THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110068. November 11, 1993.]

PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and

PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES UNION-TUPAS, Respondents.

Decision:

The principal issue posed in the present controversy is: what is the appropriate mode of
computation of the 13th month pay of employees who receive a fixed or guaranteed salary plus
sales commissions?c

Petitioner Philippine Duplicators, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution of

foreign-made copying machines and related consumables. In petitioner’s employ are salesmen who are
paid a fixed or guaranteed salary plus commissions, which commissions are computed on the selling
price of the duplicating machines sold by the respective salesmen.

P.D. No. 851, promulgated on 16 December 1975, prescribed payment of 13th month pay in the
following terms:jg

"Sec. 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more
than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not later than
December 24 of every year." (Emphasis supplied)

The Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851, issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment on 22 December 1975, defined the following basic terms:jgc

"(a) ‘13th month pay’ shall mean one-twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of a employee within a calendar
year;

(b) ‘basic salary’ shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for
services rendered, but may not include cost of living allowances granted pursuant to President Decree
No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No. 174, profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary
benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary of the employee at
the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975." (Emphasis supplied)

On 13 August 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino, then exercising both executive and legislative
authority, issued Memorandum Order No. 28 which provided as follows:jgc

"Sec. 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851 is hereby modified to the extent that all employers are hereby
required to pay all rank-and-file employees a 13th month pay not later than December 24 of every
year." (Emphasis supplied)

In connection with and in implementation of Memorandum Order No. 28, Minister Augusto S. Sanchez of
the then Ministry of Labor and Employment issued MOLE Explanatory Bulletin No. 86-12 on 24
November 1986. Item No. 5 (a) of this issuance read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission are also entitled to the
mandated 13th month pay, based on their total earning[s] during the calendar year, i.e., on both their
fixed and guaranteed wage and commission." 1 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent union, for and on behalf of its member-salesmen, asked petitioner corporation for
payment of 13th month pay computed on the basis of the salesmen’s fixed or guaranteed wages plus
commissions.

Petitioner corporation refused the union’s request, but stated it would respect an opinion from the MOLE.
On 17 November 1987, acting upon a request for opinion submitted by respondent union, Director
Augusto G. Sanchez of the Bureau of Working Conditions, MOLE, rendered an opinion to
respondent union declaring applicable the provisions of Explanatory Bulletin No. 86-12, Item No. 5
(a):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . [S]ince the salesmen of Philippine Duplicators are receiving a fixed basic wage plus commission on
sales and not purely on commission basis, they are entitled to receive 13th month pay provided that
they worked at least one (1) month during the calendar year. May we add at this point that in
computing such 13th month pay, the total commissions of said salesmen for the calendar year shall be
divided by twelve (12)." (Emphasis supplied)

Notwithstanding Director Sanchez’ opinion or ruling, petitioner refused to pay the claims of its
salesmen for 13th month pay computed on the basis of both fixed wage plus sales commissions.

Respondent union thereupon instituted a complaint against petitioner corporation for payment of the
demand of its salesmen-members for 13th month pay. The union averred that the salesmen received
13th month pay computed only on the basis of their fixed or guaranteed wage. Its basic contention was
that pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 28, above quoted, in relation to the Explanatory Bulletin No.
86-12, also quoted above, the 13th month pay of salesmen receiving a fixed salary and commissions
should be computed on the basis of their total earnings for the calendar year, i.e., on both the fixed salary
and sales commissions.ch

Petitioner- the term“basic salary” expressly excludes sales or incentive commissions from the coverage
of "basic salary" for purposes of computing 13th month pay.

The principal issue posed in the present controversy is: what is the appropriate mode of
computation of the 13th month pay of employees who receive a fixed or guaranteed salary plus
sales commissions?c

In the first place, Article 97 (f) of the Labor Code defines the term "wage" (which is equivalent to "salary,"
as used in P.D. No. 851 and Memorandum Order No. 28) in the following terms:

"(f) ‘Wage’ paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however, designated,
capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an
employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for
services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the
employee.’Fair and reasonable value’ shall not include any profit to the employer or to any person
affiliated with the employer." (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, there is no question that the sales commissions earned by salesmen who make
or close a sale of duplicating machines distributed by petitioner corporation, constitute part of
the compensation or remuneration paid to salesmen for serving as salesmen, and hence as part
of the "wage" or "salary" of petitioner’s salesmen. Indeed, it appears that petitioner pays it salesmen
a small fixed or guaranteed wage; the greater part of the salesmen’s wages or salaries being composed
of the sales or incentive commissions earned on actual sales closed by them. No doubt this particular
salary structure was intended for the benefit of petitioner corporation, on the apparent assumption that
thereby its salesmen would be moved to greater enterprise and diligence and close more sales in the
expectation of increasing their sales commissions. This, however, does not detract from the character of
such commissions as part of the salary or wage paid to each of its salesmen for rendering services to
petitioner corporation.

