See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/267599041

Practical Methodology of Predictive Maintenance for Pipelines

Conference Paper · January 2010

DOI: 10.1115/IPC2010-31197

CITATIONS READS

4 621

2 authors:

S.A. Timashev Anna Viktorovna Bushinskaya

Russian Academy of Sciences Science and Engineering Center «Reliability and Safety of Large Systems and Machin…
67 PUBLICATIONS   100 CITATIONS    23 PUBLICATIONS   49 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

diagnostica & eliabilityof pipeline systems View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Anna Viktorovna Bushinskaya on 29 July 2015.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Proceedings of the 8th International Pipeline Conference
IPC2010
September 27- October 1, 2010, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

IPC2010-31197

PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY OF PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR PIPELINES

S.A. Timashev, A.V. Bushinskaya

Science and Engineering Center “Reliability and Safety of Large Systems”

Ural Branch Russian Academy of Sciences
Ekaterinburg, 620049
Russia

ABSTRACT pipeline needs immediate repair; dd = 100%wt. Here Qth is the

Predictive maintenance (PdM) is the leading edge type of
maintenance. Its principles are currently broadly used to
maintain industrial assets [16]. Yet PdM is as yet not embraced
by the pipeline industry. The paper describes a comprehensive
practical risk based methodology of predictive maintenance of
pipelines for different criteria of failure. For pipeline systems
the main criterion is integrity.
One of the main causes of loss of containment is pipe wall
defects which grow in time. Any type of analysis of pipeline
state (residual life time, probability of failure (POF), etc.,) is
based on the sizes of discovered defects, which are assessed
during the ILI or DA.
In the developed methodology pipeline strength is assessed
using one of the five internationally recognized design codes
(the B31G, B31mod, DNV, Battelle, Shell 92). The pipeline
POF is calculated by the comprehensive Gram-Charlier-
Edgeworth method [14]. Having in mind that the repair actions
are executed on particular cross-sections of the pipeline, the
POF are calculated for each defect present in the pipeline.
When calculating POFs, the defect sizes (depth, length and
width), wall thickness and pipe diameter, SMYS of the pipe
material, the radial and longitudinal corrosion rates, and
operating pressure (OP) are considered random variables each
distributed according to its PDF.
In the proposed method of PdM of pipelines the remaining life
time can be assessed using following criteria: POF = Qth; dd =
80%wt; SMOP = МAОР; ERF = MAOP/SMOP, if ERF ≥ 1, the
ultimate permissible POF, dd is the depth of the most dangerous
defect, wt is pipe wall thickness, SMOP is the maximal safe
operating pressure SMOP = DF·Pf, MAOP is the Maximum
Allowable Operating Pressure, Pf is the failure pressure, DF is
the design factor (for B31Gmod DF = 1.39), ERF is the
Estimated Repair Factor. The above criteria are arranged in
descending order according to the growing level of their
severity in time.
The prediction of future sizes of growing defects and the
pipeline remaining life time are obtained by using consistent
assessments of their corrosion rates CRs. In the PdM
methodology these CRs may be considered as deterministic,
semi-probabilistic or fully stochastic values. Formulas are
given for assessing the CRs using results of one ILI, two
consecutive ILI, with or without verification measurements,
and for the case when several independent types of
measurements are used to assess the defect sizes.
The paper describes results of implementation of the developed
methodology on a real life pipeline. The time to reach each of
the limit states given above was calculated, using results of two
consecutive ILI divided by a three year interval. Knowledge of
these arrival times permits minimizing the maintenance
expenditures without creating any threats to its integrity and
safety.

