Wood 2010 Defending Byzantine Spain

Defending Byzantine Spain: frontiers
and diplomacy emed_300 292..319
Jamie Wood
The centrality of the Reconquista in the historiography of medieval Spain has

meant that there has been little examination of the evidence for interaction on
and across political boundaries in pre-Islamic Spain. This article re-examines
existing theories about the defence of the Byzantine province of Spania that
had been established by Justinian in the 550s and was taken by the Visigoths
in 625. The two existing and opposing models for the extent, defence, and –
therefore – the importance of the province to the empire do not explain the
evidence convincingly. Rather, a fluid zone of interaction was established in
which diplomacy and ‘propaganda’ was the primary means by which oppo-
sition was articulated.
Introduction
In 589/90 Comentiolus, the governor of Spania, the Byzantine province
in southern Spain, raised an inscription in Cartagena. Comentiolus had
been sent by Emperor Maurice ‘against the barbarian enemy’ (contra
hostis barbarus) in the Visigothic kingdom of Spain with the hope that
‘Spain always rejoices in such a governor as long as the [north and
south] poles are being rotated and as long as the sun circles the earth’.1
Thirty years later, in 619, the first canon of the Second Council of
Seville, held under Visigothic auspices, stated that lands recently
reconquered from the empire had been carried into ‘captive poverty’
(captiva necessitas) by the ‘barbaric savagery’ (barbarica feritas) of the
Byzantines.2
1
A. Prego de Lis, ‘La inscripción de Comitiolus del Museo Municipal de Arqueología de
Cartagena’, V Reunión de Arqueología Cristiana Hispánica (Barcelona, 2000), p. 383:
‘ . . . SEMPER SPANIA TALI RECTORE LAETETVR DVM POLI ROTANTVR DVMQ.
SOL CIRCVIT ORBEM . . . ’
2
II Seville, ed. J. Vives, Concilios Visigóticos e Hispano-Romanos (Barcelona and Madrid, 1963), I,
p. 163.
Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3) 292–319

© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350
Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
Defending Byzantine Spain: frontiers and diplomacy 293
The Byzantine province of Spania, which incorporated the southern

parts of the old Roman provinces of Baetica and Carthaginiensis, was
established in the 550s and was overrun by the Visigoths in the 620s. Its
history has largely escaped the attention of Anglophone scholars,
although it has received considerable coverage in Spain.3 This lacuna is
regrettable, since an examination of the history and historiography of the
province can tell us a great deal about the ways in which the empire
interacted with the barbarian successor kingdoms. While the evidence
ostensibly points towards tension and conflict between Byzantines and
Visigoths, upon closer inspection it becomes apparent that there was
actually a significant amount of diplomatic and cultural exchange accom-
panying the oppositional rhetoric exemplified by the Cartagena inscrip-
tion and the 619 synodal canon.
Over the past decade it has become increasingly apparent that existing
theories about the defence of the Byzantine province in Spain are inad-
equate. Older theories, based upon the idea that the Byzantines and the
Visigoths were consistently hostile to each other, argue that the Byzan-
tines developed a limes-style defence system to protect the southern
province from the Visigoths in the north.4 On the other side of the
debate, some scholars have suggested that the Byzantines did not pen-
etrate far into the interior of the peninsula and thus that no such frontier
can have been established.5 This article argues that the Byzantine terri-
tories were more extensive than has recently been suggested and that,
rather than constructing a fortified frontier, the Byzantines defended
Spania largely through diplomatic means. By taking a fresh look at the
extant textual evidence for the administration of the province, it is
demonstrated that Byzantines used diplomatic strategies to defend their
possessions in Spain rather than extensive and direct military action or
defensive construction. These strategies included interfering in internal
3
For bibliography see S. Ramallo Asensio and J. Vizcaíno Sánchez, ‘Bizantinos en Hispania. Un
problema recurrente en la arqueología Española’, Achivo español de arqueología 75 (2002), pp.
313–32. For the classic treatment of the province see P. Goubert, ‘Byzance et l’Espagne wisig-
othique (554–711)’, Études Byzantines 2 (1944), pp. 5–78; ‘L’administration de l’Espagne byzan-
tine: les gouverneurs de l’Espagne byzantine’, Études Byzantines 3 (1945), pp. 127–42;
‘Administration de l’Espagne Byzantine’, Revue des Etudes Byzantines 4 (1946), pp. 71–110;
‘Influences byzantines sur l’Espagne Wisigothique’, Revue des Etudes Byzantines 4 (1946), pp.
111–34. For artistic influences see H. Schlunk, ‘Relaciones entre la Península Ibérica y Bizancio
durante la época visigoda’, Archivo Español de Arqueología 18 (1945), pp. 177–240. The best
recent general treatments are those of M. Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua (Ss.
V–VIII): Un capitulo de historia mediterránea (Alcalá de Henares, 1993) and F.J. Presedo Velo, La
España Bizantina (Seville, 2003).
4
A. Barbero and M. Vigil, Sobre los orígenes sociales de la reconquista (Barcelona, 1974).
5
See, for example, G. Ripoll López, ‘On the Supposed Frontier between the Regnum Visigotho-
rum and Byzantine Hispania’, in W. Pohl, I. Wood and H. Reimitz (eds), The Transformation
of Frontiers from Late Antiquity to the Carolingians (Leiden, 2000), pp. 95–115.
Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
294 Jamie Wood
disputes within the Visigothic ruling elite, agreeing treaties with Visig-
othic rulers, and exchanging embassies. The traditional vision of constant
armed opposition between Byzantines and Visigoths, therefore, does not
tell the full story.
A limes for Spania

