confirmed from the gas rigging platform. The release was
isolated by closing manual valve 49pxy001 on the gas export cross-over manual blo down line. The point release was the tapping point fort.p49901 from which a fitting had
blown out. After the blowdown there was a loss of power, a rigger working undertneith the pigging platform was alarmed. He lost his balance and fell from the struct re. He
was saved from falling by his hareness and interia reel
Gas release in module um4ee, detection system operated resulting in process shutdown. Process blowdown initiated and full muster complete. At 15:17 gas had dispatched,
platform returned to yellow status. Source of release is believed to be a sight glass n a compressor knockout vessel. <...> is connected to flotel.
Flowline reconfigured and modified. Bd28 worked over, flowline was new. Hydrotest ok, leak on gas test. Examined the graylock, no obvious fault. 2 gas heads hlg, 3llg.(5
total). Process shutdown manually on report. Veited hydrotest by breaking graylock.
The well in question had been flowed for approximately 7 hours prior to pulling out with coiled tubing. The fluid flowing from the well was mostly water, but with a small
quantity of hydrocarbons. Water cut was estimated to be 95-97%. After the coiled tubing was pulled to the surface, the <...> operator <...> closed the well in at the xmas tree
master valve using the hydraulic <...> pump located on the <...> rig cantilever deck. Closed in thp was 1100 psi. <...> and the <...> night shift supervisor <...> briefly
consulted each other regarding the bleeding off of the pressure above the xmas tree. During the interchange <...> was under the impression that <...> considered it to be
acceptable to bleed down the pressure on the rig floor using a bleed line on the nowsco bop. However, after the interchange <...> immediately headed for the wellhead area to
bleed off the pressure above the xmas tree via the closed drains. He assumed that <...> would wait for a call on the radio to confirm thatpressure had been bled off before
opening the valve on the rig floor. <...> then began to make his way down to the lower wellhead area (d3e). On the rig floor <...> instructed one of his crew <...> to bleed off
the trapped pressure above the xmas tree. <...> thought that as the well had only been flowing water, bleeding off at the bop was an acceptable procedure. When <...> opened
Hydrocarbon release from process plant (1"drain line from pre absorber seporator boot - pin hole leak). Shut down and muster - gas release dispersed naturally - plant isolated
- back in production
Gas leak in module u4ee caused by pinhole leak in the drain bypass around the pre-absorber seperator . Muster 05:00 leak isolated . Men stood down
A pressure test was carried out on well <...> xmas tree cap using the cement pump. The cement pump was connected via chickson lines to the xmas tree kill wing valve,
exposing it to the void above the upper master gate valve, after the test, pressure was bled back to the cement pump, causing gas to be released into the cement pump area.
Sensors in the area detected low gas level and itiated.
A minor hydrocarbon release occurred during a flushing operation. The flushing operations were ongoing prior to completing an isolation to allow maintenance to change the
position of some incorrectly installed nrv's in the test separator flowlines of bd 7 and bd29. The service water hose which had been connected to the kill wing valve of bd40
for flushing operations had ruptured causing a release if hydrocarbons into the module.
Diesel bunkering operations were commenced between the <...> and the platform. Pumps were started and the hose slowly filled. Both deck crew (platform) and officer on
watch on the <...> noticed discolouration of the sea (due to diesel) and pumps w re immediately stopped. The estimate of spillage was a maximum of 20 litres. This confirmed
by the <...>.
When trying to bring gas lift back on after shutdown a gas leak was detected by an operator. He could detect the gas approx 6-8 ft away from the leak, but this was not
recognised by the fire & gas detection system. Duration of leak was estimated at 90 sec . The estimated quantity of gas release to air was 2kg. The valve stem grease nipple had
not been used prior to start-up. For gas to be present, the stem seal must also have passed.
Minor gas leak on 3" valve
Top manifold isolation valve 13 was found to be leaking hydrocarbon through a grease nipple.
During wireline ops at 0800 hrs while pulling out of the well with 5/16" braided cable, the weight indicator showed an increase. The cable was slackened off and a single strand
of wire unwound from the cable. The wire could not be moved in or out as it ha 'bird rested' due to the broken strand a flow path through grease injection was created. If it was
not poss to pump enough grease to seal the leak, resulting in a mix of oil and grease escaping. The wire was cut and the tree valves closed in making the w ll safe.
Weather conditions: wind 35/40 knots direction 100 deg temp deg c sea state 3-3.5 m visibility 10 mls. Ann condensate metering lcv 2023 failed in service discovered during
routine operational checks
3 employees on pr esd deck heard what was assumed to be a pressure release - on inv it was found that a liquid sample bomb on jupiter condensate metering skid was leaking
from inlet [lower] flange. Cr was contacted by radio to initiate a psd while a manua isolation of the bomb was carried out. Approx 3 kg of condensate had escaped, and was
contained on the module deck [leak last approx 2 mins] the condensate was flushed into the closed drain system and the deck cleaned
Nature of failure - fractured weld on tube base. <...> vibra gauge. Gauge in service approx 8 months. Instrument tech heard noise, found leak and isolated manually.
Whilst carrying out con monitoring of <...> generator a, an amec employee detectd a smell of gas. He traced the source to the fuel gas slam shut valve the machine was shut
down and the fuel gas line depressured. Further inv revealed that a fibre washer h d been installed as opposed to the dowty seal recommended by the manufacturers literature
Gas leak
During normal prod activities, the night shift operator was carrying out a plant tour when he observed a leaking 3/8" stainless fitting. The fitting was on a methanol injection
pump. Discharge gauge assembly the pump was operating at 180 barg. The oversid op then radioed the cr and the pump was stopped remotely. Once this had been done the
gauge pipework was isolated and removed. The tappings were then plugged. 5 litres of methanol was released over an area of 6 sq metres around the pump.
On the <...> small florets of oil at a rate of three per minute were observed surfacing to the east of <...> and during tidal changes to the north and west of the platform. The mv
<...> (rov vessel) was mobilised to locate the leak source which was subse uently traced to the outboard sub sea tie in flange of the pipeline on <...>. The observed leak rate at a
p/l pressure of 30 barg was three 2 mm bubbles escaping from between the flanges faces every 40 seconds. The p/l pressure was reduced to 15 barg a ter which the obsereved
leak rate was one 2mm bubble every 3 to 4 minutes. Calculation based on a 5 mm oil sphere every 3 minutes equates to leak rate of 0.1 liter/day. Although the top half of the
flange protection cover had been displaced some 3 meters owards ca and minor damage to the p/l weight coating 2 meters towards da inspection of the flange components and
bolts showed no sign of any impact damage. Its likely that a flotel mooring displaced the flange protector and damaged the concrete earlier this year.
Between <...> and <...> a programme of installation and control system logic modification had been completed on the dual fuel system of the avon turbine driving p3070 main
oil line pump. All logic changes completed,d the machine was started on liquid fuel, automatically changed to gas fuel and then some 27 minutes later the platform status
changed to hazard status, confirmed fire indication. Investigation proved that a fire was indeed burning around the external transition duct of p3 70 avon power turbine, action
was taken to manually initiate the btm system which positively extinguished the fire, although the fire teams were mustered at the scene as a precaution. No obvious damage
was evident but a team from pmd were mobilised to ins ect the engine mechanically whilst a check of electrical cables inside and external to the hood were also identified for
inspection. The underlying cause was detailed to be a blocked drain line on a fuel drain on the underside of the power turbine transit on duct which directs excess fuel to a float
trap prior to directing the liquids to the drains system. Remedial actions to prevent recurrence were essentially to ensure that overfueling on start up was not occurring, drain
systems were operational and mai tenance routines raised to ensure continued operation and consideration of improved fuel isolation on fire indication.
During norm production h2s(toxic) gas alarm activated from within stripping gas compressor 'a' enclosure. Ga activated on first detection. Second detection instigated local
shutdown. Personnel mustered and oim initiated blowdown. Flammable gas detectors s owed 7-10% lel. Full ba team entered enclosure and nitrogen used to leak test. A 2"
closed drain line was found to be cracked circumferentially on the threaded section into the compressor discharge line. 'B' compressor was examined and showed signs of cra
king. Production shutdown until repairs complete. Further investigation in metallurgy,etc will follow.
Leak detected by standby vessel. 5km from dougals rov survey indicates possibly the gas reinjection line. But this needs confirmation. Line shut in. Dsv mobilised. When line
identity confirmed. Line will be vented and nitrogen purged
While depressurising a well (d8) to the burner boom a hydrocarbon leak developed at a loose weco connection. The leak was detected by the gas detectors in the area and
automatically a plant shutdown/ blowdown initiated and a platform g.p.a. from alarm to leak stopped - estimated 3 mins.
<...> subsea well on production. At 1430hrs report from fishing vessel near ellon buoys that a patch of seawater is a different colour (100ft2). Survey by helicopter at 1530 hrs.
Gas escape from <...>. Well shut-in and flowline depressurised. Supply vesse sent for observation (<...>). After one hour leak ceased and thin film of hydrocarbon on surface
disappeared (confirmed by helicopter survey at 1600hrs and supply boat. Video film available. Subsequent rov inspection shows four sheared bolts [out of 8] on flange
connection at subsea choke manifold. Bolts replaced and pressure tested ok. Production restarted <...>. Bolt failure being investigated.
A total esd system failure caused all safeguarding actions to fail safe. This initiated a rapid blowdown of the <...> and <...> process. This is abnormal the processes are
normally blown down sequentially in order to limit flare radiation and damage to he flare tip during the blowdown crude oil carried over the flare system and was discharged
from the flare tip. It was carried by the southerly wind back over the other side of the platform into the sea. The quantity discharged was not measured but is est mated to be
upto 2o tonnes with 80% going into the sea. During incident installation was placed on hazard status.
The <...> oil process was on line direct to export whilst the <...> oil process remained shutdown to continue the hydrocyclone enginerring upgrade work including drains
system re-configuration. To enable the <...> process to operate whilst the dunlin shthe defective parts are being returned to <...> for inspection and shutdown work continued a
number of interfaces between the <...> process were isolated to enable physical segregation. A section of the closed drain system which included the drains from the export
prover loop <...> pig receivers & the <...> pig launcher was isolated under ptw isolation which indicated physiccal segregation from the above pressure sources and the de-
gasser vessel by spade installation and identified on both the ptw isolation cetificate and pcf schematic. An oil leak was identified on the thistle receiver by outlet spade at a
failed closed drains joint indicating pressure in the isolated closed drian system, the <...> process/export was manually shutdown to allow a full investigation into the source of
the pressure in the drains system and the oil leak was contained to the pig receiver area external to <...>. Further investigation identified that the pressurre had emanated from
an export prover loop which although identified as being spaded off was found not to have the spade installed but only normal restriction orifie the export pressure within the
Following a esd valve closure on <...> oil export was shutdown. 30 sec's after shutdown of the export booster pumps, the shutdown logic initiated a sps process shutdown
during 30 sec delay levels in 2nd and 3rd stage <...> production eparatoirs increased to high levels. Once the pipeline to <...> was open again <...> process was started up. On
the <...> process the esd system was reset to allow start up. On initiating the reset train 1/2 xcv's on the liquid outlets opened caus ng high pressure oil to flow into the 2nd
stage sparator which already had a high level in it. As a result oil carried over into the gas offtake into the flare system. Not all of the oil was collected at the flare ko drum but
was carried over and sprayed ut of the flare tip. The spray of oil lasted 4-5 mins then stopped. Shortly following this the platform went to red hazard status due to high level in
the flare ko drum but no oil coming from the flare
Pin hole leak on 2" equalisation spool on the <...> prod riser. Resulted in a loss of containment and spillage of hydrocarbon fluids
A condensate/gas leak occurred at the top of the sight glass on the test separator. The plant was depressurised, the test separator made safe. Following inspection, it was found
that a cushion seal had extruded from the top section glass.
<...> maintenance team were carrying out reinstatement of the shale shakers, which have been recently refurbished. These items are driven by a hydraulic system powered
from a hydraulic power pack on the level below. The hydraulic power pack was set to deliver a pressure of 172 bar, and the two men were working on a shale shaker when they
heard a loud'crack' from the level below. They rushed to a position where they could see a spray of hydraulic oil being discharged from the vicinity of the hydraulic hose
couplings and immediately proceeded to the level below and switched off the hydraulic system. The crack was parallel with the axis of the fitting and extended from the outer
edge of the screwed part of the fitting down past the threaded section to the region of the internal support for the integral valve sealing spring. The hydraulic power pack was
built by <...>, though this unit was not directly involved in the incident, other than supplying the hydraulic pressure. The fitting has no discernible markings to indicate its
origins or pressure rating, though it is believed to be rated for 345 barg working pressure as there are identical fittings on other parts of the system which can be used at this
pressure, when skidding the rig, for example. The environmental conditions are an exposed location but this and similar fittings have only a very light surface coating of rust,
Pressure test of a annulus was required. B annulus was to be open so no pressure was to be transmitted to it during a pressure test should there be cross comm. Drilling
personnel were requested to open the b annulus. B annulus gauge was checked and indica ed 7 bar, gauge was bled down but it still showed 7 bar. Annulus valve was opened
slowly to bleed down the pressure personnel were unaware that the pressure was due to gas, though it was stale air. The gas activated the gas heads in the egg box and a cont ol
action from the fire&gas was activated and the platform shutdown. No muster was called as the gas head indicated a drop in the reading by the attendant <...> and ops
supervisor.
Platform was in normal prod ops. P98 condensate pump had a known defective seal which was valve isolated for a pending change-out. The seal was charged with seal oil
pressure and locked in but the seal pump was not on. The seal oil pressure decayed ther was a small amount of condensate in the pump which leeched past the seal the high
integ astra gas head alongside the seal activated from low gas to high gas in 17 secs and the plant shutdown on an auto yellow shutdown. The platform personnel were immed c
lled to muster. Shuttling was suspended and the <...> returned to <...> to refuel in prep for evacuation. Oim <...> took on role of onscene commander.
The orig inc was the pin hole leak in the 2" discharge pipework at a weld connection of an lp condensate pump, operating under normal cons. Detected by a low level gas alarm
in the central cr. Prod staff were on scene within mins. The pump was shutdown an the sec of line isolated locally by closing valves.
Biocide was being decanted from top deck to pump suction line in prep for a seawater system biocide treatment. The flexible hose from the portable holding tank was
connected up to the suction line in the bunded area and the valve from the tank, on the har suction pipe was opened. The tech then proceeded to a lower deck to open the valve
at the pump suction. A salt water flushing line is connected into the hard piped suction line, uswed to flush residual chemicals out of the line on completion of the job. he valve
on the salt water supply line is tied into the hard pipe in between the 2 said valves on the chemical supply line. This valve had been left in the open position. By the time the
tech had gone down the one level to open the pump suction valve the ater from the flushing line had filled up the ullage in the chemical supply tank and chemical was seen
escaping from the tank vent connection the valve on the tank outlet was immed isolated on the techs return to the tank. Immediate area washed down with sea water.
Chemical decant ops were taking place involv surflo a biocide containing gluteraldehyde. This op involves the connection a chemical transit tank situated on the top deck to a
fixed pump suction line for the chemical treatment of seawater for water injecti n. The fixed pipework runs from the transit tanks on top deck down the west side of the
platform through the decking of level 2 external walkway then continues directly under this decking to reach chem injection pumps situated directly opposite west 2 lif boat.
From the injection pumps the chem is then passed into water holding tanks[2]. The decanting op commenced at approx 1250 hrs at approx 1257 hrs the senior deck operator
who was working on the west side of level one external walkway, adjacent to the m thanol skid observed liquid falling onto the deck. Invs foundthat the liquid was discharging
under hydrostatic pressure from the biocide line directly under level 2 walkway. At this time it is not poss to ascertain the precise cause of this leak due to th location of the
pipework. The area was immed barriered off and the area was washed down with a portable monitor from the fire main. The decant skid was isolated and the pipework
flushed out with water from an inlet adjacent to skid. The area of spillag was washed down continuously until all the pipework was fully flushed out.
A low gas alarm annunciated. On investigation leak found to be eminating from a 2 to 3mm dia. Hole in a 2" dia drain line which was lagged and clad. Removal of lagging and
cladding material was required to identify exact location of leak.
Normal operations were ongoing. The plotting of a surge curve on the gas turbine prime mover (recently overhauled) of a gas compressor, was nearing completion. The ngl
plant tripped on a process upset. This was almost immediately followed by a full proces plant yellow shutdown. The yellow shutdown closes down all production operations
and de-pressures the plant. In this case it was triggered by the fire & gas system detecting a high concentration of hydrocarbon gas in the separator area. Investigation cre s in
b.a. found gas leaking from a port in a non-return valve. The valve being on the outlet of main gas scrubber v05. The pin, which acts as the flapper pivot and is normally
screwed into this port, was found on the floor directly beneath.
An ops tech disc diesel backflowing from a closed rain tun dish onto the floor of the module. The diesel was being collected by other closed drain points, though some was
escaping to sea via a manway hatch. On inv it was found that the auto drain on the d esel oil filter had mal- fuctioned and was continually draining diesel to the closed drains. It
is suspected that the drains were restricted and hence could not cope with the full flow.
During routine test of the fire pump a technician opened the water supply valve to the fire monitor and the head (complete monitor) was blown off its support swivel. The water
pressure at the time was approximately 12.5bar and three other monitors were open.
A <...> prog for a flowing pressure gradient survey was underway on well <...>. The flow survey had been completed and the next major step in the prog was to rig down the
lubricator. The <...> crew requested the well closed in and they closed the lmv umv and th swab valve while the ops closed the well from the process plant. The cdp crew
commenced draining the lubricator to v45 drain vessel. When depressurised they broke open the lubricator to remove the logging tools, a few mins after this oils began to flow
f om the top of the open riser. The cdp crew immed checked their isolations and stabbed on the lubricator to the riser thus stopping the flow. The prod ops checked and closed
the actuated wing valve. The oil flow spilled on the bop deck and into the egg box and was contained by the use of absorbent material.
During production condensate/leak from 2"dia pump recycle line - plant shutdown
While carrying out plant routines, production technician became aware of diesel fumes around export pump po4 area. He traced the fumes to inside po4 hood. Adjacent export
pump - po5 was started and put on load. Po4 was shutdown manually and allowed to co l. The leak was repaired and the douty seal was replaced on the diesel burner. 3 litres
of diesel were reported leaked into the drain system. Environmental conditions: wind speed - 13.6 knots wind direction - 285 degrees wave height - 0.8 - 1.3m tempera ure -
11.6c bar. Press - 1013.2mbar visibility - 10+nautical miles to prevent recurrence: 1. Mechanical engineer to check suitability of douty seal for this kind of service. 2. Other
<...> platforms to be advised of this incident.
Normal production operations were in progress, wind speed 9.3 knots: direction due east. Visibility 10 nmiles; temp 13.4 degrees c. Barometric pressure 1010.1 mbar. Wave
height 0.7 metres. There was a gas leak from the gland packing of block valve gp 46 as it was being closed to isolate pcv 8182b for maintenance. The ngl plant was manually
shut down and systems isolated. There was no fire and gas action. The valve was replaced. The cause of failure of gland packing is to be investigated by score. Fu ther actions
will be decided when the report is received.
Normal procedure ops were in progress. A tech detected a strong smell of diesel during a routine watchkeeping check of k02 turbine. This was inv further and the bund
surrounding the diesel pump was found to contain diesel. The crt reported an oil mist det ctor had been activated. The turbine was shut down. Subsequent inv revealed that the
diesel pump seal was leaking.
Gas condensate was detected leaking from v45 production drain header pipework located under the east end of v02 separator. Header pipework id.dp 511-a6 size 2" pressure in
pipework approx 0.5 bar. Leak emanated from a pinhole size hole possibly caused b mechanical damage due to vibration on adjacent steelwork. The integrity of all the
pipework will be checked by ndt. The plant will be surveyed to ascertain if similar conditions exist at other points.
Whilst bringing on an esp after wireline work, it was reported that liquid was coming out of the closed drain vents on the se corner of the top deck. On checking out the system
a 3/4" drain v/v was found open, this was immed isolated and at the same time he vessel level was pumped down. Approx 2 litres of crude came out fo the vent and was
carried over into the sea.
Newly fitted pressure rated flexible hose on discharge of temporary bs & w pump failed. This resulted in a realise of hydracarbon oil into module m4. Module is plated with
buliding and an oil realised to sea.
The platform was operating normally with well g1 + g2 on flow at a combined rate of 70 mmscfd. The weather at the time was bad with winds over 50 knots from the north
east and rough seas. The incident occurred immediately following violent movement of th platform due to a large wave or wind gust. All 4 personnel on board were in the
equipment room engaged in a shift handover when a lound noise of escaping air or gas was heard, followed by an immediate esd level 1. The wellbay area was checked from
the e uipment room doorway and a large cloud of escaping vapour was observed around the wellheads. The immediate action was to initiate an esd level 1 from the push
button on the scs matrix panel and operate the blowdown valve after informing the <...> radio room. All personnel remained in the equipment room until the process was fully
depressured.
The platform went into a level o emerg shutdown, and auto blowdown due to 20% gas being detected at the equip room intakes. <...> cr received notification via the scada
system as the installation is normally unattended. An intervention crew arrived on th installation to inv the cause of gas alarm and emergency shutdown. They discovered a
leaking flange connection on a pressure differential trasmitter. The transmitter is located approx 4 ft away from equip room air intakes. The op pressure of the unit a the time
of the failure was 200 barg. The leak was due to loose bolts and damaged o ring seals on the flange connection where the impulse lines block and bleed assembly connects to
the transmitter.
G820 was running on full load, on diesel fuel, due to a problem with g8010 which was shut down. Platform went to hazard status and g8020 shutdown on a confirmed fire
indication in turbine enclosure. This was followed by confirmed high level gas (2 detect rs). The halon system was automatically released as per design (108kg). All automatic
systems protecting the generator worked as per design. Containing the incident and preventing escalation. Inspection of the turbine enclosure showed light smoke damage o
the upper part of the rurbine combustion casing and fuel lines. Some of the plastic fittings in the enclosure areas had melted. A visual check of the fuel lines showed no
damage. However at the 5 o'clock position looking south towards the air intakes there was a wet area on the combustion casing. The floor area showed no signs of fire.
Mechanical checks revealed that 5 of the gas burner braided connections were loose. One of the braided connection in close proximity to the wettted area was discolou ed
throughout its length (symptom of overheating. Several of the braided connections were marked over 50% of their length. The gas manifold was discoloured over 75% of its
circumference 2 to 11 o'clock position
During fab activities on 13 3/8 annulus vent line in immed vicinity of furmanite clamp vent outlet - while striking in an arc to tack weld a pipe spool in situ, a minor vol gas
flow from 13 3/8 x 20" annulus was ignited - fire blanket on location was depl yed over naked flame which was immed extinguished
Phoned <...> 1930. Confirmed facts as above. On start up, monitoring on site immediately identified fire which was immediately extinguished using dry powder extinguisher.
System shut down to investigate and make safe. A small lube oil fire occurred at g2oa exhaust collector area. A lube oil return line joint had been repaired at the power turbine
end of the power turbine to gearbox coupling. Although the oil was cleaned up it would appear that a small amount of oil seeped between the exhaust colle tor and insulation
jacket. When the machine was ran up this residual oil ignited. The fire was quickly noted as the area was visually inspected to confirm lube oil leak had been arrested, the area
operator immediately extinguished the fire and the machine was shutdown manually.
Gas leak caused by fracture of 3/8" stainless steel fitting on kto2 first stage psv23b pilot line. Psv23b isolated and leak stopped by 1556 hrs
Raf <...> notified coastguard of gas bubbling in sea at <...> location. <...> production shut down and dive vessel mobilised to investigate. Problem identified as incorrect
sealing ring used in flange (mild steel instead of stainless steel). Sealin ring changed and corresponding flange also changed as a precaution
The oil metering prover system had been depressurised and isolated to enable removal of a ball. The lid of the ball receiver chamber had been opened annd the ball was where
expected. When the ball was removed to to comence lifting it from the receiver, tr pprd pressure underneath it caused approx 20 gallons of oil a9well fluid) to be discharged
over the surronding process and over the operator.
Lost communications with <...> subsea well from the <...> & <...> causing subsea shutdown. Hydralic oil back to return tank, attempted to circulate hyd.oil returns to filtration
reservoir without success. Area operator sent to hpu to investigate the valv status, encountered hydrocarbons escaping from the returns reservoir psv. <...> subsea blue was
activated, all hotwork stoped on both <...> & <...> ongoing investigations co-ordinated by <...> office,in liason with the vendor
While on routine rounds an operator discovered oil leaking from a pressure gauge conenction on the inlet to the oil export coolers. The inclation valve beneath the gauge was
closed (double block 2 bleed <...> type) and the leak stopped. It is estimat d that it had been leaking for 10 - 15 minutes. On removal of the gauge, a crack was discovered in
the threaded section of the <...>swivadapt fitting which is fitted between the pressure gauge and the adjacent valve. It would appear that t e internal collet was not fully hand
tightened, therby allowing the gauge to vibrate. This vibration has led to fatigue in the threads adjacent to the loose collet and ultimate failure.
Flange on iniet to 41-6701 began to leak gas. This was picked up by local gas detection which shutdown process. Area operator investigated isolated and repaired the leaking
joint. Machine put back on line, production restarted, and full surbey of all flanges in fuel gas system being carreid out by mech techs.
After making upa jumper hose form p-9 to p-12 and testing same in order to equalize the pressure across the bottom ssr isolation tree plug prior to retrieving same the wireline
supervisor instructed the wireline operator to open the hydraulic intervention valve (hiv). The control panel for the hiv is located on the weatherdeck. The operator proceeded
to the control panel as instructed and turned on the air to the hydraulic pump. The operator then went to have his lunch assuming the regulator was set for 3500psi. The
wireline supervisor had observed the hiv opening. He then proceeded to p-9 and opened up the jumper line to start equalizing. The wireline helper was positioned to the left of
the hiv to control the gas flow into the lubricator. The wireline supervisor was ascending up the ladder to the scaffolding platform when (2) bangs in short succession occurred
the wireline helper observed the hiv actuator going through the scaffolding handrail. Upon investigation the (2) bangs, the hiv actuator was found laying on the grating next to
the wellhead. It was also noted that no hydraulic oil was coming out the actuator and the hydraulic hose was still connected. The jumper hose was immediately isolated and
bleed off. The wireline supervisor then proceeded to the weatherdeck and found the control panel pump still pumping at 5000psi event though the psv had lifted. He
A wireline logging run in well p9 had just been completed with gauges retrieved to the lubricator. The downhole safety valve was closed and pressure being relieved by
venting to the platform vent system. From a well shut-in pressure of 5600psi, the pres ure had reduced to approx 2000psi when a significant gas leak to atmosphere occurred at
a clamped joint below the wireline intervention valve.
Burners were being changed around to fine temperature in the interduct; this was being undertaken by the <...> rep. On completion of the work, the machine was being
brought back on line for test. The <...> rep, and the power tech were observing the run - up rocess through the viewing port in the acoustic hood. A small flicker of flame was
observed; this initiated red hazard status via the fire and gas panel. The machine shut down automatically. The flame self extiguished when the acoustic hood door was op ned
to extiguish the flame (dry powder extighuishers were on site). The halon system was on manual as per cebntral field unit policy. The platform returned to normal green status
two minutes after the initial change in status.
After the pilot valve on 060 starter gas system had been overhauled, the unit was de-isolated and an attempt to run the starter motor up, to test the speed settings was made.
Soon after the start button was pressed (approx. 30 secs) the general alarm soun ed and high level gas was detected in the enclosure. This initiated a esd level 2, blocking the
platform and venting the units.
When starting <...> unit after one failed start the 2nd start gave a very heavy light off. After approx 30 secs running at auto idle one heat rise detector went into alarm and unit
shutdown. On inv condensate had entered fuel gas system into gas generator an ignited in power turbine
A low gas alarm voted for generator `c` was received at 20:17 hrs; automatically initiating a platform g.a. initial inspection of enclosure could detect no gas present. East door
of cab was opened to facilitate this with cab fan overrides applied. West d or was opened and fuel filtration system inspected with no gas detected. Decsion was made to start
another generator and obtain technical assistance to investigate fault on `c` generator. As this plan was being actioned `c` shutdown on `high gas voted` nd platform plx
resulted.
Production personnel were working on a level control valve when they noticed crude oil spraying onto the adjacent bulkhead. The leak was traced to impulse line on train 2
mol booster pump discharge minimum flow pipework. Train 2 oil plant manually shutd wn and leak isolated. It was a pinhole leak with less than a litre lost, none to sea. No
fire or gas alarms actuated. Fire team called as precaution. Cause: a stress fracture of the butt weld on the impulse line connection to the orifice carrier. Contrib tary factor:
additional vibration caused by flow through the adjacent level control by-pass valve. Environmental conditions: wind 15kts @ 30 degrees. Qnh 1013.snow showers.
Prod ops were preparing the test separator for maintenance, it was isolated fromthe wells and oil displaced by flushing with water. This was being depressured. When pressure
was approx 4 bar the sandwash down comer developed a leak at the bend under the separator allowing sand water and some gas to escape into the module setting of a low gas
alarm. The operators depressured the separator to the flare.
Gas was detected in mod 14 deck which was picked up by the gas detection system and resulted in a full production shutdown. The source of the gas leak was from the glycol
skid seal pot. This is designed to allow glycol to be discharged into the drain sy tem in the event of high level in the seal pit or over pressure in the glycol stripping/ reboiler
unit. It is assumed a rise in pressure in the llp flare system caused back pressure in the glycol unit. This resulted in a mixture of glycol and gas being ischarged from the vent
to open drain. A small quantity of gas from the discharge was sensed by the gas detectors. Problems had been experienced by the night shift with the seal in the line to the open
drain system from the llp ko pot. Blockages were cle red twice. This is not an unusual occurrence. It is assumed the blockages are caused by rust and scale with sludge from
the pot and pipework.
Coil tubing operations - run into production well - before entering xmas tree tip of tube caught bop. Resulted in crimp in tubing which resulted in withdrawal of tube. Tube
fractured - some of fluid escaped from fractured line. When displaced to sea water was some hydrocarbon release. Closed rams on bop - make well safe cut tubing. Closed tree
valve stub of tubing in rig up now recovered.
At approximately 1330 hours on <...> gas turbine 3 (<...> turbo generator) received a signal from its control system to execute an emergency shutdown. The cause for this
signal is under investigation. During the rundown two infra red etectors indicated a fire within the turbine enclosure. This triggered the automatic release of halon within the
enclosure. Normally this would also have triggered the general alarm. This did not happen as the general alarm had been inhibited for fire and gas system testing in a different
module. On seeing the fire alarm and halon discharge the control room technicians dispatched fire and safety officer<...> and production technician <...> to investigate. They
verified that any fire origin lly present had been extinguished . Subsequent investigation has revealed that the fire was a result of lube oil leaking onto the hot turbine exhaust.
Analysis is ongoing to determine the source for the lube oil and effect a remedy.
Transformer house no 2 fire dampers were being tested, fire and gas panel over-rider keys had been used as per standard procedures. Over-rider keys do not inhibit fire pump-
start. North fire pump was duty pump. It had started and run for short periods during previous tests. Pumps had been started by damper test, and had been running for 20-25
mins when the heat head in the pump house went into alarm. The fire and gas over-rides were removed and a fire alarm was broadcast over the alarm system. <...> operator)
was proceeding towards the north fire pump via the cellar deck west walkway to shut the pump down manually. The fire alarm had gone off and he could see smoke coming
out of the fire pump house. He radioed the control room, informed them that the team were quickly on the scene and commenced boundary cooling. The fuel supply to the
engine was isolated externally. The engine stopped after a slight delay. The first team entered the fire pump house with foam hoses and extinguished flames on top of the
engine. Light fittings and cabling were charred and melted by the heat. The inner lining of the ceiling was blackened by smoke. The cause of the fire was the leakage of lubeoil
vapour from a rubber breather hose to a cylinder head cover. The hose routed close to hot pipework and the engine turbo-charger. The reason the hose started to leak is
During start up of c5010 gas compressor the commission eng and production operator were checking out unit locally. The engineer tapped interstage nrv, on 3rd stage suction
seal gas, to ensure it had seated properly. The pipework parted at the swage lock connection, causing a gas release. The prod enginner operator initiated manual shutdown
locally, the gas heads in the area also detected 60% gas and automatically shut production down. The platform personnel mustered and the fast response team along wit two
members of the fire team donned b.a. sets and rectified the leak.
After maintenance work on the gas engine driven main oil pump, p3610, the fuel gas system was de-isolated, and the unit prepared for a test run. Maintenance work had been
carried out on the fuel and ignition systems. The unit was started, but it tripped out on "low fuel gas pressure". The gas head at the air intake to the engine detected
hydrocarbon gas and initiated a 60% gas alarm/shutdown production. The detected gas was as a result of the engine mis-firing due to the ongoing ignition problems. The
roduction and maintenance personnel working on the machine were unaware that gas was present until the alarm sounded, and it very quickly dispersed. The <...> engine was
firing on one bank of pistons, but the 2nd bank had no ignition at all, leading it to misfire/backfire.
The following events took place whilst the plant was being put back on the production after an extedned maintenance shutdown period. P3610 mol pump (main oil line crude
export pump) was put on line. The production operator observed the drive end seal to be overheating. In accordance with written procedures, the pump was shutdown, and the
seal assembly was pressure flushed. On completion of flushing, the pump was put on stand by. No test was carried out. + / - 2 hours later, p3610 was required for duty and
was put on line by a different production operator. After starting the pump, the operator did not standby the unit to check the earlier flushing process had been successful, in
fact he was unaware that the pump had a problem. 15 minutes later the fi e alarm sounded automatically, and the deluge started. The seal assembly had overheated to such a
degree that it failed, overheated and lube oil ignited.
The platform was coming back into production after a process trip. During the start up hight levels were encounted in the first stage separator [train 1]. Also the flare knock out
drum. The levels contributed to crude oil "carry over" into the flare line hat resulted in a high flame buring. The actions that resulted were:- * the platform was manually
shutdown. * personnel were called to muster. * onshore duty production staff informed. * coastguard informed. A full investigation has been carried out, the esults of which
will be used to deinge the remedial actions required to prevent such an incident re-occuring. We aim to have a clear degifinition of the remedial actions and an action plan to
address them by <...>.
Normal production conditions existed at the time of incident. The gas compressors were exporting and reinjecting gas to the reservoir at a pressure of approx 179 bar. Whilst
carrying out routine duties on the adjacent compression train, an operator obse ved a gas leak at the seal gas skid on train 1. A small gas cloud was visible in an area of 1 metre
(approx) around the seal gas duplex filter. The operator contacted the process control room and a manual controlled shutdown of the unit was effected. T e gas release, in an
area open to the elements and no apparent wind had not initiated any gas alarm. The leak source was traced to a flanged joint on the filter body, four bolts on which were able
to be tightened 1 to 2 flats on the nuts. This equipment h s been in continuous duty, for approx 2 weeks, following the commissioning of the new reinjection gas compression
facility. The identical equipment on the adjacent train ( in operation for approx 6 weeks) was inspected following the incident. This was f und to be tight. The duplex filter
was part of the package which had been supplied by <...>, the compressor manufacturer. The root cause is deemed to be qc at the filter manufacturer.
Normal production conditions existed at the time of the incident. The gas compressors were exporting and reinjecting gas to the reservoir at a pressure of approx 179 bar. At
approx 0750, a painter was about to commence preparatory and painting work on t e recently commissioned train 1 reinjection compression facility. He could smell, hear and
feel gas on his face. A small gas cloud was evident around a blank flange on the compressor discharge piping. This was reported to the pcr by telephone. An oper tor sent to
investigate, advised the pcr to shut the compression train down. A manual controlled shutdown was initiated the gas release, in an area open to the elements and no apparent
wind, had not initiated any gas alarm. The leak source was traced to 1/2" 2500 blind flange which was drilled and tapped for an instrument tapping. A bullnose plug has been
fitted. The source of the leak was from the screwed connection. Following depressuring, the flange was removed, thread cleaned, new plug fitted and eal welded. The flange
will be replaced as soon as one can be dispatched from onshore. The identical flange on train 2 was inspected and miniscule trace of gas was evident. The same action was
taken. The evidence points to incorrect make up of screwed onnection. This incident will be a subject covered at tool box talks and safety meetings the preferred option is also
07:54 - gas alarm was indicated in the drilling module mm1. The alarm activated is located approx 15ft above deck level over the east open drain, within the cuttings
processing room. The chief operator and fire and gas tech reached the module and noticed a strong smell of gas. A portable gas detector recorded 10%. The fire and gas tech
headed towards gd298 and recorded 25%lel at his point. 07:56 - a second detector was activated at 20%. This detector is located in mms in a similar location, over the west pen
drain in the cp room. The hazardous area fans were switched on in the mud pit rooms [on the upper mezz level] to help desperse the gas. 08:00 - gd298 reached 60% and a
platform gas alarm was annunciated. Personnel mustered hoses were run out to fill the drains in the cp rooms to suppress the passage of gas up the drains. 08:05 - gas levels
dropped to 25% lel at gd298. 08:06 - gas detector gd237 located on a mezz level above gd299 recorded 30% lel. Gd237 is approx 50ft from gd299. 08:14 - gas levels dropped
below 10% lel at all detectors. A high level in the atmoshpheric vent pot was noted in the ccr [alarm panel] and attempts were made to drain the vessel. However, no flow was
seen from the end of the water seal despite the manual valve being in the open position. The manual valve was closed and the water seal spool was disconnected. No blockage
The utilities supervisor discussed the isolation eith the oim who arrived on the platform at 1200 hrs. The decision was made by the oim that the fuel gas relief valve line to the
lp flare drum was to be spaded off on the inlet side. At approx 1605 hrs the utilities supervisor tannoyed the technician who answered the call from a telephone outside the
platform co-ordinators ffice. The utilities supervisor stated that verbally instructed the mechanical technician stated that he was informed to fit a spade on he outlet flange of
the relief valve and questioned the utilities supervisor on this subject. He stated that the utilities supervisor confirmed the spade was to be fitted to the outlet flange of the valve.
The tecnician collected a blank extension of mech nical isolations fro the platform co-ordinator and failed to inform tha platform co-ordinator of the details of additional
isolation. He proceeded to the generator enclosure and comenced to break the line on the outlet flange. He immediately tightend the lange bolts to seal the escape caused a co-
incident high level outside the module in which the generator enclosure is located, this resulted in total platform shutdown and full muster
On start up and change over of gas compressor from diesel to fuel gas all 3 gas detectors in ventilation outlet registered greater than 20% lel. This initiated a general platform
alarm and platform personnel were mustered. The control room operator manual y shut down the compressor and gas detection indication fell to zero. Subsequent initial
investigation revealed the source of gas to be a failed fuel feed pipe. All executive action from the f & g system were as design. The intertrip to psd 05 (unit shutd wn) was
overriden as part of the override for the start up sequence.
Four gas detectors located on east side of wellbay came into alarm. Three indicated low level alarm and one greater than 40% lel high level alarm. On investigation gas was
found coming from the cuttings caisson vent on the eastside of the esdv deck. Altho gh gas levels at the wellbay east side detectors dropped away, local portable detection
continued to monitor gas levels local to the caisson vent. Gas compression was manually shutdown - as the only source of hydrocarbons in the system. For the duration o the
incident the weather was calm. Further extensive investigation found a tube end plate failure of gas cooler.
After commencing gas export, high levelgas was detected, a further six gas detectors registered low levels of gas on the production mezz deck. The production supervisor
realised that this was indicative of a large gas leak and initiated a manual sps and a to blowdown to reduce the hydrocarbon gas inventory and minimise the loss of
containment. When the gas levels has dissipated the production supervisor instruted two operators to check for the source of leakage. On inspection of the area it was found
that he hydrocarbon gas release had been caused by an open bleed valve, on a block and bleed facility this pressure gauge registers the export cooler
A pipeline shutdown was initiated by the control room due to export pipeline constraints. During power generation fuel change to diesel, generators 8001 & 8003 tripped. Four
minutes later confirmed smoke & gas detection was indicated in 8003 enclosure & t e co2 system fired off the platform alarm sounded all personnel mustered the fire team and
incident controller made the area secure & carried out a controlled opening of the enclosure doors. It was apparent that a lube oil leak had ignited on high temper ture engine
casing casing lagging which was imediately extinguished by the fire team using portable fire equipment stand by continued until the unit had cooled down. Fire and gas
detction was reinstated and the unit isolated. The engine has been removed a d sent to the vendor egt/gec to determine the cause of the fire. When the cause is determined
appropriate prevention measures will be implemented
An operator making his rounds dicovered an oil leak from weldolet for dv-10060 on mol pump p1032 recycle line. The spill was confirmed to area by bunding and the operator
isolated the line either side of the leak. The mol pump was not on line at this time but was subsequently isolated & drained down. The fire team had been mobilised and
continued to seep oil from the drip ring into a drip tray until the pump was drained down. No product went over the side at any time during the inc.
During an inspection in the enclosure of power turbine an indication of gas in the enclosure vent caused the machine to shutdown and a platform gpa/tps. On investifation it
was found that the machine had minor gas leaks inside the enclosure from the burne assembly ignitor socket. When the enclousre was opened to carry out an inspection the
reduction in ventilation pressure caused gas to migrate up the inlet vent to the gas detectors inside the inlet vent hood. This was verified during testing.
Simultaneous drilling, production, pil and gas export hydrocarbon fluids involved. Person noticed hydrocarbon fluids weeping from pinhole in weld on 1/2" tapping point (for
pressure transmitter pto 1407) on process pipework down stream of oil choke well <...>. Control room advised who shutdown and secured wellhead. Other wellheads
eyeballed for similar fault, none found. Ndt to be carried out on welds on other wellheads depending on metallurgical analysis of defective well. Well 17 flowing down s ream
of choke incorporated tapping point to be replaced.
Following a process shutdown on change over of sea water lift pumps, block/vent fuel gas valve xv20450 failed to fully close and permitted gas to be vented through xy20013
blowdown vent. Due to the proximity of the rb211 gas compressor exhaust outlet to t e vent point in combination with the wind direction gas was able to migrate through the
exhaust ductwork to the compressor enclosure the dampers do not shut in normal stop. Gas levels rose above 10% lel but remained below the high level 20% lel and imedia ely
dispersed on isolation of the gas supply. Block/vet fuel gas valve xv20450 has been exercised in demonstrate its operability and a specific operating procedure put in place to
isolate gas in a recurring situation. A full function test will be carried ut on the valve at the next shutdown.
Prior to calibration of sub sea pressure gauges on the <...> manifold the procedure called for calibration of utilty gauge pi-50010. The methanol/utilities crossover valves were
lined up to prove gauge using methanol pump ga3003. Pressure was increa ed in 50 bar increments and whilst being raised from 150 bar to 200 bar the 10mm instrument
fitting on 25 pdm se71b failed. The leak (water) was noticed by the area operator and the line was isolated. Pressure calibration operations were suspended. Initia indications
are that the fitting had been over torqued during make up, however, the whole system had been pressure tested satisfactorily to 400 bar during commissioning.
Normal production. Natural ventilated module. Crude oil escape, approx 20 lts. Elbow on manifold developed pin hole leak which increased to approx. 1/8th.inch. Detected
by area operator who shut well in and drained manifold to make safe. Duration unk own, have used 15mins. As probable exposure length. Elbow for onshore inspection and
investigation to determine reason for failure also reason for failure to detect on u/t survey.
Lined up to receive pig on pig trap. Exterior area subject to strong southerly wind. Crude oil. Pig trap door seal failed in service slick and smell of gas by people lead to
detection fixed detection did not detect.
Water leak was indentified by plant operator. The vessel was immediately isolated from hydrocarbon service, depressurised and drained down. Detection within module did
not operate. Spoolpiece was changed and vessel returned to service.
Gb 0601 gas compressor feeding fuel gas into fuel gas header. Internal modules. Release of hydrocarbon gas. Gb 0601 sour gas compressor of the srew type. Instrument
compression fitting parted, releasing oil/gas around the base of the machine due to pressu e transmitter fault (line iced up) and intervention by control operator, fuel gas header
overpressured lifting relief valves with the failure of one bellows result in another gas release which was detected on the fixed gas detection system bringing one inute prior
to the relief valve re-seating.
A pinhole leak was detected by a <...> painter who was walking in the vicinity. He reported the leak to the m.c.r. the line was supplying gas from the fuel gas separator fa-
5120. The leak is above the weld.
At 2155 hrs on <...> a low gas alarm for midule 11, gas compression activated on the fire and gas pannel in the main control room. The mcr operator <...> checked the scada
display and determined that head g27 in the west hvac ducting was th one affected. A standard `low gas` announcement was made over the public address system and the gas
compression operators, <...> and <...> were informed of the location of the affected gas head. On entering module 11 from the local control roo they smelled gas, and started
checking the area for a leak. Gas was found to be escaping from a cracked small bore pipe on gb1101a 13.5" discharge pipework, namely <...>, the line leading to the safety
release 11sv5281 and 11sv5543. The smal bore pipe is used as an instrument pressure tapping, in conjunction with a double block and bleed valve assembly. Gb1101a was
shut down, isolated and depressurised immediately.
At 0115 hrs a crude oil leak was observed at a small bore pipe weld on the prod header no 1. Prod was immed shut down. As plant operators prepared for draining the header,
the leakage increased for a short term which activated the hi gas automatic shutd wn and platform alert.
Operation on progress - production environmental conditions wind 270 deg t 35-40 knots. Gas found to be leaking from ea 4002 2nd stage suction cooler tube sheet flange
joint. The compressor was immediately shutdown and system depressurised.
Whilst carrying out an inspection of gb1101a gas compressor following report of a strong smell of gas, it was noticed that there was a small fracture of the 3/8" monel
instrument tubing from 13 1/2" discharge cylinder tapping point for: 11pshh5173-11psll5 72. The machine was shutdown immediately and repair effected. The damaged
tubing and associated fittings were found to be of the corect type and installation on further inspection another leak was located on the small bore pipework for level switch
11ls h2005 off suction scrubber fa1128.
While investigating an indication of a gas leak in mod 5 mezz. Level (due to a pre-alert initiated by one gas head) it was seen that the north prover door seal had failed and
crude oil was leaking into the module. The platform was raised to red hazard sta us at 21:42. The process was shutdown and the prover loop depressurised, drained and
isolated. On subsequent opening of the door it was seen that an section of the seal, approx 10mm long was missing at the one o'clock position. The process conditions had een
steady at the time of the incident and the door seal had been changed under job card <...>, a yearly routine, in <...>. The crude oil leakage was estimated at 0.5m3 and was
confined locally within the module and drain system.
Technician on routine watchkeeping duties observed localised gas mist from the vicinity of <...> manifold connection, informed supervisor who initiated manual process
shutdonw and blowdown. Placed platform to red hazard status as per platform local proced res. No automatic detection due to localised leak from dead leg section of manifold.
23150 gas compressor was isolated by nightshift ops to remove and replace the ip suction stainer (witches hat) to faclitate breathing operations n2 purging was carried out
across the ip barrel by dayshift ops via gauge tapping points pl 1065 and pl 1168 t e system was proven hc free and the hoses removed, tapping points being left open for
venting purposes. On completion of suction stainer cleanout all pipework was reinstated. Nighyshift ops carried out deisolation of z3150 gas compressor and proceeded to
urge the compressor using 2nd stg gas via hi-1306 pushing n2 from gas sweeting vesselthrough ip barrel gas escape was immediately apparent to the operations crew in the
vicnity for start up and blowdonn initiated in the local cr gas leakage was quickly tr ced to the n2 purge points which had remained open. Valves isolated & capped status
identified.
During initial pre commissioning checks on the 5th water injection pumps final insps were made on the turbine hood internal pipework to ensure no blockage or failed solenoid
valve. 4 small bore pipe fittings were disconnected and the pipe blown through ith air b the <...> [vendor] engineer. This uncovered the fact that a diverter valve was
orientated in the wrong position. Only 3 fittings were re-connected and the 4th inadvertently forgotten by the egt engineer. When the fuel gas was introduced to the turbine
gas discharged from the 3/8" od pipe. This was recognised quickly when no pressure was indicated on the local pressure gauge and a loud gas hissing sound was evident from
within the turbine hood. The local emergency stop button was immed pressed a d shortly after 2 gas detectors in the ventilation outlet duct indicated low level gas, causing a
yellow alert status on the platform. Due to the fact that the platform has h2s areas, it is common practice when detecting low level gas to manually initiated platform hazard
[red] status and muster all personnel.
The gpa was automatically initiated as a result of 2 high gas alarms being activated from the gas analyser room on level 3 - a full muster ensued. The gas release was contained
within the housing of the gas analyser room. Investigations revealed that the vac to the room had been inadvertently stopped at some time before the alarm. When the
pipework was checked a very small leak was found on an elbow of the kenmac manifold ft3405b1. A guard has since been fitted over the hvac stop button to protect it agai st
accidental knocks. A verification check of the hvac alarm to the pcs has been carried out, and a visual indication of the air flow from the hvac has been fitted at the outlet. This
small leak would have never been found or noticed if the hvac had not b en shut down, therefore a procedure is being drawn up for the metco technician to periodically shut
down the hvac and check the system for gas leaks by using snoop on the joints and with a portable gas detector.
During normal water wash operations on the b compressor, operator noted steam coming from lagging on 2nd stage hot gas bypass valve. On investigation it was found to be a
leaking flange. Compressor was shut down in the normal manner and de pressurised. no gas alarms were initiated to prevent recurrance, plans in place to systematically
remove lagging boxes and replace with other form of protection. In the short term, all valves with lagging boxes were checked.
On completion of bridge link from ssv <...> to newly installed installation - an initial safety insp revealed that a leak had occurred on diesel fuel system within enc of no 1
generator. The diesel storage system of the installation was empty. Gener tor enc was fuel of diesel fuel to door sill level and the generator had shut down on loss of fuel
estimated that 3.0 m3 of diesel fuel had spilled into the environment on or bout 6 july 96.
During routine diesel bunkering a leak was observed at rigid platform pipework flexible hose connection. No isolation valve is installed at this position and it was decided to
displace pipe content approx 1/2 ton into storage tank to avoid spillage into sea.
During start up of the high pressure water injection system, excessive vibration occured. The vibration damaged instrumentation disloged fittings and fractured a weld on an
ancillary cleared injection line. Preliminary findings suggest a design problem. T e plant in question has been shutdown pending further inv.
Maintenance work had been completed on the 'b' generator turbine. During start up, fuel gas leaked into the enclosure and activated a gas detector initiating a gpa. The fuel gas
line was pressure tested with nitrogen at 40 bar but no leak could be found. on restart it was discovered that a back-pressure in a sight glass in-line off the throttle valve was
created. The back pressure was sufficient to pass seals and allow gas to escape. The back pressure was created by purging fuel gas to the vent line. Th practise was stopped
and the turbine ran normally.
High pressure chemical discharged from instrument piping on discharge of temporary chemical injectin pumps. Lab tech was checking pump rate when his lower body was
sprayed with chemical. The chemical in use was 'blacksmith' wm 180 asphaltine inhibitor. Th pump in use was a checkpoint air driven pump. The air driven pump was
pumping against closed valve sub sea following a <...> production trip. The pump dicharge had stabilised at psv setting of 345 bar 6. The pump had stalled but the instrument
fitting lew when the lab tech was in the area.
Small leak occurred around a valve stem of an instrument manifold on instrument. Leak was so small that it was not noticed by the tech checking the instrument approx 1 hr
before. Metering hut is approx 6 ftx10ft with no vent and its estimated that appro 20 cubic ft of gas collected in top of hut bringing up 1st stage gas alarm initiating a ga.
A gas leak in module b from a flexible hose on the <...> riser (<...> gas lift psdl 8159b). Personnel in the module reported the leak to the ccr and gas was detected by fixed
heads. Platform muster initiated and process operations and power supplies s utdown ( platform blowdown in operation). Emergency teams investigated, identified and isolated
the leak when fixed gas heads indicated a reduced level of gas. The area was secured and ventilated and adjacent modules checked and found all clear. Ventilati n was achieved
by opening module doors as hvac system was inoperative due to power loss.
Internals of spool piece not checked for hydrocarbons prior to work. Presence of hydrocarbons caused flash fire when welding attempted. Flash fire disappeared up pipe and
extinguished itself.
At 14:25 on <...> smoke was seen in the module 'd' void area, a manual alarm was activated in the control room. A muster was initiated and everyone accounted for.
Investigation by emergency response teams confirmed smoke but no fire emanating from mg-2 exhaust lagging. Mg-2 was shutdown and the area damped down. The situation
was secured and the muster stood down at 15:52. Investigation confirmed that mg-2 exhaust insulation has been impregnated with lube oil from a leak on a flange joint on a
mg-1 lub oil line running above the exhaust. No injuries were sustained, minor property damage occurred.
Whilst wireline operations were being undertaken on well <...>, a low level gas alarm activated in that area. On leaving the module a wireline operator observed gas escaping
from a low torque valve. He closed the valve which isolated the leak. On investig tion a grease nipple was found to be missing having sheared off.
Gas turbine tripped due to the activation of the infrared flame detectors within the enclosure of the machine. At approximately the same time a bang was heard and the doors
were observed to fly open. No personnel were near to the machine which is not loca ed in common thoroughfare. A small fire on on the insulation of the enclosur was
extinguished. On examination of turbine machine it was discovered that the fuel gas distribution manifold was ruptured by internal over pressure between dual fuel burners fou
and five. Also the gas hose feeding burner six had broken off and showed signs of heat damage.
Methonol had been injected into the <...> gas lift line the system was isolated and being de-pressurised via the spillback pvc to the methabol tank. Shortly after opening the pcv
to the relieve the pressure a change of platform status occurred due to coi cident low level gas module 1. The pcv was closed immediately. The gas levels cleared and the
platform was returned to normal status. Investigations revealed that the nrv at the methanol injection point was passing opening the pcv permitting gas to pass f om the
methanol injection header into the storage tank on to common chemical al tank e vent header and to the external vent outside module 1. The nrv was replaced and inspected. A
damaged 'o' ring seal was found and identified as the cause of the gas in the methonol header.
During routine oil sampling from oil export line, oil/mist found to be emitting from a flexible sampling line from ta-14. The area technician quickly identifed this emission and
isolated the offfending leaking line as the occurrence from sampling start to finding leaking flexible line was estimated as 15 mins, leakage was estimated as 1 litre of oil
escape
Incident occurred during platform annual shutdown. The activity was replacement of pl-226 1 1/2" kicker line by pass valve for a-1301 oil pig launcher the valve flanges are 4
bolt 1 1/2" mounted in the vertical plane. At the start of the task, it was foun that all bolts on the upper and lower flanges were heavily corroded and impossible to loosen off.
The fitter sawed through two bolts on the upper and lower flanges. The flanges did not open, and no relaese occurred. A third bolt on each flange was cut an the valve was
moved to separate the flange faces on the two remaining bolts a small amount of gas was emitted from the top flange which is conected to the pig launcher. Oil/water emulsion
and gas was emitting from the lower flange which is connected to t e oil export line. After draining to a bucket for 15 mins it was decided that the fitter would reinstate the
valve, and that the line would be thoroughly drained via the pig launcher prior to futher work on valve replacement. The valve was realigned betwe n tha flanges and two new
studs fitted in each of the upper and lower flanges the fitter decided to cut out and replace the two remaining corroded bolts. Immediately the remaining corroded bolt in the
lower flange was cut, the flanges sprung apart allowi g a release of oil/water emulsion and gas. The fitter managed to remove the corroded stud install a new stud and pulled the
Coiled tubing operation, while opening sliding slide door on ta-14 upper lateral. At 6716 feet, with cithp of 740 psi. As the ssd opened the cithp built up from 740 to 1080 psi
in 5 minutes. The injector head stuffing box was at that point set 1000 psi. A the cithp rose above 1000 psi, the driller observed gas passing the stuffing box. He informed the
coil tubing operator and in turn the coil tubing operator applied more pressure on to the injector head stuffing box to contain the gas leak. This operation took 10-20 secs.
Leak off test was being carried out, the wll was lined up to the test separator for bleeding down. The actuated well valves opened up (choke in manual partially open) allowing
crude oil at 50 barg to pass through pipework. The pipeline high pressure trip perated to close in the well and test separator inlet valve xzv-1001. The test separator inlet xzv-
1001 did not close quickly enough to stop a pressure surge into the test separator. This resulted in pipe hamer, which caused a flanged joint to spring resulting in a gas leak into
the module.
On a liquid to fuel gas change over co-incident high level gas indicated inside turbine enc automatically shutting down the unit. On inv a fuel gas supply hose to dual fuel
burner no 8 had burst.
During normal production operations a gas leak was detected on the gas lift header. The gas lift compressor was shutdown, the header depressurised. When the pipe lagging
was removed the leak was determined to have come from a flange. The gas leak took pla e in a partially open module, the wend speed being 52 knots at 126 deg.
During routine operations an operator noticed a leak on the produced water tank. Further investigation revealed the source of the leak to be a pin hole leak at the base of the
tank. The produced water tank is situated in an enclosed module with forced ventilation.
C turbine fuel was changed from gas to diesel then diesel to gas as a regular routine operation. <...> was walking past module 13 on the outside walkway when he saw
smoke/mist coming out of the vent system of c turbine. He contacted <...> who nv the situation by looking inside the enclosure and saw diesel spraying out of the burner purge
hose. The smoke/mist was caused by high pressure disel vapourising. <...> contacted myself in control room to say that he was going to shut down the turbin using the
emergency stop. Water injection was automatically load shed via the prismic to bring the load to an acceptable limit for the remaining turbine.
During routine ops the gas import tripped on lo lo temp. On inv a flange was found to be leaking gas [the gas was venting onto the temp switch which actioned the automatic
shutdown]
During diesel loading from vessel to platform a small amount of fuel was lost to deck, when auxilliary generator fuel tank overflowed. (two litres). The vessel was changing
suction to his pumps, switching from tank to tank and a pocket of air was pushed t rough the system resulting in this occurrence
During routine checks of module, a member of the production team could smell gas in the vicinity of the high pressure gas compressor. The operator informed the ccr, who
checked the gas detection for any indications in that area, none were found and syste s were proved. A small leak was located from further investigations on the instrument
tubing pipework. A valve isolation stopped the leak. The compressor was then shutdown to allow the pipework to be replaced.
A small slick was observed (brown discolouration in sea) from the platform on the south east face and centrally beneath the platform. The operations team began an immediate
investigation into locating source which was found to be from the drains caisson to sea in module. There was already an operations team member in the module who had been
responding to a hi-level alarm on the skimmed oil tank, both of the skimmed oil tank pumps were running but the tank level was not falling at the expected rate. The tank level
had been higher and overflow to the caisson had taken place which resulted in the spillage to sea, operations checked the line from the module through its flow path to 'a'
second stage seperstor, all appeared fine with no closed valves or leaks, the caisson pump was in operation pumping out to the closed drain tank, after a shore period the levels
dropped to a normal operating state and the caisson was cleared of residual oil. Further investigations were carried out which indicated that the skimmed oil discharge was
unable to deliver at full rate because it comingles with don fluids prior to entering b2nd stage the don has slug flow characteristics and at the time of this incident had been
flowing at a high rate typically at peak fow 25000-30000bbl first stage to be routed via the test sep oil outlet line a a2nd stage. This routing option had been adopted on this
During routine production gas lift operations, gas head detection system in ccr alarmed at 30% lel quickly rising to 60% lel simultaneously another head rose to 20% lel, this
automatically initiated a local equipment shutdown. As this was happening two m re gas heads rose to 20% level, this level of gas quckly subsided as the compressor shut
down and vented. On identifying the location of the first gas head to alarm, an operator discovered a fractured impulse line. Gas lift operations suspended until re tification of
failed component. Investigation report raised. Personnel made aware of incident.
A leak of approximately 1-3 gallons per minute was observed from the lower section of crude oil cooler 200 hb-01. As the temperature range was within acceptable limits a
decision was made to bypass and isolate the cooler. The bypass was opened and the i let valve to the cooler closed. During the closing of the outlet valve a significant amount
of water and crude was emitted from the north edge of the cooler. The ccr was instructed to initiate a psd2 and manual blowdown of separation, they were further r quested to
initiate a mnaual red hazard status. The cooler was fully isolated and with the aid of the emergency response team area cleaned and made safe prior to returning the installation
to normal green status.
During the reaming of a liner, the driller increased the rate of no1 mud pump from 2400 to 3400psi to attain the required pressure. After a short time a bang was heard
followed by a release of mud onto the drill floor, the driller re-acted stopping the m d pump in order to investigate the cause. It was discovered that a <...> wing half of a
union, complete with anadrill transducer had blown off the stand pipe manifold leaving the thread half of the union in place. The wing half and transducer came to rest
approximately 10' from the n.e. corner of the iron roughneck some 15' from its original location on the manifold. Two men were working on the drill floor at the time of the
inicident neither of them sustaining an injury. Investigation of the thr ad half of the inion attached to the manifold revealed it to be a <...> this was replaced by a <...> and a
"<...> bull plug fitted. The new arrangement was leak tested prior to resuming work.
The i.p. compressor tripped following a high level in the suction k.o vessel. A few minutes later a gas head in m1 l4 came into alarm followed by others raising the platform to
yellow alert status. On investigation a leak was discovered coming from the head joint of the i.p suction cooler. All sources of pressure feeding the i.p. compressor were
checked and isolated and a unit blowdown initiated. Shortly afterwards the oibserved gas levels had dripped to zero. The platform was returned to normal gree status.
Because a higher than normal pressure was observed in the suction side of the m/c, esdv 36/38 refrigerent feed tp i.p. compressor isolation v/v) was suspect. The valve was
tested and found to be operating normally, more detailed testing reveale a fault with the solen old valve in the air supply line
Platform was in normal production. During routine site visit production supervisor observed curde oil issuing from a grease nipple of the oil pig launcher mnaual block valve.
It is estimated that approx 20l. Oil leaked from the orifice. Plant shutdown ffected to remove and repair/ plug.
During wire line activities on well a9 (retrieving bridge plug) a leak developed by the wire line mast stuffing nbox - (+1 - j - 10l.oil). The operation was halted and the well
pressure reduced to +/-16 bar. The stuffing box was adjusted and the operation re-commenced without incident viz. Pulled out of hole. The next phase of well access work
being completed with a different mast. The stuffing box in question being subsequently subject to maintenance.
Gas detected on satellite from <...>. Platform shutdown from <...>. Topsides depressurised and vented to atmosphere. Sbv detected gas at 500 metres and moved away.
Depressuring pipeline between <...> and <...>, pressure dropped from 18 bar to 8 ar in 2 hours. <...> facility on <...> also shutdown.
While rigging down shear seal bops from the <...> xmas tree on well <...> st it was decided to conduct ppms on the xmas tree since the well was already shut in. During the
ppms the following valves failed to test: production string - lower maste valve and flow wing valve gas injection string - flow wing valve
The production department were in the process of starting up water injection system. Exessive flow was acheived across a hand indicated control valve resulting in cavitation
and vibration of pipework. The vave positioner fitted to the hic valve, failed ca sing the hic valve to fail the closed position. Rapid closing of the valve caused hydraulic shock
to the system, resulting in damaged pipework, instruments and other fittings. A level 2 shutdown was initiated by the production supervisor. The system has r mained shut
down since the incident.
Adverse weather/sea conditions had caused extensive damage at 8m level walkways underdeck of both the production and drilling platforms. Main areas of damage on both
platforms were, east side, se and nw hand rails (mainly all along east side) were bent in oard at about 45 deg. Damage would appear to have been the result of large waves.
Access to all emergency escape routes has been made available
A 20mm separation found between the pin and box of a 20" conductor connection. Pressure integrity of the well is not lost as the 13 3/8" and 9 5/8" casing integrities were
confirmed. The wellhead integrity was confirmed. The well was shut in pending the outcome of stress analysis. Repair options are being evaluated.
<...> is the well currently being worked on the platform. The ongoing operation at the time of incident was perforation of the well prior to completion. Wireline was rigged up
to perforate with a shooting nipple (length of pipe in the blow out preventors to slow bops to be closed with wireline in the hole). This is a routine precaution against higher
than predicted pressures. The well was also lined up to inject (pump into formation) with heavy brine if necessary. Before firing the guns the annualar bo was closed around
the shooting nipple and the pressure monitored. After firing, pressure in the well rose to 120 psi indicating an underbalance. Preparations were made to inject into the well.
Precautions were taken to ensure that the shooting nipple as in the correct position in the bops. Two chain blocks were also attached to help restrain movement. The drill floor
was cleared and barriers erected prior to commencing pumping. Injecting was commenced and pressure in the well rose slowly to 1100psi at that point the shooting nipple
moved up approximately 6" and shouldered out under the bops. This movement caused one of the chain blocks to part. The ip had been crossing the drillfloor after erecting
barriers as the chain block parted. The chain struck him on the forearm,
During replacement of esdv 2401 - sealine valve - a line plug in the sealine was released whilst there still a differential pressure of approx 28 psi across it. Caused the plug to
suddenly be forced a further 400 mm into the sealine a 1 ton steel wire ret ieval line attached to the plug assembly parted
Found tubing to annulus communication on routine test of well. Well shut in,awaiting repair prog
In order to c/o tree stradle across sssv was pulled to allow down hole plugs to be set. When attempting to pull stradle on wireline pooh with part of control line clamp. Ran 4.2
drift- hung up at 696'. Ran lib showed impression of control line so tubing c early badly damaged or parted . On checking back records mnsl found no evidance of tbg-
annululus communication. Well is water injector and will not flow with sw in well mnsl intended to keep on injecting untill rig free to workover
Well b31 was routinely tested for tubing to annulus communication - the leak rate was found to be outwith mnsl specification. The leak is below the asv. The well remains on
production. Forward plan/remedial activities will be developed
Well b30 was routinely being tested for tubing to annulus communication the leak was found to be outwith mnsl specification byt below the trdhsv the well remains on
injection. Found plans activities will be developed in due course.
While drilling the 12 1/4" hole section the wellpath of the subject well knowingly came within 18.5ft of an injection well <...>. The total survey error for the two wells was
50.28ft, which meant that the wells could have collied. The mwd error was n t detected until a gyro survey was run in the 9 5/8" casing. The gyro indicated that the well was
displaced 422 ft further left than the mwd surveys showed. The incident occured due to magnetic survey errors in the mwd readings. Two errors were made, as f llows: error
one:- the wrong number was input into the survey computer for grid conbergence this resulted in a 1.3o azimuthatl error. The pre-run configuration sheet was reviewed and
approved on the rig. The grid convergence was accurately noted on this f rm, but as this a an off-line form the engineer was still able to input the wrong value into the
computer. Error two:- the drillstring magnetic interference correction programme was applied without adequate quality control procedures. These programmes ar not
universally applicable, and the software in this case wrongly applied a correction factor. This resulted in an addition 2o azimuthal error on the mwd surveus at section td.
Pre-packed screens were run in the 81/2" horizontal section on well <...>. After an open hole cleanup the well was losing 300 bph. Postflush was pumped down the drill string
and the well was noted to be still losing at 300 bph. However, on pooh flow as observed on the drillpipe and the well shut in with 200 psi sidpp, o psi sicp 10.4 ppg brine was
bullheaded down the drillpipe to re-establish 300 bph losses, on pulling the inner washpipe above the knockout isolation valve the losses stopped. After po h to 11,100 ft
hydrocarbons were observed on the drillpipe. The well was shut in with o psi sidpp and o psi sicp. The well was circulated with 10.4 ppg brine and flowchecked static prior to
continuing pooh.
During the abandonment of well <...> the completion packer was unsealed. No circulation was possible due to the packer rubbers being extruded. Before pulling the tubing a
flowcheck showed the well to be flowing. The annular bop was closed and maximum of 22 psi sicp noted. The tubing had zero pressure. The casing pressure was bled down
using volumetric control and subsequent flow check showed the well to be static. The completion tubing was then pulled with the well static throughout.
960 psi recorded on a and b annuli, indicating packer leak (already known) and annulus to annulus communication. 9 3/8" pack off to be tested and well repaired. (water
injection well)
During routine well integrity tests on birch production wells <...>, <...> and <...> the trssv's were found to be passing the leakage rate is outwith api recommendations. A risk
assessment has been conducted and additional controls put in place. Furture p anning is to confirm that the leakage rate is due to scale build up. Acid washes will be
programmed asap and trssv's re-tested. The <...> is currently performing drilling operations over the birch cluster and the oim has been informed of the addition l temporary
controls.
After tripping out of the hole at 19:00hrs on <...>, a kick occurred. A pit gain on <2bbls was detected. Pipe was stripped into the hole to 2,833' and brine was circulated. Pipe
was then staged in the hole to 12,306' and stripped to 14,558'. Brine was ci culated and weighted up from 10.0ppg to 10.5ppg to kill the well.
While pulling out of hole, drilling bops were closed to verify well ballooning. No influx from the resvoir in the wellbore and no drill pipe or annular pressures recorded. Well
monitored over trip tank before pulling out of hole cont'd
While pooh noticed improper fill - circ well ok while rih noticed improper displacement closed in well with 15 bbl gain and 725 psi sicp circ well constant ww of 680 pptf was
obtained rih circulating as required barite sag thought to be cause of problem
Whilst running in hole 7" completion string in well <...> (bottom of string at 670ft) the well started to flow. The 13-3/82 hydril gl bag type preventer was closed in. After
approx 1 hour the pressure on tubing and caseing stabalised at 120 psi. The build up of gas cap was circulated out under controled conditions. Although a subsequent inflow
test initially showed no flow. The well started to flow again and the hydrill again was closed. Currently awaiting 680+pptf brine to replace the 670+ brine in hole
Routine leak-off test being carried out on <...> safety valves. Ssv failed to close. Lmgv failed leak-off test.
Action taken: well closed in and killed programme being scheduled to take place before the end of <...>.
Well closed in from <...>-<...> noticed high pressure in a annulus plugging at this time would increase risk to personnel pressures not rising above maasp well to be monitored
and plugged after ltfd mods
While pooh with packer – swabbed well in losses could not immed be cured so welll shut in until mud tanks full again well finally bulkheaded to 635 pptf water based mud -
well stable cont'd pooh
No gains or losses during the circulation period. Trip volume was 8 bbls, which is correct for 12 stands of drill pipe. No gains or losses during circulation. No measurement
pit gain prior to shut in. Plan formulated. Relevant gas heads isolated
A pes plug was set to a remedy leak between the tubing and the a annulus the ung was opened to check the thp. The thp was found to be 118 bar with an annulus pressure of
138 bar, these readings suggest that the pes plug is leaking.
During a routine operation a well flow occured. This happened whilst the pumps were shut down to add to a drill pipe to the drill string. A well control programme was
immediately instigated
Whist drilling the well was observed to be flowing and shut in using the annular bop at 05:45. The drill string was rotated periodically as a precaution against the drill dtring
becoming stuck during the well control operation. The annular bop was obese ved to be leaking the ram bop's. Once primary well control had been re-established an
additional barrier of a retrevable packer was installed in the wellbore and the annular bop sealing was replaced.
After the well was flowing for approx. 5 minutes, it was noted that the h2s in the gas export stream was steadily rising. Prior to depressuring the flowline, an oil sample was
taken and it indicated a reading of 450 ppm in the gas phase. The well had no previous record of high h2s levels.
<...> was completed and brought on stream in <...> from the outset abnormally high annulus pressures were recorded (120) the influx was investigated and the result showed it
to be brine from an over pressured zone leaking through the liner lap. The well is subsequently produced and operated under dispensation. Pressure on the a annulus is
normally 100 bar and can be bled to zero. The influx continues to be brine with a flowrate of 3.5 litres per minute. (last recorded dec 95) at the same time a 2000 psi pressure
test on the a annulus was good. Recent fishing operations on this well have been abandoned, leaving approximatley 6000' of wire and tool strings. The accessible along hole
depth is 13000. It was reported that on<...> the a annulus pressur had reduced to zero (and was sucking). At the same time there was also a drop in b annulus pressure from a
steady 49 bar to 26 bar. The change of status occured over a period of less than 12 hours. It is suspected there is a leak between tubing and a annulus.
While drilling at 3303m with a mud weight of 1.50sg, the well was suspected to be flowing following a 1.7m3 gain. The pumps were shut off and a flow check confirmed a
flow of +/- 10m3/hr. The bop was closed and a sicp of 460psi was observed. A circulation was carried out to homogenise the mud, then a wait and weight method kill with a
mud weight of 1.61sg was carried out. The mud weight was subsequently raised to 1.64sg due to persistent instability/background gas. The well is now stable.
Formation fluid influx while pulling tubing during workover on well <...> to recover the old completion string of well <...>, an overshot was run on 5-1/2" tubing to engage the
7" tubing at 247'. The tubing was then drifted to 9148' with a 3.85" drift and to 2305" with a 4.60" drift whilst the well was closed in a chemical cut was made above the
previous hold up depth at 2292' the completion fluid in the annuls was then circulated out and displaced to 580 pptf kill brine. Thereafter the 7" and 5-1/2" tubin and sssv
landing nipple were recovered along with the control line. Drilling pulling the 7" tubing the well started to flow at 2bpm into trip tank. A total gain of 26bbl was observed. The
well was closed in by stabbing a circulating head on top of the tu ing and closing the annular preventor. Pressures on the annulus and tubing both stabalised at 60psi. String
depth was 1690@. The well was imediately bullheaded at 1 bpm with 70 bbl brine to squeeze the influx back into the formation. It took 1.5 hours to kill the well and reduce
well pressures to zero. As the well was bullheaded no hydrocarbons were brought to the surface. A further 140bbls brine were bullheaded to increase overbalance. Normal
operations were resumed. The remainder of the 7" tubing was pu led out of the hole. An overshot was run to recover the 5-1/2 and 5" tubing and the eltsr. The well was
Failure to install and test the 9 5/8" casing hanger seal assembly. Attempt to recover the seal assembly failed and the lower part of the seal assembly was left in the cavity
around the hanger neck. After obtaining the required approvals and establishing hat the flow from the well (due to ballooning) had decreased to an acceptable rate (less than
1bbl/hr and decreasing for exposed hydrocarbon bearing reservoirs in the cased 12 1/4" section). It was decided to lift the bop stack. The remains of the seal s ack were
recovered and replaced by new seals and also tested to the required pressure, before the bop stack was re-instated the same day.
