The Imaginary Constitution of Modernity

Author(s): Johann P. Arnason

Source: Revue européenne des sciences sociales, T. 27, No. 86, Pour une philosophie militante
de la démocratie (1989), pp. 323-337
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JOHANN P. ARNASON

THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY

The questionof thesocial-historical is themainthemeof Castoria-

dis' most importantwork. By comparison,his interpretation of
modernity - as a radical transformation of social-historical being-
seems less developedand less systematic.But its place is more
centralthanthisapparentdisproportion mightlead us to believe;as
I have tried to show elsewhere,the reflectionon social-historical
being in generalpresupposesa specificprecomprehension of mod-
ernity.x The modern
distinctively conflictbetween two sets of cul-
tural orientations - those whichunderlieand directthe dynamics
of capitalismand those whichopen up the perspectiveof an auto-
nomoussociety- servesas a keyto theunderstanding of less openly
problematic cultures. The hermeneutic of modernity is thusthe real
centrepieceof Castoriadis'project,and it can play this role without
growinginto a comprehensive theoryof modernity.Both the need
and the potentialforsuch a theorybecomemoreobviouswhenwe
compareCastoriadis'viewswiththoseof some othertheorists.The
idea of the"dual institution," i.e. theinstablecoexistenceand perma-
nent mutual contestationof capitalismand autonomy,is not an
exhaustiveinterpretation of modernity, but it is a least a verydis-
tinctivestartingpoint. The aim of the presentpaper is to explore
some waysof continuing the argument.
If we contrastCastoriadis'sapproachwith the most influential
alternatives, both its meritsand its potentialfor furtherdevelop-
mentwill standout moreclearly. His imageof modernity as a field
of tensions,structured aroundtwo dominantpoles withtheirrespec-
tiveclustersof derivativeprinciplesand perspectives, is more com-
plex and convincingthan the idea of a unifiedbut unfinished
project(I). It can also be opposedto theno less simplifying visions
of a transitionto postmodernity.The critiqueof the idea of post-
modernity would, however,be inconclusivewithoutan alternative
approachto the problemson whichthe postmodernists have capita-
lized. For a more adequate accountof the pluralisticstructureof
modernity, the heterogeneity of its componentsand the diversity of
its developmental patterns,it is necessaryto go beyondthe polarity
of capitalismand autonomy;theirinteraction withotherforcesand
significations revealsnew aspectsof theirimaginarycontentand of

i Cf. J.P. Arnason. Praxis und Interpretation,Frankfurt1988, especially

p. 236-265and 281-309.

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324 J.P. ARNASON

theirimpacton each other(II). But to beginwith,someintroductory

remarkson theconceptof theimaginary signification and its general
implications forthetheoryof modernity willhelpto cleartheground
forthe followingdiscussion.
A permanent concernwith'themeaningof meaning'is as charac-
teristicof twentieth-century thoughtas is the recurrentcollapse of
theoriesof meaning. The recentclaim thatthe conceptof meaning
has "fallento pieces" and that"we are leftwiththe task of picking
up the pieces"2 is reminiscentof similar conclusionsby earlier
writers;it has provedeasier to thematizenew dimensionsof mean-
ingthanto synthesize theold and thenew. Castoriadis'mostdecisive
contribution to this debate is the attemptto link the problematic
of meaningto the idea of the creativeimagination.The connection
is summedup in the conceptof the imaginarysignification; it pre-
supposesa newapproachto bothsides,morepreciselya de-functiona-
lizationof the imaginationand a detotalizationof meaning. The
formeris now seen as radicallyautonomouswithregardto organic
or systemicconstraints, the latteras irreducibleto closed contents
and determinate referents.
In keepingwith the de-functionalizing perspectiveCastoriadis
prefersthe term"radicalimaginary" to thatof the "radicalimagina-
tion"(whichhe uses in a morerestricted sense in the reconstruction
of psychoanalysis).This distinctionunderlinesthe referenceto an
elementinvolvedin theconstitution of subjectivity, ratherthanto the
activityor capacityof a subject; the lattercould moreplausiblybe
subordinatedto specificends or imperatives.The radicalimaginary
is "the unceasingand essentiallyundetermined (social-historicaland
psychical)creationof figures/forms/images... Whatwe call 'reality'
and 'rationality' are its works."3 It "emergesas othernessand as
theperpetualorigination 4 The elementof otherness
of otherness..."
and creativeself-alteration is thus inseparablefromthe imaginary
aspect; the signitiveaspect adds an emphasison opennessand inde-
terminacy thatis not characteristic of the "figures/forms/images" as
such. Ananalysisof significations in languageleads to theconclusion
thatmeaningis essentially"an indefinite skeinof interminable refer-
rals to somethingotherthan (thanwhat would appear to be stated
directly)."5One mightask how the creationof figuresis relatedto
the bundleof referrals;the answerseems to be thatthe articulation
of meaningis alwaysa selectivefiguration of an open-endedcontext
- or, in otherwords,the impositionof a formon a horizon. For
Castoriadis,all significationsare "figuresof speech." But thetension
betweenthe figurativeand the significative aspects becomes more

2 HilaryPutnam.Reason,Truthand History. 1981,p. 29.

Cambridge
» Cornelius Castoriadis, The ImaginaryInstitutionof Society, Cambridge
1987.p. 3.
4 Ibid.,p. 369. I havesubstituted for"orientation
"origination" ; theformer
expressionis used in theFrenchoriginal.
6 Ibid.,p. 243.