The history of the Byzantine province of Spania began with Justinian’s
reconquest of the African provinces. Following victory over the Vandals
in 534, the Byzantines moved quickly to occupy Septem in North Africa
(modern Ceuta, see Fig. 1). A garrison and a naval force were stationed
there under the command of a tribune who was responsible for moni-
toring events in Spain and Gaul.6 The Balearics were also rapidly occu-
pied.7 These actions were vital in securing Africa from possible attack by
the Visigoths, in controlling the navigation of the Straits of Gibraltar, and
in preparing for a potential offensive against southern Spain.8 Through-
out antiquity economic, political and military contact across the Straits of
Gibraltar had been commonplace.9 These contacts continued into the
Visigothic period: Gelimer, the Vandal king, solicited aid from the Visig-
oths in his fight with the Byzantines, and there were instances of direct
Visigothic action in North Africa.10
Although the possibility of Visigothic interference in Africa from Spain
must have been a powerful incentive to action, events of the mid-550s
provided Justinian with an opportunity to intervene. According to Isidore
of Seville, the rebellion of Athanagild precipitated the Byzantine invasion:
Formerly, when his tyranny had already been initiated while he

was trying to deprive Agila of power, he [Athanagild] had asked for
military assistance from the Emperor Justinian. Afterwards, despite
6
Codex Iustinianus I.27.2.2, ed. P. Krueger, Corpus Iuris Civilis, 2 vols (Berlin, 1967), II, p. 79.
Procopius, Buildings, viii.14–16, trans. H. Dewing, Procopius, 7 vols (London, 1916), VII, pp.
390–2.
7
Procopius, History of the Wars IV.v.6–8, trans. Dewing, II, p. 248.
8
C. Martin, La géographie du pouvoir dans l’Espagne visigothique (Lille, 2003), p. 285.
9
J. Arce, El último siglo de la España romana: 284–409 (Madrid, 1982), pp. 31–62.
10
Procopius, History of the Wars III.xxiv.7–18; IV.iv.33–6, trans. Dewing, II, pp. 196–8, 244;
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 22 (both redactions), ed. C. Rodríguez Alonso, Las historias de los
godos, vándalos y suevos de Isidoro de Sevilla (Léon, 1975), pp. 206–8. The Visigothic king
Theudis twice attempted to take Septem – losing the city to the Byzantines in 534 and failing to
retake it in 548: Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 42 (second redaction), ed. Rodríguez Alonso, p.
242. Procopius, History of the Wars VI.xxx.11–15, trans. Dewing, IV, pp. 140–2: Uraïas argued
that Ildibaldus should be made Ostrogothic king as Theudis was his uncle and they might
expect assistance. We cannot be sure of the exact dates of these events; while the internal
chronology of Isidore’s Historia is secure, but is not reliably connected to any externally
verifiable dating system, M. Kulikowski, Late Roman Spain and Its Cities (Baltimore, MD,
2004), p. 272, n. 81; for general contacts, pp. 71–6.

