09/15/18 CONSTI 1 Cases:

The Province of North Cotabato vs. The Gov’t of the Republic of the PH Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies
of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec.
7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding
itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial
or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) &
Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units
or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover,
the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite
locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x By the same token, when an act of the
President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern
(Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). (Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents of the MOA-
AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right
to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence
finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. E.O. No. 3 itself is
replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law; Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality,
not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any
local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The BJE is a
far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an
expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not
necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of
the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The
defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to
the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation
and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA: The MOA-AD provides that “any
provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying
an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the
MILF the amendment of the Constitution . It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her
oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as
she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. The
“suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards. Given the limited nature of
the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she
could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS) This strand begins with the statement that it is “the
birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as
defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that
ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain. Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein.
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It
illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot
be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.

Magallona vs. Ermita

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State
pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it
was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements
complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and
security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct
of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic
starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing
vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke
its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the
Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.

Oposa vs. Factoran

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a
clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Soriano vs. Laguardia

FACTS: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical
affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program
Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE: Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within
the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a
public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to
free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State
to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the
use of less offensive language.