On <...> the well was accidentally perforated (on depth) using pressure acivated top guns. This was the result of an apparent failure of a pes check valve during final pressure
testing on the completion tubing. Brine was lost from the tubing and sea ater was used to re-establish a fluid column back to surface. The well was initially full with 590 pptf
brine. On <...> after conducting an injectivity test the completion was pulled back to expose circulating ports. The well was then circulated to 5 0 pptf brine from above the
packer back to surface. The well was observed for three hours and was seen to be dead. No flow from the annulus or drill pipe was observed. The completion tubing was
therefore pulled out of hole without incident. On <...> a 9.5/8" dlt packer was run in hole on 5" drill pipe losses of /-1 barrel per hour were observed. The well had remained
static for 6 hours between operations. The packer was set at 1400 and function pressure tested to 1000 psi during the test the drill ipe remained open at surface and the level
was observed to be dropping slowly. The top drive was used to keep the drill pipe full. Tripping in hole recommenced in a controlled manner slight back flow was observed
from the drill pipe between connections ut diminished to nothing by the time the next stand was picked up. The well was still showing losses of /-1 barrel / hour.
While drilling 8 3/8 hole at 13550` md (12286` tvd) a kick occurred. A pit grain of 8 bbls was detected and a flow check performed. The well was shut in and sidp and sicp
were recorded. The mud weight was increased from 11 ppg to 12 ppg and the kick cir ulated out. Circulation continued, increasing the mw to 13.5 ppg drilling operations
resumed at 22:30hrs, <...>. The well was 845'tvd above the <...> reservoir. Produciton was shutdown unitl control was achieved.
Routine 6 monthly xmas tree maintenance being carried out on well this well is a 7" water injector. Both the umv and the wing valve failed the <...> asset well integrity manual
leak rate criteria for xmas trees. The lmv was successfully pressure tested nd the dhsv is in place and was successfully tested on<...>. Workover planned for well in <...> when
the xmas tree will be changed out. Well gos on suction when water injection is shutdown. Well is currently on water injection under dispensation
On completion of a workover gas injection pressure was applied to the lower a annulus to return the well to prod. This action resulted in the b annulus pressure inc to the b
annulus shutdown pressure of 50 bar. The well was plugged and invs have now been onducted to establish the presence of a leak from the low a annulus to the b annulus via
the 7 5/8" scab casing. The gas lift completion has now been reconfigured to place dummy gas lift valves in the lower mandrels allowing gas lift only to occur from t e upper
most mandrel. The new gas lift configuration was tried by injecting nitrogen gas and resulted in no b annulus press build up being observed. This was conducted across the
expected in service gas injection pressure range with the well plugged and later unplugged. The well will be returned to product for a trial period of one month after which time
a review will be conducted to ensure that the reconfig and monitoring procedures put in place can ensure that no pressure is trans to the b annulus, ou with the <...> asset well
integrity manual guidelines.
<...> is <...> welll with a tubing retrievable dhsv installed on the gas injection side. During the last closure test gas was seen to migrate up the control line when the valve was
closed and the control line was depressurised. A seal failure is suspected and we intend to lock out the valve and install an insert wireline retrievable valve. This work will be
undertaken in the next few days, on the completion of the current op.
Monitoring of well t1 annulus pressurising revealed communication from the tubing into a and b annuli. As a precaution the platform manning was reduced to a minimum.
Measures were taken to reduce the annulus pressures by bleeding off to the closed drain and flare. Tubing pressure was minimised by keeping the well on production. The
sub surface safety valve was closed and this premitted the pressure to be bled down on the tubing and annuli. Preparations are being made to repair or plug this well. An
nvestigation into the causes is under way. No personnel were injured. A detailed internal investigation report will be made available in due course.
Well <...> is a naturally flowing oil productin well on the platform. This well was taken offline for routine wellhead and downhole safety valve integrity testing. The surface
actuated valves were successfully integrity tested against a wellhead closed in ressure of 68 barge. Three unsuccessful attempts to close and integrity test the otis dkd
downhole safety valve were made. An ongoing intervention in another well precluded immediate valve changeout. A risk assessment of the situation was made. The res lt was
that the well was returned to production with additional safeguards being taken to minimise any risk of damage to the wellhead. The well was re-entered and the downhole
safety valve was recovered. Primliminary investigations howed that the ball h d seized in the half open position due to barium sulphate scale deposition. An <...> (flapper
type) downhole safety valve was successfully installed and tested. The well was returned to production service.
Drilling well through reservoir section. Meter observed drilling break flow checked well [positive] shut in well to observing drill pipe and casing pressure killed well as per bp
well control policy by weighting up mud
Drilling 6" hole on well through reservoir section. At 3148metres observed gas increase from 0.64% to 22.5% lel and flow rate increase. Shut well in and observed drillpipe
and casing pressure. Killed well as per well control policy by weighting up mud f om 1.39sg to 1.49sg.
The allowable leakage rate for the valve is 0.0025bpm and the actual leakage leakage rate was 98.9 bar over 5 minutes which equate to 0.83bp. This would be the volume rate
passing the injection valve to pressurise up the flowline to wellhead pressure. Al the tree valves were also tested and held pressure within the acceptable criteria.
During wireline ops remove control of upper master valve overpressured valve actuator shearing retaining bolts - prior to running in hole with wireline lubricator had been
pressurised to 3000 psi as per procedures and bled down before opening upper master gate valve to enter well - valve was opened using platform air and transferred to bank of
compress air bottles - reg failed to control output pressure - overpressure in actuator sheared retaining bolts - relief valve in line from reg had had not been fitt d - excessive
force sheared 5 bolts – actuator came off end of valve spindle and landed on scaffolding some 12" below
While logging with <...> on <...> the connection to the needle valve on the bleed off line to the downhole safety valve parted. This caused a loss of pressure to the downhole
valve which shut and cut the shlumberger wire. The <...> tool string and 11,000 feet of wire were lost in the well.
Drilling 8 1/2" hole section, encountered reservior section higher than anticipated drilled to 16586` md-9285`tvd, the driller noted an increase in returns flow. He spaced out
the drill pipe & shut the well in on the hydrill (bop). Shut in drill pipe pr ssure was 280 psi total kick gain = 3 bbls. Mud weight 12.4 ppg @ the time maximum anticipated =
12.5 (ppg) kill weight fluid = 13.0 ppg. Kill well with weight & weight method. Closed in injection wells n18 & n17 in case these were provising injection upport.
Took a 5 bbl influx while drilling the upper reservoir on well. Sidp = 225psi sicp = 575psi mud weight = 13.1ppg kill weight required @9324' tvd (rkb) = 13.6ppg attempted to
circulate out kick using drillers method, gas cut mud coming back. Check pressur s - 510p 225psi. Wt up and displace to 13.6ppg mud. Shut in well with 13.6ppg mud
circulated around sidp=300psi bled off 10bls sidp=0 sicp=250psi cont to circulate 13.6ppg through choke. Bleed off annulus pressure. Open hydril well static.
Well incident
The well started flowing on a trip during fishing operations at 10287'. A back-off had been made with a string shot inside 2 - 7/8" tbg at 9245' , and btms up were circ w/11.3
ppg brine. The well was static. Pipe was pooh to 7808', incorrect fill ups we e noted, and well shut in after a 4 bbl gain. Sidp was 70psi. We stripped back in the hole down to
top of fish and circ'd out influx using "drillers method". Sicp=sidp= 0 psi at this time, however the well still flowed slightly. The btm hole pressure ad been slowly increasing
during the workover due to injection support (which has since been shut in). For this reason, the well was circ'd to 12.5 brine.
<...> water injector during the workover of <...> all the preparations had been made for recovering the completion. Plugs had been set and pressure tested and an inflow test
had been performed. A 7" tubing spear was run and engaged in the hanger profile ready to pull the completion. The tie down bolts were retracted and the hanger was unseated
from the wellhead. The hanger was raised 30ft which meant that the outer housing of the eltsr was now approximately 10ft above the top of the slick joint. The maximum
martin decker reading was 305000lbs which decreased to 280000lbs. A flow check was performed and the well was seen to be flowing so the annular bop was closed around
the drillpipe. The sidpp and sicp both stabilised around 1100 psi. After a discussion betwen the <...> senior toolpusher it was felt that the most likely cause of the increase in
pressures could be attributed to the upper completion packer having been disturbed allowing reservoir pressure to pressure up the annulus. This in turn by-passed the packoff
on the 7" spear and caused the sidpp to rise with the annulus pressure. A conference call was then held with the onshore support team and it was agreed that the safest plan of
action was to attempt to land off the tubing hanger again and attempt to obtain a pressure test on the hanger seals so that the situation could be further evaluated. This was
Whilst pumping operation in progress to circulate to s.w on <...> well <...> (secured/abandoned well i.e. cement plug in position across perforation, pressure/inflow tested.)
Low level gas (20% lel) detected in area of rig floor sub base, bringing platform automatically to yellow status. This was followed immediately by cro bringing platform to red
status manually - as per platform standing instructions. Gas increased to max of 60% lel during a period of 3 to 4 minutes during which time well was made secure. The
hydrocarbon gases encountered during operation were residual hc's in the inhibited sea water completion fluid (this did not constitute a well control situation). Following
incident well fluids circulated via a closed system to the process. Gas lev ls were dissipated by natural ventilation in a matter of minutes (20knt wind from the east) confirmed
by both fixed and portable monitors.
During routine 6 monthly integrity testing of a downhole safety valve, installed in <...> well <...> the down hole safety valve failed to test. Despite repeated tests the valve is
still failing to test. The failure of the valve was reported to the well systems group on the<...>, as a result of this, discussion on the failed valve between <...> and <...> took
place. This discussion outlined the problem and the steps <...> would be taking to resolve the issue. Subsequent to this <...> have investigated using dsv to identify where the
problem lay. A scale dissolver treatment has laso been performed in an attempt to rectify the problem. <...> will be revisiting this well in the near future to perform some more
investigation and plan to re-enter the well using a mobile offshore drilling rig circa j<...>.
While pressure testing a cement abandonment plug on <...>, it was found that the shear seal rams of the bop stack were leaking. Subsequently the cement plug and 9 5/8"
casing were successfully pressure tested to 3000 psi using a flange sub and pipe rams. ater investigation showed that the side packers were damaged. No dangerous situation
could develop as the well was fully cased off with a pressure tested cement abandoment plug.
At approx. 15:17 the casualty, together with lifeboat no: 08 fell into the sea from the production platform. The lifeboat was subsequently recovered by the daughter craft of the
stand by vessel (sbsv) and taken alongside the sbsv at 15:47. The casualty as recovered to the deck of the sbsv but showed no signs of life. The casualty was officially
pronounced dead at 17:25 by a doctor from raf <...>. The police were informed.
Diver received fatal injuries while working on the <...> subsea template (tied back to <...>) from the vessel dsv <...>. Cap came off under pressure and struck diver who later
died during decompression. Other diver received minor injuries.
Operation: removal of <...> 52 running tool from 26" conductor pipe at bop deck, slot e3. Personnel involved: 2 x <...> service engineers 1 x <...> supervisor 1 x s<...>
assistant rig supt. The air trapped within the conductor pipe was n t sufficiently bled off prior to removing the connecting snap ring. The running tool was ejected from the 26"
conductor pipe. The injured party was thrown to the deck and sustained facial injuries. The injured party was medi-rescued at 0200 hrs and sent to bergen hospital, norway.
When directing tugger operations in the middle of the south drilling rig floor injured person sustained an injury to his left hand after being struck by a dropped torque wrench.
The wrench was dropped from a height of approx. 18 ft.
A scaffold squad consisting of 2 others and the ip were working on cd13 mezz erecting a scaffold. 2 were tying off boards on a platform approx 18 ft above deck level. Ip was
cutting a board at deck level 6 ft away from the scaffold. He was postioned under a main support beam and he felt he was protected from the operations above. One person
knelt down to postion the short board and knocked the board through the hole it was intended to fill. As the board fell it struck a cross member of the scaffold which deflected
outwith the scaffold hitting ip on his left hand. Ip sustained injury to his thumb. He visited the medic and was refered to the field doctor who in turn refered him to the a.r.i.
Whilst on station at <...> the starboard main engine shut down due to a high jacket temperature. <...> started to drift off station and a pot water hose lying on the deck shifted
knocking the ip over. Weather had been foggy but was 500 - 700 metres. Wind se 10 knots, sea <1 m. Temp +4 deg c. Baro 1018. Ip sustained injuries to head, arm, neck &
nausea. Because of doubts over whether the ip had been unconscious it was thought prudent to medivac. Ip treated as minor case at <...>t & released. Subsequently signed off
by own doctor.
Drilling running in the hole with clean out assembly. Whilst tailing a stand of 3 1/2" drill pipe the ip got his left hand trapped between the stand of drill pipe and the iron
roughneck.
Whilst running five and a half inch tubing. He caught his finger between the pipe and the jaw. Sustained crush type injury to finger.
Whilst pulling casing, the elevators were slackened off and the pin taken out. Elevators opened and thumb became caught in pinch point between the two opened sections.
Actions taken to prevent recurrence:- incident to be fully discussed at safety meeting in particular, to be aware of pinch points.
Removing bridle on crane. Standing on boom; signalled to crane driver to take up the slack , this action allowed the load to travel to the west which knocked the man over and
caused his injury. Actions: improvements to contractor's risk assessment proce ures and work activity procedure. Discussions with contractor to brief all employees.
The drill string was being pulled out of the hole and racked on the drill floor. The 7th strand of heavy walled drill pipe was being lowered by the driller onto the racking area,
the derrickman half way up the derrick was pulling it into position using a ugger winch. At the drill floor level the ip and another floorman were pushing the drill pipe into
position prior to it being lowered approx 18" onto the floor. The pipe swung slightly hitting the ip on the chest. Following hospital examination and examin tion of his
companies doctor the ip was declared fit to resume work the following day. A tugger has now been utilised to pull drill pipe into position.
The <...> wireline crew were prep to rig down the wireline pressure control equip following successful run on well to set dummy pack off. The crew had drawn the tool into the
stuffing box and closed the work over valve. An operator had then released the d um brake to drop the tool 2 m. As the tool lowered the wire parted. Tension released the wire
recoiled and struck the wireline cab operator in the face. The cab window was partially open at the time.
<...> was four days into his offshore duty. At the time of the accident he was repostioning a 15 tom swl air hoist onto its fixed runway beam above the seawater lift pumps. The
main work was completed but the spare chain attached to the hoist remained oiled on the access scaffold. While attempting to lower this chain into its deck level catch baskit
he lost control, and asthe remainder of the chain snapped into its natural postion it struck him on the shoulder. This work task will not be repeated until we have carried out a
critical task analysis and produced a written detailed procedure.
Driller had just completed the removal of the lower crossover section of the bop stack in order to send it ashore for recertification. In order to carry this out the stack had been
lifted utilising the bop winch. At the actual time of the incident, the in ured party was positioned at the winch control panel and was setting the stack down after the spool
removal in order to transfer the total weight off the winch itself and spread it between the winch and turnbuckles positioned on either side of the stack. s an additional
precaution to prevent the stack swaying, some wooden packing had also been placed under the stack. Whilst operating the controls, the hydraulic supply hose and fitting came
adrift without warning, striking the ip on the leg. A full investigation is being carried out.
A bundle of 2 7/8" drill pipe was being transferred between pipe rasks on the pipe deck. The ip was following the load. The load was being lowered into position when the
operation was stopped approx 3" from landed to allow the tag line to be cleared from nder the load. As this was occurring the load moved slightly trapping the ip right thumb
between it & the samson post
Ip struck by 2 scaffold boards from bop deck scaffold
A scaffold clip fitting dropped or fell from <...> platform top sides and struck a welder who was working on the spider deck a light glancing blow to his right shoulder.
During removal of hydrill from bop stack, ip was injured when a scaffold board used for access above fell approx 15 feet and struck him on the neck.
A level control valve, lcv 5011a, on 'a' stream ceased operating on <...>. This did not cause major operational problems as there was stillsome control from 'b' stream. Spares
were ordered on <...> and on <...> an instrument technician was asked to remove the drive box from lcv 5077a. This was regarded as now instrusive work which in the normal
course of events should not have caused a hydorcarbon leak. However, when he removed the actuator lin age, the centre spindle of the valve complete with the drive boss was
ejected from the valve followed by hydrocarbons. The instrument tech rushed to a shutdown box and initiated a class 1 shutdown. This action and intervention by the
operators isolated he leak 4-5 minutes. The instrument technician was subsequently medivaced and is currently receiving treatment for shock.
<...> had just pulled back to surface after being unable to pass the sssv with a read memory logging string. <...> of <...> closed the hydraulic upper master valve from the <...>
pressure skid on the pipe deck and returned to the wellheads to line up the tree and riser for bleeding down through the closed drains. For the duration of the run a 10000 psi
glycol injection pump was connected in through the <...> bops. In line between the bops and the pump there was connected two lo-torque valves, one <...> needle valve, a
check valve, and some connection hosing. All items in line were rated to 10000 psi. Because of this connection arrangement it was possible to safely monitor the well head
pressure being bled down at a pressure gauge on the glycol pump. To ensure as true and accurate a reading as possible, <...> decided to make certain that the 3 valves were
fully open. After confirming that the two lo-torque valves were open, he then proceeded to physically check the status of the needle valve. When turning the valve anti-
clockwise he found the valve turned freely, and therefore assumed that the valve was not fully open. After apparently opening the valve 1-1/2 turns it was brought to his
attention that the valve assembly was actually unscrewing out of the valve body. As he attempted to screw the assembly back into the housing, it blew out, coming to rest
Tanker in range of 15-40,000 tonnes was passing <...> on sw corner closest point to <...> was 1.5 nautical miles tanker lost all engine power when due west of <...> and started
to drift directly towards cleeton 10 mins after power had been lost engi e power was regained tanker's closest point to <...> during this power loss was 1.08 nautical miles
While infield vessel was working deck cargo at <...> platform, stern aft quarter of vessel collided with diagonal brace on jacket - damage appear to be superficial but is under
further inv
Supply vessel collided with vertical leg on drilling platform causing dent above water line
Whilst prep for rig move of jack up drilling rig - anchor handling vessel suffered total loss of power vessel started drifting and narrowly missed colliding with platform
Whilst changing position from <...> to south side of <...>, vessel had positioned approx 50 m from <...>. As vessel came astern, starboard engine remained jammed astern -
vessel steered btwn platforms whilst the engineer manually stopped engine - vessel pull d ahead on spring of port anchor wire - during this motion dsv scraped along platform
leg and <...> riser - further contact occurred btwn vessel mast and platform structure
During maintenance activities, vessel <...> was on station close to the alc on transferring 2" air hose supply to the column, the vessel appeared to be caught in a sea swell
resulting in its aft end coming into contact with the installation's e cape to sea ladder. This resulted to damage to the ladder's verticals and scraping the outer concrete surface
of the installation. The sea state at this time was in the order of 1.5 metres.
The supply vessel <...> while manoeuvring alongside the platform to load and discharge cargo, experienced a malfunction of the vessel's fwd propulsion system which causes
the vessel to collide with the platform on 2 occasions and in rapid suc ession. No personnel injured on platform or vessel. No apparent damage to platform although a close
insp will be required to confirm this for an area of leg 10 ft below waterline. The vessel sustained plate indentation of a minor nature to the vessel's po t bow approx 20 ft from
the vessel stem. The vessel will continue on his normal duties.
Supply vessel <...> discharging cargo had difficulty maintaining position with strong head seas and wind when it came into contact with cross member on south west corner. At
first inspection removal of paint to cross member on south west corner. Min r structural damage to supply vessel <...> (pipe at stern of vessel used in conjunction with flexible
hose. Wind ssw x7/8, sea swell from 210' 21/2 - 3m. Heading of v/l time of incident 230. V/l on hand controls, all machinery operating c/eng visite bridge at time to warn of
rising temp's on engine (bthruster)
A large section of mandolite coating on the underside of a wellbay hatch cover was discovered to have fallen to the well bay below. Activities during the previous 12 hours
included working of supply vessel with considerable number of deck lifts and normal drilling ahead
Transferring 50 gal drum of chem from main deck to lower deck - drum was being lifted by a single strop double choked around drum - as the drum was being manoeuvred
over handrail of lower deck, drum slipped out of strop and fell into sea.
Snubbing operation. Wire failed at weak point.
12 ft long dhsv fell through hole in bottom left hand corner of a cargo basket end - hole had been cut out of wire mesh – crane had been slewing which caused basket to tilt -
causing valve to slide out of hole – initially struck a light fitting prior to falling approx 10 ft to main deck
Alignment of pipework using chain block - chain block being used to allow pipework into position – movement of other connected pipework caused overload of cahin block -
chain parted
Pennant line fell from whip line hook. Investigation suggests release mechanism activated by contact with overhead beam.
During lift of 21,l25" bops a horizontal bestraining tirfor failed allowing bops to rotate slightlly-no injuries or personnel in vicinity. Check certs of tirfor line. All personnel
competencies checked and satisfactory.
A fork lift was used to lift a pallet of chemicals. Due to the design of the pallet, the fork lift operator lifted the pallet off centre. The pallet was raised approx. 7ft. At this
point,the fork lift tipped sideways and came to rest on the north bulkh ad wall. Findings pallet design was poor. Forklift operator had lifted the pallet too high knowing that
the pallet was off-centre. Actions taken to prevent re-occurrence. Suitable pallets to be used in future by bw mud. Highlight incident and need for aw reness at all <...> safety
meetings. Memo given to all <...> forklift operators regarding unstable loads.
A deck level wireline pulley was being manoeuvred into position using tugger. The lifting point on pullet was only designed to hold the weight of the pulley during rig-up.
When the pulley reached appropriate position, the tugger should have been stopped. however, the tugger operator continued operation and overloaded the pulley eye. The eye
failed releasing the tugger line up the derick. This caused damage to the tugger wire and the pulley casing. On spite of the pulley's eye being damaged, the pulley did not fall
and did not suffer any loss of operating integrity. The pulley was then in position and supported by the wireline. At this point the gse were notified and permission was obtained
to continue wirwline operations. A risk assessment was conducted before proceeding.
During crane operations with the <...>,a 1 ton contaimer was knocked over on the vessel deck due to sudden vessel movement. 2. During operaions to regain control the vessel
then moved to within 4/5 metres of the riser access tower. Wind speed 27 knots. Direction-144 : wave height-3m :visibility - fine and clear actions
A driller had been backreaming out of the hole and had pulled 25 stands. On the 26 stand after screwing in the top drive to the drill string and with the elevators kicked back
away from the pipe 14", the driller started to pull the drill string. After he had picked up 3'0" the retaining plate, for the main hinge pin, fell to the floor. Upon investigation it
was found that the plate had caught up under the slip handle and been pulled off. The retaining plate was held on by two wire locked 15/16 bolts and weighed 5 lb approx. No
damage was caused by the plate, only lost time to the rig. The plate was removed from service and a replacement plate removed from another set of elevators. Holes were
drilled in the plate and two securing lines attached to the h ndle on the back of the elevators and new bolts installed. Actions taken to prevent recurrence replacement plate was
drilled and two securing safety lines attached to the handle on the back of the elevators and new bolts installed. Manufacturers suggested modification: * modify elevator
retaining plate to incorporate a securing safety line or re-design securing system. * set slips higher to make sure elevators do not contact with slips.
Wind nnw, 45 knots, 4.5 m swell. Crane was lifting 30' tool from supply vessel when wave caused vessel to lurch, causing tool to be caught underneath handrail of vessel. One
sling parted from tool. Due to deck space available on boat, the crane driver d cided the safer option was to lift the tool on to the platform, which was done successfully. No
personnel were injured.
An instrument spool weighing 0.2 ton was being lowered 15' by chain block, after 6' of movement the load went into free fall, landing on grating.3
After removal of electrode from barrow, the chain block held for approx 20 secs before the load chain slipped through the block.
At approx. 1645 hours on <...> <...> engineer having in conjunction with his colleagues completed production logging tool operations on well t-10, commenced rigging down
wireline mast equipment prior to resuming the next phase of the program which was on well t-03. On dismantling, the telescopic section of the mast was proving rather
difficult to retract, therefore the platform service engineer phoned the onshore manufacturer-representative for assistance. Having between them ascertained that the unit had
become pressure locked the service engineer armed with this knowledge from onshore support, carried out an effective repair which allowed the dismantling operation to
resume. The wireline mast now fully dismantled was ready for transferral to well t-03. Spotting of the mast then resumed onto the next well t-03. During the erection phase on
well t-03 it was noticed that the telescopic tower was unusually slow in responding during certain stages of the operation, that is to say, it was sporadic at times, very
intermittent & very hard to judge the actual rate of ascent. Note: when the main boom (telescopic tower) is being extended the winch lines require to be paid out thereby
maintaining a safe distance from the top sheave in relation to proximity sensor and winch hook. The winch lines are free fall and their length diminishes as the main boom
Drilling tubular dropped from grab of <...> hydraulic pipe handling crane. A 600 lb 31 foot long 5" diameter drilling tubular was being slewed clockwise in a horizontal
position by the <...> hydraulic crane <...> which has a 4.1 tonne swl at 8 metres, the tubular slipped from the grasp of the "grab" on the crane and fell 5 feet onto the rubicon
pipedeck handrails causing minor damage. The crane was being operated by remote control from the drill floor which overlooks the pipedeck. The crane was taken out of
service and thoroughly checked for safe operation by both the vendor and our independent lifting equipment certifying authority. Attempts were made to repeat the incident,
but each time it worked as per design. The crane has been declared fit for service.
Cargo handling from platform to vessel using whipline. Sea state calm. 1 tonne load landed onto vessel. Crane operator unable to lower line to release load. Lowered boom to
release load, then slewed out to sea to investigate problem. As he boomed down he aw a strand of the whipline part from the rope (approximately 150 feet back from the ball)
and curl back towards the drum. Whipline removed and sent onshore for inspection by sparrows and certifying authority.
Failure of pullift load chain. Link failed whilst supporting shaker table during normal drilling ops. Pullift under little load just supporting shaker.
During crane operations into the utulity shaft a louvre blade fell approx 13 metres narrowly missing one of the deck crew on inspection it was found to have come off the top of
the redundant steam boiler ducting. This ducting runs out of the drilling pack ge switchroom then routes in a diagonal direction upwards terminating 2.5 metres above the
pipedeck the ducting in this area is approximately <...> years old and had undoubtedly been struck occassionally during crane operations in this confined space. Recomm nded
remedial action: remove redundant ducting in the valley area. Install bumper bars where required. Complete a platform wide survey.
Total engine failure prevented crane boom being placed in rest. Boom at 45 degrees to the south during engine change. Weather deteriorated, wind veered westerly and incresed
to 40/50 knots. Slew brakes overcome (not designed for this load) and crane slewe into scaffolding that was in place for engine change. Scaffold and slew break stopped crane
movement. Boom stopped close to derrick but did not hit derrick. Slew and "cab" brakes checked two hours prior to incident, both on. "cab" brake forced out of eng gement by
force applied. No items fell from scaffold or crane no persons on scaffold. One person in engine compartment exited safely by alternative access route on hearing screeching
noise. He was not aware of any crane movement.
Joints of heavy wall drillpipe were being moved from the pipedeck to the drillfloor using the automated pipe handling equipment. Once the joint reaches the drill floor a teflon
"rabbit" was inserted into the pipe (rabbit is used to clean out debris etc. F om inside pipes). The joint is then moved from the horizontal to vertical position using the hydraulic
lifting arm. As the joint was lifted into the vertical position the rabbit fell out of the bottom of the pipe and down to the weatherdeck approx. 15m be ow. The rabbit landed on
top of a canvas habitat where two amec personnel were working. On inspection of the drillpipe the thread protector on the pinend of the pipe was found to have a hole on it,
which allowed the rabbit to fall through. Three stands of pipework had been successfully removed prior to this using the same method. The size of the teflon rabbit was 1.2m
long by 70mm diameter and weighs 5kg with small metal eye bolts in each end.
Whilst using a 3 tonne chain block to lift a 500kg load, the chain block went into free fall, fortunately the load was only inches above its inetended location and the rigger
managed to control its descent to some degree. Operations suspended and the chain block quarantined, will be sent onshore for inspection.
During helifreight unloading a single freight item weight 1040 lbs was being transferred from aircraft to laydown area when the heliloader lifting appliance failed dropping the
load. No injuries resulted from this. Due to the need to maintain an operati nal helideck the damaged appliance and freight were moved to a safe area for examination. The
heliloader was a registered lifting appliance and was re-certified for service on <...> for loads up to 10 cwt. Examination of the equipment showed that loa bearing structure
was corroded on the internal surfaces of box section members. However a load test the previous day indicated no defects.
After lowering a grease gun to the deck using the tugger on the crane operator began hoisting up on tugger. When when the hook was approaching the walkway on the crane he
stopped hoisting the tugger. But it countinued to turn (that is normal) at the same ime the ferrule on the hard eye caught briefly on the edge of the walkway, lifting one part of
the walkway (grating) and causing it to fall from the crane and into the forward landing area. The grating suffered only slight damage and no other damage occur ed. The
investigation of the walkway showed that 90% of the remaining grating clips were loose and some missing.
Ip manriding in derrick when he became stuck, he did not signal quickly enough or the tugger operator did not react quickly enough to avoid injury. All procedures relating to
manriding are being reviewed. Notes 1. Visibility at time good. 2. Manrider was /8m from drill floor. 3. No drill floor operators in progress. 4. Drill floor quiet at time.
One of the four chains which are used on the bop emergency lift system parted. Immediate inspection of other chains.
During the lifting operation to remove the pack off adapter flange on well <...> the air winch tugger line, connected to the flange, parted 20 feet above the winch operators
head. When the two pieces parted, the winch drum end of the line fell and glanced the winch operator on the chin - he sustained no injury. The opposite end, connected to the
flange fell into the well bay before becoming entangled in the the racked drll pipe above the monkey board. The line was immediately secured at drill floor level u ing rope.
The winch line that fell into the wellhead module wrapped around the compact spool which had been barriered off for the lifting operation.
During tripping operations the derrickman attached the chain at the end of the monkey board tugger line around a stand of 5 1/2" dp in order to rack back same. As the
derrickman started to rack back the stand the dead end of the winch line eye slipped thr ugh the ferrule. The chain attached to the eye by a hook slipped fown the pipe. At
approx 30' above the drill floor the chain unwound itself from the pipe and free fell to to the drill floor.
Well services work was ongoing and east gantry crane was in use in mod 01. The hook was being lowered through a deck hatch when 'arcing' occured between hoist rope and
deck. There was a bang in the vicinity of the crane motor and the hoist ceased to ope ate. 1. Gantry crane isolated and taken out of service. 2. Motor returned to beach for
inpection to establish reason for failure. 3. Changes t0 earthing arrangements being discussed with beach. 4. Similiar equipment to be checked field wide
While moving a load on the top deck, the crane driver realised on starting to lower the load that it was freefalling. He put the control lever in the neutral position and applied
the brakes. The load was brought under control with no damage being done. Ac ions 1. Clutch pin link replaced 2. Vendor mechanic asked to check assembly pins on similar
cranes 3. An incident investigation team has been set up to identify underlying cause and actions to prevent recurrance 4. Information on problem sent to all <...> platforms.
Weather: wind 195 degrees at 10 kts, seas 5.2 metres max, temp 5.2c, visibility 10 mil. Incident occurred on an american hoist 11750 crane type, positioned in the north ease
corner of the platform. While moving a three tonne load (a reel for the wireline nit), the crane driver realised the load was freefalling in an uncontrolled manner. The crane
driver brought the load under control by putting the control lever in the neutral position and applying the brakes. The load was brought under control with no da age being
done. The three foot freefall was in mid-air. Crane has been takes out of service since the incident. An investigation team has been set up. Terms of reference include
determining underlying cause and actions to be taken prior to putting cranes ack in service and what needs to be done to prevent recurrence. Hse was informed by phone on the
morning of <...>.
A kelly scabbard - containing a kelly - was being offloaded from supply vessel far supporter. It was observed that the end plate - 12" dia, 3/8" thick, 5 holes 9/16 dia and
weighing 12lbs - on the end of the scabbard had swivelled through 180 degrees, rem ining in place by one bolt. While transporting over the deck, the plate fell 15 feet onto the
deck. On inspection it looks as though teh plate was only ever secured by two nuts and bolts onto the scabbard. The one nut and bolt that was found was small eno gh to pass
through the holes in the plate and the scabbard end cover. The unit had been shipped from the drilling contractors yard. The deck crew observed the displaced plate as the unit
reached the platform and stood aside in case the plate of contents o the scabbard came adrift. The load was lifted in the level position.
A pump & motor assembly was being lifted into position when the slings supporting the load came free from the chain blocks hook, resulting in the load dropping 1 metre to
deck. Damage was incurred to the motor and a stair tread. Initial investigation sug ests rigging practices were suspect but a full investigation is under way at present.
After completing his pre op checks, the platform crane driver commenced raising the crane boom in order to swing the boom pass the drilling derrick before commencing liftng
ops. When the boom reached the min radius the crane driver heard a noise and reali ed that the boom cut-off switch had failed to operate, he stopped the boom by de-clutching
the drive manually. He then observed that the boom stops had been damaged by the excessive boom travel.
During routine weekly maintenance on the lifeboat when the winch was asked to raise the boat back on to the davits it went in the opposite direction and lowered the boat.
This damaged the sprag brake/clutch assembly and allowed the boat to descend into t e water. The boat was still attached to the fall wires. No person was in the boat.
During routine running of the draw-works by <...> personnel they observed smoke emanating from a hatch of the drill floor, below which is located the brake drum & clutch
mechanism for the rotary table. On lifting the hatch the operator observed a small am unt of flame & a large volume of smoke from the external paint coatings of the brake
housing. The operator immediately raised the alarm & extinguished the fire with a dry powder extinguisher. The fire party arrived & provided cooling water to the equipmen
During daily maintenance checks the well service driller over-hoisted the travelling block to collide with the crown block whilst attempting to test the crown saver. Impact
damaged the blocks and severed the hang-off line attachment chain resulting in a 0.25 kg severed chain link falling to the drill floor from thr top of the derrick.
The kelly and kelly sock were being picked up in a single operation, the kelly sock was being supported by 2 x 3 ton strops. The strops were secured above the kelly spinner
and below, to the kelly sock. During the lifting operation a collar on the kelly sock snagged on the kelly sock support/pivot. One of the two slings being used partially parted
at this point. The slings being used were fully certified from <...>. The failure occurred because of the excessive forces applied when the kelly sock snagg d and not because
the strop failed during normal usage. Procedures will be amended to ensure that the kelly and kelly sock are lifted in separate operations. The kelly sock collar will be modified
to ensure that no further snagging can occur.
A one ton pod of synthetic base oil was being lifted using a set of mobile lifting forks from the main deck to the bop deck. The load snagged deluge pipework. This caused the
load to slip off the mobile lifting forks. The banksman had seen the problem and had asked the crane driver to stop, but the pod fell 35-40ft to the bop deck below. The
lightweight metal frame around the pod was designed to be lifted by forks. The forks in use did not have any restraining mechanism.
Lifting a tote tank - overhoist mechanism got jammed in rope. <...> was the boat being worked. Debirs that fell weighed approx 2 kgs
Loss of control of load as suspended overside. Control regained.
A length of drilling line (115ft) was slung approximately 30ft back from the end and picked up by the crane to a height of 50ft. Here it was realised that headache ball would
reach limits so it was lowered, pennant removed, hooked directly onto headache all hook and raised arppox. 40ft when the line slipped through the canvas strop to the deck.
No-one was injured, no damage was sustained. The strop was wet and line is greasy. The 'bite' of the strop was not checked the second time.
A 1 tonne chain block was rigged up to lower a small 5cm spool & valve assembly (approx, weight 50kg) approx 4 metres. On taking the weight of the spool the block held the
load without any problems. However,when the load began to be lowered, the chain sta ted to run through the block thus allowing the load to descend under its own weight. Due
to the small weight of the load, the rigger was able to control the descent by grasping onto the operating chain and allowing the load to be lowered safely. The fault chain block
was immeadiatly taken out of service. Investigation has revealed that the outer brake friction disc was not in the correct position relative to the ratchet mechanism. Similar
chain blocks were recalled and inspected with no more being found defective.
A 6" ball valve with a level control valve attached, (approx.550kg) was sitting on a support stool and being supported in the upright position by a 1.5 tonne nitchi chain block.
A technician raised the load in order to check a label on the valve. When he eleased the chain the brake did not engage andt started to run back through the block. The
technician was able to arrest the fall by grasping the chain and then securing it to make the load safe. The faulty chain block was immeadiately taken out of servic . Note: this is
the second fault with chain blocks from this manufacturer. All chain blocka of this make have now been recalled from service and are being sent back to the supplier. Further
investigation will be undertaken in conjunction with the suppli.
Two men (drilling crew) were manouvering an agitator unit using mechanical lifting devices above the mud pits, the load (approx 500kg) was attached to a chain block which
was attached to a chain block which was attached to beam clamp, which in turn was fi ed to an "h" beam coated in a passive fire protective (pfp) material. (height from beam to
deck (approx, 4m).another chain block was attached to the unit to allow it to be moved laterally into position. Once in position, one of the men was instructed to p ck up the
load. When the load was (approx, 450mm) off the deck, the beam clamp detached from the beam and fell 2m and jammed in some overhead pipework. What happened was, the
clamp had actually been secured to the pfp and not to the beam itself.
Attempting to free off annular preventer & lift trolley which was jammed bop lift frame lifted bop to max lift to enable mpi inspection activity - when lowered hanging arm on
south side of frame stuck in the lifting beam trolley - an attempt was made to f ee arms via use of hydraulic jack & chain pulls to lever up the assembly when this failed the lift
frame hydrams were powered up/down with too much tension on the chain lift the hyd power overcame capability of chain lifts - one parted/ one hook distorted subsequent
investigation of hydraulics revealed that the control sequence valve assembly on the lift/lower controls of hydraulic rams required freeing off. Unit to be tested for correct
functions with frame diconnected from the bop. The inspection of seq ence valve is to included in maintainance plan procedure.
1" manilla rope used to pull drilling line through sheaves whilst stringing the crown/travelling block, parted. The task being carried out was to install a new drilling line. This
was contained on a spool at rig-floor level. The line was being transferr d to its operating position in the crown and travelling blocks by attaching 1" manilla rope and pulling it
up through the sheaves at the top of the derrick. The operation required a certain amount of slack line to be present so as to reduce the loading on the rope. This was not
maintained, consequently the amount of weight on the rope increased, exceeding its load-bearing capability. The rope snapped as it passed over the crown block.
The swivel collar on the samson post had seized on. Application of wd 40 and grease would not release it. The cathead jerk chain was attached via a shackle to the swivel in an
attempt to free the swivel. Whilst pulling on the chain via the cathead the ch in broke. A roughneck was on the rig floor when the chain broke and sustained first aid injuries
when he fell backwards onto the pipe rack.
During a drilling operation to rack back pipe the travelling block came into contact with the kelly cock causing it to fall to the drill floor.
A piece of scrap wire cable approx 108 feet in length, 11/2" in diameter and weighing 446lbs, was being lifted by the platform crane to the scrap metal skip. The wire was
coated with a heavy grease. It was slung through a choked lifting strop at a point a out three-quarters of the way along its length. This imbalance, coupled with the lubricating
effect of the grease caused the wire to slip through the strop and fall to a landing area some 100 feet below. It was daylight at the time, cloudy but dry. Two me bers of the <...>
deck crew had prepared the lift prior to its being taken up by the platform crane driver.
A combination low head room geared beam trolley and chain block failed when under load removing a turbine engine from the gt 3 enclosure. The chain block failed when
cracks were induced on either side of the chain block assembly at the guide housing above the anchor points. The fso was called to the scene at approx 2340 hrs and the load
was made safe using secondary lifting equip and the area was barriered off until insp the following morning. A team was set up to inv the inc and a separate team set up to
scertain the safest way to remove the rb211 from the enclosure which was subsequently removed on the <...>. The failed chain block had a cert of test and exam dated <...>
and a subsequent si 1019 dated <...>7. This instance being the 2nd t me it had been used since re-cert. Two hse insps who were on the platform at the time viewed the scene.
Failure of lifting equipment (<...> 2 ton chain block - proof tested to 3.0 tonnes on 11/11/97) rigger was preparing to transfer a 2" valve, weighing approx 5cwt, from one chain
block to another to lower it 15ft to the ground. When the valve was ransferred to the 2 ton chain block, it started to freefall on release of the hand chain. The rigger
immediately controlled the descent of the freefalling valve by regripping the hand chain. A total of 6 chain blocks and 3 pull lifts were sent to the plat orm by <...>, dedicated to
the job in hand, which was change - out of valve and spool pieces on the a water injection pump y3003a. The work was immediately stopped and the remaining chain blocks
and pull lifts were load tested by acl and witnessed by t e oie. Failed chain bloch was quarantined at the request of the hse.
A <...>, attached to the west crane fly hoist, was being used to transfer a drum of cp 1550 corrosion inhibitor from the cherry- picker deck to the west side of the cellar deck.
The clamop was fitted on the drum then lifted and slewed clea of the platform. About half way between the pipedeck and the cellar deck the drum slipped from the clamp and
fell into the sea. The drum was retrieved by the standby vessel but was found to have split losing its contents into the sea. 1. The type barrel clamp in use on the platform had
been withdrawn from use with plastic drums. 2. An alternative method of transporting plastic drums to be sourced eg: cargo net, other sutiable lifting device.
The east crane was being used to pick up a tank of chemical, manifested as 5 tons weight, from the <...> supply boat. As the tank was being lifted, the alarm for the fly hoist
(set at 7 tons) came on. The load was then lowered back down onto the d ck of the boat. Damage was found on the hook and the pennant. The hook. The hook had been
visually inspected the previous day by the crane operator as part of his routine daily checks and was found to be in good order. During the investigation the tank was found tp
be 9 tons in weight. Swl of the hook pennant was 8 tons. The damaged equipment has been backloaded for inspection.
A 4 tonne utility tugger winch line parted on drill floor whilst transferring the travelling block from pipedeck onto the drillfloor. The tugger line was being used to assist the
moving of the 9.8 tonne travelling block, which was being supported by the p atform crane, onto the drillfloor for installation. As the line parted the line began to feed back
through the top derrick sheave falling onto the drillfloor (dropped object) landing adjacent to the driller and winchman. There were 4 persons in the loc tion, 2 outwith the area
of contact one adjacent to line when parted and one at winch. On inspection of the tugger line the inner core showed signs of corrosion. It is the intention to send the wire
onshore for strength testing to confirm that there was not an excessive load supplied.
K lift, high reach mast wireline crew had finished on the c52 well and were in the process of rigging down. The job was progressing normally until the hydraulic arm was
lowered. At about 2' from the top the lower movable box support section dropped from t's fixing poiunt on the ram into the bvottom fixed section. Because of this the ram was
unable to support the side force, the ram bent and the top sections fell towards the deck. The fall was checked when the guy ropes came into tension. The assembly cam to rest
with the ram bent to an angle of 30 degrees to the vertical.
5.5" completion tubing was being hoisted from the rear of the temporary catwalk up towars the h.w.u. work-basket by the use of two winches. One winch was attached to the
rear end of the tubing by use of a certifed fibre strop and the front winch by use of single joint elevators. As the tubing was moved forward the rear strop became detached from
the tubing. The forward winch operator having noticed the rear strop becomming detached from the tubing, commenced to lower the tubing to arrest it's forward movem nt
however due to forward momentum the tubing continued to move forward and through the single joint elevators and then breaking through the wooden strop board at the end
of the catwalk adjacent to the h.w.u. it continued to fall forward and down coming t rest on the skid deck some 30' below. The final resting positon of the tubing was with the
box end left supported on the h.w.u. structure at a height of 30' with elevators still attached and the pin end on the skid deck, making an angle of approx 35 degr es.
A crawler crane had been assembled on the pipe deck for the purpose of removing the platform west fixed crane. A functional test was underway using a 25 tonne water bab
when the crane collapsed. The water bab went overboard. The crane jib came to rest anging down the side of the platform and the crane body capsized on the pipe deck. No
injuries. Platform damage miminal. Contractor involved is <...>.
Crane had been shutdown from midnight after working the supply vessel. Started working deck cargo moved 3rd lift from catwalk to 'v' door, when operator noticed the
whipline drum was slowly rotating paying out as though it was a controlled release control were in neutral. Load was already landed, roustabout pusher informed, load
unhitched, crane was boomed up to 9m radius. Headache ball was laid on deck, crane was switched off. There was no injuries or plant damage.
A compression fitting on an impulse line blew off. The crude oil metering skid on dp level / <...> platform. The system was operating at 12 bar 6. The instrument/metering
technician working on the skid was sprayed with crude oil. On investigation of the i cident the compression fitting olive was found not to have compressed onto the instrument
pipework. The investigation is ongoing to check other fittings on the skid. In addition the gas detectors around and above the skid did not detect the release of hyd ocarbon this
is subject to further investigation.
A rope access team member was operating one of three 5 tonne chain block attached accross a separated talon connector on well <...> conductor at the 20' level. On the second
pull of the chain, the highest link connected to the hook of the chain sling ass mbly broke and fell into the sea and the chain block fell to hang from it's lower point of
connection. The rigging arrangement had been on place on the conductor for approx. 3.5 months the incident was not caused by any direct action of personnel.
On <...> the supply vessel <...> was engaged on the west side of the <...> installation. Atmospheric conditions, wind 18 knots, 335 degrees, sea 2-2.5m, visibility good &
weather dry. On the abovedate at approx. 10.20am the west crane landed a 10ft container onto the vessel port side forward, adjacent to the aft bridge superstructure. On landing
the container the crane operator lowered off his line to enable it to be unhooked. The crane pennant somehow became tangled with the vessels man overbo rd equipment and
also the 2 boat davit and it is reported that the crabne wire ball struck the port side bridge bulkhead. The report from the vessels master states that the impact from the ball on
the bulkhead affected the control mechanism for the positi ning system causing unplanned manoeuvring of the vessel. During manual control action to move away from the
platform the stern swung to starboard and contacted the sw leg bracings.
Installing 24" riser guide at 11.6m. Guide toppled off clamp while adjusting in half shell. <...> comealong supplied by <...> failed. Allowing chain to pull out of unit. Riser
guide was prevented fro falling to seabed by previously installed safety strop. No injuries occurred. All identical comealongs taken out of service.
Start-up operations following a level 2 shutdown. 'A' injection compressor had been restarted following a level 2 shutdown tx0206a seal/lub oil reservoir had remained
operational, circulating oil around the system. 'A' injection compressor was brought into service. 1 1/2 hours later, the area operator noticed that the tank was buckled. An
investigation has commenced and initial findings point towards a minor explosion having caused over-pressurisation, estimated 0.3 bar. Suspect source of ignition is static
discharge, but no explanation for source of combustible products is yet forthcoming. Investigation continues including discussions outside the company. Oil level to be
maintained above return pipe to prevent static discharge and full monitoring of oil flash point on return to service.
During the start up of a gas turbine generator, the fuel control valve overfuelled the engine and, upon ignition, exploded in the exhaust ducting rupturing a flexible bellows.
There was no resultant fire or other damage. No person was injured.
Following the de-isolation of p98-high pressure condensate pump motor, re-instatement of the motor start cubicle directly above, which housed the starter switchgear for p34
water injection pump motor, which was available, but not running. A flashfire was een by the technician installing the cubicle. He immediately raised the alarm to the ccr and
tackled the fire locally. Platform fire alarm was sounded, all personnel mustered and accounted for. Fire teams attended and extinguished the fire and remained t cool
switchgear. Investigation team set up to establish causation. Nothing evident in first 24 hours of inspection. All other cubicles
During normal ops a fuel change over was being made on p05 mol pump turbine. The turbine tripped and some moments later an explosion was heard. The source of the the
explosion was not immediately clear. No fuel - gas control action took place and eventual y the source of the explosion was traced to the p05 exhaust. 2 items of debris have
been found on the platform top deck. No muster was called as the engine was isolated and the incident contained.
Flash fire from turbo/exhaust manifold area caused when esd reset.
While flushing out a sample point on the <...> riser during daily sampling, a flash fire occurred at the inlet to the 25 litre metal sampling drum when gas given of by approx. 5
litres of oil sample in the drum ignited. Taken :- the fire was quickly extingu shed by the lab technician who placed a rag * check elecrtical continuity of ground connections at
all sample points over the inlet to the drum, thus smothering the flame. * set up a maintenence routine in the maintenence management system tp conditions a the time were
dry, cool with a 15-20kt wind blowing pr0mpt regular testing of sample point ground connections. Electricity. This had then discharged across the inlet of the sample through
the well ventilated module. Container and the instrument tubing ca sing a spark to ignite the gas. * improve the sampling procedure concerning sampling. To prevent a similar
incident occurring, the following steps have been subsequent investigation revealed that the ground connection at the * all sampling suspended until checks complete. Sample
point was inneffective and had allowed the build up of static
The make up tong counter balance line broke in 2 while the tongs were latched onto the pipe. Previous insp in april of the line revealed no faults. Counter balance dropped in
its guides and the line dropped to the floor. There were no injuries
Rotary hose (mud hose) parted from the top drive due to it snagging belowguide track after running in the hole with the last component of the b.h.a. (bottom hole assembly).
The elevators were unlatched and the driller picked up the block to get clear of t e lift nubbing, at the same time the make-up tong was brought forward in an attemp to latch it
around the drill collar. This caused the tong hang off line to come into contact with the mud hose pushing it forward beneath the guide track. The hose snagged nd it was pulled
in 2 , parting at the connection of the top drive whilst pulling up to get another stand. The hose fell approx. 15' to the drill floor, fortunatly theree were no persons standing in
the area and no injuries were sustained.
Whilst conducting normal pig launching ops; valve b was at approx 80% closed whilst travelling towards 100% closed position when a large part of elec actuator assembly was
literally blown off actuator body - part in question incorporates main elec feed ca le and houses a key interlock and plug and socket arrangement feed to actuator motor – length
is approx 400 mm x 150 mm in dia and weighs approx 10 kg
During flow testing of fire pumps two fire pumps starts due to 'dip' in firemain pressure. This caused water hammer in the vicinity of the pipedeck monitor (an-s-3935a) which
resulted in a 1" coupling and blank to blow off. Three persons were in the vic nity of the incident, but no injuries were sustained.
Whilst tripping out of of hole the blocks were being run down to latch onto the tool joint when at 30' the tong hanging line on the back up tongs became entangled on a shackle
attached to the mud hose. The downword movement otf the blocks caused the tong courter balance weights to rise quickly and strike the top of the guide frame dislodging the
top counter weight which jumped clear of its retaining pin and fell 60' to the drill floor with no injury to personnel
A slip segment fell 15ft and landed on the drill floor. The rig floor was clear of personnel and of any objects.
Retaianing bolts sheared and 230mm x 8mm metal plate fell 27 feet to the drill floor.
On <...>, the <...> ndes (new derrick equipment set) was drilling the 17 1/2" hole section. At 22:00 hrs a survey was being taken by the down hole tools which required the
pumps to be cycled. A man working on the rig floor in front of th doghouse, heard the pumps kick in and then saw a bolt (20mm x 50mm long) hit the rig floor on the east side
of the iron roughneck. Then, looking up he saw the broken bracket fall and land on the cable tray above the roughneck. The broken bracket was retr eved and found to have
parted across one of the bolt eyes. The distance from the rig floor to the cable tray is 12.8ft and to the bracket position is 75ft.
Top drive guard clashed with upper carriage grab of star racker, resulting in the pipe sensing roller being sheared from the housing and falling 90ft to the rig floor.
A 7ft scaffold tube was deropped from the pipe deck to the west drilling landing area. Barriers were erected and there was no damage.
Whilst a technician was ascending the shaft stairs, an adjustable spanner fell from his pocket and fell to the 77 metre level. No personnal were injured and no plant damage
sustained.
During circ hole clean, a stand was in the process of being racked back when (2) bolts dropped to the rig floor, landing about 5 feet from dm. The rig floor was cleared and the
stand duly racked.the tds was lowered to the rig floor and it was as ertained that in fact 3 bolts on the bell guide had sheared. The remaining bolts were examined and found to
be secure. The bell guide hinge pin was also still secure.
The driller was working the drill string, with the link tilt in the park position, travelling the length of the stand (93ft) and the link tilt struck the underside of the monkey board,
causing the centre mechanism assembly, (weight approx 19 lbs and 1 foo in length), to detach and fall 85 feet to the drill floor.
5 stands of heavy wt drillpipe & 5 stands of 5" drillpipe were racked in preparation to run pipe back into well. Driller activated tilt to retrieve stand of 5" from racking and the
shakle and pin became detached and fell to drill floor. These items were not load bearing.
During routine testing of deluge system, the fir pump cut in. The ensuing pressure surge blew out the vamve stem, bonnet and handle from a fire hydrant valve. This assembly
landed on a stairway below.
A logging toolstring was being made up using the mousehole hatch to lower the end of the string below the drillfloor. The mousehole, although available, was not installed.
During the operation a stilson wrench was knocked, causing it to fall through the h tch, from the rig floor to the bop deck. The area below was barriered off, albeit not for this
part of the job. No-one, fortunately, was in the area. There was no adverse weather conditions.
Containers were being offloaded from a supply vessel and located on top deck. One of the pieces of steel banding that hold the wire mesh onto the tube frame fence on the
north face, dropped down to the walkway on the deck below. Contaienrs were not actually being placed on that part of the deck at that time, but clearly containers have come
into contact with the fence on previos occasions & damaged the banding. This piece of banding may well have been hanging waiting to fall & the deck vibration as containers
was landed was enough to make that happen.
An insulator working in the area of the ngl roof reported that the top of k01 exhaust stack ( length 7.5m, diameter 1.2m ) has parted just above a flanged section and was resting
across handrails on the ngl roof ko1, ngl and gas compression plant were shu down and depressured. A risk assessment was carried out and the broken piece of exaust was
removed to a safe location. An investigation team has been mobilised to determine the immediate and underlying cause of the collapse assess the potential for recurr nce and to
initiate a plan for remedial action. Weather: wind south to south east - strong to gale force - rain and heavy showers.
During a routine launch of the <...> rov by <...> personnel over the port side of the psv <...> just prior to undocking, the sheave wheel attachment bolt failed. This resulted in
an uncontrolled entry into the sea by the <...> platform of the tether management system (tms).<...> rov and the broken sheave wheel.
Production operator had lowered a hose [1" dia] from upper level of gtm to the id weather deck. The top end of the hose was tied off whilst fittings were found. The weight of
the hose caused it to slip and fall to the id weather deck.
Some personnel were checking barriers of a radiological controlled area along wellbay maindeck level, eastside. A scaffold pole [approx 12'-15'] fell from above hitting
outboard handrail, and over board into the sea. Upon investigation scaffolding was being dismantaled on the eastside upperdeck walkway.
While taking lsa scale reading on the 1st stage separator, a 14" spec blind fell approxinately 2.5m from the 1nd stage separator outlet on vessel c1020, missing two persons by
0.75m. The spec blind weight is about 30lbs.
Person walking aling the outside walkway when location sign fell and struck mans safety hat knocking it off his head. There was no injury or damage to equipment. There
were no signs to shoe that this sign had been forced from its original location. Like y cause the sign had been removed for whatever reason and laid somewhere out of site and
the wind which was blowing in the area of the incident dislodge the sign allowing it to fall.
While breaking out a stand from top drive system in our drill derrick, a steel die (100mm x 18mm and weight approx. 220grammmes), which forms part of the pipe handler for
breaking out and making up tool joint connections, dislodged from the torque wrench ie retainer and fell approx. 27 metres to drill floor. No damage or injury was caused as a
result but personnel had been working in the area. Drilling was stopped to allow investigation and repair.
Due to high winds in excess of 50 knots pieces of heat sheild, fell from the external derrick ladder, to pipedeck. No personnel were injured.
Part of a downhole wireline tool, which was being dismantled, was inadvertently dropped through the gap between the lublicator and the skid-deck grating, dropped down to x-
mas tree mezzanine level. To prevent recurrence, a hinged guard has been designed t seal the gap between the lubricator and the grating, and the relevant procedure has been
amended to ensure that installing the guard is included in the set-up process.
As it was <...> time we had made candle decorations with <...>. One person unfortunately left the office with the candle burning. To prevent recurrence all the candles were
removed from the <...> decorations. The fire was discovered efore anything else caught fire and extinguished.
Smoke was observed coming from the exhaust fan ducting of 2k101 c pt/ <...> compartment. The operations dept. Was informed and 2 operators were sent to investigate. They
found a small fire under the exhaust collector in the pt compartment. This was extingu shed with a hand held dry powder extinguisher but the fire had migrated outside the
compartment to the north bulkhead of 'c' module. Flame detection in the compressor area caused a class 1 fire and gas shutdown and the fire was extinguished by the automat c
deluge system. An investigation into the incident is ongoing.
9 5/8" casing for well t5 was being cut ready for tie back and installation of next section of tree - when first cut was made a fire occurred - quickly extinguished by use of a
charged hose which was laid out at work
Vent stack purge ignitied by weather conditions. Extinguished using fixed halon system. 4 x 55kg bottles discharged
During the test run of a temporary power generator there was a flash from the alternator accompanied by the emmission of some smoke. The machine was immediately stopped
and a dry powder extinguisher used to put out some small flames within the generator. his occurred with no external connections made to the alternator out- going terminals.
The frame of the machine was connected to the platform earth. Damage was limited to the internals of the alternator which, when tested, was short circuited on two of three
phases.
The platform had hired a temporary generator to replace the permanent essential services generator. The generator was being prepared for a stand alone no load run when there
was a flash and smoke in the control cab about 10 seconds after it was started. 3 personnel were present within the generator control cab when the incident occured but there
were no injuries. A short circuit within the control circuitry was thought to have caused the incident. The personnel immediately left the control cab after pr ssing the
emergency stop pushbutton inside the cab. Three electrical cubical covers were blown off at the same time as the flash and smoke was given off into the cab. The generator is
now being removed from the platform and returned to the supplier, kolfo limited. They will then determine the causes of the incident. Prior to being shipped offshore, the
generator had been fully load tested and certified by a lloyds inspector.
Small electrical fire broke out on an alternator on 'b' generator.

K-570 air compressor was run up to allow repairs to k-580 radiator fan 00:20hrs the platform went to red hazardous status caused by smoke in module l1c. The alarm was
investigated and on entering the module smoke was seen to be coming from the k-570. As there is no remote facility in the ccr to shut down the machine the technician used
the local stop button and also closed the air outlet valve. One technician used the local stop button and also used the air outlet valve. One thechnician started to disc arde a dry
powder extinguisher at the machine but as there was no visible fire he stopped, he was joined by another technician and discharged two co2 extinguishers to cool the machine
down. The module doors were opened and the technicians were relieved b two red team members in ba who used a fire hose to cool the machine after it was confirmed that
the machine was eletrically isolated.
At approximately 06:30 <...> foreman returned to u5 engine room and discovered smoke coming from the est door of the engine room. He shouted for assistance. Deck
forman procceeded to the u5 east door motorman opened the east door and discovered thick smoke, but no visible flames. Heaccertained that no one was in the engine room
and then raisd the alarm by initiating the gpa at the east side of u5. Deck foreman confirmed the alarm with an emergency call to the radio room/control room. At 06:35 a red
uster was logged in the radio room/control room. <...> electrician arrived at the u5 west door, opened the door and discovered dense smoke and flames at the ac switchboard.
He re-entered u5 via the east door, confirmed that the source of the flames wa the 2ac ciruit breaker and exited the room. Three other persons arrived in support and the fire
was extinguished using a dry powder extinguisher the board was confirmed to be still energised by the indicator lights being lit and the engine still running the 2ac engine was
then manually shut down. The fire re-ignited due to heat in the panel and another co2 extinguisher was discharged into the the panel. Red team arrived at the scene and secured
the area. At 06:41 the fire was reported to be extinguished.further c02 extinguishers were required as the high heat intensity caused the panel to re-ignite. The further co2 was
Normal porduction operations. A fire occurred when cm3201 a hazardous extract fan motor drive end bearing failed, causing level 3.1 shutdown. G.p.a sounded, all personnel
to emergency muster stations. Emergency response team deployed to scene. Fire extin uished by fixed protection system. Motor to be sent onshore for examination.
Smoke generation and fire was detected in the drive end of the motor enclosure. Fire was extinguished by on site personnel using dry powder extinguisher and electrical stop
button. No fire and gas detection or executive action and no alarm.
Garments were removed from a tumble drier, piled on a stainless steel table and left unattended. A garment in the centre of the pile autoignited after a period of time. This is
thought to have occurred due to a specific combination of temperature, compr ssion and water content. The alarm was raised by a passing production team leader who then
extinguished a small fire.
H9515 vent fan d.e. motor bearing overheated, causing grease to ignite and produce a small flame. Flame was quickly extinguished by use of hand held co2 extinguisher.
During welding og u4ee roof ne padeye, fluid breached hot work enclosure, some being soaked up by fire blanket.welding flash/heat ignited fouid resulting in fire. Fire
extinguished by the work party very quickly using dry powder extingisher. On investiga ion, fluid found to have emanated from 4 off bunkering hoded ex of ibc bunking
linesne corner u4ee roof. These hoses had recently, on dayshift ben disposal (well clear of habitat). As welding has taken place at worksite earlier in shift, it can only be c
ncluded that hoses moved from front of brisco panel to external of habiat at a time just unknown. Investigation could not determine party responsible. One of the 4 hoses was
labelled 'methanol'and dur to nature of fire(ie. Barely visible blue flame above liquid), it is assumed flammable liquid was residual fluid from 'methanol'
Welding operation required at the north west corner of the pipe deck. Welding cables re-routed across the pipedeck. An independent work party discovered a smouldering
welding cable joint. Dry powder extinguisher utilised. Investigation highlighted that th welding cable insulation had suffered mechanical damage prior to the incident.
Smoke was detected in an heating ventilation air conditioning (hvac) duct. On investigation and removal of panels it was found that at the plastic retaining frame around the
filter had been damaged by fire as had some gas detectors. The filter is located .3 m from the heater bank. At the time of the incident the fans were not in operation as an elec
shutdown and re-instatement had occurred earlier in the day. The fans require re-instating manually the control logic should not allow the heaters to be energ sed when the fan
is not running. The heater control system relies on 3 thyristers. Invs have shown 2 of the 3 to be in short circuit, this combined with the lack of air flow allowed an unwanted
heat build up with subsequent ignition/melting of the nearby plastic components.
The module 6 mud lab ventilation fan had been running continuously with the heater bank set at 12 c a maintinance routine was commenced and the temperture controller was
operated to check the heater bank sequentinal control.whilst carrying out this operation the muster alarms sounded, the electrican carrying out the work isolated the heater and
proceeced to muster. The icident was investigated while the muster was proceecding the smoke detectors in the mud lab which had actived and sounded the alarm was i
entified, the area inspected and it was confrimed that the smoke in the atmosphere had originated from the heater bank. There was no evidence of flame or combustion,
personnel were then stood down from muster.
A field reactor (choke) fed of '600v via a 1200 amp contactor' coil overheated melting its lacquer coating. The lacquer ignited and started burning the adjacent control wire on
the right hand side of the reactor within cabinet e6 scr bay located in the dr lling switch room. The fire watcher working on a job in the switch room smelled smoke and
investigated its source. He discovered a fire in the e6 scr cabinet and activated the platform general purpose alarm. Two operations technicians arrived on the scen and
extinguighed the fire with a hand held powder type extinguisher. As soon as the drilling contractors electrician arrived on the scene the cabinet was electrically isolated.
The platform was on annual shutdown and the oil process was covered by a master isolation. It was therefore depressurised but not entirely degassed. The task in hand was to
cold cut a flange from a short half inch dia. Pipe stub on the oil metering skid a d weld on a new flange. The work plan which had been discussed in detail between the oim and
the ssp included flushing the related pipework with water from bottom to top until there was no trace of oil coming out og the highest point (which was the pipe stub in
question) then isolate the system, & purge avoid in the system above the pipe stub inert gas via a probe passing through the centre og the pipe stub. The old flange was cold cut
off without problem and the new flange was being tack welded in place. When the welder struck an arc for the third tack there was a bang and the pipefitter who was also close
to the job saw a nine inch flame come out of the pipe stub/flange for about 3 seconds and then extinguish itself. They immediately evacuated the are made safe the welding
equipment and the fire watcher advised the control room. When operations personnel arrived on site, smoke/vapour was seen to be puffing from the pipe stub. On investigation
it was found that an isolation valve which was thought to be closed, and was tagged as closed was in fact open when this valve was closed the puffing stopped. It was founf
Normal gas export running both gas export compressors. Due to extremely high winds the insulation on train 2 exhaust had become loose and was in danger of being removed.
When weather permitted a temporary fix was employed by banding with ss band, using sm ll pieces of scaff board to add strength to corner areas. On the morning of <...> a
production operator noted the scaff board on the sw corner of the exhaust to be smouldering. On removal the board ignited and was extinguished using a fire ext.
Excessive vibrations noted by local worker, he informed ops control centre, on investigating he noted smoke and activated internal alarm, following this he discharged a dry
powder extinguisher contents to doose a flame from the drive end of the motor and associated pump. There was no release of pumped medium or damage to adjacent
equipment. Presumed drive end bearing failure was prime cause. Investigation underway and preventive action to be advised.
Welding 1" weldolet onto <...> crude oil line. Platform in total shutdown status, oil /gas free. Vapour from oil line. <...> line was water flushed to prepare for hot work - gas
test at location, hot water permit issued at site. When welding in progress sm ll flame noticed at penetration to <...> line at the weld site. Immediately extinguished and alarm
raised. No damage to personnel or equipment. Incident investigation in progress.
Technician investigating the reason for z-3150 gas compressor shutdown. On opening the modulee door he observed flames coming from ducting directlt above the turbine
acoustic housing. He contacted the control room for assistance and proceded to use a 1" h se reel to surpress the fire. The fire was extinguished shortly afterwards with support
from platform fire team.
Fire p/p p-7003 was under investigation due to heavy exhaust emissions. It had been test run on a couple of occasions without problems. On the last run shortly after the engine
was stopped, one of the work party saw flames from around the turbine blower. e immediately alerted the others in the party and extinguished the flames using a dp
extinguisher. A technician also ran out of 1" fire hose and used a small amount of water for cooling.
Fire caused by debris blowing off skip and lodging itself between turbine exhausts.
During weekly testing of platform fire pumps the operator noticed a build up of smoke in the room. He activated the deluge in the room manually. The diesel supply to the fire
pump was isolated. When the response team arrived at the scene the pump was s ill running erratically on residual fuel so the response team leader stopped the fire pump by
stalling it, the unit was cooled down, room cleared of smoke and all personnel returned to normal duties. On further investigation it appears that the clutch ov rheated
Whilst closing a circuit breaker there was 'flash over' resulting in damage to switchgear in adjacent area of concerned circuit board. No personnel sustained injuries due to this
incident.
A small explosion/fire occured inside housing on mol pump a. Localised damage to unit. Gpa on full muster, no injuries or subsequent damage.
G-8000 power generator was running on diesel fuel for approx. 7 hours. Fire detected in gas generator cell. Fire extnguished using one bank of halon
There was an indication of fire in the turbine enclosure for g8020. This resulted in a platform change of status and release of the fine water mist extinguishant system. On
opening the turbine enclosure doors a large amount of steam was observed to be pre ent within the enclosure. This was the result of the release of the fine water mist system
and the subsequent generation of flash steam. Once the enclosure cooled down initial examination indicated the following damage. Gas manifold discolouration between
burners 2 & 5. Blacking/sharring of the epoxy on the thermocouples. The connections on pigtails 5 & 6 only hand tight flexible on burners 6 & 13 full of diesel
At 03:50 hours, two gas detectors (ge10 and ge1) stuated at a low level, adjacent to the methanol storage tank in process level 2, went into alarm at 25% lel causing a gpa and
class 1 esd. The platfrm went to muster stations and the cause of the shutdown nd the cause of the shutdown investigated by the incident management team. The gas levels
cleared within a few minutes and following confirmation of a full muster at 04:15 and checks of the area utilising portable gas detectors, personnel were stood down t 04:18
Overflow of methanol during transfer from supply boat. The volume is estimated to approx 10l. The vapour from methanol spill triggered methanol detection sensor 10 gm 3/4,
hence process shut-down lasting 44 minutes.
Suddenly - without external disturbances - the shaft in the bottom of xv-q16-9 mapa butterfly valve on the linde a.6 nitrogen unit blew out. The grove for the retaining ring was
worn out and caused the r&t ring to slip, some n2 vented off (10 bar).
At 0100 a smoke detector in the oil sep module 4 came into alarm on inv it was discovered that the test separator c1004 had a jet of hydrocarbons leaking from it [contents of
leak crude, water, gas] the m4 panel operator immediately shutdown the test se arator to isolate it from production while this was happening another operator isolated the
source of the leak. A hole in the bottom spool to level switch] the platform gas detection picked up the release of gas placing the platform in yellow status the leak was
isolated and equipment made safe.
During the shutdown actions from a level 2a shutdown the auto diverter closed faster than the production wing valve which caused the pressure to rise rapidly. The graylock
coupling leaked during this pressure rise then ceased as the pressure decayed.
Drains tank overspilt into sea
Operator was passing through process area and heard hissing sound gas leak from. Well 3 tell tale hole between actuator and xmas tree. Shut in and isolated.
Person observed condesate and water dripping from well 2 flowline on a blank flange. Well closed in and isolated to effect repair
Failure of seals on hydraulic actuator - 100 l of <...> t5 oil lost to sea
Actuator stem seal failed on hydraulic actuator for valve releasing 75 l of <...> t15 hydraulic oil to surrounding deck
Gas release from stem of 8" valve. Unable to isolate valve initially, continued to vent. Deluge initiated. It took 4 hours to isolate the pipework and stop the release. Immediate
investigation due to the time it took to get the incident under control.
During routine prod ops loss of containment of natural gas occurred from a 2" dia line conveying flash gas from tops of condensate surge drums to the platform hp vent system
pressure in line was approx 6.2 barg process operator heard the sound of escaping gas located the source of the leak and isolated the line using manual block valves prod
process was then shut down in a controlled manner
Valve to the tree flange nuts were slackened and flange was seperated with a wedge - escape of gas from the flange.
At approx 10:15 a valve tech was walking by the condensate pumps on 23a cellar deck and noticed a smell of condensate. On review of the line it could be seen that the pipe
into a weldolet was weeping condensate. Following this discovery the condensate lin was isolated and depressured peding a repair procedure.
A pressure gauge attached to condensate export line which was in op blew off - resulted in a release of condensate water and monoethylene glycol - estimated btwn 50-100
gallons of liquid sprayed onto surrounding structure and pipework - pipe was immed i
Platform suffered main power failure as a result of relief valve to hp scrubber having lifted resultant effect was a liquid/foam flow from hp vent on <...> platform liquid foam
being mainly water and glycol with a very small percentage of condensate - platform was depressurised - all lines drained & vented
Diesel bunkering hose became entangled in <...>'s propeller and was completely severed - release of diesel fuel onto deck and into sea.
Compressor activator usually operated by instrument air. At 105psi the activator would not operate so nitrogen bottle was used to open it. The activator was overpressured by
the nitrogen bottle and blew - causing damage to discharge pipework on compresssor.
A very slight discolouration was noticed near the bridge,upon investig- tion it was found that a 1" vavle on a diesel fuel line has suffered corrossion to the body and has
resulted in a "pin-hole" leak
Gas release occurred when compressor blew down and psv outline line on adjacent compressor was open to atmosphere - full installation muster occurred
Gas leak detected on a fitting within turbine driver enclosure
Condensate lcv on the <...> separator ws found to be leaking from the valve body -- small hole discovered in body -- possibly caused by erosion -- valve isolated, removed and
changed out.
Vent valve moved off its sea from the closed position and partially opened was reset to closed position released gas passed thru normal vent system
Low level gas detection - leak found where psv had been removed. Change in wind direction caused backdrafting in vent system.
Modifications to flowline completed on a63. System filled with sea water and pressure tested successfully on bringing a 63 online . Gas escaped via sample point used during
pressure test.
Conducting routine ppms on lifeboat 6 (air craft pressure checks). Upon opening the first bottle there was a big bang and both regulators came loose from their holding
bracket.
Release of hydrocarbon gas during shutdown operations. System had been depressured flushed, purged and pipework opened, lazy gas migrated from oil separators in area 9 to
the production manifold on area 6b, which had a flange removed. An imbalance of pre sure between the two area hvac systems caused a flow of air through pipework deayubg
h/c gas out of the separators. Action taken to install suitable barriers (eg stopple bags) to ensure migration of gas could not occur.
Gpa acttivated by two gas heads at 24% momentarily. No obvious source of gas despite full investigation.
Hydraulic oil leaked from north crane engine compartment on to the mp turbine exhaust and ignited. Extinguished almost immediately by deck crew. No discernable damage
to exhaust, expansion joint/np injuries. Source of leak identified as hydraulic hose.
The safety officer was walking in module p05 when he noticed a gas smell and the presence of a small amount of condensate dripping from a flange, downstream of the
pressure control valve pv4171b (first stage separator gas outlet). The valve was isolated and the leak repaired.