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THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY 325

obviouswhenwe considerthe mostcentraland fundamental imagi-

narysignifications - thosethroughwhich"everysocietydefinesand
developsan imageof the naturalworld,of the universein whichit
lives,attempting in everyinstanceto make of it a signifying whole
in whicha place has to be made not only for the naturalobjects
and beings importantfor the life of the collectivity, but also for
the collectivityitself,establishing, finally,a certainworld-order."*
In relatingto theworldas an inescapableand inexhaustible horizon,
the "figures/forms/images" encounteran othernesswhichtheycap
neithershutoutnotabsorb. In viewof thisreference to an otherness
that is not reducibleto the self-alteration of the imaginary,the
imaginarysignifications can- at least in their world-constitutive
capacity - be described as creativeinterpretations.Castoriadishas
so far emphasizedthe creativeaspect muchmorestronglythan the
interpretiveone; as we shall see thishas some consequencesforhis
understanding of modernity.
But thepartwhichthe conceptof the imaginary significationcan
playin developing a theoryof modernity shouldfirstbe characterized
in moregeneraland positiveterms. In the above quotation,Casto-
riadis refersto realityand rationality as "works"of the imaginary;
in otherwords,definitions of realityand rationality are elaborated
againstthebackground and in thecontextof imaginary significations'.
The modernworld givesa new twistto these interconnections.It
is dominatedby imaginary significations whichtendto identify them-
selveswithrealityand/orrationality in explicitcontrastto a devalued
idea of the imagination.This constellation is reflectedin the inter-
pretationsof modernity as a delayedencounterwithreality,aftera
longdetourthroughother-worldly illusions,and as a definitivebreak-
throughof rationality, aftera prehistory of more limitedand inter-
mittentprogress. Classic formulations of both perspectivescan be
foundin the workof Max Weber,but it also containssome counter-
weightsto them. The pluralismof values,whichhe regardedas a
hallmarkof advancedmodernity, is by the same token- although
Weberis less emphaticon this point- a pluralismof interpretive
perspectives:different aspects of the humanconditiondevelopinto
mutuallyirreducible"world orders",and even those among them
whichseem mostthoroughly rationalizedand most directlyadapted
to therealityprinciplehave theirown interpretive contentsand pre-
suppositions.The conceptof the imaginary could serve
signification
to underpinthisinsightand giveit a morecriticalturn. Fromthe
viewpointof a criticaltheory,the imaginaryfusionof significations
with realityand rationality is a challengeratherthan an obstacle,
and the contradictions and pathologicalsymptomsto whichit gives
riseare potentialkeysto therediscovery of thedifference.The very
self-occultationof the imaginarycan thus lead to a more adequate
grasp of its role. But to substantiatethis we need a more diffe-

« Ibid., p. 149.

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326 J.P. ARNASON

whichinteractand
rentiatedaccountof the imaginarysignifications
conflictin the constitution
of the modernworld.

The interpretation of modernity as an "unfinished project",pro-

posed by JurgenHabermasand closelylinkedto his theoryof com-
municativeaction as the basis of social evolution,is a convenient
startingpointforthecomparisonand evaluationof otherapproaches.
Habermas'criticalcommitment to modernity shows,above all, the
untenability of a simpledistinction betweenaffirmative and critical
theories. His critiqueof the existingversionof modernity is based
on its own inadequatelyrealized premisesand intentions,rather
than on traditionalistor futuristvisionsof an alternative.On the
other hand, his convictionthat modernity has (or should have) a
future does not blind him to the one-sided and unbalanced
characterof its achievements.The idea of the unfinishedproject
is designedto graspbothsides of thepictureand clarifytherelation-
ship betweenthem. The project as a whole is a comprehensive
process of rationalization, the finishedpart is a differentiation of
culturalspheresas well as of theircorrelateson the level of social
action, and the unfinishedone a reconstructive unificationwhich
wouldbringto lightnot onlythe commondenominator of the diffe-
rentiatedspheres (proceduralrationality)but also the underlying
reasons fortheirseparationand the possibilityof a morebalanced
combination.In otherwords:if thereis a unityof modernity, above
and beyondthe manifestimbalances,tensionsand conflicts, it must
be coextensiveand consubstantialwith the unityof reason, and
thepathologicalaspectsof modernization mustbe reducibleto hyper-
trophicoutgrowths thatcan be cut down to size and broughtunder
control. In thisway,the excessesof the capitalisteconomyand the
bureaucratic stateas wellas thebreakdown ofcommunication between
specializedsubculturesand everydaylifeappear as corrigibledevia-
tionsfromthe main line of the project.
The notionof theunfinished projectis easilyapplicableto various
componentsof modernity - the institution of citizenshipas well as
the marketeconomy,the nation-state no less thanthe worldsociety,
to mentiononlya fewexamples. But the attemptto encompassthe
whole of modernity - as a structureand as a process- withinthis
idea goes much furtherand is linkedto more specificpresupposi-
tions. To spell out the implicationsof Habermas'thesisis enough
to suggestthe outlinesof an alternativeview: for a theorymore
sensitiveto the complexity of the modernworldand less inclinedto
filterit througha homogenizingconceptual scheme, a unifying
"projectof modernity" would not onlybe unfinished, it would also
be intrinsicallyincomplete, because of the changingbut permanently
problematicrelationshipbetween modernityand its pre-modern