In the second place, contrary to petitioner’s contention, P.D. No. 851 in defining the term "basic
salary" did not exclude from the ambit thereof sales commissions which are paid along with fixed
or guaranteed wages. As pointed out above, what Section 2(b) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851 excluded from the scope of "basic salary" were "profit-sharing
payments and all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the
regular or basic salary of the employees . . .," which properly refer to "fringe benefits."

To recapitulate, the 13th month pay of employees paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus sales
commissions must be equivalent to one-twelfth (1/12) of the total earnings (fixed or guaranteed
wage-cum-sales commissions) during the calendar year. Considering that petitioner has excluded from
the computation of the 13th month pay the sales commissions earned by its individual salesmen, we
believe and so hold that petitioner must be held liable to pay for the deficiency.

G.R. No. 110068 February 15, 1995

PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES
UNION-TUPAS, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

This time, petitioner invoked the decision handed down by this Court, through its Second Division, on 10
December 1993 in the two (2) consolidated cases of Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. Hon. Dionisio de la
Serna and Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. vs. Hon. Cresenciano B.Trajano, in G.R. Nos. 92174 and 102552,
respectively. In its decision, the Second Division inter alia declared null and void the second paragraph of
Section 5 (a)1 of the Revised Guidelines issued by then Secretary of Labor Drilon. Petitioner submits that
the decision in the Duplicators case should now be considered as having been abandoned or reversed
by the Boie-Takeda decision, considering that the latter went "directly opposite and contrary to" the
conclusion reached in the former. Petitioner prays that the decision rendered in Duplicators be set aside
and another be entered directing the dismissal of the money claims of private respondent Philippine
Duplicators' Employees' Union.

Motions must fail.

PROCEDURAL:

The decision rendered in Boie-Takeda cannot serve as a precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis.
The Boie-Takeda decision was promulgated a month after this Court, (through its Third Division), had
rendered the decision in the instant case. Also, the petitioner's (first) Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision dated 10 November 1993 had already been denied, with finality, on 15 December
1993, i.e.; before the Boie-Takeda decision became final on 5 January 1994.
Preliminarily, we note that petitioner Duplicators did not put in issue the validity of the Revised Guidelines
on the Implementary on of the 13th Month Pay Law, issued on November 16, 1987, by then Labor
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, either in its Petition for Certiorari or in its (First) Motion for Reconsideration.
In fact, petitioner's counsel relied upon these Guidelines and asserted their validity in opposing the
decision rendered by public respondent NLRC. Any attempted change in petitioner's theory, at this late
stage of the proceedings, cannot be allowed

SUBSTANTIVE:

we do not agree with petitioner that the decision in Boie-Takeda is "directly opposite or contrary to" the
decision in the present (Philippine Duplicators). To the contrary, the doctrines enunciated in these two (2)
cases in fact co-exist one with the other. The two (2) cases present quite different factual situations
(although the same word "commissions" was used or invoked) the legal characterizations of which must
accordingly differ.

In Durplicators:

The sales commissions received for every duplicating machine sold constituted part of the basic
compensation or remuneration of the salesmen of Philippine Duplicators for doing their job. The portion
of the salary structure representing commissions simply comprised an automatic increment to the
monetary value initially assigned to each unit of work rendered by a salesman. Especially significant here
also is the fact that the fixed or guaranteed portion of the wages paid to the Philippine Duplicators'
salesmen represented only 15%-30% of an employee's total earnings in a year.

The Third Division held, correctly, that the sales commissions were an integral part of the basic salary
structure of Philippine Duplicators' employees salesmen. These commissions are not overtime
payments, nor profit-sharing payments nor any other fringe benefit. Thus, the salesmen's commissions,
comprising a pre-determined percent of the selling price of the goods sold by each salesman, were
properly included in the term "basic salary" for purposes of computing their 13th month pay.

In Boie-Takeda :

The so-called commissions "paid to or received by medical representatives of Boie-Takeda Chemicals or

by the rank and file employees of Philippine Fuji Xerox Co.," were excluded from the term "basic salary"
because these were paid to the medical representatives and rank-and-file employees as "productivity
bonuses."The Second Division characterized these payments as additional monetary benefits not
properly included in the term "basic salary" in computing their 13th month pay. We note that productivity
bonuses are generally tied to the productivity, or capacity for revenue production, of a corporation; such
bonuses closely resemble profit-sharing payments and have no clear director necessary relation to the
amount of work actually done by each individual employee. More generally, a bonus is an amount
granted and paid ex gratia to the employee; its payment constitutes an act of enlightened generosity and
self-interest on the part of the employer, rather than as a demandable or enforceable obligation.