New well <...> is being tested using the <...> burner booms. During the initial clean-up phase, slugs of water intermittently extinguished the flame, therefore carrying over
small quantities of unburnt condensate to the sea. This problem only occurred for a l mited period of time during which close monitoring of the spill was maintained and
adjustment of burners was made to avoid flame extinction. This incident resulted in a sheen (discolouration of the sea) of approx. 30m by 150m, ie less than 1bbl. Wind speed
7 knots, dir. 210 deg. Wave height 1.4m
Small condensate leak from grease nipple valve. Nipple regreased and exercised leak sealed no spill to enviroment
The water outlet valve of the first stage separator failed to close during an unplanned shutdown. This allowed oil into the water treatment plant in excess of treatment capacity
for a period of 14 minutes. Initial quantity underestimated, calculations now show quantity to be 21 barrels of light crude. Investigation shows valve struck between
auto/manual mode. Repairs now made. Checks of other similar valves ongoing.
Construction work ongoing on lp plate separator vessel c402 "vapour" noticed emanating from 2" flushing point. Investigation shows origin was back pressure from closed
drains drum system created durning a coincident plant shutdown. "vapor" considered to b hydrocarbon/air mix. No fixed or local portable gas detector activated.
Level control valve on water side failed to close fully (10% open). This was in normal operation mode. Excess oil allowed into water treatment plant which could not cope.
Spill occurred from sea caisson. Maintenance investigation of fault ongoing.
During pressure testing on control line for dhsv the c77 valve came off the multibowl "graylock" clamp. Pressure at time was approx. 8000psi. The four allen screw type bolts
had failed. These will be subject to analysis. (hse onboard at time. Site made available for inspection by messrs <...>)
Bleeding down pressure in 13.3/8" annulus of well d15 on the connected dunbar platform. This allowed a slug of 1.6 sg liquid into the pipeline which could not be handled in
the alwyn water treatment plant. A new procedure is being developed.
An upset caused by a slug arriving in inlet separator led to loss of level in water led to loss of level in water side of main treatment vessel. This in turn resulted in oily water
treatment plant failing to cope with consequent release to the sea.
During normal production operations, minor gas leak detected from a flange on lt 25995b on the <...> separator [c111] located on po4 weather deck. <...> production shutdown,
separator depressurised and valves isolated. Face of valve flange re-dressed an after leak testing etc plant re-started.
Metal fatigue of connection on pressure transducer resulted in a gas leak inside the turbine enclosure of generator p801b. Generator was not running at time of incident. All
other similar equipment on generators to be inspected and checked.
An operator attempted to hammer open a 2" <...> union on chickson which was under 400b pressure. The resulting leak brought 5 gas detectors into low level alarm.
Immediate response from supervisor and drilling personnel ensured inventory safely vented of . Initial investigations indicate a breakdown of communication and inexperience
of personnel. A full investigation is ongoing, including a cause free analysis.
Ops tech noticed diesel mist emanating from hood of b gt. Machine was shut down & fuel oil isolated. Weather at time: wind 8 - 10 knots machine in question: egt gas turbine.
Diesel was contained within turbine enclosure.
Normal production operations were in progress at time of incident – nightshift production supervisor was in process of routine walk about when he noticed a gas leak coming
from the top of the gas metering house closer investigation showed that the leak wa coming from the area of a 2" isolation valve on supply side of chromatographs. The
supervisor immediately isolated the skid and vented inventory to flare. Conditions at time were dry with very slight wind. Product was produced gas.
During routine plant checks an operator observed a small gas leak from the body bleed plug of a grove isolation valve on the hp 1 section of the gas compressor. The leak was
monitored whilst preparation for gas plant shutdown were made. At all times leak as determined to be a wisp of gas in an open ventilated module and not of sufficient
magnitude to be detectable by gas monitors. The gas plant was shutdown in a controlled manner and the body bleed plug was removed and replaced. The failed component was
f und to be seized and full of rust particles.
Steady oil and gas production. During platform tour, a build up of ice and wisp of hydrocarbon gas vapour was observed from the body bleed of a valve (manufacturer grove).
The valve is on the bypass line of the gas reinjection compressor cooler. Valve is n open module location, weather at time, wind 15-18kts leak was such that it was not enough
to be picked up by any area detectors. Leak was monitored while the reinjection compressor was shut down, plant depressured and valve isolated.
Normal production operations were in place at the time of the incident. Ops assistant was making a tour of his area when he spotted oil leaking from a 1.5" class 1500 flange on
the pipeline side of the flowline instrument pressure sensing device. The ops ssistant immediately informed the control room technician who closed the well in and
depressured the line. Contents of the leak eqate to approximately 3-4 litres of crude oil. Due to the deck being plated in that area, there was no release to sea. Flow li e isolated
depressured and flushed.
During routine bop test following installation of 13 3/8" casing - leak on kill line was observed – well was in a safe con with all tested barriers in place - lmrp was retrieved and
leak fixed – damaged o ring seal was thought to be cause of leak - riser joint was changed out
While the mechanical technician was walking past p8105 export pump he noticed there was a leak from the dart union of the seal flush line. The pump was not in use, so he
pushed in the local stop button, called the control room and informed the operator, then proceded to close the manual suction and discharge valves. The operator informed the
<...> control room that p8105 was unavailable due to a seal leak. The mechanical technician depressured the pump to closed drain to prevent any further leakage,then
proceeded to raise a permit to repair the leak while in the process of preparing the paperwork and isolations, the platform went into a shutdown with loss of power generation.
On regaining emergency power it was required to reduce the levels in the separators, to prevent liquid carryover to the fuel gas system, prior to starting the main generators.
P8105 was tried but kept tripping, so <...> control room operator then tried another pump, the instruction about p8105 prior to the shutdown was overlooked and they opened
the pneumatic suction valve xv8105 on p8105, giving a release of fine hydrocarbon mist, caused by the trapped pressure between the actuated valve and the manual valve,
from the dart union on the seal flush line, which activated the gas alarm, due to the close proximity of a gas detector to the pump. Personnel were mustered and the fast
Having completed the setting and testing of a 4.5" petroline plug, at approximatley 52' below the swab valve, as part of the well workover programme for t05. The wireline
lubricator was then drained to the process closed drains. As the drain manifold was approximately 3' from the bottom of the riser,a small volume remained. To clear any
residual hydrocarbons from the riser, the riser partially filled with water and again drained down to the closed drains. After checking the bleed valve on the manifold an not
getting any fluid release, the riser was undone and lifted clear of the tree, with the remaining fluid in the riser, a mix of water and hydrocarbons being released and falling to the
lower level of the wellheads. As a result of this, two gas heads i the vicinity of t05 registered low level gas and the platform gas alarm was activated. This was the second and
final plug to be set, the first having been set and tested, with the tubing then being circulated to water injection quality sea water. The pro edure for circulating out future wells
is to be reviewed. A provision for bleeding down the lubricator and riser is to be incorporated in future kill wing rig up's, with the type of vavle changed form needle valves to
ball valves. Type of valve changed f om needle valves to ball valves.
The fire and gas alarm was automatically activated at 08.02 on <...>. The deluge in process area <...> level 1 was automatically released. The cause of the alarm was
"confirmed gas" in the analyser house initiated by 2 gas detectors gp001 and gp002 locate inside the analyser house personnel working directly in the area were <...>
instrument tech and metering vendor <...>. The work in progress was calibration of transmitters for gas metering. The confirmed gas was caused when the instrument techni ian
opened up the transmitter hood in preparation for calibrating the transmitters. The hood is of a sealed type and it was determined that due to a minor leak on either instrument
pipework or the valves within the hood gas pressure was held inside the ho d. Once the hood was raised the gas entered the room and came into contact with the 2 gas detectors
At 23:40 hrs on <...> a platform level d with blowdown was auto initiated due to gp030 located in fire zone ab (level 1 process area) going into 60% lel, this initiated a
platform level d with blowdown and initiation of level 1 process area deluge a d platform gpa. While monitoring the fire zone in the icss it was apparent via the migration of
the gas path as indicated on the surrounding gas detectors in this area, that the alarm was genuine and all subsequent actions and incident response determined with this in
mind
Well a6 on line, mist cloud on xmas tree observed by operator. Cloud determined as gas/condensate wingvalve shut and leak stopped. Leak was insufficient to trigger gas
detectors. Xmas tree inspected leak found to eminate from grease nipple on wing valv bonnet. <...> engineer mobilised well depressured above sssv. Grease point changed
out and well returned to service
20% lel indication in process area level 1 from single gas detector. 60% lel indication in process area level 2 from single gas detector. In production from wells a1-a6 inclusive.
Gas compressors shutdown on process trip & gas venting to flare via vent s stem. Level d esd initiated automatically with b. Down and deluge release. Complex muster carried.
Initial indications show downstream of psv a body plug has become uinscrewed ojn low pressure side (mp sep area) psv internal seal failure allowing back pre sure gas from
vent system to communicate into domw section of psv & vent to atmosphere. (see attach)
The night shift elec person was walking between the sack store and u5 engine room on the upper walkway when he heard a screeching noise coming form the feul gas module
area. The screeching noise was intermittent, so he went down to the module where the n ise appeared to be louder. Nothing was obvious and being on his own and not fully
conversant with the feul, gas skid made his way to the control room and reported his observations to the control room operator. The lower level of the feul gas skid was in
pected and nothing found. There are two vertical ladders positioned between the gas compressure and surge drum the techs split up to inspect both areas. The screeching was
coming from the suction pressure control valve. A small leak was detected between the flange faces.
Routine vibration checks were being carried out on the emergency generator,p855 and p860 fire pumps. On starting p855 water was noticed to be leaking from a tapping point
on the fire main above p860. P860 was then started and p855 stopped. Two ops tech were investigating the leak when it was decided to shut down the fire pump. Before they
were able to do this the tapping point blew out and the water jet sprayed over mcc4. One tech mechanically isolated that section of the fire main while the other th c went to
the control room to shut down the emergency generator. There were thhen three loud bangs and flame was seen to be coming from mcc4. One of the techs operated the fuel
emergency shut off valve for the emergancy generatorwhich was attempting to estart, while the other thec attempted to extinguish the fire with a co2 extinguisher. At this time
a gpa was operated and the platform put into red status. The smoke from the fire increased and both tech withdrew from the area and handed over to two of the fire team who
were wearing b.a. they entered the module and extinguished the fire with co2 extinguishers. The area was then ventilated.
At 17.04 hrs an sps and red status was automatically initiated, by coincident high level gas heads adjacent to process closed drains break drum v5060. Almost immediately
gas levels indicated in the control room began falling and when two technicians arr ved at the scene no gas was evident at 17.15 hrs the platform was returned to green normal
status and drilling operations resumed, ( the well has been closed in on red process operations were resumed as investigations proceeded.
On changing out prod wells from test train to main train in the wellhead area, the prod snr operator observed a fine spray of hydrocarbon gas/ fluids coming from well <...>.
The control room was informed and this well was closed in. On further inv a pin ole leak was found on the welded bend of the drain, upstream of the drain's isolation valves.
During <...> workover, drilling were pumping down tubing/annulus to pressure test wireline plug. Returns were to be monitored from 9 5/8 annulus. The assistant driller lined
up from the 9 5/8 annulus up to the choke manifold and through to the trip tank pumping commenced at 1/2 bbl/min. Whilst pumping, the wireline operator took a bind on the
p.o.p. and then sheared off which confirmed the p.o.p. was set. The night shift driller then increased the pump rate up to 3 bbls/min and the pressure increased to 00 psi. The
day shift driller checked to see if there were returns at the trip tank but there were none. The <...> platform superintendent was informed by the control room that a fluid
spillage had been reported from the well heads by the ops co-ord the latform supt. Immediately called the driller on the rig floor to close down the pumps and to investigate
where the spillage had come from he reported that the splitter valve on the choke manifold was open, allowing the fluids to flow to the choke line, lo ated in the bop room
which was open ended. The pumps were on for 1 minute at 3 bbls/min from pressure increase until shutdown. The <...> supt. Informed the <...> rep who in turn contacted the
oim, otl, safety officer and logistics supervisor who then inform d the standby vessel of a small fluid spillage of contaminated tsw. The oim initiated incident control procedure
Normal process/flowline operations ongoing when bubbles were observe in the water north of the platform - nne from the birch caission - a sheen of approx 50 mtrs broad was
drifting 500 mtrs nne of the platform. Oim instruced shutdown of birch production at approx 15:50. Once shutdown, bubbles started to reduce considerably wind speed was
approx. 30k at time of observation from 197o.
Normal production operations ongoing when a crude and gas release occurred due to a flange parting in a drain line on the inlet side of crude cooler. The gpa was sounded and
all personnel mustered at emergency muster stations.
During normal production operations, a mechanical technician was tasked with going to 'a' rr turbine enclosure to investigate vibration. On his arrival at the unit he entered to
carry out the work and was faced with a "glow" from the unit and when he loo ed closer could see flames. He closed the door after exiting and advised a production operator
who manually discharged the halon extinguishing medium. The gpa was sounded by the ccr and all personnel went to emergency muster stations. The emergency respo se
team, were deployed and mustered at an area close to the scene after which they investigated the scene and confirmed the fire extinguished and area safe. Investigation revealed
that the root cause of the problem was loss of integrity of the air oil sea between the compressor and the power turbine. This had been replaced in 95 but no locking washers
had been picked. The high vibrations and lack of locking washers resulted in the retaining bolts backing off and subsequent oil mist from the hot gas and ignition.
Ngl release in mod b from <...> sampler. No activity with equipment at the time of the event. Fracture of stainless tubing by swegelok fitting on air driven pump caused
release of ngl in general area. Sequence of gas heads (5 in total) lead to automa ed action - level 2 shutdown and depressurisation. Full gpa and operator isolation sampler has
been stripped, modified and rebuilt – pressure tested and commissioned.
Preparations were being made for a shut down of the test separator within module 03 mezz level: whilst checking the sandwash drain line to ensure it was clear and obstruction
free, the production operator opened the drain line block valve. He immediately heard a flow through the system. He checked the test sep. Sand wash drain valves and found
one he suspected was passing. He then attempted to close the block valve but encountered difficulty. At this point a section of the drain line failed, discharging water and gas
mist under pressure into the module. This resulted in a manual level shutdown followed by an automatic level shutdown. The gpa was sounded, personnel were called to their
primary muster points.
Whilst carrying out work to recommission the test separator, following a shut down and maintenance/ cleaning work on the vessel, a release of gas within the crude inlet line
occurred, activating 2 x adjacent gas detectors. This incident took place whilst personnel were removing a spade from a flange within the system. The system was isolated,
depressured and was thought to be gas free. When the flange was slackened off, the entrapped gas was released, it was not a continuous flow and dissipated very rapi ly.
Subsequent preliminary investigations confirm the system remained isloated. A mouk incident investigation has been initiated to determine the cause of the gas presence within
the line.
Enclosed module: lighting good: normal production operations. During normal productions operations, a hydrocarbon release occurred when pipework failed at 4" spool to
psvs 0775/0776 on the inlet of recycle cooler 'ex 0104x'. This resulted in a discharge of condensate within the module and subsequent release of gas. A number of the module
gas heads were brought into alarm by gas presence. Platform personnel were called to their primary muster stations by the general platform alarm and a level 3 shutdown
initiated.
Pinhole leak developed on 8" pl 42054 a3384ax line from test manifold to test separator, resulting in a minor loss of containment of hydrocarbons into the module.
Normal production operations. Gas head (g262051) indicated low gas level in rpm module level 2, monitor screens in pcr checked and no othr gas heads in the area were in
alarm but showed that gd262051 had been fluctuating.
Normal operations, clear evening with little wind, gas head gd 262051 indicated low level gas 27% lel in rpm module level 2 mezz. The screens were monitored in the control
room, no other heads were in alarm but gd 262011 and gd 262021 were fluctuating bet een 0% and 15% two technicians were sent to investigate. Initially no reading of gas
was indicated in the area but there was still fluctuation on the control room monitors. The technicians made a detailed search on the lp compressor level 2 and found
localised area where gas was being detected on their meter. The shift supervisors days and nights joined the technicians at the area and continued to search to pinpoint the
leak. After checking the pipework a leak was found on 2nd stage discharge sp ol. The compressor was manually shutdown, vented and isolated.
The platform went to alarm status after confirmed low level gas in m3e weellhead area. This was followed with confirmed high level gas in the same area. The platform went
into automatic shutdown and process blowdown, followed by power shutdown. Investi ation showed that the alarms were caused by a hydrocarbon leak from a hole in the
flowline on well <...>. Initial investigations point to this hole being caused bt sand erosion. The investigation continues.
This was a day shift cable splice area. The permit to work for day shift was signed over for night shift as fall back work. Nightshift looked at it but as cable no.s were not right
it was left for dayshift. The temporary floodlight in the confined area ov rheated and being held in plastic it fell on to the cables and set fire to them. This was detected by the
operations team and the fire was quickly extinguished.
Drained overflowed & 0.3 tonnes of oil spilled into sea.
After greasing sealing ring on a closed 12" ball valve with a hp grease gun gun was depressurised and internal non return valve within grease nipple sealed correctly grease gun
connection adaptor was then removed from nipple and within a few secs internal non return valve failed to seal allowing gas to be released. As a precaution a platform ga was
manually initiated and the valve and pipework was manually depressurised via vent system - duration of leak was less than 2 mins via a 3 mm hole
While carrying out pt train 2 fuel gas skid warm up procedures, operator observed small gas leak from welded joint on pipework. Pipework immediately blocked and vented,
affected section left isolated and depressurised.
On first test run of turbine (egt tb 5000) after major service by vendors, fuel gas leaked from this flanged joint of the main gas regulator inside this turbine enclosure. The joint
was found to be defective. Gas leak was detected immediately and isolated no leak test of this part of the system had been carried out after the service. A risk assessment has
been carried out for the first run of a turbine after service highlighting the requirement for a nitrogen leak test of the gas fuel system to be carried out
At approximately 07:15hrs whilst carrying out a routine backwash of the hydrocyclone (as per operational procedure), a pin hole leak was noticed from the base of the body of
pcv 3701, the reject ratio control valve. Approximately 10 litres of produced wat r was released before the line was closed in. To prevent recurrence the valve type is to be
reassessed. Suspect that corrosion was the cause of failure. Valve was replaced with same make until reassessment has been completed.
During routine preparation of plant for start up the wing valves were opened in readiness to start flowing wells. A small amount of gas leaked from the choke valves on slots
<...> & <...>. Hydraulic wing valves on both wells were closed and flowlines depressurised.
The fire and gas system detected gas on several heads located in module 2 lower and a shutdown of production and vessel depressurisation was initiated automatically. Muster
alarm sounded. After an initial spread of gas in the module indicated on the fir and gas panel, the gas levels rapidly reduced due to automatic blowdown of the equipment. At
the start of the incident operational inhibits were in place but these were removed immediately to allow automatic fire and gas functions. The cause of the rel ase was found to
be a fractured instrument tube on the export compressor discharge header, probable fatigue due to compressor vibration. Replacement works and inspection of similar
installation undertaken.
During a period when the plant was shutdown but still under pressure and awaiting startup it was found that a grease nipple on a tk valve on the no 25 flowline/manifold was
leaking a gas/oil mist. On finding the leak, the header was immediately depressuri ed and a new grease nipple was fitted. The leak was not picked up by the f&g system, the
whole operation took no more than 10 minutes.
Galley referigeration unit freon r502 leaked to atmosphere. Approx 1kg of gas was lost over a period of time, several weeks. No personnel injured as a result.
While bleeding down slot 12 annulus to flare via fixed pipework – continuous sampling for fluid returns were being carried out via needle valve on tree cap. A hydrate formed
in the needle valve, pressure built up behind hydrate & then released to atmosphe e when ice plug broke down production operators informed ccr via 333 call to close in well.
Muster alarm sounded manually from ccr while incident was being investigated. Approx 5m3 gas released in open module dispersed to atmosphere.
Platform experienced an sd2 shutdown. The grease nipple on slot 23 top isolation valve to test separator header started to leak oil & gas. The hydraulic wing valve on slot 23
had already closed, the bottom isolation valve off the test header was also clos d along with the manual wing valve on slot 23. The oil/gas leak quickly stopped.
Crude pump 'c' was online following plant startup. Approx 1 hr after startup whilst carrying out routne check, an operator noticed a slight gas/oil vapour leak at pump seal. He
reported this to his supervisor. The pump was then inspected & shutdown for repair.
During routine check by night shift operator a diesel spill of approx 6 tonns was disc on pa cellar deck leak was caused by an overflow from aux generator day tank initial inv
indicates a manually operates valve left in open position
During a major overhall of the west crane ca-a-7510 it was necessary to empty the diesel fuel tank. The low point drain was found to be blocked and to progress the work an
attempt to use the bottom plug was made. During the activity the plug was unscrew d fully and diesel was spilled down the crane pedestal having missed the catchment tray
being used. A flash fire subsequently occurred on the hot turbine exhaust adjecent to the crane pedestal. The fire was extinguished by the work party assisted by a m mber of
the response team. Diesel tank contents at time approximately 50 litres, spillage estimate 0.5-1.0 litre.
Main oil line pump p3070 being started on diesel fuel, engine appeared to start normally. After 8 minutes of running an ir detector inside the engine clousure alarmed in the
main control room 1 indicating fire. Area tevhnician advised, went to investigate and confirmed fire and proceeded to push emergency shutdown botton. A second ir detector
picked up the fire and the platform hazard alarm sounded. All personnel commenced mustering. Emergency responce perdonnel extinguished on the outside of the engine to
power turbine transition piece heat sheild using portable co2 extinguisher. Fiixed halon systems available but decided not necessary to use. Diesel and gas fuel supplies
isolated, power supply isolated and fire dampers all closed no further signs of fire ut smoke in both turbine hall and inside engine enclouser. After a period of time when it was
considered unlikly that fire could reignite the area was vented by opening the doors, then entered the emergency support team in ba sets to confirm area clear of fire. Ventilation
dampers reopened and fans started. Fire caused by ignition of some burners while diesel fuel from the unlit burner poured into the transition cone and then eventually ignited.
Whilst investigating hydraulic problems on the west crane one and a half bukets of hydraulic oil were drained from hydraulic system. The oil was manhandled down from the
crane to the pedestal platform below and was decanted into a 45 gallon drum. A funnel was not initially used and as a result oil was caught by the wind and sprayed onto the
gas turbine exhausts below where it caught fire. Immediately the fire was seen a gpa was initiated and the fire was extinguished.
Viscous chemical being pumped for process trial. Direct from chemical drum. Suction head maintained and air ingress excluded by the introduction of nitrogen.
Overpessurisation of drum caused rupture and loss of containment of chemical. Chemical loss contained within dedicated bund area.
Minor fire from instrument impulse line, gas leak ignited by faulty trace heating tape platform fire and gas system detected, plant shutdow and depressurised, deluge auto
activated and fire extinguished.
At approx 0800 hrs on <...> during an intervention visit to davy a small gas leak was detected from wellhead of well a2 platform was s/d but not vented, at the time due to a
psd condition attributable to low pressure in assoc well hydraulic unit - flo line pressure at this time was 150 barg. Leak was initially detected audibly which was poss because
of the fact that cons were particularly quiet due to s/d cons installation topsides are arranged to be of open construction, as far as reasonably practicab e - decks are grated and
there are no windwalls open const provides max practicable dispersion of any leaking gas, by natural vent initial invs suggested that leak was emanating from speed clamp or a
body plug above clamp - it was not poss to determine ex ct cause at this time due to wind cons during the inv it was found that the leak from the body plug stopped as the shut
in well pressure increased - this has been attributed to the fact that seal afforded by the ball and spring arrangement in the body plu is assisted by higher differential pressure,
aiding ability to seal - well was therefore left shut in with no evident leak and platform demanned overnight further inv was carried out on platform the next day and root cause
of leak was established as body plug.
Commision work ongoing on diesel / gas generators. In engine room flexi hoses to engine were disconected due to preperation of pressure test of same. Hp fuel gas system in
shutdown mode, all ebv's fail safe open and vent for flare open. Detected gas in an ulus on fuel gas lines to engine 1c and 2c. Gas for flare system was pressured back through
ebv's on fuel gas stamd.
During cargo offloading operation a bang was heard by the bosun. He found a leak at a viking johnson coupling aft of the turbet. He called to shut down the transfer pump.
Cargo transfer operation was suspended. At 1210 the general alarm was sounded. L aks discovered at the metering skid on stream / fcv and prover inert valve from stream 3.
Approx 50l of crude oil spilled over board.
While disconnectng the empty propane tank, gas was observed passing out of the hose end of the quick connector the operator immedately re-made the connection but the gas
detection system had already picked up and this resuiled in a pesd
Weather conditions – light winds (n). At 05:40, <...>, the condensate reinjection pump, ddp32005 'b' was on line reinjecting condensate downhole. There was a sudden release
of condensate & associated gas on the north side of the <...> collar deck. This was detected by 5 flammible gas detectors ans as a result an automatic esd (level a) occured
accompanied by the general platform alarm. <...> personnel mustered in the <...> t.r. <...> personnel withdrew from <...>. The source of the leak was identified by emergency
response personnel, as coming from the psv 32009 ('b' condensate reinjection pump discharge) pilot assembly body. The equipment was isolated and depressured by emergency
response and production personnel wearing b.a. allpersonnel were stood d wn from muster at 06:35hrs <...>. The psv will be removed for full strip down investigation. Both
condensate reinjection units remain isolated
During prep ops leading up to platform based proppant fracture of well a plume of liquid was sprayed into atmosphere when a lubricator was uncoupled to repair leaking joint -
plume fortunately contained mainly seawater from immed prced tasks
Gas turbine - flame detection in end. Platform shutdown. Co2 used. 17:36 – extinguished. Platform mustered. 17:36 muster stood down. Minor damage. Field sgut-down for
fortnight. Brought on today. Running b up on gas - 3/4 hour on load. Ignition of diesel is lagging.
Gas detected, cellar decks - 3 gas alarms, muster continued, isolation spade taken out, from <…> associated gas line. Loss of power has caused venting.
Minor gas leak detected by two flammable gas heads on <…> cellar deck adjacent to well d8 during workover on well d8. Personnel sent to muster stations until leak
identified, source shut off and area gas free. Leak found on pipework to closed drains that h d been disconnected and isolated for the workover. Isolation procedures were
found to have been followed but the application of the isolation to the valve was not carried out efficiently. Determined that valve had possibly been knocked open during
workover.
Hydrocarbon leak on production choke. Well had been shut in for heavy lift operation and on restart the choke which had originally been 'weeping' developed a leak. Well tech
informed control to close in well while he depressurised section of piping to clo ed drain system. Choke was subsequently changed out and well brought back on line without
problem.
A sealant injection fitting failed, ie fitting broke off on xev 30056 <...> production riser esd valve resulting in a release of hydrocarbon fluid to atmosphere.
Perished o ring on in line stainer of main fuel transfer system gave way allowing release of 150 ltrs of aviation fuel to the bund and overboard.
Normal production operations slight smell og gas in vicinity of 'b' injection machine. Leak noticed on 3rd stage oil trap vx0215d seal oil sight glass joint. Sight glass joint
failed, releasing gas/oil into immediate vicinity. Remedial actions 1. Confi m type/thickness of gasket with manufacturer. 2. Remove all other gasket types and retorque on
line. 3. Isolate sight level glasses on sour seal pots. 4. Develop smp for repairs to sign glasses. 5. Reinforce handover and disturbed joint procedure at safety briefs.
<...> oil process had previously been on annual shutdown, but was restarted 3 days before the incident and was producing normally at the time. A jet of oil and gas was found
to be coming out of the production separator sight glass drain valve. A low level gas alarm was activated at 0657hrs but no action was taken until the leak was observed by a
general assistant who was passing that area at 0730hrs. The valve was closed as soon as it was found but there was a large pool of oil of approx 40-m2 on the deck late. The oil
was running into the open hazardous drain gulley but as the strainer was partially blocked the level in the gulley increased to a point where it overflowed to the storm drain
pipework and into the sea. Some of the spray from the leak was als going directly into the sea. It is estimated that the total leak was 150 litres, of which 30 litres reached the
sea. The pressure in the separator at the time of the incident was 14 barg. It was not necessary to bring personnel to muster stations as the as dispersed immediately when the
valve was closed. The sight glass drain consists of a one inch ball valve and a half inch needle valve in series. Both valves were found open. It is thought that they had been
open since start-up but had been plugged with sediment/wax until the incident.
The plaform was in normal production operations. One of the two pumps from t71 open drains tank was pumping out routinely (on an automatic cycle) when an alarm (g223)
indicated low gas in the vicinity of the pump followed 3 seconds later by a high gas, au omatically activating the platform yellow shutdown. Two adjacent gas heads also
indicated low levels of gas in the area. The shift leader was in the central control room at the time of the incident and advised the control room operator that he suspected h
knew what the problem was. He then went directly to the site and within 2 minutes of the shutdown had verified the cause as a failure of the labour pump discharge hose. At
this point there was no further leakage of gas into the package. Fluids released w re predominantly water, but with c. 5% hydrocarbons and residual gas. The failure appears to
be attributable to mechanical damage to the 3" hose, a <...> type fitted with cl. 150 connections. Mechanical handling work had been taking place in the area the previous day
and it may have contributed to this failure. This is the subject of an ongoing investigation. Hse duty advisor informed at 14:45
Whilst in routine operation, an operator found a spray of liquid coming from the water outlet of v01 bulk separator just downstream of the vessel nozzle. Gas was not picked
up on the site decectors. A small hole was found on the first weld downstream o the flange. The liquid escaping was predominantly produced water with evolving natural gas.
The separator was closed in and depressurised and repairs are under way to the produced water pipework at present.
Oil was seen coming from the direction of the flare stack by one of the drill crew. Identified later as crude, the oil had dropped onto the sw corner of the moving pipe deck,
head of nw crane and nw corner of level 6 of the dgl. On investigating, it was ound that a production tech. Had inadvertently styood on an isolation valve to the maintenance
vent line. He immediately closed the valve to stop further loss of containment.
Very slight weep was seen at the 2" weldolet weld connection onto an 8" water outlet line from v1756. The 2" line was the backflush water supply line for the unit. The unit
was locally isolated, no interruption to process was experienced, as a spare unit as brought on line. Weld weep was spotted by an operator on walk-about who immediately
notified his supervisor and isolated the unit. The units themselves take produced water from the base of the separators and strip out the remaining amount of oil from t e water,
before the water passes through a further vessel for de-gassing before being dumped overboard. The units are housed in a naturally vented module.
A brass plug blew out of the duplex lube - 400 gas turbine. The brass plugs are fitted from the filter following lube oil filling. The oil had been modified for some years such
that the are not used for that purpose the mods a mild steel plug has been fit ed for the in order to prevent the plug from blowing out in the manner as experienced with the
brass plug fitted to it on the inside of the filter lid.
Drainage of water from off line production separator (v01) down to the closed drain (v45) had taken place. The oily water from v45 had been pumped to an online separator
(v02) via a 2" cladded line. Oily water spatter was spotted on adjacent pipework duri g a routine visit to the area. The line was isolated and the cladding removed. A 2mm hole
was found at a bend in the 2" line.
A pre-perforation logging tool run on the main bore of dual lateral well 1-2 was in progress. Whilst running the toolstring into the well the grease injection presure was
apparently lost to the stuffing box system. Dead crude oil returns subsequently bled through the grease return line hose. A small volume of crude was spilled onto the rigfloor
and onto the bop deck beneath.
During routine production operations, a pinhole weep was discovered on a 1" drain stub by the export flow control valve - crude oil was observed to be frothing on the surface
of the pipe. The pressure in the line was lowered and on dropping the pressure, he leak stopped. The platform is about to enter a 16 day shutdown and a controlled shutdown of
the facilities to remove all hydrocarbons from the topsides was initiated immediately - this is ongoing at present. A continuous firewatch has been placed on th line until the
shutdown sequence is complete.
The platform had been shutdown for major maintenance and construction activity for 12 days. Open drains had been covered with a tarpaulin sheet for those activities in that
area. Open drains tundish loot seals are topped up with water in that area by a co tinuously running water supply. At the supply line for this top up water a further offtake can be
used to supply wash down water. During the isolation of the wash down water supply, the supply to the loot seal was incorrectly isolated - impossible to find out at what time.
Over a period the water in the loot had evaporated allowing a small amount of gas to be liberated from the drains tank residual oil and migrate up the empty loot. Gas detectors
in the immediate vicinity detected the gas. All work was sto ped and all personnel were called to muster. Production operators were working in the area, immediately realised
the problem and corrected the situation. Internal investigation to determine causes and make recommendations to prevent recurrence was organised.
At 0300 the electric power generator gt2 tripped on high exhaust temperature. When the generator was restarted at 0320 it would not take the normal load, and started
"backing off". Gt2 was then manually shutdown remotely. The investigating technician n ticed diesel spraying out of the 3/4" diesel fuel line inside the turbine enclosure. He
isolated and stopped the leak from outside the enclosure. As a precautionary measure the on-duty fire team and portions of the emergency team were activated. <...> control
room (on scene command centre) was alerted. Supervisors and the fire/safety officer investigated the site and the incident was closed at approx. 0430. A <...> announcement
was made on the platform at 0700 for information purposes. Approx. 300 gallons of diesel were collected in the closed drain system. The likely cause of failure of the 3/4"
diesel fuel line at a weld near a union joint.
Release of diesel fuel during normal running of equipment, from a pressure gauge on the discharge side of the diesel fuel supply to the combustion chambers. Oil was seen
running out of the fitting. The machine was manually taken off line.
We had a diesel leak in gt2, an electric generator turbine. Remote sensors picked up a diesel mist inside the halon protected turbine enclosure. The turbine was stopped and the
leak isolated from outside the enclosure. Approximately 40 gallons of diesel w re collected in the closed drain system. The likely cause initially looks like a failure of the 3/4"
diesel fuel line at a weld near a union connected to the diesel filter. This failure and incident appear to be similar to an occurrence <...>. Area has een isolated, investigation
team set-up.
Gas above the control action level was detected at t single gas detector which caused an automatic platform yellow shutdown. The level dropped off again within a few
seconds. A small rise in gas concentration was detected at a beam detector downwind toe g s head. Annulus venting had been completed in the eggbox next to the gas detector a
short time prior to the shutdown. Gas heads in the eggbox had been inhibited to allow this routine activity to be acrried out. The detector which tripped is not known to b
affected by annulus venting and was therefore not inhibited. Detailed investigations have failed to reveal any other potential source of hydrocarbons in the area and no gas has
been detected since the incident. The detector has been proven operational. F rther investigations are ongoing, but it is thought unlikely that any further information will be
obtained.
Technician working on the ngl roof smelt gas and contacted the operator. Gas was found to be leaking out of daniel orifice box connected to the discharge piping from an ngl
compressor. Early indications are this box was not tightened shut. The leak was mall enough not to be picked up by the beam detectors some ten feet away. All hot work
permits were withdrawn. The site was investigated, and the daniel box tightened up and rechecked for leaks. Infra red sensor was checked and confirmed to be in workin
condition. Incident investigation initiated.
Technician working on 66 ft. Level and faintly heard gas. He informed the operator. The site was investigated. A union coupling on the 1" closed drain system was leaking
gas. All hot work permits were withdrawn. The leak was isolated and the piping co nection tightened, stopping the leak. Incident investigation initiated.
During re-start of the ngl a small condensate leak gassing off from the bonnet of a 3/4" drain valve was discovered by the operator. Local gas detectors did not register the
leak. Local isolations did not stop the leak so the ngl plant was shutdown and he leaking valve and associated pipework removed (blanks fitted until repair complete).
An operations technician whilst carrying out normal watch keeping duties discovered a fine spray release of diesel fuel from the turbine drive to p04 mol pump. Following
manual shutdown and isolation of the turbine fuel systems it was found that a defect ve lip seal in the diesel fuel valve was the source of the leak. It is estimated that less than
10 litres of diesel was released. No fire and gas functions took place.
Operator in ngl plant could smell gas in the area of v06 (hp gas scrubber) level transmitter drain valve. On inspection a small gas leak was discovered coming from the bonnet
joint of the 3/4" drain valve. The ngl was shutdown manually, the system purged nd the valve removed. On inspection a small erosion path was discovered between the valve
body and bonnet seal faces. To prevent a similar incident all other valves of this type used on this system are to be checked using scar radiography. Valve to be sen to beach to
identify the corrosion mechanism. <...> circulated to other platforms.
While running in hole with a wire line bailer tool string a small gas and oil release occurred from the lubricator stuffing box gland. The well was closed in on the blind ram
bop and the lubricator depressurised the hydrocarbon release was minimal and co tained quickly by the wireline team, oil contaminated the top part of the lubricator and the
moving pipe deck head above the lubricator but did not reach the bop deck level. It did not activate the fire and gas detection system. Hot work permits were imme iately
withdrawn. Immediated assessment was the situation had been controlled at source. Once the well was closed in and safe the situation was 'risk assessed' and a course of
remedial actions developed to effect a repair to the gland and recover the tool string and wire. An investigation of the failure mode of the gland packing will be carried out
when the tool string and wire has been recovered.
A joint failed on the fuel gas demister of p06 which allowed gas to escape inside the hood. High gas alarm activated and the turbine was shut down and fuel gas isolated.
Auxiliary diesel generator j06 was being run up for its weekly test run to check performance. Engine was left running to warm through and cjecked after approx. 30 mins.
Found running satisfactory. Two minutes later on return of the technician to carry o t the running logs he found a fine spray of diesel fuel escaping from the fuel oil reservoir
onto the engine. The engine was immediately shut down and the leak isolated. He spillage was mopped up using absorbent pads, none of the spillage was outside the vicinity
of the engine bay. Total spillage estimated at circa 1 litre of diesel fuel.
The ac lubricating oil pump bypass hose ruptured on compressor ko1 while the compressor was shut down on standby. Lubricating oil was pumped from the hose until the
pump shut down on low pressure. The oil flow was restricted in its flow by the stainless s eel braiding and flowed into the engine bed plate area where it was collected by the
drain system and returned to the sea sump. No spillage to the sea occurred.
Release of diesel fuel inside pressurised hood of k02 turbine during commissioning trials. Cause was traced to a failed bourdon tube inside the diesel fuel pressure gauge. This
released a mist / spray inside the hood.
During commissioning of k-01 systems s diesel gauge failed, spraying diesel fuel inside the enclosure. The fuel ignited on the hot turbine casing causing a flash fire. The fire
was extinguished by automatic action of the fixed halon system. The fire lasted no more than a few seconds.
A <...> dp guage failed in sevice allowing gas condensate at 140 barg to escape to atmosphere. Platform shutdown and personnel sent to muster stations. Leak isolated and area
vented down within 30 minutes. No one injured.
Lube oil caught fire inside the lighthouse area of the turbine non drive end bearing. The fire was contained inside the turbine enclosure. All lube oil and vent pipes in the area
have been dismantled, rejointed and test run. No leaks detected.
Oil and gas processing plant. Steady plant condintions. The only activiy was the draining of an overhead diesel tank into a drains vessel. This operation had been carried out on
previous occasions recently, at seemingly greater draining rates than on this occasion. Gas was detected in close proximty to an open drain, protected by a lute seal. The seal
had been reported as having been topped up with water at the begining of the shift. Platform automatic shutdown resulted. Emergency response team modilised a d platform
personnel to muster stations. Gas dissipated quicky. Investigation team set up. Enviromental conditions were still. Lute seal topped up. Draining of tank ceased.
The shift team leader was informed by the central control room of a slight rise in a gas detection monitoring head around the area of the booster pump for crude oil. On
investigation he found a crude oil sampling point isolation valve had been left in th open position. This led to the release of crude oil from the 1/4" diameter sample line. The
line pressure upstream of the isolation valve was approx. 10 barg. The oil released filled the "tundish" drain pot and overflowed on to the deck within a bunded rea. The leak
was stopped immediately and was estimated to be approx. 15 litres in total. The oim on investigation observed a small amount of crude oil (less than 5 litres) spreading on the
surface of the sea. The spill was observed to be broken up in ature and covered an area of the sea approx. 1 mtr wide by 20 mtrs long. The spillage to sea was through 3 x 1/8"
holes within the bunded area.
Low level gas indicated in z2 followed by high level gas which caused a platform sps. Source of leak was found to be the inlet flange at the base of rv35510 on the lube oil
eliminator of the gas export compressor. Rv35510 was off-line at the time of the ncident, ie. Inlet valve closed rv35509 was on-line. Rv35510 had been taken off-line earlier as
it was believed to be passing, ie. There had been signs of icing.
During bunkering into a permanent chemical tank from an ibc, the chemical tank overflowed. The overflow from this was not handled by the drainage system, due to partial
blockage in the drainage system. This resulted in an overflow of chemical into the mi dle deck level of the chemical package. The control room received a report that there was
a strong smell of chemicals on the m2/m3 roof area. The bunkering was then stopped and clean up operations commenced, as per the msds info. Two persons reported to t e
medic complaining of sore eyes and respiratory problems, were checked but did not require any treatment. The medic requested to see a further seven persons who had been
exposed. None of the above nine persons required any further attention but were recorded as first aid cases.
Gas head 2503 started drifting, low level gas came up. Investigation revealed a small gas leak at a 4" flange on the regen gas heater bank in msm b elliott s/d vent to flare msm
b/d and isolated.
During routine platform insp it was noted the actuator for wing valve on well g2 was leaking gas and condensate from end nearest the well checks carried out with portable gas
detector confirmed 100% lel up to approx 12" from actuator - well has been shut n at the waster and wing valve until service engineer repairs actuator.
At 10:35hrs i was called into the control room and made aware by the operator t bate that 3 gas heads were at a low level display in g module he had already been in contact
with the area operator <...> and the area was being checked out. I waited in the control room until i received information from the field by radio. During this time i called the
oim and told him i would be updating him on the problem very shortly i was informaed of a leak on the downstreamflange of ep22b's psv 4sa block valve. I w s asked if a
mechanic and myself would come to g module to help evaluate the best response to the problem. It turned out that one bolt of the four was slack. The leak was stopped by
simply tightening it up. I then phoned the oim to update him that the problem had been sorted
During normal plant operations a 20% l.e.l. gas detection was annunciated in the control room for gas compression module b1. The area operator investigated and traced the
source to the pilot valve exhaust of the <...> p.s.v. the p.s.v. was solated and standby p.s.v. put on line
Upon pressuring fuel gas skid an audible gas release occurred - skid was isolated and depressurised - on inv lagged 2" discharge line from fuel gas heater was found to be badly
corroded -
The gas turbine driver was being test run following an overhaul by vendor. A diesel leak from a burner ignited. This was detected automatically, the engine shutdown & the
co2 extinguisher released. 'Gpa' initiated muster. Cause traced to leaking joint washer which has been replaced. After initial investigation of the fire & subsequent co2 release,
it was decided to remove burner nozzles 6 & 7 for closer inspection & to remove all associated liquid fuel pipework for pressure testing. 1. Burners 6 & 7 were removed to
the workshop where they were cleaned and inspected. New compression fittings to the liquid fuel inlets were fitted & the aluminium washers renewed. No damage had been
sustained by either burner and it was decided to re-fit them. 2. All liquid fuel lines from the fuel rail to the burner were removed & pressure tested to 16 barg. All were found
to be in good condition with no leakage. 3. The burner shim pack gasket & the burner gaskets were removed & replaced. 4. Access to burners 5 & 8 was not easily available
& all connections to the burners were checked by the <...> rep who found no slack fittings or evident damage that could have caused a leak. 5. A boroscope inspection of the
engine bearings was carried out by the <...> rep who reported that no damage was evident & we would re-build & run the engine. 6. The isolations were removed & the engine
During re-instatement of gas compression system following maintenance /inspection programme, leak occurred at 1" x 1500 rtj flange on train 1 stage 2 scrubber. At time of
release approx. 12 bar in system. Automatic shutdown occurred (4 x gas path detecto s activated). Duration of leak approx. 20 seconds, system made safe. Environmental
conditions - 10 knots, @ 300 degrees, clear skies, 6 degrees c. Flange joint leak rectified, full check of other flanges on system. No further problems encountered.
Normal gas export running both gas export compressors. At 17:15 hours, the gas beam detectors detected gas at 3% lel, a prod. Operator attended the scene and noted a gas
leak from the stem packing on train 1 recycle valve. The operator requested a train sd, further inspection of valve revealed that the stem packing was missing and the stem
shaft scored. High winds (35 - 40 knots) from the se vented area extremely quickly.
On change over from gas to diesel feul on the main generation, a leak occured on gt1 diesel supply pipework to the turbine burner. This resulted in a fine mist of diesel which
ignited on the hot turbine surface. The fg detection system actioned and shut he turbine down. Operations then activated the halon protection system to extinguish the flash
fire. Subsequent investigation of the diesel system found a leak path on the fitting between the burner and supply pipework. The sealing washer was found to be damaged.
2 x measurement techs were carrying out a routine insp of gas metering orifice plate orifice plate is installed in a peco measure master dual chamber orifice fitting which is
designed to allow on line removal of orifice plate techs commenced releasing 4 b lts securing sealing bear - 3 of 4 bolts had been released when o ring seal suddenly blew out
followed by release of gas
Steel small bore line parted from compression fitting.
Eroision of an LCV on a gas liquid separator caused gas blow-by and as a consequence a failure of the downstream 2" CS elbow, a hole 40mm2, allowed the release of approx.
16/18 scm of hydrocarbon gas over a 20 min. Period at an upstream pressure of 4.5 ba . The incident commencecd with a general alarm of 02:06 activated by low level gas
detection and following confirming of the gas release concluded at 02:21 with the executive action to block and vent the installation.
Very difficult to understand explanation by <...> oim but this apprx to be procedure fault rather than sytem/equipment failure. Drain valve eventually shut and gas dispersed no
consequent problem. Small gas leak from back of flow of gas from flare system knock out drum via drain system into caisson. Due to drain valve being open.
Well a5 was in full production, when an ops tech who was carrying out his watch keeping routines heard the sound of escaping gas. On inv he found the leak to be coming
from the male screwed connection on a5 annulus needle valve. He immed isolated the valv . The pipework was vented down, needle valve removed and a body bleed plug
fitted.
An operations technician was carrying out a site check in module 13 mezz gas plant, prior to the release of a spark potential permit. Whilst in the module he could smell gas.
With the use of a gas meter, he was able to locate the leak which was coming fro the turbo expander diaphragm flange on 24 pcv 3220 seal gas control valve. He informed
relevant personnel and the turbo expander was shut down.
A mech tech was working in module 14 mezz gas plant. As he walked past a valve, he detected a minor gas release issuing from it. He immed notified the control room who
sent prod tech to inv. The source of the leak was found to be coming from the stem of a block valve upstream of 32psv0029 on the gas export system gas export was shutdown
to allow repairs to be carried out.
Whilst carrying out watchkeeping routines an operations tech. Noticed a mist of diesel oil coming from a pin hole leak on the discharge pipework of the main fuel pump on 'a'
turbine. Ops tech. Immediately wrapped pipe and and informed central control roo . Firewatch was implemented until gt could be taken offline. Release was found in the
early stages total release was 2 litres. Suspected vibration caused failure in a weld as no support bracket fitted as in other machines. Under investigation.
Whilst carrying out watchkeeping routines an operations tech. Noticed a spray of diesel oil coming from a leak on the discharge pipework of the main fuel pump on 'a' gas
turbine generator. A second gt was started immediately and the "a" gt shutdown. Ap roximately 5lts, of diesel was spilled into the halon protected turbine enclosure. The leak
was on the same pipework on which leak occurred previously, but in a different location. The cause of the leaks remain under investigation. The machine will not e run until
the cause of the repeated leaks can be determined. (nb: the turbines are normally fuelled by natural gas, but are running on diesel during current plant shutdown).
Gas lift compression restoring cylinder lube oil flow. The lube oil flow alarm was activated - maintenance called to attend and investigate/ repair. Work permit issued
mechanic changed out an in line bursting disc on lube pump discharge, it failed to res ore the lube pressure mechanic released lube oi pipework couplings to bleed oil through
system (compressor is on line) all lines clear except 4th staple cylinder feed. Mechanic slackened off the 1/4"s/s compression fitting to cylinder quill after 5 secs g s was
released from the open end. Gas compressor was shutdown. Incident investigation in progress.
Restarting the hypochlorinator generating unit after a filter change. Operations had started the feed pumps noted discharge pressure at 150 psi. They reset control panel output
failure alarm which activated (opened) pmv 8301 feeding sea water to duplex f lter then to hypocholinator manifold. On resetting the operators heard a bang and on
investigation saw that the manifold piping (plastic) rated to 225 psi, had shattered. They shut pmv and feed pumps.
At approx. 21:56hrs, there was a gas release from an instrument at 400 bar on the agi skid in m4 main deck. The automatic fire and gas system automatically detected the gas
and general alarm was soundedand a production shutdown and plant depressure- isati n took place. The leak ceased and the gas gas was dispersed naturally. All personell were
mustered safely without injury. Hse inspectors were on board carrying out a routine platform inspection at the time of the incident.
Evolution of gas & oil from flash gas compressor on <...> and subsequent evolution of gas from lube oil tank of this machine reported on <...> sequence of events started on
<...> with a report of extensive spillage of seal oil & gas detection in m3 upper mezz in vicinity of c0401/2 – concluded with a report of smell of gas in area outside of m3
upper mezz which led to shutdown of the c0401/2 on <...> and wholesale replacement of the oil in lube oil storage tank of c0401/2 poor planning and comm of preps of y1601
for removal of p1601 led to an inappropriate isolation of a drain seal pot in m7 - error led in turn to back filling with deck liquids of that part of the misc vent system which
vents sour gas evolving from co401/2 & gas from gas fuel system for gt2 & gt6. Coincidentally the vent valve from the gt2 fuel system and valve admitting gas feed to that
system were passing slightly because c0401/2 seal oil system was now being pressurised rather than vented to the atmospheric misc vent, the pressure in the seal oil system
was able to overcome the pressure in seal oil to lube oil buffer gas space; this overpressurisation led directly to transfer of gas contaminated seal oil into lube oil system.
Contaminated liquids in lube oil tank began inevitably to overflow through m/c bearings, labrynths and lubeoil vent in sw corner of m3 upper mezz; seal oil tank began to
During pressure testing work as part of riser shut down work on <...> a leak was discovered in the trunion of a manual 14" tk isolation valve. Work to repair the valve was
started around mid-day on <...> under boundry isolations that had been in pla e for shut-down work. 2 technicians, 1 <...>, 1 <...>, commenced the work by removing the
trunion plate reataining bolts. This did not free the trunion, further methods were used to extract the trunion, but to no avail. The <...> technician then reques ed that the valve
be cycled as it was in the closed position. At this point it was noted that an adjacent pressure gauge pi03505 was indicating 6-7 bar pressure in the line. The chief operator was
summoned and 2 technicians left the work site for lunch. the chief operator vented the pressure build up and at this point the trunion freed and fired across the walkway, just
missing a workman. As a result of the recent pressure testing work, it was possible that up to 190barg could have been trapped in the va ve cavity. A full investigation has been
carried out and a detailed report will be submitted with the oir9b.
During normal plant operations on <...> a gas alarm was activated in m5c west. The leak was quickly identified by onshift operators and isolated.the plant was then shutdown
in a controlled fashion. The gas leak originated from a level control valve c nnected to a gas scrubber. It was found that the stem had blown out of the valve body. The control
valve had been maintained on <...> as it had been reported as seized in the closed position. The actuator was removed, leaving the valve stem exposed with no manula
isolations applied. After the incident, the control valve was stripped down and the plug was found loose inside the valve body having sheared off the valve stem. The stem was
therefore held in the valve body by the gland packing alone. The stem remained in place for two days before being blown out off the valve body releasing gas into the module.
A high fluid level was indicated within the atmospheric vent pot. Attempts to clear this were not successful. Shortly after the high level a 20% gas was detected in the cuttings
process room in mud module 2. The gas level increased to 60% activating the platform pa gas alarm (16:25). The level was cleared in vent pot and gas levels reuced to zero
within 7 minutes. One gas head was activated in the cp room. A controlled plant shutdown was initiated and the lp vent system isolated to allow flushing and ma ntenance of
the atmospheric vent pot following a previous incident (<...>) investigation concluded that there was communication within the east caisson betwwen the lp vent ststem and the
open drains. This communication occurs when there is a high level n the atmospheric vent pot, presumed to be due to back pressure. Remedial actions included inspection of
caissons, resealing the caisson pipework, modification of the atmospheric vent pot and installation of a dump line to allow debris to be flushed out. the final remedial action to
install the dump line was scheduled for the next planned shutdown during <...>. It was not possible to installi during the modifications to the vent pot due to restricted access
to the bottom of the vassel. This dump line was installed <...>.
Gas was detected intermittently at the water injection vacuum pump exhaust vent. It was detected by the quality gas detector in line. During the release the levels varied
between 0-30% of lel peaking twice momentarily to 98% of lel - following invs it was found to be coming from aleak in the first stg gas coolers e2001 and e2002. The process
was shut down and coolers stripped down to identify mode of failure. This is still under investigation by the manufactures. Simultaneous oil and gas production/export nd
drilling activities in progress.
A fuel gas leak occurred in <...> turbine enclousure when the o ring in the demister pot failed. Gas detection by fire and gas system resulted in general platform alarm and unit
shutdown. The gas level in the enclosure increased when hvac shutdown and re ulted in a total platform shutdown. The o ring had been made from extruded rubber and ends
had been glued tog to fabricate the o ring. The unit is shutdown until a correct specification o ring can be fitted, other machines will be checked. The vendor has een advised of
the incident, they have been requested to confirm correct part no.
Person noticed hydrocarbon fluids weeping from pinhole in weld on 1/2" tapping point for pressure transmitter on process pipework down stream of oil choke well <...>,
control room advised who shut down and secured well head.
A small release of oily water from a .5" branch connection on the reject water discharge line was detected by a passer-by. The process was shutdown manually and the line de-
pressurised. On further inspection a small crack was detected in the weld. The und r- lying cause is still to be identified.
On report of diesel spillage at turbine diesel day tank. Cr operator stopped the diesel circ pump on inv it was found that the recirc valve to the online diesel storage tank had
been inadvertently been left in the closed position. This resulting in diesel escaping from the tank via the flame arrestor. The platform drain system contained the spillage
Operator on routine plant tour observed oil/produced water leak in prod manifold area. It was identified as pinhole leak on np 218 prod flowline. Mcr and prod supervisor were
informed immed. Well was shut-in and flowline isolated and depressured.
At 0130hrs on <...> on <...> drill floor there was a release of crude oil from a wireline lubricator which activated a single gas detector to low limit and resulted in a small
quantity of crude oil spilling on the drill floor. At this time the wireline cr w were progressing a drift run on well np30 prior to running a plt survey. No other operations or
activities were in progress. Leak was quickly isolated by wireline operator closing a needle valve and did not cause any equipment damage or major enviromental pollution.
Module 11 gas compressor gb1101b - small bore 1" pipe fracture - operator found leak when smell of gas noted - no alarms initiated - m/c isolated for remould of offending
spool.
Hydrocarbon leak via coiled tubing unit stuffing box. Leak was stopped by increasing hydraulic pressure to the seal.
Hairline crack on 6" discharge line adjacent to 2" lp flare line weld on gas compressor gb119b. Gas was smelled during flowline checks and on further investigation found gas
leaking from crack. Mcr notified and compression shutdown, isolated and vented. R port to be sent to corrosion engineer for failure analysis.
While checking casings in module 05 wellheads operator smelt gas. Upon investigation found the flange on sp35 flowline/standpipe spraying oil/ gas over surrounding area.
Consider that extreme weather conditions(and hence platform movement) may have contributed to this incident.
On initiation of planned blowdown a 2" vent line from 'b' train crude coolers failed. Visual inspection showed that a (approx 5-10 mm diameter hole had appeared in the wall of
the pipe, allowing gas to lead into module 5 for a period of approx 1 minute at an estimated initial pressure of approx 8-10 barg.
A gas release occured in module 6 gas compressor following failure of a 3/4" stainless steel pipe in the root of the 3rd from last thread of a 3/4" npt fitting. Fitting located in
compressor hp outletto metering line 'orifice plate' the leak was detected y fixed detectors and by subsequent identification with portable monitors. The leak was isolated and
depressurised allowing a low level gas (3 gas heads registering approx 30% lel) to be vented in approx 2 mins,
A hydrocarbon release occurred at approx. 1800 hrs at the metering skid. Gas detection was activated in the area of the metering skid. The <...> operator requested the area
operator to investigate the gas alarm. Upon arrival at the scene the area operator w tnessed oil leaking from several flow glasses on the metering skid. The <...> operator
activated a class 2 shutdown at the request of the operator at the metering skid. This incident is currently being investigated by the hse.
Two hihi gas alarms activated in pr1 which in turn initiated a gpa, esd1 plant blowdown and a full muster of all personnel. The cause of the gas alarm activation was the
inadvertent release of liquid condensate from a one litre sample cylinder that had ju t been filled by the metering technician. A written work instruction is to be prepared and
issued detailing sample procedure under the t-card system and to include an attached checklist/ aide memoir of valve sequences. A review is to be made of all tasks ransferred
from the chemist to the metering tech. To determine if all procedures have been communicated correctly and none missed. Ptq to be raised to propose modifications to: a: the
handles on valves v1 and v4 on each welker cylinder to be changed to 't bar type. B: the ultra-seal on each welker cylinder to be changed for parker (or similar) quick
disconnects in which both the male and female sections are fitted with fail safe non-return valves.
C compressor shut down on 2nd stage high level in ko drum. The machine was being restarted but, prior to loading, a minor gas leak was identified in the interstage cooler end
flange liner. The leak came from an internal failure of the titanium liner. The ompressor was shut down and isolated. To prevent recurrance all existing liners have been
inspected and a revised inspection programme is being developed. Engineering support is being used to evaluate the need for fixed plugs or no plugs in the carbon ste l shelfs.
Action will follow the recommendations
Maintenance operations on the <...> pig receiver. Cover plate of thermowell removed & gas found seeping from the instrument interior. <...> pipeline isolated & vented.
Thermowell had been damaged by sand erosion & was removed with a blank flange fitted. Co responding thermowells at <...> end of pipeline was inspected & found to be in
excellent condition. Inspection programme & operations philosophy under review to prevent recurrence.
The platform was in normal production operation. High winds were blowing otherwise enviromental conditions were normal. A leak of hydrocarbon from a flange weld of
a'mol pump p0301a was discovered by maintenance tech. The maintenance tech informed the entral control room who shutdown the pump. The leak of hydrocarbon was not
detected by any gas alarms.
Operators working at oil pig launcher noticed large quanties of steam below mezz level. On investigation it was discovered a bend of pipework on degasser v2701 of oily water
at a temperature of approx 90 oc. The isolation valves upstream and downstream of lv 27016 were closed and the release stopped. The pipework was found to have a hole
approx 4cm diameter at a 90 o bend (pipe ident 2" pl-27-019-dia)
Platform at time of incident was on full production. <...> was undergoing coil tubing intervention work for milling out operations. The coil tubing unit was a 2" unit and at the
time of the incident was tripping out of the hole. At 19:30 there was a gas rel ase from the coil tubing pressure equipment. This initiated a gpa and platform shutdown. <...> was
effectively secured and the gas release isolated. On investigation it was found that the stripper mecannism on the coil tubing pressure equipment has failed d e to wear. This
was subsequently repaired and pressure tested. Production then recommenced.
Lab tech reported to ccr sampling on j5 complete. Inhibits not removed immediately due to other activities ongoing in ccr. Operator in process of isolating j4 had closed
diverter valves and had reached point of closing flowline material valve. Valve had b en closed approx 3 turns when there was a bang and oil/gas began spraying from gland on
valve. Operatot called ccr saying that release was due to his operations advised shutdown not considered necessary at this time as leak rate appeared to be decreasing. 2nd
operator called ccr and requested level 2 shutdown. Level 2 shutdown initiated manually and executive actions functioned correctly. Diverter valve cracked open to allow
blowdown of inventory through production manifold. Release continued. Ccr establis ed contact with prod supv. Decision was not to initiate gpa at this point but tannoys put
out to stop hot work immediately and return ptw's. Decision to remove inhibits on gas heads. Gpa and level 3 shutdown initiated automatically on removal of inhibits. all
personnel went to muster and normal emergency response procedures implemented. Plant conditions continued to be monitored with all personnel in safe location. Decision at
approx release had decayed to a point where manual intervention to isolate leak considered safe. Manual intervention commenced 18:16 leak stopped situation under control
Whilst removing 1" rf ansi 150 blank flange, a small quantity of gas was released.
When using the vent header to blow down well <...>, following a SSSV leak off test, gas was released from a 2mm corroded pin hole in the line from the kill skid to the vent
header mainfold.
Before incident: p74 skimmer pump had been replaced after failure, reconnection of the pump had been delayed as the electrician involved had been reassigned to a higher
priority job. The pump remained electrically isolated with the cable disconnected and the cable transit block to v88 open. This work had been done on hw permit [hw 16480],
taken out on the <...> and suspended on the <...> at 04.26 hrs. At the end of his overtime period on the <...> the rp signed off cw permit <...> associated with p74 pump
removal & replacement at <...> & the mechanical isolation certificate <...> at 2115. The remaining cold work permit <...> detailing mech isolation/ de-isolation requirements
was not signed off until 0940 on the <...>. This permit was left on the rp's desk in the permit office with a yellow 'sticky' on it advising nightshift personnel that electrical re-
connection was required prior to p74 re-instatement. The dayshift rp was aware that elec work remained outstanding on the pump but not the status of the transit blocks. There
was no verbal handover from the dayshift rp to the nightshift rp and ets as these individuals were otherwise engaged at the time. At the time the rp went off duty, [2130 on the
<...>] 2 permits remained 'live' but suspended, p74 required cable re-connection and electrical de-isolation, the cable transits into v88 were open and the mechanical isolations
At approximately 08:40 fixed gas detection systems in 'b' module detected a significant release of gas. Platform went to muster. Investigation by emergency response team
identified major failure of <...> wellhead jumper hose. Hose dia 6", serial number 1 396, working pressure 5000psig, operating pressure at time of incident 700psig. Hose
manufactured in <...> and tested to 7500psig. Hose installed <...> and pressure tested for 4 hours at 4500 psig in <...>. Contents of hose released to module sweet wellhead
fluid, approx 91% water cut). Hose locally process isolated and area washed down. Muster stood down at approx 10.04. All production remains shut in. Investigation team
mobilised, details of volume of release, etc to follow. Environmental co ditions at 0600 on the day of the incident: wind 230deg at 8kts, ivs 10+nm, seas 05.m
At approx 04:50 on <...> a noise was heard by an operator outside module e. On investigation the c3 (hp gas compressor) outboard dry gas seal rotameter glass was found to be
shattered and hydrocarbon gas was being emmitted from inlet and outlet port . Local gas detectors registered the occurrence of gas although levels did not reach alarms settings
(highest level seen was 10% lel). The c3 compressor had been shutdown at the time of the incident although it was found to be pressurised to 740psig, casi g drains were
opened and c3 depressurised. The ip compressor (c2) was also shutdown and depressurised. An incident investigation is underway. A copy of the report will be forwarded on
completion of the investigation.
On a liquid to fuel gas changeover, coincident high level gas indicated inside turbine enclousure g-8000, automatically shutting down the unit. On inspection a fuel gas supply
hose to duel burner no. 12 had burst.
On liquid to fuel gas change over, co-incincident high level gas indicated in the turbine enclousure of g-8000 which atomatically shut down the unit. On investigation a fuel gas
supply hose to duel fuel burner no 12 had burst
Gauge blew off at instrument fitting on the gas compression import export metering skid.
Diesel fire pump-fire in exhaust due to hydraulic leak.leak will be repaired today. No damage to fire pump.(module 15) fire activated smok and flame detector. Fire pump
which was on test run had to be shutdown.
Following the renewal of the seat on the air eliminator (manufactured by <...>, valve type also known as a vacuum breaker) on the 'c' salt water lift pump in module 3 (weirs
submersible lift pump). The pump was restarted to test for leaks as per normal ractise. During the test run, while the operator was recording the discharge pressure and
checking for leaks. The bonnet of the air eliminator failed (cracking in 4 places) releasing the 2" screwed vent pipe and a jet of water (discharge pressure 200pst). had the
operator been in the vacinity of the pipe. He could have been seriously injured.
Bleeder plug on bottom flange of xmas tree was passing. This resulted in a steady trickle of escaping fluids which was picked up by routine watch keeping operations. The
indication was that the seals on the pst nipple was passing. The well was closed in w th the dhsv closed. Pressure was bled down from the dhsv and the pressure reduction
stopped the leak. A plan is in place to set 2 bridge plugs above the dhsv in the long string (the well is dual completion) and the short string. This will allow removal of the xmas
tree and a repair to be effected.
C turbine was running on gas fuel suppling 50% of the platform power requirements on a load of 14mw. There are a total of 6 gas detectors in the turbine enclosure, 3 on the
air inlet and three in the air outlet. A gas alarm occurred at 1000hrs <...>, 1 head on the outlet had detected gas above the alarm level of 15% lel. Investigation of the day shift
did not find any gas present within the enclosure, although the detection system was reading approx. 6% lel. A further 2 gas alarms sounded during the nig t shift, one at
2000hrs and 1 at 2145hrs. Again investigation using a <...> triple plus showed no signs of gas being present. During exhaustive checks trying to determine and detect the small
gas leak, 2 out of 3 detectors on the inlet detected gas abov 30% lel. It is thought that thisoccurred due to air pattern movement change with having the enclosure door open for
some considerable time. This resulted in a turbine emergency shutdown, a release of halon inside the turbine enclosure and a general platf rm alarm. After confirmation that no
fire had taken pplace, the turbine was isolated from gas and diesal fuels and the platform personnel were stood down from emergency stations. The cause of the gas leak has
been identified as a 3" flange fitting. Furthe leak checks are on going.
<...> being visited for routine compliance insp activities - during helicopter approach a plume of what was thought to be gas was seen at platform - helicopter returned to <...>
& standby vessel instructed to move away from immed atea - <...> initiated an esd from info relayed from helicopter
Due to a generator fault main power supply was lost at 07:00 hrs. This resulted in a 2b shutdown closing all xmas tree wing valves. A gas leak was noticed venting from the
lower master valve of the xmas tree on well a31. An operator closed the downhole afety valve but could not depressurise the xmas tree as the wing valve was closed. As a
precautionary measure personnel were called to muster stations @ 07:33. The wing valve was opened and the xmas tree depressurised. The leak then stopped. The fixed ga
detection system did not detect any gas during the incident despite being close to the release. After the incident the gas heads were checked and found to be in working order.
The platform remained shutdown until a wireline plug was installed above the ssv. Investigation into the suitability of the stem packing fitted in the lower master valve is
ongoing
During subsea jacket 'rov' inspection it was noted that bottom section of both fire pump caissons were missing- hence pumps located at 16.5m & 18m elevation- caissons
broken at 12m. Hence firepumps considered vulnerable to tide etc as now outside of caisson. Risk assessment done- no demanning but work restrictions imposed to minimise
potential hydrocarbon incidents. 1.workforce & safety reps advised-satisfied with the short term measures taken by <...>. 2. <...> commissioned to examine the technical issues
& the longer term remedial workscope. 3.both fire pumps exposed to tidal forces, <...> is available but not believed to be in good condition. <...> appears ok but may not be
reliable if called to operate. The <...>, a dive support vessel, was doing a rov survey when it discovered that the fire pump a & b caissons had lost 6m & 4.5m of their caissons,
leaving the pumps protruding out of the caissons ie without protection from the sea motion. The a caisson is no longer secured by a subsea conductor guide whereas the b
caisson terminates in its guide. Summary report caisson damage on n w hutton. Introduction a caisson survey of the structure <...> was carried out on behalf of <...>. By <...>
onboard the vessel <...> deploying the rov <...> on <...>. The survey incorporated all caissons on the structure & 2 were found to have extensive physical damage. They were
After a routine tubing/annulus communication check, it was identified that the 9 5/8" annulus pressure could not be bled down to zero pressure. On shutting in the 9 5/8"
annulus resulted in subsequent pressure increased to approximately 750psi. Repeated attempts to blow down the 9 5/8" annulus resulted in subsequent pressure build-up. At
this time, it was unclear whether the leak path was from tubing to 9 5/8" annulus or whether the leak path was past the production packer into the 9 5/8"
1220hrs drilling ahead in lewis iv sandstone, a drilling break was encountered at 15450-15446. A flow check was performed. The well was flowing slowly. The well was closed
in on the annular. An approx gain of 10bbls was seen. Shut in d/p pressure stabilis d @ 90psi sicp @ 240 psi. Mudweight was 12.8 + ppg. Well was circulated out w/drillers
method, and well killed with 13.3ppg. No gains were measured while circ out influx. No evidence of influx type was seen at surface. Rft pressures, taken part kick were
easured @ 9.7ppg throughout the hole section.
During annulus pressure testing pressure was bled down from 650 psi to 0 psi above the annular safety valve which was in the closed position. Following this blowdown the
pressure above the asv was noted to build up from 0 to 57 psi in a period of 15 minut s (equivalent to a build-up rate of 2822 scf/hour). This pressure build-up rate exceeded the
maximum allowable value of 900 scf/hour detailed in the mobil drilling and production procedures manual (dapps)
Pressure test performed on tubing annulus and there was found to be tubing - annulus communication. Well is completed in a reservoir interval of high pressure and the annulus
exhibits a capability of flowing if the surface pressure is lowered. Well has be n shut-in and further investigation to analyse the leak is planned
After bleeding down the tubing to remove a suspected hydrate plug at surface, the 'spent' perforating gun parted at the e-line weak point and fell thro' the tubing to the closed
trdhsv. The gun was stuck across the trdhsv and prevented the valve passing n inflow test. Attempts to retrieve the gun using standard slickline fishing tools proved successful.
The valve failed in flow tests and a lead impression block indicated the flapper had broken off and remained within the valve profile. The will has been lugged awaiting
assembly of packing elements for a wrdhsv
During annual ppm's the a1 injection valve in this well was found to have failed.the a1 injection valve has been previously placed in the well to isolate t/a communication
higher in the well.the well is shut & will be killed & plugged as operations allow.
During annual ppm's communication between the tubing/annulus was found the well has gas lift installed with an asv which has failed to test. The well has been shut-in while
further testing is conducted to re- confirm the previous leak results.
Tubing to annulus communication developed in well on <...>. The communication has been traced to be below the asv safety system. It is thought that the source of the
communication is most likely through a gas lift valve below the asv. The asv has sinc been satisfactorily tested. The well remains on production. A forward programme to
investigate the leak will be prepared as operations allow.
During heavy lift operations for the abandonment of the adjacent <...> well, it was ascertained that the <...> dhsv would not close. Repeated attempts to leak test the valve
failed. The dhsv was subsequently locked open and an insert valve was retrieved a d a d8p plug set in the nipple profile of the dhsv. The well has been shut-in while further
plans are considered to obtain an integirty test of the insert dhsv.
During routine platform testing procedures, it was reported that tubing to annulus communication existed. Asvtested good (communication below asv). Since well was not
being gas lifted, well was left on production while investigation continued. Original ca ing/tubing pressure data supplied from offshore did not indicate tubing to annulus
communication. Additional tubing/annulus pressure test data since then has confirmed tubing ti annulus communication does exist. Well is presently on production with the kn
wledge that gas lifting the well inits present condition is not permitted. Forward program to investigate the leak will be prepared as operations allow
During heavy lift operations for the drilling of the adjacent <...>, it was ascertained that the b15 annulus pressure would not vent down and that tubing to annulus
communication existed. Tubing to annulus communication is suspected below the dhsv, since a uccessful negative test on the tubing was performed with the dhsv in the closed
position. A bridge plug was set in the packer tailpipe and a successful negative test performed. The well has been shut in while a workover program is prepared to replace the
ailed tubing. Operations are scheduled to begin following the completion of b46
Whilst drilling on well a20 at 15965",a mud gain was noted. The well was shut in and a shut in casing pressure of 23psi was noted. The tubing had zero pressure. The easing
volume was circulated out through the choke. Ther was no mud contamination noted n the returns to surface, and no cain in pit volume while circulating. A few check showed
the well to be static. Normal operations were resumed
Whilst cementing the 9-5/8" x 10 3/4" casting to a depth of 13046' around 300 bbls of losses were observed during cement displacement. Once cementing was complete, the
well was observed flowing. The annular was closed.sicp rose & stabilised at 200 psi. T e pressure was subsequently bled off and the annular opened. A small backflow was
observed which decreased to static conditions after 1hr 20 mins. It is believed that the cmt job had pressured up the formation.
Unloading perforated well. Coiled tubing and guns jammed up in riser above xmas tree. Shear bop rams operated and bottom half of guns released smashing through sssv @
1500 ft subsea.
When circ bottoms up after check trip - erratic flow was observed and well was shut in - pit gain 1 bbl, pdp zero - pann 125 psi - well was circ via choke with 125 psi back
pressure. Close in and monitor pressures pdp zero - continue circ conventionally
Well <...>: well ops prior to incident: drilling completed successfully. The zx tie back packer was set. The casing/liner was pressure tested to 3000 psi then circulated to sea
water and inflow tested with rates declining from 43 gal/hr to 3.3 gal/hr over 3 hours. The well was then cleaned up and dlt packer set to allow the removal of the bops and the
installation of the spool type xmas tree. This was followed by the re-instatement of the drilling bop. On releasing the dlt packer the well was found to be c pable of flowing at
118 gal/hr and the bop was closed. Pressure of less than 50 psi were recorded. The well was circulated over the choke and after 400 bbls hydrocarbon traces were observed in
the water, some bbls of contaminated were recovered. Once a fu l bottoms up circulation had been achieved, the well was still capable of flowing, and circulation was
continued through the choke with back pressure equivalent to well pressures from recent surveys. Brine was mobilised to kill the well and enable the pac er to be set above the
suspected leaking liner shoe track.
Driller noted erratic flow rate for mud returns, picked up off bottom, observed gas breakout at bell nipple. Close in well (pipe rams) monitored well. No pressure increase
noted. Ciculate out gas cut mud, under controlled conditions over choke, whilst weighing up mud to 635pptf.