1
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
1. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate goal of pipeline maintenance, including integrity
and risk control is to minimize overall maintenance/monitoring/
inspection costs and breakdown consequences. In order to
achieve this goal, some maintenance principles have to be used
[16], [12].
There exist three main principles of systems maintenance ([19],
[15]). One is based on the notion of inherent resource, which is
a random variable or function. The other two use reliability
level or current condition of the system.
Historically pipelines were first used with respect to their
design lifetime (the least economical method), as being highly
critical infrastructures, but poorly monitored due to lack of
diagnostic instruments at that time [7]. Pipelines failures lead to
great economic losses (including pollution of environment)
and, sometimes, to injuries and/or loss of human lives. The
design life of pipelines is chosen based on the size of the
deposit, and on the forecast rate of oil/gas extraction. Pipelines
should not be allowed to fail in a manner that causes spill or
pollution of the environment, injuries or casualties. Therefore,
reactive maintenance is the worst choice of maintenance for
pipelines, although it still takes place in a number of cases.
The pipelines should be operated taking into account their
current condition and purpose of usage. Pipelines should be
maintained when their condition becomes warning or a hazard
issue. This is proactive maintenance. There are different kinds
of proactive maintenance – preventive, reliability based,
condition based, predictive, etc. The most suited method of
pipeline maintenance is based on monitoring their POF
(reliability (POF) and remaining life [13], [15]-[17]).
This approach can also be adopted for maintaining pipelines,
with some adjustments that take into account the main specifics
of pipelines and the available technology for their inspection.
The main specifics of pipeline diagnostics are: high cost of
diagnostics and verification; lack of necessary and sufficient
numbers of accurate measurements; absence of consistent
transparent recommendations on how to analyze results of
measurements containing intrinsic errors.
Remaining lifetime (RL) is a conditional random time of
transition of a pipeline segment from its present state to a limit
state. RL is a random variable (RV), because it depends on
many parameters random by nature and on a set of restrictions,
rules and decisions imposed by the pipeline performance and
ILI technology. For pipelines all limit states can be subdivided
into deformation type limit states (elastic-plastic deformation)
and integrity-loss limit states (leak, rupture). For risk analysis
the main limit state is integrity-loss limit states (leak or
rupture).
For a full description of a RV it is necessary and sufficient to
construct its probability density function (PDF). In order to
construct the RL PDF, it's necessary to have the following:
degradation models; algorithms for calculating the conditional
PDF's; a full group of assumed future performance scenarios
(in the form of event / decision / fault trees), and the relevant
database. Maximum economic value is obtained by assessing
the remaining lifetime (RL) for each individual defective pipe
run [6], [12].
Historically predictive maintenance, when introduced, did not
stand up to the expectations because, in the first place, there
were no means created to define the levels of pipeline quality
degradation, which should trigger the maintenance action.The
comprehensive theory of how to assign the levels that trigger
inspection/monitoring and maintenance was developed in [19],
[16]. For more details see [18]-[21], [15], [16], [13], [12]. In
this paper a real life case is described using some of the ideas
from of the above sources.
2. CRITERIA FOR PIPELINE RESIDUAL LIFE
ASSESSMENT
In this paper assessment of the pipeline residual life was
performed using several pipeline limit states (LS) criteria. They
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Criteria used for assessing pipeline remaining life
LS Criteria Description
Pipeline probability of failure POF is equal to
POF = Qth
the ultimate permissible POF Qth.
The depth of the most dangerous defect dd is
dd = 80%wt
equal to 80% of the pipe wall wt.
The maximal safe operating pressure SMOP is
SMOP = МAОР
equal to the maximal allowable operating
(ERF = 1)
pressure (МAОР).
The depth of the most dangerous defect dd is
dd = 100%wt
equal to 100% of the pipe wall wt.
The failure pressure is equal to the maximal
MAOP = Pf
allowable operational pressure
2.1. Assessment of the pipeline POF
Pipeline probability of failure (POF) assessment is performed
using the Gram-Charlier-Edgeworth method [14]. In this
method both the leak and the rupture criteria of pipeline
integrity loss are utilized. Several independent methods of
pipeline reliability assessment are implemented while using the
following worldwide accepted pipeline design codes: B31G,
modified B31G, Battelle, DNV, and Shell-92.
In order to obtain consistent and authentic assessments of
reliability of real life pipelines both types of possible pipeline
integrity loss failure (leak and rupture) are taken into account
(with maximal possible completeness), as well as the
probabilistic character of pipe geometry, pipe material
properties, sizes of defects which are present in pipe wall
thickness, operating pressure, corrosion rates, etc.
The following main uncertainties which influence pipeline
