DANISH AI BOOK I PHILO- SOPH Y: MUSEUM VOLUME 31 PRESS “1996CONTENTS Anders Engstrgm: Metaphor and Ambiguity .... 7 Claes Entzenberg: Metaphor, Interpretation, and Contextualization 21 Drude von der Fehr: From a Semiotic to a Neo-Pragmatic Understanding of Metaphoi 39 Nikolaj Frandsen: Understanding Metaphors with the Two Hemispheres of the Brain 49 Cynthia Grund: Kierkegaard: Metaphor and the Musical-Erotic .... 65 Thorsteinn Gylfason: The Irrelevance of Meaning ...... 89 Arto Haapala: Metaphors for Living — Living Metaphors .. 97 Thorleifur Hauksson: Man as Wolf (Once More) ..... . 107 Hans Siggaard Jensen: Visual Metaphors ....... MW Hroar Klempe: Musicalisation of Metaphor and Metaphoricalness in Music 125 Svend Erik Larsen: Metaphor — a Semiotic Perspective .... . 137 Paivi Mehtonen: Obscurity as a Linguistic Device: Introductory and Historical Notes ... _ 157 Erna Oesch: The Limits of Literal Meaning ... . 169 Veikko Rantala: Metaphor and Conceptual Change .. . 181 Stig Rasmussen: How can a Metaphor be Genuinely Illuminating? ......... 191 These articles are based upon papers read during the Nordic Workshop on Metaphor held at the University of Copenhagen, April 1995. The workshop was funded by NorFA. For this volume, the regular editorial board was joined by Cynthia M. Grund and Anders Engstrom.12 ANDERS ENGSTROM (2) Davidson has no account whatever of how it is that the literal sentence used is in any way connected up with what the hearer comes to notice. (Mark Johnson 1987, p. 72). On the one hand: If there can be given clear cut principles as to what we are led to notice, it is clear that Davidson’s position cannot at least preclude the thesis that metaphorical meaning is speaker’s meaning (though he still may be right in the view that metaphors do not have any special sentential meaning apart from the literal). In Black’s view, Davidson does implicitly commit to such a position, and this kind of criticism does seem relevant when Davidson for ex- ample claims: We say Mr. S. is like a pig because we know he isn’t one. If we had used a metaphor and said he was a pig, this would not be because we changed our mind about the facts but be- cause we chose to get the idea across a different way. (Op.cit. p. 39). On the other hand, if it is not possible to set any principle or restriction at all as to what we are supposedly led to notice, Davidson would obviously be right in his claim that a hearer cannot misinterpret a speaker, but it would be a position which made the process of interpreting metaphor obscure, i.e. it could simply not qualify as a theory of how metaphor works. Johnson’s sort of criticism is thus relevant when Davidson claims: But in fact there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, and much of what we are caused to notice is not propositional in character. When we try to say what a metaphor “means” we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention. (Op.cit. p. 44). This tension between the sorts of criticism that Davidson’s view has received, I suggest, reflects just how principle-led Davidson can allow the interpretation of metaphor to be in order that a hearer cannot misinterpret a speaker. As the quotes amply illustrate, Davidson is, to say the least, somewhat ambiguous as to how principle-led the interpretation of metaphor can be.” I think, however, that both of these criticisms are misguided to a degree. The subtlety of Davidson’s position is that he views metaphor neither as interpret- able in any simple sort of fashion, nor does he view metaphor as falling in the domain of the non-interpretable and obscure. But Davidson's view does re- quire a mediation between these two limits as to how principle-led the inter- pretation of metaphor is. A mediation as to what counted as a proper interpre- tation of metaphor within a community of speakers would be restricted to some extent, but there would be no clearly preferred interpretation.’ If there exists an inclination towards certain interpretations within a community of