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THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY 327

background, and irreducibly inconsistent, in view of the conflicting

tendenciesand perspectives thatinteractwithinthe modernconstel-
lation. As I shall tryto show,Castoriadis'imageof modernity can
help to developthis argument.
The first aspect- the incompletenessof modernity - will be
easier to discuss in connectionwith the postmodernist critique;I
shall therefore startwith the second,i.e. the radical divergenceof
the projectsthatenterintoor can be derivedfromthe structureof
modernity.Castoriadisdistinguishes two such projects. One is the
imaginaryinfrastructure and horizon of capitalist development:
'Texpansionillimit^ede la maitriserationnelle." 7 The otheris the
perspectiveof an autonomoussociety,"la societyqui s'auto-institue
explicitement et lucidement, qui sait que c'est elle qui pose ses insti-
tutionset ses significations" 8; it is the commonsource of various
cultural,politicaland social counterweights to thelogicof capitalism.
Althoughthe relationship betweenthesetwo centralsignifications is
morecomplexthansome of Castoriadis'formulations would suggest,
their mutual irreducibility is beyond doubt. The pursuitof un-
limitedpowerovernaturedoes not necessarilyenhancethe capacity
of humansocietyto questionand reshapeits own institutions, and
a coherentvisionof the autonomoussocietyexcludesan unquestion-
ing commitment to the more or less rationalizedphantasmof total
mastery. The difference is thusmoreradicalthanthe Habermasian
distinction betweensystemand life-world; forHabermas,thesystemic
mechanisms - thoseofa monetary economyand a bureaucratic admi-
nistration- may develop a destructivedynamicof theirown, but
in the last instance,theyare derivedfromcomponentsof the life-
world.
Neitherofthetwocentralsignifications is theprojector structural
of
principle modernity; the result of their interactionis, rather,a
"mixedsociety",capitalistand democraticin changingproportions.
In this sense, both componentscan be regardedas unfinished
projects. But theyare also unfinished formoreintrinsicand funda-
mentalreasons. The self-sustaining expansionof rationalmastery
transcendsall specificgoals,and the projectof autonomycan never
lead to the abolitionof all tensionsbetweenthe self-constitution of
societyand the self-conservation of institutions.
The attemptto grasp the culturalcontextof moderncapitalism
as an imaginary horizon,open to different interpretations, is easier
to understandif we compareit withotherapproachesto the same
problem. From a traditionalMarxistpointof view,the autonomy,
predominanceand dynamismof economicstructuresconstitutethe
ultimatefoundations of thelogicof capitalismand thereis no need to
raise furtherquestionsabout their culturalpresuppositions.The
primacyof theeconomicspheremaybe seen as a distinctive charac-

i CorneliusCastoriadis.Domaines de Vhomme.Paris 1986,p. 197.

8 Ibid., p. 417.

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328 J.P. ARNASON

teristicofthemodernworldand as theresultofa revolutionary break

with traditionalpatterns,ratherthan as a generallaw of history,
but thatdoes notnecessarilyentaila stronger interestin thecultural
background.Castoriadis1 thesisis moredirectlyrelatedto twoother
modifications of the Marxianparadigm. On the one hand,the need
to broadenand radicalizethecritiqueof capitalismled theFrankfurt
schoolto focuson theculturalsignificance of capitalistaccumulation
and industrialprogress,and to reconstruct a logic of dominationas
theircommonprincipleoforientation.As a result,moderncapitalism
is reduced to the most recent- and most revealing - phase of a
processwhoseessentially
civilizing continuousand homogeneous logic
is the main targetof criticism.By contrast,Castoriadisregardsthe
phantasmofan unlimited expansionof rationalmasteryas a distincti-
vely moderncultural orientation;the shift from an economistic
perspectiveto a more culturalisticone is thus accompaniedby a
strongeremphasison thehistoricaloriginality of moderncapitalism.
On the otherhand,the emergenceof the Soviet model as an alter-
nativepatternof modernsocietyposes new problemsfora critical
theorythatwas originally developedas an analysisof capitalism. As
long as a criticaltheoryof Soviet-type societiesdoes not question
the primacyof economicstructures, it has a built-inpreference for
some versionof the conceptof state capitalismand thus- as past
experiencehas shown- a tendencyto dilutetheMarxiananalysisof
capitalism,ratherthanto transcendit,and to minimizethespecificity
of post-revolutionary societies. The referenceto imaginary significa-
tionsallows Castoriadisto constructa moreflexiblemodel:without
denyingor downplaying the difference betweenSoviet and Western
institutions,he argues that the social regimeof post-revolutionary
Russia and otherstatesorganizedalong similarlines is still located
withinthe social-historical universeof moderncapitalism,and that
thecommonculturalhorizon- the centralimaginary significationof
capitalistdevelopment - is the basis of both competitive and imita-
tive interactions betweenthe two societaltypes.9
Castoriadis'reflections on the culturalpreconditions of modern
capitalismalso invitecomparisonwith analysesof the "spirit"or
"economicethic" of capitalism,developedby Sombart,Weber and
variousotherauthors. Both lines of argumentare opposed to eco-
nomic or thechnological reductionism, but thereis an obvious and
crucial difference: the earliertheoristsemphasizepatternsof con-
duct and tend to concretizethemin models of man, whereasCas-
toriadis is primarilyconcernedwith a global interpretiveand
praticalrelationto the world. The tendencyto collapse a cultu-
ral orientation intoa humantypeor a "characterological" paradigm
reflects,of course, the individualisticpreconceptionsof classical
socialtheory, and it sometimesresultsin an uncriticalmythologization
of capitalistpioneersand innovators.Conversely, Castoriadis'radical

« Cf. particularly*Le regimesocial de la Russiew,ibid.. 175-200.