integrity are considered as random variables (RVs): the defects’
depth and length; pipe wall thickness and diameter; pipe
material SMYS; radial and longitudinal corrosion rates (needed
when prognosis is made for a certain time depth) and MOP.
The number of variables considered random can change
depending on time and the issue in consideration.
The method constitutes itself as an assessment of the
probability that the limit states function (LSF) for a pipe cross
section is a positive value at time t. The LSF is constructed as
2
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
the difference between the value of the function which
describes the burst pressure, and the value of the operating
pressure. For full description of the GSE reliability assessment
method Authors refer the Reader to paper [14].
2.2. Estimated Repair Factor
The Estimated Repair Factor is defined as:
MAOP
ERF  (1)
SMOP
Here SMOP is safe maximum operating pressure:
SMOP = DF·Pf (2)
Where Pf is the failure pressure (assessed using one of the
world wide accepted codes B31G, modified B31G, Battelle,
DNV, and Shell-92), DF is the design factor.
The values of the design factor for the three design codes
depending on the on-shore pipeline location class are given in
Table 2.
Table 2. Design factors for different location classifications
[B31.8]
Design code Location class Design factor
1 0.72
B31G, modified 2 0.60
B31G, DNV 3 0.50
4 0.40
According the DNV code (see [1]), SMOP is calculated as:
SMOP  DFt  Pf
Where DFt  MF  DF is total usage factor, MF = 0.9 is the
modeling factor (based on a 95% confidence interval).
If for the pipe cross-section in consideration with a
defect ERF  1 , the defect is subject to immediate repair.
3. METHODS OF CORROSION RATE ASSESSMENTS
Any type of analysis of the future state of a pipeline, like
residual strength, POF, etc., is based on the predicted sizes of
the defects which were detected during ILI or DA.
If the rate of the depth and the length of a corrosion defect
change are close to linear in time, then the defect parameters at
time t can be assessed using following formula:
d  t   d 0  vd  t
(3)
l  t   l0  vl  t
Where d0 , l0 are the depth and the length of the defect at the
time of performing the ILI; vd , vl are, correspondingly, the CRs
in the radial and the longitudinal directions.
The main problem in providing for the integrity and safe
operation of pipelines lies in obtaining the needed quality of the
prediction of the future technical condition (state) of the
pipeline. In order to achieve such quality of forecasting the
future sizes of defects, it is necessary to accurately assess the
corrosion rates. Traditionally it is presumed that the CRs are
constant values.
For the case when results of two sequential ILI are available,
the CRs are defined as the difference between the
corresponding parameters of the defects, as given by the first
and second ILI, divided by the time between these ILIs:
p  pP
CR  L (4)
tL  tP
Where pP , pL are, correspondingly, the parameters of the defect
as measured during the last and the previous ILIs; tP , tL are the
times of conducting, correspondingly, the previous and the last
ILI.
In real life CRs are random variables (RVs). Some pipeline
operators [5] realizing this fact, utilize the following method of
forecasting the future state of the pipeline, based on predicting
a maximal possible CR. When assessing the maximal possible
rate of defect growth it is assumed that the probability density
function (PDF) of the depths of the n defects, which are
actually present in the pipeline transporting oil or gas
condensate substances, is, as a rule, described by the Weibull
law. The two-parameter Weibull CDF has the form:
F ( d )  1  e ( d /  )
b
Where d is the defect depth, α and b are the PDF parameters.
The maximal defect depth, which is possessed or exceeded by
the (1- γ) portion of the total number of defects found during
the ILI, is defined according to following formula (expression
for the Weibull PDF quantile):
dmax       ln(1   )  b
1
(5)
In the case when the distribution of the defect set is normal or
approximately normal, the depth of the defect with probability γ
is assessed using the formula for the quantile of the normal
distribution:
dmax      d  d (6)
Where    is the inverse of the standard normal cdf, d is
the sample average of the defects depth,  d is the sample
standard deviation of the defects depth, n is the number of
defects present in the pipeline.
If results of two sequential ILs are available, then the maximal
CR, with a probability of  , is defined by formula:
d max  L  d max  P
amax 
tL  tP
Here dmax  P , dmax  L are the maximal depths of the defects as
defined by formula (5) or (6), for the previous (P) and the last
(L) ILI correspondingly.
If results of only one ILI are available, then the maximal, with
probability  , CR is defined according formula:
d max 
amax 
d
Where  d is the net time of pipeline operation before the time
of conducting the ILI (years).
Consider two more approaches to assessing CRs as RVs.
According to the first approach the CR is a RV with following
parameters:
3
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
 M  pL   M  p P  pL  pP When individual corrosion rate for a specific defect is not
M CR    possible to define physically, i.e., when the defect was not
tL  tP tL  tP
(7) found during the previous ILI, or when the defects were,
D  pL   D  p P 
D CR  
according to the previous ILI, larger, than according to the last
 tL  tP  ILI, the external corrosion rate is assumed to be, according to
2