Following investigation to determine the sourceof high a annulus pressue in well <...> a tubing leak below the sssv has been identified. The rate of leakage is above the
allowable sssv leak rate. Remedial work to change out tubing is being planned.
On the <...> a small leak was observed from the wear brushing tie down bolts on the hp riser. The well pressure was bled off and the leak fixed. The well pressure was thought
to be related to thermal expansion of a trapped field.
Whilst drilling through the tor formation on sidetrack, the well began to flow, at a depth of 13202 ft. Closed well in, and measured pressures. Pdp = 355 psi, pcsg = 380 psi.
Estimated 3.5 bbl gain. Circulated out brine influx with drillers method. Pd = 355 psi. Killed well with 11.8 ppg, up from original drilling weight of 10.8 ppg. Opened up
well, dead. Continued to drill. As detailed in hse notification for well, possibility of brine flows from chalk when drilling 8 1/2 " sidetrack wl mud weight o timised for the
reservoir. These chalks have been pressured up to 11.1 ppg in the past, but this one was up to 11.4 ppg emw.
On going drilling operations on slot <...> the well was detected as flowing during a routine flowcheck, prior to pulling out of the hole with the drill string. Well was closed in
and pressures allowed to stabilize at 575psi. Influx circulated out with ex sting mud weight and killed with a second circulation, using 11.8ppg kill mud weight and by
maintaining a pre-calculated, amount of back pressure to ensure no further influx was allowed into the wellbore during well operations.
Drilling 8 1/2" hole through kimmeridge formation with 11.1ppg mud weight. Md 13770ft, tvd 12267ft. The gas levels increased to 30% total gas and the well was flow
checked. The well was found to be flowing. The annular bop was closed and pressures stabili ed at 360psi. The influx was circulated out and the well shut in again. Pressure
stabilised at 425psi 12.1ppg mud was pumped and the well killed.
Whilst pooh (9250ft:5770ft tvd) wiyh a 3 7/8" clean out assembly. An 83bbl water influx occurred. The liners cement job tol is probably lower than expected, with the flushed
etive formation exposed and water based cement spacers up to the tol. This result in the pressure at the tol = 4750psi. The linesr's integral.the back packer had previously
pressure tested and was leaking. On pooh with the clean out assembly. The etive must have been swabbed in. On closing the sidp = 250psi: sicp = 450psi. The slug wa
displaced out of the dp using the drillers method the string was stripped into tol and will be killed by the drillers method. Next the mud weight will be increased to 0.68psi/ft to
allow a tie back packer to be run and set.
While drilling 121/4" hole @ 4682 mtrs m.d. an increase in returns flow was oserved. The driller picked up and spaced out the drill string and flow checked the well. It was
confirmed that the drill well was flowing and the well was shut in with the upper pipe rams using the fast shut in method. (while the well was being flow checked the night
tool pusher and the night company man were called to the drill floor) s.i.d.p.p. stabilised at 250 psi and s.i.c.p stabilised at 320 psi after 10 minutes the shut i pressure had
started to fall, (indicating the formation had broken down and crossflow was occurring)
On well <...>, the 7" liner had been set at 8,100ft with the shoe at 12,997 ft. A clean up assembly was in the hole and the well had been displaced to seawater. Seawater had
been in the well for 24hrs. The sea water was being diplaced from the well with 6 0pptf brine in preparation for the perforating run which was to follow, when crude oil was
seen in yhe sea water returns at the shakers. The pumps were immediately stopped and the well closed in. Sidpp=100 psi.sicp=390psi. After discussions on the well si e it was
decided to attempt to bleed off some of the drill pipe pressure. This pressure had settled t0 50 psi. Which was bled off to the drillpipe to 0psi. Pressures were monitored and
remained stable. The well was then circulated at 50 spm via the choke anifold and no further crude oil was seen. The well was closed ib and there was no sidpp or sicp. Total
volume of crude bled of 2bbls. By this time the wel was fully displaced to brine at 600pptf and a flow check revealed that the well was stable. Prepara ions were made to pooh
and resume operation as per the programme the crude was collected in the trip tank and pumped to the production closed drain system.
Weather good. Well <...>, commenced rih with coil tubing, run to approx 30 meters when tubing hung up. Lost weight approx. 7000lbs and as a result started to pull back out
of the hole in an attempt to tag stuffing box with bha. Bha had parted from tubing a a result released oil and gas into the area (approx 1.5bbls) immediately run back into hole
with coil tubing to get seal of stuffing box. Closed rams on bop's on rig floor as per procedure. Investigation ongoing.
A coiled tubing sand cleanout was being carried out on well fa33. The well was being flowed and sand was being washed from the completion by pumping viscous fluid slugs
through the coiled tubing. At 2450mmdbrt, the operator began to pull out to check his pick up weight. No weight was seen on the weight indicator and a release of oil was seen
at the top of the coiled tubing stripper assembly. The operator quickly checked the injector head and observed that the coiled tubing had parted between the injector head and
stripper assembly. The operator immediately closed in the coiled tubing bop pipe rams. This stopped the flow. The operator then closed the swab valve and established that
there was no coiled tubing across the tree. The coiled tubing triple combi shear seal bops were then closed making the well safe with two barriers against flow. The area
authority was informed of the incident and the well was shut in. In all a total of c. 0.5 bbl hydrocarbon was released onto the bop deck during the period of c. 30 seconds
between observing and stopping the emission. The remaining tree valves (lower and upper master) were checked. With the well safe the spill was cleaned up. The coiled
tubing was then rigged down. Wireline was rigged up and after establishing that the top end of the lost coiled tubing was below the dhsv nipple, a dhsv was set & tested. The
Whilst pulling the production tubing during a workover operation, the treated sea water fluid level was seen to rise in the well. The annular bag on the drilling bops was shut in
and the well monitored. No further pressure build up was seen. Tsw was circulated across the well via the kill & choke line. The well was topped up with 20bbls and losses
were monitored at 12bbl/hr. The base of the completion tailpipe was at 298m brt. The well was taking losses of 12bbl/hr at the time of the incident & contained a full column
of fluid. An overbalance was maintained on the reservoir throughout the incident to prevent any influx from the formation. It appears that some oil had been trapped beneath a
plug set in the tail pipe. Previous attempts to pull the plug had been unsuccessful. As the completion was being pulled to surface, oil beneath the plug expanded as it dropped
below bubble point pressure and gas came to surface within the well bore. The incident involved no loss of hydrocarbon containment. After the incident, a further attempt to
pull the prong from the tail pipe plug was successfully made. No indication of pressure equalisation was seen, however. As a further precaution, the fluid level has been
allowed to dropin the well whilst still maintaining an overbalance on the reservoir to allow for further oil/gas expansion from under the plug. This operation will be repeated
The dhsv on well 6-2 had failed a routine dhsv integrity test. Preparations were underway to change out the dhsv. During integrity checks on the tree by production personnel
prior to handover to well ops it was discovered the the lower master valve could ot be closed. Operational checks & maintenance was then carried out on the tree by cameron
reps, however no cause for the lmv failure could be identified. A lead impression block was then run on wireline to determine if there was any obstruction in the va ve. The
indications from the impression block are that the dhsv is lodged in the lmv. The well has been secured & preparations are presently ongoing to fish the dhsv from the tree &
install a new valve in the dhsv nipple. Note: <...> has been a dead prod cer since <...>. Coil tubing clean out & n2 lift in <...> failed to bring the well back to production. The
dhsv was last changed out and tested on <...> after a gyro data survey. This was preparation for a sidetrack during <...>. The dhsv has most likely been propelled up the hole,
whent the valve was last closed for an integrity test.
<...> is a water injector. The a annulus pressure was seen to rise and fall with injection pressure. On further tests, the a annulus could not be bled down below 60 barg while
well injecting, the a annulus and well-head pressure fell as injection stopped. the well and a annulus go on vacuum within 1 hour. Communication is not thermally dependant.
Communication is below the dhsv nipple. The well is in the forward rig plan for a workover in <...>. The well does not have the ability to sustain flow to surface. injection will
therefore be maintained to minimise the influx of gas into the wellbore pending: the weekly requirement to check the a annulus for gas is continued, (however no attempt well
be made to bleed down); no gas is observed in the a annulus; b and c annulii are bled down as normal. The well will operate under dispensation within well integrity on <...>
well <...>.
Tubing to annulus communication identified below dhsv unable to plug well die to scale - production continuing until end of march 97 when wo to be performed.
Whilst running completion after circulating to 1.29sg brine, during clean up trip observed gas bubbles at surface. Shut in the well and observed positive pressure. Stripped in,
as per bpx policy to kill well with 1.35sg brine.
Asv underwent routine test. Leak rate approximately 20 scf/min. Full annulus was bled down and entire completion string integrity tested. No flow through the completion
resulted. The 20 scf/min is slightly above the api rp 14b specified rate of 15 scf/min for production safety valves same specification has been the "default" value used for asv's
for the time being although it is recognised that this is a different type of service and application. Well has been put back into service on gas lift
During a well operation on well a33 pressure had built up in the 9-5/8" annulus. The pressure was bled down to closed drains from 1900 psi. To confirm that the gas cap had
been vented, a valve was opened on the the cement unit, releasing initially water nd then some gas. Although the valve was quickly closed adjacent gas detectors sensed the
gas release, resulting in alarm annunciation. Investigation revealed that the bleed off line to the closed drains had been blocked by hydrates due to its small bor . Actions to
prevent recurrence include well operations procedures improvements (clearer procedures on vent requirements along with pipework diagrams) and clear instructions given to
personnel involved in this operation.
Well operations ongoing on a17 milling obstruction in the 7" liner. At estimated bottoms up at approx. 2330 a 20% lel gas alarm was activated in the bop deck area. The well
was secured by closing annular bop's. During closing operations the gas indicati n rose to 60% lel activating the platform muster alarm. The detected levels quickly reduced on
closure of annular bop below 20% lel within 2 minutes. Zero pressure was indicated on the shut in well. The annular bop was opened to observe well and gas dete ted at 12%
lel with a gas monitor. The well was closed in and commenced circulation via choke to poor boy degasser until lel below 2% after 15 minutes. No gas had been detected
during previous operations on this well. Procedures have now been put into pl ce to monitor returns at bottoms up.
Whilst pooh with backed off drill pipe with its base at 8216 ft an influx of 26 bbls was identified from swabbing. The well was shut in with 80 ps on dp, 120 psi on annulus.
Drill pipe was stripped in through the annular to 15958 ft where dp stabilised at 0 psi. The well was stabilised using drillers method with gas being knocked out through the
degasser. Pipe was then run into the 7" liner shoe at 18 587 ft where the well was circ to 12.3 ppg mud with no more gas returns.
Well <...> - well kicked after chemical cut on tubing @ 15,430'. Circulated out influx through choke taking (contaminated returns to slop tank. Sitp = 50psi,sicp = 50psi.
Pumped sized salt pill followed by 9.7ppg brine. Static lossed 4.5. Wait on weath r to continue operation as platform has no chemicals or brine left onboard (adverse weather
has caused the supply vessel to divert to <...> for shelter. While waiting on weather for 38hr static losses decreased oil and gas migration started up the annuls sitp = 0, sicp =
65psi. Closed well on bop.
When perforating the f band on well s30, an abnormally high reservoir pressure was recorded. This resulted in the blow out preventer [wireline] being closed and the kill
weight of the workover fluid being raised from 11.4 ppg to 12.7 ppg in order to kill the well.
Drilling 17 1/2" hole on s57 when motor stalled at 1881 ft. After several tentative attempts to pass obstruction it was concluded that this was well s6 casing. Well s6 was
abandoned in order to sidetrck to well s57 risk assess conducted which concluded hat physical risk to installation was not present. Drilled ahead [with additional precautions]
and were able to pass the obstruction.
Well <...> workover preparation for tide track. Whilst pulling out of the hole with the dlick joint fishing assembly it was observed that the well was not taking the correct fluid
replacement volume. Observation of the well bore pressure indicated that a hydrocarbon infllux had occurred below the bottom hole assembly (bha). Using volumetric
stripping procedures the bha is to be run back to bottom and the influx circulated out.
Whilst drilling 8 1/2" hole with 630 pptf mud at 17290 ft ahd the driller observed a drilling break and flow checked the well, which was seen to be flowing. The well was
closed in & following pressures recorded: sidpp: 300 psi scip: 210 psi. 2 bbl increa e was measured. Well was circulated to kill fluid at 661 pptf using wait & weight method -
on completion of circ well was observed to be dead and bop opened. Influx fluid was water which had been absorbed into the mud system by the emulsifiers [indicated y a
decrease in mud weight & electrical stability] - drill string was stuck and was released with a single jar down blow. Rotation of string was established & circ commenced.
Dynamic losses of 1 bbl/min were observed. Circ stopped and lost fluids were o served to be returning to mud system from well - optimum circ rate to minimise losses was
established and well circ to ensure mud weight was even throughout system at 661 pptf. 50 bbl calcium carbonate pill was mixed & pumped into well to cure losses. Whe
losses are cured present plan is to pull out of hole to perform bop pressure test. Meanwhile future prog is to be disc by geologists and reservoir engineers.
Six monthly planned xmas tree maintenance had been completed on <...> water injection well. As per procedure the tree valves were subjected to a full pressure integrity test.
The following valves failed: lmv, hmv mwv and pwv. The swab, service and kwv al met the required integrity criteria. Well integrity above a deep set ab-1 injection has been
confirmed. The well will be left with the tubing depressurised above the ab-1 injection valve and a plugging programme will be implemented asap. A tree valve inv
stigation/repair programma will follow when equipmentpersonnel are available.
During routine pressure monitoring, the production operator noticed the a, b and c annuli appeared to be in connection with each other. A series of checks were made and
communication was confirmed. The well was confirmed. The well is a <...> producer, producing 18,032 blals/d gross at 99.1% waterbut giveing 166 bopd. The well is
currently closed in. Following completion of the current well intervention (a1322) the well will be pluggged 9in the lower 3.68" tauape nipple. We will be mann ng up with
drill crew in <...> and have scheduled a well kill with brine or temporary abandonment with <...> as a priority.
Wireline toolrack toppled onto operator pinning him against toolchest causing fatal injuries. Investigation continuing.
Supply vessel <...> was backloading coiled tubing reels onto starboard side of aft deck. Two reels weighing more than 10 tonnes were being tug winched into position using
both port and starboard motor winches. One winch caused a sideways movement on a h lf height container. <...> was trapped between the two containers and sustained
crushed injuries.
While acting as banksman for backloading of a boat - ip suffered a compound fracture of right wrist - acc occurred when tension was being taken up to lift an open topped
container containing scrap - as it lifted the container started to slide a few ft and was going to hit a breathing apparatus set on side of heli shed - put his arm out to try to prevent
it striking bottles - he thought he was clear of shed but as he moved back with container his elbow struck the heli shed behind broke his wrist
Casualty was employed as part of a work party retrieving a 64mm dia. Steel braided lifting sling from the pipedeck to the drill floor. During this process the sling fouled and
looped around the end, and on top of a protective bumper rail at the base of th "vee" door ramp, winching was stopped whilst an assessment was made of the guard rail and the
operation recommenced. Upon recommencement of winching the sling fell from the guardrail to the location of the casualty, striking him on the arm and breaking i
Ip was working on the derrick retrieving a section of 5" drill pipe. A tugger line driven from the drill floor winch was started to assist in retrieving the pipe . The line slipped
free and struck the ip on the forearm knocking him to the floor.
During running operations of 2.3/8" workstring on well d8, ip was operating the counterbalance winch pulling in the last sections of pipe past the hwo workplatform. As the
elevators passed the handrail he fended off the pipe by hand to prevent the elevat rs from catching the rail. At this point it is thought that the winch wire had built up on one
side of the winch drum. The wire then slipped off the built up turns and moved to the other side of the winch. The workstring subsequently dropped trapping i s hand between
the guardrail and the elevators.
The operation in progress at the time of the incident was the function check of a new set of air operated slips, which had just arrived onboard the installation. To perform this
function the slips were connected to the air supply by two air hoses to effec opening and closing. This was operated by a pedal in the doghouse. The slips were functioned to
the closed position by the assistant driller. This caused the slips to fall onto their side. A drill floor tugger was connected to the slips, however they did not open due to the slips
being caught under the frame. The assistant rig supt. (ip) had been observing this from the doghouse, at this time he came out of the doghouse to assist and placed his hands on
either side of the frame at the front in an attempt o release the slips. When this failed, he asked for the slips to be lifted a little with the tugger. This lifting action allowed the
slips to clear the frame and in so doing the resultant action of the pneumatic cylinder extended the piston rod causing th frame to be driven to the floor striking his right foot
resulting in a crush injury, breaking a toe and bone in his foot. Written instructions to be provided when using this equipment. Training requirements for this and other work
equipment to be assesse /provided. Slips should be marked in such a way that they are used only as intended the equipment must be visually checked and the function test must
Whist carrying out maintenance on an emergency generator, <...> was 2 hours into his shift when the accident occurred. He was bleeding hydraulic oil from the generator
starting system accumulators through a hydraulic hose into the oil reservoir. The ose kicked as the pressure from the accumulators was released, resulting in a wrist injury.
The working practice has now been changed to ensure the accumulator is safely depressureised before bleeding oil from the system.
<...> (the ip) and a colleague were working on the pipedeck with cargo for a supply boat. A half height container containing sections of a milling trough was on the deck. The
two men entered the container in order to move some sections of the troug to enable other material to be added to it. They were lifting one piece when the ip trapped his hand
between the through and the side wall of the half height, resulting in the 'pad' section of his middle left finger being lost. He was casevaced the same morning. <...> was 9 days
into his tour and 3.5 hours into his shift. Lifting pad eyes will be fitted to each section of the milling flowline or trough, and slings fitted to each section to minimise manual
handling requirements. A practical manual hndling assessment on the operation of filling and emptying storage containers and half heights will be conducted and the incident
will be discussed at drill crew and supervisors safety meetings.
Ip was assisting deck crew landing a lift of multi stacked skips when his finger became trapped between the lip and lifting shackle. Incident to be highlighted at safety meetings
to heighten awareness of the necessity to be alert when lifting operations a e undertaken and to keep fingers away from nip hazards.
Bottom single of a stand of 3.5" drill pipe was to be removed. The pipe was lowered into the mouse hole and broken using rig tongs. The ip assisted the floorman backing off
the bottom single using a chain tong. The floorman worked the chain tong while the ip supported the chain from the opposite side. Once the joint was backed out completely it
dropped to the bottom of the mouse hole - a few inches - and the pipe in the elevators swung clear. It was at this point thatthe ip felt his finger had been nipped. rig crews to be
instructed not to support the chain tong by holding the chain when backing off joints of drill pipe into the mouse hole or similar operations. Crews to be informed of incident
and recommendation at toolbox talks and safety meetings. Detail of this incident to be communicated to other installations.
Whilst steadying load of spool piece being lifted by crane, valve fitted to underside of spool snagged on pipedeck beam, the spool piece swung free and struck casualty on
head. Sustained lacerations to the face. Actions taken to prevent recurrence: 1. In ident to be raised at safety meetings. 2. Issue updated deck operations handbook. 3. Review
progress of training/competency of deck crew and crane ops.
Laying out 6.5 drill collars the operation proceeded as follows: 3 drill collars were laid out in singles from drill floor. A transit sling was wrapped around the front end of the
drill collars which was then lifted by crane in order to wrap remaining s ing round the rear of the bundle. The front end was lowered. The injured went to the catwalk to attach
the back sling to the crane. At that time the bundle broke and a drill collar rolled onto the injured's foot. The dunnage in the v-door prevented th full weight of the drill collar
landing on his foot.
An end cap 'protector' fell during a crane lift from a supply boat onto ip's hard hat causing miror bruising
The chain block had been rigged at 0700 hours for a future operation. It was attached o a sling and lowered by rope. This lowering rope was then left hanging fro, the chain
block. It appears that the connection between sling and chain block has become i secure, and disturbing the hanging rope was enough to dislodge it. <...> was worling in the
derrick sub base with two other roughneck left to remove a hole cover, the other left to pass down more hose. <...> remained in the area below the ch in block and he if
believed to have touched the rope hanging from it. The rope fell approx 16ft to the grating deck,striking him on the head. Recommendations to prevent further occurrences:
identify all rig-ups used by the well engineering department and nsure adequate training. Provision (either by purchase in the market place or by re-design) of chain blocks
with shackles rather than hooks for the semi-permanent interface of lifting gear to a fixed structure. Specifically for the ttpe of rig-up used in he incident subject of this report,
it is recommended to amend procedures to reflect the following: the rope used to lower the chain block into its final position should be attached to the sling and not the hook,
thus ensuring the chain weight rests on th sling at all times.
Lifting grating and securing to railings caught finger between grating and hand rail when one section that was being lifted slipped
Material from a dismantled scaffold was being lowered from level 2 plq external walkway to the valley floor. Whilst a 10' board was being lowered from level 2, the scaffolder
on level 2 lost his grip on the board and the board fell to the valley floor. n its decent, the board was deflected by a horizontal lag pipe, and the board struck the injured party
( material stacking scaffolder) on the chest knocking him to the floor.
After the well intervention work on <...> had finished, the shearseal blow out oreventer (bop) (weighting ca 1 tonne, lingth ca 1 metre) and adaptor spool has to be lifted from
the top of the christmas tree out of the wellbay area. The job was complicated by a fire loop installed on a unistrut square above the wellhead. In order to lift the bop through
the fiore loop,the bop had to be rotated and tilted to one side, once through the fire loop the east crane would be used to lift the bop to the skid deck. Damaging the fire loop
would cause a deluge release and consequent plant shutdown. A scaffoid working platform was constructed around the treea at a height of ca 1.6 metre. Due to the risk of
damaging the fire loop, 3 riggers were tasked to lift the bop through the fire loop, using three chain blocks to turn , tilt and lift thes/s bop. Also at the worksite were an
operations technician the well services supervisor (wss) the <...> picws and the <...> operator, <...>. Using the chain blocks the bop was lifted off the christnas tree and an
adaptor spool removed from the bop by the riggers with assistance of <...>. The spool was laid down on the south west side of the working platform. <...> then stepped down
from platform, the picws left the worksite under instruction of the wss to organise the the crane. The three riggers on the scaffold platform & the ops tech. Next the to the
A drillpipe single was picked out of the mousehole and was being moved to be made up to the drill string. The ip was restraining the drillpipe and nipped his finger between the
joint of pipe and the c-plate on top of the 30" conductor.
The decw crew were relocating a coil of wire using the crane and a polypropylene rope through a santch block to the capstan. The wire coil got stuck and the ip went close to
free the coil. The wire sling holding the snatch block parted and the rope swung and hit his left lower thigh.
Ip was helping deck crew unload supply boat. While positioning the last lift a half hige container containing 10 x 45 gal drums of de- greaser. The ship took a big roll trapping
ip against a waste compactor and the above half hige container.
Incident occured whilst reassembling a top drive drilling system. A torque arrestor had been hoisted into position and was being held at the corect height by a length of sort
line, tied off to an eye at the head of the torque arrestor. The ip was working t the base of the tourqe arrestor, attempting to align the torque arrestor with the link adapter
support plate in order that the securing bolts, which hold the two items together, could be inserted and the torque arrestor secured. At this point in the upe ation the knot in the
soft line slipped and then came free. The torque arrestor weighing approx 135 lbs slid from a height trapping he ip's lower arm against a temporary hop up at the same height
the torque arrestor finally came to rest on top of the hop up off the ip's arm.
At approx 22:30 on <...> there was a lifting incident. Two drillers moving drill pipe were pinned against the wire line unit when drill swung. One driller was evacuated onshore
with a twisted knee.
The casualty was 8hrs into his shift and 13 days into a 14 day tour. The weather was calm and bright. Well <...> was being prepared for n2 lift operations. A 4 1/2" h-2 check
valve had been pulled from the tubing hanger on the well. The polished rod lubr cator (prl) had been removed from the tree and lifted up approx 3' using a tugger from the drill
floor. The casualty asked the other crew members to lower the shaft on the prl and remove the check valve. When this was attempted, the casualty had a parmale wrench
holding the prl shaft in place and the other operator slackened the jubilee clip that holds the shaft in place. When the jubilee clip was slackened off, the shaft slipped down
through the wrench and the shaft with the h-2 check valve hit the opera or on the foot. An investigation team was set up and their recommended actions are: 1. <...> wrench
sent to beach for inspection. 2. Procedure for using prl's will be reviewed. 3. <...> to review operating the prl to determine whether a better method of securing the shaft can be
found. 4. Raise awareness at safety meetings.
The lm2500 turbine had been refitted to the turbine enclosure. The lifting frame used to install the unit was being removed from the enclosure using the overhead hoist installed
in the enclosure. The hoist and attached lifting frame ran off the end of the runway beam due to the fact that the pivoted end stop had not fallen back in place. The lifting frame
struck the ip who was working inside the enclosure. A design change work order [dcwo] has been raised to review the design of the end stops, in the mean ime a sign has been
located adjacent the stops to alert personnel to check the position of the stops.
A permit had been raised to allow <...> wireline crew to rig down and tidy up their equipment in mod 3 production. The work had progressed as far as putting the lifting cap
onto a horizontal riser joint. A certified lifting sling was attached to the pell by crane to raise the riser joint clear of the deck to allow the lifting cap to be fitted. Once the riser
was raised approx. 6" to 8" from the deck the lifting cap (approx. 60lb) was lifted by one operator with the intention of threading it onto the riser joint. The operator thought he
had married the cap and riser joint and made to rotate the cap full onto the riser joint. At this point the cap fell to the deck causing a crushing injury to his left hand when the
cap hit the deck.
Whilst trying to manoeuvre fouled tailpipe assembly in the slip window, the tail pipe was raised causing the assembly to move sideways nipping ip's thumb on the slip bowl
guide.
Ip was assisting in the deployment of an umbilical for a hydraulically powered clamp. His job was to manually feed the slack unbilical hose, which was laid out on the deck,
forwards towards the powered sheave used to deploy the hose to the underdeck. As t e unbilical was being lowered, its weight overcame the friction grip of the sheave and it
began to pay out rapidly. As it gained speed a kink in the slack umbilical, which was looped in a figure of eight on the deck, flew forward and struck the ip on the orhead. In a
few seconds the hose movemnet stopped when all the slack was deployed.
A crossover sub was being lifted using a tugger winch and being guided into poistion. The tugger wire caught up on the top drive - realising causing the x-over sub to move
suddenly upwards - trapping ips fingers between sub and elevators.
A 14" pipe spool for a new riser installation was being positioned over the edge of the north face of the top deck for welding. It had been positioned by crane and was being
held by rigging and located at the end to be welded by a <...> clamp. After som minutes in this position it slipped from the clamp and fell over the edge of the platform onto a
scaffold approximately 2.5m below, although it was still retained by the rigging. As it fell it pushed the injured person over. A cut to the back of his head was discovered some
hours later. He does not recall hitting his head and it is thought that the cut was caused by the zip on his hat liner. Conditions at the time were dry with a 10-15 knot wind. The
area was well lit.
Redundant cable being removed, last cable snagged, extra tug given and hit ip in face causing lacerations & swelling to mouth
In preparation to test bop's <...> was observing the rate of fill of the bop stack looking through the opening in the rotary table when a wire line tool string with sinker bars some
18 foot in length 2" in diameter toppled over striking ip on the helm t and knocked him to the deck. The helmet protected him from more serious injury, although it caused his
glasses to be pushed down on the bridge of his nose resulting in a cut.
A work party were awaiting signing on of their permit prior to starting work. An hvac louvre box fell approximately 10 meteres from the top of the module to the deck,
stricking the injured party a glancing blow on the right lower leg. Louvre retaining sc ews sent for material and failure analysis. The wellhead and dc3w/d3ce ventilation
system is currently being refurbished and any similar problem will be highlighted.
The incident occured while pulling riser no 6. Tension was applied to one wire as part of the procedure to secure cone in position. While working beneath the wire the tension
road separated from the fitting to which it was attached. Releasing the wire. Th wire fell away hitting the ip on the shoulder and glancing his hard hat. Likely causes separation
of tension rod from reducer nipple. Either insufficient make up or the tension rod becomming backed off apr 3 threads remaining when it parted.
Whilst making up the bottom hole assembly on the drill floor, the iron roughneck was being used to screw together the component parts. The assembly fell forward and out of
the v door striking the ip who was working on the catwalk.
While working in the area below dga plant pipework 2 steel shims of approx 10 lbs in weight each fell from under the pipe. One landed on top of a field panel and the other
struck the firewatcher on the shoulder and hand. The shims fell about 6 m.
Ip struck by the top drive bails on the back, whilst removing slings from the top drive assembly.
Ip checking generator. Noticed leak of anti-freeze (ethyl glycol) from a 1/4 inch pip. Tried to tighten fitting with correct tool. Fittingr sheared off. Whilst trying to fit
replacement and then blank off liquid was sprayed over face and body. Ingestion occurred and vomiting resulted.
Preparation for well perforation. Rth using coiled tubing. Displacing well fluid (inhibited seawater) with nitrogen to create a 2000psi underbalance at the perforating depth
displaced fluid routed via mud returns trough injured person monitoring tubing head pressure adjacent to trough 70ppm h2s recorded on alarm in shorters co-incident with
injured person smelling h2s. He collapsed as he was vacating area via pipe shuttle
One of the engine room cats (generator) was overheating. The header tank pressure relief cap was turned to relieve pressure. The cap blew off spraying hot water onto lagged
exhaust, the exhaust deflected the spray onto the injured party. In his retreat th injured party slipped on steps. He received low level scalds to his back, bruising and slight
strain to leg/ankle.
Ip was carrying out a routine function test on a high pressure trip switch associated with the gas compression modules. The ip had applied a "self isolation" from the pressure
source and connected the test instrument in readiness. Upon connection, the i noticed a rapid build up in pressure (given on the instruments digital read-out) which caused gas
to back-pressure via the hydraulic oil resevoir, resulting in failure of the glass "window". Flying glass from the instrument caused lacerations to the ip s hand and face. Upon
investigation, it is apparant that the valve used to isolate the pressure source from the instrument was passing and that there may be a fault with the instrument's pressure
release valve which should have eliminated the possibility of gas exerting a back-pressure on the oil resevoir.
Rig skidding operations on night shift. Hydranautics unit. Hydraulic fluid. Inside. 8.5 hours into the shift & 6th day on board. This man was working the hydraulic unit which
is used to skid the drilling rig.he noticed a trickle of oil from the unit and w nt to close the valve prior to shutting the machine down,it was while he was moving his hand to
close the valve that he was hit by the high pressure leak of hydraulic fluid. *inform and remind personnel the hazards associated working with high pressure sy tems. *'o' seal
replaced. *procedures modified. *system fully inspected.
A minor gas leak on psh m28-14 (opps) created icing which caused activation of the switch function. The latter activated the opps primary protection function, i.e. closing
esdvs 28-2&6 and fcvs. The <...> gas process was shut down and restarted 6 times before trouble shooting identified the cause of the event. The psh was out of service for 8
hours.
The production was shut down due to the failure of a small piece of pipe in the water system. Difficulties in isolating the pipe caused a lenghty (unknown) shutdown. <...>
crude feeds into the <...> system and two <...> cargoes scheduled to load in july were defferred to <...>. <...> field normally produces <...> bbl/d.
Beam trawler onderneming g09 entered 500m safety zone while fishing.
At 04:30 hrs on <...>, the <...> standby vessel <...> contacted the installation control room and informed them, that a <...> fishing trawler <...> had no engine power and was
drifting toward the <...>, nd its positi n was 2 miles from the north east side of the installation. Weather condition at heather: wind 145 deg, 25/30 knots, 2/3 metre seas,
visibility poor in mist, down to 200 metres in places, cloud cover 8 oktas. The vessels sister vessel <...> was n location but unable at this time to offer any assistance. At
04:38hrs the oim on heather was called out, and the platform emergency procedures for collision was activated. The <...> standby vessel <...> launched its frc, and the crew
transfer ed a handline fron the sister vessel <...> to the stricken vessel <...> so that a 3" wire tow line could be connected between the 2 vessels. At 06:04 hrs <...> had taken up
the slack on the wire tow rope and the <...> was on t w passing by the heather on the installations north face at 750 metres. At 06:20 hrs the oim stood down personnel from
their muster stations.
Collision with supply vessel <…> during diesel bunkering operations. Damage to n.e. leg of quarters platform.
At approximately 06.20 <…> the supply vessel <…> was coming alongside the north side of the platform to discharge cargo when it experienced bow thruster control
ploblems. The vessel went under and made contact with the platform underdeck st ucture causing damage to the platform north side diesel bunker hose causing a spillage of
approximately 10 gallons. An underdeck inspection of the platform confirmed no structural damage.
N.leg access bidder damage. Possibly hit by supply vessel. No injuries no other damage vussible. Will be investigating over weekend.
Whilst discharging cargo at <...>, psv <...> struck the north west leg which is column 1.
Tanker <...> at <...> thruster prediction error on no.4 main engine; master immediately called immediately: on instruction from master esd <...> initated immediatly stopping
cargo and releasing hose and chain. 06.09 vessel into manual and fu l astern applied; no response at this time; all thrurster engaged manually with fulll thrust to star- boarm to
clear <...>. Emergency pitch applied,again no response. Main engine stop button, restarted 0814 when vessel abeam of the <...> and operating satisf ctorily at this time in
normal manual control. Vessel make small impact with the outer skirting of the <...> on port bow causing deep scuffing along 25 meters.
Engine failure of 1 engine on sbv <...>. Weather conditions 7-8 seas 45kt winds. Vessel unable to carry out standby duties and had to hold station until escort vessel arrived.
<...> asked to cover standby duties until <...> arrived. <...> arrived safely at <...> 2315hrs on <...> note: main shaft also reported to be loosening from gearbox
At approx. 17:15 during an operation to re-instate the whip line on the west crane, it was noticed that the root section of the boom was bent. The crane was immediately taken
out of service pending iinvestigation and repair. The main finding oof the inves igation was that the crane had been operating on reduced air pressure which affected the
reliability of the pneumatic control system and effectiveness of boom limit switches. Consequently it has been concluded that during operations at minimum radius, the crane
driver would not have been warned nor prevented from inadvertently touching the backstops. Changes to ensure correct air pressure and to warn of low air pressure have been
recommended.
The drill crew were experiencing problems latching the heavy weight drill pipe. The roughneck was assisting by way of the man riding winch. When this operation was
completed the roughneck was lowered back to the floor. The stand was then lowered through t e table in the normal fashion, the driller noticed a flicker on the weight indicator
and the brake was immediately applied. At the same time a loud noise was heard in the area of the floor. The noise came from the top drive gaurd, which had been snapped f
om it's mounting. On further investigation it was established that the man riding wire rope had been trapped behind the gaurd, when the stand was lowered through the floor the
tension of the trapped line had caused the gaurd to snap off and fall to the gr und. Fortunately the gaurd fell to an unpopulated area of the drill floor.
Whilst running in the hole with 3.5" drill pipe, a falling object was observed landing on the drill floor just in front of the draw works. On further investigation the object was
found to be a securing bolt from the service inspection hatch for the crown lock main shaft. It would appear that the bolt in question had been left loose inside the inspection
hatch, and subsequently fallen down through the travelling block and onto the drill floor.
On <…>r one of the crane operators noticed bent lacings on the root section of the west crane boom. The main finding of the investigation team was that the crane had been
used to lift a chemical tank skid unit which was located within the 11m minimm radius. Although the boom was at 11m at the time at which the load was taken, with no luffing
motion, the resultant forces pulled the boom against the stops.
Bunkering hose fell onto back of supply boat when it snagged on the boat whilst being hoisted back onto the platform. A one tonne strop failed when hose was snagged.
Dropped load <…> replacement boom on platform. Full load test on crane.23 tonnes ok.24 tonnes brake slipped. Tried lowering bag to deck. Bag fell to the deck 6-8 ft. Bag
split. No-one injured.
During lift of 9.8 t bulk on the load line, the load line 'jumped'on the drum. The crane operator immediately stopped the lift with the load approximately 6' off the deck and
engaged the load line brake. Whilst turning his head to view the drum location the operator disengaged the lift clutch . The load then travelled through the brake and came to
rest on the deck. No attempt was made to arrest the load descent to avoid shock loading the boom and load line.
A lifting operation was being conducted which required a pipe spool- approx 3.3 tonnes, to be transferred from a platform crane to and errected scaffolding. As the lift was
being transferred onto the structural scaffold, a ladder beam, from which a chain lock was eing suspended started to fail-it started to buckle. At this point, the full load had not
been transferred from the crane. The load was immediately taken back by the crane, and the lift made safe. The structural scaffold did not collapse, nor fal over, but clearly the
ladder beam was badly distored and the operation was stopped. A full investigation was undertake, and initial indications are that there is evidence of internal corrosion of the
ladder beam. A full report is presently being compiled
South crane was lowering an equipment cover weighing 0.2 tonne over the sea down to a lower module. When the whip line lever was put into neutral the l0ad continued to
creep downward. A crane mechanic was called out and arrested tne movement. Investigation ongoing.
At 0630 on <…>, when pulling out of the hole, a roustabout was hit on the shoulder by a small piece of metal (approx. 2"x1"x1"). On inspection, it was found that the metal
object had fallen approx. 90ft from the elevator latch assembly. The driller lowered the elevators to the drill floor and they were then removed from service. The elevators and
failed component are being returned onshore to <…> for analysis and proposals to avoid repeat failure. No injury occurred.
East crane was working the vessel <…>. Basket (approx. 60 ft, weight 9 ton) was to be lifted from the vessel to the platform. The crane operator lifted the basket from the
vessel and the operator continued to boom, slew and hoist the basket clea of the vessel. When the load was approx 30 ft above the vessel the operator was aware that the hoist
drum had stopped moving. The operator advised the vessel to pull clear. When the joystick was put in the neutral position, the basket started to drop in a controlled manner to
the sea. On touching the sea, full control was regained and the basket was lowered on to the platform. The crane has been taken out of operation and the vendor rep mobilised
to investigate the incident.
A 3 ton chain bock was being used to support a 12" water injection line along with hydraulic jack, to allow the installation of packing to be fitted to supports. On taking up the
tension with the chain block the chain snapped at the point where it meets w th the chain block. No injury or damage was caused by the failure. The chain block was certified
by <…> lifting on <…>.
A 2 ton webbing sling parted when used to turn the bridle of a heavy lift into position.
Gantry crane stuck, tugger attached - wire rope parted, 1 tonne sling 4 tonne tugger. No injuries. (air tugger)
Making up sub on top drive unit when tong line parted. Line is rated at eight tonnesand in date for certification. Examination of east torque unit shows no mechanical defect.
A one ton sling parted durning a lift. It had become snagged under the load being lifted from deck level. The crane record showed that the sling failed at 4.5 ton. Crane in use
was <…> north crane. No injuries or other damage. Full investigation including s tree. Cause tree analysis ongoing.
Supply vessel operations removal of bunkering hose from supply vessel wind 10-12 knots, sea 1-2 metres, visibility 2 miles. Overcast with mist. 3 ton sling while carrying out
the normal retrieval of the bunkering hose, the vessel deck crew indicated that he hook was connected ready for lifting the hose. The lifting sling attached to the hose snagged
on one of the vessels stern bollards. The crane driver tried to free the sling causing the sling to fall. Hose had been raised to around 2ft at the time. Leve 2 crane operator
gaining experience under the direct supervision of level 3 team crane driver.
Normal production operations ongoing at the time. Drilling operations ongoing, running 26" conductor pipework. Cold and dry with wind at 25 knots. Control (instrument )
technician in the process of carrying out routine maintenance when a sling weighing ap rox. 3kg landed approx one and a half metres from where he was working. Investigation
into what actually caused the sling to fall is yet to be concluded. Once the findings are known appropriate action will be taken to ensure no reoccurence of the incident
An inlet header on the hydrocyclone package had been removed for valve replacement. The header was supported on chain blocks with two 1.6 tonne pull-lifts used to
manoeuvre the header spool out of the way for access to the valves. When returning the heade to position, it was necessary for one pull-lift to be operated to even the load as it
was being lowered. When the operator changed the gear to change direction to lower the chain free fell through the mechanism resulting in the load being dropped approxi
ately 6 inches until it stopped on the new valve. When this happened the operator noticed the pull lift on the other end of the header slipping. The load was made safe and the
lifting gear involved removed to quarantine for technical examination. Environm ntal conditions were good and the location was inboard of the module. Person involved in
operation of the pull lift is a safety rep and is involved in the investigation. All other similar units on the platform were checked and found to be operating correctly.
During tripping out operations of 5" drill pipe on well t 15, the drill pipe was being moved from the pipe shuttle, to the south pipe bay, using the heila pipe handling machine.
At approx. 16:50 hrs, a joint of 5" drill pipe had been picked from the pipe shuttle with the pipe handling machine & was in the process of being moved to the south pipe bay.
As the pipe was being manoeuvred towards the south pipe bay & approx. 10 - 15' above the pipe shuttle, the grab on the end of the pipe handling machine's telescopic arm
became detached. This resulted in the drill pipe & grab falling back onto the pipe shuttle. The box end of the drill pipe came to rest on the hand rail of the stairs to the rig
floor, with the pin end on the pipe shuttle. The grab was between the drill pipe and the handrail at the south side of the pipe shuttle. Investigation revealed that the locking pin
fitted to the pivot pin, which secures the grab to the pipe handling machine had failed. As a result of this failure, the pivot pin was then free to move. This resultant movement
led to pivot pin becoming clear of its bushing on one side. The weight of the drill pipe then caused grab & pivot pin to swivel about the other bush, causing mechanical
deformation of the lug. Once the pin was clear of bracket, the grab was no longer restrained & slid.
Following retrieval of wireline tool string into lubricator & riser attached to the swab valve on well a3, the braided wire parted in the pack-off assembly on top of the lubricator.
He was released for a period of 20 secs between the wire leaving and the floating seal segment assembly closing off the flow. The back pressure in the lubricator activates the
segments. The seal can form a pressure seal if hydraulically pressured. The action was taken in this case by the wireline winch operator. There were no injuries or damage
other than the braided wire.
3 production operators and 2 deck crew were preparing to lift lid off pig launcher with crane. 1.2 ton swivel sling attached to lid then onto hook of 8 ton pennant. Crane
operator told to hoist lid which became stuck. Informed to lower off, informed to jib back and take the weight after repositioning, once again told to take the weight. This time
the sling snapped, the lid remained in position but the 8 ton pennant became detached from the main hoist hook and dropped to the ground striking person on ri ht shoulder.
Deck foreman arrived and inspected hook which was found to be in a locked position. This has since been removed and sent for analysis.
Whilst lifting a pipe carrier from the deck of the <...>, using the <...> east crane, one of the 3 ton attached slings fouled, and caught on to a 20 ton half height. This caused the
sling to fail and part, dropping the load to the supply vesse deck. The dropping distance was approx 4-5 feet, no personnel were injured. The crane overload alarm did not
sound, and no damage was sustained, by the crane or its equipment. After removal of damaged sling, checks for vessel and equipment damage were carried out. When
satisfied work recommenced.
Skid deck hatch being lifted using 5 tonne tugger form drill floor. When the hatch was approx 1ft above deck one padeye bolt sheared and the hatch fell back onto deck
An iron roughneck required to be backloaded for onshore repair. The equipment was packed into a half height container on the pipedeck and securely fastened in position with
timber shoring. Prior to backloading the container was inspected by both deutag a d wood group deck foreman. The container was lifted and transported down onto the supply
vessel deck; the platform <...> generators were started sending a cloud of black smoke in the general direction of the crane drivers view was obscured and the containEr, by this
time approximately 1.5m above the vessel deck, impacted against adjacent containers. At this point thee container wall collaped and the iron roughneck fell to the vessel deck.
The deck sustained superficial damage. In accordance with standard operation procedure the vessel deck crew had retreated to a safe location prior to the container being
lowered and were well clear of the incident. The container was fitted with a removable wall on one side, although this was not apparent to those staff l ading the equipment.
Prior to this particular duty the container had been used to transport bop's th the platform. These bop's had been secured by struts tack welded the container floor. The weather
at the time of the incident was well within limits for such a lift.
Nightshift crane operator had carried out the normal start-up and function tests prior to commencing crane lifts. All the tests proved successfull and there was no slippage on
brakes. However, when transporting a 1.9 tonne lift to the pipedeck, the boom s ipped approx. 5 feet. This occurred immediately after the signal to spop was given by the
banksman. There were no clashes with the load as it was still approx 15 feet above the deck. Operator immediately landed the load and made the crane secure he the co tacted
the pss who called out the mechanic to invesigate the fault.
Whilst pulling out of hole (<...>). The ids (top drive) system seized on the torque tube. Torque tube assembly and supports were pulled upward and uncurred stractural
damage.a metal plate, approx. 5kg, was displaces from the structure and fill to the drill floor.
Whilst laying down 13 3/8" casing using 500 tonne spiders and single joint elevators, one of the slings connecting the evevator bridle to the spiders broke and struck a
technician who was on the stabbing board assisting backing out the casing joint.
When lowering the clamp to the drill floor with no equipment in it,it dropped onto the floor and the hinge wield fractured
Wireline lubricator, bop and shooting nipple were to be lifted through the rotary table using the travelling block. As the strain was taken up one leg of the two leg lifting chain
While pressure testing coiled tubing bop pipe rams the test tool was ejected vertically 50ft. Striking the underside of the top drive. The tool then fell to the drill floor
While removing the <...> bop,s by means of the rig tugger the rugger winch wire dislodged the split type rotary hole cover which fell through the rotary hole struck the bop
trolley, then continued to the skid deck, a total distance of 38ft. No injury or damage sustained.
In the final stages of running a new completion into <...> utilising hydraulic workover unit.encapsulated control and balance lines were being clamped to the completion string
by two <...> operators who were standing on a scaffold sited underneath hwu workbasket. Control and balance lines were routed from the spooler reel(sited on skid deck) via a
roller sheave hung off access scaffold to the completion string. During the operation a test manifold sited internal to the spooler drum fouled drum rotating mechanism causing
reel to stop rotating. As completion was being run in hole this caused excessive tension on the sheave and ultimately the scaffold to which it was attached resulting in partial
scaffold collapse.
During back loading operations on to supply boat <...>, the boom walkway on the <...> east crane snagged one of the guy wires on the hydraulic workover unit (hwu). As the
crane slewed further outwars, the guy wire unsnagged, causing the h u to shake and oscillate. No injuries were sustained.
Whilst laying down a 2-3/8" joint from the hydraulic workover unit, the box end of the joint slipped through the weatherford (type p) single joint elevator. The free end fell 71"
to the pipe deck. No injuries were sustained.
Operation - unloading a boat. Enviromental conditions - good visability, moderate sea rate. Substance involved - liquid nitrogen container. Machine - crane with wire pennant.
Events - during normal crane operations of unloading/backloading a boat , the bo t deck crew hooked onto the load, the crane driver took the weight and the pennant wire
parted from its socket. The swl of the pennant is 15.5 tonnes and the weight of the container 10.9 tonnes. People involved - crane driver/ boat crew.
Equipment failure draw-works "brake releasing spring stop" failed causing braking shaft to over rotate. This allowed the pivot point under the spring to move under centre,
rendering the brake inoperable. There was no load attached to the lifting device at this incident. The driller controlled the situation using the secondary electric brake
meechanism and operator skill. This type of brake may be an industry standard brake unit.
14" diameter spool of approx. 6m in length, obtuce shape weighing 2.2t being installed on the east side of production deck mezz of the platform . The spool piece had been
slung for lifting by means of two three tons (swl) transit lifting slings at the cor ect angle. When moving the spool into its location the lifting sling ferrule on one of the slings
came into contact with a protruding piece of the platform steelwork. This resulted in the ferrule snagging and dropping one end of the spool approx. 4m. It id not make contact
with any of the platform structure or equipment. The load was left suspended by the remaining three ton sling. None of the personnel involved with this operation were
hurt/injured. The incident site was made safe pending a full investigation. Weather conditions fine.
During normal drilling operations the draw works brake failed. As a result the ddm(derrick drilling module) was allowed to descend and came to rest on the drill floor. During
the descent the brake which had been left on remained in the on position. On ealising there was a problem the driller operated the emergency brake. Contact with the drill
floor caused damage to the equipment. Weather was fair with light rain but had no bearing on the incident. Equipment is now quarantined subject to investigatio
The draw works brake failed during tripping operations the ddm (topworks descended approximately 50ft (freefall) until stopped by the draw works operators actions he
controlled the ddms descent by use of the balor brake (electromagnetic brakes) the failure caused no damage or injury
During lifting operations of a 50 foot wire mess completions container from the walkway of m6 roof west side, the container lifted out two sections of heavy duty handrail. The
handrail fell from m6 roof and was suspended above the walkway of the skid deck east side by the remaining handrail. The north crane was used during this incident. The
weather conditions were fine. The handrail was recovered and relocated.
A container was being lowered to the deck of supply ship mv <...>. On impact with container already on deck of vessel (to obtain correct location) a steel 't' rod about 60cms
long weighing 1 kilo fell from the underside of lowered container to vessel deck. Vessel deck crew were well clear of the dropped object. The steel rod is not a platform item of
equipment and has the appearance of a "home made tool". Due to the condition of the rod it is likely that it was jammed on the underside of the co tainer for some considerable
time. And the impact of the container caused it to come loose and fall. Asco has been informed and are attempting to trace previous locations of the containor to determine if
anyone can determine the source of the rod.
While re-entereing a wireline tool into the lubricator the wireline bezame snagged - the wire broke at the weak link - the attached tool fell from the lubricator on the upper deck
onto the swab uiv on the mezzanine deck on damage.
Lifting by crane the dieseg bunkering hose. The dry break coupling snagged on the hose saddle causing the coupling to break. Lower half of the hose fell to seabed. Missed
<...> by 3 1/2 m.
When lifting out a clamp from the wellhead using an air tugger. As the clamp passed through the drilling bop deck hatch, it dislodged a deck support beam (which formed the
edge of the hatch opening). This beam subsequently fell into the wellhead and lan ed five metres from the men who were vacating the area, having finished their task. The
incident was a near miss. The air tugger operator was in contact with two observers (radios). The construction of the bop deck is such that these beams can be remov d along
with the deck plates, to increase the size of the hatch opening. The beam is a channel section beam that sites in u-shaped lugs either end. To secure the beam and prevent it
becoming dislodged the u-lugs and beam are drilled and securing pins fi ted. It would appear that these retaining pins had not been fitted the last time the beam had been
removed and re-fitted.
Work was in progress to change out the anchor points on the <...> passenger lift. Part of the work scope was to take the weight of the lift cab to enable the anchors to be
released. During this operation, the rigger had to release the gipsey chain to adjus his gloves. At this point he noticed that the weight had come off the strops. A further
unsuccessful attempt was made to take the weight. The lifting operations were suspended and the faulty chain block removed from service and replaced. The chain bloc has
been sent for independent specialist inspection for the reason and nature of failure to be identified.
During calibration tests an accomation jacket crane with water bag, the hook, rope and water bag was accidentally released into the sea. Suspect pump on crane hydraulics.
During tripping operations the derrickman attached the chain at the end of the monkey board tugger line around a stand of 5 1/2 dp in order to rack back same. As the
derrickman started to rack back the stand the dead end of the winch line eye slipped thro gh the ferrule. The chain attached to the eye by a hook slipped down the pipe. At
approx 30' above the drill floor the chain unwound itself from the pipe and free fell to the drill floor.
A sheave (1.7kg) dropped from the monkey board level durning a hoisting and lifting survey. It bounced from the derrick and landed in the process module at the back of the
derrick.
Having just made a connection in the hwo unit work basket the jack started to push the pipe in the hole. The winch wore connected to the top of the pipe in the hole. The
winch wire connected to the top of the pipe was inadvertantly left in the 'pull' po ition. Lowering the jack the cable broke at the sheave. The one piece wound back on the
winch, the other piece fell back onto the pipe.
Loop of 8mm wire fell 40 feet from its support sheave onto the work basket. Both ends of the wire were secured. One at the winch drum, the other to a lifting cap fitted to a
joint of tubing that was being stroked out of the well by the hydraulic worko er unit. On inspection of the sheave, it was apparent that the sheave wheel had siezed and the
wire had worn/cut the sheave wheel in half. All parts of the sheave remained suspended in the derrick. The sheave had been inspected on <...>.
Construction and commissioning work is ongoing during the hook up phase of the etap project. Whilst rigging for a 1.5 tonne lift of a spool, two 2-4 tonne beam clamps were
rigged with two 2 tonne chain blocks onto two 2 tonne wire slings. The slings were ouble wrap reeve to reduce the weight loading further. When starting to place a load on one
of these straps, it parted, the other strap held the weight and the riggers made the sight safe. The task was being carriedunder the permit to work system by compe ent riggers.
All straps carry test certification being purchased new, they have been in use for a maximum of three weeks. A report on the sling faliure from a specialist vendor who
examined it also is attached. We concur with the report and believe that t e sling was damaged on a previous lift. All the slings in use on cpf have been called in for expert
examination on site and toolbox talks have been held with rigging teams to emphasis the need to examine slings for prior damage before putting them into se vice.
Accident/incident report <...> details in investigation fully. The weather conditions were dry and clear.
The hydraulic actuator - weight 3.2 tonnes - for the heron 'a' oil inlet valve was in the process of being reinstated after repair. During the installation operation, the actuator was
suspended at a height of approx 6 feet from the deck and a few inches above a temporary access scaffold platform. The load made an uncontrolled descent after wooden blocks
used for dunnage slipped form the rigging arrangement. The load remained attached to the slings during the descent but the tempoaray access scaffold below was badly
damaged. There was no damage to the valve actuator. An investigation has revealed that the installed 14 tonne runway beam in the area does not provide enough headroom for
the removal or reinstatement of the valve actuator. In order to gain extra height the riggers clamped a 6 inch h beam on top of the existing runway beam & then set timber
dunnage on top of that. The wire strops were then wrapped around both beams & the dunnage. To gain height the choke hitch was set high on the reverse side of the beam.
The load had been suspended just off the deck for approximately 30 mins to test the arrangement & takethe stretch out of the strops. It had been raised to working height for
over 15 minutes before slipping. The area had been barriered off for the lift to exclude non essential personnel, the two riggers and the valve technician involved in the
Te drilling mousehole (length 30', diameter 9") had been lifted from the pipe rack to the moving pipe deck using the platform crane. When the mousehole was subsequently
lifted from the deck the spacer(weight 18kg) which during normal operations sits on to of a spring at the bottom of the mousehole, slid out and dropped 2ft onto the moving
pipedeck. The spacer and spring which should have been removed prior to transportation were still in fact contained inside the mousehole. <...> were in charge of the operation
for <...>. Actions to prevent occurrence 1. <...> on behalf of <...> to develop a procedure for the safe lifting and treansportation of the mousehole to ensure the spacer and
spring cannot fall outduring transportation. 2. All <...> crew to be made aware of the incident through toolbox talks. 3. All <...> and <...> installations advised of the incident
4. <...> to carry out audit of this type of portable equipment and procedures amended to ensure safe transportation.
As part of routine crane maintenance the operator checked the minimum boom radius cut-out, which worked correctly.he then proceeded to attempt to lower the boom,
however as he moved the lever to the 'boom down' position the boom began to rise further resu ting in impact and damage to the back stops. The operator was only able to
prevent the boom from raising further by switching off the engine. The operator sought the assistance of a colleague to observe the boom movement as he attempted to recover
the boo to the boom rest. This was achieved successfully and the crane was taken out of service until the root cause of the failure had been identified. Subsequent investigation
by the crane mechanic identified two faults within the boom hoist mechanism. 1) a pn umatic hose in the boom hoist clutch supply was found to be crimped by it's supporting
bracket resulting in a restriction in the line, preventing the air pressure venting to atmosphere. 2) a leaking shuttle valve within the boom lowering system was passin air
through to the boom hoist system, such that even when selecting 'boom down' the boom would be caused to raise. Actions have been put in place to check similar parts within
the other cranes within the forties field & to prevent recurrence.
While the derrick man was operating the monkey board jacking system, the pin end of the jacking handle detached and fell 90 feet to the rig floor. The pin weighed approx
0.5kg. When removed and inspected the weld connecting the pin to the handle was found to have broken. The handle was repaired and additional pins to back-up the new weld
installed in the handle. The pin did not strike anyone.
Normal drilling operations were in progress at the time of the incident a roughneck, <...>, was being winched up to approximately 13m above the drill floor using a man riding
winch and riding belt. When the winch operator, <...>, another roughneck, returned the operating lever ('dead man's handle' to the neutral position he realisedrealised that <...>
was still being hoisted upwards. He immediately moved the operating lever to the lower position, which stopped the winch from lifting further but didn't actually lower the
man back down. At this point the rig manager, <...> took over the controls & isolated the air supply to the winch using a quarter turn valve mounted local to the operator stance
point. The stabbing board was then moved to a suitable height to allow safe recovery of <...>. The winch involved was an <...>. Its <...> work identification no is <...>. The
winch was immediately taken out of service and arrangements made for a lifting equipment specialist, <...> of <...> to transfer to the platform to participate in the failure
investigation. On stripdown of the operating lever (part no <...>) it was discovered that the lip of the 'raise' pilot valve piston bore had been peened over slightly through
contact with the head of the 'raise' actuating screw. This had prevented the pilot valve piston returning to its neutral position.the actuating screw had become able to contact the
Drilling crew were running drill pipe in the hole. Conditions at the time of the incident were calm and visibility was good. The derrickman was on the monkey board using the
derrick tugger through a sheave. During this operation the sheave pin became deta hed and fell approximately 85 feet to the drill floor. Internal investigation team was set up
immediately.
The bop deck crane/hoist was being used to transport bags of milled swarf from well 5-1 to the west end of the bop deck on the north track. The transverse trolley that allows
the trolley to move onto other east/ west tracks was not at the end of the track that the trolley was being operated on. The trolley reached the end of the track and rode over the
stops at the end of the runway beams. The west wheels of the trolley came off the end of the track. The hoist was secured and lifted back onto the tracks. A investigation team
was set up, but initial thoughts are that the stops may not have been fully extended at the ends of the track and the operator was not observing the travel extent of the trolley.
The trolley will not be used without the transverse trol ey in place at the end of the track that the hoist trolley is being used on. It is likely an engineering fix and procedures
will be introduced to prevent recurrance but this is subject to the findings of the investigation team.
Whilst carrying out drilling operations on <...> well <...>. The drilling operators <...> were preparing to run in hole with first section of 9 5/8" casing. The section has been
positioned into the rotary table using the single joint elevator. The single joint elevator was connected to the main block and lifted approx. 20 feet. At that point the link
connection on the single joint elevators parted and the casing fell through the rotary table. The casing came to rest as the collar of the single joint elevator me the rotary table
preventing the length of casing falling down hole. The operations was suspended and made safe until an assessment could be made. Checks on similar equipment carried out
and no defects found. Investigation as to the likely causes underway
An empty nitrogen tank was being back loaded from the platform to the far supporter . During the lift one section of 1/8" checker plate decking (1mx2m) blew off the tank and
fell into a half height container on the port side of the far supporter deck. The weather conditions at the time of the incident were wind 36 knots, direction 101 degrees, sea state
2-3 m. An incident investigation has been initiated and is ongoing. Actions taken/planned to prevent recurrence of incident
While traversing the overhead crane in the ngl package, the crane hoist struck a valve assembly that had been installed at a lute seal in the deck surface drain pipework. The
impact caused a 3/4 inch screwed nipple in the assembly to pull out of the trea ed socket, both the valve and the nipple fell to the walkway of the package, outside the ngl
control room. The valve assemble weighed 7lb and fell approx., 20 feet.
Cargo transfer between platform and supply vessel <...>. Using the north west <...> hoist crane. During the transfer of drill pipe for back load, the boom hoist sprag clutch
failed. The boom began to free fall, causing the load which was posi ioned above the desired landing area to land heavily on the deck. The boom continued to fall until the
mechanical breaks arrested the fall. The boom fell from approx. 90' radius to 130'. Supply boat crew unhooked the load and the crane boom was raised and locked in a safe
position to enable the maintenence team to investigate the failure.
A drill side track work over was underway, running a cement clean out assembly, operating the draw works. During the operation of the draw works a retaining wing nut
weighing approx. 1/2lb fell 30ft to the drill floor from the draw works line spooler susp nsion snatch block. The snatch block is an ansell jones 2 tonne rated block with a
detachable sheeve face plate (to allow threading the wire over the sheave). The wing nut had sheared from the bolt assembly
Whilst pulling the drillstring a travelling block dolly carriage compression spring fell some 50ft to the drillfloor. The compression spring was circa 1kg, size circa 14 by 13
inches. The spring narrowly missed a person on the drillfloor.
The deck crew were back loading a 20' basket of scaffolding tubes and boards onto the support vessel (far supporter) deck. The crane driver was trying to turn the basket to
allow placement on the deck when it touched against the port side of the vessel, t is and the up rise of the vessel caused the basket to tip and 5 boards falling approx, 5 foot onto
the support vessel deck. The boards and tubes had been secured correctly prior to the lift.
A single joint elevator with chain and swivel attached slid down over the joint of tubing when the chain on which it was suspended broke. This was caused by the elevator not
being slowed down quickly enough when it was picked up to be positioned below the tool joint before
Well f06 wireling to replace insert valve below sssv and in retieving tool, wire cut and tool fell down hole - prong on tool is stock through flapper of sssv intend to set check
rate below long dose
Riggers using 3 x 1 ton chain blocks to tirfor pipespool. Whilst removing the spool the rigger noticed that the load chain on the center block was running through the block-
brake not holding. As the spool was being supported by 2 other blocks the rigger as able to swap out the deffective block and complete the spool installation safely.
During crane operations on the skid deck, crane lifted and slewed with 8' container approx. 5ft, to move away from erected scaffolding. This was a blind lift. Container hit a
handrail (approx. 60 kgs), handrail sheared at bottom of stanchions and fell dow to the impact deck below (approx. 20ft).
Dropped object: no injury to personnel. The south crane was put on the park brake facility, and the crane op went for a break. On his return he heard a banging noise on the
drill derrick cladding. He saw that the crane pennant hook was swinging in the w nd [gusting 40 knots] and striking the cladding. On further investigation he noticed that the
geronimo line [10 mm derrickman's rescue line] had been struck and that it had parted at the padeye on the monkey board level. The line fell approx 40 metres, oming to rest
2 metres above the south skid desk. The crane driver immediately informed the hse advisor of this and an investigation team was formed to determine the root cause and to
prevent reoccurence.
The supply vessel <...> was being unloaded of cargo via the platform east crane. A 20ft half height was hooked onto the whipline and when deck personnel clear, started to lift.
At approx. 10 feet off the deck the crane operator felt a loss of p essure on the whipline controls. The load dropped onto the deck turning onto its side spilling pipe onto deck
which became lodged between other cargoes.vessel deck crew later secured further with chocks ect. Control was available to lower whipline so that the headache ball could be
lowered onto deck to release from load. The deck crew unhooked the load, pulled the pennant clear and once clear from the vessel crane was shut down for further
investigation. The main hydraulic oil supply hose was found to have burst at its mid point by the support bracket.
Whilst lifting a 300kg flowline pipe spool from the cellar deck east lay-down area by crane, the load became snagged under a protruding structural beam causing the 1 tonne
lifting sling to fail resulting in the load falling approx 20 ft to the deck. No ersonnel were injured but the deck sustained a large gash. The area was barriered off pending
inspection of the area and communication with the hse
During top hole drilling operations, a securing pin dislodged from the bail ears hinge pin. The hinge pin fell 90ft to the drill floor. Significant vibrations are normally
experienced during this activity, the drill floor is barriered off and all bolts/p ns checked regularly. The dropped hinge pin was replaced and the equipment checked. Drilling
operations resumed when the equipment was deemed okay. The top drive vendor has been contacted to identify/discuss possible improvements to the bail ear hinge
mechanism.
During rigging up operation of riser prior to connecting cp49 xmas tree to wireline bop, a 40' section of 5" riser fell approx. 15-18ft into module 02 well head. Investigations
have revealed that the drillfloor rotary table slips used to secure the riser n position were dislodged accidently by the rigging bridle ring in use with the draw works/rail arms.
While setting up to lift the last 12' section of the riser to stab into the 40' section of the slips. The rigging was drawn across the drillfloor and u wards with the block. The ring
of the 3 leg bridle caught one of the outer lifting handles on the slips and lifting them and allowing the riser to slip and fall clear of table through bop. Deck and into wellhead
module below. Riser damaged scaffold adjacent to well <...>9
A joint of completion tubing was raised to the hydraulic workover unit workbasket, the laydown line tether was unhooked from the pine end protector, the protector was
removed and the joint stabbed into the previous joint. The pin end protector was re-conn cted to the laydown line tether by means of a safety hook. The tether with attached
protector was released from workbasket, the protector wt, 14 kg detached from the safety hook and fell approx 16 meters after first glancing a scaffoldaccess tower to hwu. the
protector impacted a greted area on the unit sub-structure, bounced and fell a further 4 mtrs to skid deck.
Crane boom being lifted from cradle as part of a driver examination when 2m out of cradle it fell back into cradle, damaging underside tubulars on the boom.
During wireline well intervention into well e9, the toolstring became stuck. After "jarring" in an attempt to free the toolstring, the wire parted at surface and went down hole.
The well was immediately shut in at surface. It is estimated that a maximu of 0.75 standard cubic metre of hydrocarbon gas was released via the top of the wireline lubricator
(stuffing box) before the well was shut in.
A liner & retaning ring was lifted out of the mud pump cylinder by a chain hoist on a gantry crane. When the load was above the cylinder top the gantry crane was swung over
the main deck. The load was then lowered and when the load was six inches above th deck the main lift chain parted allowing the load to drop the last half foot.
Whilst lowering the 21 1/4 bop onto the lp riser (bop deck module d2) the lifting rams a & b failed resulting in the bop dropping 6" onto the lp riser. The rams failed at the
clevice end. The other tow rams remained intact. The bop came to a rest at a light angle on top of the lp riser. The site was made secure. No personnel were injured. The
investigation is ongoing as to the exact cause of the failure.
When moving/lifting the pipestop during 95/8" casing operation a one tonne sling & 2 x 2 tonne shackles were secured to the pipestop. (weight approx 450kg). The sling was
placed into the crane hook of east crane whipline. The banksman signalled to the cra e operator to take the strain and lift easy. The sling was tensioned and it failed
catastrophically at the hook end. The pipestop did not move and the whipline jolted slightly. No personnel were injured. The data from the crane mipeg unit has been do
nloaded for interrogation to ascertain possible causes.
While pulling a 1/4 tonne assembly along the deck the operating handle of a 3/4 tonne swl chain hoisr sheared off at the connecting bolt due to brittle failure. As a result of this
there was no longer any retention of the chain within the chain hoist and he chain was free to pull through. As the valve was only being pulled along the deck there aws no
dropping of the load and subsequent damage to people or plant
As a dunnage rack was veing unloaded one of the four legs parted transferring all the load onto the remaining three legs of the bridle. The weather at the time of the incident
was;- wind 20 knots, sea state 2m, visibitity good although lighting was by me ns of platform/supply vessel and crane lighting. During offloading of the tubing the crane driver
felt and noticed one of the four legs of the bridle part. The lift at this time was level with the pipedeck but still outboard of the platform. It was felt b the driver that the best
course of action would be to continue with the lift and to land it on the pipedeck as quickly as possible. The deck crew on pipedeck where told by the driver to stay clear whilst
he landed the load which was done in a controlled anner. The failed lefting equipment is to be depatched onshore for examination following which any corrective actions will
be generated.
Emergency fire pump p27d was started as part of routine weekly checks. During initial run up (after about 3 seconds) a loud bang was heard and a flash was seen in the vicinity
of the battery banks. The operator immediately shutdown the pump. On inspection it was seen that 1 battery had exploded in the battery bank 'a' and the top of the batter was
destroyed. Battery acid was released during the explosion but largely contained by a lid on the battery bank the operator was injured and not exposed to acid spray.
After rig skidding of rig 1 from a61 to a67 the lower section of the wireline riser backed off between the pin and collar falling and striking a67 hatch cover, coming to rest on
the substructure and a67 hatch. Weather direction - 270 deg. Speed - 32kn gus ing 50kn. Sea - 5m sig - 8m max. Investigation ongoing.
A completion string had been run on well b15. During a rouine pressure test of the annulus with an applied pressure of 3000peo. The tubing hanger lifted approx 4 feet out of
the bowl and past the holding down bolts. At the time of the inc normal precautio s for pressure testing were in place with the surrounding cleared of personnel and barriered
off.
Whilst dismantling a suspended scaffold platform, located above n7 on level 3 north west corner of platform, a scaffold tube 6 inches long slipped out of a jointing sleeve and
fell approx. 60-80 feet to level 1 deck. A safety meeting was held to discuss t e incident and raise awareness to ensure this type of hazard is identified in future and appropriate
barriers are erected below scaffold operations.
A piece of wind wall cladding ( 3.3 ft x 8 inch x 1/16 inch,weight 5.6 lbs ) was found on the south walk way of the pipe deck. On further investigation by drilling crew it was
found that the piece originated from the east side of the racking board wind wa l. A reasonable assumption can be made as to what must have happened. While waiting on
weather due to high winds in excess of 70 knots a piece of wind cladding came loose. This piece landed approximately 90 ft lower on the pipe deck walk way. The piece i part
of a cladding member positioned directly adjacent to a window cut in the racking board wind wall structure. This window allows the degasser vent line to be routed through the
wind wall. The actual window in the wind cladding is not reinforced with a frame structure. As a result the cladding member adjacent to the window was subjuct to increased
bending stress (wind loading, derrick work).
A stainless steel plate 900mm x 320mm, weight 5lg fell onto an access platform on the crude oil plate coolers from the pipe work and has vacated the area.
A metal wedge approx weight 5kgs fell from a height in excess of 15 feet narrowly missing personnel below. This was on the south west corner of the main deck. There was no
sign of other personnel working or moving in the area. No wind or vibration which m ght explain the reason this object fell.
At 1400hrs on the <...> during the dismantling of scaffold no 9770 a section of handrail weighing some 18kgs fell away from its normal position striking scaffolder <...> then
falling 30m to level 2 east side of the puq. As it fell its glanced off th live 18" cr gas production pipeline which is 8m above level 2 deck coming to rest on top of the
scaffolding rack on level 2. The injured person received bruising to his head and shoulder. He did not require any medical treatment. The 18" pipeline was no damaged.
The floor hands were cleaning up the derrick, wellservices were working below on rigfloor. One of the floorhands had an untied bucket and was filling it with water on a
walkway without a kickplate. The hose was partway around the bucket which was pulled a d knocked the bucket off the walkway. It fell to the rig floor below, no one was
injured. The bucket had been initially tied off but was untied to move to another location. This represented a high potential incident but no one was injured and no damage oc
urred.
A helicopter trolley was knocked from its resting place in the helideck netting onto the pa top deck.
Techincian positioned ba cylinder verically againist the handrail, the the cylinder slipped and then rolled under the ajdacent stairtread falling onto the stairway below (approx 2
metres). It then rolled down to the next level, hit the kickplate and rolle under the bottem step falling (approx 0.5 metres) onto the sloping roof of the walkway between the plq
and ralq and subsequently rolled to the north edge and then fell in clear space to the sea
A small piece of angle iron 4 x 4x4 cm /100 gr dropped from unknown height in the derrick onto the drill floor. Origin of angle iron could not be traced.
During routine wireline operations, a set of spang jars slipped from the operator's hand through one of the rotary table kelly bushing holes to the bop deck (36ft below). The
bop deck was barriered off to ensure no personnel would be in the area.
Work was ongoing, spooling a new guide wire onto a drum in the skyscape unit. The wire rope was fed round two snatch blocks to allow the wire to be fed onto the drum under
slight tension. One of the snatch blocks was anchored to a pad eye on the skyscape ase plate. During spooling unexpected tension was placed on the wire rope which lifted the
baseplate. Although spooling was stopped the motor continued to operate spooling about another two feet of wire onto the drum, this was enough to pull the baseplate off its
two rear support lugs and it fell into the sea. Information on this incident has been disseminated to other brae platforms and discussions with the equipment supplier are
underway.
An operations technician was walking along the walkway on the pdr level 1 south east when a scaffold clip - weight 0.85kg - landed on the walkway approx. 1.2 metres away
from his location. He immediately looked up to see people looking over the handrails n level 5a, 38.5 metres above, where it was later established that scaffold erection work
was being carried out. Immediately after the incident all scaffolding areas on the cpf were checked for loose items. All scaffolders were councelled, at a specially onvened
toolbox talk, on the need to ensure that all areas below any scaffold work, erection, monification or dismantling, must be barriered off with imformative signs and chains to
exclude passers by. This is reinforced in the permit to work system. Duri g investigations into the incident one of the scaffolders involved in the work on level 5a came forward
to the oim, accompanied by his safety representative, to admit to disloging the scaffold clip.<...> accident/incident report <...> refers. The weat er conditions were dry and clear
with minimal wind.
Two scaffolders were erecting a scaffold platform below the deisel tanks adjacent to the east stairway level 3. The oim who was on a safety inspection observed that the
walkway below the scaffold had not been barriered off and the oim instructed the scaf olders to stop the work. As the scaffolders were complying with this with this request a
scaffolding clip weighing 0.5kg fell 6 metres onto the walkway below. Initial investigations show that the scaffolders were working under a bp permit to work procesur which
staes that the performing authority are required to barrier off areas below when working from height. The oim has requested an investigation team to investigate the reason for
the non compliance with the permit to work precedure and actions to prevent recurrence.
During a period of high north westerly winds (66 knots) a 1x2 metre 'filon' cladding sheet was blown off from the rear of the north east crane. The sheet landed on the platform
level east walkway.