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THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY 329

critiqueof individualism leads himto emphasizethe anonymousand

impersonalcharacterof the culturalfactorsin question. But at the
same time,his accountof thespiritof capitalismlinksup withsome
older insightsand suggestions.One of Sombart'smore significant
contributions to thedebatewas his distinction betweenthe romantic
and thebourgeoiselementin thecapitalistethic;theformeris related
to thebehavioralpatternsof pre-capitalist elitesand associatedwith
the more violentand adventuousaspects of the capitalistbreak-
through,whereasthe latterhas its roots in the traditionsof mer-
chantsand artisansand is more conduciveto the rationalization of
economiclife. Bothaspectsare transformed by theconnection which
marksthe emergenceof moderncapitalism. Castoriadis'definition
of the centralimaginary signification of capitalismunderlinesa ten-
sion betweentwo poles,comparable- but by no means identical-
with the polarityanalysedby Sombart. The unlimitedexpansion
of rationalmasterypresupposeson the one hand an imaginary abso-
lutizationof powerand a reductionof theworldto an object of con-
trol; on the otherhand, the pursuitof power is subjectedto the
disciplineof rationality.Changinghistoricalconstellations can affect
thebalanceand reinforce one componentat theexpenseof theother.
Although thevisionof absolutepoweris fusedwiththemoremodern
project of a definitiveconquest of nature,it is obviouslymore
closelyrelatedto pre-modern phantasmsthan the otherfactor,and
its predominance therefore signalsa shifttowardsmore ambiguous
combinations oftradition and modernity. Thisphenomenon is, among
otherthings,relevantto the interpretation of modernimperialism:
as manyanalystshave pointedout, it was both the cause and the
effectofa reconsolidation oftraditional powerelitesand powerstruc-
tures,and ifit was also rootedin thelogicof capitalism,thecultural
orientations of thelatter- including, as HannahArendtpointedout,
the culturaldefinitionof power as an abstractobject of accumu-
lation- were probablymoredecisivethaneconomicpressures. On
the otherfand,the separationof control-oriented rationalityfrom
its imaginary horizoncan serveto legitimatean apparentalternative
to capitalism;but the rejectionof the latterbecause of its "anarchy
of production"and the lack of a controlling centredoes not amount
to a breakwithits mostfundamental premises.
Finally,Castoriadis' approach sets him apart fromthose who
subsumetheculturalfoundations of moderncapitalismundera more
generalpatternof socio-cultural modernization (Habermas'stheory
of modernity can be read as a criticalversionof thisargument).The
specificcontentof the commondenominator varies; some theorists
individualism
stressthe role of institutionalized as the drivingforce
behind the developmentof a marketeconomy,the extensionof
citizenship,and the generalshiftfromGemeinschaft to Gesellschaft
as a formof social life,whileotherstryto derivethe moderneco-
nomy,themodernstateand modernculturalmodelsfroma dominant
patternof rationality whichis thendefinedas formal,purposiveor

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330 J.P. ARNASON

cognitive-instrumental. But for Castoriadisthe relationshipof the

capitalistimaginary to the morecomprehensive patternof modernity
is not that of a particularcase to a generalprinciple;he sees it,
rather,as an irreductible differenceand a moreor less acute tension
betweencomponentsof a multi-polar field. This is not to say that
the imaginary significationwhichlendsmeaningto the accumulation
of capital cannot transcendthis contextand give rise to more
complexstructures and moreUtopianperspectives.It can be trans-
lated into the accumulationof abstractwealth or abstractpower,
with correspondingly different consequencesfor the social world.
As a societalgoal,it becomesa trans-functional pointof reference for
the functionaldetermination and differentiationof institutions and
activities;but it can also appear as a counterweight to the fragmen-
tationof modernsocietyand a temptation to overcomeit by subject-
ing social life to completerationalcontrol. In this capacity,the
centralsignification of moderncapitalismis one of the sources(not
the onlyingredient) of the totalitarianproject. And on the level of
more concretevalue-orientations, the imaginarytransfiguration of
theeffortto maximizecontrol- moreprecisely:theimaginary exten-
sion, unificationand deproblematization of new strategiesfor the
conquest of nature - can be combined with - and givea new direc-
tionto- theutilitarianemphasison the primacyof humanneeds as
wellas theexpressivist idealofa freedevelopment ofhumancapacity.
Both themesplayed an importantrole in Marx's attemptturnthe
ultimatelogic of capitalismagainstits provisionalembodiment.
The otherbasic componentof modernity is the imaginary project
of an autonomoussociety. Its impact on the modernworld has
been less continuousand less conclusive,but- as Castoriadissees it
- strongenoughto justifythe descriptionof the overallresultas
a "dual institution."The projectof autonomyis theculturalhorizon
of democraticinstitutions, inasmuchas theyinvolvean explicitself-
constitution of society;it has been appropriatedand radicalizedby
modernsocial movements, most importantly by the workers'move-
ment,but in a selectivewaywhichhas oftenobscuredtheconnection
withdemocracy;and it also manifestsitselfin an enhancedcapacity
to question and transformculturalpatterns,including - in parti-
cular- thosewhichfunctionwithinthe separatespheresof modern
art and modern science. But since the democraticelementsin
modernsocietieshave been a major counterweight to the logic of
capitalismand a necessarybackgroundto the rise of social move-
ments,evenwhentheideologyof thelatterhas made themreluctant
to recognizethis fact,the problematicof autonomyis above all a
starting-pointforthe theoryof moderndemocracy.
This pointof viewhighlights the interpretivefunctionof the ima-
ginarysignifications.More precisely,the two centralsignifications
of modernity are culturalintepretations of power,but theyfocuson
different aspectsof powerand relateto themin different ways. The