NACE recommendations [10], 0.016 in/yr, or these defects are

Here М is the mathematical expectation, D is the variance, taken out of consideration.
pP , pL – are the defect parameters, which are considered as
RVs with mathematical expectation, equal to the ILI tool 4. CRITICAL DEFECTS DEPTHS AND SEPARATION
readings and SD, equal to ILI tool measurement errors (ME) OF THE TYPES OF PIPELINE FAILURE
SD. The type of failure of a pipeline defect is of great interest
In order to assess the ILI tool ME SD it is possible to use the because it allows prediction of whether the pipeline will burst,
method described in [2], or utilize accuracy characteristics of producing a great spill, or will leak, with releasing much
the used ILI tool, according its specifications. For instance, smaller amount of oil/gas. The consequences in terms of fines
when measuring the depth of a pitting corrosion by a MFL and cleaning expenses for both cases dramatically differ.
instrument with an 80% certainty (reliability), the tolerance is The rule of separating the leak type defects from the rupture
±10%wt. Then the standard deviation SD of MEs for the defect type defects has the following form:
depth would be: If d  t   dc  t  , the failure occurs as a rupture; in the contrary
10% wt
SD  (8) case the failure is of the leak type.
1.28 The critical defect depths for a moment of time t is defined
Taking into account eq. (8), the CR variance from eqs. (7) can according to B31Gmod by formula:
be rewritten as:   
1 h
D CR  
2 SD 2 wt  y 
(9) dc  t   
 tL  tP 
2
0.85 1   h M t 1 
The second approach uses the principle of local corrosion     
 y 
activity [11], according to which each defect has an associated
Where
population, defined as being in the (n) – th vicinity of the
defect in consideration immediately up- and downstream.  l 2 t  l 4 t 
 M  1  0,6275   0,003375 for l  t   50 D  wt
According to this approach each of the defects will be  D  wt ( D  wt )2
associated with its own local corrosion rate, defined as random 
 l 2 t 
variable, with its average established by eqs. (10) and (11)
 M  0,032  3,3 for l  t   50 D  wt
respectively, depending on whether the defect is internal or  D  wt
external: MAOP  D
j  n i j  n i h  ,  y  SMYS  10000 psi .
d
j i  n
j d
j i  n
j
2 wt
The sizes of defect depths and lengths at moment of time t are
RLi  (10) RLi  (11)
(2n  1)ts (2n  1)ts  tc assessed using formulas (3).
The surfaces of burst pressures as a function of the
Where dj is the individual metal-loss depth [mm], tc is the
dimensionless depth and length of the defect are given in Figs.
coating degradation lag [years], ts is the pipeline service life 1, 2 (shown in red), depending on the used design code. The
[years]. grey plane divides these surfaces into two unequal size subsets.
The associated standard deviation values are defined by The larger subset of defect sizes closer to the origin is
equation: responsible for the burst type failure. The second, smaller,
 Li  RLi  COV (12) subset is responsible for the leak type failure of the pipeline.
Where RLi is the local average defect depth corrosion rate
[mm/year], COV is the coefficient of variance of corrosion rate
sample population.
The coefficient of variance (COV) values should be determined
based on the ILI or electrical resistance probes (ERP) data,
depending on which is the most appropriate for representing the
future anticipated corrosion process.
Using the obtained CRs it is possible to assess the future defect
sizes utilizing formula (3) and, consequently, assess the
pipeline remaining life.

4
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
 Design factor 0.72

The defect depths and lengths were obtained as a result of the

two last ILIs. The 2005 ILI revealed 22 external defects of the
loss of metal type; the 2008 ILI gave 69 external defects of the
same type.

5.1. Pipeline residual strength

The visualization of SMOP, calculated by formula (2),
according to B31G and B31G mod, for the years 2005 and
2008 are presented in Fig. 1. The values of ERF, calculated by
formula (1), for each defect found in 2005 and 2008 are shown
in Fig. 3.

Figure 1. The pipe burst pressure surface, according B31G

code (in red), and the plane (in grey) which divides this
surface into the rupture and leak type failure subsets

Figure 3. SMOP for pipe cross sections with a defect

according to the B31G and modified B31G codes

Figure 2. The pipe burst pressure surface, according B31G

mod code (in red), and the plane (in grey) which divides this
surface into the rupture and leak type failure subsets

5. SOME RESULTS OF ANALYSIS FOR A REAL CASE

PIPELINE
The analysis presented below was conducted for an on-shore
pipeline. Its parameters are given in Table 3.

Table 3. The pipeline parameters

Notation
Pipe diameter D, in
Pipe wall thickness wt, in
Yield stress (SMYS), psi
Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
(MAOP), psi
Tolerance 15%wt (with 80% certainty),
in
Value
12.75
Figure 4. ERF according to the B31G and modified B31G
0.50 codes for pipe cross sections with a defect
42.00·103 and 52.00·103
It can be seen that according to Figs. 3 and 4 for all the found
1037.00 defects pressure SMOP is more than two times more than
MAOP. Hence, as of 2008 ILI, not a single defect needs repair.
7.50·10-2

5
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
 According to Table 5 and Fig. 5 (which actually is a
visualization of Table 5)., the maximal POF for the whole
5.2 Pipeline POF pipeline is when all the pipeline parameters and the defects’
Below results of several variants of calculations are presented sizes are considered as RVs; this POF is minimal when the
using the GCE methodology [14]. They differ in what pipeline parameters are considered as deterministic values, and
parameters of the pipeline are considered random. The initial the defects parameters are RVs.
data used is presented in Table 4. The POF in this particular case for the time of the second ILI
(2008) is negligible for all three approaches considered.
Table 4. The pipeline Parameters of RVs Hence, the main question for the Operator of the pipeline is as
Сoefficient of follows:
Mathematical
Symbol Variation PDF How corrosion will affect the integrity of the pipeline in the
expectation
(COV) near future and what optimal (lean) predictive maintenance
wt, in 0.50 0.02 Normal actions should be planned beforehand and executed in the most
D, in 12.75 0.02 Normal appropriate time?
SMYS, psi 42.00·103 or 52.00·103 0.07 Normal
MAOP, psi 1037.00 0.10 Normal