As the chef was going out of the galley door onto the level 2 north walkway he heard the clang of a piece of metal hitting the deck. On turning he noticed a 6" triangular offcut
of thin sheet metal lying on the walkway 6ft east of his position. Although he did not observe the object falling, one corner of the object was bent over suggesting impact the
incident was reported as a dropped object and an investigation was carried out. The scrap metal skips on level3 above were checked and found to be in good rder. Nets were in
place. No loose material was evident in the surrounding area. A review of the procedures for transfer of sheet metal workshop to the skip was conducted. No evidence of poor
practice was found. A subsequent review of the weather conditio s at the time: weather 45knots/direction wnw suggests that it is unlikley that the object was dislodged from the
vicinity of th escrap metal skip. This together with the lack of visual confirmation of the object falling suggests that the object may have b en blown from a lower level. He lack
of visual confirmation of the object falling suggest that the object may have been blown from a lower level. The investigation report has recommended increased attention to
housekeeping. Measures have also been introduced.
On the morning of <...>, scaffolders had accessed a worksite in the deckhead of package 2, above f-01 diesel fuel filter unit, from a hatchway in the deck above. Their task was
to erect a scaffold and, because of the array of cable trays and p pework below them, they failed to reconginse the hazard presented by the possibility of an object dropping
through to the module deck below. In consequence the clause in the standard procedure for the task, which would require the area below to be barred ff, was not followed on
this occasion. At 1015 a man taking process readings in the area below was alarmed when a scaffold clip fell past him, brushing againist his hand. He had not previously been
aware of the work overhead. Due to lack of access, the ob cured overhead view and noise in the area he was unable to attract the attention of the men overhead. He then raised
a <...> safety first card and submitted it to the fire and safety officer, who immediately arranged for the job to be stopped and initia ed a full incident investigation. Alough the
man did not belive himself to have been physically injured in any way, he was nevertheless referred to the platform medic who confirmed that no injury had taken place permit
to work local rules will be amended
Drilling crew were mobilising on the platform and installing the rathole on the rig floor. A spanner was knocked off a grating on the rig substructure, falling around 10m to the
bop deck. The spanner landed some 5m from personnel working on the bop deck.
During a period of very high winds an operator working on the moving pipe deck heard a small piece of cladding (weighing around 1/2lb) fall onto the top deck central
walkway 5m from where he was working. On investigation it appears that the cladding had een removed from pipework on the ngl roof (one level higher than the main deck),
but had not been secured properly. The ngl roof was checked for any other loose material. On investigation it appears that the cladding had been removed some time before, but
had not been secured properly by the person(s) carrying out the work.
Normal platform operations ongoing. Routine maintenance taking place on v3002 (kick off compressor knockout drum). A discarded screwdriver blade (handle missing)
measuring approx 9" in length was dislodged, causing it to fall to the pipe deck 30' below mi sing a person working below by approx 4'. No injuries or damage to property
resulted from the incident.
During normal production operations, scaffold poles which were temporarily stacked during a scaffold dismantle were left unattended in a well compartment. Due to the
movement from the platform the scaffold pole which was resting on the well 5-2 xmas tree nasa valve gas side, slipped and opened the dublock valve attached to the nasa. This
dublock was not fiited with an end cap (as is the normal practice) and allowed the gas release. An operator in the area smelt the gas and heard the release and manually
initiated the yellow shutdown.
During a period of high winds, the anemometer situated on a mounting on the a frame of the top deck crane became detached and fell down onto an access platform on the
crane structure. Due to a management decision to suspend permits because of the adverse weather conditions, no personnel were in the external areas of the platform, the
incident was not discovered until after the winds had abated and an inspection for possible damage was being undertaken.
Electrician working on a scaffold just below the upper deck level (30m), dropped a 300mm section of unistrut. It bounced on the scaffold boards and fell through a small gap
around a tubular. The section of unistrut fell to the 19 metre level work area, ar und the <...> esdv platform. This landed approx. 2 metres from a welder working at this level.
After severe storms, a sheet of stainless steel cladding measuring approx 2m x 1.2m was found lying on the roof of module 18. Investigation revealed that the cladding had
come from the allimec hoist cab situated external to the flare tower and had fallen approx. 5m. Remainder of cladding around the hoist cab was checked for security. Minor
repairs will be required.
At approx 1600 hrs a potential dropped object wedged between pipework and the bulk head of m1/m4 void space was reported. Investigation of the site revealed that a section
of rubber matting used as deck noise suppression had fallen 20ft from the deck abov and stopped 30ft above the deck walkway. The area was immediately barriered off and
the matting brought to deck level under controlled contitions. The area of deck where the mats are used were lifted immediately and stowed away safely. It was noticed t at
many of the mats were loose and stacked unsecured against handrails. The cause of the incident was not inially obvious with two likely causes being considered. These were:1)
matting moved in high wind conditions or 2) matting stuck to the bottom of a c ntainer and fell during transit. A number of interviews were conducted with personnel directly
involved in crane operations. All those intervied stated that at no time during crane operations did they witness an object falling from the base of the contain r. The conclusion
of the investigation is that the matting was moved due to the high wind conditions.
Scaffolder moving tubes to a worksite on the skid deck. As he lay the tubes down on the grating one tube slipped through a small gap and fell 15 metres to the floor of module
'f' below
At approximately 10:00 am on <...> a witness reported a scaffolding board (approx 6ft in length) being caught by the wind in the north east corner of the platform and being
blown overboard where it fell into the sea. The board did not strike any of the platform or land on any vessels, no injuries were sustained. The falling board was not observed
by the platforms standby vessels, no injuries were sustained. The falling board was not observed by the platforms standby vessel the dea mariner. The witness i mediatley
reported his observation to the control room. The safety supervisor and scaffold foreman were called and investigated the area, a loose tarpaulin was discovered blowing in the
wind on a section of a temporary water/debris barrier structure. The arpaulin had originally been secured to the barrier by nailed down scaffold boards. It was concluded that
the board had fallen from this area having become loose in the 45kt nw winds that had prevailed through the previous night and were present at the ti e of the incident the
structure was made safe and an incident investagation report will be submitted in due course.
Oil operator was functioning an overhead chain operated valve pw43 (produced water inlet v/v) on the b65 hydrocyclone package. As the operator pulled on the chain to
operate valve, the chainwheel came off the spindle & fell approx 4m to the deck. The valv wheel weighs approx 5kgs. The operator was "brushed" by the valve as it fell and
subsequently reported a minor abraision to the right forearm and slight neck strain. There was no plant damage.
A 2 x 2 metre section of grating had been removed at the mezzanine level to allow access to sea water lift pump below. A four sided scaffold barrier had been built around the
resulting hole for personnel protection, and one side fitted with a gate to allo access during lifting operations. One end of the gate was fitted with a "scaffold trolley wheel" for
ease of movement. During the movement of the scaffold the trolley wheel became detached from the scaffold tube and fell a distance of 3-4 metres onto 2 p rsons working
below. One person was struck on the side of his helmet and shoulder, the wheel then struck the second person on the hip. Both of the injured persons suffered minor bruising
and grazing. They were both examined by the medic and were both fit to return to work.
Fault tracing on running signal from pga (fire pump) to central control room (ccr). During test run, broken tacometer wire resulted in el. Starter engine on fire pump diesel
engine to repeat starting sequence. El. Starter was consequently overheated, resu ting in arcing of el. Cables to the degree that insulation on cables ignited. The occurance of the
minor fire was immediately observed by technician performing the test. Diesel engine was manually stopped locally. Fire was put out by using small amount of co2. Ccr was
informed. Platform accident committee meeting has been held. Facts from event established and agreed upon. Corrective actions proposed.
During operations, when drilling a 17.5" section at 5,500+/- when a lot of high power outage was required, smoke was discovered emitting from an electronic's cubicle in the
drilling module 10,scr switchroom.the rig electrician who discovered the smoke imm diately informed the rig floor and drilling was suspended.
A stress relieving (heat treat) blanket was inadvertently placed over the end of a scaffold board which caused the board to smoulder and ignite. Was extinguished.
20 minutes into its warm up sequence after a water wash of gas generator p801a coincidental flame detection activated the f&g/esdsystem and the co2 protection.subsequent
testing of the flame detectors found them to be fully operational.
Casing cement programme in operation at the time of the incident. Wind 25 - 30 knots. Sea 3-1/2 - 4 mtrs. Visibility 8 miles. Mud logging unit ups cooling fa. Internal
transformer overhrating causing a small smouldering fire within the unit. The operator had left the logging unit for a period of about 10 minutes in which time the incident
occurred. There are two smoke detectors in close proximity to the ups unit. Neither detector activated. Both have since been tested and proved working. The operator o his
return noticed smoke coming from the ups unit, he immediately switched the unit off and informed the control room. The fire extinguished without the need for use of
extinguishing agents. Investigation into the cause is underway.
Cable fires no, switch gear failure at present. Investigation to be completed by <…> and forwarded to hse for reference.
At approximately 1225 hours a mechanical technician was in the area of the seawater lift pump when he became aware of an unusual noise and abnormal vibration. Deciding to
investigate, he left the area to obtain test equipment. On return, some minutes late he observed flames coming from a drive end motor bearing. He extinguished the flames and
reported the incident. Currently under investigation.
Operation: normal production operations were ongoing at the time. An operator noticed a large quantity of smoke emanating from the bearing housing of a seawater lift pump.
The general platform alarm was sounded to muster and account for personnel. The sea ater pump was shut down and isolated. Cooling was applied to the bearing housing by
the fire team. There was no interuption to normal production. 3
Change of sttus & sps from co-incident smoke detection due to bearing failure/collapse on cooling water pump motor. Although no fire detected pump room filled with smoke.
Maintenance supervisor heard loud bang, saw smoke and flame from electric generator number 3.he initiated the platform gpa, the automatic fire protection operated on smoke
detection which put the fire out. The platform pob at muster station, no party inju ed
Work was to take place to remove and replace five previouly identified defective cells of gt2 main battery bank. All potential loads that could be fed by the battery bankwere
isolated at gt2 auto-isolation panel by operation of the integral main isolator andle. On return to the battery charger unit which housed the battery cells, smoke was observed at
one of the cells, boiling grease molten solder running down the front of the cell. The problem cell was isolated from the from the rest of the bank by caut ously disconnecting
the copper link to the adjacent cell.on testing the cable connecting the hot terminal to the negative rail using a clip on type ameter, it was found to still have a 45a flowing
through it. It was concluded that the cell must have an in ernal fault and that the cable had to be disconnected, the safety way being by use of heavy duty cutters. On doing so,
the cable came loose from the nowe
Reverse osmosis pump pulley "v" belt slipped causing it to overheat producing smoke which caused the platform to sps.
Electrician investigating main power generator shutdown & closing emergency board bus section spotted arcing,flame & smoke coming from kto810a kmi cubicile.
Immediately opened bus section with emergency stop then he grabbed a co2 extinguisher and extingui hed the flames within the cubicle. No indication of smoke detection was
apparent in the main control room. Area was ventilated and made safe. Platform gpa occurred due to loss of inst air, power should be supplied by above emergency switch
board which was isolated. Once muster complete,the electricians checked the emergency switch board and when satisfied it was safe to restore power, r.e.p. powered the board
back up to restore lighting & power for platform use.
Fire in seawater lift pump junction box level 3 shutdown,gpa and muster fire put out using a hand held fire extinguisher. Rew stud down 18:15 p plant returned to production
10:20
A temporary diesel driven air compressor was being test run after replacing an oil filter. During start up smoke was noticed by the operator who then shut the unit down. A
second operator approached the unit with a dry powder extingusher, opened the sid access door and identified a small fire. The fire was then entinguished with the dry powder
extinguisher followed by cooling from a water hose.
Reported fire in pci gg enclosure. Smoke from enclosure door. Unit shutdown and vented. Halon initiated fire team alerted to platform pc. Platform bpa's sounded.
Headcount correct at 13.48. All comp trains blown down. Entry to enclosure made by fir team when safe to do so. Found fire, approx 24" by 6" section of wood still on fire.
Foam utilised, confirmed extinguished. Continued damping down section of wood when it was removed form enclosure. Wood chalk which caused fire was not initially appar
nt. Unable to confirm period of time wood chalk has been in position. Possibly utilised during initial installation. When situation secured, personnel stood down form muster
stations.
Pump p7250 was being test run after maintenance works on the pump drive shaft and associated bearings, during the test run the turbo chrger failed and as a result of the failure
a small flame was observed in the area of the exhaust.
Smoke detection confirmed from lower ids eqpt room at 06.15 on<...>. Source identified as k9310b ventilation fan. Platform s/d automatically power loss occurred. Platform
returned to normal status at 06.55.
A permit was raised to remove 44ov cables from the ups system to allow fitment of a feeder manager into an adjoining cubicle on the main switchboard. The wireway cubicle
was opened and a spanner checked for size against one of the cable gland locking nuts at this point an electrical short curcuit was made causing an arc from the 440v cable
across the spanner to the switchboard casing. No electric shock was felt by the person holding the spanner, and there was no ensuing fire or explosion. As the arc occur ed the
mccb breaker tripped immediately rendering the circuit dead. On closer inspection it could be seen that the insulation on the cable concerned has a split or small cut which
probably happened during original installation allowing the short circut to be made. It was noted that the inner insulation had been stripped off the cable up to the gland plate,
leaving the core insulation as the only protection. Recommendations following an incident investigation are recorded on report number <...>.
While <...> chemical injection system was being test run a component failure occurred within the <...> variable speed drive unit located within the switchgear panel pc10a.
This caused the front plastic panel of the drive unit to be blown off inside the cub cle. The heat caused by the failure caused smoke to be released out of the top of the panel into
the switchroom. The component failure caused the red and the blue phase protection fuses to trip. A technician in the vicinity of the switchroom, alerted by t e noise noticed the
smoke and informed the central control room. A portable co2 extinguisher was applied to the cabinet as a precaution and a muster was called but stood down almost
immediately. Coastguards and standby vessel similarly alerted and stood d wn. The panel was isolated and investigations carried out on all other components of this type on the
platform and no faults were found. The faulty <...> variable speed unit has been removed and returned to the manufacturers for full investigations to be ca ried out and a report
sent to <...>.
Two operations technicians were dispatched to investigate the alarm personnel were instructed to proceed to their alternative muster points. The night chef subsequently saw
that the contents of tumble dryer no.2 were alight and that there was smoke and flames within the machine.
<...> operator emptied his ashtray into bin and then went for a coffee on his return approx. 5 mins. Later a smell of smoke was being investigated by 2 presons. On opening
up radio room door the bin contents were smouldering. This was extinguished with a co2 portable extinguisher. Contents of bin were then checked, confirmed safe and
removed outside for disposal.
The contactor for ventilation fan motor vm525a burnt out. Checks indicate the contactors right side phase had broken down along with the surrounding insulation. Location
mm2 switchgear room, enclosure 6b.
No.1 egt common alarm initiated on dcs. Area operator checked local control panel & reported fire detected in hood. No alarm on css panel but area checked, and fire in hood
verified. Mcr activated co2 from local firemans panel. Co2 initiated alarm on css anel. (require fire to be detected by two flame detectors before co2 extinguished will
automatically be activated).
16:15 auto start of fire pump on demand. 16:25 duty operator requested to shutdown fire pump. On entry into enclosure, technician noticed smoke and flames coming from
gearbox. Pump was manually shutdown. Intial inspection revealed loss of gearbox oil.
After a generator service whilst starting the engine, cold start circuit "short circute" the arl caused oil to ignite - attendent staff shut down the engine and extinguished the fire
with available fire extinguisher.
An 11kv motor was undergoing a 2 hour uncoupled test run when it tripped out on a short circiuit, causing a significant upset to the platform power supplies. An on site
inspection of the motor carried out over the past two days found significant damage to the motor stator windings and highlighted two possible casuses of the failure. There
were a number of loose stator winding wedges which had contracted the rotor fans with at least one having broken up and there was a significant amount of liquid - probab y
water/glycol coolant - found in the bottom of the motor casing. During the test run the motor was under positive purge pressure with no indication that there was any
hydrocarbon gas within the casing. The actual cause of failure will not be known until the motor has been inspected at the manufacturers - it is believed that both the
possibilities identified may habve contributed.
At approx 18.40 on <...>, gas turbine 3 (<...> turbo generator) received a signal from its control system to execute an emergency shutdown. The fire and gas panel in the
control room showed infra red and smoke detectors had been act vated in the enclosure. The egenarl alarm was automatically activated, personnel called to muster and the
automatic release of halon within the enclosure extinguishing the fire
During function testing of the ss2 rotary table smoke was seen emanating from under the rotary table. The alarm was activated locally and the fire team found smoke and
flames coming from the rotary table brake housing. The fire was extinguished by lifting the deck plate.
Diesal emergency generator running on load, which is situated in level 1 of the accommodation. An instrument operator noticed fire and smoke from the turbo charger unit
situated on the top of the emergency generator. He notified the main control room who ctivated the general alarm. The fire team extinguished the fire and made the area safe.
All personnel were stood-down from the general alarm. An investigation is underway to confirm the cause of the fire which at the moment is thought to be the result of failure
of the turbo bearing.
Ccr alerted by smoke detection in c8 fan room, moduel d. Investigation carried out by team techs who found c8b bearing smoking. Fan buttoned in on ccr panel. Unit started on
demand when button released causing small fire on inboard layshaft bearing. Fire mmediately extinguished by team techs using portable c02 extinguisher. Fan electrically
isolated and water applied to cool bearing. Muster initiated on outbreak of fire.
At 0148 on <...> a small quantity of hydrocarbon ignited within the area of 'a'generator trurbine exhaust. This was quickly extinguished by a hand held co2 extinguisher and
water from a hose line. Investigation suggests that ol. Either heating medium o degreasing chemical was washed down from the waste recovery unit above during chemical
cleaning operations some oil fell onto exposed insulation material and some formed a small pool alongside the exhaust. The exhaust heated this to ignition temperature and the
fire occurred
Minor external leak discovered in a bleed plug and bonnet flange on valve hv m28-3a. No activation of permanet gas detection system. This valve is formally a part of the <…
> gas pipeline.
At approx 1750 hours the control room requested investigation of a low interface level in scapa separator. An operations techincan proceed to the area and on arrival at the
northwest entrance to the scapa pancake he could smell gas and saw a white cloud o hot water/gas escaping from the south end of the scapa separator. He requested that
production be shutdown from the control room - a class 2 esd was intiated. On investigation the leak was identified as comming from the interface level bridle area. The s
parator was isolated from the process systems and the manual vent line to lp flare opened and draining of the separator via the sandwash system commenced. Attempts to
isolate the interface level bridle and the level transmitter were unsuccessful due to th valves on each being inoperable. During this period there was one low gas alarm active
(10% lel). The liquid which had been escaping from the failed drain line fitting became a gas release which in turn caused a confirmed gas situation on the scapa panca e and
actived a class 1 esd and gpa at 1752 hours. The operations supervisor requested manual activation of the scapa deluge system to dilute and contain any leaks. The platform
blowout system was the requested and was actived by the control room operator
Hydrocarbon gas leak from well m37 production wing valve due to failure of stem seal.2 20% gas alarms were activated. The wing valve was immediately closed followed by
the hydraulic and master valves.
During normal operations the fire and gas panel indicated gas detection in m4, the m4 operator was tasked to investigate the alarm. In the interim period a second gas detector
was activated which put the platform into a level three shutdown and gpa. A po itive isolation of the damaged line was effected (spades and locks).
During normal operations a rising pressure in the <…> unit resulted in failure of the lid seals.the ensuing gas leak produced two gas detections in the module resulting in a
level three shut down and platform muster.
Hydrocarbon gas leak from well m18. The platform production had previously shutdown due to a logic problem. At approx 6:50 2 15% gas alarms activated in the wellbay.
Investigation revealed that there was a hydrocarbon release form the joint between the xm s tree and the transition spool to the choke valve on well m18. The well and flowline
were isolated and depressurised.
From the occurrence of a 2a production shutdown the produced gas process sytems automatically vented to the flare system. The flare system was not ignited at the time due
to no or very low volumes of gas venting which was unable to sustain a flamed flare the venting of the gas sytems at the shutdown was blown back towards the platform with
a southerly wind at 15 knots where it was drawn into the hvac to migrate into work areas and the accommodation. Low gas detectors were activated at 15% lel in modules m2
& m10. The flare is normally maintained lit by a flow of purge gas to the flare system. This has recently been isolated due to under lagging corrosion.
From the occurrence of a 2a production shutdown the produced gas process systems automatically vented to the flare system. The flare system was not ignited at the time due
to no or very low volumes of gas venting which was unable to sustain a flamed flar . The rapid venting of the gas systems lifted the water and accumulated gas condensate
from the flare 'u' seal. These fluids were blown back towards the platform with a se wind at 6 knots and fell out onto the roof areas from where they were drawn into he hvac
to migrate into workareas and the accommodation. Low gas level detectors were activated at 15% lel. The flare is normally maintained lit by a flow of purge gas to the flare
system. This has recently been isolated due to under lagging corrosion. this corrosion problem and a repair programme is with engineering support. Until the recommissioning
of the purge gas supplies, an alternative means of continuously supplying dry fuel gas into the flare system has been provided.
Whilst starting up oil production after a previous production trip, fluctuations in the produced water flows to the <…> unit caused a rising level and rising pressure. The gas
rising pressure caused gas leakage from the <…> lids which activated gas d tectors to initiate a level 3 shutdown and gpa. The area production operators quickly arrived at the
location to notice that gas rapidly dispersing and within minutes the area was clear.
During recovery from a shutdown, a slug of oil/condensate carried over into the water outlet from the third stage separator. The light ends flashed off into the wemco unit
causing gas to be released from the lid seals. Local gas heads detected the gas a d shut the plant down. Platform personnel were called to muster.
During recovery from a shutdown, a slug of oil/condensate carried over into the water outlet from the third stage separator. The light ends flashed off into the wemco unit
causing gas to be released from the lid seals. Local gas heads detected the gas a d shut the plant down. Platform personnel called to muster.
During recovery from a shutdown, a slog of oil/condensate carried over into the water outlet from the third stage separator. The light ends flashed off into the <…> unit
causing gas to be released from the lid seals. Local gas heads detected the gas a d shut the plant down. Platform personnel were called to muster.
During a production start-up, a leak was spotted on a 50mm line on the oil metering system in module 5 production mezzanine deck.the leak was immediately reported to the
production supervisor who was in the local control room in module 4. On investigation a pin hole leak was found on the pressurising line up-stream of the isolation valves to
stream 2. Start-up and export was stopped, the line was isolated and drained, then fully spaded off before resuming start-up. The estimated discharge from the leak was
approximately less than a barrel (42 gallons). The line has subsequently undergone n.d.t inspection and report .
At approx 18:20 a message was tannoyed to the duty electrician as the no.2 solar generator had shutdown. Shortly after this the control room operator recieved a phone call
reporting a gas leak in the <…> cellar deck north east corner. The gas detection s stem at this point picked 20% LEL in zone 32. A platform operator had been sent to
investigate the problem on <…> On his arrival he discovered a valve had blown fron the base of a fuel gas filter.
Whilst using cengar air saw to cut penetration into solar room module external wall. Air saw blade inadverantly partly cut into 2" fuel gas line feeding no3 solar generator.
Fuel gas line was on the internall wall in close proximity to penistration. Thi result was gas leak into solar room, gas detected platform shut-down. Personnel to emergency
stations.
Gas leakage from process small bore piping on condensate pump discharge on new phoenix triplex module on v<…>.
Coiled tubing string hadbeen pulled out of well <…> after an aborted roto jet cleanout job. The pressure in the reel had been bled off and the bottom hole assembly was being
broken down by <…> and <…>. Pressure had been trapped due to a bl ckage in the rot-jet filter and toolstring whicih caused nitrogen gas and dust to be released into the faces
of both persons.
Oil leak from hydraulic hose. The generator was shutdown and a replacement hose procured.
Whilst working condensate pump a to refit a relief valve a fluid containing meg/water/condensate leaked. The leak was largely in a spray mist form was arrox 2-3 gallons.
Whist carrying out daily plant checks on at a production leak on valve bv62x situated on top of the <…> slugcatcher. The <…> gas stream was immediately shutdown and
safely vented. The valve assembly was removed, repaired and refitted by the m chanical lead technition where upon the system was tested before resumption of gas production
open actions.
It was noticed that condinrat water mix was falling on to <…>. Most probable source is the lp venton <…>.
Night shift operators were carrying out routine pigging operations. While pressure was being introduced to the pig launcher in a controlled manner the seal on the pig launcher
door failed at approx. 700 psi.
In preparation of sour gas flow compressor tb 5000 was being deisolated after routine maintenance. During reinstatment of the fuel gas system local gas alarms activated at
50% lel. The fuel gas supply valve was closed and area checks carried out.
Whilst prepering the <…> to <…> pig receiver the door of the receiver opened- approximately 6 barrels of stabilised crude oil escaped from the receiver onto the area operator
shut in the receiver immediately. Approximately 1 barrel of crude oil to the sea direct with approximately 3 barrels of draining indirectly via deck drains to the drilling sluice-
way over a 24 hour period.
Whilst commissioning mp compressor after major overhaul a gas leak occured on g155 discharge line, initiating executive action and a class 2b shutdown. The leak occured on
a 3/4" vent attached to a spacer ring on the inlet line to psv325-b rated a 1500psi investigation continues - initial investigation suggests a fatigue related failure - onshore
analysis being actioned. Oir/12 raised.
At 21.32 on <…> a fire at g160 turbine exhaust, within area 1 was observed and reported to the ccr using the 199 facility. Gpa/muster action. Fire believed to be caused by seal
oil which has sprayed onto the exhaust cladding during a previous inciden ans entered below lagging to hot wxhaust. Unit has been shut down for approx 4hrs due to a shut-
down ealier in the say. Incestigation continues- independent onshore team mobilised.
A pin hole leak was discoved in an armoured hose. An estimated 25 litres of crude had been lost on to the deck. There was no spillage over board. The hose connects a point on
the b to a crude line to a sampling unit. The unit has beem shut in and the repl ced. Although the incident is still under investigation it would appear that the hose had been
rubbing against the steel hinge of a cabinet. The replacement hose ahs been run in a different configuration to prevent a recurrence
During adjacent b44 workover heavy lift operations, it was ascertained that the b35z asv was leaking. Repeated attempts to leak test the valve failed. A bridge plug was
subsequently set in the production tubing tallpipe. Tubing and annulus pressure wer vented to zero pressure and the asv/trdhsv closed. The well has been shut in while further
plans are considered to obtain an integrity test of the asv(ava brain changeout).
Incident occured on the <…> platform at 18:35 hrs on <…> when preparations were being made for a waterwash of the mp turbine compressors. Gas was detected by gas
heads 57a and 57c in the turbine enclosure. A class ii shutdown was successfull initiated and production and drilling wells immediately secured. An investigation has been
launched to determine the cause of the incident and identify any corrective actions/lessons learned.
During well flowing operations to the test separator a high oil level was detected in the test separator which resulted in carry over of crude to the hp flare knock out drum. The
high level trip switch was initiated on the hp flare knock out drum which i volved the associated safety systems being initiated, resulting in production being shut down on the
platform. Prior to the high level trip switch in the hp flare ko drum being activated a small amount of crude oil was discharged along with the gas being vented up the flare
stack which resulted in the outfall landing on the east side of the platform. All saftey systems were initiated as per design with no danger to platform or barge personnel.
During sand wash operations the inlet pipe spool to the sand wash degasser was eroded by process fluid which caused loss of containment. As a result gas detection sensors
were activated which initiated the gapa, production and water injection shutdown. Al platform personnel were mustered and accounted for. Weather conditions at the time:
wind speed 15 knots, wind direction 260 sea state 1 metre. The area was re-checked and found to be gas free. The eroded spool piece was removed and pipework blanked off
sing blind flanges. Production operations were then restarted. Adjoining pipework is being ut checked. Review of current pipework arrangement and material specification.
Lubricator had been installed on well a21 and was to be tested to 2000 psi using halliburton unit. The kill side of the well was rigged up to the <…> unit. The hmv was closed
on the well. The derrickman was instructed to test the lubricator. The w llhead kill line was opened up to the <…> unit. The derrickman opened up the kill line valve on the
cement unit and because bleeder valves were in the open position on the unit a small quantity of gas was released from the unit causing the gas det ction system to be initiated.
On hearing the alarm the derrickman closed the unit kill valve. The kill and swab valves were closed on the tree. The cause of the gas was traced to a passing hydraulic master
valve on the tree. See wells it sys text
Operations in progress. Summer shutdown activities. Plant fully depressurised and inerted. Power supplied by two avon turbo-generators running on diesel fuel. One single
flame detection was signalled in control room. The flame detector is located in the e closure of turbo generator p801c, at low level and looks below the power turbine. One
operator was immediately sent to the machine. Looking through the enclosure's window, he noticed smoke and manually released the co2 in the enclosure, which also shuts t e
machine down. It is believed that a small flame was caused be oil comming in contact with the hot exhaust. The source of oil is from the bearing housing via the labryinth seal.
Discussions have been started with the manufacturer to determine the exact c use of the leak. Checks are carried on twice daliy in turbines enclosures to monitor the situation.
The incident took place on the <…> platform in the south well bay on the gas well n24. It occurred under normal operating conditions with the wells flowing. Some
construction personnel, involved in cold works unrelated to n24, were present in the well bay at the time of the incident. The mechanism of one of the spring hangers
supporting n24 flowline suddenly ruptured releasing the spring and piston assembly. Under the force of the springs, the assembly was ejected againist the pressure pilots
installed on he flowline. One of the pilots connection was ruptured, resulting in a gas release. Production personnel were immediatly alerted by the personnel present at the
scene and by the triggering of one of the gas detectors installed in the well bay. They immedi tely shut the well and depressurised the flowline. An investigation is ongoing to
detemine the cause of the rupture. Actions to avoid recurrence will dephend on the results of this investigation.
The turbo generator p801a had been shutdown for maintenance and the co2 system isloated to allow access in the enclosure. Mechanics were working inside the power turbine
enclosure when coincident flame detection alarm was recieved in the control room. Because the co2 system was on manual and isolated, co2 was not released on flame
detection. The control room operatorimmediately contacted safety and area operator to investigate and alert work party. The oim was informed. The mechanics working in the
enclosure did not see any flame, but remarked on an outbreak of smoke. On investigation in the gearbox enclosure it was found that that some smoke was coming from the
lower part of the insulation surrounding the power turbine exhaust diffuser. The enclosure door were closed and the co2 manually discharged. Initial inspection of the
equipment revealed traces of oil in the area of the power turbine exhaust diffuser. The lagging will be removed to check for any accumulation of oil in the insulation material.
Immediately after the incident, it was observed that the pressure in the power turbine bearing seal air supply was zero, when it should have been 2 bars. When the machine is
running, air taken off from the avon compressor is injected in the labyrinths in order to create a barrier and preclude any oil leak (buffer air). Below a given speed, buffer air is
The incident is a "follow on" to the incident reported on the <…>. On the <…> incident an oil leak ignited a small fire. After this incident all residual oil was cleaned up. The
power turbines insulation was inspected and considered to be n a satisfactory condition. On the <…> p801a was started. During the machine warm up cycle, co-incident uv
detection automatically initiated a co2 release. It is most likely that residual oil was still available in the insulation after the<…>, which ignited. The power turbine insulation
has been completely replaced since the incident. Boroscope inspection concludes no oil leakage since the <…>t incident. The power turbine labyrinth seal has been tested as
satisfactory.
During normal plant monitoring, an operator noticed ice build-up on the lagging blanket on 3/4" valve y09218 on the gas injection flowline. On further investigation a small
(wisp) gas leak was seen from rtj joint between the 2500 rating valve body and bla k flange. The joint was replaced with a new one which was monitored after installation and
found to be ok. Investigation report <…> was completed. The replaced rtj was sent to the beach for failure cause analysis.
During monitoring of the plant an operator noted severe movement on an actuated valve hv 13480 <…> production bypass choke valve. The actuator appeared to be driving
the valve open and closed vibrating severely. It was then the operator noticed a fine pray of oil coming up the stem of the 6" valve. The operator reported this immediately
and the <…> process was shutdown and de-pressurised. No gas detectors operated due to the rapid action taken. On investigation it would appear that the rotork actuat r
internal circuit board had failed and the gland on the valve was leaking. This valve will remain out of service until the full repair is carried out. An internal investigation report
is being completed. An oir 12 had been completed also.
Following the test flow of the lower cretacious well slot 9, the xmas tree cavity was to be depressurised to enable rigging down of the <…> equipment. The well service
engineer proceeded to depressurise the tree cavity to the open drain system vi a hose & not the process drain system as per the procedures. This caused a minor gas release &
subsequent gas detection in the well bay initiating a yellow shutdown & emergency muster. The engineer concerned isolated the nasa valve immediately & reported to the
control room. The gas dissipated quickly & the area was checked out. Once satisfied normal oil/gas production was restarted. However a full bp investigation has been
initiated. The lc slot 9 well remains isolated & the tree has been depressurised as per standard procedures.
During normal production operations a production technician while performing normal duties noticed a small drip/spray of oil and gas coming from the cyrus metering manual
block valve down stream of lcv 13099. The leak was contained by absorbent pads, the ystem was manually isolated drained and the plug replaced. A program to replace the
body bleed valves on similar valves is in place.
Routine oil and gas production operations were ongoing. Approximately 1 hour before the release the gas plant had tripped and hence all the gas was being flared. Wind 20
knots from 110 deg. Sea 2-3 mtrs. Visibility 10 miles. The gas detection in the area ndicated a release of gas. This came in as a high gas alarm approximately 20 to 60% lel.
Operations technicians were despatched and confirmed a smell of gas in the area. The <…> and test separators were shut down and depressured manually. The gas releas
continued. The technicians continued to investigate and traced the source to the <…> separator psv 13114. This gas a 1/4" diameter tell tale vent pipe on the bonnet that was
leaking gas. The psv was manually isolated and the leak was stopped. The tell ale indicated the back pressure from the downstream flare side of the psv was leaking back.the
psv has been removed and is being returned for examination by our valve vendor, <…> to determine the cause of the failure. Investigation into the cause is underway.
At 10:25 the platform general alarm sounded, this being the result of 3 gas heads in zone f, process area, coming into alarm (low level 20%) the platform personnel mustered
and drilling personnel made t15 well safe. Investigation of the alarm by the fast response team, discovered upon arrival, at the process area, that methanol was coming out of
the vent pipe of t8180 and on being informed of the situation,isolated the bowser connected to the tank. At the time of the alarm, the production operator had bee bunkering,
methanol into t8180 and on being informed of the situation, isolated the bowser connected to the tank. Due to the prevailing wind conditions at the time the methanol was
being blown back onto the platfrom and as a precaution, the <...> meth nol pumps were shutdown. The fast response team ran out a fire hose and washed the methanol into
the process area's closed hazardous drains and continued flushing for a further 15 minutes after the methanol had ceased to flow the vent pipe. It has been c lculated, from the
tank volumes, that approx. 40 gallons of methanol was dischardged from the vent of t8180. In order to prevent a similar incident, the following actions are planned: 1.
Methanol bunkering has been deemed to be a two man task. 2. Instal ation of either a tank level repeater guage at the bunkering point or a signal to the scada system is being
Whilst blowing down the topsides export gas system for maintenance on a metering skid valve, a confirmed gas signal in the wellbay level 2 east initiated the gpa, firepumps
started blowdown commenced and deluge released as per f & g c& e's. On completion f blowdown the production and test manifolds pzv's were inspected via their tell-tale
holes. Gas present at pzv on production manifold pzv isolated pending removal or repair. Note: pzv is on line with 1 spare.
Well a8 pressure monitoring impulse flexi-hose developed a leak during manual re-pressurisation. The hose developed a leak which allowed gas to pressure the external rubber
protection causing it to baloon and burst. The hose was being slowly pressured ma ually locally via a needle valve. The hose was isolated immediately and as a result only a
small volume of gas dispersed to atmosphere.
Wind 23 knots at 137 deg 12:52 - technician reports leak from pipework nw weatherdeck around the mp sep. Pcv-43008. 12:54 - ops eng and ops sup attend the scene. 13:00 -
oim site visit - initial thought on mode of failure was that undercut on welded pipe upport (welded to piework) had produced a 1/4" dia hole. (decision to stop the process in a
controlled manner) 13:05 - pa announcement to stop work and asasemble personnel in the tr with an explanation of the situation. 13:07 - all work stopped. Permits eturned to
the permit office and personnel assembled in the tr. 13:10 - contacted duty manager 13:11 - gas export shutdown 13:25 - condensate export stopped. 13:25 - mp separator
isolateed and blowndown. At no time did any gas register on the icss as the rea is very open and the wind direction was favourable. 14:10 - pa announcement to inform
personnel that the situation had returned to normal, and permits were reissued.
Oil production was shut down at 15:20 owing to a problem in the slop oil vessel. At 15:30 a scaffolder noticed oil leaking from the mol pump suction header and reported it to
the ccr:- 2 operators confirmed the leak and a precautionary gpa was sounded. La er inspection found internal corrosion had caused the loss of containment.
B export pump being test run following maintainance. After pump started, pinhole leak occurred in crude export pump suction pipework. Process plant shutdown and
depressurised. Manually activated level 2 shutdown. Straub clamp fitted to area of pinhole lea and manifold pressure tested to check for leaks. Long term intent is to change
out the export pump suction manifold pipework. *note: due to the minor nature of the leak it was possible to fit the straub clamp without requirement to shutdown. Shutdown
was effected to carry out further investigation and testing.
One gas head in low alarm and one gas head in high alarm on loss of water seal to open hazardous deck drains in module 16 gas compression. The water seals in this warm
module tends to evaporate. To mitigate against this a continuous trickle flow of water had been piped to each deck drain via plastic tubing. A needle valve fitted to the tubing
blocked up hence the seal was lost. On loss of the seal the module hvac which keeps the module at a slight negative pressure, sucked out some gas from within the drains
system. The effected drain seal was topped up with water and the normal trickle flow of water reinstated. Subsequent investigations into possible source of the gas in the open
hazardous drains system has identified that a liquid overflow from the in ection compressor seal oil degasser tanks is piped into the open hazardous drains. A change request
has been raised to repipe these overflows into the closed drains system to prevent gas entering the open drains system.
Normal platform production ongoing at time of incident. At 1812 hours <...> in module 04 in vicinity of the metering skid, two gas heads came into low alarm. (gas head
numbers 9139 and 9143). Immediate investigation at the scene identified a condensate leak from a four bolt flange, fitted with a spectacle blind, on an atmospheric vent line
from the prover loop on the metering skid. A manual level 2 shutdown was immediately initiated from the ccr and the metering system depressurised. A precautionary mus er
was also initiated from the ccr until system was depressurised and the area made safe. The leaking flange was repaired and similar flanges in the same area were inspected prior
to recommencing production.
During our <...> pipeline survey the rov observed bubbles emanating from the top valve xxv-3753. On closer visual inspection of the valve the bubbles were recorded as gas
leaking from a bleed plug on the bonnet of the valve at a maximum estimated rate of 8 scfd. The leak does not affect the valve integrity. Repair procedures are being
developed for replacement of the plug at next practical opportunity.
Defective weld, observed by module operator during start up operations: whilst preparing plant for start up the module operator observed a small pool of oil originating from a
small crack in the weldolet on the export pump recycle line 1" purge point. In rder to prevent a hydrocarbon release the startup was aborted and the system isolated for repair.
The offending pipework was removed for examination and repair. Similar pipe work and fittings adjacent have been inspected for similar defects prior to resta t of production.
Further checks of adjacent pipework to be carried out after plant restart. Contents of the pipework system is hydrocarbon.
The glycol regeneration package had just been started up after an unassociated unplanned shutdown. At 08.20am (30 minutes after restart) a leak was detected by sight at the
top nozzle of the glycol reboiler bridle. Leak was a mixture of steam/glycol vapou at approx. Temp of 200 c. At 08.30 a single smoke detector was activated by the steam/
vapour. System was shut down and the leaking section of pipework was blanked off.
Isolating gas well for maintenance, suspect blockage which them cleared resulting in a minor gas release into the gas compression module
Release of gas occurred in u5 from pilot operated rv9324 during loading up of the recip comp. In injection mode. Gas release due to down stream isolation valve found in the
closed position.
Gas release from k9320 gas re-injection compressor cyl 4 valve cover, joint failure. Module/equipment made safe. Normal status then repairs commenced.
During process of hand loading the reciprocating gas compressor rv9322 pilot valve operated venting gas into module, gas tech observed leakage ans stopped machine,
informing control room. Platform then went to gpa status and sps operated due to coincidenc gas heads in u5wmezz.
Rv9327- gas was found to be leaking from the pilot valve vent port onto the module.
A hydocarbon gas release from the vent port of a mono block 3 valve manifold fitted to a well <...> conduit number <...> used for measuring the well thp. The release was
caused by the failure of an incorrectly selected blanking plug that had been fitted to the vent port the volume of gas was assessed as moderate as the inventory was rectricted to
the volume between the flow wing valve and the master valve when the plant tripped
Gas pig receiver being isolated to allow rouine change out of psv. Passing primary isolation valve resulted in gas emission from bleed. This release was detected by fixed gas
head, resulting in platform gpa status
Hydrocarbon leak from temperature capillary on discharge line of crude oil export pump p3070. Oil spill into module. Minor spill to sea.
During the transfer of barite from silo p.4 to the mixing hopper tank, the operator noticed a rise in pressure to 40 psi. He bled down the system and on checking the hopper, he
found the viewing window had blown out.
Recommissioning tests purging fuel gas system stable environment.fuel gas. Gas turbine generator g-5010b technicians/engineers were preparing to start a main generator on
fuel gas. While purging the fuel gas system gas was released into the turbine enclos re and the platform general alarm sounded, system was shut down instantly by personel
working on generator. Investigation revealed that a compression fitting had become ? All siilar fittings on this and similar systems were checked and a full investigation
initiated
Platform in normal operation with commissioning work in progress. Two operations staff were commissioning on main power generators and walking towards the fuel gas
heaters they noticed a smell of condensate and while one person informed the control room t e other investigated around x204 feed bottoms exchanger area. On shift ops team
leader arrived on scene and by this time leak of condensate had been discovered on the plate exchanger. Within 10 mins isolation of the exchanger was completed (unit not on
p oduction and in fact not operated to date). The platform was shutdown as a precaution exchanger contents drained and prepared to be flushed. Environmental conditions at
the time wind 10 knts @ 225 degrees vis 10 mls with 1 m sea. Area is busy thoroughfar , no gas detection arose even with portable unit. But unable to determine accurately
how long leaking before discovery.
At 15:50hrs on the <...>, valve stem packin's found to be leaving condensate. The valve was manually isolated and repaired, approx 3 lts of fluid drained to the deck of the
production module, this then being washed to the hazardous open drai s system. System pressure was around 13 bara and the liquids and pressure were residual. Vessel off line
at time of leak. Weather - wind 14-16 knots direction 310
Plant operative under normal conditions, when at 08:40hrs a report of a leak from a valve was passed directly to the control room. Operations personnel & myself arrived on
scene. The valve in question is an automatically operated valve which opens & dumps condensate on high vessel level and closes on low level. The construction is a bettis
actuator fitted to a ball valve leakage appeared to be coming from area where the actuator bolts to the valve body indicating gland leakage. (this to be determined) deci ion
taken to shutdown the platform under controlled conditions isolation of the train prior to valve removal & overhaul. Platform was shutdown at 08:49.
Small gas leak discovered on valve 08-fcv-0206. Gas issued from a plug fitted to the flow control valve bonnet yoke. Normal pressurised state. Discovered during routine
inspection, line isolated, depressured and plug inspected and made good.
At approx 16.20 on <...> instrument techs working in the production wellbay choke valve area noticed gas escaping in the vicinity of their own task. They reported this to the
control room who sent an operator to investigate.. He isolated a ouble block and bleed valve from which gas was escaping from the downstream block part of the valve.
During post fracturing well clean up of wellslot 14 36 the 1/2 inch heavy wall s/s pipe work which formed the depressurisation line from the temporary proppant catcher to the
lp flare header [downstream of 02-psv-0045 mp sep] failed. Failure occured throu h erosion of two[2] 90 degree bends due to particuate matter in high velocity gas. During
venting operations the area operator was alterted by the noise of the escape. He informed llr, isolated and monitored.
A production shutdown level 2b scs operated from scs 03-pt-156/160/161 on investigation 03-xxv-0133 platform resdv had closed. The system was reset, the valve was then
operated [given an open signal] and observed hydralic fluid flowed from under the laggi g around the activator. On further investigation, the position indication shaft was found
to be missing. The securing arrangement had come loose and the shaft was forced from the actuator by hydraulic pressure [202 bar][transaqua]. The indication shaft co ld not
be located some 20 - 25 ft from the edge of the platform structure and some 15 ft above the walkway.
As a result of a routine review op operating data a leak was located on a production jumper between the wellhead and the subsea manifold. The amount of hydrocarbon
released was very small. It was identified when the flowline pressure decayed to the ambien sea bed pressure during shutdown,when it should have maintained 90 to 100 barg.
Feed heater x-0205 was found to be leaking condensate on to the bunded area. The unit was isolated, taken out of service and drained. Windspeed was recorded at 35 knots,
direction 345degs. The leak was discovered by the construction superintendant. The quantity of loss was 40 litres of consensate/water mixture. The equipment involved was a
heat exchanger. The incident is reported on <...> incident report <...>.
Oil and gas leak resulting in three gas heads in high gas alarm. Situation under control in 6 mins and gas dispatched.
At 06:00 hrs on <...> as part of the annual shut down preparations, n2 purging operations were being carried out. The hp separator was to be charged with nitrogen to a pressure
of 20 bar(normal operating pressure -60 barg) bj services were carrying out this procedure, during the operation a loud 'bang' was heard, initially the operators were unsure of
the cause as there was no visible evidence of eg a burst hose. However the injection manifold that was screwed into a ported blank on the pipework, had moved through 90
degrees. The operation was suspended and the occurrence was reported to the installation management. Further inspection revealed that the gasket between the ported blank
and valve y 031109 had blown. The control of hydraulic power to the pump is via a wind in / out knob which is attached to wire, the wire had kinked and operation of the knob
had little or no effect on the pump speed. The <...> operator at the injection point had requested that valve y 031109 be closed, before he had confirmation that the pump had
stopped.this this action reduced the volume that the pump was acting upon and a very fast rise in pressure occurred. Pressure relief during the purging procedure was from the
plant psvs this path was isolated when valve y 031109 was closed and the only pressure control was at the pump. The overpressure device (which if activated immediately kills
The production systems were being restarted after platform shutdown. Hydrocarbon gas was detected in module 15, adjacent to the drains system and automatic level 2
shutdown and blowdown was initiated and platform personnel were mustered. Gas dissipated ra idly and personnel stood down. Investigation revealed that a level control valve
on the hp flare drum was stuck fully open and a header drain valve was also passing oil into the drains and subsequently vent system. The excess gas in the atmospheric vent s
stem leaked out into the atmosphere causing the shutdown.
Whilst draining down the <...> seperator, the water dean hose broke caused a spill of contents, and a gas alarm woth a full muster.
A minor gas release occured due to <...> drag valve stem seal passing gas to atmosphere. Valve is located on open area of pp main deck. It was detected by a vigilant operator
who heard the leak during carrying out routine tour. Unable to tighten gland the system was shutdown, isolated and vented and spares organised for the repair . There was no
automatic detection, small leak in an open windy area a platform incident report has been raised and is being investigated by a team including a safety reprentative.
Residual vessel nitrogen purge gas was being used to assist in the displacement of spent sulfacheck to overboard. During the operation the purge gas migrated through an
interconnecting open bund drain. The release of combined nitrogen/hydrocarbon/fluid wa detected at 25% lel by local gas detection. Placing platform to general alarm.
Release of dead crude and associated gas from 'o' ring seal due to failure of 2 out of 4 retaining bolts on a multi-purpose pump suction manifold. Coincident hi level gas
initiated platform sutdown/blowdown and brent system esdv closure. Oil and gas release contained within pumproom.
During a draining operation of sulfa check vessel v21003a nitrogen purge gasses migrated via the drain system to atmosphere. The nitrogen purge contained residual
hydrocarbons and these were detered by the fixed local automatic detection system. The saf gaurding system completed executive action in accordance with system
requirements and the platform was placed on general platform alarm status with all plant shutdown.
During the comissioning test run on train b 3rd stage gas compressor two gas leaks were detected om the 1" methonal injection line to the dry gas header. The leaks occured on
the upstream flange of hv-00024 and the down stream flange of hv-00025. The head r pressure at the time was approx 200barg the 3rd stage gas compressorwas immediatly
shut down and the leakage isolated by closing the dublock valve hv-00023/29 the dry gas header was then depressurised to flare.
During cargo offloading the watchman on deck discovered a leak on the metering unit. He immediately informed the ncg and the cargo pumps were stopped and the cargo
transfere operation was suspended. No gas sensors were triggered, the area was searched by se of portable gas meter. No gas was detected. Approx 50 liters of crude oil was
spilled on deck. No oil spilled overboard. A leaking gasket was observed on the flange of produce inlet valve stream no 2.
During commissioning test runs on the hp fuel gas compression, two leaks were detected on the system. The fuel gas compressor was being slowly pressured up to 220 barg
prior to test run commencing. When the system pressure had reached 164 barg, two leak were detected simultaneously at 33-ebu-1718 and 33-fo-1740a. A small quantity of
hydrocarbon gas was released to the atmosphere. The system was immediately depressured and tests suspended pending investigation and repair.
Durning start up of <...> compressor 'a', 3rd stage. A gas release was discovered from a flange down stream of filters on the seal gas on the machine. The machine was
immediately shut down and blown down to h.p flare and the leakage the leakage ra e rapidly decreased. The flange bolts were tightened up and the flange was service tested
durning the next start-up using a portable gas detector. No leaks detected.
Compressor 'a', 3rd stage was running under normal conditions when the site operator discovered a very small gas release from a flange on the seal gas system to the machine.
The machine was immediately stopped and depressured to hp flare. The bolts on t e flange was re-tightened and the machine restarted. All flanges on the seal-gas system for
the machine were also checked before start-up. Flanges were checked during start-up sequence using a portable gas detector without any leaks detected.
The hp <...> compressor train 'a' was running under normal operating conditions when the production superviser observed a minor gas leak from the 0.75" blind flange on hv-
10412 bleed valve, between the double block valves on the 3rd stage seal gas iquid trap. He immediatedly radioed to the control room to shutdown and blowdown the
machine. As the leak rate was very small no gas detectors were activated. The joint was replaced. When the machine was restarted the gas detection system was activated an
the ncc (control room) again instructed to shut the machine down. The leak was traced to the 0.75" drain connection on the seal gas filter 04-f-005a. The o-rings were found to
have failed. These were replaced and the machine was leak tested using nitroge
Process plant, hp compression and fuel gas compression were all on line operating conditions were stable at 0055 hrs gas were detected at the water treatment and water inject
areas and also on the main deck. The on shift process operators and bosun were nstructed to check out these alarms. At 0059 hrs esd1 occured due to high level gas detection
and the process plant was automatically shut down. At 0102 hrs the leak was confirmed to be at the fuel gas stand at valve 33-esu-17424. The leak was immediatel isolated by
closing the vavle stand inlet block valves and the system was depressurised to 0 barg
When assembling the cylinder and pipework on fuel gas compressor b after repair work. The discharge pipe flange on the cylinder was incorrectly installed (not properly
aligned) causing the o ring to blow during test run. The inspection prior to test r n also failed to notice the problem.
Leask occurred from mechanical seal unit on oil transfer pump a. Oil transfer pump a was immediately isolated and de-pressurised and stand by pump activated. Oil transfer
pump a was prepared for mechanical seal inspection/replacements less than ibbl was split on the deck and cleaned up.
Nitrogen compressor 'a' was started up prior to making adjustments to the control system at about 0145. Within seconds of start-up a loud bang was heard from within the
enclosure, followed by the gpa. On completion of the muster, the response team on sit reported a significant amount of water and water vapour within the enclosure. There was
no evidence of smoke or flame. The area was secured and the muster stood down. No personnel were within the enclosure at the time of the incident. Initial investigat on
revealed catastrophic failure of 4" nrv2 and significant damage to air/water plate cooler. In view of the potential for injury of this event it was decided to instigate a formal
investigation into the fundamental cause, presently in progress. A platfo m instruction has been issued as an interim measure to prevent personnel making un-controlled entry to
the enclosure of the 'b' machine with the machine runnning.
Psv on condensate re-injection pump discharge vented internally and through a vent port causing condensate to collect on the deck and initiate a flammable gas detector. This
was caused by pump start up against a closed valve thereby causing an over-pressu e. This over-pressure was not detected as start up is made with the low pressure trip
inhibited. This inhibit also automatically inhibited the high pressure trip which was not noted by control room personel. The psv sealing mechanism failed and when the psv
operated allowed condensate to vent via the post. The machine was isolated. Condensate was washed into the drain system. Investigations are continuing but it is intednded to
initiate an engineering change to separate the inhibition of the low trip fr m the high trip and to provide a fail safe to prevent start of the pump against closed valves.
Flammable gas was detected on two heads in the stripping gas compressor compartment shortly after the compressor was started up. Gpa and esd 1a occurres and personnel
went to muster. Cause was found to be a minor leak on a flange in the balance line. Com ressor was isolated and depressurised. Flange was connected and tested to 1 bar by the
manufacturer during a recent maintenance. System and flange cannot be tested at a greater pressure due to seals in the system. Intend to discuss qa procedured during c
mpressor maintenance with vendor to try to reduce possibility of future occurrences.
Gpa initiated by single flammable gas detector on mezzanine deck 13:38. <...> investigating the incident were withdrawn from the area when three flammable detectors and
one toxic detector on the cellar deck alarmed. This resulted in an esd 1a on the platfor . The situation was evaluated by the control room and the ert recommitted when gas
heads cleared. There were no leaks or other obvious signs of gas detected. Likely root cause was due to methanol and hydrocarbon vapors being released from drains system fo
lowing hosing down operation of residual methanol from a bunded area. All deck drains checked to ensure that a good water seal is present. This practice is to be included in
operator routine tasks.
Leak of methanol in tracer line to stripping gas compressor bravo. Gas detection picked up the leak and activated gpa. Leak was located repaired and the line tested.
Due to a defect in a gasket, gas leak occurred on the hamilton slug catcher meter orifice carrier. Gas detection picked up the leak and activated gpa. Leak was located and line
isolated, blown down and the gasket replaced.
A export pump was being used at the time. A flammable gas detector located by the pump skid went into alarm. Gpa was sounded and hands went to muster. A small quantity
of oil had leaked from the "c" pump which was offline at the time.
During steady production at 06:48 hrs the installation gpa was initiated by the activation of a gas detector on the dd cellar deck adjacent to the condensate re-injection pumps.
The installation came to muster and investigations were carried out by the em rgency response teams. It was identified that there was an escape of condensafe from b pump.
This was isolated by the emergency response teams and the area made secure. Maintenance department to flush and purge b pump and carry out investigation on the es ape of
condensate from the pump and repair the defect. Investigation revealed fractured suction head bolt. Bolt to be sent for analysis. All other suction head bolts to be checked
during repair. Awaiting spare bolt for repair of pump.
Condensate pump b discharge. Psv leaked condensate from a part in the back flow preventor on the valve pilot gas detection. System initiated gpa.
Routine test for ellon subsea well was ongoing. A small gas leak developed at 'b' daniel orifice meter. Two gds located just above the gas metering skid were activated (no wind
at time of incident) which gave us an esd 1. Faulty equipment isolated and ven ed. Replacement of seal gaskets at gas metering stream in progress.
Hydrocarbon leak from do5 flowline. Well was being restarted with choke set at 10/64". Production wing valve was opened and well technician observed gas leak in mainifold
area. Requested control room to shut in well. Flowline was depressurised to drain an leak stopped. One gas detector went into low alarm. Investigation revealed faiure of one
3/8" a-lok compression fitting on flowline. Repaired and well restarted satisfactorily.
The damper assembly on seal oil pump 'a' had been removed for replacement but then refitted as the new unit was incompatible. As the original damper had zero charge when
reinstalled attempt was made to recharge it. Due to the bladder in the damper being amaged, nitrogen at 150 bar pressure was able to enter the low pressure (suction) side of
the seal oil pump. The mechanical seal failed causing damage to the pump and associated drive, guard and motor.
Internal stall of engine compressor, causing supersonic flow reversal, allowing brief venting of combustion products into ge enclosure.
The alpha main generator <...> was being installed after removing the charlie generator for maintenance (4000 hour service period). This was done during daylight hours, and
approx 4 hours into the planned work schedule f r that day. Prior to running up the alpha generator, the integrated hi fog fire protection system was being initiated. This is
acheived by inserting a pre-charged nitrogen cylinder into a pressure reducing regulator which in turn feeds a local pressure i dicator and enters a second regulator on the hi fog
cylinder itself. This was successfully completed on the first of the two systems. On completion of inserting the second pre- charged nitrogen cylinder however, the top of the
regulator and diaphragm on the hi fog cylinder separated under great pressure. The two technicians working on the unit at the time were unhurt by the incident. The area was
cleared of non essential personnel. The hi fog system was then checked. On inspection some slight damage wa found on the charged nitrogen cylinder housing and the local
pressure indicator. A video was taken as evidence of the damaged equipment.
Normal production operations were ongoing on the platform when a gas alarm adjacent to the gas scrubber v05, was activated in the central control room. All hot work was
immediately ceased and the site investigated by the shift team leader. The shift team eader smelt gas as he approached the scrubber v05, saw a leak of condensate from a
pinhole on a 2" elbow on a level bridle, and initiated a production shutdown. The leak was isolated locally providing single valve isolation the area was ventilated and the gas
scrubber isolated to provide double valve isolation. Incident investigation initiated.
During routine operations a smell of gas was noticed in package 5. Investigation revealed crude oil dripping from a body cavity vent nipple on esdv 3141. This valve is on the
6" oil return line from the de-watering hydro-cyclones to one of the main separa ors (v04). A manual yellow shut down was initiated and the valve isolated. There was no
inidication of gas on the fire and gas detection systems.
Normal production operations were ongoing on the platform when a gas alarm adjacent to the condensate pump p74 was activiated in the central control room. No work
permits were issued at the time of the incident (as shift changeover). The site was investig ted by the operations technician and a leak of condensate from a pinhole on a 1"
recycle line from p74 was observed. A production shutdown was initiated and the leak was isolated locally. The area was ventilated and an incident investigation initiated.
Location - at end of mol pump line, t71-lp drain tank was being pumped when gland packing on the pump suddenly started leaking. Event - a gas heak immediately by the
pump went into high, quickly followed by a second and platform went into auto shut-down. ost event - because platform realised immediately the problem, decided not to go
to muster. Will report as oir/9b/12 because of auto-shutdown.
At the time of the incident the platform was operating under normal steady state production conditions. Routine drilling activity was in progress on fb 3-3, water injection
sidetrack well, although this had been hampered by downtime due to severe weather conditions over the weekend. At 2000 drilling personnel working on the bop deck noticed
a smell of gas which they thought to be coming from eggbox 4 and they immediately reported it by telephone to the central control room. No indication of gas was evident on
the f&g panel in the ccr. The fire and safety officer, <...>, and shift team leader, <...>, who were in the ccr immediately went to investigate the incident. On arrival on the bop
deck they too were aware of a gas smell but gas presence was not indicated on the portable monitor carried by them. They decided to descend the emergency exit stairs into
eggbox 5 so as to approach eggbox 4 by its main door. When they reached the bottom of the stairs in eggbox 5, they became aware that crude oil was spraying out of a fitting
on the xmas tree for well <...>. They immediately exited eggbox 5 by its main door and hit the emergency shutdown button for the eggbox which is located just outside.
Through the door window they were able to see that the leak died away rapidly. Susbsequent investigation revealed that a pipework assembly, carrying two pressure gauges
Normal plant operations - ngl condensate gas - pipework above condensate pumps - a <...> control technician (<...>) entered the ngl west door and could detect a strong smell
of gas but could see no visible leaks. He informed the ngl control room and along with a production technician (<...>) he proceeded to the p97/west door area. Above p97/98
they saw gas condensate flashing off from a stub connection at pit 8217. After quickly checking if the leak could be isolated they went to the ngl co trol room to report the leak
to the ccr the plant was then manually shut down via the yellow shutdown button. Local incident investigation report raised.
The platform was returning to normal operations from a planned shut down for maintenance and construction activities. The hydrocarbon gas release occurred in a joint that
had not been disturbed during the shutdown wor. The gas release was detected by a pr duction operator who heard the leak and smelt gasas he approached the vicinity. The well
associated with the flange leak had been brought on line some 20mins before. He judged that he had clear access to isolate the leak at the isolation valve. He did thi
immediately and stopped the leak. The operator and shift team leader took the decision not to sound the general alarm because the leak was stopped immediately and the gas
dispersed and the operating plant shut down. The leak was not detected by the fire and gas detection system, a gas point detector that was located nearby was hpwind and did
not pick up the leak. The wind was blowing from the south at 10knots. The detector was checked for operation and found to be functional. The leaking joint was examin d and
found that the sealing ring had been installed out of true with the joint face therefore reducing the sealing contact on one side. There was evidence of scuffing of the ring that is
concluded to have come from the original installation of the joint
Normal plant operations. Hydrocarbon gas (stripping gas) - a gas release was detected at g5208 in package 5 west which went from low to high alarm and initiated a yellow
production shutdown. One other detector in the area went to low alarm. The gas dispe sed immediately. The investigation failed to find any leak path. Investigation centred on
operation of dearator towers and the overflow lute seals. The most likely cause was thought to be loss of level in v28 injection water holding tank which allowed str pping gas
to escape the lute seal to atmosphere. The level transmitter and low level switch were found to be defective. Transmitter and switch repaired. Local incident and investigation
report raised <...>.
The oil return pipe from the recycle oil pumps to the 3rd stage separators developed a pin holeleak due to apparent corrosion. During an attempted emergency repair the hole
enlarged to appoximately 1/2". The oil process was shutdown to prevent further leakage.
During underbalanced drilling operations, a routine inspection of the bop stack revealed a small gas leak from the flanged connection between the double gates. The leak was
isolated, repaired (by re-tightening bolts) and pressure tested.
The unit had initially been purged with n2 and all known disturbed flanges checked for leaks. It was only when gas was intorduced that the other flange was identified.
Procedures changed to identify any piece of equipment or flange to be identified and dded to the check list and isolation certificate.
Normal gas export with both export compressors running. At 1930 hours the gas beam detectors detected gas at 19% level. A production operator attended the scene and noted
a gas leak from the stem packing on train 2 recycle valve. The operator requested a train 2 shutdown to effect a repair. The stem packing was renewed. Weather conditions:-
wind 30 kts. Dir. 180 degrees.
Internal modifications to glycol contactor vessel, prior to commencement the column to be removed was flushed with sea water, and after gas testing to permit vessel entry.
The condensate column was cut in half with a cutting disc. The top section was th n removed from the vessel. The bottom section was laid out horizontally inside vessel in
order to remove the side nozzles to get out through the manway. Whilst removing the second nozzle residue condensate ignited and flashed out of the end into the ves el
internal. Burning continued inside the half column. This was extinguished by the fire watcher using a dry powder fire extinguisher. <...> present on site at time of incident.
See short investigation report.
Dry gas export valve leaking (pv 56003b) discovered by prod supv during walkthrough. Release had not activated local fixed gas detection. All ongoing hotwork ceased,
permits returned to mcr, area barriered off. Release found to be from gland packing, v lve pv56003a was brought on line, and pv56003b isolated upstream and downstream
with manual isolation valves. Gas pressure vented through 2" drain line.
2 <...> gas turbine generator using diesel as fuel. Smoke reported coming from enclosure vent pipework. Operator dispatched to investigate. Nothing obvious looking through
enclosure windows, no heat or uv detector alarms. Opened enclosure and found sma l diesel leak & flame at 4 burner. Machine was shutdown by control room & diesel isolated
locally. Flame went out. Investigation showed minute hole/crack in 1/4 od stainless pipe leading to 4 burner when pressured to 60 bar g. New pipe fitted and tested. achine
then switched over to gas fuel.
Gas pelease from v2060 (export compressor suction scrubber)
Hissing sound heard by ssp on walking past "a" gas compresser k2010. Small leak discovered on 3rd stage pressure transmitter p2033. Control room contacted and compressor
shut down.
A general alarm was initiated by low level gas detection. The gas release was found to be from stem of a pressure control valve (worn seals) on hte fuel gas skid.
Gas detected in gas turbine enclosure unit 040. On inspection found a 2mm dia hole in the ss annular fuel gas supply line. Line had been rubbing against adjacent py cooling
air hose fitting. Unit was shutdown and vented and fuel gas pipe section replaced.
Whilst starting gas generator unit 060 a ga was initiated by gas detection in the unit enclosure, the automatic actin was to shutdown the unit. The unit had reached the stage in
the start sequence where the gas starter had a supply of 200 psi. Following shutdown the gas levels rapidly dropped to a safe level. Following investigation the cause of the
gas release was identified to be the misalignment of the spigoted 6" exhaust flange between the starter motor and flexible exhaust pipe.
Whist reassembling fuel gas pipework to <...> g-610, a blind flange was removed. At the same time 050 gas compressor was vented. A minor release of gas issued from the
open ended pipework into the <...> enclosure. The release was less than 1m3 for a short duration.
<...> g600 shutdown on high t-max, on investigating it was found that the exhaust lagging was impregnated with hydraulic oil and had ignited. The fire was extinguished with
a single hand held extinguisher.
A technician reported a smell of gas around the gas metering skid. On investigation a gas release was evident when feeling around an insulated gas chromatograph sampler.
The insulation prevented identification of exact source of the leak. Heat trace wa isolated and the process shut down and depressured in order to remove the insulation identify
the leak and repair or remove. The leak was around the sampler piston cylinder to mounting flange joint which is an o ring type seal. The sampler was removed a d a blind
flange fitted until repair or replacement of the defective unit.
The platform was shutdown and blown down. A test was being carried out to access leakage through the maintenence valve in the riser downstream of the esdv. A pressure
indicator has been rigged up with a short length of plastic tubing to a 3/4" piping isol tion valve on the depressured side of the maintenence valve. The plastic tube failed under
pressure due to the 3/4" valve passing, leading to a gas release. This was detected by the fire and gas system which initiated a trip of main generation (plx). The iser esdv was
immediately closed by the operator. The crew mustered. The permanent tubing was reconnected. An investigation will be carried out.
During an operations routine of changing over a duplex filter on a densitometer, on moving the arm towards the off-line filter, oil started to spray from its filter lid. It then took
a couple on minutes to swing the arm into its original position with th loss of approx. 1/2 barrel of crude oil to sea through gratings. Gas inhibits were in place at the time but
two gas heads registered low levels. Immediate actions: isolation of filter and foam used as precautionary measure. Investigation revealed a dama ed o ring. Weather
conditions: wind 12.6 knots, 300 degrees, sea 2.5 metres.
One gas head came into low alarm for module 13 mezz gas plant.operations technician was sent to investigate and found a small leak which was coming from the turbo
expander diaphragm flange on 24 pcv 3220 seal gas control valve. He was able to nip up valve and stop the leak.
Ops. Tech. Was preparing gas metering stream 3 for maintenance when he felt a faint smell of gas. He traced it to the primary isolation valve for the densitometer.
Investigation showed a small spot of ice on valve body. This covered a pinhole leak. He ontinued with preparation which also included isolation of this valve. It will remain
isolated until replaced, when an investigation will be carried out on the valve.
Whilst walking through platform checking on ongoing operations, an unfamiliar noise was noticed. This was traced to the west mezzanine deck. Initially what appeared to be
water dripping onto a pipe and evaporating was observed. However, closer inspection howed this to be a suspected gas leak at the 2 o'clock position on a pipeline. A
production operator was called and he was asked to identify line. Then informed by production shift supervisor that this was crude oil header to wellstream coolers, suspected
gas leak, although no alarms had annunciated. Decision made to shutdown production immediately and isolate section of pipe for inspection.
Vent hose from slot 1 gas lift supply line ruptured, thus releasing a quantity of gas into the module. This action caused the plant to shutdown/depressurise and automatically
initiate the general alarm. The gas lift system to all gas lift wells has been i olated until the investigation has been completed. The likely cause was a passing valve on hp/lp
interface caused over pressurisation of lp vent line which lead to vent pipe rupturing. Personnel working adjacent to the hose witnessed the rupture but no in ury occurred.
Terms of reference: * determine the immediate cause of the accident * determine the underlying causes, including any breakdown in management systems and processes *
consider issues not directly related to the incident, but having an effect o the response to it * make recommedations to prevent this type of event recurring * consider the
competency of individuals involved and the procedures and practices in place.
Minor release of gas from clamplock sealon slot 16 ag1 flowline. The leak was discovered by a technician working in the area. He smelt gas and reported it to the central
control room. The fixed system did not detect any evidence of gas in the area. As a recautionary measure the well was closed in, depressurised and isolated. The subsequent
restart of ag1 and area gas check, a second leak was found on slot 25 at nasa weco coupling. The agi system was shut down and depressurised and an icc put in place. An
investigation team has been set up to determine the cause and actions required to prevent re-occurence.
The inlet flange joint on 3" valve gr033 upstream of psv4205 on the regeneration gas heater was noted to be leaking by a person in the vicinity - the source of the leak was
located by sound and smell. The size of the leak was not insignificant but was no large enough to have been detected on the fixed monitoring systems in the area. The position
of the leak was such that no isolations were available, necessitating a platform shutdown to effect a repair. The potential for escalation from the event would a pear to be low at
this stage and an investigation is in hand to determine the cause of what is most likely a gasket failure.
Whilst recommisioning the water handling process the production operator was having difficulty in establishing the level in the <...> unit (v1200) due to an erratic leveltrol.
The <...> unit is effectively used as an atmospheric water settling tank for re oval of remaining oil before discharging the water overboard. The operator had shut in the outlet to
the <...> as the level control valve as passing, until reasonable levels were established. It appeared to him that the levels were still low. At this poin both high level alarms in
the oil and water legs annunciated in the ccr as flow into the <...> appeared to suddenly increase. The operator attempted to open the outlet valve to arrest the rise in levels but
by this time oil and water had spilled out the op of the vessel creating a small spill and spray of oil and water on to the deck. To prevent further release of liquids, the operator
in the ccr manually initiated a level 3 shutdown of the process
Production had been shutdown due to an unrelated event at time of incident. C5010 gas compressor was offline. A crew member noticed smoke coming from the compression
module and called the ccr. Two operators were sent to the scene to investigate and discov red smoke and a small flame coming from the power turbine casing/gearbox drive
shaft area of c5010 gas compressor. The operators immediately knocked out the fire using a dry powder extinguisher. The fire was not picked up by fire & gas detection and so
no alarm was activated and therefore no muster took place. The fire team went to the scene to confirm the status and to cool down the area of the fire. The machine was fully
isolated for detailed inspection and investigated before restarting production. The ire had been caused by a small amount of lube oil leaking from a screwed fitting on the gear
box drive casing which had been ignited by the hot surface of the power turbine casing. A full investigation is being carried out into the incident.
Normal operations were in progress when a hydrocarbon gas release was noted.
Preventative maintenance was being performed on well a17 xmas tree. An instrument technician effected some local isolations to remove a number of pressure gauges.
Having completed this task the technician took the guages to the instrument workshop. A s ell of gas was noted by an operator approximately one hou later. He traced the leak
to well a17 where gas was noted leaking from 1/4" instrument pipework. The operator isolated the leak at the 9 5/8" annulus. Investigation concluded that the instrument
technician had not applied the correct isolation. When the instrument pipework was originally disconnected no gas leak occured. The technician did not cap the open end. It is
assumed that some form of blockage was present in the pipework that cleared wh lst the technician was working in the workshop.
The platform had been shutdown since <...> and train 2 gas compression (k202/203) remained shutdown while its compressor bundle was being changed out. During the start-
up of train 1 compression (k102/103) gas passed from train 1 to train 2 via passi g valves and a open-ended pipe resulting in a gas release. A blank flange had been fitted in
place of an nrv on k203's discharge as an isolation while its bundle was being changed out. However, this flange had been fitted on the upstream-side instead of he
downstream- side of the discharge pipework. The gas release was detected by operators monitoring the start up for potential gas leaks. On finding the leak the plant was
shutdown and depressured.
A production maintenance technician was tasked with cleaning two fuel gas filters (v400a & b). The task was performed on v400a using the appropriate operating procedure.
For v400b the technician had opened the line to the closed drains. However, it was n t possible to comply with the procedure as the relief line to flare was spaded. Assuming
the filter was depressurised he cautiously slackened the filter lid. A release of gas and liquid occurred activating an overhead gas detector to 20% lel. The chief perator was in
the module and requested a manual shutdown as a precautionary measure. Investigation concluded that the line to the closed drains was blocked and it was not possible to
depressure the filter pot. The filter has been isolated to prevent use, pending further investigation.
Having completed the isolation, an operator began removing an instrument drain plug on v111 when it blew off causing a release of gas (the operator was unfamiliar with the
unusual isolation valve type, ie the valve handle is in the open position when the andles are turned 90 degrees to the valve). Unable to stem the release, the operator radioed the
control room and activated a plant shutdown from outside the module. The control room operator activated a plant shutdown and blowdown. A nearby ground leve detector
registered 20% gas. The instrument was later isolated by the chief operator.
While the platform was shut down isolations were performed to allow a heat exchanger to be physically isolated to allow work at a later date. When the spades were fitted the
permit was signed off but the isolations were left in place. Unfortunately one o these isolations was a locked open drain valve on a line to flare which was isolated with a
single isolation. When production was re-instated no problems were experienced until a high pressure compressor shut down and as a result blew down thereby incre sing the
pressure in the flare system. This increase in pressure was sufficient to cause gas to leak past the isolation valve and be vented from the drain point. The amount of gas
released was very small but activated a gas detector a few feet away. Th duration was a few seconds until the pressure in the flare returned to normal. The valve was isolated
and production returned to normal. When a permit is signed off as complete, the isolations must be returned to normal status and not put on long term i olation. The conditions
that existed to make this isolation regime safe may change and the isolation standard may no longer be acceptable.