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THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY 331

visionof an unlimitedexpansionof rationalmasteryis an imaginary

projectionof the abilityto intervenein the world; the power to
controland transform natureis thus subsumedundera simplifying
and totalizingculturalmodel. In contrastto this image of power
as a mediumof interaction betweensocietyand the non-socialworld
(a mediumwhich,in extremecases,can obliteratethedistinction and
reduce societyto an object of control),the project of autonomy
centerson differences and changesin the role of powerwithinthe
social-historicalfield. Implicitpower or "infra-power", inherentin
institutionsas such and exercisedthroughthe social construction of
individuals,is to be made moreaccessibleto reflection and question-
ing,and the explicitpower to make decisionsabout the course of
social action,vestedin politicalinstitutions, is to be guidedby the
normative principlesofautonomousparticipation and publicdebate.10
In other words: the imaginarysignification autonomypointsthe
of
way towards a globalmodification of therespectiverolesand relative
weightsof meaningand powerin social life.
The most influential traditionsin social theoryhave been more
concernedwithmoderncapitalismthanwithmoderndemocracy, and
the alternativeinterpretations of the latterare less clear-cut;it is
therefore moredifficult to characteriseCastoriadis'theoryin terms
of contrastswithotherpositions. But we can at least comparehis
basic assumptionswiththoseof some contemporary theorists.The
emhasison a culturalhorizonofdemocracysetshimapartfromthose
who explainits developmentin termsof redistribution of power.
NorbertElias regards"functional democratization", i.e. the long-term
shifttowardsless asymmetrical powerbalancesand towardsa greater
dependenceof rulingeliteson the populationstheyrule,as one side
of the civilizingprocesswhichhas set the overallcourseof Western
history. From Castoriadis'point of view, this theorymisses the
essentialpoint:it ignoresthe possibilitythatthe morecomplexand
balanced networksof power mightgive rise to more abstractand
impersonalformsof domination, and thattheresultantformof social
lifemightbe as heteronomous as the moretraditionalpatterns. On
the otherhand, Claude Leforttries to derivethe most innovative
characteristics of moderndemocracyfroma change in the social
symbolization power. As a "lieu vide",power eludes both com-
of
plete controland exhaustivedefinition;its verymeaningexcludes
uncontestedappropriations as well as unquestionedinterpretations.
This view is moresensitiveto the culturalpresuppositions of demo-
cracy,but the positiveculturalhorizonwhichCastoriadisinterprets
as a projectof autonomyis obscured.
A thirdapproachwhichwe can use as a contrasting exampleis the
attemptto use the conceptof the life-world - originallydesignedto
protectmeaningand subjectivity againstthe imperialismof modern

1(>For the distinctionbetweenimplicitand explicitpower,cf. CorneliusCasto-

riadis, "Pouvoir,politique, autonomie".Revue de M&aphysique et de Morale,
no. 1. 1988,p. 81-104.

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332 J.P. ARNASON

science- as a cornerstone forthe theoryof democracy.This appeal

to a deeperdimensionof social life is, to beginwith,an answerto
those who doubt the viability - or at least the rationality - of
democracy because of the complexity of modern societiesand the
independence of their specializedsubsystems. But as the work of
Habermas and his disciples shows, the supposedlytrans-systemic
foundationof democraticproceduresand imperativeslends itself
to two different interpretations:thedecisiveaspectsof the life-world
are eitherlocated at the anthropologicallevel, more preciselyin
the linguisticbasis of socialization,or in specificinstitutionsof
modernsocieties,particularly thosewhichinvolvethe codification of
rights.u By connecting the questionof democracyto the projectof
autonomy,Castoriadisescapes this dilemma. The culturalcontext
of democracyis neithernarroweddownto particularinstitutions nor
sublimatedintothemeta-institution oflanguage;it is,rather,grounded
in the difference betweeninstituting societyand institutedsociety
(in otherwords: betweensocial-historical creationand its results),
and in thepossibilityof activatingthisdifference and orientingit in
a specificdirection. This defenceof democracyis less self-limiting
thanthe strategieswhichtake a strictdistinction betweenlife-world
and systemforgranted. In thelightof theconceptof self-institution
and therelatedproblematic ofimaginary significations,theseparation
and stabilizationofsubsystems is notsimplytheresultofevolutionary
differentiation;above and beyondthat,it involvesthe suppression -
or at least thelimitation - of the differencebetweeninstituting and
institutedsociety,and therecan be no a prioridetermination of the
changes that mightresultfromthe reactivationof this background
for the purposeof democratizing economicand politicalstructures*
On theotherhand,theprocessof self-institution is too indeterminate
and theprojectof autonomytoo fragileto offerthekindof sanctuary
whichthe conceptof the life-world suggests. For Castoriadis,the
logicof democracyis thusmoreradicaland its futuremoreuncertain
thanforHabermas.