In this study the probability of failure of the whole pipeline is

defined as the POF of its weakest link, which is the cross
section of the pipe with the most dangerous (largest) defect.
Case #1. All pipeline parameters are considered deterministic.
Defects’ depth and length considered as random variables
(RVs)
All pipeline parameters, except defect sizes, are considered as
deterministic and given in Table. 3. Defects’ depth and length
are considered as random variables, normally distributed with
the mean equal to raw ILI readings and with standard deviation
tolerance 15% wt
SD    0.06 in.
1.28 1.28
In this case the POF of the whole pipeline is equal to zero (see
Table 5). Figure 5. Pipeline POF, calculated under different
Case #2. All pipeline parameters are considered as RVs. The assumptions
depths and lengths of defects are considered as deterministic
values with tolerances added. 5.3. Corrosion rates
All pipeline parameters are considered as RVs (see Table 4). Two design cases are considered: when the corrosion rates are
The depths and lengths of defects are considered as deterministic (using eq. (4)) and when they are RVs (using eq.
deterministic values with tolerances 15%wt = 7.50·10-2 inch (7) for the mean and eq. (9) for the variance).
added. In cases, when the corrosion rate was not possible to define,
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. i.e., when the defect was absent in 2005 or the corrosion rate is
Case #3. All parameters of the pipeline and its defects equal to zero (for defects which sizes appeared to be larger in
considered as RVs. 2005 than in 2008, according to corresponding ILIs), the mean
All parameters of the pipeline and the defects are considered as of the corrosion rate is taken as 0.016 in/yr, and the variance is
RVs. The depths and the lengths of the defects are assumed to taken according the eq. (9).
be normally distributed with the mean equal to the raw ILI
data, and the SD  0.059 in. For the rest of RVs their PDFs and 5.4. The prediction of defect depths and lengths
their parameters are shown in Table 4. The prediction of defect depths and lengths at time t are defined
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. by formulas (3) using the calculated above corrosion rates.
The forecast is five years deep, which is the generally accepted
Table 5. POF of the whole pipeline in the pipeline industry depth of prediction.
2005 ILI 2008 ILI Consider six defects with largest depths (≥ 39%wt), which
B31G B31G mod B31G B31G mod parameters are given in Table 6.
Case #1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 6. Most dangerous six anomalies as per 2008 ILI
Case #2 8.88·10-16 0.00 3.70·10-13 0.00
Depth,
Case #3 4.59·10-14 0.00 8.40·10-11 2.37·10-12 ID # Log distance, ft
%wt
Depth, in Length, in Width, in
1 3806.20 39.00 0.20 2.24 2.77

6
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
 2 6786.50 40.90 0.20 2.83 4.0
3 8030.80 56.10 0.28 3.18 4.61
4 9091.40 38.40 0.19 1.41 2.77
5 17015.00 45.00 0.23 3.89 8.31
6 18931.30 45.20 0.23 2.95 7.38

The predicted depths of these defects are shown in Fig. 6.

Figure 7. Predicted SMOP for Six Deepest Anomalies as per

2008 ILI

In Figs. 8 and 9 the surfaces of SMOP and MAOP for the

Figure 6. Defect Depths of Top Six Anomalies as per 2008
ILI
In Fig. 6 the blue vertical lines define the overall tolerance of
the ILI tool, equal ±15%wt. From Fig. 4 it can be seen that the
most dangerous is defect #3. At the current corrosion rate, even
without accounting for the tolerance, already in 2011(7-Feb-
2011) the depth of this defect will be equal to 80% wt, and in
2013 (20-Feb-2013) will be equal to pipe wall thickness.
The defect #2, with accounting for the ILI tool tolerance, will
be 80% wt only in 2013.
All other defects, even with accounting for the tolerance will be
in 2013 below the 80% wt mark.
5.5. The prediction of safe maximal operating pressure
The prediction of SMOP at time t is defined by formula (2). In
Fig. 7 the graphical interpretation is given of the results of
conducted calculus for the six most dangerous defects, which
parameters are given in Table 6.
According to B31Gmod, in Fig. 7 SMOP for the defect #3 for
the year 2012 will be smaller than МAОР (after 16-Jul-2012);
hence, it is necessary before 2012 to repair the defect.
pipeline in consideration are constructed. SMOP is built as a
function of two dimensionless variables: defect’s depth and
length. The black dots on the figures represent the SMOP of the
most dangerous defect #3, depending on the forecast time t.
The last dot (farthest from the origin) corresponds to the
moment of time t = 4yrs (2012).
The intersection of the SMOP surface with the MAOP plane
divides the safe region of SMOP from the failure region of
SMOP. It can be seen, that for the code B31G mod the last dot
in the Fig. 9 belongs to the failure region.
Pressure, psi
SMOP
2008
2009
2010
2011
MAOP
2012
d/t
l Dt
Figure 8. The SMOP surface, according to the B31G code,
the MAOP plane and the degradation trajectory for the
most dangerous defect of the pipeline