Philippine Education Co. Inc. (PECO) v. Court of Industrial Relations: nature of bonus

As a rule a bonus is an amount granted and paid to an employee for his industry loyalty which
contributed to the success of the employer's business and made possible the realization of profits. It
is an act of generosity of the employer for which the employee ought to be thankful and grateful. It is
also granted by an enlightened employer to spur the employee to greater efforts for the success of
the business and realization of bigger profits. . . . . From the legal point of view a bonus is not and
mandable and enforceable obligation. It is so when It is made part of the wage or salary or
compensation. In such a case the latter would be a fixed amount and the former would be a
contingent one dependent upon the realization of profits
Traders Royal Bank v.National Labor Relations Commission:

A bonus is a "gratuity or act of liberality of the giver which the recipient has no right to demand as a
matter of right." (Aragon v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., 61 O.G. 4567). "It is something given in
addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient." The granting of a bonus is
basically a management prerogative which cannot be forced upon the employer "who may not be
obliged to assume the onerous burden of granting bonuses or other benefits aside from the
employee's basic salaries or wages

If an employer cannot be compelled to pay a productivity bonus to his employees, it should follow that
such productivity bonus, when given, should not be deemed to fall within the "basic salary" of employees
when the time comes to compute their 13th month pay.

It is also important to note that the purported "commissions" paid by the Boie-Takeda Company to its
medical representatives could not have been "sales commissions" in the same sense that Philippine
Duplicators paid its salesmen Sales commissions. Medical representatives are not salesmen; they do not
effect any sale of any article at all. In common commercial practice, in the Philippines and elsewhere, of
which we take judicial notice, medical representatives are employees engaged in the promotion of
pharmaceutical products or medical devices manufactured by their employer.

We recognize that both productivity bonuses and sales commissions may have an incentive effect. But
there is reason to distinguish one from the other here. Productivity bonuses are generally tied to the
productivity or profit generation of the employer corporation. Productivity bonuses are not directly
dependent on the extent an individual employee exerts himself. A productivity bonus is something extra
for which no specific additional services are rendered by any particular employee and hence not legally
demandable, absent a contractual undertaking to pay it. Sales commissions, on the other hand, such as
those paid in Duplicators, are intimately related to or directly proportional to the extent or energy of an
employee's endeavors. Commissions are paid upon the specific results achieved by a
salesman-employee. It is a percentage of the sales closed by a salesman and operates as an integral
part of such salesman's basic pay.

G.R. No. 168654 March 25, 2009

ZAYBER JOHN B. PROTACIO, Petitioner,

vs.
LAYA MANANGHAYA & CO. and/or MARIO T. MANANGHAYA, Respondents.

DECISION
Respondent KPMG Laya Mananghaya & Co. (respondent firm) is a general professional partnership duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent firm hired petitioner Zayber John B. Protacio as
Tax Manager on 01 April 1996. He was subsequently promoted to the position of Senior Tax Manager.
On 01 October 1997, petitioner was again promoted to the position of Tax Principal

However, on 30 August 1999, petitioner tendered his resignation effective 30 September 1999. Then, on
01 December 1999, petitioner sent a letter to respondent firm demanding the immediate payment of his
13th month pay, the cash commutation of his leave credits and the issuance of his 1999 Certificate of
Income Tax Withheld on Compensation. Petitioner sent to respondent firm two more demand letters for
the payment of his reimbursement claims under pain of the legal action.

Respondent firm failed to act upon the demand letters. Thus, on 15 December 1999, petitioner filed
before the NLRC a complaint for the non-issuance of petitioner’s W-2 tax form for 1999 and the
non-payment of the following benefits: (1) cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits in the amount of
₱55,467.60; (2) proportionate 13th month pay for the year 1999; (3) reimbursement claims in the amount
of ₱19,012.00; and (4) lump sum pay for the fiscal year 1999 in the amount of ₱674,756.70.

PETITIONER:

-that when he was promoted to the position of Tax Principal in October 1997, his compensation package
had consisted of a monthly gross compensation of ₱60,000.00, a 13th month pay and a lump sum
payment for the year 1997 in the amount of ₱240,000.00 that was paid to him on 08 February 1998.