II
So farI havecontrastedtheidea of the"dual institution" withthe
constructionof an unfinishedprojectof modernity and triedto show
that the formerperspectiveis more sensitiveto the complexity
and the internaltensionsof the modernworld. But this claim has
yetto be confronted withthe argumentsof thosewho take a more
thoroughly pluralisticview and develop it in such a way that it
undermines theveryidea ofmodernity or relegatesit to thepast.

11 For the latterargumentcf. AndrewArato and Jean Cohen. "Civil Society

and Social Theory",Thesis Eleven, no. 21. 1988.p. 40-64. It should, however,
be noted thatAratoand Cohen criticizeHabermas for neglectingvoluntaryasso-
ciations as a part of civil society;this bringsthem somewhatcloser to Casto-
riadis' position.

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THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY 333

There is, however,no consensuson the criticalimplicationsor

positivecontentsof the postmodernist thesis. Its defenderspractice
what theypreach- an uninhibitedpluralism- to such an extent
thatthecommongroundhas becomeveryhard to define. This pro-
liferationof postmodernisms is perhapsa symptomof more funda-
mental problems: the postmodernistshave found it difficultto
articulatetheir break with modernitywithoutreducingit to a
continuation of the self-questioning and self-transformationthathas
been characteristic of modernculture,and to specifythe charac-
teristicsof the supposedlynew era withoutfallingback on modern
conceptionsof a coherentculturalpatternor an overallsocial con-
figuration. 12 If thereare nevertheless some "familyresemblances",
they have more to do with the thanwiththe results;
starting-point
as a Germanauthority on the subjectputs it, "postmodernity begins
wheretotalityends".13 But the reactionagainsttotalizingmodesof
thoughthas some more specificconnotations.The idea of totality
and its offshoots are rejectedbecauseof theclosure,unityand homo-
geneitywhichtheyallegedlyimposeon a fieldthatthepostmodernists
want to open up to a pluralityof perspectivesand a play of diffe-
rences. In more concreteterms,the postmodernist critiqueseems
to be directedagainstthreemaintargets:theglobalvisionof history
as progressor liberation, thestrictdifferentiationof culturalspheres
on thebasis of an underlying principleof rationality or functionality,
and theidea of a uniformand universalreason. The deconstruction
of thesemodernfictionsis supposedto pave theway fora pluraliza-
tionof thesocial and culturalworld. But as someadvocatesof post-
modernism havebeenforcedto admit,theresultis neithera negation
of modernitynor a movementbeyond it; the inventionof post-
modernity is,lookedat moreclosely,onlytherediscovery ofneglected
or misunderstoodaspects of modernity.The totalizingand uni-
versalizing patternsthatare now beingsingledout forcriticismtook
shape againstthebackgroundof a pluralisticconfiguration, and they
never achievedmore than a relativepredominance. It would be
misleadingto describethemas unifying interpretationssuperimposed
on a pluralityof historicalforces;as we can learn fromWeber's
analysisof different value-orientationsand worldorders,the under-
lyingpluralismextendsto the level of interpretations, and it can
give rise to divergent imagesof modernity.If we take intoaccount
the problematicrelationshipbetweentraditionand modernity, as
well as the co-determination of different patternsof modernity by
different traditions,the picturebecomes even more complex; the
intrinsicpluralismof the modernworldis compoundedby its open-
ness to pre-modern sourcesof differentiation. But at the same time,

12 For a veryinformativediscussionof these problems,cf. ZygmuntBauman,

"Towardsa Sociologyof Postmodernity" to be publishedin Thesis Eleven,no. 23,
1989.
is WolfgangWelsch, Tostmoderne- Genealogie und Bedeutung ernes urn-
sittenenBegriffs,"in P. Kemper (ed.), 'Postmodern? oder der Kampf um die
Zukunft,Frankfurt/Man 1988,p. 29.