7
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
 Pressure, psi 3 1.29·10-7 1.70·10-4 1.31·10-2 1.04·10-1 1.00
4 0.00 1.11·10-16 1.11·10-15 3.56·10-14 2.13·10-12
5 1.09·10-8 3.85·10-6 2.90·10-4 4.05·10-3 1.95·10-2
6 4.91·10-12 3.56·10-10 4.25·10-8 2.69·10-6 6.40·10-5
SMOP

2009 Table 9. Predicted POF for pipe cross sections with defect
2010 according to modified B31G code
POF of pipe cross section with defect, for moments of time t
2011 Defect #
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
MAOP 1 0.00 4.31·10-14 3.82·10-9 8.67·10-6 7.5·10-4
2012 2 8.66·10-15 1.41·10-9 1.03·10-5 1.51·10-3 1.96·10-2
-7
3 8.02·10 3.88·10-3 1.16·10-1 3.70·10-1 1.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.44·10-15
5 2.01·10-9 6.75·10-6 8.80·10-4 1.15·10-2 4.56·10-2
l Dt
d/t 6 3.33·10-15 7.77·10-12 1.38·10-8 3.75·10-6 1.60·10-4
Figure 9. The SMOP surface, according to the B31G mod
code, the MAOP plane and the degradation trajectory for According to Table 9, on the condition that the ultimate
the most dangerous defect of the pipeline permissible POF is 10-7 1/km year and with the present
corrosion rate CR, the defect # 3 will need repair already after
Analysis conducted in this Section, related to the most 1 year after the last inspection (in 2009); the defect # 5 – after
dangerous defect, shows that this defect (#3) should be 2 years (in 2010).
removed or repaired as soon as in 2012. Consider defects that are located in a one kilometer stretch of
the pipeline which includes the defect # 3 (not necessarily
5.6. Prediction of pipeline POF located at the center of the segment). These defects are nine in
Here two design cases are considered: when the corrosion rates number. Calculate now the variance based on only these ten
CRs are deterministic and when they are RVs. defects (including defect # 3): D[vrc] = 1.38·10-4 in2, D[vlc] =
For the case when the CRs are considered as normally 3.95·10-2 in2 (compare with corresponding variances calculated
distributed RVs, the means of the CRs of defects were found by based on the assessment of the ILI tool tolerance, see Table 7).
eqn. (7) and the variances of the CRs, according eqn. (9), are Using these variances, assess the predicted POF for the pipe
equal to 2SD2 / 9  7.70 104 in2 for all defects. Here cross-section which contains the defect # 3 (see Table 10).
SD  0.06 in. Other initial data are considered as RVs and their
Table 10. Predicted POF for pipe cross section with defect
parameters are given in Table 4.
#3. The local (censored) variance is used
The predicted POF was defined for the six most dangerous
POF of pipe cross section with defect, for moments of
defects which parameters are given in Table 6. The corrosion
Code time t
rates were considered as RVs, parameters of which are shown
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
in Table 7. The results of calculus are given in Tables 8, 9.
B31G 3.37·10-8 6.12·10-6 3.90·10-4 8.88·10-3 1.00
-7 -4 -2 -1
Table 7. The PDF parameters of the CRs of the six most B31Gmod 1.51·10 2.90·10 2.53·10 2.49·10 1.00
dangerous defects
Radial CR Longitudinal-axis CR Implementation of the local variances of CRs leads, as can be
Defect #
Mean, in
Variance,
Mean, in
Variance, observed in this particular case, to a smaller radial CR variance
in2 in2 but a much larger longitudinal CR variance, as compared to the
1 0.02 0.31 general case, when the CRs are assessed using the ILI tool
2 0.02 0.39 tolerance value, as given by the Vendor. At the same time, the
3 0.05 0.47 pipeline POF is also smaller as compared to the general case.
7.70·10-4 7.70·10-4
4 0.02 0.02 It should be noted that, when considering CR of defects as
5 0.01 1.07
RVs, the difference between the POF is substantial and can be,
6 0.01 0.02
on the average, of four orders of magnitude (104), when
compared to the case when considering CRs as DVs.
Table 8. Predicted POF for pipe cross sections with defect This situation calls for drastically raising the measurement
according to B31G code accuracy of defect sizes.
POF of pipe cross section with defect, for moments of time t
Defect # 5.7. Residual time to pipeline repair/failure criteria
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 After the last ILI the decision making person (DMP) has to
1 5.62·10-14 2.79·10-11 2.74·10-8 7.48·10-6 3.40·10-4 make up her/his mind as to when and where to conduct the
2 9.54·10-12 9.39·10-9 5.32·10-6 4.20·10-4 5.99·10-3