While drilling well n32 at depth 13,727 ft, a drilling mud hose suffered a major failure at swaged/bonded section while under pressure at 3900psi causing a loss of approx. 40
barrels of xpot oil based mud into the sea. The hose connection was located in a area not normally accessed by personnel and nobody was in the vicinity. The hose was rated
for swp of 4000psi and test pressure of 6250psi. The damaged hose was returned onshore for survey and analysis. New hose fitted and tested to 4500psi. Weather c nditions
wind south-east 15 knots, air temp 5 degrees, sea temp 7 degrees, sea conditions moderate se sea and swell.
Normal production operation. Mcr received an alarm from sp21 that the well had shut in;operator sent to investigate. Discovered 12mm instrument line had parted at the pilots
for uhmv on sp21 on the choke gantry. Oil was spraying from open 12mm line. Immed ate isolation put in place and repair undertaken.
Whilst investigating reported gas leak inside gas turbine z-1300, high leve gas was detected in combustion air inlet ducting resulting in esd level 3 - total platform shutdown.
Gas was found to be leaking from a fitting on the fuel gas system. The cause, hich allowed gas to remain in the system under pressure whilst the machine was shutdown, was
eventually traced to an incorrect isolation for unassociated work some 2-3 days earlier.
Whilst conducting fault finding on p-4003, high level gas was detected in the combustion air inlet ducting resulting in an esd-3 total platform shutdown. The machine was
isolated whilst platform was restarted. The unit remaining out of service whilst in estigations continue.
Following completion of maintance activity on the gas metering skid the equipment was being de-isolated. Durning the de-isolation gas escaped from the pipework into the
module. The operator immediately closed the valve to stop the release
At appromimalety 0200 hours the area operator for pr1 was carrying out routine checks on plant and equipment. At this time he observed an oil spill at the north end of the
hydrocyclone skid adjacent to the lp condensate pump. The operations supervisor was called to the area by the operator. Upon his arrival futher investigation revealed that the
backing plate on pi 2654 (range 0-280 bar) had parted from the gauge body (the operations supervisor had already been in this area at approximalety 0145 hours and o leak
was observed). No fuilds could actually be seen leaking from the guage although hydrocarbon spillage was clearly visible. The quantity of oil released was estimated to be less
than 50 litres. No gas alarms had been actived. Based on the evidence av ilabe the investigation team concluded that the hydrocarbon leak path via the faulty weld located on
the rear of the pressure indicator. Gas detectors in the area of the leak were tested to confirm all were operational.
At 0445 hours gas was detected in pr1 (ge-085 gas head high high). The situation was investigated by the area operators and the operations supervisor and the leak was traced
to a vent port on pi 4028 (condsensate metering). The plug was isolated at the <...> valve and changed out. On further investigation it was noted that the seat on the plug was
damaged allowing gas to escape.
The operator had started intial shift plant checks when he noticed a distinct smell of smoke/hot lube oil coming from 'a' jbgt. On further investigation within the load gear box
compartment, it was found that a small amount of smoke was circulating within the compartment and subsequently being blown out of the compartment by the hvac fans. The
operator reported to the main control room operators and requested assisstance with further investigations of the compartment. On inspection of the compartment the intial
assessment was that a small lube oil leak impinging on the hot exhaust surface at the most northerly end of the gear box drive shaft (below no.2 bearing) was the most probable
cause of the smoke. Whilst awaiting input from the goc on guidance on the availabilty of 'c' jbgt and possible load reduction, the operator and the operations supervisor
proceeded to carry out further investigation. On opening the east door to the load gear box compartment 10-12" flames were evident at the most northerly point of the drive
shaft. The door was closed and the operator and the operations supervisor return to the gcr for a co2 extinguisher which was used to extingus the fire. The operations supervisor
co-ordinated the reduction in load for shutdown of the unit in a manner not to compromise the other units. The unit was shutdown in a controlled
<...> satellite indicated gas on deck. Release caused by fracture of instrument tube betweenhi/lo pilot and npt valve.underlying cause is movement of conductor and
vibration.new fittings and pipework installed as well as 1 extra guide to minimise movement.
Gas release from swab cap when pressure gauge broke off. Vibration believed to be primary causation.
Redundant flow lines were being removed by a pipefitter with an electric hacksaw. Unable to gain access to a stub fitting to cut it off, he walked around the header to a better
position. Unfortunately he positioned himself at the wrong flowline (origina ly there were 18 similarities) and began to cut the stub on that line which was live (gas 60 bar).
As soon as he had penetrated the stub gas was released. The oim sounded the ga and activated esd/blowdown. The leak path was small and no gas alarms were activated.
Two mechanical technicians were working on train 2 gas compression module. Four studs were loosened, one removed at one end of a compressor balance line when natural
gas within the line was released at a pressure of approximately 1290 psi. The gas was immediately deluged.
The pressure in the inner annulus of a wellhead is monitored by a pressure gauge connected to the annulus by small bore instrument pipework. The compression fitting
connecting the small bore pipework came apart for a reason still being investigated. The wells are natural gas. There were no injuries and the gas escape did not ignite.
Following opening of 3sdv6116 by piper main control room the downstream pipework of 3sdv6116 was exposed to 3.1 bar pressure. The outlet flange of this sdv immediately
began to leak to atmosphere (diesel initially from interface liquid seal in vessel 3c61 0 then gas). Local gas detector pr2-ge24 picked up low (10% lel) gas alarm. Operator was
sent to investigate and found cloud of gas/diesel in area. The operator then called the piper main control room to initiate a class 2 shutdown and blowdown (gpa was a so
initiated). As a precautionary measure, the level of shutdown was raised to class 1.
Whilst carrying out a routine inspection a technician heard a gas leak. This was traced to a small leak to the "destec" flowline joint. The installation was vented and the joint
changed. The defective joint was very badly corroded from the inside with about 50% of the material missing.
Following intrusive maintenance into the 12" gas line off the test separator, a pressure indicator vent line was found open and leaking hydrocarbon gas the valve and vent line
had been used to verify mechanical isolations made on the system unfortunatly t e valves had been left in the open position on pressurisation of the system. The gas leak did
not cause a platform alarm.
The production department were lining up the well j14 to the test seperator. One operator operated the choke valve manually. During the operation the choke valve failed
releasing hydrocarbons from the valve actuator bonnet. The operator isolated the sect on op pipeline and drained to the closed drains system to stop the leak. The choke valve
was removed for examination and replacement the operator was not injured only contaminated with hydrocarbons.
High flow alarms and low pressure alarms annunciated in the ccr on the <...> platform for the 10" west riser on the water injection system. The ccr personnel immediately shut
in the west water injection manifold and the riser valve. The first valve close was well a6 and the pressure immediately stabilised. The prognosis was that the subsea flowline
jumper had failed. This has now been confirmed as the mode of failure following subsea inspection by the dsv <...> on <...>.
Hydrocarbon gas release (methane) from 1/2" s/s impluseline connecting the orifice to the dp cell during repressurisation of the plant. The gas was released in a zone 1
metering hut on the top deck of the pd platform.
Bubble of toxic gas released from sump causing a single toxic gas head tg013 to alarm briefly at high level before returning to zero. Muster called in accordance with platform
procedures.
Gas commpression system was in recycle mode following dga plant trip. At 15:27 gas heads in vicinity of c2 & c3 alarmed at low level. Quickly follwed by several other gas
heads indicating presence of gas below low level alarm point. Gas plant shut down an muster initiated. Subsequent investigation indicates that release was probrably caused by
leakage from corroded pipework beneath insulation. Detailed report to follow after lagging has been stripped.
<...> was in normal operational when a toxic (h2s) gas detector went into high level alarm (offscale>50ppm). An emergency muster was initiated from the ccr. All personnel
were accounted for. Ccr confirmed detector tg013 in vicinity of the south side dr in sump and wells t8/t6 was already falling. The area was checked by ert and a 8ppm h2s
level recorded, source not identified. A second sweep of the area failed to detect h2s or other hydrocarbon gas. The area was confirmed secure. The muster stood dow at 0542.
A detailed investigation report will follow. No injuries, or plant damage occurred.
Operational tests on <...> started to raise concern with the intregity of the <...> subsea test line. The <...> standby vessel <...> was requested on the <...> to check the <...> area
at first light on <...>. At 07.55 the sbv advised a roken sheen on the surface in the <...> area. The source was not confirmed. A dsv was mobilised. The csol <...> arrived in field
<...> and at 11.55 noted patches of oil and gas coming to surface. <...> production was shutdown. Rov and diver advised <...> flexible jumper parted from <...> wellhead.
Low level gas indication in m1 after <...> had an esd valve closure. (<...> process shutdown at time). Source found to be a leaking gasket at the gas lift inlet to fcv to ta05.
Gasket changed out.
Gas compressor shutdown (train 1 was already shutdown and train 2 tripped on high discharge temperature). Leak emanted from <...> and <...> gas lift flow line fanges, one
on <...> and two on <...>.
H.p ngl pump discharge line failure occurred at a previously installed 'furmanite' clamp. The escaping ngl's immediately gasified and brought platform to g.p.a status and
subsequent shutdown, blowdown and power loss. The ngl pump stopped automatically (as per s/d philosophy), and the ngl/gas leak ceased. The gas dispersed within 30
seconds via the natural ventilation of the open module.
Employee observed an ngl release from a pipe spool and activated a mac point. A pin hole leak had occurred on the discharge pipework of an ngl pump at the 11 o'clock
position throught a weld
Natural gas liquids (ngl) leaked from pipe spool due to weld failure, which caused a change of platform status due to gas detection. Further investigations are ongoing.
During an rov survey of the nw face of the <...> a jacket, the rov discovered some bubbles of crude oil leaking from an instrument tapping point on the 8" <...> riser at a depth
of 498ft. The tapping point was found to be fitted with a damage redundant pr ssure transmitter. This was leaking a small quantity of crude causing a slight disclouration of the
sea surface (<...> completed and sent to the relevant authorities). As a result of the discovery the <...> riser was shut down and depressurised and no furt er leakage was
observed. Wind speed was 9kts at 70 deg. Wave height 1m. The use of the rov to close the two needle valves on the tapping point is being risk assessed at the present.
During a routine test on slot 21 a pinhole leak was observed at the 8 o'clock position on the 3" crude oil pipework outlet (line no 3" d3a- 1109-pa-t) of the test separator (09-
410-2005) the leakage at the time was predominately produced water and the sep rator was shutdown depressurised and isolated. A temporary propriety clamp was fitted until
the 3" spool piece could be replaced with a new one. The surrounding pipework was inspecteed ultrasonically for defects but no features were detected. The pinhole piece of
pipe will be inspected in an attempt to determine the cause of the pinhole.
During normal gas lift operations the operator in the area detected a 'smell' of gas. On further investigation a small leak was found, on the upstream flange of valve gp 1251 of
the 6" to 4" discharge line from the hp compressor. The compressor was immed ately shutdown under controlled shutdown sequence. The fixed gas detection did not pick up
the leak due to the small amount, the open configuration of the module, and wind direction.
During normal operations 'a' turbine showed a small gas reading of 19% of lel on one gas head, whilst the turbine was being changed over from fuel gas to diesel it tripped due
to infra red detection and halon was released in the enclosure automatically. A susequent blackout ensued due to running on one turbine at that time. On further investigation a
small crack was found in the air purge line to the diesel burners. During the changeover to diesel, diesel fuel had entered the line from the fuel block causi g a very small
amount of diesel to be sprayed over the exhaust area which evaporated, and activated the ir detector, halon release and turbine shutdown.
A production operator found a small condensate leak from a flange in the gas compression module. The system was shut down and the line depressurised. There were no gas
alarms triggered due to the small quantity and the open nature of the module. The leak as traced to a flange on the pipework from the lp discharge scrubber. The leaking
condensate had been partially contained within the insulation on the line. When the insulation was removed the leak was confirmed as coming from an rtj joint fitted with a s
ectacle blind. After the bolts on the flange were tightened the joint tested ok and the plant was restarted. The total volume of the leak was estimated at some 5-10 litres which
had flashed off to atmosphere below the platform.
During a set run operation of the "a" turbine a fire and gas excutive action instigated a general alarm and halon released in the turbine enclosure. Platform personnel went to
full muster. Intital indications showed an infra red detector in alarm. On insp ction it was found that no fire was evident. On further inspection a diesel leak was located on the
turbine itself. After confirmation that the diesel supply had been isolated, platform personnel were stood down.
The fire and gas system on gas turbine 'c' detected a small leak on the fuel gas pipework. The turbine was immediately shut down under control. It was investigated and found
to be leaking from the main distribution manifold for the gas burners on the ga generator. Turbine has remained shut down and manifold will be replaced by the wglit turbine
engineers.
Following a loss of platform generation and production, an operator detected gas coming from the cabinet containing the specific gravity analyser system for monitoring
import gas quality. The isolation valves to the cabinet were closed in and the cabinet ented. The equipment was manufacturered by <...> and problem believed to be associated
with the regulator diaphragm. The equipment to remain isolated until investigation complete and recommendations actioned.
During preparations to isolate the 'b' gas turbine it was noticed that diesel was emanating from the fuel pump. The system was immediately isolated and made safe. On detailed
inspection it was found that the 'o' type ring seal on a pressure gauge tap-in n the pump body had opped out of its location. This resulted in fuel spraying towards the enclosure
door. Had the turbine been operational, there was the potential for a fire.
Production operator found a small condensate leak from a flange in the gas compression module. Portable gas detection equipment recorded 4% lel in the surrounding area and
9% lel around the leaking flange. The system was immediately shut down and the lin depressurised. There were no gas alarms triggered due to the small quantity and the open
nature of the module. The leak was traced to a flange on the pipework from the lp discharge scrubber. The leaking condensate has been partially contained within the nsulation
on the line. When the insulation was removed, the leak was confirmed as coming from an rtj joint. The <...> plant has remained shut down until cause identified the total
volume of the leak was estimated to some 3 - 4 litres which had flashed off t the atmosphere below the platform.
Normal production operations ongoing. Fire and gas system showed a detector in the gas compression module reading 40% lel. A number of further detectors then started
showing gas. Compressor shutdown on f&g executive action. Gas levels then decayed before eaching the point where the f&g system would trigger a full plant shotdown and
general alarm. On closer investigation using portable detection, operators found that a 3/8 " helix impulse line instrument tap point had been sheared.
Discovered gas/liquid leak on well no1 flowline flange downstream of choke flange. Well isolated and flowline depressured to effect repair.
Pig train sent, with 2 off 0 -1 g beg sources from <...> to <...> platform - when arrived at <...> one source plus holder missing. Suspect at <...> reception facillities - preparing
to track source using special equipment. <...> onboard.
Esd 3 platform blackout and full muster caused by detection of fuel gas in power generation turbine z-1300 (gt4) combustion air inlet ducting during machine start up. N.b. gt4
was shutdown to investigate duel fuel operational problems and was being test un. The gas detected had migrated from the machine combustion chamber to the inlet ducting
and not from an external source.
A section of the south mezz deck walkway grating main support structure gave way whilst installing a replacement grating panel.
7" liner set- dart not released-poor cement bond-drilled out with 9.2/ gal mud-1.2 bbl influx 1900 psi casing pressure-circulate out brine influx with 14.8/gal-squeeze50 bbls
cement @ shoe-wait on cement
After completion of well a tubing to annulus communication was noted. Well has installed gas lift valves with aflas seals. Initially thought cause of tubing to annulus
communication was that seals require higher temperature and longer exposure for energis tion when compared to standard seals. Well retested 5 days later. During test
communication still evident. Asv has been subsequently tested and held pressure. Well returned to production, pending workover currently scheduled for <…>. During
workove investigation programme will be performed and gas lift valves will be replaced if necessary.
As part of routine test on well <…> tubing-annulus communication noted. Annulus build-up recorded 153 psi in 2 hrs, equates 16422 scf/hr - above mobil drilling and prod
procedures recommendation of 900 scf/hr. Well asv and dhsv both tested with good test . Leak path evidently below asv. Well returned to production and leak investigation
programme planned. Dhsv and asv to be tested every three weeks to ensure integrity, until leak investigation performed.
After a routine tubing/annulus communication check, it was identified that the 9 5/8" annulus pressure could not be bled down to zero pressure. On shutting in the 9 /58"
annulus, the pressure increased from 49psi to 330psi in 40 minutes. Repeated attemp s to blow down the 9 /58" annulus resulted in subsequent pressure build-up. The the thp
remained at +/- 725psi throughout the build-ups. The dhsv and asv have been tested and are operational. There is no tubing to annulus communication above the dhsv.
After a routine wellhaead maintenance and tubing/annulus communication check, the folllowing was identified: the hydraulic master valve *(hmv) and production wing valve
(pwv) failed integrity test. These tests were conducted on <…>. As this placed th well outside the mnsl dapp procedure, the well was immediately shut in and a program
issued to safely isolate this well until work over could be scheduled.
Hydraulic master valves (hmv) and production wing valve (pwv) failed integrity tests. In addition the dhsv failed to completely close, possibly due to scale.
After a routine wellhead maintenance and tubing/annulus communication check, the following was identified: the lower master valve (lmv) failed an integrity test possibly due
to a sheared operating spindle. The dhsv is closed but unable to be tested due to the unknown position of the lmv gate. As this placed the well outside the mnsl dapps
procedure, the well was again isolated on <…>.
Tubing to annulus communication was previously identified and subsequently a-1 injection valve run below the leak path to isolate the wellbore from the reservoir in <…>.
<…> perforations were added in <…>, but efforts to re-run the a-1 injection valve failede resulting in a slickline/toolstring fish. Subsequently, a tubing bridge plug was run to
above the slickline fish at 7,546ft wlrkb to determine tubing integrity. The bridge plug was successfully pressure tested from above and t that time noted that the annulus
pressure was following the tubing pressure up. An a-1 injection valve was run on a tubing packer to 7,550ft wlrkb but failed when inflow tested. An attempt to retrieve the
packer/a-1injectionvalve was aborted when the lickline hung-up in similar fashion to the operation which resulted in the slickline fish. A plug was set in the trdhsv at (710ft
mdrkb and a successful leak-off test performed (well temporarily suspended)). Therefore, tubing to annulus communication ha been confirmed between trdhsv at 710ft mdkrb
and bridge pug set at 7,546ft wlrkb. Forward plan is to make a second attempt to re-run the a-1 injection valve on a packer and commence water injection at a restricted rate
(slickline fish) until a workover
While attempting to cycle open an omega uni-balance pressure plug installed in the tubing string on well a20 a gas alarm and platform shutdown occurred at the <…> cement
unit. The unit was using water to cycle the plug open at 2300'. The tubing vo ume to this depth is approximately 53bbls and the cement unit was being utilised in order to
maintain close volume control. The plug was cycled 11 times with no apparent flow seen from well through the rig choke manifold. The 12th cycle attempt was bled d wn
recovering the fluid used to pressure up system and was followed by a surge of fluid containing gas. The bleed off line was immediately closed off, however the gas detectors
had already tripped causing a platform shutdown and loss of production.
Well a2 being isolated and flowline depressured for intrusive choke valve maintenance. Surface safety hydraulic master valve started to open due to logic of control panel.
Release was through a "bleed valve attached to the swab cap. Well subsequently fu ly depressured above sub-surface safety valve. Full report attached.
Drilling 6" hole sect. Inc. With 10.8ppg mud. Flowcheck made foll. Drilling break. Observed press. Build up after end of circ. Period. Cont. Circ. Conventionally. Suspected
well might be u tubing no further difficulties.
Running completion on <...> well was killed with 12.2ppg & been in static condition for two days when it was noticed flowing. Well was shutin,opsc. Kill pill(hi-vis) was
pumped = 60bbls & displaced 12.4 ppg brine. Total of 15bbls were bullheaded away to the formtion observed wel. Well static cont. Run completion.
Well handed to production engineer for chemical squeeze. Well handover sheet completed showing blowdown v/v open. V/v subsequently left open whilst well was opened and
a gas release (hp) occurred. Operator immediately shut the well and reported the releas to the ccr.
Drilling 8 1/2" section. Exoerience 8 bbls/hr dynamic losses. No static losses. Gascut mud returns. Stopped drilling. Flowchecked, well flowed. Closed in well on annular
preventer. Attempted to circulate (drillers method) with 30 spm. Unable to pressure u to required pst (1060 psi). Mixed lcm material and condition mud in reserve pits.
Monitored closed in well for 4 hrs. No secondary buildup. Performed regular flow checks. All static. Gascut mud at bottoms up. Flowcheck static. Closed annular preventer bu
did not close in well on choke.routed 40 bbls gascut mud via poor boy degasser. Opened up annular preventer. Flowcheck static. Pump out of hole @ 30 spm. Spot 40 bbls lcm
above top sand @ 11850 ft. Continued pooh into window. Circulate bottoms up. No dynamic losses. Flowcheck static.
Drilled 8 1/2 hold to 13487ft, very slow progress. Pumped out 28 stands & 2 singles, noticed 70bbl gain in active pit. Closed in well, no pressure observed. Open well,
observed slight flow, rih 2 singles and installed kellylock. Closed in well, sicp 220ps , total influx 100bbl bit depth 11678ft, mudwt in use 620pptf. Circulated drillers method,
observed losses. Attempted to strip in with 650pptf mud. Open well, no flow, no losses. Attempt to free strings, so far without success.
Stopped circulation. Monitored well over trip tank. Well flowing. Closed in well on annular preventer after 20 bbls gain. Monitored pressure build-up in annulus (float in drill
pipe). Initial pann=300psi, build up to pann=350psi. Circulate 650pptf mud @ s m (first circulation drillers method). Pst=650psi. Pch (initial)=450psi, pch (final)=80psi. Light
mud returns (635pptf). No hydrocarbons. Closed in well after 120% bottoms up closed in pann=100psi. Bleed of pressure in 50psi stages to zero. Total returns bbls.
Flowcheck over triptank, well static. Continued circulating and conditioning mud. Completed wiper trip to section td @ 13487ft. Pooh.
Whilst snubbing in (under well pressure of 2700 psi) a gas lift insert string (glis) on well <...> using a hydraulic workover unit (hwu), it was noticed that the well started to
flow through the glis. A kelly-cock was installed onto the glis and the well was brought under control after a minor release of hydrocarbons. The glis completion consisted of; a
tailpipe with 2 wireline retrievable back pressure valves (check valves) 2-3/8" 13%cr l80 tubing with cs hydril connection and 5 side pocket mandrels (spm) with pre-installed
dummy gas lift valves. (all assemblies were tested in the onshore workshop to 5000 psi for 15 mins. <...>'s body tested on the <...>, check valve assemblies tested from below
on the <...>). The <...> was configured from the wellhead up as follows; <...> blind/shear rams, <...> annular, <...> 2-7/8" pipe rams, <...> 2-3/8" - 3-1/2" variable bore rams,
<...> 2-7/8" stripper & a <...> annular. Upper kill & choke lines were fitted between the <...> blind rams & the <...> variable bore rams, there was also lubrication & bleed off
lines between the <...> strippers. Portable gas meters were positioned in the workbasket of the unit prior to runningglis the check valve assemblies were tested to tubing head
pressure 500 psi for 15 mins. Against the workover valve block by closing the upper annular bop. The string was run in hole utilising <...>'s jam system & as per <...>
<...> investigation into premature activation of radial cutting torch. Sequence of events. Well intervention work to shut off water in well <...> was in progress. Part of the task
required the tail pipe on the isolation packer to be severed, this was to be carried out using a 'radial cutting torch'. The tool string was made up as per the 'operating manual' and
run into well at02:45 on <...>, the top of the isolation packer was tagged at 4630 mbrt at 05:30. After several attempts to run into the packer the tool was recovered to surface
with the intention of removing the 'nogo' ring which was thought to be preventing the tool entering the packer. On retrieving the tool it was noted that it had fired and that the
lower half with the nogo' ring was missing. Immediate actions. <...> checked the annulus pressures on the well to confirm the integrity of the tubing, all were as per initial
readings prior to running the tool, he then contacted the onshore well service support group and advised them of the problem. Initial investigation into cause of incident.
Interviews with both of the <...> engineers, <...> and <...>, confirmed that the tool had been made up properly and at no time during the run had the tool been fired deliberately
<...> demonstrated the firing sequence to <...> (oim) and <...> (fso), the system is such that accidental initiation is not possible. <...> then carried out checks on the unit to
Circulated bottom up on a junk run from 13383ft. Gas level increased to 36%. Driller flowchecked - no flow, shut well in. No pressure build up. Circulated remaining bottoms
up volume through choke/poorboy degaser as a precaution until gas level dropped to 0%
Drilling operations were in progress with 8 1/2" hole @ 13341ft in the kimmeridge foramation. Surface gas readings increased rapidly and the well was flowchecked. After
15mins flow was observed and the well was closed in. After pressures had stabilised an the relevant well kill preparations had been put in place the well was killed using the
wait 8 method. This was only partially successful using 13.7ppg mud & further well kill operations were implemented to kill the well, successfully with 14.5ppg mud. he well
was then flowchecked, opened up and normal drilling operations resumed.
Having set the 7" liner to isolate a high pressure zone of kimmeridge formation, the mud density in the hole was subsequently reduced in preparation for the lesser pressured
reservoir. On drilling out the shoe track a kick was taken associated with 10 bbl influx. The influx was circulated out and then heavier mud circulated to balance formation
pressure.
Completion string was being pulled fm well d7 for change out of the esp. Well had previously been circulated with brine. Suspected that packer at lower end of completion was
tight within the casing. Possibility of shabbing expected.
During routine annuli checks in eggbox-2 an operations tech observed that the 'a' annulus 1/2" pipe-work downstream of the dublok valve had sheared. The annuli contained
treated seawater at zero pressure. The 3" mcevoy and dublok valve were subsequently isolated. Actions - investigation team set up.
Whilst carrying out drilling operations on <...> well <...>, the top hydril bop had to be closed. At that time in the programme the well was open hole into the reservoir and
loggong whilst drilling operations were in progress. The well was cased to 2773 meter and the tool was 10 meters below the case shoe when the tool encountered an
obstruction. During an attempt to drill and slide through the obstruction the hole was packed off and circulation was lost. The tool was worked free and a high gas reading was
bserved at the drill floor and the tool was pulled back into the shoe. Observation of the annulus showed gas bubbling, and gas was evident at the shale shakers with a trace of
oil in the returns. Top hydrill on bop was closed and well checked for pressur for two hours. Onshore drilling engineers contacted and a circulation plan agreed to allow for
two full circulations of drill pipe and annulus down to td. After each circulation flowchecks are to be carried out. As there was no pbu it is believed this wa migration due to
the period of time logging of the well has taken. Thus normal well procedures allow for this event.
The drill string was run in to the bottom of the will. Prior to drilling ahead the mud was buing circulated and conditioned. As the mud from 'botton uup' reached the surface gas
was detected in the mud. This was also detected by the platform gas
Down-hole safety valve on this water injector well was routinely tested. Failed to stop backflow of water from the formation. Both master valves have been successfully
integrity tested. Generic risk assessment for water injectors, where a dhsv failure has occurred, is in place. It is considered to be the most safe to continue injecting until
remedial action can be taken and dispensation has been given for this.
During routine testing of the tubing retrievable downhole safety valve, the valve failed to close. A repeat test was conducted and the valve still failed to close. The well has
been left shut-in pending remedial action to occur over the next few days [cur ently waiting on weather].
Whilst pulling production tubing in order to replace an electrical submersible pump. Gas alarms were initiated, on examination oil (approx 3-4 barrrels) had escaped through
the blow out preventer. The well was shut in and water (filtered sea water) was in ected to "kill" the well. The operation of pulling the tubing had been on going for about 12
hours when the incident occurred. Echo meter readings verifying depth of fluid were being taken after every 10 stands of pipe had been removed. The cause of the r lease of
crude oil & gas is thought to be a release of a pocket of gas entrapped in the submersible pump. Its subsequent expansion raised the fluid level rapidly bringing the crude oil to
the surface. There was no fire/explosion and no one suffered injury
During routine well maintenance it was discovered that slot 23 dhsv failed open. There was no loss of containment, nor was the integrity of well threatened, due to the upper
master valve, lower master valve and wing valve still available. The normal flow ath is through the upper master valve, through wing valve to the flowline, which has a choke
control flow control valve. The three way split to different manifolds each have their own double isolation. A well team complete with the relevant equipment have been
mobilised in order to change out the dhsv.
Whilst rimming in hole bha became stuck,repeated jarring released it suddenly.once pulled out of hole logging suite was found to be missing which included 2x radioactive
sources cs.137,74gbq,nos 1225gw & am 241/be,185gbq nos 1372k. Drill collar covertor , rill floor & hud system checked for contamination.they were not contaminated.
The well was circulated to seawater under controlled conditions. After pressure tests and clean up we commenced pulling out of the hole with the clean up assembly. 22 stands
were pulled out with the hole taking the correct volume and no indications of s abbing. With the bit at 19,910 ft flow was observed from the drillpipe. The well was closed in
with 2050 psi on the drill pipe and annulus.
Kick while drilling s60 @ 11752 ft. Correct procedure by driller, correct operation of equipment
Whilst logging up through reservoir.(s60) with drill pipe conveyed logs@ 11655 ft. Proper fluid displacement. Was not ocurring. Hydril was closed to circulate well to fluids to
disperse off any invading fluids from reservoir (none was found) gas cut. Mud irculated to surface through. Choke gas. <...>.
<...> whilst drilling 8 1/2" hole with 645 pptf mud at 11115ft ahd (8871 ft tvd) the driller observed a 4 bbl pit increse and flow checked the well, which was seen to be flowing.
The well was closed in and the following pressures recorded.
Drilling 8 1/2" hole at 15341 ahbdf (9683 tvd). Well kicked. Well shut in on t.p.r's. Then transferred to bag. Initial pdp-240psi pann 160 psi final pdp-410psi pann 380psi after 1
hour. Pit gain 20 bbls (not accurate). Drilling mud weight .655psi/ft. Kill mud weight .718psi/ft (includes 200psi overbalance). Kill method wait and weight. Dp pressure fell to
370psi decide to kill with no overbalnce. Kill mud weight 700 pptf. (also losses have been seen at 15263' (9260 tvd).
During initial function of dhsv via remote well head panel pressure was seen to drop suddenly to zero. On investigating a pipe was found to have become detached from a
fitting on inspection it was noted that fitting had not been made up. Refitted pipe & tested.
Following replacement of tree on subsea well <...> (by <...>) they were unable to obtain satifactory leak off test on dhsv production to continue following assessment
procedure by ah onshore to offshore management
When drilling ahead 81/2" hole at 11,847 ft.md/11593 ft tvd gas alarms on dp shaker area d3 were activated at 20% initiating gpa and at 60% lel initiating level 3 shutdown and
associated production shutdown (level 2) well j18 was closed in with sicp=620ps sid=660psi. The well was circulated to kill mud of 13.1 ppg then to 13.9ppg. No influx
volume was recorded. All gas circulated out as per procedures.
Observed flow from well <...> while drilling 8.5" hole. Closed in well and monitored pressures. Used wait/weight method to regain control over well.
Observed oil at surface after in flow testing from well ta-25s1. Circulated to kill mud.
During a routine hydrostatic pressure test on <...> well a2 a failure occurred at the flx pacher. The failure resulted in the surface held section of 2 3/8" and 5 1/2" tubing being
displaced vertically through the riser. The drill floor was not occupied at the time, in accordance with pressure test procedure, and no injuries resulted. An accident
investigation is currently underway to establish the cause of the failure. Operational activity at the time of incident was running a new completion.
He was about to reinstall the hooking arrangement on the stern of the lifeboat afetr 4 pm certification. Instead of using a chain block for adjusting the hook, the crane was used
directly. The crane was asked to move up 1 cm and at the sametime he tried t align the boltholes using his finger, the tip of the finger (half the nail) was cut off.
Whilst supply vessel was receiving back loads from platform <…> apparently caught his right hand in load. It would appear that during positioning operations he became
unbalanced on the vessel deck and fell# forward. This could have been caused by an accumlation of events.
During rigging down operations a grease control unit was being moved from adjacent to the dog house to the entrace of the v door by use of a tugger. Two assistants were
guiding the unit towards the door access (raised approx. 4" from floor) when the load as lowered, one of the assistants sustained a fracture to his right foot when the underside
of the unit clipped the top of his foot.
Whilst installing an 8 inch vent spool to the <...> riser system, the spool was suspended overbaord for fixing at the two flange points. The spool was to be rigged and lfted to
the horizontal position for bolting to pre-installed pipe work. Whilst positio ing the spool using chain blocks the lower flange snagged on a scaffold fitting bolt. As the lower
flange became unsnagged, the upper flange spun into the scaffold handrail trapping and crushing the injured person's hand resulting in the injury.
A water container suspended by a crane suddenly dropped onto foot of injured person. Water was being transferred from one container to another. Failure of crane suspected,
cause yet to be determined.
The injured party was involved with routine drilling operations on the rig floor. The ip inadvertently stepped forward, placing him below the elevators which were being
lowered at the time. The elevator horns struck a glancing blow to the ip's hard hat. His fall was arrested by a colleague. He was attended to on the scene by the platform
medic prior to removal to sick bay for further treatment and observation.
Commenced erecting haki scaffold base. Standard fell over srtriking ip on back of safety helmet approximately one inch above bottom edge and also stricking ip on back of
skull, knocking ip unconscious. Examined by medic and doctor, transferred to hospital for precautionary x-ray and observation.
Rope change out on the east crane. Weather overcast and raining. The main hoist rope was being spooled off the drum into a skip on the pipedeck below. There was two turns
left on the winch drum and the rope socket was turned to the correct position for th new rope going on. The old rope was not tied off. Suddenly the rope retaining wire snapped
and the rope broke free, falling downwards to the direction of the skip. The ip was standing next to the skip pushing the rope into the skip when the untethered ro e fell on him
injuring his arm.
Whilst pulling out of hole, in the process of applying the tongs to the drill pipe, ip's left hand was caught in the jaw of the break out tongs. Ip attended the medic who assessed
the injury as a soft tissue injury to the left index finger. Ip recieved first aid treatment, was stood down for rest onboard to the end of shift and returned to work on light duties
next shift. Ip eft the platform <…> at the end of tour - he reported on <…> that he advises he attended his gp who reffered him for x-ray which determined he had sustained
three hairline fractures of his left index finger.
<…> were rigging up a hoist on the skid deck level above b30. This required a hoist to be disconnected by a sling/shackle to a spreader beam. Once the beam was over the hole
in the deck the hoist was to be lowered through. It was during this operation t at the accident occurred the hoist chain had been lowered through the hole but the body of the
hoist required turning before it could be pushed through. In the process of manually turning the hoist it want through the hole in the deck due to the weight of the chain and
trapped the injured parties hand.
Roustabout/pusher was guiding load of drill collar suspended on crane pendeant on the northwest pipedeck. The load struck an h frame of a sampson post trapping injured
parties hand between the load and the post causing laceration and fracture to is right iddle finger and possible fracture of adjacent finger.
Working in rig 2 on the monkey board running back drill pipe. The main block came into contact with the monkey board. While tripping pipe out of the hole, ip was working
on the monkey board. He was pulling back a stand of pipe after unlatching the elev tors. The driller was lowering the travelling blocks, which hit the monkey board, causing it
to spring up and hit injured party on the right leg.
<...>, roughneck, was guiding a crossover into the iron roughneck, to be made up to a bha in the rotary table. The roughneck operating the controls on the iron roughneck
closed the pipe spinner across the crossover before it was fully located ins de it. This resulted in the crossover being ejected outwards, forcing <...>'s hand against a stand of
drillpipe suspended from the top drive above the rotary table
Lowering steel plates from main deck to 23m level via platform crane. The load stuck an obstruction as it was being landed, the injured person was holding on to the steel
plates and they swung against a waste skip crushing his hand between the skip and the plates.
At 23.25 on <...> whilst working on the drill floor the floorman was assisting in the removal of the elevators from the bails in order to pick up the kelly. The elevators were
supported by a sling and tugger winch. One side of the bails was freeded whil t ip was freeing the other side the elevators twisted round and he momentarily caught his left
hand little finger between the elevator horns and the bails. As his finger became sore he consulted the bravo medic who on examination suspected a fractured fin er. Ip was
medivaced to the beach the following day <...> were <...> confirmed he had fractured the bone in the tip of his little finger in his left hand. Ip was 5hrs 25 mins into his shift
and two days into a 14 day work cycle action
Ip was attempting to operate the interlock mechanism of the pob deck crane runway transverse beams. This mechanism is operated by a chain pull bell crank that releases a
cam device which allows the transverse trolley to be aligned for cross movement. As he pulled the operating chain the lever and chain (weight approx. 1kg) became detached
and fell hitting him a glancing blow to the right shoulder. The retaining pin for the lever had previously been fitted with a sub-specification bolt that had worn and c me loose.
The lever mechanism had been reported defective the previous day and had been given an initial examination (restricted due to lack of scaffold access) but not taken out of
service. Actions taken to prevent recurrence:- 1 sparrows to review inte rity of the securing pin design. 2 include checks of the transfer trolley lever/pin mechanism as part of
the sparrows maintenance management document. 3 advise other platforms of this incident. 4 highlight the incident at platform tool box talks, with mphasis to take
equipment out of service if its safe operation is suspect, and bring this to the attention of the area authority.
While lifting bundle of pup joints, a bundle of two heavy weight drillpipe joints shifted. The movement of the hw bundle struck the back of the right foot of the injured person,
compressing it and causing it to be trapped. Alert action on part of the ba ksman resulted in the ip's foot being quickly freed. The person was 10.5 hrs into his shift. 1) stopped
job to investigate. 2) reinforce current pipe handling awareness campaign. 3) review pipedeck stacking practice.
Running completion on <...>. Dry/daylight hours. 4.75 s.w.l. shackle. North "v" door tugger. Tugger line running against "reda" cable. Lead floorman went up derrick and
secured line out of the way by means of a shackle. (not moused). Running line bac ed off the shackle pin resulting in the fall. Pin hit <...> and "d" section bounced off the
floor and gave a glancing blow to his partner. (no injury).
While standing on drill floor, struck on arm by an object which fell from racking board level (90ft)
The ip was carrying out his floorman duties on the rig floor. He was 11.75 hours into his working shift and 12 days into his tour of duty. The derrickman was racking back a
stand of 6.5/8" drill pipe at monkey board level when his safety helmet fell off nd dropped to the rig floor (85') and struck the floorman on his safety helmet. Initially the
floorman stated that he had no ill effects but later complained of a sore neck. He was examined by the platform medic who arranged for him to be sent in to <...> for a
precautionary medical examination. As a result he was given some painkilling medication and pronounced fit to return to work. Initial investigation revealed that the
derrickman's helmet was not secured as directed by <...> procedure for orking aloft, which state that a chin strap will be worn and recommends additional safety lanyard
attachment. This procedure is to be reviewed abd reinforced to all platform crews at safety meetings.
A fire occurred during maintenance activities on the puq hazardous area open drains caisson. The 2 mechanical technicians in the area were caught in the initial flash and
received superficial burns to the ears. They escaped from the area. Automatic delug and shutdown / blowdown occurred. The general alarm was sounded and the pob was
mustered. The fire was extinguished using foam applied by the platform emergency response teams. The area was made safe and 'sterilised' pending the arrival of an investiga
ion team from bp and the hse. Full details of the investigation findings will be forwarded in due course,including notification of over 3 day injury if it becomes applicable.
During work on the platform programmable logic control, a fault caused the platform to shutdown system to operate. This in turn activated the vent line xv on the diesal
storage legs. The compressed air vented from an 8" line at 160psi and the nesuing rele se struck the ip on the back. The ip was examined by the medic who found no signs of
injury, but rested the ip for the day. Whilst the ip still suffered pain, he was sent to the doctor onshore, who also found no signs of injur but referred him to his own pp. The
platform is not connected to the reservoir and is being commissioned at present.
During an unplanned deluge release the ip was making his way out of the wellbay area, when he came into contact with a fixed hand valve. The deluge was operating in this
wellbay area at the time of injury. The ip was assisted to his feet and walked to the sick bay. He was attended to by the platform medic then transferred to a & e at ari. The
injured person had worked for 13 days of a 14 day rota. He was in ninth hour of his shift period of 12 hours. He was undertaking pre-commissioning work on well bio xmas
tree.
A flange on one of the platform's compressor trains failed at 2600 psi, resulted in an escape of some 250 m3 of gas. The event occurred during installation and testing of a joint
blind. The event was considered very similar to the <...> accident in <...>.
A fire broke out in a turbine at 0700 hrs and was quickly put out by the emergency fire-fighting system within the closed space of the turbine. Production was automatically
shut down. Preparations were made to evacuate the 69 persons on board, but this was called off.
While working on the uk <...> field, the standby vessel <...> lost power in its steering and got adrift in 5-8 metre waves and 35-knot winds. 130 non-essential personnel on the
<...> platform were airlifted after fears that the vessel would hit the platform. Helicopter was called to the area and other standby vessels tried to get a towline on the vessel. At
2310 hrs the next day tow was connected by the <...> anchor-handling vessel.
Standby vessel <...>, reported that a supply vessel of approx 4,000 tonnes was heading towards the platform on a possible collision course and they had been unable to contact
the vessel. Platform gpa and muster initiated and emergency response plan implemented. Contact was established approx 20 mins before the closest point of approach and the
vessel altered course.the vessel was the <...> and was returning from the <...> platform, approx 10.25 miles from north east of <...>. At this time the <...> platform was on the
second day of a planned shutdown, and plant was already closed in.
On <…> the supply vessel <…> was bunkering potable water on the n side of accommodation platform ap1. During this operation the vessel experienced total loss of
propulsion. The vessel drifted in an easterly direction toward the <…> parting the bunkering hose. The vessel master was able to use his bow thrusters for limited steering
<...> - Fishing vessel <...> fouled her nets in the area of <...> field at 06:30hrs. Co-ordinates <...>. Vessel freed from snagging at 08:00hrs approx. Leaving half her net
remaining at the site (as advised y vessel skipper). Subsequent rovsurvey carried out in the evening of <...> have revealed damage to subsea wellheads <...> (Manifold Valve
Hydraulic Jumper) and <...> (Gas bubbles were observed escaping from flowline jumper on downstream side of fl xible coupler, approx 1.5m from tree).Further survey to take
place in next few days to assess real extent of damage once marine growthj and trawl debris removed. Both wells shut in and isolated.
The port stern side of the <...> then glanced across the splash zone of the south east leg of the installation.
At 15.58 hrs on the <...> the <...> the standby vessel for the <...> platform (official number <...>) was observed from the platform not displaying any navigational lights. The
platform was advised that the <...> had lost all power and was drifting towards the platform the oim initiated emergency procedures onboard the platform and notified hm
coastguard. The <...> platform standby vessel transferred to the scene and attended the <...>. The <...> drifted north of the <...> pl tform and reported at 16.55 that all power
and main engines had been restored. The platform was then advised that a replacement stand by vessel the <...> would relieve the <...> at 06.00 hrs <...>. The master of the
<...> reported th t the loss of power was due to his number one generator tripping causing all load to be transferredto his number four generator which then shutdown due to
overload causing total loss of electrical and consequential loss of main engines.
The incident occured when the supply vessel <...> was discharging/loading deck cargo on the north side of the <...> platform. The heading of the vessel was 025 degrees. The
vessel had just loaded a lift on port side mid-ship, for which the ma ter had to come close to the platform. The boat went too close and came in contact with a diagonal brace of
the structure. This was remarkable by some of the platform personnel, who described the effect as if a wave had hit the platform. The master of the <...> immediately reported
the incident to the radio operator who advised the oim. The platform structure was visually inspected and no damage could be observed. The <...> master was called by radio
and confirmed that: * the vessel made only monir contact with the platform and he could not observe any damage from his deck. * all equipment was working properly and the
cause of the incident was a human fault. Superficial pain scraches on the diagonal brace were subsequently insp cted by means of abseilers, and the diagonal brace were
The incident occurred during a cargo transfer operation at the <…> platform. The vessel <…> had taken up position alongside the north face of the platform . The vessel
master has stated that the tide was pushing the vessel tow rds the platform hence the requirement to move and re-position. During this manoeuvre the vessel clipped the
underdeck walkway. No damage was caused to the platform, the vessel steaming light was broken and the after mast bent by approximately 10 degrees The weather
conditions at this time were as follows: Wind - 326 degrees, @ < 1kt Visibility - 10+ Nautical Miles Sea & Swell - 0.8 m. A full incident investigation has been initiated.
At 1204hrs while bunkering water, the <…> made contact with the A5 boat bumper (Platform South/West corner) after it's bow thruster hydraulic system caused the controls to
momentarily stick in the "Hard to Port" position. The weather cond tions at the time of the incident were Wind WNW - 25-30kts. Sea - 1-2 metres with max swell of 3 metres.
Once control of the bow thruster hydraulic system was regained the bunkering hose was removed and the boat moved away from the platform to perform c ntrolled testing of
the bow thruster hydraulic system. The hydraulic system functioned correctly and nothing conclusive was found. The boat bumper was dented and the top support pipe has a
slight kink on the top side.
Vessel ROV support <…> using platform as way mark on Auto Pilot. Auto Pilot not switched off until vessel 10 to 60 metres from installation.
Whilst moving the vessel from the southern side to the eastern side of the unity platform there was a failure of the ships starboard "taut wire boom" causing the vessel to swing
starboard. At the time the vessel was engaged in rov work at <…> unity
Standby Vessel coming alongside and collided with platform brace. Incurred damage to vessel ballast tank but persons onboard platform unaware of any apparent damage to
platform
Two x 1.5 tonne come-a-long chain pulls were being used to provide lateral support for the <...> lubricator during chemical cutting operations, these were attached to structural
steelwork using 2 tonne slings. The <...> chemical cutter was run to sever the 4.5" 13.5 lbs/ft fox chrome tubing at 736ft. The weight of tubing including buoyancy factor 8073
lbs, the block weight was 62000 lbs. Weight was taken on the tubing before the cut (75000 lbs) on weight indicator, this gave an over pull of 5 00 lbs. On the tubing. Prior to
the <...> cutting the tubing, the driller, slackened the chain pulls in anticipation of some upward movement when the tubing parted. The cut was initiated. At this point the
tubing jumped approximately 3 ft. In the s ips, the upward movement caused the chain pulls to tighten more than expected causing the chain on one of the blocks to part.
Weather was fine, sea state 0.5 to 1.0 mts., Wind 8 to 10 knots sse, visibility 8 miles plus.
During an operation to lift the wireline lubricator, completed with wireline tool. The lubricator was lifted off the deck approximately six feet. The banksman signalled to stop
lifting and to boom up to position the lubricator above the BOP's. T was a this time the brake failed to hold the weight and the lubricator dropped to the main deck. It then
stepped into the hatchway of well B8, lodging between the htachside and the B.O.P. Additional pressure was applied to the whipline brake, arresting any f rther movement.
The lubricator came to rest about 20-30 degrees from the vertical. As the lubricator came to rest, the tool string protudedapproimately 6 feet into the well bay and the plug pin
sheared and drooped the plug. The plug fell onto the gra ed well head mezzaaine deck.At the time of the incident well B8 was shut in and isolated, with the following valves
closed: Down hole safety valve; Manual Master valve; Swab valveand Hydraulic wing. Following the incidentthe incient the whip line bra e was inspected and tested and
found to be in full working ordeer. It was therefore concluded that the crane driver had failed to apply sufficient pressure to the whip line brake pedal, allowing the whip line to
free fall when the control level was returned to its neutral position.
Crane positioned over lift but boat pulled away. Container dragged down the boat and went overboard.
On the evening of <...> at 22.40, the south crane driver on being informed that rig2 had been skidded on to drilling slot a14, for wire line operations, arranged with a banksman
to carry out a test on the field of operation of his crane. It was known hat on slot a14 collision could occur between the rig and the crane walkway at the machine house rear,
which the driver can not see from his position. The driver discussed with the banksman the likely area of collision and positioned him where he could cl arly observe imminent
collision and inform on his radio of any need for the crane driver to stop. The test commenced and the driver slewed the crane. The banksman, over the radio, notified the
driver that collision was imminent and the driver stopped his lew but the crane hand rail on the machine house walkway struck a protruding beam on the rig structure and was
damaged. The damage to both rig and crane was moved to the rest position. An lp1 has been raised to initiate a full investigation.
The north crane was discharging the vessel <...> and on his whip line had a container of 4.5 tonnes held at 10 feet above the deck.The operator was positioning the container
for lowering when he noticed it drop slowly.He immediately hoisted to chec the movement and on stopping the hoist again saw the container drop slowly.He then positioned
the load and placed it on location on the deck,ceased his operation and called the crane technician to check out the whip hoist system.The technician on checkin found that the
whip hoist was slipping and set about adjusting the brake.At the adjustment point he found that the rod assembly was turning freely,indicating that something further was
wrong and on removing the brake cover found that the adjustment rod h d broken,rendering the brake inoperable.The part in question was an original manufactures part fitted
at the last major overhaul 3 months previously.The reason for the change was that the part had thread damage and was considered to be unfit for use.No da age or injuries
occurred as a result of the incident.
Following the repair of a pump. The top drive was being lowered to make a connection to continue drilling. When the top drive was approx 30ft above the drill floor, a 7lb
filter cover detached from the top drive and fell to the drill floor. No personnel w re involved. An lp1 incident investigation was launched to determine the cause of the incident
and identify any corrective actions / lessons learned.
Section of rubber, weighing 40lbs, fell approx. 90 ft from the south crane cathead bumper frame. The incident occured during the transfer of a container from the pipe deck to
the skid deck. Personnel were clear of the load as per the crane operations proc dure. The rubber bumper has been replaced, and the incident is currently under investigation.
Preliminary findings suggest that the cause to be general wear of the material attributed to normal use. In that regard, the focus will be on addressing the insp ction frequently
to highlight areas of concern to prevent future failures.
<...>.10:05. Jarring operations in progress to pull a bridge plug from B37.Wire line ran over a sheave at deck level,up round the sheave at the top of the lubricator,and into the
well.Lower sheave bracket fractured.Sheave assembly catapulted into roof o the module and fell onto the front of wireline winch.The sheave and parts of,did not land outside
that barried-off area.The sheave in question is treated as lifting equipment under <...> regs and load-tested and had valid certification.There were 2 opera ors in the winch
cab.There was no damage.No personnel were injured as a result of incident.The area was barried-off and no unauthorised personnel were allowed within.The sheave was 14"
diameter and weighed approximately 18llbs.The investigation has thus f r not identified any cause of the failure.The work was being done within standard operating procedures
and the equipment was not exposed to loads above the SWL.Operation continued only after replacement sheave had been inspected and dye-pen crack tested.T e failed
equipment will be sent ashore for analysis.A review of SWL's for equipment will be carried out to ensure current arrangements are still valid.
Whilst pulling out of the hole on a28 the top drive torque wrench tension spring broke. The hook end of the spring fell from the wrench some 90 feet to the drill floor landing
on the north side racking board the unit is manufactured by <...> the weight of the hook end is approximately 75 grammes. Both springs were changed out for new after
occurrence. New design of spring requested from shore base.
Near miss occured on completion of a lift of lenghths of steel to the laydown area at the east side of the pump room. The steel was being manoeuvred into the pump room to be
stored. The crane hook (liebherr standard whip line) was positioned adjacent and nd outboard of the lay down on the level above. As the load (-750kg) had been landed and the
load was about to be disconnected the crane hook was lowered slightly. The outboard pennant (one of two 10 ton 15 ft) ring moved up the hook and consequently slip ed down
through the hook gate. This was due to the ferrule on the pennant snagging on the on the structure above. The pennant, still attached to the load, then fell from the hook and
was suspended outboard of the handrail on the lay down. There was no inj ry to personnel and no damage to equipment. The load did not move and the pennant was pulled
back onto lay down area. The operations involving the east crane were stopped and the crane hook checked for any abnormality to hook gape gate mechanism. It was f und to
be intact and had no play. Investigations ongoing on installation and <...> attempting to source alternatives to hook design to prevent reocurrence.
The top drive system weight was positioned on the two support pins on the dolly tracks. Two 10 ton 50 foot slings, chain hoists were positioned in the derrick from 10 ton
beam clamps and secured to the top of the top drive system for support. At 00:45 on the <...> the mechanic and the floorman proceeded to take up the strain. As the tension
was taken on both the chain blocks a loud bang was heard from the south side of the derrick. Operations were immediately suspended. One of the crew ascended the derr ck to
investigate and discovered that the tension screw on the south clamp had sheared, and the north clamp tension screw was bent. Operations were suspended and made safe, and
the rig superintendant and platform rigger called to the rig floor. Both clamp were removed and the platform rigger installed 10 ton slings around the beams to secure the job.
Prior to ordering equipment, the job had been surveyed by the platform rigger and the rig mechanic. Tow 10 ton chain hoists and two fifty foot 10 ton slings ere requested. It
was intended to use the platform supplied 10 ton beam clamps. The rigging was intended as a back-up safety device in event of failure of the hydraulic retract system or the 2
1/4 stop pins that the top drive was resting on. The beams in the derrick are 90 degs away from the designed load of the beam clamps. It was anticipated that the fleet angle of
When nippling down the bop overshot mandrel (2.35 tinnes) all but 4 of the 16 locking bolts were recovered. These were left in for safety until the driller was ready to remove
the overshot.) The driller had rigged up 4 x 3.25 tonnes and 2.65 tonnes shackl s to his travelling block rig up lines - which were capable of lifting 15 tonnes. Also 4 x 3 tonnes
and 2 x 8 tonne slings. When ready, he connected to the bop overshot mandrel with the 4 x 3.25 tonnes shackles, then engaged the drawworks and started to ull the overshot
mandrel. During this part of the operation, he pulled up to 8 tons with no movement of the overshot. He shutdown the operation and checked to see what was wrong and found
he had forgotten to retrieve the 4 bolts left securing the mandrell to the bop. He then removed the 4 bolts and proceeded to lay down the mandrel. Upon investigation, it was
discovered that the 4 x 3.25 tonnes shackles and the 2 x 6.5 tonnes shackles, 4 x 3 tonnes slings and 2 x 8 tonnes slings were all deformed and unfit for futher use.
After drilling to 3490 ft with top drive the driller was instructed to pull back inside the casing shoe at 3411 ft. When the top drive was broken out from the string at 90 ft in the
derrick one of the floorman, <...>, heard the sound of something impacting on the drill floor just behind him. Upon investigation it was discovered that a pin 6" long by 2"
diameter and 1lb in weight had fallen from some where up the derrick missing him by 3 ft. The operation was shutdown immediately & the drill floor cleared. The rig
mechanic & the rigsuperintendent then went up the derrick to the monkey board level & conducted a visual inspection to find where the pin came from. It was discovered that
one of the link tilt hinge pins had come out of the link tilt on the top drive & fallen to the rig floor. After checking that the link tilt was still secure the top drive was then
lowered to the drill floor. The operation was shut down and the top drive was thoroughly checked over by the maritime hydraulic rep who was on the rig at the time conducting
maintenance checks, to see if there were anymore loose items. At this time it was discovered that the retaining bolt had been placed in upside down allowing it to come free
once the locking nut came off. Prior to the incident, the top drive was visually inspected the day before on the <...> and also on the planned weekly inspection, the last being
As part of the workover carried out from the south drilling rig (dr2), long bails (50 feet) had to be used. The dangerous occurance happened when these long bails were
removed. The crane was used to lead the bails through the 'v' door. The crane was then ttached to the north bail, the retaining latch bar securing the bail to the "cow horn" was
unbolted so that the bail could be laid out, meantime a roughneck had unbolted the south bail. When the crane picked up the weight of the north bail, the hook turne allowing
the opposite bail to slip from the "cow horn" and slide down the 'v' door. Actions to prevent a similar incident will be fully defined following a cause tree analysis. In the
meantime, drilling personnel have been requested to improve communicat on during tool box talks and a standard instruction covering all bail change out operations is being
written.
The incident happened on the <...> platform when an empty tote tank was transferred from the helifuel storage area ( module d05 deside the helideck) down to the pipedeck
using the north crane. Enviromental conditions were good (wind approx. 12 knots, fair, ight time but good lighting). Personnel involved in this routine operation were the
crane operator, one banksman, and one deck crew at helifuel storage area, one banksman and one deck crew on pipe deck, all in radio contact. After lifting the tank from th
helifuel storage area, the crane driver was moving the load literally and down to its destination when it struck the top of a rack located on d04 roof just in front of the crane
cabin, dislodging two sections of wireline lubricator. These pieces of equip ent fell to the pipedeck, first onto a skip, and then further onto the deck itself. Total fall: 9.3 metres.
Preliminary recommendations to prevent similar incidents are: 1. Relocate the rack in question (done) and rearrange deck space on d04 roof. 2. Surv y the site for potential
unsafe storage. 3. Improve general hazard awareness and observation techniques. 4. Review spot lights orientation to preclude dazzling of crane operator. 5. Review benefit of
additional night shift crane operator or appointment of assistant deck foreman.
The incident occured on the <...> platform a skidding operation of the south rig (dr2) from slot 13 to 6. The rig was initially skidded one slot east. The second stage of the
operation was to skid the rig two slots south. This second operation was in progress, after approx. Five minutes, a loud "bang" was heard. The skidding operation was
stoppedimmediately and during inspection it was discovered that a clamp (no.20) had fallen from the skid base to the bop deck approx. 12 metres below. Initial inspection
shows that the clamp is distorted and the two bolts attaching the clamp to the skid base have sheared. The clamps are attached to the mobile rig by two bolts and normally
secure the rig in position on the skidding beams. The clamp fouled on the existing structure, the bolts subsequently sheared, leaving the clamp free to fall. A formal risk
assessment was carried out for the rig skidding operations on <...>. The risk of falling objects was identified and mitigation specified. A pre-job safety meeting was heldprior to
starting the operation. The skidding operation was carried out under permit to work. The bop deck was barriered off and announcements made prior to starting the skidding
operation as per safe operating procedure (<...>). With all precautions put in place, the incident did not have the potential to cause injury to personnel. After the incident a full
The incident occured on the <...> when a transferred to its storage location on the north side of the bop deck using the 40ft north bop gantry crane. The bop gantry crane is
equipped with tow pairs of winches (east & west). The four slings were attached to he bop. The bop was positioned to its final location to be lowered down when the brake on
the west winches failed. The west side of the load dropped approx. 9 inches. The tool pusher decided to pick up the level bop in order to land it immediately in a se ure manner.
When the load was approx. 1 inch from the deck, the bolts were being installed to the bop stump when the bop again dropped on the west side. The crew continued to land the
bop to make the situation safe. The crane was subsequently inspected an the brake spring washer common on the west winches was found split in 3 pieces. Further
investigations are ongoing, and the other bop crane brakes spring washers will be inspected for any defect prior to use. Contact will be made with the manufacturer to assess
the cause of the spring washer failure, and regular inspection/change out of this component will be included in the preventative maintenence plan.
The incident occurred on the <...> during a supply vessel operation when a pipe carrier was back loaded to the <...>. Wind = 160 degrees, 30 knots sea state = significant wave
1.7 metres, maximum wave 2.5 metres the load was attached to the c ane hook by an intermediate pennant. This pennant was equipped with a hook at the bottom (attached to
the load lifting slings) and a ring at the top (attached to the crane hook). After landing the load, the slf deck crew asked the crane operator to lower a little more and slacken the
pennant to allow them to unhook the load. The crane hook was over the side of the vessel, and whilst being lowered it touched the water. When the crane driver went to lift it
up it was noticed that the pennant had come off the crane hook. The pennant left on the vessel was recovered onboard using the <...> crane. Inspection of the crane hook and
pennant showed yellow paint marks on of both components, but no mechanical damage except that the crane hook safety latch return spring as not operating properly. By
pushing the hook safety latch against the safety pin, a gap could be observed. However, it was not possible to remove the ring through this gap by hand. At this stage, it is
believed that the pennant/hook assembly rubbed agin t the side bumpers of the vessel and the pennants ring was forced out of the hook. Further investigations are ongoing and
As the <...> south crane was being used to land drilling equipment on dr2 drill floor, a bolt fell from the head of the crane boom to the drill floor. On investigation it was found
thay the bolt was a retaining bolt from the crane boom walkway which had she red. All bolts on this and the other two platform cranes were checked and found to be
satisfactory.
Pennant detached itself from nab crane: this incident occured on <...> at 22:45 hrs. The nab crane was back-loading cargo to the supply vessel <...>. The wind speed was
approx. 10 knots & the sea state was 1 to 1.5 metres. One of the lifts to back-load was a gas rack which was attached to the crane hook by a pennant. This lift was safely landed
on the deck of the safe truck. The crane operator then lowered his line so that the supply boat deck crew could unhook the pennant from the load. The headache ball was
lowered over the side of the supply boat, dipping lower than the lift on the deck. At this stage, the upward force thus applied to the pennant ring was enough for it to pass
through the gap between hook & latch, detaching itself from the crane hook. As the crane driver recovered the hook, the pennant was left on the deck of the supply boat.
Investigation after the incident revealed that there was a gap of approx 22mm between the hook itself & latching mechanism. This could be increased by applying pressure
between the two faces. It is thought that this was sufficient to allow pennant to pass through, when accompanied by the upward force as the pennant was slackened off. A very
similar incident occured during march this year. As a result of this, the safety pin of the latching mechanism was machined so as to prevent any significant gap opening up
During the n39 drilling programme, the drilling assembly was being pulled out of the hole. The normal procedure is to pooh a stand of drill pipe, disconnect, and rack in the
derrick. To do this with the new top drive, the elevator bails are tilted to pr sent the stand to the derrickman at the monkey board. Then the bails are moved back to the vertical
position and top drive is lowered to pick-up the next stand. The bails are moved by means of hydraulic pistons and their position is controlled by the dril er using a 3 way
switch located on the top drive console. There are three positions: neutral (bails in vertical position) tilit (bails tilted towards the v door) and drill (bails tilted in the opposite
direction towards the drawworks). After having racked a stand, the top drive was lowered with the bails accidentally tilted towards the drawworks. The bails struck a fixed
access platform causing it to fall 10 meters below. Fortunately the platform fouled on structural braces 12 meters above the drill floor rawworks. A piece of tubular (1m long
6kg) ended up on the rig floor close to the drawworks.
One of the electrical control umbilicals to the top drive system got caught on the stabbing board framework. The control umbilical was then stretched and parted 30ft below the
monkey board. It fell to the rig floor as it disconnected itself from the secur ng rings
Platform shutdown for planned maintenance and construction activities. Isolation valve xxv14123 sea water outlet 1st stage hp compressor after cooler was being installed. A 1
tonne chain block was used to spring the pipework to allow a joint to be installed at the valve flange face.the installation work was performed by score valves ltd & the lifting
operation was performed by a <...> rigger. The chain block was used to open the flange face but on release of the hand chain, the chain block brake failed to arrest the load and
the load began to move. The rigger prevented any significant effect by holding the hand chain & applying sufficient effort to control the movement of the pipework. The rigger
reported the failure & the chain block was removed to quarantine. The chain block was withdrawn from the dedicated shutdown rigging loft supplied by <...>. From
investigation <...> had sourced the rigging equipment from <...>. Acl had sub-contracted to <...> The platform requested the assistance of <...> to assist in the investigation.
The unit has not yet been dismantled but it is assumed that the pawl was not engaging the brake mechanism. It was suggested that this could be due to excessive gap between
the brake discs/hub/ratchet. A tirfor also supplied with the shutdown rigging loft failed pre-task checks & two beam clamps which had not yet been withdrawn were also found
Platform shutdown for planned maintenance and construction activities the gas compressor gearbox was being lowered to the deck under the direction of two <...> riggers
using the platforms fixed trolley beam hoist l51163. The gearbox load was 8 tonne. The swl of the trolley beam hoist was 12 tonne. The lifting equipment had been certified in
<...> by <...>. Minor defects had been identified during the recertification but these had been repaired and from investigation did not contribute to the failure. The riggers
noticed that during the decent the hoist and load shuddered. The riggers inspected the load and rigging equipment but could not identify the reason. They continued to lower
the gearbox at a slower rate and once again the load shuddered. It was identified that the hoist block was now of the level the load was secured by the platform crane and
lowered to the deck safely. The trolley beam hoist has been removed from service and is to be sent onshore for further analysis. The platform requested the assistance of <...> to
assist in the platforms investigation. It was identified that the load chains were twisted. This resulted in the chains jumping off the hoist sprockets this would not have been
immediately identified during pre - task tests checks. It is probable that this fault is introduced at assembly by the manufacturer/supplier. The workforce were informed and two
To free off sticking brakes on the drawworks, it was necessary to run the drawworks and engage gear monemtarily. This caused the brakes to free, but makes the handle "kick"
against the stop.the brake stop partially came away (broken weld) jamming the br ke in the release position. The blocks dropped appoximately 2 feet until the pup joint
connected to the top drive rested on the rotary table. The travelling blocks lent on the torque tube and the momentum of the drum caused the drill line to jump wraps and
become loose on the drum.
Removing scaffolding materials from East flare using helicopter. The load caught under the LP flare wind strakers and the helicopter winch wire parted at the hook. Load fell
onto flare rails.
During lifting operations of a load approximately weighing 5 hundredweight there was a near miss which involved the ponderball striking the boom sheave guard which
resulted in both damage to the guard and lifting rope. The crane in use was the telescopic ipe rack crane and at the time of the incident the limit switch had been over-ridden.
The suggested causes for the incident were lack of attention by the driver, operation of the crane when the safety limit switch was over-ridden. A full investigation is underway.
Steel box section (4" x 4" x 30" approx. 10lbs) skid on bottom of container (Well services control line basket), detached while container was being worked by crane, item
detached at approx. Height of 5 ft above deck.
During reorientation of tubing hanger a needle valve assembly came in contact with the topdrive bale and subsequently fell to the floor approx 60'. The hose connected to the
needle valve assembly glanced the injured party party across the hand.
A wireline tool string fell through the mousehole and on to the BOP/skid deck below. The wireline failed after the tool was pulled into the wireline sheave. There was no
scabbard on the mousehole (i.e. It was just a hole)....cont...Under investigation <...> by <...>.
Whilst rigging a 250kg spool in D3C, the load being rigged commenced to descend under its own weight. The chain then rubbed against the scaffold installed for the job,
which stopped its momentum.
The Pipe Deck Machine (PDM) failed during operation. This PDM lifts length of drill pipe or casing from the pipe deck onto a conveyor which transfers them to the drill floor.
The equipment failure is a fracture of a hydraulic cylinder rod. This PDM is ope ated under a S.S.W. and no people are allowed in the area during oeration. The environmental
conditions played no part in this incident.
Drilling operations on Well <…>. The derrick drilling machine (DDM) was preparing to move over centre of a stand of drill pipe. The block was extended into the top of the
stand of drill pipe. During this operation a funnel guide was struck. This caused t e funnel guide, weighing 19.2 lbs to fall 98 feet to the drill floor. The operation was stopped.
The incident was reported to HSE by telephone. No person received injury through this incident.
During the racking back of a stand of drill pipe, the upper carriage arm of the Pipe Handling Machine appeared to extend beyond well centre (without intervention from the
operator). As the blocks were lowered the retract position the torque wrench guide unnel collided with the top of the stand of drill pipe shearing the retaining bolts. This
resulted in the guide funnel spacer (approximate weight 3lbs) falling 98 feet to the rig floor. Safety wires prevented the guide funnel from falling to the rig floor No person was
injured in this incident.
An 800kg rated pull lift (chain lever hoist elephant type) was being used to support a pipe in order to remove a flame arrestor for maintenance. When the lever on the pull lift
was moved to the lower position, instead of holding back the load, the chain an free and lowered the pipe to rest on a scaffold platform. The pull lift had been manually tested
before use. No one was injured or no damage sustained to any plant or equipment. This was the first use of the equipment since it arrived on the platform o <…> as part of the
statutory changeout of platform lifting equipment. The pull lift was immediately quarantined and returned ashore for an independent analysis and report. All other items in the
rigging loft were inspected and another 5 defects discov red. A user feedback report was raised against the supplier of the equipment (<…>) we have requested that the rigging
lofts are changed out as soon as possible due to a lack of confidence in current equipment.
Whilst 2 Bail arm elevator links were being lowered (utilising a tugger) from the drillfloor a 1 tonne sling parted at the ferrule and one bail slid down the vee door ramp to the
catwalk (each 1/2 tonne bail was secured with a 1 tonne sling). The lift wa controlled and no personnel were in the immediate vicinity as per standard operating procedures for
this type of operation.Probable immediate cause has been identified shock loading on a choked sling (SWL x 0.8) possibly caused by a wrap jumping on the tugger. Inspection
of the sling does not indicate its condition to be a significant factor.Actions to prevent recurrence include a review of refresher training requirements for the drill crews, and
update in the standard work procedure for this operati n specifying the use of higher rated slings to take account of potential shock loading
Drilling operations - Running 12 1/4" hole with new bottom hole assembly on <…> Well <…>. Retract system of Top Drive Equipment over hoisted and impacted onto
Crown Block Bumper Bars. Shim plate, nuts and bolts fell from crown area of derrick (weigh up to 0.5 kg). Significant damage to derrick crown area, retract system dolly rails
& rollers.Possible cause. Over hoist of retract system. Overruning of upper hoist rails. Area cleared of personnel and barriered off. Equipment isolated. Area checked for
damage, potential dropped objects. Investigation initiated. HSE Duty Officer, <…> informed via telephone by <…> OIM <…>. Weather 20 knots @ 300 degs.
During conductor centraliser replacement operations on <…> platform, a centraliser component weighing 170kg was being lowered from the lower West side wellbay
mezzanine deck (27m above sea level). During the lowering operation, the air controlled wi ch was noticed to run away, as a result the load descended in an uncontrolled
manner. After striking a guide can, the manual break was applied and the load came to rest 10m above sea level, no damage was sustained by the guide can. This air winch had
been successfully used on three previous lifts in the same location, all previous lift weights were higher or equal to the lift described above. The air winch stalled at load of
37kg when tested by crane mechanic, thus indicating mechanical failure. The winch as quarantined and is to be sent to a 3rd party for examination to determine the cause of
the failure. Winch: I<…> 905 Kg. Weather - Wind 7 knots 228deg. Clear.
Whilst lowering a 0.3 tonne load 4ft with a 1 tonne <…> type chain block, the lifting device was unable to support load in static position without manual intervention (ie hald
chain).Investigations have shown that all activities were carried out co rectly as per (unwritten) lift plan, and lift as carried out was well within the expected capabilities of the
equipment.The chain block was quarantined and will be sent for srtip down and thorough examination.
The lifting chain of a 3 tonne chain block failed as a 2 tonne spool was being lifted. The spool had not moved when the failure occurred. It is believed the load chain snagged
in the lower block.
Normal deck operations were ongoing moving 45 gall chemical drums from skid deck to pipe deck. Chemical: castrol solvex wt2 corrosion inhibitor one barrel was transferred
successfully to the pipe deck. On the cranes return a second barrel was attached to vertical barrel lifting device (ident. No <…>). The deck foreman secured the device to the
drum ensuring that the locking pin was fitted and the clamp tight. He signalled the crane to begin the lift. The load was suspended approx. One foot above the de k to ensure
that it was secure, then lifted up. The deck foreman withdrew to a safe area. While his back was turned he heard a noise behind him. On turning round, he saw that the drum
had released itself from the lifting device and had fallen on the deck. The impact had caused the drum to burst open allowing the contents to spill out. He was aware that the
drum contained toxic fluid and did not approach the spillage. He immediately barriered off the area and notified his supervisor. The supervisor then no ified the osa and ccr.
Platform was called to muster to ensure that all personnel were kept clear of the area. The chemical was identified as harmful and a chemical spillage operation was
implemented.
During vessel discharge operations involving the <…> the body of a brass padlock was seen falling from a 20' half height container and hit the west skid deck - no one was
injured - The lock was not part of any of the <…> containers we conclude that it came off another container.
The east platform crane was being used to 'backload' equipment onto the vessel <…>. A 7 ton container being backloaded was being held in position for the vessel to
manoeuvre into a suitable position to enable backload operations to commence. hilst awaiting the vessel final positioning, the load was suspended for approx 15 mins. As the
vessel manoeuvered under the suspended load and the crane started to lower the 7 ton container, the load went into 'freefall' for the last 4 metres before hitt ng the vessel's deck
cargo. Two of the vessel's deck containers were damaged. Initial investigations have shown that the crane's power load lowering chain had failed.
13-5/8" drilling riser was racked back in the derrick with two singles and a 7' pup joint of 5" drillpipe required to reach the fingerboard (riser section 28' long). The riser section
was being moved to give more deckspace. Two derrickmen were used to con rol the drillpipe box into the elevators with air tuggers.the first attempt to latch the drillpipe box
failed and the standy began to 'belly' causing the box to lower in the mast. A second attempt to latch the drillpipe box was not possible as the box was now lower than the
elevator.the riser section continued to fall across the drillfloor landing on the doghouse roof.the drillpipe pupjoint above the riser section had kinked and the remainder of the
drillpipe was left in the southeast leg of the derrick.th driller was in the doghouse at the time(on the brake) but moved out of the way when he realised what had happened.
Operations were stopped and the area made safe by tying back the drillpipe into the derrick. The riser was also held on a tugger for security pending the investigation team.
Chain block used to lift seawater filter units on <…> platform failed when lifting filter element. Technical investigation into cause of failure is currently being carried out by
<…>. Initial investigation has determined that a chain link failed where the lifting chain enters the hook clench device. Chain and block have a safe working load of 1.5
tonnes. Element being lifted weighed approximately 150 kilos.Block and hook assembley currently being dispatched to <…> for detailed Technical examination.