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334 J.P. ARNASON

a retrospectively idealizedtraditioncan be counterposedto modern

projectsofunification and defendedas a moregenuinecounterweight
to pluralism. The latteralternative had provedattractiveenoughto
temptsomeversionsofpostmodernism turn.u
intoa neo-traditionalist
If the theoryof modernity is to respondto the challengeof post-
modernismand dissipatethe illusionof postmodernity, it therefore
needs a conceptualframework thatwould allow it to graspboththe
connectionsand the tensionsbetweenunityand plurality.At first
sight,Castoriadis'approachmightnot seem verypromisingin this
respect:it suggestsa constitutive duality,ratherthana plurality,and
theidea of a centralconflictbetweena capitalistand an anticapitalist
pole of modernity is reminiscent of theclassicalMarxistthesiswhich
Castoriadiswants to refute. But althoughhe startswithan image
of modernity as a conflictualunityof capitalismand its opposite,he
givesthisinterpretation a new turnwhichsets it apart fromearlier
versionsand makes it easier to use as a firststep towardsa more
complexmodel. For Castoriadis,the anti-capitalist projectis not-
in contrastto classical Marxism- an attemptto anticipatea post-
capitalistsocietyon thebasis of thelong-term tendenciesof capitalist
development.The divergent logics- thoseof autonomyand expand-
ing rationalmastery - are bothpresentfromthe outset,irreducible
to each other,and capable of enteringinto changinghistoricalcom-
binations. And as the focusshiftsfromstructuraltrendsor social
forcesto the culturalorientations whichlend meaningand direction
to them,it becomeseasierto graspboththedepthof theconflictand
the complexity of the interaction.The culturalorientations in ques-
tion are conceptualizedas imaginarysignifications, not as values,
normsor ideologies;theyare, in otherwords,multiform complexes
of meaningthat can give rise to more determinate patternsand at
the same timeremainopen to otherinterpretations.Last but not
least,each of thetwocentralsignifications can expandintoa broader
interpretive perspectiveand thus leave its markon or generateits
versionof otheraspects of modernity.The imaginaryreductionof
the worldto an object of rationalmasteryis part and parcelof the
capitalistmode of accumulation,but above and beyond that, it
affectsotherways of relatingto the world; in particular,it has a
decisiveinfluenceon the culturalinterpretations of modernscience.
It has also provedcapable of perverting the project of autonomy
and assimilatingit to the extensionof rationalcontrolover society.
On the otherhand,the abilityot envisageautonomyas a formof
sociallifeis - as we have seen- linkedto a generalized butunevenly
developeddispositionto questionand innovate. All culturalspheres
are to some extentinvolvedin the conflictbetweenthe two per-
spectives.

!4 Cf. particularlysome of the contributionsto the collectionModerne oder

Postmoderne?Zur Signaturdes gegenwartigen Zeitalters,ed. P. Koslowskiet al..
Weinheim. 1986.

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THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY 335

The analysisof the "dual institution"may help to extendthe

argumentand place it in a broadercontext. The two complexesof
meaningare not only subject to different interpretations;theyare
also open to contacts and partial fusionswith other imaginary
significations, less prominent(or at least less familiarto social
theory),but perhapsequallyessentialto the structureof modernity.
The problematicof the modernstate and its self-interpretations is
the most obviouscase in point. The processof state formationin
the early modernWest generatedits own imaginarysignification:
that of sovereignty.15 As an expressionof the "self-determination
of the state" (O. Hintze),the notionof sovereignty differsfromthe
traditionalimaginary of despoticor imperialpower:its development
culminatesin the separationof theidea of the statefromthe person
of the ruler,and it is fromthe outset embodiedin a systemof
sovereignstates. It cannotbe reducedto a by-product of the capi-
talist imaginary - not only because of its independentand earlier
historicalorigins,but also because of the difference in content:the
idea of sovereignty servesto legitimizea privilegedcentreof control
and regulateits relationswith other such centres,ratherthan to
articulatethe phantasmof perfectcontrol. With regard to the
projectof autonomy,the relationshipis both closer and more con-
flictual. If autonomyis to be understoodas theexplicitself-determi-
nationof society,its moderninterpretation developsin oppositionto
the more limitedself-determination of the state (limitedboth in
respectof traditionalculturalmodels and traditionalstructuresof
power),and its impactis reinforced by the contrast.
Although the constitutive
signification of the modernstatehas a
historyand a contentof its own,the resultsof its interaction with
the two other significations are no less important. On the basis
of the idea of sovereignty, the modernstatehas functioned as a pre-
conditionand co-determinant of the capitalistproduction, while the
processesof state formation and interstatecompetition have at the
same timefolloweda logic of theirown, different fromand often
at odds withthelogicof capitalistdevelopment.On theotherhand,
the project of autonomyhas been partly incorporatedinto the
modernstatethroughthedevelopment of democraticinstitutions, but
its oppositionto otheraspectsor potentialities of the statehas often
mutedthe conflictwithcapitalismand lent some credibility to the
idealizationof the market(mistakenfor the essence of capitalism)
as a paradigmof autonomy. Conversely, a one-sidedemphasison
the anti-capitalist aspect- at the expenseof the morepositivegoal
of autonomy - has facilitatedtheconfusionwitha statistalternative
to capitalism.

is AnthonyGiddens(The Nation-Stateand Violence,Cambridge1985)stresses

the importanceof the idea of sovereigntyfor the formationof the modernstate,
but he does not link this question to the problematicof the imaginarysignifi-
cations.