8
Copyright © 2010 by ASME
needed maintenance/repair actions or the next ILI. In order to conducting the ILI
figure this out, the DMP needs to know what time is left from POF of pipe cross-section
the time of the last ILI and the set of prescriptive or physical with defect = 10-6 11-Sep-2008 15 (0.5)
criteria that govern the specific pipeline operation. The (B31Gmod)*
prescriptive criteria serve as warning or alarm levels of POF POF of pipe cross-section
10-Oct-2008 29 (1.0)
with defect = 10-7 (B31G)*
that trigger maintenance action [19], [16], [12].
POF of pipe cross-section
There are different approaches in the pipeline industry to with defect = 10-5 8-Dec-2008 59 (2.0)
assessing the residual time to pipeline repair/failure criteria, (B31Gmod)*
i.e., 0.8wt defect depth, POF reaching a prescribed value for POF of pipe cross-section
pipelines of specific type (on-shore, off-shore, production ,etc.), 13-Feb-2009 67 (2.2)
with defect = 10-6 (B31G)*
or actual loss of integrity (leak, rupture). POF of pipe cross-section
16-Jun-2009 123 (4.1)
Each approach yields its own assessments. These assessments with defect = 10-5 (B31G)*
are given below for the most dangerous defect #3, in DEFECT DEPTH= 80%wt 25-Jul-2009 39 (1.3)
chronological order, starting with the time to reach the POF= SMOP = МAОР (B31Gmod) 12-Mar-2011 595 (9.8)
10-7, from the moment of conducting the last ILI. DEFECT DEPTH= 100%wt 12-Aug-2011 153 (5.1)
Tables 11 and 12 also give the times between the time when * - Parameters of the defects (depth, length, CRs) and of the pipeline (diameter,
wall thickness, SMYS, MAOP) are considered as RVs.
each defect reaches the 80%wt criteria and the moment of time
the pipeline loses its integrity (by leak or rupture).
The times given in the last column of Tables 11 and 12 are
Table 11. Times of failure for the most dangerous defect #3, valid only for the conditions described in detail above. For
according to different criteria safety reasons these time intervals can be divided by a safety
Time between the factor (SF > 1.0, its value determined/assessed by the
Predicted date moments of Operator), when the actual conditions differ from the ones
Used criteria analyzed in the paper, and given in monthly increments (shown
of defect failure arrival of adjacent
criteria, days (mo) in brackets).
POF of pipe cross-section The Figure 10 is a visualization of Table 11. It turns out that the
353 (11.7)
with defect = 10-7 24-Jun-2009 most sensitive criteria is, obviously, POF = 10-7, using the
(from the last ILI)
(B31Gmod)* B31G mod. All criteria related to specific values of POF using
POF of pipe cross-section different design codes serve as warning and alarm levels of
15-Aug-2009 52 (1.7)
with defect = 10-7 (B31G)* pipeline safety. They provide needed awareness for the DMP or
POF of pipe cross-section
trigger different actions depending on the engineering
with defect = 10-6 3-Sep-2009 19 (0.7)
(B31Gmod)* principles used by the Operator. The last three criteria (in
POF of pipe cross-section capital letters in Tables 11 and 12) are physical criteria because
with defect = 10-5 19-Nov-2009 77 (2.5) they describe triggered actions or actual loss of containment by
(B31Gmod)* the pipeline. The warning level leads to activity which is ruled
POF of pipe cross-section by the fact that there is a relatively large amount of time before
30-Nov-2009 11 (0.3)
with defect = 10-6 (B31G)* advancement of a leak or rupture, which may be used by the
POF of pipe cross-section Operator to plan and carefully execute necessary actions. The
22-Mar-2010 112 (2.7)
with defect = 10-5 (B31G)* alarm level triggers, in general, more fast activity because the
DEFECT DEPTH = 80%wt 7-Feb-2011 322 (6.7) time to actual failure is much shorter.
SMOP = МAОР (B31Gmod) 16-Jul-2012 519 (17.3)
DEFECT DEPTH = 100%wt 20-Feb-2013 225 (7.5)

Table 12. Times of failure for the most dangerous defect #3,
according to different criteria (ILI tool tolerance added to
all defect sizes)
Time
between the
moments of
Used criteria Date arrival of
adjacent
criteria, days
(mo)
In this case, the POF
POF of pipe cross-section of pipe cross-section Figure 10. Times for conducting prescribed maintenance
with defect = 10-7 (using with defect is 0 actions or time to failure for the most dangerous defect,
B31Gmod)* already > 10-7 at the according to different criteria
moment of