-beginning 01 October 1998, his compensation package was revised as follows: (a) monthly gross
compensation of 竄ｱ 95,000.00, inclusive of nontaxable allowance; (b) 13th month pay; and (c) a lump
sum amount in addition to the aggregate monthly gross compensation.

-On 12 April 1999, petitioner received the lump sum amount of 竄ｱ 573,000.00 for the fiscal year ending
1998.

RESPONDENT FIRM:

- denied it had intentionally delayed the processing of petitioner’s claims but alleged that the abrupt
departure of petitioner and three other members of the firm’s Tax Division had created problems in the
determination of petitioner’s various accountabilities, which could be finished only by going over
voluminous documents.

- they had been taken aback upon learning about the labor case filed by petitioner when all along they
had done their best to facilitate the processing of his claims.

During the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter, respondent firm on three occasions sent check
payments to petitioner in the following amounts:

(1) ₱71,250.00, representing petitioner’s 13th month pay;

(2) (2) ₱54,824.18, as payments for the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits and reimbursement
claims; and

(3) (3) ₱10,762.57, for the refund of petitioner’s taxes withheld on his vacation leave credits. Petitioner’s
copies of his withholding tax certificates were sent to him along with the check payments.

Petitioner acknowledged the receipt of the 13th month pay but disputed the computation of the cash
value of his vacation leave credits and reimbursement claims.

LABOR ARBITER:
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner was not fully paid of the cash equivalent of the leave credits due
him because respondent firm had erroneously based the computation on a basic pay of ₱61,000.00. He
held that the evidence showed that petitioner’s monthly basic salary was ₱95,000.00 inclusive of the
other benefits that were deemed included and integrated in the basic salary and that respondent firm had
computed petitioner’s 13th month pay based on a monthly basic pay of ₱95,000.00; thus, the cash
commutation of the leave credits should also be based on this figure

The Labor Arbiter also ruled that petitioner was entitled to a year-end payment of 竄ｱ 573,000.00 on the
basis of the company policy of granting yearly lump sum payments to petitioner during all the years of
service and that respondent firm had failed to give petitioner the same benefit for the year 1999 without
any explanation.

NLRC:

From the amount of ₱12,681.00 awarded by the Labor Arbiter as payment for the reimbursement claims,
the NLRC lowered the same to ₱2,301.00 representing the amount which remained unpaid.As regards
the issues on the lump sum payments and cash equivalent of the leave credits, the NLRC affirmed the
findings of the Labor Arbiter.

CA: FURTHERED REDUCED

(1) ₱2,301.00 representing private respondent’s reimbursement claims;

(2) ₱9,802.83 representing the underpayment of the cash equivalent of private respondent’s unused
leave credits;

(3) ₱10,000.00 attorney’s fees.

ISYU: W/N CA CORRECT(TINANGGAL PATI YUNG LUMP SUM YEAR END EK EK, TSKA BINABAAN
YUNG BASE SA COMPUTATION NG LEAVE BENEFITS)

SC: YAS KASI IN THE NATURE OF A BONUS LANG YON

WRONG SA BASE SA LEAVE BENEFITS

After an assessment of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter with respect to the award of the year-end lump sum pay and the cash value of
petitioner’s leave credits. The appellate court held that while the lump sum payment was in the nature of
a proportionate share in the firm’s annual income to which petitioner was entitled, the payment thereof
was contingent upon the financial position of the firm. According to the Court of Appeals, since no
evidence was adduced showing the net income of the firm for fiscal year ending 1999 as well as
petitioner’s corresponding share therein, the amount awarded by the labor tribunals was a baseless
speculation and as such must be deleted.

On the other hand, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s award of the lump sum payment in the amount
of ₱573,000.00 on the basis that the payment thereof had become a company policy which could not be
withdrawn arbitrarily. Furthermore, the NLRC held that respondent firm had failed to controvert
petitioner’s claim that he was responsible for generating some ₱7,365,044.47 in cash revenue during the
fiscal year ending 1999.

While the amount was drawn from the annual net income of the firm, the distribution thereof to
non-partners or employees of the firm was not, strictly speaking, a profit-sharing arrangement between
petitioner and respondent firm contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding. The payment thereof to
non-partners of the firm like herein petitioner was discretionary on the part of the chairman and managing
partner coming from their authority to fix the compensation of any employee based on a share in the
partnership’s net income. The distribution being merely discretionary, the year-end lump sum
payment may properly be considered as a year-end bonus or incentive. Contrary to petitioner’s
claim, the granting of the year-end lump sum amount was precisely dependent on the firm’s net income;
hence, the same was payable only after the firm’s annual net income and cash position were determined.