During cementing operations on <…> liner section, the cement swivel was held in place to stop rotation by an air winch tugger via a snatch block on the driller's side samson
post. When the drill string was picked up, no slack was put onto tugger li e which was subsequently tensioned. The snatch block hung up on the top of the samson post and was
subsequently pulled open splitting the sheave which fell about 8ft to the drill floor. There were no personnel within the immediate area.
At 07:30hrs while landing the suspended BOP assembly (50 tonnes) on D21 wellhead, one of four BOP Emergency lift chains (21.7 tonnes SWL each) snapped. Landing
operation was almost completed at the time of the incident. As no obvious external reason could explain the failure, the landing was completed without further problem, using
the 3 remaining chains. The snapped chain identification number is <…>. It was last load tested in <…>, last inspected offshore by <…> <…> and is pr perly colour coded.
The chain had been stored in oil bath and had not been used since its last test in <…>. No injury to report as nobody was exposed to hazard during the landing operation as
instructed during the pre-job safety meeting. Such a po sible failure was listed on the risk asssessment down on <…> and the redundancy of chains mentioned as existing
safeguard. All remaining chains have been removed. Complete chain will be sent offshore for detailed failure analysis.
The incident occurrred during tripping operations, pulling out of hole racking back stands of 5" drillpipe in the nw racking board. The derrickman having attached the tugger
chain around the drillpipe in preparation to rack back the stand was distracted f om his operation, due to the fact that the tugger line had become snagged on a snatch bloke at
the rear of the monkeyboard. Meanwhile the driller continued to lower the blocks and elevators. The elecators contacted the tugger line which resulted in it par ing. The tugger
chain fell downward 30' initially restricted by the drillpipe untio it unwpapped. (probably after contacting the next upset down the pipe) the free falled a further 60' landing on
the drillfloor within a few feet of the foot of the pipe.
Whilst personnel were carrying out Wireline Operations at well E16, a lubricator was in the process of being positioned for stabbing on to a wireline B.O.P. The lubricator was
suspended between 9-12" above the B.O.P. The lubricator was suspended on the en of a tugger wire, the tugger and wire had been re-certified in <…> of this year. Both were
rated for the task. During the final stages of 'stabbing' the lubricator onto the B.O.P, without warning, the cable parted approx. 2" above the counter balance (t is is the part at
the end of the cable which actually supports the load). Personnel working on the task jumped clear and the lubricator toppled to the east of the worksite. Whilst falling, the top
of the lubricator fouled the unistrut supporting the overh ad Gantry crane electric cables, carried on falling, and came to rest entangled in the Gantry crane steel rope and lifting
sheave. This prevented the lubricator from crashing to the deck. No personnel were injured during this incident and at no time was he well in any danger.The failed cable and
associated tugger will be examined and the cable sent for analysis to an independent vendor.
A drilling probe was being lifted from one area of the platform to another via platform crane. At an early stage of lifting, probe disengaged from lifting tool and fell to deck. No
injuries were incurred. Investigation is ongoing into cause of disengagement.
Conditions at the time of incident; windy, vis. Good; drilling crew personnel were in the process of changing out upper i.b.o.p on <…> top drive. An arrangement of 1 ton
slings and pull lifts were rigged up in order to lift solid bodied elevators high o main shaft to gain access to connections. These were to be broken out by the rig tongs. This
operation also required the top drive to be made up to a drill string due to the high break out torque of the i.b.o.p. at this stage it was noticed that the top rive unit had started to
bottom out on the dolly track stops. In order to make the operation safer it was decided to pick up the drill string and top drive approx. 6" to ensure more movement could be
made with the top drive later in the operation. The are was cleared of personnel and the lift commenced. During this, the sling parted and a chain pull lift fell to the deck. No
personnel were injured or damage sustained. A company investigation is currently ongoing.
The pump cartridge was being removed from the pump body by the use of a 3.1 tonne 'elephant' chain block to allow for the installation of a new cartridge. As the cartridge
was lifted clear of the locating studs it was observed to slip a short distance of approx 1". Two more similar short slips of the load on the chain block were observed. The load
was successfully landed on its support plinth without any damage or injury to personnel. The reported defective chain block was removed from service and sent o shore for
independent examination. All similar chain blocks of the same rating were quarantined in the field as a precaution. The independent examination inlcude load tests and a full
strip down for internal examination. No fault was found with the chai block, it was found to be in a good operating condition. It is suspected that during the lifting activity
that was the cause of this report the pull chain may have been twisted resulting in the chain jerking as it passed over the pulley wheel, and this w s not observed by the persons
carrying out the lift as the reason for the slippage of the load.
Whilst backloading cargo onto the <…> (The vessel was positioned with the starboard side to the North face of the platform) using the <…> Crane, an empty container was
being placed in position when it became snagged on the bulwark of the vessel.
While offloading materials from a supply vessel, one leg of a four wire sling on a gas bottle rack snapped. The vessel reported this to the crane but by this time the rack was
over the platform deck. The rack was landed on the platform without any further problem. During lifting a second rack it was noted that the lift was at an angle. On landing on
the platform it was observed that one shackle had fallen back and the sling was looped under it.
A snubbing operation was in progress - running in drillpipe to well P1. Another length of pipe had been hoisted to the snubbing unit and was suspended, with the lower end
held by an operator to prevent it moving. Whilst waiting for the previously lifted p pe to be lowered into the well, the suspended pipe became detached from a hook and fell 2
1/2 - 3 ft to the work basket floor. It then leaned against the mast. No reason was found to why the hook opened. This hook plus three others quarantined pending further
investigation.
While function testing the black gold telescopic mast to check the hydraulic circuits prior to it being fully erected the jib was raised 1m from the cradle. At this point one of the
main frame pivot brackets failed causing the jib to cant to one side and landed askew in the cradle. Further inspection of the failed bracket revealed that only one bolt had been
engaged as the other appeared to have been sheared for some time as indicated by the discolouration of the remains of the top half of the bolt. The m st had just arrived from
the beach and had been certified fit for purpose. The mast was shipped off for repair and further inspection.
An initial investigation into a reported vibration concern with goods lift failed to establish cause. Lift was isolated until more detailed investigation could be carried out. This
latter investigation showed that the drive shaft connecting the motor to t e winch had sheared. Investigation into cause of failure continues all safety devices and over-rides
were operational and would have prevented any free fall situation.
Whilst manoeuvering the end channel cover (2.1 tons) into place on gas cooler e-2031 the 3 ton <…> chainblock failed at the hook swivel assy resulting in the channel cover
dropping approx 0.5m onto the deck. No injury to personnel occurred but the deck late was damaged. Other similar chainblocks are being inspected. The failed equipment
has been returned onshore for analysis to determine the cause of failure.
O ring leak on tree crossover causing hydrcarbon release. During the wireline fishing operation on s-58 a 1950 lb, overpull was being held on the wire while flowing the well
in an attempt to free off the toolstring downhole. While this operation was taking place due to the fact that the well was flowing with wire in the hole. The wireline crews were
constantly manning the work site e.g. rig floor/wireline unit & wellbay mod-05. On <…> at 5:00 am, while <…> [night shift wellserv supervisor] was monitoring the wellbay
area he heard a loud popping noise, on further investigation it was evident that there was gas and oil spraying out from the tree crossover hammer union. On seeing the extent
of the leak <…> contacted <…> [wellserv wireline operator] by radio and instructed him to close the shear seal bops. He also phoned the mcr and informed them of the
situation in the wellbay. As the shear seal bop was closing, several production operators arrived in the wellbay. Once the wireline operator confirmed that the shear seal bop
was closed he was then instructed to close the hydraulic master valve by the wellserv supervisor. At the same time the production operators closed in the swab valve nd lower
master valve. Once the tree was confirmed closed the wellserv supervisor and a production operator bled down the wireline riser and made the area safe. Wellserv then washed
On completion of perforations on well <…> the sheaves were being rigged down. The bottom sheave was chained to the floor and suspended by the floor winch. The brake
was removed and the sheave fell 3 feet to the drill floor.
Whilst pulling out of hole (CN36) with a clean up assembly after circulating to inhibited seawater. A pressure switch cap became detached from the IDS (Top Drive
Assembly). The object fell some 90' striking the doghouse and landing on the drillfloor. T e opeeration was suspended to check all similar attachments on the top drive
assembly securing mechanisms were replaced (grub screws) and indication marks installed as a visible indication of any movement.
During a routine operation on well J2 a near miss occurred during a wireline tool change. The well was shut in at the time of the near miss, the wireline lubricator de-
pressurised and disconnected from the rig up. An air driven chain hoist which was su ended from an "A" frame on the deck above and being used to lift the wireline. The
actual near miss occurred when the wireline luricator was in the suspended position and the crew were about to remove the wireline clamp which held the wire in position d
ring lifting of the lubricator from the deck to the vertical position with the air hoist. The tail end of the chain fell from the "A" frame some 50 feet above the wireline deck
level, glancing off the lubricator maifold breaking the glass of the pressure gauge and coming to rest with the endof the chain hanging 6 feet below the wireline deck. None of
the crew members were injured and only minor damage to equipment was sustained. After a site inspection and investigation by the Management Team it was dee ed to be safe
to continue with current operation prior to rigging down off the well, The air hoist was removed from service and detailed investigations are in progress.
While lifting a joint of 10 3/4" casing across the pipedeck. There was a failure of the grab unit of the palfinger causing the joint of casing to fall approximately 4ft to the
catwalk. No-one was injured and no equipment was damaged
Rigging foreman had rigged up the 5 tonne chain block. (<…> type, supplied by <…>) to lift a load in the well head area, on attempting to take the load the ratchet failed
causing the chain to pass through. He immediately removed the faulty chain b ock from service and obtained another one and completed the task. This was the first time the
chain block had been used since receiving it onboard during last lifting equipment change out in march. Chain block was quarantined, a controlled test was conduc ed
confirming failure. Incident investigation team has been formed. Chain block to be sent onshore for technical inspection.
Crane on <…>. Fall wire parted while lifting a load . Caused by alledgedly wrong reeving of fasll wire. Load fell/lower 20 to supply boat deck
At the start of the crane operations on <...> satellite the crane operator was raising the boom of the crane from its rest, surface water laying on a boom plate above him cascaded
onto him causing a momentary distraction. The crane boom struck the side of elideck perimeter with the boom light causing it to be torn from its mountings and to fall to the
deck below.
<...> - After rigging up the 9-5/8" cement head to the casing string, the Mud Pump was slowly started (in order to break circulation). Before any noticable pressure built up, the
cement head became disconnected from the casing and fell approx. 11 t to the drill floor. No injury to personnel occured.
Whilst welding a patch on a sea water injection booster pump G164 recycle line,a flash occurred from the unwelded 6" x 1/16" gap at the top of th patch and travelled
approximately 6" up to the flange directly above the patch area.The duration of the ignit on (which self extinguished) was approximately 3/4 seconds. No injuries were
sustained to worksite personnel,the worksite was made safe and incident reported immediately to the CCR. No detectors or alarms were initiated.The PTW for the task was
suspended and the worksite inspected by the duty Production Supervisor. Mechanical/Electrical Isolations and Risk Assessment were actioned prior to the task
commencing.The deareator tower (D124) stripping gas inlet and outlet to flare had been isolated and vessel v nted and the line being welded remained full of sea water during
the task.The weld was completed and MPI tested by removal of the full spoolpiece to the construction workshop, then reinstated and the system recommissioned. OIR12 to
follow.
Parked but not adequately secured cargo trolly on north east side/corner of the helideck, was forced over the side of the deck by windpressure. From the rotor of a landing
helicopter. The trolley dropped into sea approx. 60m below. No injury/no damage besidesloss of trolly. The walkway underneath helideck is about 4m wide and open to the
dropped trolley. No personnel nearby when incident happened. Trolleys position on the helideck was not in accordance with instructions. Notice to hlo has been issued.
During normal operations a large section of the passive fire protection (Mandolite) has fallen from one of the Wellbay roof hatches onto the M49 Xmas tree, causing damage to
the tubing head pressure gauges and instrument stub. On further investigation it as established that deck operations were ongoing in the area, the lying down of a load on the
above deck may have caused the Mandolite to break free and fall. The immediate action was to shut in M49 and depressurised the well, all other wells in the East ection of the
Wellbay were subsequently shut-in and a risk assessment completed for the removal of remaining Mandolite prior to start-up.Wind 27knots @ 210 deg., Sea 3.5 to 4 mts.,
Visibility 8 miles.
A 30" long section of redundant 2.5" pipe fell vertically onto the grating. The pipe has fallen approximately 10-15 feet from a void space between the generator room and the
control room walls.
Several 20mm nuts were found lying on the deck area around the solar turbine exhaust stack on module n8. On investigation it was found the nuts had fallen a considerable
height from the flanged sections of the stack. Further investigation by the maintaina ce supervisor and loss prevention supervisor highlighted a problem on the exhaust stack
protection frame and associated guides. It was found that the insulated spacer blocks had disconnected from the guides allowing lateral movement of the stack. Some of he
material associated with the spacer blocks was later found in the area below. The area around the stack has been barriered off and personnel made aware of the problem. The
maintenance supervisor has instigated a daily inspection program to visually ins ect the stack and record status. A high percentage of secured bolts remain in place. Plans are
being developed to carry out repair work and conduct a design review for long term corrective action.
The incident occurred on the <...> during construction work in the south drilling rig. Abseilers were installing cables in the south west corner of the derrick. One abseiler
dropped a spanner insecurely held in his pocket. The spanner fell on a safety net i stalled in the gap left on the south side of the derrick to protect the bop deck below. The net
was attached to hand rails approx. 1 metre above the south skid deck. The spanner bounced on the net and ended up approx. 3 metres away from personnel working n the skid
area. A risk assessment ans site visit had been carried out. As part of the precautions against dropped objects, safety barriers and safety nets had been installed to protect
personnel, and the abseilers had been instructed to secure their tool . The safety net served its purpose, and although the spanner ended up not very far from the personnel, the
energy of the object was insufficient to cause major injury. After this incident it was stressed again to the abseilers that all tools should be se ured and the barriers have been
deployed further away from the base of the derrick.
Section of cladding which was in two parts, situated around a flange. One half dropped onto the mezzanine deck below. Dropped 6 metres, weight 1kg and was approx 25cm
in diameter. No injuries.Object emanated from insulated pipework below walkway above
While working on the north gantry of <…>, removing a non return fire damper from the hvac system. The centre rib of the nrd (metal strip 2" x 3ft long, weight approx. 6kg)
dislodged itself and fell through grating panel down to the deck of <…>, about 15 t below the worksite. No injury or damage incurred.
At approx. 0945 hours it was reported to the drill floor that an emergency battery pack fell from a strip light in the derrick approx. 180' to the skid deck.Weather conditions at
the time of incident - wind SW, 45-50 kts. Clear visibility. Current ope ations - Drilling 8 1/2 " hole as per drilling programme. Type of batteries that were involved in the
incident - NICAD rechargeable - which remained intact upon impact. Sustaining incessant high winds over the last 8 - 10 days from various directions wh ch appears to have
caused vibration to slacken fittings. All other light fittings in the derrick checked for integrity along with the lighting circuit isolated for that particular system.
During a routine tour of the installation, the Safety Supervisor noticed that a stack of 3 pallets of drums at the east side of the sack store laydown area were listing at an angle of
approx. 30 degrees from the vertical and in danger of toppling onto the adjacent East escape route and guardrail beyond
<…> took a call on <…> from <…> HS&E Safety Advisor <…> about a dropped object on <…> central platform <…>1. The incident took place at about 18.00 hours on <…
>t. A 30" isolation valve being installed as a replacement to V-961400 at the discharge of compression train 1, became unstable due to inadequate support. The valve slid and
fell from its final location between pipe flanges some 3 metres above deck. The valve is installed in a vertical orientati n being some 10 tonnes in weight. There was no injury
to personnel and no structural damage. <…> confirmed HSE considers this type of incident reportable. It was agreed the conversation was a formal report of the incident. A
full investigation nto the incident has been undertaken and the investigation report is attached to the OIR9B.
Operator stepped on grating on stores laning area outside engine room stores. Grating flipped vertically and operator prevented 11m fall by grabbing hose and grating over the
gap
It appears that the proximity switch between dolly beams at monkey board level worked loose due to vibration and was suspended by its own cable. The cable lay across the
face of the dolly beam and, at some stage, the travelling block dolly rollers severed the cable causing the switch to fall. This switch does not generate an alarm, it is used as a
reference point for calibration. All other proximity switches have been checked, secured with an additional double locking nut and attached safety line to hold t em in place
should they become detached. The safety line can not come into contact with the dolly beam.
At approximately 19:15 hrs a member of the night shift was entering the <…> hvac room on level 1 south side of the <…> platform when he observed the non directional <…
> antenna fall from the underside of the helideck glancing the level 1 deck then fall i to the sea. At the time of the incident the platform was experiencing severe snow squalls
and lightening. Initial investigation indicate that the glassfibre "whip" aerial broke just below its first joint. The remnants of the aerial will be removed so tha the cause of this
failure may be established; a visual inspection suggests that the coupling itself is still intact. Night time wind direction 345degs at 28 knots with snow squall gusting to 50
knots.
A handjack from wash water control valve <…> worked loose falling from level 2 down on to level 1 missing a person by six feet. Approximate weight of the handjack was
about 3 kgs. The likely cause was the circlip came loose or was incorrectl fitted to the retaining pin on the valve. The pin had worked its way loose over a period of time due to
vibration. Incident report <…> raised for this incident.
In <…> wellbay level 1a a well service team were opening the xmas tree swab valve on well <…> when a noise was heard from below. Looking down through the grating it
was noticed that a 1 1/4" x 4 ft steel pinch bar, weight 10kgs had fallen throu h level 1a deck grating 16ft to level 1 deck below. The bar had fallen into an area that was
permanently barriered off. The barriers were not specifically to mitigate for dropped objects from the work site above but to keep people away from cutting re injection
pipework. The bar had earlier been used by the team in opening torque valves. The majority of grating is 1 1/8" spacing but the section immediately adjacent to the well are 1
3/8" grating.the tool slid through the larger grating slots but would hav not gone through the smaller. Likely cause:- 1) improper storage of tools 2) lack of care and attention
3) incorrect selection of tools action taken:- inspected areas for other potential dropped objects investigation recommendations:- 1) fabricate st rage bins for drilling/ well
service hand tools for wellbay or other grated work areas. 2) barrier of deck area below when work site decks are gratings. 3) better selection of handtools thereby avoiding the
potential for a dropped object.
At 1345 hrs on <…> a person ascending the stairway to the oim's office stood on a grating which gave way and fell to the deck 5m below. There were no injuries. The area in
question is on the top landing at the section where cabling penetrates th outer wall to the office block and comprises a small section of approximately 425mm x 140 mm
weight 2kgs. The small section of grating had been welded onto the main landing section. The cause of the failure was severe rust and degrading of the welds an the fact that
it had been welded onto the grating unsupported. The area was immediately barriered off and the south stairway top landing grating was also inspected. Priority message was
sent to the other forties platforms to check similar areas of grati g. Investigation team set up to determine the underlying cause of the incident.
On <…> around 1040 in the morning <…>, <…> shift team leader, discovered a fragment of brick on the ngl roof south west corner, just to the west of control valve, pcv
3051. The brick fragment weighed 0.2kg and measured approx. 60x50 25mm. It had to be assumed that the brick fragment had fallen from the flare deck above. (bricks
sandwiched between steel gratings are used to form a heat resistant barrier to protect the upper structure of the flare tower) no other fragments were discove ed in the vicinity
and no signs of damage as a consequence of the brick falling were apparent. It is not possible to say exactly when the fragment of brick fell. Operational conditions at the time
of discovery were normal and the weather calm, dry and sun y. Actions taken to date:- 1. Area barriered and restricted to essential operations personnel. 2.area inspected by
operations personnel and <…> (<…> inspection engineer) . Binocular survey of underside of flare deck carried out by <…> 4. He icopter survey carried out by <…> of flare
deck upper surface no signs of distress or damage have been observed in the course of these inspections. We are presently in discussion with <…> to determine possible causes
of the fr gment becoming dislodged. The likely next step will be a further helicopter survey using a specialist photographer to provide additional assurance regarding the
Scaffolding operations were in progress at a site above the level 2 external walkway on the south side of <…>. A connecting, higher level walkway was being used as a
temporary laydown area for the scaffold materials. A tube approx 2 metres long hat had been put down in this laydown area rolled and fell through the gap between the
walkway grating and the kickplate. It fell cleanly into the sea and was lost. Had it rolled at a slightly different angle, it is feasible that it could have fallen ont a maintenance
platform area some 6 metres below and whilst its fall would almost certainly have been broken by some non-process pipework with minor damage potential, it could
nevertheless have struck an individual on the maintenance platform. There was n fact nobody there at the time but as this area had not been barriered the potential existed for a
person to receive a major injury as defined by RIDDOR. One of the scaffolders, <…>, immediately reported the dropped tube to the platform HSE Co-ordinator,<…>. <…>
Report No <…> has been raised to investigate and make recommendations from this incident. For further details of this summary please see OIR9B
Drilling in progress on <…>. Floor man came down from the Belly Board (40") with a Wind Wall retaining bolt, the nut and locknut was missing from the fixture.The bolt
was still in position when spotted by Rig Floor man before he removed it and broug t it down to the Drill Floor. Following a search of the Drill Floor the missing nut was
located.Weight of the nut which had fallen (at some unknown time) was @ 100 grams.The remaining fixtures were checked on the Belly Board, 4 of which were found to be
loose and required tightening. It was noticed that two of the bolts had locknuts missing. Investigation team set up and other <…> platforms with similar Drill Derricks
notified.
While two platform personnel were passing through Package 5 West side, carrying out an advance safety audit - they discovered a small section of cable tray lying on the deck.
On initial inspection it was obvious that it had dropped from redundant cable ray in roof area above. Tray looked badly corroded - for rest of report see OIR9B.
During normal operations a technician noticed that the wheel (weighing 12 lbs) from a chain wheel valve for PO5 MOL pump resting on small bore pipe work at a height of
approx 7ft. On further investigation it became apparent that the wheel was from the suc ion valve directly above. The wheel had vibrated off its shaft and fallen from a height
of approx. 18ft.
2m rectangular length of light steel to secure vertical edge of corrugated sheeting on Level 3 office porta cabin became dislodged due to high winds and fell approximately 8M
to Level 2 walkway below. As the bottom edges of the sheeting were exposed, it ould appear that the high winds occurring at the time of the incident had entered behind the
corrugation at this point and caused enough movement of the sheets to dislodge the corner edging piece, which then fell to the walkway below. The weather conditi ns at the
time of the incident were: Wind NNW @ 30Kn, with a sea of 3-6m.
The <…> rig mechanic was preparing an air receiver vessel at the base of the drilling rig for internal inspection. Whilst engaged in this activity the toe of his boot contacted a
loose section of timber which was partially concealed in the rig support tructure. The timber (700mm x 100mm x 50 mm weight 2kg) fell 10 metres onto the bop deck.
A team of five scaffolders were erecting scaffold just below the monkey board on the drill derrick during mid-morning, approx 11:00 hrs the weather was dry and misty with a
wind speed of 18 knots from the south east. One of the scaffolders was moving arou d the derrick sides (outside bracing) making the scaffolding safe, when the cable from the
fall arrestor made contact with his hard hat and despite the chin strap being worn, dislodged the hard hat, which was fitted with ear defenders which then fell appr ximately 60ft
to the rig floor. The hard hat was fitted with ear defenders. The only person present on the rig floor was the tugger operator who was in visual contact throughout the operation.
The surrounding area was barriered off to all other persons. T e hard hat fell approximately 10ft away from the tugger operator. As soon as the scaffolding was made safe, the
team descended and the incident was reported to the fso/hsec at 11:30hrs. The incident was confirmed and then reported to the installation manager at 12:00hrs.
Abridged version - see oir9b - A 3m length of 3/4" instrument tubing was removed from a stock rack on skid deck and laid on support grating so technician could cut 20cm off
one end - long piece slid away, dipped through the access stair, falling approx. 8 to the BOP area below - no-one in area at time, but potential for injury.
The scaffold equipment had been secured by wire and rope lashing on the east/west walkway of the spider deck on the south side of the conductors after being used for
conductor chock replacement. A bad storm developed on the afternoon and evening of <…> and upon inspection as the storm abated on <…> the scaffold equipment was
found to be missing.By visual inspection it was found that the wire and rope lashings had broken and that the boards, tubing and fittings had been washed overboard. On <…>
the spider deck area was inspected for damage and no damage was evident. Various boards were recovered and removed from the area.
After the severe storm on the night of the <…> it was noted the following morning that 2 sections of cladding had been blown off the south side of the Derrick onto A module
west laydown area.No one actually witnessed the loss of the cladding but th rigger <…> noticed that they were missing while checking around the platform for any storm
damage.Area to be checked for integrity of other sheeting and arrange for the replacement of the cladding at the earliest opportunity. The weather condition overnight
overnight were 68-80kts in a westerly direction with a sea state of 8 metres.
Two scaffold boards were being transported down a stairwell. A gust of wind caught the scaffold boards. The boards were blown out of the carrier's hands and over the hand
rail. They fell into the sea; one of them glancing off a light fitting on the cellar deck causing minor damage.
Anemometer cups and arms of wind sensor <…> found on skid deck, had become detached and fell from drill derrick. Anemometer weight : 0.65 kg fallen : approx 150 ft
weather conditions : wind 220 degrees (south westerly) + 50 knots. Immediate action : checked visually, from as best an advantage point available due to weather, that no other
parts of anemometer in potentially hazardous condition. Investigation implemented - report <…> likely cause identified as worn bearing allowing significant play on speed
sensor spindle. Resulting vibration from excessive wind causing cap and lock nut to work loose.
Cladding restraining bracket fell from the <…> gt and was found inside the turbine hall, module 10 & 11. Cladding weight: 0.5 kg fallen: approx. 25 ft length approx. 3 ft
weather conditions: n/a as inside the module
Transporting a choke valve by crane, when the valve handle became detached and fell to deck approximately 10ft. Valve handle weight: 5.5kg fallen: approx. 10 ft weather
conditions: fair immediate action: task stopped & made safe. Sor issued. Investig tion implemented - report <…> likely cause identified as: handle shipped not properly
secured.
Cement pump room module 5. Whilst carrying out diesel pumping operations on slot 23 the driller heard a noise from somewhere within the cement room. On further
investigation a 300mm dia, approx 8kg, heat trap which had been fixed to a sprinkler frangible bulb was found lying on the deck approx 12 ft below from where it had
originally been positioned.
Two UV light fittings dropped three metres to deck. [Approx 4 feet long-10lb each).
A mechanical tech. Was attempting to retrieve copper tubing from a pipe rack, as he tried, a heavy steel wall pipe became dislodged and fell to the floor narrowly missing him.
The pipe was 9' 3" long and 2" in diameter, weight approx 22 kgs - Rack locate 8' 8" above floor level
As caisson submersible pump 34/425/2008a was not pumping it was decided to remove it and install the spare pump. The pump and the motor which i around six feet in length
is made up with twelve seven foot riser sections (5" dia) and following preparations or removal in good weather conditions, the first riser section was removed and while
preparing to remove the second section it was noticed that the eleven feet of exposed electrical cable suddenly disappeared down into the caisson. At first it was thought the
cable ties had failed however as the rest of the riser sections were removed it became apparent that the submersible pump had parted from the riser. Final removal of the riser
sections revealed that the pump had parted with two seven foot sections of he riser plus the electrical cable and fallen approximately 500 feet to the seabed. The ciasson which
is around 235 ft. In depth is located in the centre of the platform jacket. It is suspected that the riser flange bolts have either sheared or slackened off during operation.
Investigation underway.
Baggage store on edge of helideck. Down draft from rotors caused portable drill to become unstable and fall 30 feet to lower deck . No injury
During construction work to extend the <...> helideck, a steel beam weighing 217kg was temporarily placed on the radio room roof. The beam was subsequently dislodged
from its rest position by the down draught and vibration of a landing helicopter. One end of the beam slid off the radio room roof, across an adjacent walkway and came to rest
wedged against a scaffold platform. It fell approximately 6ft below the level of the radio room roof. The radio room roof is no longer used to store any materials and will
shortly be under the new helideck extension.
The gas vented through lt-vent was ignited by lightning. The fire was extinguished with fixed co2 system. The low temperature (lt) vent is a cold vent, equipped with a
dedicated, manual operated co2 snuffuing package, foreseen to be used if the vent should be ignited.
Firepump G5026 (<...>) was on-line to back up the utility water system when a class 1 platform shutdown was initiated by F & G detectors on the <...> pancake. Deluge of
the area was activated automatically by F & G system. On investigation it was found tha a major mechanical failure had occurred on G5026 with debris being ejected through
the diesel engine casing with a localised fire ensuing. Recommedations/Actions: - the fire was extinguished by the fixed systems. The fire team then ensured that all fire within
the fire pump compartment was fully extinguished. Strip down the engine to determine the root cause of the engine failure.
Indiction of fire in m10 switchroom on the fire & gas panel in the m13 main control room. The on duty production electrician and production supervisor went to m10 to
investigate the alarm and found there to be a fire in the "dynamic brake" cubicle. The f re was extinguished using the hand held dry powder and bcf extinguishers located in
m10, the <...> electrician then arrived and isolated the power supply. Further investigation would indicate that the fire was caused by a fault on the contactor that had mad it
overheat, melting and igniting the plastic. The fire was contained within the steel cubicle and had not spread to any other part of the switchroom. Wind: 23 knts ssw sea: 3mts
visibility: good
Various faults in the accommodation electrical power circuits caused to portable electrical equipment. Damage was accompanied by overheating and smoke.
The platform was in normal production mode. At 5.45 the general alarm sounded upon smoke detection inside the compression local control area. The reason was because of
an electrical short in the cubicle for one of the cooler motors. The platform went t muster and the smoke was investigated by a team in "BA" gear. The short was contained in
the cubicle. The cubicle has been isolated and investigation commenced. No-one was in the control area at the time of the incident. Initial investigations have f und the fault
to be in the cubicle and not to be caused by anything in the field.
Vent stack fire caused by snow storm. Extinguished utilising 1 x 50kg halon cylinder
Electrical Circuit to Antifrost heater was re-energised - C/B would not close - explosion and fire observed at Meter Stream #2 Instrument Enclosure. Flame dissipated and
equipement was isolated and site secured pending investigation.
Roustabout reported a loss of steam to the pipedeck wash down unit. This was reported to both rig mechanic and electrician. They investigated the cause and found that the
boiler had tripped on feed pump overload and pressure in the system had bled down to zero. The pump overload was reset by the electrician. No obvious reason for the
overload had been ascertained. The unit successfully started up but was shut down again due to a slight leak of steam from a level gauge. On completion of the repair, the mech
nic switched on the 400 amp circuit breaker. Immediately the circuit breaker flashed over and a fire developed. The alarm was raised and all personnel were sent to muster. The
equipment was electrically isolated and the fire extinguished by the emergency eam using dry powder extinguishers. Once the fire was out, a member of the fireteam was
trying to ascertain if there was sufficient heat from the breaker to cause reignition. Whilst in b.a. he removed his glove and placed his hand in the vicinity of the b aker,
sustaining a small thermal burn from a protrusion on the breaker. No medical treatment was required. A full investigation to asertain the root cause is in progress.
Cold flare purge ignited during thunderstorm. Suspect static discharge. Alarms raised and automatic shutdown (level 2) initiated, muster 2 G.A. No damage apparent to cold
flare. Nobody injured. - for full report see OIR9B
The <...>'s artificial lift pump P6530 failed to stop on receipt of a trip signals from the shutdown logic because the electrical motor contractor (motor switching device) contacts
had welded in the closed position. An attempt to shutdown the pump ha stopped fluid flow through the pump, resulting in rapid overheating and mechanical damage to the
fluid end rotating element. The pump was stopped by disconnecting the HV switchboard feeding the pump motor and stopping the electrical generator connected t it. There
was no loss of electrical containment.
Instrument UPS Invertor panels GX 4027C/D.The system changed over to its bypass supply in response to a minor HVAC fault. The changeover generated an alarm in the
CCR. An electrical technician sent to investigate found the cubicle hot to touch and on o ening the panel observed smoke and an electrical burning smell. The technician
isolated the electrical supplies bringing the situation under control.Further investigation revealed that four of the smoothing capacitors had failed, expanded and distorted he
busbar. The failure is considerd to have occurred during the changeover of supplies. The capacitors were found to have been installed longer than their recommended working
life.The failed capacitors were replaced. All similar capacitors in the system are to be replaced. The relevant pmrs will be reviewed to include manufacturer's recommendations
on working life.
Oil export pump p306 de bearing seal failure caused overheating. Small fire from residual oil. Flame detected by ird deterted by ird detector. Fire put out by ops tech.
Two personnel were working on the mezzanine above the SW corner of the BOP deck. They noted a smell of burning and checked around to investigate and found a fire at a
field control station. One person raised the alarm whil the other tackled the fire with a Dry Powder Handheld Extinguisher. The platform General Alarm was sounded on
receipt of the alarm call and emergency teams responded to the incident. It was noted on the arrival of the teams that the fire was out. The mu ter of personnel continued until
the electrical equiment was isolated and the area made safe. All personnel were accounted for and were stood down from the muster at 1015 hrs. Cause of the fire - A link cable
within the control station had short circuited to earth due to a cut in the insulation and moisture within the enclosure.Weather - visibility clear Wind direction/speed - 216 deg
@ 18 knots Sea state - 2 Metres.
Abridged. See oir/9b for full report. At 0112 hours, the fire and gas detection system detected a fire within the enclosure of the b power generator, causing carbon dioxide (co2)
fire suppressant to be automatically discharged from the fixed systems. The machine was shutdown automatically during this sequence. Operations personnel confirmed the
status on site and control room staff sounded the general platform alarm (gpa) to call platform personnel to muster. Necessary external contacts <…> control room, coast guard
and the <…> drilling rig working within the <…> field - were made by the control team. Emergency response teams were deployed to the scene, and prepared firefighting
equipment to allow manual intevention to contain escalation if ecessary. They confirmed that the fire had been extinguished by the co2, and set up ventilation to allow heavy
smoke logging of the turbine enclosure to be dispersed. Fuel and power supplies to the b power generator were further isolated by operations per onnel. All 116 pob were
accounted for very promptly, the headcount being completed within 9 minutes. Off duty personel were stood down from muster at 0143 hours, emergency teams remaining on
standby for a period therafter until ventilation and cool down o the area was complete.initial indications are that a loss of cotainment allowed pressurised lubricating oil to
An electrical fire broke out at the junction box for mud pump nr.2. The fire has been caused by the generation of a hot spot. The hot spot eventually melted the insulation and
the cable then made a short circuit with the junction box. This melted some co per from the lug and the cable, and then arced to the box.The hot spot occurred because a wrong
size lug (300 mil) had been crimped on a smaller size cable (240 mil), causing poor conduction from the cable to the lug.
Main bearing on the barite recoverey centrifuge overheated and caught fire during mud treatment operations.The fire was promptly put out by portable CO2 fire extinguisher.
Nobody hurt during the incident.
Plater was removing structural supports with a burning torch within an enclosed habitat. A section of <…> tarpaulin was not covered by the fire blanket and therefore exposed.
It subsequently caught fire and the plater immediately isolated his oxy fuel feed. The firewatch man rapidly extinguished the fire by hand/fire blanket. Overall the fire lasted for
a few seconds. No injuries occured. All naked flame sites have been checked to ensure no exposure of <…> tarpaulin to flame, spark or slag with sui able coverage by fire
blanket. Incident will be discussed at future safety meetings and tool box talks.
Smoke/flames were observed coming from one of the temporary centrifuges. The electrical suuply was shut off and the fire extinguished with dry powder. The fire was a result
of overheating caused by metal to metal friction ignited a rubber o ring. The pl tform mustered whilst the fire was extinguished.
At approx 0750 hrs an operations technician was checking out a suspected failure of the oil heater element on the lube oil tank on the <…> water injection pump. Whilst
surveying the area he removed the fill cap (approx 50mm diameter) from the tank, upo removal he observed a small amount of smoke, he quickly replaced the cap, and
informed the control room of the events. On hearing the radio transmission a second technicia immediately responded to the scene and assisted to isolate the equipment. On
recei ing the message in the ccr a full muster was immediately called and platform fire team attended. A foam branch was laid out for cover, whilst a co2 extinguisher was used
to inert the tank via the fill cap. There was no apparent residual heat within the t nk or further evidence of overheating. Coastguard, standby vessel and other emergency
contacts were alerted as per emergency procedures for platform musters. The platform crew were stood down from muster after ten minutes. The cause of the overheating is
ubject to ongoing investigations and the heater element is being pulled for inspection. Conditions at the time of the incident were : daylight, dry and clear. Wind direction 320
degrees at 22 knots.
During stable production operations an alarm was received in the Central Control Room at 23:55 for a common alarm activated on K 3000 VSD due to low level cooling water
in the header tank. At 23:56 the on site Electrical Technician approached the unit, s elled burning insulation, he immediately isolated the equipment with the loacl trip button.
Looking through the cabinet louver be observed flame which died out following the isolation. On duty personnel were stood by during a further full isolation of t e equipment.
Subsequent examination revealed that the water coolant system had failed causing water to leak over several banks of thyristors and capacitors which had allowed short
circuiting of the capacitors and heat/flame damage to the wiring and term
Confirmed Flame detection within Generator Hood and auto release of Inergen extinguishant. Platform held at muster for 20 minutes. Platform was running on a single
generator operation when SPS followed the loss of generation and AC power. All emergency eq ipment and support services operated as per design.
During change out of turbine meter, operations technicians went to clean test separator outlet filter basket. The following is a sequence of events. Prior to the commencement of
any work the line had been water flushed and nitrogen purged. Turbine meter i same line (approx. 2m from filter pot) had already been removed from line, washed out using
same water hose and replaced into line. Filter pot lid carefully removed ensuring that no pressure was trapped in filter. Filter basket was removed and on inspect on found to be
blocked with same type of gel material from well a1 returns along with a small amount of residual water. A "green" water hose was run out from a nearby hose station (the
same hose and station as used previously). The hose was turned on and imed into the basket to wash out gel, there was a "blue flash" and a "crack" from inside the filter
basket. The hose was immediately pointed away from the basket and switched off. The basket was inspected to ensure nothing had ignited.
At 03:30 hrs on <…> hd 17 heat detector in the ccr indicating high temperature at the top of s429 vent stack and automatically activated the general plant alarm. The chief
operator and a plant operator went immediately to the scene and confirmed that the vent stack offgas had ignited. They immediately informed the ccr operator who manually
activated the halon sniffing system which extinguished the flame. The atmospheric vent collection and fluids knock out systems were checked and no abnormal conditio
found. There was no activation of any process plant or other safety system alarms at this time. The weather conditions at the time were winds of nnw 35, 50 knots, seastate 8
-12 metres, visability 1-3 miles in heavy snow squalls. The weather forcast indi ated a moderate to high risk of lightning during snow squalls.
With the platform in normal production mode, a platform alert was initiated by smoke indication in n25 switchroom. All platform personnel were mustered at their lifeboat
muster points within the tr. Initial checks of the switchroom were conducted and the resence of thin smoke was still evident. Further systematic examination of the electrical
cubicle (45v) revealed a failure of a securing bolt on a bus bar connection which had allowed short circuiting of two phases. A further investigation is ongoing to identify
failure mode.
C.r.o. working near f & g panel detected burning smell. Doors were opened to locate source and flames were observed on top of power supply unit. At this point p.s.u. (power
supply unit) failure alarm operated and operations team leader appeared. Both o ened panel back doors to access burning psu co2 extinguisher picked up at control room door
and flames knocked out with two puffs.
During the restarting of the gas turbine driven gas compressor the newly installed exhaust bellows lagging caught fire. Fire detection system called for deluge and the fire was
extinguished. The technician in attendance also released the fine water mist p otection internal to the turbine hood as a precaution. A full muster of platform personnel was
completed.
Fire in laundry caused by a number of towels auto igniting. Removed from a dryer that had not completed a hot/cold cycle due to a fault and left in bundle. Detection systems
activated alarms and muster called. Minor damage to adjacent wall covering. No injuries. Fault repaired - age of machine may lead to change out.
During normal gas injection operations (single train ops) the HP & LP vent stacks were struck by lightening twice in a 15 minute period. On both occasions the vent stacks
caught fire. The operations team made the correct PA announcement & platform genera alarm to alert all personnel of the situation. They also with the aid of the response
team fired off the fixed halon system which extinguished the fire in seconds. During this period the process plant was held in a steady state to avoid a blow down. A l halon
systems were replenished and spare bottles re-charged.
Normal platform operations were ongoing. Three main power turbines were supplying power. Main power generator 'c' indicated 'fire' by way of a single flame indicator.
Area operators were sent to investigate. Flames were seen inside the enclosure and th operator initiated manual halon release. The platform was called to muster stations and
all process plant shutdown till fire was confirmed as out.
During routine operations on the a boiler system, the operations technician also checked the b boiler operation and observed that the pilot burner was alight but also yellow
flames were observed inside the burner tube itself. It was suspected that the oiler tube may have failed and that glycol had entered the flame tube and ignited. The boiler
system was shut down and the fuel gas manually isolated
An oil plant operator was conducting routine reinstatement checks following a maintenance shutdown. This operation included access above v74. The operator brushed against
an electrical cable which arced to earth. The breaker was tripped. Immediate site in estigation identified incorrectly terminated live cables, appear to be from removed
floodlight fitting. Site made safe. Formal investigation in progress, reported as a dangerous occurence electrical short circuit.
Platform operating under normal steady state conditions. At approx 15:25 smoke was detected in Module'D' C9 fan room. An emergency shutdown was initiated resulting in
activation of the blowdown system and main power outage. The platform general alarm was ctivated -personnel to muster stations
At approx 0300 hrs on <…> a fire alarm for Module "D" computer room annunciated in the Control Room. A second alarm initiated a halon gas release and a level one
shutdown. The platform was called to muster and emergency team deployed. Fo lowing investigation the area was declared safe and secure. The muster was then stood down.
Subsequent investigations revealed that an overheating fan starter capacitor was resposible for the smoke in the Computer room. For rest of report see OIR9B.
During de-commissioning operations on well <…> involving the cutting and pulling of 20" casing the rig electrician heard a bang in the direction of module 24 and on entering
the scr switch room found smoke and a smell of electrical burning. After trip ing the ship to shore power supply and raising the general alarm the area was inspected by the
emergency response team. They observed that in one of the general electric scr cabinets a phase 3 600v auxiliary fuse switch had blown and flashed across the t rminals.
Following an inspection of the remaining scr cabinets normal operations were resumed. Platform investigation ongoing regarding failed fuse switch.
At 21:52 hrs on <…> the f and g system detected smoke in room (office) 703 (lv. 7 of accommodation module on investigation a waste paper bin was found to be smouldering.
Gpa was initiated and persons muster stations) water was poured onto the paper debris and heat/smoke extinguished.
During methanol loading on <...> the hose started to leak. It was near a coupling at sea level, 35 metres from the boat. Stopped and changed out a5 metre length. The "new"
hose did also start to leak after a short time. The opeation was stopped and the new ose ordered. The methanol spill was ca. 50 litre.
The platform was 9 days into the annual shutdown. The workscope associated with this incident required inspection on 'b' manifold nozzles. The auxiliary manifold comprises
7 off downcomers and the inspection necessitated the removal of 5 of these downcome s in order to facilitate the 'b' manifold valves removal. A red-hot work permit has been
issued to grind through seized bolts (burning was also identified as an option). C48 downcomer has been removed, the inspection has been carried out and the mechanics had
replaced c48 downcomer but the retaining bolts were only approximately finger tight. Fire blankets had been installed on the c48 downcomer, which was adjacent to the
downcomer (<...> flowline), on which the red-hot work was being done. The retaining b lts on the test manifold valve on this riser were in the process of being flame cut as
they were seized. As a result of this red-hot work, a slight gas seepage through the upstream flange of c48 manifold valve ignited and a slall fire ensued which was qui kly
extinguished by the on-scene firewatcher. To prevent activation of platform fire and gas esd and associated gpa, the flame detection b3/1 fd1 and fd2 (level 1 authorisation),
covering 'b' module auxiliary manifold had been inhibited for the red-hot work.
Prior to starting 2k101a <...> compressor a high liquid level in the interstage scrubber needed to be cleared. At about 2230 hrs the system operations began draining down the
interstage scrubber via the closed drain under <...> guidance. A leak occ red (condensate) at a compression fitting serving the suction scrubber to closed drain and caused two
level gas detectors to activate. The gas detectors both reached 25% lel causing a class 1 fire & gas ESD.
The incident occurred when operations were ongoing to re-instate cooling water pipework on the <...> Interstage Cooler. One part of this activity was the removal of a blank
flange on line <...> which ties into the LP flange. The 6" bli d was unbolted and left lying loose on top of the flange whilst the spool was prepared for re-instatement. The 16"
flare valve had not been isolated for the task. During well operations there was a surge of gas to the LP flare system causing the blank fla ge to move, resulting in a gas release
into the module. The platform subsequently shut down on coincident high-level gas detection. Detailed investigation performed indentified failure to follow procedure as the
immediate cause.
Intervention visit to investigate a recurring low level gas detection. On entering vacinity of gas detection it was apparent where the gas was coming from ie prenure indicator
guage pi-0208 damaged tube. Supply to guage isolated and gauge removed. Replacement fitted and back on line.
Platform was not manned at the time of the incident. Small volume gas release in M.E.G combination inlet ducting for rogen unit. Caused by solenoid valves paring -
platform shut @ level three.
On platform shutdown the hydraulic system oil reservoir became over pressured and blew the top mounted pump out of the tank. There was no-one nearby due to the platform
shutdown.
During the mechanical maintenance on valves associated with the hp vent system it was noted that there appeared to be evidence of liquid.`
Small gas release from the pig launcher. One of the hydraulis pig fingers had been removed and a flange fitted. When the launcher was used the flange leaked. Launcher shut
down and vented. New seal fitted pressure tested to 1250psi test ok. Returned to service.
Scaffold foreman was moving scaffold tubes from ac cellar deck to at when he noticed a smell of condensate. On arriving at the pumps he noticed a stream of fluids coming
out the back of a gauge on the discharge line from pump a. He could not isolate the gauge so he stopped the pump on the emergency stop button. He called for assistance and
was met by <...> who isolated the gauge using the wheel key the area was washed down with water and the gauge was replaced.
Whilst carrying out fire start maintenance checks on ac cellardeck, the lead instrument technician noted a sheared 't' stainless steel impulse line. The s/s line was approx 12" in
length and had fractured at the compression fitting . No evidence of either damage or corrosion was found. Loss of containment.
Gas leak from the fuel gas inlet to K400 gas turbine.
During routine checks it was found that the 30" flange on the compressor discharge header was seeping gas.
Generator G6001 on line and on load; Engine backfired causing gasket failure and small hydrocarbon release and ignition. Engine shutdown and fuel gas supply isolated.
Water was being transferred from the vessel <...>, when the hose from the platform ruptured. The pumping operation was stopped and the hose uncoupled. The boat crew
reported that the hose had split at the coupling. The north crane lowered his h ok to recover the hose to the platform for repair and the hose was hoisted on to the platform. The
vessel left the platform. While the deck crew attempted to tie off the lower section of the hose the end suspended from the crane parted from the coupling a d the hose assembly
fell to the sea, narrowly missing a deck crew member on the lower deck. No injuries occurred as a result and the hose has now been recovered onboard the beryl alpha. Weater
conditions were good, no wind, good visibility.
Date <...> - time 15:15 hrs - area 1 gas compression. During normal running operations a leak was found by a <...> operator, he immediately alerted the ccr who sent
production operator to determine the degree of hazard - the ccr monitored the area continu sly - at no time was any gas detected on the area fire and gas detection system, due
to the leak being relatively small. On reaching the area the operator determinedthat an "o" ring at the plug on the pilot valve assembly on psv 325a - g155 3rd stage of he mp
gas compressor was leaking, a small build up of hydrates was taken off line and shut down in order to investigate and conduct repairs. The psv had been replaced during the
recent shutdown and had been on line for approx. 36 hours. On exposing the pl g it was confirmed that the "o" ring seal was split. The male and female thread assembly was in
good condition. The "o" ring was replaced using an oem part. The system was re-commisioned and brought on line, tested and found to be leak free. An investigat on has
commenced into the cause of this loss of containment.
During preparation for the removal of a sand probe in n4y flowline a double block and bleed mechanical isolation was put in place. The flowline had been flushed, drained
and at zero pressure, however an instrument tapping between the xv and the manual b ock valve was indicating pressure. To prove the double block and bleed, the instrument
tapping was cracked open to vent the pressure. The operator noted gas spluttering from the vent on the instrument tapping indicating there was a blockage in the vent. W thout
warning the gas flow increased without opening the valve further. The volume of gas escaping within a relatively small area, coupled with minimal wind conditions, activated
the gas detection and subsequent gpa and deluge release. The operator immedi tely closed the vent tapping. An lp1 has been raised to initiate a full investigation.
During run up sequencing of the mp compressor after a compression trip, gas was detected within the turbine enclosure on module 4 activating the automatic gas detection
system, halon suppression system and initiated a gpa. An incident report was raised to determine the root cause and to identify any corrective actions to prevent reccurance.
A coiled tubing operation was in the process of being set up on <...> platform to carry out a sand isolation procedure on production well a23 in the well bay. The equipment had
been positioned, interconnected and in the early stages of being funct on tested by the contract services company halliburton when a small casing hydraulic oil returns tank
(~0.5m cubed) became over pressured. The equipment was not connected to the well at this time.the result of the over pressure was to deform the tank, sit ated on level 3 well
bay, and ultimately caused a welded corner of the tank to split and allow the hydraulic oil to be ejected approx. 8 metres. Two personnel were wetted by cold hydraulic oil (type
g millermatic). The c/t supervisor immediately shutdown he operation and deployed oil spill kits. The two affected personnel required change of clothing and showered. No
first aid was required. A local investigation team is being set up and the contractors shore based organisation being contacted for more information.
After a maintenence operation on a gas metering orifice plate, the metering stream was repressurised. The metering technician who was present noticed a small leak from a
compression fitting. On attempting to tighten the connection, the 1/2" fitting parted allowing gas to escape. The technician isolated the upstream valve and fitted a cap to
secure. After examination of fitting it appears that it was incorrectly made off (under-tightening_ and that a genuine swagelok fitting was assembled with a ringlok fit ing which
is believed to be a copy of swagelok. This assembly was supplied by the equipment vendor.
Gas leak, about 5m3 from hose on double block and bleed system, when outboard xv failed. Suspect seal failure within the valve.
During a routine check the well operator noticed a hydrocarbon leak from the kill swing valve stem of the n32 well. Operation initiated a well shutdown which included the
dhsv. Further investigation showing that the stem packing had failed.
Platform was in steady state oil and gas production. No drilling activities. Power generation turbine g41101a was on load and running on diesel fuel.during watch keeping
activities, a technician noticed dense white mist issuing from the turbine enclosure xhaust fan. The turbine was immediately shutdown and inspected. There was 25 litres of
diesel fuel present in the base of the enclosure. Further investigation discovered that the compression fittings on the diesel ring were found to be slack. The machine as a
history of vibratory problems which may have contributed to the problem. G41101a is a <...> turbine. It was noted that the turbine enclosure oil mist detector did not operate.
Platform investigation is ongoing to establish the cause of oil mist detector failure.
Normal gas export operations were in progress. Open module area with good natural ventilation and normal weather conditions. Hydrocarbon release was export gas - A leak
occurred on the top connection of the balance line - on the probe body. The probe sect on has thermal insulation enclosure
During routine production operations, gas plant processor control problems resulted in some controlled flaring of gas through the HP flare system- The Fire and Gas system
detected gas in the location of the <...> separator - At 14.23 the Gas Detector wen into high alarm
At approx. 0110hrs the <...> scada operator acknowledged a 60% alarm on gashead f12, located in the process area. He then telephoned the arbroath operator, made him aware
of the situation and requested he investigate the alarm. At approx. 0113, gashead d5 & d21, both located by the wellhead area, came into 20% alarm, as a result of these heads
indicating 20%, the montrose operator initiated an arbroath level 3 shutdown. Also, as a result of the coincidence 20% readings, the platforms ga sounded and the platform
personnel reported to muster stations. Investigation by the frt, found that p8105 mol pumps mechanical seal had failed and a fine spray of crude was leaking from it the
production operator was contacted and the pump was isolated and depressurised via the closed drain system, the leak ceased at approx. 0117 hrs. It was estimated that approx. 2
galls of crude leaked, this was fully contained by the bunded area around the pumps, and was washed down the open hazardous drains. All actions as per cause nd effects were
executed, p 8105 was left isolated and drained down.
Well a3 being flowed via 2inch warm up line to vent system.(normal routine operation). Small hole evident in line causing small gas escape to atmosphere. Note:insufficant
quantities to initiate fixed detection systems.operator closed in line and stopped activity.
During a platform shutdown caused by process instruments, the wells automatically shut in and the wellhead pressure rose to its shut-in level at the same time, the inner
annulus pressure rose to a similar pressure exceeding ist alarm point set at 170 barg. This indicates thast tubing to inner annulus communication occurred. Well A1 is being
flowed in order to reduce the pressure seen in the annulus at surface to below the alarm level.continuous monitoring is being carried out. The inner annulus is designed to
contain the original shut-in W/H pressure.
Well 8a swab valve had been maintained and hydraulically tested from underneath by fluid in the xmas tree pressurised via the kill w/v. The test rig was removed from the kill
w/v and fitted to the swab cap for final gas service test. The operative left th kill w/v open and its blind flange plug out when the hydraulic master v/v was opened gas escaped
under pressure through the 1/2" NPT connection at the kill W/V flange.
Steady state operations: Test sep. Operator noticed dripping condensate from a lagged valve. Lagging removed which identified condensate spray from valve stem seal.Note 1:
Valve was a manual isolation valve to a level control bridle. Action taken: Test separator taken off line and depressured. Note 2: No automatic detection of gas from fixed
detectors Wind speed in module 17 knts 152 degrees
Process upset caused high pressure in open drains system which blew out water seal in mod 05 plant room drains. This introduced gas into the plant room and ccr which
resulted in a gpa and muster. Full investigation is ongoing with hse.
Whilst investigating the cause of a gas injection blowdown valve not opening, the trapped pressure/gas between the double gate seals was suddenly released. The Mechanical
Technician suffered only superficial injury and returned to work shortly afterward. he valve had been removed from the process and was awaiting backload ashore.
Investigation is ongoing.
Gas release from A15 Gas Injection Flowline which is under construction. Passing valve caused gas to migrate along the flowline and discharge from graylock flange. Full
investigation ongoing.
The export pump (PX0102A) in Module 13 was being worked on by the maintenance department and had just been run for approximately 25 minutes before being shutdown.
At 1745 hrs the CCR got indication of high gas in module 13 and sounded the GPA moving all personel to Emergency Muster Stations (coastguard alerted). The problem
resulted from a gas / oil leak from a flange on a 10 inch suction line upstream of the pump which sprayed the product into the module. Investigations are ongoing and reports
being com iled.
During permit controlled task to repair coupling guards on <...> compressor, gas pockets were released initiating gas heads in the module. Review of isolation identified that
standard isolation did not cover route to degasser. As a result there wa more gas than expected released to the module resulting in one high gas alarm and several in low alarm.
The task had been controlled with an operator on site. The job was stopped and reassessed when this hazard was identified.
B' gas injection compressor had been returned from maintainance, de-isolated and start up checks completed. Lube oil circulation was established <...>. Compressor was
pressurised to 45 Bar 20/9 to service test two PSV's that had been re-certified, the c mpressor was then depressurised. Lube oil remained online. At 16:00 hr <...>, lube oil was
found to be offline, initial checks found nothing untoward, the lube oil was re-established at 16:30, at 17:00 it was reported that the lube oil/seal oil reservoir w s distorted.A
level valve for seal oil o/h tanks had stuck open and 3000 lts+ had been pumped out of the lube oil reservoir. Gas always present in the tank was mixed with air drawn in to
replace volume of oil removed. It is thought an explosive mixture as ignited by a source not yet confirmed. Full investigation ongoing.
Minor gas release-llg indicated on 2 gas heads in pac module due to pinhole leak on gas supply
Minor gas release from 1/2 branch on oil inlet to 1st stg sep.12" line from pin hole leak fitting to flange weld. Small gas release not detected by gas heads. Train one shut down
manually by operations staff.
Gas released in process module u5w lower due to reciprocating compressor k9320 cylinder no 3 head/valve cover joint failure.
Minor gas release in gas compression module (u5w mezz) due to leaking sealant port on ba19/20 injection manifold block valve. Fire and gas panel indicated 2 gas heads on
llg.
Technicians monitoring area for potential leakage from pre-identified broken joints (post shutdown work), at 40 BAR pressure a technicians attention was drawn to a noise and
then spotten gas emitting from Pas Boot Area - platform GPA initiated on coincide ce low level gas. On investigation drain balve between PAS Boot B/V and LCV was found
to be partially open. As the leak did not appear until 40 BAR it would appear there had been a blockage in the drain pipework.
Gas escaped when a valve block assembly parted from a dp cell on bbo2 gas lift flowline due to the fitting of incorrect retaining bolts.
Abseilers were descending column 1 on a man riding winch to access a fixed airline breathing system located at the worksite. As the fixed H2S detectors were indicating
readings of 0PPM and 22PPM, 10 minutre rescue sets were being worn as a precautionary m asure for the 3 minute journey to the worksite. When the work party reached the
130m level, the air supply failed on a set being worn by one member of the work party. Winch operator and standby man were contacted and the work party were recovered
immediat ly. Subsequent checks indicate that the pressure gauge on the BA set is stuck at 220 BAR.
A minor gas leak which was not detected by the fixed monitoring system was noted during routine watchkeeping. <…> flowline pressure switch nozzle weldolet was found to
have developed a hairline crack in the weld.
Following the overhaul of k13800, the injection compressor was being prepared by operations staff for reinjection. During the start up sequence gas was detected in m3ee, the
gas level indicated was below the alarm level. The compressor was manually stoppe which initiated an automatic shut down/blow down sequence. Upon investigation the gas
was found to be coming from the module drain.investigation ongoing.
At approx. 16:15 hrs on <…> the control room received a call to say the smell of gas mp compressor 6. Operations staff with a portable gas detector were despatched. A leak
from a pinhole in a dublok double block and bleed was discovered u der lagging. The valve is an isolation valve for a pressure transmitter on compression export. Operations
personnel isolated the valve and the leak immediately stopped. It was tought the leak was from the threaded connection between the valve and transmi ter inst. Turbine, but on
close inpsection a tiny pinhole was discovered close to the point where one of the double block connections screwed into the valve body [export comp ko801b]. Normal
production operations in process at the time. Weather conditions 10 knots wind at 300degs sea state 1 metre swell with 10 miles visibility. Air temp 9degs.c.
During the re-opening of well slot 21, instrument linework (12mm) located on the flowline pressurisation/depressurisation header, was forced out of the connection fitting, by
the process gas pressure in the system, gas escaped to atmosphere for 5 minutes ntil isolated by process operator. System operating pressure at time (55bar)
Metering stream 3 taken out of service to remove/inspect/refit filter. During reinstatement the metering stream was being depressurised with condensate liquid, the condensate
liquid passed the "o" ring seal of the filter housing resulting in a loss of hyd ocarbon containment gas detection (fixed) activated resulting in full platform production shut-
down and depressurisate. Platform alert activated (automatic) the stream inlet valve being used to pressurise/service test the system reclosed and metering st eam
depressurised. Wind 23 knots direction 300 degrees visibility iomile sea state 2.3 m swell
At approx 01:06hrs on <…> a low level gas detection alarmed in the process area, followed by a second head which initiated a general platform alarm. A third gas detector
indicated in the same area. Incident team leader and ops team co-ordinator dispat hed to investigate. The incident team leader was unable to locate the leak either by sound,
smell or sight, nor could the gas detectors easily be identified (21 gas detectors in the process area). At approx 01:11 OIM issued instruction to shutdown and blo down level 3.
At this point the detectors were reading between 20 - 28% Lel, once blowdown commenced these readings quickly dropped to zero. Incident team checked area to make sure it
was all clear before returning to the control room to establish search or the source of the leak. Platform remained shutdown until source of leak discovered and rectified.
Addition. Two minor leaks were discovered on the MP Compressor Recycle Line. One leak was on a flange and a spiral-wound gasket was replaced. The other as a stem
gland valve leak which was rectified by tightening the gland packing.Normal production was resumed after the leaks were rectified.
During a production system start up following an unplanned production systems shutdown, a gasket seal at F2115 Ctriethylene glycol carbon filter top cover failed. Hot tri-
ethylene liquid escaped. The vapours produced caused 2 fixed point gas detectors to ctivate. The result being a general platform alert and production system shutdown.
Operations personnel located the source of the escape and isolated the filter unit until an inspection/repair could be made to the filter unit. Volume of liquid lost approx 60 lts.
Wind 220' at 15 knots. Sea state 1.5m, Vis 8-10 miles. Dry & clear.
G.P.A. alarm from fixed gas detection - Muster all POB. During "Well B6" clean up from a previous frac on this well a loss of containment of hydrocarbon/water/propant mix
occured. A failure of pipework due to erosion was the cause of this incident. The wi d direction being north east 0.40deg - 18 knots. The platform production was shut down.
The failed pipework system is isolated. No person injured. HSE duty officer informed at 03:30 <…>.
Normal process operations ongoing. Person working on level 4 mezz. Noticed minor gas leak from 'b' export gas compressor discharge pipework and contacted platform
central control room. Production staff attended the area and confirmed that leak was from re undant pilot assistance pipework for the discharge psv. Production staff
immediately shutdown the affected gas compressor and depressurised the system. The leakage point was from a weld on a spoolpiece. Due to low quantity of gas from the leak
no field ga detectors went into alarm. As excessive vibration is thought to be contributory factor in this event, temporary supports will be fitted to the pipework. The redundant
pipework will be removed when the compressors are shutdown. The plant is to be surveye to identify any pipework of a similar configuration.
While commissioning the gas re-injection compressor, the re-injection riser valve was equalised to 450 bar. On opening the valve a leak of hydrocarbon gas occurred from one
of the valve tell tale ports to atmosphere. This was noticed by <…>(com issioning manager) who immediately had the valve closed and compressor shutdown and de-
pressurised. The gas immediately dispersed and did not activate the module fire and gas system. The fire and gas system was checked and found to be fully operational. W nd
was 193 degrees at 34 knots. No one was injured and no damage to plant occurred. A full incident investigation is ongoing.
At 1055 on <…> a technician was working in level 4 process area when he noticed gas leaking in the underside of the A Export Compressor discharge cooler. He immediately
stopped what he was doing and contacted the platform Central Control Room. An i mediate reponse to the leak was initiated where it was discovered that the leak was from a
1" drain line from the cooler discharge pipework.The A compressor was shutdown and the system vented to flare. A Task Risk Assessment was carried out to enable r medial
work to be carried out to the pipework.As there has been a previous similar event involving vibration induced fatigue to small bore pipework a small team has been set up to
determine the extent of the problem and options for reducing possibilitie of any further leaks. Actions include but not limited to; Establishing potential for defects on similar
fabrications Establishing root cause of failure to determine future engineering solutions Reviewing previous history of similar defects and ensuri g corrective actions have
been followed up, Reviewing findings from small bore pipework survey carried lout during <…>.
Leak from badley corroded drain valve on gas metering outlet on seperator. There was no fixed detection. It was manually detected but, did have problems isolating leak. Shut
down vlave failed to close then had to go to manual closing valve upstream.
<…> generator had been worked on i.e. psv recertification. Psv refitted and on start of m/c flexible nose between psv and hp vent system failed. Gas leaked into <...>
enclosure initiating detection and subsequent platform <…> esd. Gas spread to <…> hall and <…> control room. Operators manually isolated vent system and naturally
ventilated closed spaces.
<…> generator had a diesel leak inside the engine unit housing. No injuries.
Small gas leak from dew point metering analyser. Gas detected from 1 ton level gas head. Precautionary muster. No e.s.d. platform to alarm status on confirmed low level gas
conditioning module um4ww. Leak found to be from the gas dewpoint analyser samp ing cabinet located on the glycol contactor outlet line. This was confirmed by hand held
meter readings, the cabinet was isolated and remaining area checked. Platform returned to normal at 0440hrs.
Leak reported by platform personnel and location of leak given as rm4e gas compression module. Area tech. Investigated and leak originally thought to be from valve flange
and gas compression shutdown. Further investigation found leak to be from a pinhol in the body of the 3rd stage discharge esd valve. Gas process manual blowdown
initiated. Preparing site for valve removal and investigation.
At 2353 hrs well <…> was opened to recommence production from the <…> facilities after a maintenance shutdown which included a number of valve change outs on the
production manifold assembly. Immediately on the well being beaned up, the platform went to general platform alarm status on a coincident low level gas detection in m3e
where the <…> flowline ties into the production manifold. The gas dectection level immediately increased to a coincident high level initiating fire grade 1 shutdown (surface
process s/d, emergency depressurisation process and closure of the <…> system riser esdv's). The shutdown actions were confirmed and the hydrocarbon gas levels monitored,
with the platform muster and <…> supervisor called out via <…> at 0007 hrs on <…>. At 00:16 the <…> bell 214 was requested to be on standby and contact was established
with <…>. The process was fully blown down at 0020 hrs and the external door to m3e was opened to provide natural ventilation. Gas level monitoring continued but the
reduction was slow due to limited natural ventilation and contact was made with the coastguard at 0025 hrs. With the gas levels slowly reducingthe emergency support team
were despatched to provide a natural ventilation route from m3w via m3c and finally opening a through route into m3e at 0117 hrs with the m3e gas levels reducing below 25%
Fuel gas leak occurred in P4250 Gas Turbine hood causing platform to go to GPA status.Confirmed high level gas shutdown P4250 Gas Turbine as designed.Shortly after
this,confirmed high level gas activated in the Air Intake of P4250 Gas Turbine resulting in Platform Blackout,PSD (production shutdown),blowdown and closure of the <…>
System ESD valves.All these actions were as design. Emergency response team arrived at the site of the Incident and confirmed that the Gas had dispersed from the
Hood.Platform ire/Gas system was reset and the platform returned to normal status.Investigation team set up.On initial investigation,no obvious signs of where the leak
occurred have been seen.A series of N2 pressure testing programmes have started to identify the location of the leak.
Fire grade 2 shutdown caused by coincident smoke in TFL engine room. The TFL pump was being used to bring on <…> wells following a process shutdown (normal
operation). The engine had been running for approximately 30 mins. Prior to the smoke detection the crankcase dipstick had ejected due to a faulty seal causing a small amount
of lubricating oil to be sprayed over the engine. The dipstick was secured and the engine continued to run. Just as the engine was being shutdown due to the pumping
operations eing complete, the smoke detectors were initiated. The initation was caused by fumes from burning lube oil which had impregnated the exhaust manifold lagging.
The area was manned at the time of the incident and therefore was no naked flame present.
A pig trap isolation valve was being leak tested using a 24" internal test tool manufactured by <…>.the test tool had been pressurised with nitrogen to 100barg .during the
removal process of the tool following successful test of the v lue the tool was ejected from the pig trap.the tool and its carrying trolly travelled across the deck space colliding
with and finally resting against a handrail. Damage was sustained to the tool, its carrier and the handrail. No persons were injured.no o her structural damage was sustained.
The platform was depressurised at the time.two technicians were carrying out the testing operation and the area was cordoned off investigations conclude that nitrogen had
leaked past the tool seals pressurising the spa e behind.when the tool seals were relaxed the back pressure propelled the tool from the pig trap.a full investigation has been
conducted.the tool and its seals have been sent for examination.
At approximately 20:30 hours the control room oprator requested a process operator to investigate a slight oil sheen on s/board side of vessel. The source of the sheen was
quickly identified as being a leakage of oil from the impulse line for pressure tr nsmitter 02-pt-0715 it was found that the isolation valve was immediately closed and the
leakage of oil isolated at the time of the incident inst. Department were attampting to clear a blockage in the impulse line. Since the incident has occurred the pipi g of the
impulse line has been altered to accurately reflect the p & id.
The production chemist was taking crude samples from sample point on export metering skid fast loop system. 2 toxic gas detectors & 2 flammable were inhibited. After
taking samples the 4 heads alarmed. As they were inhibited no automatic gpa or shutdown. abinet was isolated from outside. Half a barrel of crude leaked after seal on pump
found be faulty. Pump was isolated and removed. Technical anaylsis & investigation of failure being currently looked into.
Discharge of crude emulsion to sea. Maintenance was being carried out on the produced water system. Valve inadvertently opened allowing oil thru to the produced water
caisson which was not properly isolated from the system. Retrospective report as spill o ly identified following invest of subsequent incident on <…>. Oil & gas production
suspended and investigation carried out. Report to be forwarded to hse and dti
Discharge of crude oil to see approx 1m. The cuase of the incident is not known with certainty - believe discharge from produced water caisson due to level transmitter
malfunction . On discovery of dischage oil spill procedure instigated. Dispersant used to break up spill. Oil & gas production suspended incident under investigation. <…>
informed.
Single gas detector on dd cellar deck detected flammable gas by transfer pumps. Work was ongoing in the area at the time flushing the transfer pumps with hot water with the
vented water being led by hose to the closed drains. The pump was mechanically is lated and being flushed with hot water to remove wax deposits from the suction strainer via
a line to the closed drain. A temporary hose was fitted to a 3/4" valve so that some of the flushing water could be bled off to the hazardous drains to visually c nfirm that the
pump was fully flushed. The temporary hose consisted of a crimped end fitting onto a smooth piece of tubing (not serrated). While under pressure (3.5 barg) the hose blew off
releasing some hydrocarbon vapour/oil which activated the detecto . Replacement of such hoses is already underway and all fittings will be inspected. The use of all utility
hoses and temporary tie ins to be covered by a controlled procedure. Until the above is completed the oim has issued a memo to all personnel.
A gas release on the fuel package meter was noticed by an operator were a leak of nitrogen through the terminal casing exiting at the cable clamp. The pressuration was stopped
immediatly and the 24v power supply isolated to the flow meter tag number.
A leak of high pressure gas took place from the flange of a 12" ball valve in the injection compressor PSV on the flare header line. Leak was caused by closure of a 12" valve at
a pressure specification change which should normally be kept open. This al owed full system pressure to be put against a lower rated flange on the valve.The valve flange seal
then leaked and allowed gas to escape.Leak was observed by personnel in the vicinity and reported to the control room. GPA was initiated and oil produ tion shut down to
allow system to be pressurised and made safe.An internal investigation is in progress in to the closure of the 12" valve without the upstream 6" isolation valve being closed
first.
An operator was carrying out a routine pigging operation on the <…> 12" injection pig trap to launch an intelligent pig. On conclusion of the interlock sequence the operator
opened the tell-tale bleed valve to ensure that the launcher was free of toxi and flammable gasses. The gas test carried out proved to be negative. The operator then realised
that he had forgotten to carry out a section of the procedure that required the interspace between the kicker line isolation valve and the pipeline isolati n valves to be vented to
flare. This procedure is normally carried out at the beginning of the operation.The operator proceeded to open the kicker line isolation valves and the pipeline isolation valves
without closing the tell-tale bleed valve. It wa following this that a release of gas occurred from the tell-tale bleed valve on the <…> pig trap door. The escape of gas was
detected by fixed gas detectors and the installation GPA was activated with the resultant level 1A shutdown. A full investig tion of the incident has been carried out and
remedial actions to prevent recurrence are being implemented.
Gas leak was observed coming from the valve stem on the Temperature Control Valve (TCV) on the hot gas by pass for the A injection gas compressor. System was isolated
and de pressurised. A technical investigation into the cause of the stem leak is currenyly in progress.
Two operators were tasked with looking at the interface level transmitter on the <…> slug catcher methanol boot. On investigation it was found that the <…> transmitter
could not be verified as the level glass was dirty.The operators informed the CCR that the bridle would have to be blown down. Inhibits were applied by the CCR to the gas
detection system & the operators isolated the double block & bleed valves and connected up the temporary pipe work to the closed drains. On the initial attempt t blow down
the bridle the liquid could not be evacuated from the level glass confirming that a blockage was present.The closed drains valves were isolated & the gas side of the bridle
opened to re-pressurise the bridle. When this was completed the orig nal isolations were applied and the bridle blown down successfully.A sea water utility hose was then
connected to the top of the level glass & the level glass flushed through.On completion of the operation all the valves were isolated & the sea water tility hose depressurised.
On breaking the mcdonald coupling joining the two lengths of the utility hose a small amount of gas was released which was detected by a gas detector which activated the
GPA. During the disconnection of the hose an operator su tained a slight laceration to the middle finger right hand. Laceration was cleaned plaster applied & operator returned
Seal on B stripping gas compressor leaked process gas into compressor hood while A compressor was running. Cause is thought to be a failure of the B discharge valve to
fully seat, and a passing NRV. Due to the failure of the discharge valve to seat full , the logic did not allow the blowdown valve to open thereby allowing gas back to the B
compressor causing the seal leak.The oil production system was shut down and the fault investigated. Prior to re-start the B compressor was isolated and inspected w th all
hood doors fully shut. Blowdown and discharge isolation valves on A compressor were confirmed shut. Once production re-started, the B compressor was leak tested with
N2.An Operating instruction will be issued to ensure that before starting any tripping gas compressor, the Valve status on the offline machine is checked and the blowdown
valve is open and discharge valve shut.
Whilst lining out <…> gas pig receiver the in board <…>, <…> gearbox came away from the valve assembly due to a fracture in the casing of the mechanism housing. This
incident is subject to a full ongoing investigation details of which can be obtained from the SHE Team, <…>.