9
Copyright © 2010 by ASME

The actual spill (failure) triggers a disaster scenario, in which
every single moment counts. For the three described above
cases the cost of the same activities dramatically differ
depending on the time that is available to perform the needed
actions.
6. CONCLUSIONS
 The described above methodology permits implementation
of the most versatile predictive asset maintenance when
operating pipelines.
 The comprehensive practical predictive pipeline
maintenance methodology described in this paper provides the
pipeline Operator with a powerful tool for creating and
implementing an optimal IMP for each specific pipeline, using
results of specific pig runs.
 The Operator, as a decision making person (DMP), receives
information in the needed format, which allows her/him to
decide which of the criteria to use and how and when to
conduct the necessary ILI, maintenance and repair actions.
7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Authors would like to express their gratitude to the
unknown Reviewers for their comments and recommendations
which helped enhancing the content of the paper.
8. REFERENCES
[1] Alkazraji D. A Quick Guide to Pipeline Engineering.
Series editor: Clifford Matthews, Woodhead Publishing
Limited and Matthews Engineering Training Ltd,
Cambridge, England, 2008
[2] Bushinskaya A.V., Timashev S.A. Statistical analysis of
ILI data for optimal pipeline integrity management. All
Russia Conference «Safety of Critical Infrastructures and
Territories», Ural Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences,
Ekaterinburg, December, 2008, In Russian
[3] Davis, M.J. Tenneco’s Efforts for Verifying Pipeline
Integrity. ASA Distribution/Transmission Conference,
Toronto, Canada, 1988
[4] DNV Recommended Practice RP-F101. Corroded
pipelines. Det Norske Veritas, Norway, 2004
[5] Enterprise Standard #0-03-22-2008. Methodology of
assessment of potential hazard and residual life of
pipelines with corrosion defects and discontinuities in
welds and parent metal, detected during ILI.
"OrenburgGasprom", 2006, In Russian
[6] Kariyawasam S., Peterson W., Revised Corrosion
Management with Reliability Based Excavation Criteria.
Proceedings of IPC Conference, Paper # IPC2008-64536,
2008
[7] Kiefner, J.F., Vieth, P.H., Orban, J.E., and Feder, P.E.
Methods for Prioritizing Pipeline Maintenance and
Rehabilitation. Final Report on Project PR3-919 to
American Gas Association, Battelle, 1990
[8] Kulkarni, R.B., and Conroy, J.E. Pipeline Inspection and
Maintenance Optimization System (PIMOS). Pipeline
View publication stats
Risk Assessment, Rehabilitation and Repair Conference,
Houston, Texas, pp. 1-13, 1994
[9] Kulkarni, R.B., and Conroy, J.E. Development of a
Pipeline Inspection and Maintenance Optimization
System. GRI, 1998
[10] NACE Standard RP0502-2002. Pipeline External
Corrosion Direct Assessment Methodology.
[11] Nicoletti E.S.M., R.D. de Souza, Dr Sérgio da Cunha
Barros. A Practical Approach in Pipeline Corrosion
modeling. Part2. Short-term integrity forecasting. In: J. of
Pipeline Engineering, March, 2009
[12] Timashev S.A. Risk assessment and Reliability-Based
Maintenance for Large Pipelines. Chapter 40, Engineering
Design Reliability, Reliability Handbook, CRC Press,
2005
[13] Timashev S.A. Risk Based Management of Pipeline
Integrity and Safety. Intensive Short Course, 2002-2010
[14] Timashev S.A., M.G. Malyukova M.G., Poluian L.V.,
Bushinskaya A.V. Internet– Oriented Method Of
Reliability Analysis Of On-Shore Pipelines With Growing
Defects, Proceedings of IPC Conference, Paper #
IPC2008-64545, 2008
[15] Timashev, S.A. Machinery Diagnostic and Residual Life
Monitoring System. Machinery Reliability Conference,
Charlotte, NC, Industrial Communications, Inc.
Knoxville, TN, pp. 176-188, 1998
[16] Timashev, S.A. Optimal System Integrity and
Maintenance Control, COMADEM, 2000.
[17] Timashev, S.A, Shalin M.G. et al. Optimal Control of Far
North Pipelines Integrity and Maintenance. OMAE'2001.
[18] Timashev, S.A. On a Problem of Reliability Control.
Third International Vilnius Conference on Probability
Theory and Mathematical Statistics, Abstracts of
Communications, pp. 186-187, 1981
[19] Timashev, S.A. Reliability of Large Machine Systems,
Moskva, Nauka, 184 pp, 1982; SEAG, Pavia, Italy, pp.
102, 1984
[20] Timashev, S.A., Kopnov, V.A. Optimal Death Process
Control in Two-Level Policies. Fourth International
Vilnius Conference on Probability Theory and
Mathematical Statistics, Abstracts of Communications,
pp. 308-309, 1985
[21] Timashev, S.A., Kopnov, V.A. Optimal Resource
Assessment with Respect to Fatigue Crack Formation
Criteria. Journal of Machine Building and Structure
Reliability Problems, #1, Moscow, Nauka, pp. 65-70,
1990 (in Russian).
10
Copyright © 2010 by ASME