By definition, a "bonus" is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver. It is something given in addition to
what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient.A bonus is granted and paid to an employee for
his industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer’s business and made possible
the realization of profits.Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It is so only
when it is made part of the wage or salary or compensation. When considered as part of the
compensation and therefore demandable and enforceable, the amount is usually fixed. If the amount
would be a contingent one dependent upon the realization of the profits, the bonus is also not
demandable and enforceable.

In the instant case, petitioner’s claim that the year-end lump sum represented the balance of his total
compensation package is incorrect. The fact remains that the amounts paid to petitioner on the two
occasions varied and were always dependent upon the firm’s financial position.

Moreover, in Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court held that if the bonus is paid only if profits
are realized or a certain amount of productivity achieved, it cannot be considered part of wages. If the
desired goal of production is not obtained, of the amount of actual work accomplished, the bonus does
not accrue. Only when the employer promises and agrees to give without any conditions imposed for its
payment, such as success of business or greater production or output, does the bonus become part of
the wage.

Petitioner’s assertion that he was responsible for generating revenues amounting to more than ₱7 million
remains a mere allegation in his pleadings. The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence
to substantiate the allegation.

The granting of a bonus is basically a management prerogative which cannot be forced upon the
employer who may not be obliged to assume the onerous burden of granting bonuses or other benefits
aside from the employees’ basic salaries or wages.Respondents had consistently maintained from the
start that petitioner was not entitled to the bonus as a matter of right. The payment of the year-end lump
sum bonus based upon the firm’s productivity or the individual performance of its employees was well
within respondent firm’s prerogative. Thus, respondent firm was also justified in declining to give the
bonus to petitioner on account of the latter’s unsatisfactory performance.

The granting of the year-end lump sum bonus was discretionary and conditional, thus, petitioner may not
question the basis for the granting of a mere privilege.1

With regard to the computation of the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits, the Court of Appeals
used a base figure of ₱71,250.00 representing petitioner’s monthly salary as opposed to ₱95,000.00
used by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. Meanwhile, respondents insist on a base figure of only ₱61,000.00,
which excludes the advance incentive pay of ₱15,000.00, transportation allowance of ₱15,000.00 and
representation allowance of ₱4,000.00, which petitioner regularly received every month. Because of a
lower base figure (representing the monthly salary) used by the appellate court, the cash equivalent of
petitioner’s leave credits was lowered from ₱28,407.08 to ₱9,802.83.lawphil.net

The monthly compensation of ₱71,250.00 used as base figure by the Court of Appeals is totally
without basis. As correctly held by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the evidence on record reveals that
petitioner was receiving a monthly compensation of ₱95,000.00 consisting of a basic salary of
₱61,000.00, advance incentive pay of ₱15,000.00, transportation allowance of ₱15,000.00 and
representation allowance of ₱4,000.00. These amounts totaling ₱95,000.00 are all deemed part of
petitioner’s monthly compensation package and, therefore, should be the basis in the cash
commutation of the petitioner’s leave credits. These allowances were customarily furnished by
respondent firm and regularly received by petitioner on top of the basic monthly pay of ₱61,000.00.
Moreover, the Labor Arbiter noted that respondent firm’s act of paying petitioner a 13th month-pay at the
rate of ₱95,000.00 was an admission on its part that petitioner’s basic monthly salary was ₱95,000.00

ON DIVISOR:
Court of Appeals, Labor Arbiter and NLRC - used a 30-working day divisor instead of 26 days which
petitioner insists. The Court of Appeals relied on Section 2, Rule IV, Book IIIof the implementing rules of
the Labor Code in using the 30-working day divisor. The provision essentially states that monthly-paid
employees are presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.

The provision has long been nullified in Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees’ Union (IBAAEU)
v. Hon. Inciong, etc., et al., where the Court ruled that the provision amended the Labor Code’s
provisions on holiday pay by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. In any case, the provision is
inapplicable to the instant case because it referred to the computation of holiday pay for monthly-paid
employees.

Petitioner’s claim that respondent firm used a 26-working day divisor is supported by the evidence on
record. In a letter addressed to petitioner, respondents’ counsel expressly admitted that respondent used
a 26-working day divisor. The Court is perplexed why the tribunals below used a 30-day divisor when
there was an express admission on respondents’ part that they used a 26-day divisor in the cash
commutation of leave credits. Thus, with a monthly compensation of ₱95,000.00 and using a 26-working
day divisor, petitioner’s daily rate is ₱3,653.85. Based on this rate, petitioner’s cash equivalent of his
leave credits of 23.5 is ₱85,865.48. Since petitioner has already received the amount ₱46,009.67, a
balance of ₱39,855.80 remains payable to petitioner.