Panganiban v.

Borromeo, 58 PHIL 367

FACTS: Husband and wife Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala signed a contract before the notary public
of Elias Borromeo. The contract had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Atty.
Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document. He was quite knowledgeable about its contents
although he did not know it fully because of a difference in dialect. The contract is an agreement
between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and
the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is valid

HELD: No. Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon to his or her offender spouse, this
doesn’t mean that the purpose of the legislature is to legalize adultery and concubinage. A notarized
contract that permits concubinage and adultery is not judicially recognizable. Although the consent of a
party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals
and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.

IN RE: ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 932

June 21, 1940

FACTS: Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for 9 years, sought
the legal advice of the respondent for a possible second marriage.

They prepared the document. Baniquit then asked, "Would there be no trouble?" The respondent points
to his diploma and said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid."

Hence, he contracted a second marriage.

Respondent realized that he had made a mistake for the timeline of the separation of husband and wife,
and for that reason, he immediately sent for the contracting parties to sign the deed of cancellation of
the document.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be suspended.

RULING: Yes. The advice of the respondent and the document prepared by him as a notary public is
contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. It constitutes malpractice
which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly
negligent in giving the complainant legal advice.

Selanova v Mendoza 64 SCRA 69

Facts:

Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a document
extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife. One condition of the
liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which
each had filed against the other and that they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever
acts of infidelity either one would commit against the other. Respondent relied on Art 191 of the old Civil
Code that states the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. The judge ratified the document without judicial
approval from CFI Negros where the couple was residing, making it void assuming arguendo that Art. 191
is still in effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is void.

Held:

It is. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:

1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
or of the absolute community property between husband and wife.

While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the RPC, and a
contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence
not judicially recognizable.

De Leon v CA

GR No. 80965

June 6, 1990

FREEDOM OF STIPULATION OF CONTRACTS

FACTS:

(1) On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De
Leon were united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal. On August 28, 1971, a
child named Susana L. De Leon was born from this union.

(2) Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable
marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home.

(3) Sometime in March, 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American citizenship.

(4) On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, a
petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed
claims for support and distribution of properties. It appears, however, that since Jose Vicente was then a
Philippine resident and did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the
divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to obtain some sort of property
settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.

(5) On March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law,
private respondent Macaria De Leon,

(6) On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and
US$35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the aforestated Letter-
Agreement.
(7) On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint
petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership

Applicable Laws:

(1) Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. (1255a)

(2) Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy;

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;

(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;

(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be
ascertained;

(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

(3) Article 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage
settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations during the marriage. (n)
(4) Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, or in
case of abandonment by the husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court,
according to the provisions of articles 167 and 178, No. 3.

In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been entered against the guilty
or absent spouse. (1433a) The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife, as we l as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
(1433a)

(5) Article 221.The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;

(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;

(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

(6) Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable. (1265a)
(7) Article 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or
both parties to enter into the contract. Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of one of the parties
will vitiate consent only when such identity or qualifications have been the principal cause of the
contract.

A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction. (1266a)

(8) Article 1414. When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be
repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has
been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest will thus be subserved,
allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.

(9) Article 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity. (1288)

(10) Article 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is
employed.

There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.

To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.

A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if t he claim is just or legal, does not vitiate
consent. (1267a)

RTC: WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the conjugal partnership of the Spouses is DISSOLVED
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid

HELD: The letter-agreement is invalid.

The cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2'
was the termination of the marital relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia
Lichauco de Leon.

Intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of marital relationship is not only
contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy. As such, any agreement or obligations
based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be deemed null and
void.

... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;

Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to be
applied. It provides:

When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one
of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a
third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be subserved, allow the party
repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to
the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief
should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in
which she was before the transaction was entered into.

OTHER NOTES:

(1) Applying the foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring
Jose Vicente to court for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia would
pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer of certain
properties to her, is obviously not the intimidation referred to by law.

In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the following requisites
must concur:

(1) that the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the
consent to be given;

(2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful;

(3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion between the evil and the
resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and

(4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.

Pugeda v. Trias

Nature of the Case: Motion for Reconsideration

Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot
ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains
unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by
the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals
based on newly discovered evidence.
Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar Lands
Act which at the time of his death were not yet fully paid and were subsequently transferred in the name
of the widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and thereafter the title
was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal property not conjugal;

(2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and

(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied the motion
and declared the decision as final.

Ruling:

Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto
forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even
after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the setting aside
of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly
discovered evidence. The doctrine in the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the
widow recognized in Section 16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers made by the husband
without the approval of the Director of Lands; hence, not applicable in the instant case. Adjudication
may be made pro indiviso in a project of partition without the need of actual division or partition of the
properties among the heirs.

Silverio vs Republic

G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his first
name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his petition.
CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court
decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the
intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is
allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.

Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition
filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major
changes in statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to women.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan
and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and
female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor
but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local
civil registrar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as
to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.