The area technician was completing the de-isolation of <…> flowline as part of the well engineering perforating activity on this well. As he was cracking open the flowline
valve to upper manifold isolation valve he observed oil leaking from the upstream flowline located on the ground floor level. The assisting well services operator proceeded to
close the isolation valve as the area technician went to investigate the location of the leakage. The source of the leak was identified as an open instrument t pping point
isolation valve. This valve was closed and the leak was secured. Area technician observations at that time were that this tapping point did not have a blanking plug installed
similar to the adjacent tapping point on the same flowline. Throug out the above the area technician was in radio communication with the process control room, where the
operators were closely monitoring the status of the gas detection system. Throughout the duration of this incident only three heads detected an increase in gas levels with a
maximum of 46% lel. As the result of securing the leak, the indicated gas levels quickly dropped to normal zero% levels.
Whilst removing guns from well there was a leak from free standing stack – approx 40 litres spilt. No platform muster or gas detected.
Following a test run on the CRI generator, the automatic diesel fill up failed, causing a spill of diesel on the pipedeck. Approx. 10 gallons was spilled; this was contained in the
immediate vicinity on deck.
At 05:05 hrs the platform was shutdown on indication of fire in leg 'A'. Onsite investigation showed that these indications were not genuine. The smoke detectors had been
contaminated by sea water from a leak at the top of the main service water riser loc ted in the leg. A small amount of H2S was released from the standing water at the bottom of
the leg.The service water was shutdown and the H2S cleared below 5ppm by 05:35 (without the aid of forced ventilation). And the platform returned to normal status
At 2020 hours, <…>, <…> went to a level 3 shutdown as a result of gas detection in module 02, gas compression. A precautionary muster was called. The affected plant was
isolated, the remainder returned to normal production. Nitrogen/helium leak as performed to locate source of gas. Recycle valve fu1430 was found to have a leak on the stem
packing. This has been repaired, and the compressor train b repressurised ready for service.
Priming of 'a' train 1st stage intercooler, ex 0215a with seawater. This involves venting of displaced air into the module, but in this case hydrocarbon gas was present giving a
release into the module resulting in fire and gas detection, automatic shutdo n and a muster. Gas entered into the sea water system via a ruptured disc which had previously
failed.
Platform operating normally, when at approximately 07.55 three x gas heads in two separate fire areas within module 02 went into alarm. Firstly on low then on high. The
CCR initiated a level 3 shutdown. The area was checked out following depressurisation but nothing found indicating where a release could have occurred. Investigations
ongoing.
The accident happened during the recertification of the PSV (PSV 1415). After a routine pre-test of the valve, the test rig was blown down in preparation for the disassembly
of the valve. Because the design of the valve, gas pressure remains in the dome of the main valve. The injured party began to undo the instrument tube fitting which is
connected to the valve dome. The tube then blew out of the fitting and struck the individual on his left hand. <...> was treated at <...> Hospital where he was retained for two
days.
Normal production operations in progress with an emergency response exercise ongoing. The exercise entailed copious amounts of water being sprayed onto module 3 roof and
the pipedeck. Two gas alarms were activated, one in low gas and the other in low gas oing to high gas later. Over a period of one minute 17 seconds both these were observed
to be continually falling and subsequently cleared. It is suspected that the amount of water entering the drains from the exercise and entering a common header, resul ed in a
back pressure in the drains in Module 2 which in turn forced any gas in the drains out through the gully seals. The source of the gas in the drains and the reason for its
expulsion are still being investigated.
During operations to run casing into the hole, the mud fill hose was inserted into the open end of the casing on the rotary table. Before the valve was opened the pre charge
pump was activated causing the pressurised hose to be ejected from its position. he hose glanced the hard hat of the person operating it and sprayed water based drilling mud
onto the drill floor. An investigation team was set up including senior representatives of the drilling contractor. Investigations found that the low pressure fil up line had been
connected to the high pressure mud pump system due to the unavailibility of the low pressure trip tank system. When the mud pump was started the 2" valve on the end of the
fill up line was left closed allowing the mud system and hose to ressure up to relief valve pressure. The pressure lifted the system relief valve which caused a sudden pressure
decrease in the fill-up line this caused the hose to recoil from inside the casing and struck a glancing blow to the foreman's hat.
At 2.20 0n the <…> during normal production operations, two gas heads g5220/g5221 located near t71 initiated low gas alarms in the ccr. The plant operator was requested to
investigate and reported no obvious gas leaks in the area, but suspected the lo gas could be coming from p10 pump gland.while the plant operator was locating a grease gun to
pack the gland, the crt tech reset the two gas heads, g5220 remained normal, g5221 came back into low alarm then went into high alarm initiating a yellow shutdo n. The plant
was made safe and the source of gas was discovered coming from a cover plate joint where a removed pump p11 had once been in place the cover plate joint was replaced and
tightened and no further leaks were detected. The operating pressure of 71 is 12mbar. At the time of the incident the wind spped was 22 knts and direction was 315 degrees.
Further actions to prevent recurrence:- 1. Other <…> platforms notified 2. Cover joints and glands on p10 to be checked 3. Checks cross field to ensure all pumps have
adequate number of clamping bolts on the joints.
On the morning of the <…>, <…>, a non-destructive testing technician employed by <…>, was carrying out ultrasonic thickness checks on gas pipework on the ngl roof.
Whilst an area of external corrosion was being cleaned up using a hand craper, so as to provide a good surface for the ut probe, the pipework perforated allowing gas to be
released to the atmosphere. The operating pressure of the pipe that perforated was ~12.5 barg. The arrangement of the pipework restricted access to some extent and meant that
<…> was fortuitously standing on the opposing side of the pipe to the area that perforated. <…> was not injured by the release and rapidly withdrew both himself and his non-
intrinsically safe test equipment from the immedia e location of the leak. He then telephoned the central control room using the platform emergency number, 555. Operations
personnel (<…> and <…>) and the fire and safety officer (<…>) immediately went to the ngl roof where <…> indicated the location of the release. The wind conditions were
relatively light - the platform weather monitor records 9 knots @ 300 deg - but sufficient to be carrying the released gas away from the platform and dispersing it towards the
west (this ap ears contrary to the anemometer's record but may be due to flukey conditions around the flare tower.) <…> immediately initiated a yellow shutdown of the plant
At the time of the incident plant operations were normal and no work was going on in the mol area in the vicinity of the lp condensate pumps, p-74 and p-75. The first warning
of a problem came at 1239hr when a low level gas alarm, g 5220, annunciated in he central control room, the ccr operator (<…>) immediately called upon the operations shift
team leader (<…>) and the fire and safety officer (<…>) to investigate. As they approached the area the gas alarm went from low evel to high level and an automatic yellow
shutdown of the plant took place. In the package there was a smell of gas and a search of the area around gas detector 5220 revealed the source of the leak as a pinhole in the
pipe to flange weld of the first fla ge off p-75 pump in the 1/2" nb recycle line (line no<…>). The operating pressure of this pipework is ~12barg. Due to the limited extent of
the release no other gas detectors in the area went into alarm and, following consultation between he ccr and fso the oim concluded that a general alarm and muster was not
required. The wind conditions were typically 10-15knots from 290-340deg
At 23.40 during recovery of the plant following a shut down at 21.15, traces of oil and water were discovered on the top deck North West corner, West walkways and Deep Gas
Lift area. On investigation it was discovered that a carry over had occurred up th ough the LP flare, of an oily water mix. The OIM implemented a controlled shut down of the
plant. The wind was light (15 knots) from an East South East direction.The investigation indicates that two non return valves leading from the separators to V17 0 pump
discharges were passing, allowing overfill and eventual passage to V161 and then to the LP flare. All level indicators and switches have been function tested both
independently and through actual filling of both vessels and found to operate effect vely. Two new non return valves are en route and will be changed out prior to re-start of
plant.
During normal flowing operations of well A07 (Slot04) a leak developed on the 2" barrel nipple screwed into the C annulus causing head spool. The barrel nipple provided
connection for the access valves to the C annulus.The leak, trapped liquid (dirty w ter) and air were expelled through the top edge of the screw thread. The leak was observed
by area operator who immediately took action in conjunction with the control room and the well was shut in and precautions taken against potential injury from re ease of the
valve assembly while the annulus was depressurised from approximately 20 bar.Subsequent investigation has identified that the nipple had been cross-threaded during the
original installation of the valve assembly. The weight of the valve ass mbly acting on the nipple will have contributed to the fatigue failure of the threads on the top edge. The
original valve assembly has been removed and replaced with new barrel nibbles and rated instrument fittings.
A gas release was detected at G3445, this gas head went to high gas, initiating a yellow shutdown, other detectors in the area also detected high gas. All detectors quickly
returned to zero after the initial alarm. V28/29 were being isolated at the time for planned maintenance. External environmental conditions at the time of the incident were
logged as calm.
Description :- OIM informed by the Shift Team Leader to investigate a minor leak he had noticed on his inspection of the plant by VO2 - MOL Separator. On investigation it
was found that produced water was dripping from the underside of the 18 inch inlet h ader to the vessel. I informed the emergency response team to standby as a precautionary
measure to allow the Operations Team to shutdown vessel and isolate in a controlled fashion. On isolation of vessel prior to venting down, the weep developed into a s all
pinhole jet of produced water. See OIR9B for rest of report
During a shift handover inspection a pinhole leak was discovered in the spool which connects the scale inhibitor supply to the production flowline of well fb21. A fine spray of
well fluids was emanating from the leak. Due to the small nature of the leak, he fire and gas system had not been activated. The operator activated the eggbox emergency shut
in. Although the downhole safety valve closed, the actuated production upper master and flow wing valves remained stuck in the open position. The operator clo ed the
production lower master valve to ensure isolation from the well. All other wells in the eggbox shut in without fault. The flowline was isolated from plant and the leaking spool
removed for inspection. Inspection of upper master and flow wing valve actuators initiated. The fire and gas system checked and found to be fully functional. Corrosion of
carbon steel spool by neat scale inhibitor solution was confirmed as the cause of the leak. The fitted spool was found to be of incorrect metallurgy. Stain ess steel is required for
this service. The tree valves are suspected to be sticking as a result of corrosion materials in actuator can.
Normal routine operations. Operations technician was walking between well eggboxes and the mol control room when he smelt gas, looked around and saw a gas leak coming
from the main production manifold. The technician initiated a platform yellow shutdown ( rip and vent). The shift team leader was informed who contacted the oim. Oim
arrived at the scene to witness extent of the leak. Oim instructed the control room technician to sound the gpa and call all personnel to emergency muster stations, time 01.15. A
no time did the platform fire and gas systems detect any gas. The emergency response teams isolated and depressurised the pipeline. The scene of the incident was made safe,
at this point personnel mustered at emergency stations were stood down. Weather was still, mild with no wind at all.
While carrying out well service operations, as per programme <…> for bullheading well <…>, in preparation for drilling operations, there was an apparent failure of a 1/2"
b.s.p. swivel blanking cap, on the chicksan line rig up. This caused a rele se of treated seawater, at a pressure of 1100 p.s.i., onto the b.o.p. deck. On noticing this, the service
crew isolated the leak immediately, informed the control room and their supervisor. The operation was suspended until a full investigation was carried out.
Pigging operations on the <…> pipeline were ongoing, the receiver had been on line for pig receipt for a period of four and a half hours before the leak occurred. The weather
conditions at the time of the incident were - wind 193 degrees at 5knots, a d a sea state of 1.2m. (the weather had no impact on the incident). At 10.50hrs a leak was reported
from the door of the <…> pig receiver. The leak was isolated by the shutdown of the <…> production and export system, and depressuring of the rec iver. An estimated
spillage of 1bbl crude oil occurred, with 4.5 gals spilled to sea. (oir12 & pon 1 completed) initial investigations indicate the failure of the door seal as the cause of the leakage.
A detailed investigation of the incident is ongoing.
During portable mini meter proving operations crude oil was lined up to the portable mini meter prover situated external to m4w. During this operation an oil spillage was
quickly noticed internal to the module. The alarm was manually raised immediately an the system isolated. On investigation it was found that two 12mm drain valves on inlet
lines to the mini prover were inadvertently left open prior to starting the operation. The spillage was contained within the module and successfully cleaned up. The sp llage of
crude oil in the module was estimated at 400 litres.
At o859hrs an operations technician discovered a sheen on the sea east side of the platform and informed the ccr. Interface levels on separator trains checked and "b" train not
clear. Wells immediately started to be closed in. Demulsifier pump on chemical injection skid for "b" train found not to be operating, which caused the deviations in the
separator interface. All wells closed in 15 mins later and standby demulsifier pump started. However, incurred short term increase in oiwob figure from normal 4 ppm to 125
ppm. Amount of crude actually evacuated to sea was estimated at 0.02172m3. Oiwob sample taken after wells closed in - 5 ppm.
A GPA was activated when two gasheads 1304 and 1305 sensed a minor gas leak from the <…> relief valve. The platform was shutdown and blowndown and in the ensuing
investigation a small leak was also detected at the discharge block valve inlet flange.
At 20.40 A Gashead in BG532 Avon Cell was found to be reading high after the introduction of gas to the engine on initiation of the GPA manually, the engine was checked
and a small fitting was found to be missing from the gas fuel rail on the engine.
Snubbing pipe into well - small quantity of gas released as tool joint passed through rotating head. Residual pressure due to insufficient bleed down between snubbing rams by
operator.
During sphere launching operations, the hamilton pig launcher was being pressurised from 2 barg N2 to 67barg with process gas. When the pressure reached between 5 and 6
barg a minor leak was noted on the door seal. Pressurisation was halted and the pres ure vented off. The launcher was isolated and left at ambient pressure.The door seal will
be removed at the next intervention visit and examined for damage or embrittlement. If necesary the manufacturer will be asked to examine the seal and determine the leak
causation.
A 5mm leak developed on line 2" p-694-1a, c130 line to co2. Shortly after it was discovered and two gas heads registered 27% and 11% lel. The line carries crude and oily
water back to the second stage seperator. Total loss of inventory is estimated at o e barrel, half of which found its way to the sea causing a slick. The leak was temporarily
repaired until the manifold is replaced. It has been recommended that the corrosion monitoring programme be reviewed for this system.
Loss of containment, filter failure. Prior to the incident, the platform was in routine operation, exporting oil and exporting and injecting gas. Ongoing maintenence in a number
of areas around the plant, including internal cleaning of the test separator were in progress, with men inside the vessel at the time of the incident. One field operator was
working adjacent to the crude oil booster pumps in the separation area main deck north. At 14:25, a loud bang from a piece of equipment in the separation, main deck north,
was heard by a production operator, who was working on a crude oil booster pump. Simultaneously, the main control room operators noted both low and high gas alarms on the
fire & gas system. In conjunction with the alarms and the production operators radio message to the mcr, the cro initiated a manual red esd (process shutdown). (note that the
reason an automatic esd didn'toccur was due to the fact that the control action inhibit for the separation area was on for sampling purposes). The production operator reported in
that one of the new allocation meter filters on the palaeocene separator had failed and that oil and gas were leaking out. The 'o' ring lid seal on the plenty filter upstream of fx
41051 allocation meter failed (parted) thereby releasing hydrocarbon oil and gas to the atmosphere. The bottle screw used to hold the lid down onto the seal was found not to
Prior to the incident, the platform had shutdown on a blue esd resulting from a fault in the west crane <…> fire & gas panel. It had taken approximately an hour to start and put
onto the main switchboard one of the main generator sets, which is requir d prior to recommencing production. The next step in the start up is to start a main seawater lift pump
and a main cooling medium pump (both 6.6 kv drives). Seawater lift pump 67-7001 was started at 0208. At 0210, a loud bang was heard by personnel in the main control
room. An operator went outside to investigate and reported that there was a large seawater leak downstream of the seawater booster pumps. The control room operator shut
down the lift pump at 0211. Inspection at the time revealed a complete ru ture of the main seawater header immediately downstream of the booster pumps. Subsequent
inspection revealed 3 complete 'separations' of gre pipe joints as well as evidence of movement of the line along its entire length as far as the export gas intercool r. System
overpressure is one possible cause, while weak pipework joints in the gre is another. The basic cause of the incident has not been determined as yet
As part of normal ongoing oil production an export oil booster pump was running. Without warning the drive end mechanical seal failed allowing hydrocarbons to escape from
the closed system to the surrounding process area.The pump quickly isolated and es aping light oil hosed down using fire water. All escaped oil & firewater washed into
hazardous drains system. Virtually no oil escaped to the sea surface. Failed seal to be examined to establish cause of failure. Weather fine, with 17kts east winds.
As part of ongoing normal oil production an export oil pump was running. What appears to be caused by erosion, a hole (approx 3mm diameter) suddenly appeared in a 1 1/2
diameter pump pipe spool & sprayed oil onto nearby process area . Red ESD initiated a d pump isolated. Foam (AFFF) laid over deck. Gas triggered alarms. All to Muster
stations, but immediately made safe and repaired. No contamination of sea. Similiar pipe spool on a second pump to be NDT'd..
Portable water tank <…> was put on line at 17;00 on <…>. At 00.00 hrs a "strange" smell was detected coming from the galley hot water supply. The incident was reported
and the system shutdown at 01:00 hrs. On <…>, <…> was isolsted and the syste flushed with water from <…>. Draining and system flushing was completed by 07:00 hrs and
no further odours detected. Samples of the contaminated water were sent for analysis. <…> remains out of service pending further investgation.
The chef reported a noise which sounded like air or gas being released. Platform personnel reported this to the control room. An esd-2 was initiated. No gas had been detected
by the platform systems. Platform personnel found the source of the leak and ented down the relevant flowline which instantly stopped the leak. Flowline and well isolated
from the process.
During making interfaces <…> failure in the F & G panel caused level 0 blow down. Blowdown occurred whilst attempting to rectify fault. Non ignited gas release. No
impact on <…>. No injured persons. Smells reported onshore. 1400kg gas. <…> investigating.
On <…> while attempting to blowdown the <…> installation it was noted that the riser valve, LD-ESD-30003, was passing.On <…> the valve was integrity tested and it
allowed a pressure of 89.5 barg in the downstream piping to rise to the pi eline pressure of 111.6 barg in about one minute. The top works of the riser valve LD-ESV-30003
were examined during an open-close cycle to investigate the possibility of the valve not closing properly. During the operation the keyway was correctly posi ioned in both the
open and closed positions confirming that the problem is within the valve. Interventions to the <…> installation have been suspended, with the exception of interventions
directly associated with the vlave, until further safety evalua ions have been performed.
During routine start up of the <…> platform the A crude oil transfer pump was started up. A sight glass on the B pump seal system common suction line failed and crude oil
was released onto the platform. The process was immediately shut down and measu es to contain the spillage implemented. The <…> which was alongside the <…> went to
precautionary muster which was stood down once the leak had been contained and area declared safe. An investigation is currently being undertaken by an dependently led
team which will submit a full report. The <…> is presently shut down until the investigation is complete.
On <…> as the <…> production module was being repressured following a planned shutdown a minor leak of condensate was observed from the plate heat exchanger on the
suction to the export pumps. After inspection of the leak it was decided to depr ssure the plant and repair the exchanger. The exchanger was leak tested satisfactorily and the
plant repressured ready to start the export compressor. At 06:30 on <…> a gas detector went in to alarm and an operator went to investigate. He reported a con ensate leak to
the control room from where the module was immediately blown down. A manufacturers representative has been mobilised to lomond and is currently inspecting the
exchanger.
Production Operator heard abnormal noise during outside duties on the <…> module. It was caused by a leaking door seal on the HP Filter vessel - It was localised but was
such that remedial action was necessary to limit release - The vessel was bypasse , isolated and vented to flare
During watch-keeping routines a fine mist of oil was noticed at the elbow (hairline crack) on c7 chemical injection line, just before the quill. Heavy seas (mean 8mtrs) and
vibration on c7 flow line assembly were noted at the time of failure.
A point gas detector came up with a low gas alarm at 1515. The CCR informed the area operator to check the metering skid. The operator found a HC leak in a tie in point for
a jet mixer (not yet installed). The tie in point, being a 4" line is a dead le . The pressure in the line is 24 Bar. The volume of released crude oil estimated to 5 litres.The CCR
advised the OIM and a Yellow Shutdown was initiated as the leak could not be isolated from the plant. All unessential personnel were moved out of the plant modules by
tannoys. The general alarm was not initiated. The leaking spool was then removed and the tie-in point blanked off by a blind flange. The inspection of the affected spool
revealed deep corrosion in the heat affected area of a weld. Thi pipework was installed 12 months ago.
During <…> the area operators smelt gas in module 4 mezz.. The investigation revealed a minor leak from the upstream joint on the PSV protecting the DE seal oil pot for
MOL pump A. It was decided to change to the standby MOL pump and repair he minor leak. Whilst in the process of changing the pumps, oil started to leak from the PSV
joint. The operator contacted the CCR immediately and shut down the plant by initiating a yellow s/d. During the pump changeover, the mechanical seal of the DE of the
MOL pump A malfunctioned and crude oil filled up the seal oil pot. The level transmitter did not close the outlet to LP flare. This pressure in the pot did not rise to the trip
level of the high level pressure switch protecting the pot and the CC never got an alarm. The crude oil filled the pot and the inlet pipe up to the PSV located at the mezz. Level
above. The crude then leaked through the upstream joint of the PSV. The incident was responded to immediately as the operators were alraedy in place as they were changing
to the standby pump. The pressure in the system was 22 Bar at the time of the incident.
The platform chemist was taking samples from individual xmas trees. While flushing through from the sample point to the closed drain to get a representative sample, he heard
a sound. He looked round and saw that oil and gas was being released from the ann lus closed drain line on A4 wellhead. He immediately shut the sample point and informed
CCR over the radio. The leak disappeared when he closed the flushing valve of the sample point to closed drain. When the operators arrived, they immediatel;y cleaned u the
released oil. No oil was spilt to sea.The reason for the spill was that oil flushed to the closed drain system from the sample point was back flushed through a loose instrument
fitting on the annulus drain connection from well A4 to closed drain.
First up, LAH in the LPP flare KO drum. On draining this vessel crude oil was found. PAH was then reported on both Glycol skids and the LLP flare KO drum, also LAHH on
the Produced Water Plate Separator Train 1, which had been commisioned earlier in the d y. The LLP drum was drained to the local open drain. (A proportion of the oil
draining went to sea due to the poor operation of this drain gully (approx 5 Lts)). On review of Produced Water System, the plate separator outlet valve was found to be
losed. Oil had filled this vessel and overflowed onto the LLP flare KO drum.
On <…> Power Generation Turbine a minor diesel jet leak occurred on combustion can 10 diesel supply line check valve. As a precaution the Fire team was mobilised while
the machine was changed over to Gas fuel thus depressurising the offending line. After removal the screwed connection on the check valve was found slack and abnle to be
tightened by approximately half a turn. The Turbine had been overhauled a week previously when the fuel nozzles and check valves had been renewed. <…> who supplied
and fitted the check valve were contacted and replied that they were satisfied that no leaks had been observed during the post inspection programme running checks. They also
state that check valves of the type installed are torqued in the factory to achieve the correct opening pressure. Thus our conclusion is that it was a quality control issue at <…>.
On <…> the machine had run all day on diesel fuel with a load of about 10 megawatts without leakage, but when the incident ccurred the load was 20 megawatts.All other
check valves on the machine were inspected and found ok. Three signs have been posted in the Turbine Control Room overlooking the Turbine Hall instructing those
responsible to check for leaks immediately a tu bine is fuelled by liquid.
During a routine inspection of topsides process pipework on the <…> platform prior to starting some planned maintenance activities, a minor gas leak was found by the
Platform Instrument Technician using a portable gas detector. The gas leak was locate to a "Hub" type joint on the well flowline on the North side of the mezzaine deck.
Wind speed at the time was 18 knots.
Normal production . Hydrocarbon Gas. No machinery. During routine production monitoring of gas processing area the Production Supervisor noted/heard sound of gas/air
escaping - subsequent inspection of the area revealed small pinhole type leak on a 1" e bowlet, location on the bend of 8" gas line to gas compression second stage discharge
scrubber. Process was immediately shut down. Subsequent NDT inspection showed no wall thinning of the gas line, the defect area showed original weld preparation had crea
ed minor raised area in the line of gas flow causing some turbulence of gas/liquid and subsequent area of erosion.
Normal production ongoing at the time of the incident. Whilst carrying out routine duties in the wellbay module, an operator detected a smell of gas. Further investigation
located a fine mist spray from a weld on a 1/2" chemical injection point on t3 prod ction flowline. The control room was informed and a controlled manual shutdown of the
well was carried out. This was followed by the depressurisation and isolation of the flowline. Normal operating pressure of the flowline is 62 bar. Initial investigation would
indicate a hairline crack in a weld.
Condensate booster pumps have been installled on the <…> platform to handle the production from the <…> platform. The <…> condensate is comingled with the <…>
platforms condensate and arrives at the riser platform via the <…> via the <…> pipeline. The combined condensate is routed across the bridge to the <…> platform through
the <…> booster pumps, back across the bridge and into the <…> pipeline. The main <…> booster pump process and drains pipework is totally segregated froem the <…>
process facilities. Maintenance work had been carried out on the <…> booster pump system necessitating the isolation and draing of the suction pipework. On completion of
the work and during the introduction of condensate into he system, the closed drains were overpressured. A gasket in a flanged connection on the drain line, which runs
through the process module, failed resulting in the release of condensate. This was detected by the fire and gas system and the ga sounded and ll personnel mustered. Platform
was manually shutdown, blowndown and the process module deluge activated. Root cause was a failure to adhere to procedures resulting in process valves not being in their
correct operating position.
During the 8000 hour service on train one gas leak was discovered on the reinjection compressor. Ne-c0310-3 the compressor package had been s/d and isolated as per the
amoex isolation procedures. No intrusive work was planned for either the gas compresso or re-injection compressor. The leak was found to be coming from the 3/4" cooling
gas return line flange (900~rtj) at the drive end of the re-injection compressor, where the pipe joins the compressor casing. The re-injection blowdown valve was opened to
epressure the compressor and the leak stopped. (the blowdown valve had been shut to prevent the possibility of backdrive should the inlet/outlet valves leak). It was noted that
the flanges were fitted with the incorrect bolts. The flange had studs fitted hich were double nutted instead of set bolts as per the specification. These bolts were also fitted in
the cooling gas return pipe flange at the non-drive end of the unit, although this was not leaking. Upon further inspection the thread of the bolts was lso put into question. This
was checked using a thread gauge and found to be 3/4' unc instead of 20mm as per the manufacturers drawing <…>. Although the threads are very similar in pitch, the bolt
diameter has a difference of .8 mm. The bolts fitted were found to be slack and not at the correct torque for this rating of flange. The correct bolts have been fitted to the
During routine monitoring of plant and machinery a smell of gas was detected by Chief Operator and Production Supervisor. Further investigation using portable gas detectors
revealed the source of the leak to be a 10" manual isolation valve (Valve 16) on he upstream side of the metering tube. (Operating pressure 165 Barg @ 60 deg C) on
removing the valve insulation the gas was identified as coming from the valve bonnet flange. The valve was isolated, depressurised and the leak stopped. Valve details - <…>
Environmental conditions:- Wind 10-12 kts at 180 deg. Temp - 15.3 deg Celsius. Sea state 0.5 Mt good visibility. On replacing sealing ring and gasket there was no obvious
evidence of the failure mode of the sealing arra gement. All bolts were found to be tight so the mechanism which caused the leak is unknown.
Normal operations ongoing - While performing an induction tour the medic reported to the control room an unusual smell at South side of intermediate process area. Pinhole
leak discovered from the bottom of a 1" pneumatic control valve. The valve isolated and leak stopped after approx 2 mins
<…> Platform is currently in Combined Operations with the <…>. Well <…> on the <…> platform was being brought into production for the first time when a hydrocarbon
leak occurred through a grease injection fitting on the xmas tree pr duction wing valve. The leak was detected by personnel observing the commissioning activities from a safe
area. The production wing valve was closed immediately and the xmas tree depressurised and made safe.
During water injection well <…> an hp flexible hose was connected between <…> and adjacent manifold to balance pressure over the valve on test. The 12mm connection
onto the du-bloc from the flexi-hose parted from the male connection on the du-bloc causi g the flexi-hose to whip back under pressure (system at 287 bar) striking the
operator involved in the work
During routine checks around Module 25 Pig Trap Area, a Production Operator noticed a small leak coming from the rear of a 2-inch drain line from the <…> Platform Pig
Receiver. He immediately isolated the Receiver from Hydrocarbon service.The <…> informed immediately by the onshift <…> Platform Production Supervisor.Spool piece
removed and repaired, and system re-instated.
During routine plant tour a small gas leak was observed at gas outlet from hp seperator (fa210) upstream of 02-plu-128a. The bypass around the control valve was opened and
the valves upstream and downstream of the control valve were closed to isolate the eak. A vessel shotdown is planned to remove the tailed spool. Work order raised to fabricate
new spool. Onshore facilities engineering to review failure to ensure suitability of replacement onshore facilities engineering to review inspection procedures an initiate survey
of similar gas pipework. Oir12 will be submitted.
A deck co-ordinator reported smell of gas at north west corner of the captruss at the flare gas let down skid. A check by an operator identified a pin-hole leak in a 3" gas line
from fuel gas heater skid to flare gas let down skid. Area of pin-hole leak located at a pipe support fixture. Production shut in as soon as possible.
At 8:20 on <…> a low gas alarm was indicated in module 11 gas compression module. The main control room operator alerted the outside operator to investigate the alarm. On
arrival at the nodule, the operator reported to the mcr that there was gas in t e module. The mcr operator alerted the production supervisor who went directly to module 11.
Meanwhile gas compressor gb 1101a had tripped. Gas was found to be coming from an instrument tubing line which had fractured. The instrument line was isolated and the
gas leak stopped. The gas which had been released into the module had caused various gas detectors to register gas concentrations in the range 0-18% lel. Only one detector
had exceeded the 20% lel threshold required for a low gas alarm. This detector ad peaked at 22% level. The gas in the module dissipated quickly via the forced ventilation
system. The instrument tubing was situated on the gas compressor gb1101a discharge side. This line operates at approx 20 barg. The fracture of the tubing was most ikely
caused by vibration induced fatigue. The instrument line was remade and the compressor brought back on line. An estimate of the amount of gas released into the module was
made based on the proportion of the module affected and the gas concentrations experienced. On the basis it is estimated that the order of 11kg of gas was released. The
Mod 11 - fatigue failure on gb1101 a gas comp. - crack on weldolet on discharge spool. Causing small gas leak. Discovered by operator using gas monitor. Machine shutdown
& isolated, spool removed for repair.
During routine inspection by area operator. A weld fracture was noticed on gas compressor GB1101A suction damper. The machine was shut down and isolated, and the suction
damper removed for repair.
On a routine inspection in the area of GA0392 LPG P/P's a smell of gas was noted. On closer inspection a small leak was discovered on a weld, discharge side of GA0392S.
Removal of lagging identified a cracked weld. Loss of containment was small and therfo e not detected by fixed gas detection. Failure was dicovered by routine check in the
area by plant operator.
While rigging up chicksan bleed down lines to the low pressure (0.5 - 1 bar) closed drain system (mod 4 west wellhead area), it was found that the isolation valve on the closed
drain system was seized; no movement was possible. It was assumed that the is lation valve was in the closed position and the manifold blanking cap removed to facilitate the
connection of a 1" flexible hose whose end was disconnected to allow pressure testing. Over a period of approx 10 minutes, a small volume of gas back flowed f om the drain
system. Along the 1" line and into mod 4. This was detected as two gas heads as a low level release. The open end of the 1" line was immediately reconnected to the rest of the
chicksan bleed down lines and isolated using lo torc valves. The control room was then contacted and the platform brought back to normal status within 3 minutes of
detection.
A 1" drain line connected to a 1" drain valve (attached to a 3" ngl line) failed at the neck of a weld neck flange. Failure resulted in uncontrolled release of ngls from vessel @
38 barg into module no. 5.
At 08:15 'C' compressor tripped on seal high pressure from the 2nd stage drive end seal. Because of the wear on the seals it is necessary to crack open the drain until the
compressor starts. When the compressor restarted sufficient gas came out of the d ain to trip a gas head. It was a very still day. The general platform alarm sounded and the
whole crew went to muster.
Normal production operations ongoing at the time.Environmental conditions Wind 8 to 10knots at 270deg. Sea 1mtr. Visibility 8-10 miles some rain. While under normal
operations a low (20%) gas alarm activated in the CCR. On investigation by the produ tion staff it was observed that gas was escaping from a crack in one of the instrument
impulse lines associated with the turbine driven gas compressor. The machine was shutdown and de-pressured. Investigation is underway.
Half inch inpulse line connected to a well head sheared due to well movement.a gas detector picked up a release the platform was shut in remotely from rn. An intervention
crew flew to platform understock repairs.
I was on the cellar deck of <…> platform by condensate pump a when low oil level was reported by contro room. Level was 50%. Within 4 ft of pump the seal popped &
condensate began to spray out of the pump. The xzv to the suction of the pump was within 6 ft & i stepped straight to it and closed the valve the approximate loss of
condensate to the deck was 20 gallons which was washed down to hazordous drains immediately
On <…> personnel were onboard the <…> carrying out various activities including opening up of vessels, which had been previously purged & flushed, for internal
inspection. The crew included the OIM who is a substansive <…> and 2 production techhicians. <…> were working on opening up Production Separator 'A' on the <…>
cellar deck. Due to the condition of the bolts a grinder was being used. Regular hosing down of the immediate area had been taking place as the work progressed to keep the
area clear of any oil, debris etc. The production separator is on a skid which forms a "bund" with grating over part of the area and this was also hosed down frequently. At
approx 1650 hrs a small fire & smoke was noticed. Dry po der extinguishers were used and adjacent fire hoses were deployed by the mechanical technicians who were
working in the area. (Note: these Technicians are also Response Team members). Also the contract SO who was on the platform with the team assisted. The OIM co-
ordinated activities and manually initiated the deluge at the skid. The alarm was initiated and personnel mustered. The OIM made the necessary all stations call and began
accounting for the POB assisted by the contract SO and also utilised th normal communications in the event of a muster. The <…> Incident Control Room was manned and
On pulling coiled tubing to surface (well i2) an escape of hydrocarbons was detected at injector head. <…> electronic depth counter registered 330 feet of coil remaining in
hole. Pipe was immediately run back in hole (approx 3-4 ft), sealing on stripp r and stopping hydrocarbon release. Release of hydrocarbons set off platform low level gas
alarms initiating a g.p.a. swab valve mumv and scssv were closed and pressure above humv vented to to closed drains drains injector was disconnected from riser and coiled
tubing bottom hole assembly (8.3" in length) was found to have been pulled off at slip connector.
Two mechanics were preparing to remove an nrv from a gas link from the 3rd stage sep. They had slackened off all the studs but while they slackened off the last one, they
heard pressure being released and smelt gas. They then re-tightened the studs to a rest the leak. The line immediately downstream of the nrv was subsequently found to have 2
bar of residual pressure in it.
The platform general alarm was activated by 2 low level gas detectors coming into alarm in the area of the lp flare k.o. vessel. Investigation showed that nitrogen foam in this
vessel, to allow it to be spaded, had collapsed. This allowed vapour from res dual liquids in in the vessel and pipework to escape through an open nozzle on top of the vessel
which was being used as a vent.
The platform was under its annual shutdown. Gas was detected at low level alarm in the area of the esdv enclosure. <…> platform south. On investigation by the prod. Supv.,
A leak was found on pressure instrumetation for the gas export riser. This leak as isolated and repaired. A further leak was also subsequently found at the gland of the gas
export sdv 11156. The export riser has been depressurised and plans are in place to repair this.
A hydrocarbon gas release occurred when a 1/2" <…> compression fitting failed within the gas enclosure house on the gas metering system. The event leading to the incident
occurred during the de-isolation of metering stream one, the weather condition at the time were fair (25 knot northerly wind). The gas release into the metering house was
contained and no personnel were in the enclosure at the time. Initial investigation revealed a defective fitting on the vent line from the gas analyser system to LP flare.
During shift checks, the Operations Technician noticed a smell of hydrocarbon in the PD proces area. On further investigations, he noticed a small leak from the underside
body of methanol plug valve PD-CMPL-1671 on the methanol skid manifold system was p essurized. Effective double blocks and bleeds were intiated to isolate and
depressurize the faulty valve. The faulty valve was removed and the flange faces blanked.
A fuel gas leak occurred on the body bleed of the pilot regulator on the fisher 31032 fuel gas regulator for g8020 main generator. The gas detection system in the fuel gas
cabinet detected a high level of gas, tripped and shutdown the machine.
A night shift production operator noticed a small pool of oily water on the deck of process module 4. The source was traced to a pinhole leak on a 6" low pressure line which
returns oily water from skimmed oil tank below deck back into the 2nd stage sepa ator in the module above. The section of pipework was promptly isolated by the operations
technicians and the leak assessed by platform management. The leak was clamped and the line was subsequently returned to service. The complete line section is curren ly
being assessed by inspection technicians and an early assessment will be taken on spool replacement.
Pin hole leakage in 6" produced water outlet, downstream of lcv 2219b, suspected internal corrosion, erosion. The leak, a very small spray of produced water was not of
sufficient size to activate the automatic gas detection system, the spray was noticed y a passing operator. Propriety clamp fitted over the leak. Repair order raised to replace
pipe spool.
The turbine was being re-commissioned following a planned shutdown and the utilities operator was on site to de-isolate the gas supply. The reintroduction of the gas supply
immediately triggered gas detection inside the turbine enclosure. This in turn aut matically activated the general alarm and personnel went to muster. The operator was able to
isolate the supply before going to muster. The situation was monitored by the emergency response team and nobody was committed into the module until gas levels ha
declined to normal levels (which occurred with 15 minutes). Personnel were stood down after the turbine was checked out and confirmed safe.
Halon release in module 8 following detection of gas by beam detector during spading operation on closed drain system on a1 separator. Whilst carrying out a full isolation of
the a1 separator the first positive isolation to be put in place was a spade in he live closed drain system. During the insertion of the spade one of the gas detectors which had
not been inhibited detected over 60% lel of gas shutting down production and discharging 17 halon spheres. Halon spheres reinstated prior to restarting productext_line.
Investigation.tion. Investigation commenced.
A gas release was visually detected coming from the choke bonnet on well <…> by well services personnel working in the vicinity. The well was closed-in at the time. The
control room were notified straight away and immediate action was taken to isolate t e leak. The size of the leak, coupled with the wind and weather conditions were not
significant enough to initiate the f&g detection in the module.
In investigating a suspected gas mod valve problem during turbine commissioning, and with the turbine shutdown but still live to gas, the mod valve was stroked which
resulted in the injection of a set quantity of gas into the turbine, which, being unignit d, percolated through the machine and into the enclosure susequently setting off the gas
detection and initiating a platform general alarm and muster.
The Fire and Gas system detected low levels of gas in process module 7. As the gas leak could not be traced to any equipment in the module itself, further investigation
centered on the void spaces between adjacent modules. These checks revealed a leak i the drains system pipework where it crossed the void space. A controlled plant
shutdown was immediately instigated.Gas levels were monitored throughout but did not increase further. When plant was confirmed as fully shutdown, module was ventilated
unt l gas levels were reduced to zero. Repair options are presently being examined.
Discovered gas/liquid leak on well1 flowline flange downstream of choke valve. Well closed in ~ flange gasket replaced and retightened - re-pressured and gas tested ok.
On visit to platform discovered gas & condensate once again leaking from hub flange on well1 flowline. Pipe misalignment suspected ~ well shut in and flowline depressured
to allow for new pipe spool to be fabricated and installed.
The sprinkler system in accommodation module n4 was isolated and drained down in order to change frangible bulbs which had been reported as having a slight leak. On
completion of the bulb changeout the system was reinstated and refilled. At this time it w s noted that the pipework was becoming very hot. Cables in the accommodation were
evacuated in case frangible bulbs should burst and release hot water. A short time later a bulb burst in one of the cabins. The platform alert was sounded and all persons mu
tered and were accounted for. The source of the problem was found to be a faulty thermostat which controlled the immersion heater in the sprinkler water header tank nq-v-
3901. This heater is provided to prevent freezing of water within the header tank. Th thermostat had failed in the 'on' position causing the water in the tank to overheat.
Modifications to the system are being investigated.
When the test separator was de-isolated on completeion of internal works and closing up it was filled up with water to carry out a final leak test. At this point the level
neucleonics were assumed to be still isolated. However a level indication was obser ed in the CCR from LX 1302
A radioactive source was returned from offshore by supply boat. The source was not removed from the container at <…> and the container was sent to poa but not unloaded.
The container was sent from the <…> back to <…> where the source was discovered three days later. The source was in its dedicated container. No personnel were exposed to
radiation.
Repair work to the ESD valve on the <…> 12" re-injection pipeline at <…> required a pig with a radioactive source to be inserted into the line prior to the valve being welded
back into place. The <…> placed the source into the pig and the p g was inserted into the line by the Synetix RPS and two scaffolders. Once the pig was inserted the <…>
carried out radiation level measurements around the area and recorded a reading of 15 micro sieverts per hour. The area was contained within a habitat. A reading taken the
following day revealed radiation levels of 50 micro sieverts per hour. Lead sheets were placed on the pipe and a barrier erected. Further measurements recorded levels of 1-2
micro sieverts per hour at the barrier ten inches from the pipe.Possible radiation doses have been calculated and demonstrate that they were not sufficient to cause harm to
health. This was confirmed by the <…>.
Radiation source would not re-enter its container after an exposure.contingency measures required to remedy the situation.
Down hole communication was discovered via routine annulus pressure monitoring when there was a significant change in pressure. Well was shut in on <...>,sssv shut and
tubing bled.pressure remained constant indicating probable leak below sssv.hse in <...> (<...>)informed <...> @ 15:40 who stated no need for written report.straddle fitted <...>
to rectify problem.
Whilst monitoring the well for down hole losses over the trip tank the well was observed to flow at estimated 5 bbl/h. The bop was closed on the upper variable rams. No
pressure build up was seen at that time. After 10-1/2 hours and commencement of pumpin . A pressure of 100 psi was seen on the drill pipe. Attempted to circulate out influx
conventionally but induced downhole losses. Drillpipe circulated to 640 psi/ft mud by tht time. Bullheaded annulus contents and lcm to the loss zone. Final dp and annu us
contents and loss zone. Final dp and annulus pressures = zero. Static downhole losses=75 bbl/h
Whist running in hole at 4361 ft the well (ba05) was observed to be flowing. Closed in well on hydril & monitored build up = 140 psi
Rih check trip assembly in well <...>. Last circ <...> @ <...>. Since then a rft had been run [tubing conveyed logging]. Subsequently ops were suspended to carry out derrick
insp [<...>] when circulating @ 11997 ft returns were observed to be err tic and gas cut. Detected level increased in active system. Closed in well on annular preventer:
attempted to establish circulation over choke. Brought up pump slowly to 40 spm. No returns, pumped a total of 50 bbls closed in well on choke. Monitored pres ure build-up.
Opened up well, monitored over trip tank. Filled up well with 630 ft pptf mud. Initial loss rate 100 bbls/hr decreasing to 25 bbls/hr. Sus- pect loss zone @ 12,325 ft [low
pressure sand]. Total losses 140 bbls. Closed in well on annular prev nter, due to limited active mud volume. Build lcm pill and mud. Meanwhile monitored pressure, no build-
up opened up well, filled up with 27 bbls mud. Monitored well static post event analysis: suspect gain caused by bringing up trip gas [rft run] from hor zontal section. Losses
induced while attempting to establish circulation. At no time over balance primary control was lost. Plan ahead: pooh inside 13 5/8" casing shoe off load mud [wow for boat
handling] rih to 12 1/4" sec td [in stages, condition mud] a td, circulate hole clean. Pooh run 9 5/8" casing
<Minor> perf. 9 5/8" csg over new prodn. Zone. Displace to kill wt brine and flow check. Took 5 bbl gain and shut in. 1st circ. Of drillers method showed no hc's but still
200psi sidpp. After several circulations and flow checks well is seen to flow @ 2bbl per hour, suspect supercharged formation. Further circ. Showed 2bbl gain. Shut in well
and monitored pressure increases. Sample a bled at choke confirmed gas. Killed well with driller method & kill wt brine (580pptf).
While pulling out of the hole the well was observed to flow and closed in with blow-out preventers. Two barrels gained, 20 psi on choke, 0 psi on drill pipe. Choke stabilised at
60 psi after 1 hour, the drill pipe remained at 0 psi. Circulated out a small volume of gas using driller's method. Observed and verified well static.
Drilling 8-1/2" hole at 10216 ft, no drilling break, increase in return mud flow noted (flosho) increased from 27% to 32%). Pick up 30' and flow check. Well appeared to be
flowing. Bubbles in mud at bell nipple plus smell of gas noted (no gas detected on as pack, platform gas detectors or hand held monitor). Close in with pipe rams, pdp 50 psi,
pann 50 psi increasing to 60 psi. Stable after 5 min. No pit gain seen
Whilst pressuring up for a routine bop test on <…> the wellhead standby man heard a loud bang followed by a release of water. A riser spool tie-down screw from <…> was
found on the deck some 3m from the wellhead. The adjacent well <…> access p atform was distorted from a high pressure impact with the associated steelwork indicating 3
impact points before the tie-down bolt release, the bop hydro-test pressure was at 4200 psi and <…> had the 5.1/2" x 7" liner installed awaiting pressure test.
Whilst checking for pressure on a annulus on <…> after cutting tubing with 4s explosive tool. Opened bleeder plug at manifold and found gas to be present. Closed off bleeder
plug to discuss way ahead and shortly afterwards noted that the bleeder plug had started leaking. The supervisor isolated same at manifold, stopping leak, and whilst on his
way to inform control room, the platform changed status on co-incident low level gas. Leak was noted from noise rather than smell. A gas sample taken for analysi as well was
in abandonment stage with completion isolated from reservoir by deep set cement plug and packer.
<…> drilling operations ongoing. Phase 8 1/2"-actual td: 7,394m while tripping out of hole a gain of 2m3 observed. String run back at 7060m where another gain of 3m3
noticed. Well shut-in. Casing pressure recorded at 460psi. Hydrocarbon influx circu ated out using w&w method (obm sg: 1.80 to 1.84). Well found to be static after
circulating.
D22 is a pre-perforated well with the perforations isolated by a deep set packer & plug whilst running completion. When displacing above the packer to seawater, the
underbalance caused the barrier to fail with subsequent influx of hydrocarbons & release a surface gas. Bop actuated & kill procedures implemented (w/w method). Platform
was mustered & all non-essential personnel were transferred to the <…>. Well kill complete within 24 hours
Drilling operations had just stated circulating e10 well. When gas from the shale shakers led to coincident gas detection, and as a result, a level 3 shutdown. The tree had been
removed,riser nippled up and the tubing hanger released.40' of tubing had b en unstung from the pbr. Circulating had commenced at 50gpm/1400psi.30bbls had been pumped
when gas appeared at the shale shakers.the returns were routed via the poorboy degasser.at no time was control of the well lost.
Well e10 was being prepared for the setting of cement plugs, above perforations. A cement stinger had been run in hole to 14500' and circulation commenced. Prior to bottoms
up, circulation was stopped and a flow check carried out. The well was static w th no signs of gas. Circulation restarted and immediately two gas detectors on the drill floor
went into alarm, causing automatic production shutdown. The annular preventer was closed and circulation stopped. Gas levels receded. At no time was there lo s of control
on the well.
<…> well 1.1 had been drilled to td @ 3703m, a wiper trip had been carried out with no indication of problems hole fill or condition. Whilst pulling the bit up into the
completion tailpipe a 10bbl mud loss was observed downhole between 1520 & 15 5hrs. The well was flowchecked until 15.55hrs. And was stable. Circulation was commenced
at 16.07hrs. And 4 minutes later water based mud and oil were ejected onto the drill floor. The driller reacted quickly and shut the well in via the annular preventer about 2bbls
of mud/oil fell to the bop deck and activated low gas detectors in well compartments 1 and 2. The cause is currently presumed to be the failure of the production packer at
2975m, allowing mud to u-tube into the completeion annulus. In turn th s has allowed the oil from the sump beneath the packer to be forced into the tubing through the gas lift
mandril orifice valve. Weather conditions at the time were:- mild, overcast and calm.
Gas lift well underwent routine safety valve testing. Tubing retrievable safety valve tested fine. Annular valve does not close. Will be attewmpt to cycle valve further. Chemical
wash planned as means of removing debris possibly fouling intl. Valve mechan sm. Failing these efforts, annulus will be depressured of gas and filled with water, well
produced under natural flow. Well currently shut in.
After successful scale milling operations on a7, coil tubing op. Opened circulation sub as instructed. While running back near to bottom for final clean up, coil tubing suddenly
stopped passing through bop or stripper section and coil tubing fractured ab ve stripper.3000 psi in coil jumped to 5100 psi then was released through fracture. <…> it was
identified cause was a mechanical failure in injecture head. Coil tubing operations to descale well a7
In preparing a4 well for work over drilling were circulating fluid to replace the fluid in the well and remove the gas cap. While lubricating out pressure from a4 well the
contaminated kill fluid emerged from the secondary gas vent 30' above the rig, impa t deck, well bay and into the sea. Estimated amount into the sea is 100 litres of kill fluid -
oil content unknown at this time. Wind 16 knots, 185 degrees. Sea state 3 - 2.6 metres, swell direction 230 degrees. Overcast with showers.
<...> - Mud weight reduced from 11.5 to 11.3 ppg - Pooh - test BOP - RIH approx 600ft BHA well seen to be flowing - well shut in 200psi casing pressure and 140 bbls influx -
strip to 13390 ft packed off - pull back to 12267 ft (7" liner set at 11924 t and kill well with 11.7 ppg. Forward plan to Pooh - install low torque subs - RIH to bottom -
circulate out remaining influx and continue drilling. Investigation team flown out to establish root causes of incident. Executive to follow up incident with office inspection of
investigation findings.
<...> A - Background <...> drilled to depth of 14085feet,, 4 1/2" liner set & cem, cleaned out & displ. To 11.8ppg comp. Brine. First set of perf. Guns deton. Prematurely
while running in hole, perf. 7" liner.8 days spent restoring well to poi t where perf. Guns could be rerun. Platform shut down was instigated on <...>. In prep. For press.
Test.<...> to <...> pipeline. Over the course of the 8 days there would have been a build up the reservoir press. Due to a) no reservoir drawdown in the s rrounding area, all
wells being closed in and b) op req'd that one water inj. Pump remain online to maintain a load on turbine It has been estimated that these two effects could have inc.reservoir
pressure by approx. 200 psi (equivalent to 0.6 ppg increa e). Event - drill pipe conveyed perf. Guns run in hole, set on depth and fired by applying pressure to the drill pipe.
100 psi applied pressure was left on the well to confirm detonation. The guns fired, loss of press. Noted, the annular was opened and t e well flow checked. Flow check to the
trip tank confirmed the well was flowing (10bbls flowed back) and was shut in at 08.00 hrs <...>. Drill pipe/annulus press. Built up to 100/125 psi respectively over course of
1 hour.Subs. Actions - well was c rc. Using the drillers method. 97 barrels of contaminated brine at 11.4ppg circ. Out. This equates to an influx of 12bbls of s'water into
<...> - Well <...> located on the <...> satellite platform was completed on <...> and then suspended. On <...> the well was being inspected due to injection problems when
pressure was observed on the gauge that monitors the void between the tubing han ar plugs. The pressure was bled off but continued at 100psi/min. A safety review has been
carried out which concluded that the pressure rise is caused by a failure of the lower tubing hangar plug. The well currently has two satisfactorily tested barrie s. The upper
tubing hangar plug and the tree cap.
<...> Field - Small gas leak dectected during routine ROV survey of F1 subsea wellhead. Subsequent investigation and testing indicates a leak from the 9-5/8" gas lift annulus
leaking to the sea via the conductor/20" casing annulus. Leak rate approx 2-3 l/min at sea bed conditions.See attacement for more detail :1) Minutes of meeting 2) Non-
standard operations risk assessment 3) Monitoring instructions
<...> Platform - GAP at Shaker house. 430psi on drill pipe and casing. Circulated out through choke. Maximum 50% LEL <...> Gas kick, circulated out. Mud weight increased.
Drilling resumed
<...> - Incident - Well Kick Well Control Operations - Stripping into well <...> Incident - Well Control Operations - Off Bottom Well Control 7<...> See well file for additional
information.
<...> - Influx (kick) during liner inflow test
<...> Platform well number <...> While circulating bottoms up for a geological sample, the drillier notified fluctuations on the returns with break out of gas, whcih initiated
low levels of gas on the fire and gas panel in the CCR. The spaced out nd shut in the well. He circulated the well with 14.7 ppg mud to kill the well. The BOP Hydril was used
to shut in the well and allow circulation of the gas through the drilling choke and poorboy.
<...> - Description of events leading to Operation of BOP Equipment t 0045 hours on <...>, during A32 completion operations, the annular preventer was closed following an
influx of 8 bbls of hydrocarbons into the well bore. Background Compl tion tubing was run with 10.8 ppg nacl/Kcl brine in the well. A fluid loss control device (KOIV), which
is used to maintain a column of fluid in the well while running the top hole completion, was deliberately broken to facilitate future logging and stimu ation operations. The
well went on losses in excess of 200 bph. The fluid weight was reduced in stages from 10.8 ppg to 9.5 ppg in order to control the losses to a manageable rate. The well was
monitored, found to be static then took an influx of 8 bbls. Action Taken The annular preventer was closed and <...> Well Control Procedures followed. Kill weight brine (10.3
ppg) was bullheaded down the tubing x 10-3/4" casing annulus and the completion seal assembly stung into the packer bore. The well is now nder control and the annular
preventer has been opened. Currently proceeding with planned operations
<...> - Loss of power (hydraulic) from <...> unit. No gas release. The Packer seal failed resulting in the loss of hydraulic oil from the <...> Unit (BOP Control) The hydraulic
oil was lost into the Petro Free (ester based) mud. This failure rendere the Blow Out Preventer system from having an energy source (Hydraulic Power) The system was Shut
Down - the hydraulic oil replenished and the well closed in. No environmental discharge occurred. The Overshot packer on the riser (Bell Nipple) is above the BOP stack - its
present function is to control mud containment while tripping. Well Number : <...>.
<...> - As a result of a PM by <...> it was established that the Hydraulic Master, The Lower Master xmas tree valves and the Deep-set injection valve on well M3 were
defective. While trying to obtain a second isolation barrier to allow w reline operations to rig up, the stem of the lower master valve broke, leaving the valve in the closed
position. A programme was initiated for a <...> Gate Valve milling unit (hot tap machine) to mill/drill through the lower master valve to allow ac ess to the well bore, so it
could be plugged and the defective xmas tree removed (see attached procedure). Whilst attempting to complete this operation the shaft of the milling tool broke. The two sets
of safety seals and the hydraulic stuffing box of the equipment ensured the shaft remained in place and there was no loss of containment from the well. Subsequently the mill
shaft could not be removed and the valves on the xmas tree could not be closed. Contingency 1 (well kill) as detailed in the well inter ention programme was immediately
instigated to kill the well. (Fluid pump/brine tank and chick-san had been previously installed for this eventually). Once this operation was completed liquid N2 was used and
an ice plug was created in the well bore, this llowed the defective xmas tree to be removed and replaced with another. All the operations were completely under control and at
<...> - After milling the 7" packer and slowly POOH to 11169' (7657' TVD and 1567' AH above 7" liner) The viscous mud started to swab. The well had previously been flow
checked for 2 hours. The packer was then RIH to 12481'. After circulating an conditioning the mud to 0.650 psi/ft mud and influx was detected. The influx was circulated out
and the mud weight increased to 0.680 psi/ft. The reservoir pressure was significantly higher than predicted.
<...>. When drilling at 12481' AH(9442'TVDBDF) a 16bbl influx of water (plus a small amount of gas) was closed in. The mud weight was increased from .630 to .670psi/ft.
The well was killed by the wait and weight method. The supporting water in ection well has been closed in and the intention is to drill ahead to td at /- 13000' hole size 8.5".
SIDPP=390 psi, SICP=530psi. <...>.
Kick occurred on <...>. 10 Barrel Influx. Closed BOP's. Circulated 10 Barrels. OIR 9b to follow. Well Number <...>. After drilling to TD at 13160ft, the hole was circulated
clean. After shutting down the pumps and flow checking, the we l was observed to be flowing. It was subsequently closed in and approximately 10 bbls influx was recorded,
with a SIDPP 0psi and SICP 150 psi. No swabbing had occurred, but ther mud weightwas being controlled from 685 back to 680pptf. It is probable that ome lighter fluid
(than desired) had ended up in the annulus at the time the pumps were shut down. This light fluid, added to the loss of ECD and the 'cleaned up' annulus (ie lightened further),
caused the annulus to kick. However the mud weight in the dr ll pipe remained at 680pptf and thus no SIDPP was seen. The kick was circulated out using the driller's method
(as for swabbed kicks). The well was killed at 40 spm with an additional 100 psi back pressure being held over the formation.
<...> - Drilling of <...> had encountered severe losses whilst drilling the <...> formation. These losses had continued througout the section, including the reservoir formations.
During drilling 8-1/2" hole through the <...> reservoir at 15 406ft, with losses at approximately 380bbls per hour. 45% LEL gas was detected by the hand held gas meters in the
mud treatment skid (no indication on fixed detection). Due to severe losses, no increase in the return mud flow or pits levels was observed. he drill string was picked 25ft off
bottom and the well shut in with the annular preventor. Pdp 700 psi, Pann 390 psi. Pressure rose to Pdp 870 psi, Pann 530 psi. Stable after 15mins.
<...> - Sand injection was being carried out on Well <...> Xmas Tree in order to calibrate the flowline sand detectors. Whilst openeing the swab valve to allow the sand
injection to commence, gas started to leak from around the swab cap threads. The well was flowing steadily at the time of the event and the sand injection exercise was being
monitored locally by operating technicians. Action taken:- 1) Swab valve closed manually by those on site 2) Xmas tree closed in from CCR and system depressur d to enable
examination of swab cap seal. 3) Seal removed and inspected, found to be split in two horizontally at one part of its circumference, and partially split at the other. 4)New seal
installed and pressure tested. Well brought back on line for ompleteion of sand trials. 5) Damaged "O" ring to be sent ashore for further inspection. Suspect gas ingress into
the elastomer causing explosive decompression when depressured after leak testing. Requires confirmation.
<...> is a perforated well . With the perforations isolated by a deep set packer and plug whilst running completion. Whilst displacing the hole from mud to brine above the
packer a small flow from the well bore was noticed. The BOP upper pipe rams ere closed and well monitored. Kill mud was introduced using W/W method. It is assumed that
there has been some form of failure of the Baker retrievable packer. The packer remains in the hole and the well temporarily suspended with cement plugs for other operational
reasons Well number <...>.
<...> - Pressure up Xmas Tree to N/up BOP stack. Observed slight traces of 1.32 brine leaking from BPV. "Leak" of BPV means loss of one (of 2) safety barriers. Second
barrier is 1.32 brine. Action Taken: Carry on N/up BOP stack. RIH with hanger re rieving tool on DP secured with a Kelly valve to re-establish continuity, pressure test BOP
body and riser connections and provide second tubing barrier.
Well <...> - Drift runs were being carried out on well <...> from the south rig on <...>. On two separate occasions a leak was observed at the stuffing box. This necessitated the
closure of the top set of BOP's and the bleeding off of pres ure in the lubricator to atmosphere. After both leaks, the stuffing box packings were changed out. Stuffing box and
packings have been sent onshore for inspection.
<...> - A <...> elbow failed on the <...> BOP accumulator. This accumulator is designed to store a reserve of pressurised hydraulic oil which is an independant form of power to
operate the Blow Out Preventers. One of the two seals in a <...> elbow failed. This elbow is positioned in the main hydraulic high pressure supply line. When it failed the
pressurised contents of the 20 accumulator bottles vented their stored hydraulic energy through the leak to the <...> room. The spilt hydraulic oil, 180 galons, covered the floor
of the <...> room. None escaped down the drains in this room as they were plugged. There is a 3" lip sill on the door which acts as a bund. The spilt hydraulic oil was cleaned
up. However, a small hole in the door sill allowed a few gallons of oil to leak out of the <...> room and onto the deck outside. One to two gallons of this oil managed to fall
into the deluge drain before it was cleaned up. The deluge drain drains directly into the sea below, where this oil fell. The failure occured while a new 12 1/4" bit and Bottom
Hole Assembly were being run into a new string of 13 3/8" casing. The casing had not been drilled out and was a tested pressure barrier.
The spot hired supply boat <...> was along the west side of <...> and preparation for the lift of a process vessel to the platform weather deck was ongoing. The seaman's thumb
was somehow caught by some part of the hook or the pennant eye just ab ve. Detailed circumstances are unclear at this stage of the investigation. The seaman sustained an
open fracture of the distal phalanx of his right thumb (almost complete detachment).
During the installation of <...> actuator on <...>, problems arose locating the actuator on the keyed stem. The work party then decided to rock the actuator back and forth to aid
installation. The actuator was suspended from a chain block and lif ing plate - the hook from the chain block dislodged resulting in the <...> actuator and lifting plate to fall
approx 5ft on to the deck. The IP received a glancing blow from the actuator on the outside of his left ankle. IP was treated for bruising how ver, no improvement was
observed in his injury and consequently IP was Medivaced. X-rays showed that his ankle was broken.
The injured party's foot was trapped under a wooden spreader beam (deployed to separate individual rows of horizontal completion tubulars). After the crane dropped the
weight off the tubular bundle, the change in weight distribution caused the wooden spre der beam to move downwards, trapped the man's foot, causing the injury.
While in the process of pulling out of the hole with the casing cutter assembly,the stand was set in the slips, broken & spun out. The mud bucket was placed around pipe to
allow the fluid to drain. The stand kicked off the joints in the slips and sprung t ward the i.p. lifing him up & pushing the i.p. out of the v-door. The i.p. came to rest against the
pipe on the catwalk.
Whilst securing coolers following a cleaning operation, an overhead right angled bracket supporting an inertia reel tool balancer rotated through 180 deg. The carabiner,
securing the tool balancer to the bracket, somehow released itself causing the tool b lancer to fall and strike the inured person on the safety hat, neck and shoulder. The
incident investigation is not yet complete.
At approx 11:15,whilst offloading and backloading the <…> the intention was to lift a 40' basket of screens from the deck of the boat, to the pipe deck of the platform. The
crane operator lowered the 30ft pennant which caught up on the lifti g bridle stowed within an adjacent basket, recently backloaded, and now lying to port (platform west) of
the "intended lift". Two deck hands attempted to disentangle the hook from the bridle of the basket before signalling the crane operator to "pick up". as the crane operator
began to "pick up" on the line, the hook swung to starboard (platform east) and the open hook caught under the edge of the 40' basket. As the crane operator "picked up" on the
line, the vessel also heaved resulting in a proportion of the basket weight being taken by the pennant. This caused the basket to pivot and move to port, trapping one of the deck
crew between the two baskets. Weather at the time: wind 245 deg t x 30 kts, sea max 2.5 metres, vis 8 nautical miles and fair. The pen ant and hook assembly involved was
taken out of service immediately and a full investigation is being conducted.
A team were dismantling flowlines in the wellhead area. <…> was the supervisor in charge. The work was being carried out from a purpose-built scaffold. Chain blocks, beam
clamps & slings were used to assist in handling spools & fittings as they were lowered onto the scaffold. <…> was assisting by manoevering a tee-piece which was resting
on the scaffold & held up by a chain block. As he did so, the centre of gravity shiftef & the tee piece rolled over & around onto his right foot. The weight of the tee piece is
approx 150lb. He was 11 days into a 14 day offshore tour. He reported to a medic for examination & whilst there was bruising/swelling to the foot there was no indication of
boney injury. Having completed his 14 days offshore, h went home where an X-Ray showed a fractured bone in his right foot.
Burns to hands and head injuries due to being thrown back. 0835 - Medivac to <...>.
The accident happened during the recertification of the PSV (PSV 1415). After a routine pre-test of the valve, the test rig was blown down in preparation for the disassembly
of the valve. Because the design of the valve, gas pressure remains in the dome of the main valve. The injured party began to undo the instrument tube fitting which is
connected to the valve dome. The tube then blew out of the fitting and struck the individual on his left hand. <…> was treated at <…> Hospital where he was retained for two
days.
The IP was working on BOP/SHALE SHAKER carrying out general duties. Activity being carried out at the time was drilling and the sustance being used was Oil Based Mud.
The IP went to the Shaker Area to relieve the Shaker Hand for approx. 15 mins. At 12:00 hrs IP reported to the Medic complaining of breathing problems. He was treated by
the platform medic & then after consultation with the onshore doctor was med-rescued by Coast guard Helicopter This incident is still under investigation, report number : <…
> Weather - wind 268 degrees - 24 knots. Rain & Misty. 3rd day of Tour - 5.5 hours into shift
The ip was inspecting the end of the joint of a pipe, suspended by an elevator link tilt, prior to it going into the hole. In preparation, the the next length of pipe was raised (by
using a tugger) from the pipe deck catwalk, through the 'v' door. The lea ing end of this pipe impacted on the pipe being examined and it was pushed toward the ip. It hit him
and knocked off his helmet. The ip continued working and only reported his injury to the medic several hours after going offshift. He worked his normal fi ld break the day
after that. The instruction for this type of operation has been amended to ensure that only one joint is suspected on the rig at any one time.
When assisting with drilling operations on the north rig floor, ip (roughneck) trapped his finger between the elevators and bails. Prior to the work commencing the driller had
given a <...> to the crew.
During drilling operations on <...>floor for Well <...>, injured party's little finger on his left hand became trapped between the make up and break out rig tongs. Safety
awareness for this type of incident has been reinforced through tbt's an the re-emphasis of the RA which was already in place.
Laying out 5" drillpipe from hole using pipe elevators. Wind direction 225 degrees. Wind speed 10-12 knots. No adverse weather. The drill pipe elevators link tilt lock dogs
were secured in the open position to allow the link tilt to fully extend to positi n the drill pipe elevators at the drill floor mouse hole. The securing rope had gradually slackened
off to a point where the lock dogs partially engaged the link tilt. When the single stand of drill pipe was lowered into the mouse hole the link tilt only xtended to mid position.
When the elevators were unlatched they swung backwards towards the rotary table, the lock dogs then disengaged and the link tilt fully extended.this resulted in the elevators
moving quickly towards the mousehole. When the elevator were unlatched and swung towards the rotary table, the injured person moved towards the elevators and was stuck
on the thigh when the elevators moved back towards the mousehole. The injured person was operating the elevators. He was one week into his two week offshore rota. He
commenced shift at 1800hrs. An internal investigation is ongoing to identify actions to prevent recurrence.
5" dp elevators were being replaced. As removed from bails a roughneck had removed its retaining pins from its elevators. The driller came over to help not knowing pins had
been removed and pulled on the bails causing the elevators tp drop to the rig fl or, grazing the inside his leg from his knee to his shin.
Ip was part of a team of two pipefitters and a welder contracted to enterprise oil to perform consruction work during the <…> platform <…> maintenance shutdown. The work
was part of a modification to the pipework between the 20" oil export lin and the densitometer skid in module cim which involved the cutting and welding of pipework to and
from a 2" stub-piece horizontally exiting the 20" oil export line. The line had been cold cut and prepped with a grinder on the nightshift, the dayshift co tinued the work.
When the first welding arc was struck there was a bang, through what appears to have been a conflagration within the 20" pipe upon which the team were working. As a result
of the conflagration, a jet of flame appears to have escaped fro the large diameter pipe striking the ip resulting in burns to the back of his left hand and lower arm. Ip received
treatment from the medic and was then evacuated to hospital. Days into tour - 4 days time into shift - 3.5 hours
Leak snoop testing diving system 1/2" oxygen lines. The system was pressured to 210 bar, <…> and <…> (Mechanics) had previously taken up 3 leaks on the system and
were re-checking the fitting on top of our DM-3 module when the ncident took place. <…> and <…> identified a small leak coming from the previous repaired fitting, in
addition another leak was detected on the second oxygen line, both lines run parallel with each other and 4" apart. <…> left the area to vent down the system, <…> continued
his snoop testing of the previous repaired fitting. The snoop testing operation, because of limited access to the fitting meant that <…> had to be on his knees. It was at this
time that the pipe ame out of the fitting, grazing the right hand side of <…>'s face, and exposing his right eardrum, to escaping high-pressure air.Both lines have subsequently
been replaced by stainless pipe to allow completion of the pressure testing. These will e renewed with <…> in due course.All further high pressure testing will be performed at
increasing increments and on identification of a leak personnel to retreat from the vicinity and the system to be depressurised.
HSE verbally contacted <…> - Report <…> to follow. Summary:-Whilst conducting Nitrogen N2 operations work, an N2 line was isolated ready for venting. Before the line
was vented, two operators were struck on the leg and suffered extensive ruising. Both men were taken from normal duties and referred onshore to the duty Doctor. A full
investigation was conducted.
A gas leak occurred from a graylock flange on a15 gas injection well flowline. The flowline had recently been installed by the construction dept. onboard. A misunderstanding
of the permit explaining the status of the job by the prod. dept. caused the problem. This resulted in an uncommissioned flowline being connected to a live system by a single
closed valve. It is assumed that gas passed a diverter valve, so pressurising the flowline and causing gas to escape through the flange. The initial discharge may have been air
sitting in the flowline. An investigation report suggests that the incident could have been caused by inadequate isolation of the flowline from the live system and confusion as
to the status of the line when permit was signed off.
Code (Chain1-5) Type of event
AN Anchor failure
BL Blowout
CA Capsize
CL Collision
CN Contact
CR Crane accident
EX Explosion
FA Falling load
FI Fire
FO Foundering
GR Grounding
HE Helicopter accident
LE Leakage
LG Spill/release
LI List
MA Machinery failure
PO Off position
ST Structural damage
TO Towing accident
WP Well problem
OT Other
Explanation
Problems with anchor/anchor lines, mooring devices, winching equipment or fairleads (e.g. anchor
dragging, breaking of mooring lines, loss of anchor(s), winch failures).
An uncontrolled flow of gas, oil or other fluids from the reservoir, i.e. loss of 1. barrier (i.e.
hydrostatic head) or leak and loss of 2. barrier, i.e. BOP/DHSV.
Loss of stability resulting in overturn of unit, capsizing, or toppling of unit.
Accidental contact between offshore unit and/or passing marine vessel when at least one of them is
propelled or is under tow. Examples: tanker, cargo ship, fishing vessel. Also included are collisions
with bridges, quays, etc., and vessels engaged in the oil and gas activity on other platforms than the
platform affected, and between two offshore installations (to be coded as CN only when intended for
close location).
Collisions/accidental contacts between vessels engaged in the oil and gas activity on the platform
affected, e.g. support/supply/stand-by vessels, tugs or helicopters, and offshore installations (mobile
or fixed). Also are included collisions between two offshore installations only when these are
intended for close location.
Any event caused by or involving cranes, derrick and draw-works, or any other lifting equipment.
Explosion
Falling load/dropped objects from crane, drill derrick, or any other lifting equipment or platform.
Crane fall and lifeboats accidentally to sea and man overboard are also included.
Fire.
Loss of buoyancy or unit sinking.
Floating installation in contact with the sea bottom.
Accident with helicopter either on helideck or in contact with the installation.
Leakage of water into the unit or filling of shaft or other compartments causing potential loss of
buoyancy or stability problems.
“Loss of containment”. Release of fluid or gas to the surroundings from unit's own
equipment/vessels/tanks causing (potential) pollution and/or risk of explosion and/or fire.
Uncontrolled inclination of unit.
Propulsion or thruster machinery failure (incl. control)
Unit unintentionally out of its expected position or drifting out of control.
Breakage or fatigue failures (mostly failures caused by weather, but not necessarily) of structural
support and direct structural failures. "Punch through" also included.
Towline failure or breakage
Accidental problem with the well, i.e. loss of one barrier (hydrostatic head) or other downhole
problems.
Event other than specified above
Code (Type of Unit) Type of Unit
AC Accommodation
CO Compression
DP Drilling&production
DR Drilling
PR Production
PU Pumping
RI Riser/injection
WS Wellsupport/wellhead
Note: Both DP and PR

type of units are
referred to as
'Production' in the
report
Explanation
Accommodation platforms
Gas compression platforms
Traditional (manned) production platforms, steel jackets or GBSs.
Included are also platforms with drilling, production, and
accommodation facilities
Drilling platforms with the only purpose of perform
(Manned) production platforms with no drilling facilities, but with
accommodation
Pumping platforms
Water or gas injection and riser platforms
Wellhead platforms (normally unmanned) with no processing
facilities, serving as “well support”. Often linked to the main
production platforms.
Code (Operation Mode) Operation mode
CS Construction
DD Development drilling
EV Completion
PR Production
WO Well workover
Explanation
Unit under construction (inshore/offshore) and commissioning until production start

Development and production drilling; incl. concurrent drilling and production and drilling
of injection wells
Completion or abandonment of ongoing drilling operation
Production
Well workover (light or heavy), e.g. wireline operation
Code (Event Category) Event Category
A Accident
I Incident
N Near-Miss
U Unsignificant
Explanation
Hazardous situation which have developed into an accidental situation. In addition, for all
situations/events causing fatalities and severe injuries this code should be used
Hazardous situation not developed into an accidental situation. Low degree of damage, but
repairs/replacements are required. This code should also be used for events causing minor
injuries to personnel or health injuries.
Events that might have or could have developed into an accidental situation. No damage and
no repairs required
Hazardous situation, but consequences very minor. No damage, no repairs required. Small
spills of crude oil and chemicals are also included. To be included are also very minor
personnel injuries, i.e. "lost time incidents".

5.7 Hazop V1.1

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ACCIDENTS ON FIXED OFFSHORE UNITS ON THE UK CONTINENTAL SHELF 1991-1999

For each event the following information is given:

Gas release from produced water separator units.

Rupture in pl 631, a 2" teg line between <...> and <...>.

Small electrical fire broke out on an alternator on 'b' generator.

Note: Both DP and PR

Unit under construction (inshore/offshore) and commissioning until production start

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