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336 J.P. ARNASON

But the culturalcontextof the modernstategoes farbeyondthe

idea of sovereignty.Most importantly, it includes the imaginary
signification of the nation,as well as the Utopias and ideologies
derivedfromit.16 And the development of the nationalimaginary
is in turninseparablefromthe romanticcurrentin modernculture.
If romanticism in the broadestsense is definedas the attemptto
restoreor recreatethe contextsof meaningdestroyedby the expan-
sion of rationalmastery, it can be understoodas theantithesisof the
capitalistimaginary, more directlyopposed to it but less capable
of countering its impacton social lifethanthe projectof autonomy
is. Marx'sviewof romanticism as an inevitableand temporarily legi-
timateresponseto capitalismcould thus be reformulated in less
reductionistic terms. Castoriadis'attitudeto thisaspectofmodernity
seemsambivalent:he appropriatesand reinterprets a keycomponent
of the romantictradition,the idea of the creativeimagination, and
uses it to reconstruct the non-rational foundations of reasonas well
as the rootsof the divisionbetweentwo mutuallyirreducibletypes
of reason (associated respectivelywith autonomyand rational
mastery),but withoutthematizing the romanticbackgroundas an
integralpart of modernity.
I have only touchedon some aspects of the broader field of
significations whichsurroundsthe imaginarycore of modernity.A
more detailedanalysisis beyondthe scope of this paper. But to
roundoffthe discussion,a further aspect of Castoriadis'conceptual
schemeshould be brieflyconsidered. As I suggestedat the begin-
ningof SectionI, a critiqueof Habermas'theoryof modernity should
taKe issue not onlywith the construction of a unifiedproject,but
also withtheassumptionthatmodernity can be analysedas a closed
structure withoutanyconstitutive linksto thepre-modern background.
The alternative view- thatof an intrinsically incompletemodernity,
permanently co-determined by traditions- can draw supportfrom
some versionsof the postmodernist critique,but it needs a more
constructiveframe of reference. Castoriadis'commentson this
themefail shortof a systematictreatment, but theyare both sug-
gestiveof further developments and symptomatic of thehermeneutic
strainin his theory.
The twoconflicting significations withwhichCastoriadisis mainly
concernedhave one importantfeaturein common:theirpre-modern
antecedentsare still relevantto the understanding of theirmodern
contents. In and throughthe capitalistimaginary,the notion of
infinity,whichhad firstacquireda positivesignification in theJudeo-
Christiantradition,"invadesthis world'1 17 and becomes a part of
the culturalprojectforthe conquestof nature. The projectof the

16 In the firstpart of The ImaginaryInstitutionof Society,Castoriadisdis-

cusses thenationas an imaginarysigniiication,but thispointhas so farnot been
integratedinto his theoryof modernity.
17 Cornelius Castoriadis. "Reflectionson 'Rationality' and 'Development'",
Thesis Eleven 10/11.1984/85,p. 24.

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THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY 337

autonomoussocietyis a reactivatedand modifiedversionof theori-

ginal Greekbreakthrough - a progressbeyondit in some respects,
especiallywithregardto its moreuniversalistic principles,but also
a de-radicalizedversionin the sensethatless substantive conceptions
of democracyhave tendedto prevail.18
For our presentpurposes,the specificclaims or meritsof these
two genealogiesare less importantthan theirhermeneutical status.
In bothcases, Castoriadis'positionis throwninto reliefby the con-
trast with two other interpretations.His account of the idea of
infinityand its modern transformation differsfrom traditional
theoriesofsecularization as wellas fromHans Blumenberg's criticism
of them. Againstthosewho claimthatthedivineattribute of infinity
was simplytransferred to the worldand to man's effortto master
it, Blumenbergargues that the idea of infinity was a permanently
problematicthemeforboth Greekmetaphysicsand Christiantheo-
logy,and thatit playeda similarproblematizing role withregardto
modernideas of progressand rationality. 19 Castoriadisrefersto
an "incestuousmarriage", ratherthansecularization pureand simple;
as he sees it, the new idea of the growthof productionas a self-
sufficientand supremegoal combineswith a rationalizedidea of
infinityto generatethemodernphantasmof infinite progresstowards
completedomination.Withinthis mixture,the idea of infinityis
thusa constructive ingredient,ratherthana symptomof difficulties
or disenchantment.The contrastsare sharperin the other case:
Castoriadis'interpretation of Atheniandemocracyas a movement
towardsan autonomoussocietyis opposedto thosewho stresseither
the class strugleor progresstowardsthe rule of law.2° Not thathe
but both of
ignoresthe role of social conflictsor legal institutions,
themderivetheirspecificmeaningfromthe social contextwhich
conferson the projectof autonomy.
The two centralsignifications of the modernworld thus appear
as creativetransformations ofearlierculturalorientations,ratherthan
creationsex nihilo;and thetransformation takesplace in such a way
thatit opens up a space for structuredconflictsof interpretations.
The interpretive aspect of the imaginarysignifications thus proves
to be as importantin this contextas it is on the more distinctively
modernside.

18 Cf. Castoriadis, "La polis grecque et la creation de la d&nocratie". in

Domaines de Vhomme,p. 261-306.
i» Cf. Hans Blumenberg,Sakulansierungund Selbstbehauptung.Frankfurt/
Main 1974,p. 90-102.As Blumenbergpointsout, Pascal was the firstto associate
withthe idea of progress.
the idea of infinity
20 For contemporary cf. R. Sealey, The
versionsof the rival interpretations,
AthenianRepublic:Democracyor the Rule of the Law, Stanford1987,and G.E.M.
de Ste. Croix,The Class Strugglein the AncientGreekWorld,London 1981.
22

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