having struggled he could not remove those [imperial soldiers] from

the borders of his kingdom.11
The continued resistance of cities such as Córdoba to Visigothic rule

made the Byzantine invasion easier.12 This was fortunate because in 552
Justinian’s forces were still bogged down in the Ostrogothic war in Italy.
Hence, only a small force was dispatched to Spain, while a second
expedition may have been sent in 555, at the end of the Italian campaign.13
The Visigothic nobility, ‘seeing that they were ruining themselves by their
own destruction and fearing more, lest the [Byzantine] soldiers might
invade Spain with the pretext of giving assistance’, killed Agila and made
Athanagild king.14 Although the Byzantine invasion met important stra-
tegic aims, such as further securing the Mediterranean and Africa, it is
unclear whether Justinian intended the total conquest of all Spain or was
opportunistically taking advantage of Visigothic disunity as he had done
in Ostrogothic Italy and Vandal Africa.15 Given Justinian’s unwillingness
to send troops or other resources even to Italy, together with the uncer-
tainty of the situation throughout the empire, the opportunistic ‘wait and
see’ option seems the more likely.16
The Byzantines had to maintain their newly won control of southern
Spain. There are two basic theories about how they accomplished this. By
far the most prevalent concept is that there was an organized and fortified
Byzantine limes-style frontier in southern Spain. Barbero and Vigil were
11
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 47 (both redactions), ed. Rodríguez Alonso, pp. 248–50: ‘His
cum iam dudum sumpta tyrannide Agilanem regno privare conaretur, militum sibi auxilia ab
imperatore Iustiniano poposcerat, quos postea submovere a finibus regni molitus non potuit.’
Cf. Isidore, Chronica, c. 399a (second redaction), ed. J.C. Martín, Isidori Hispalensis Chronica,
CCSL 112 (Turnhout, 2003), p. 195: ‘The Roman army enters Spain due to Athanagild’ (‘In
Spaniam per Athanagildum Romanus miles ingreditur’).
12
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 45–6 (second redaction), ed. Rodríguez Alonso, pp. 246–8.
Claude, ‘Diplomatischen Beziehungen’, p. 18. Recent work has emphasized the increased
localization of power in the Iberian Peninsula in the aftermath of the breakdown of central
Roman control, perhaps explaining Athanagild’s willingness to exchange southern coastal
regions that were only loosely tied to his kingdom (if at all) for imperial support; Kulikowski,
Late Roman Spain, pp. 256–86; S. Castellanos, ‘The Political Nature of Taxation in Visigothic
Spain’, EME 12 (2003), pp. 201–28; S. Castellanos and I. Martín Viso, ‘The Local Articulation
of Central Power in the North of the Iberian Peninsula (500–1000)’, EME 13 (2005), pp. 1–42.
13
E.A. Thompson, The Goths in Spain (Oxford, 1969), pp. 324–9; Presedo Velo, La España
Bizantine, pp. 32–8, 165.
14
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 46 (second redaction), ed. Rodríguez Alonso, p. 248: ‘vident-
es . . . proprio se everti excidio et magis metuentes, ne Spaniam milites auxili occasione inva-
derent’. The capture of ‘some cities’ (‘civitates aliquas’) by Justinian’s troops led to Agila’s fall,
according to Gregory of Tours, Libri Historiarum X IV.8, ed. B. Krusch and W. Levison, Gregorii
Episcopi Turonensis Libri Historiarum X, MGH SRM 1.1 (Hanover, 1951), p. 140.
15
J. Moorhead, Justinian (London, 1994), pp. 108–9; L. García Moreno, ‘The Creation of
Byzantium’s Spanish Province. Causes and Propaganda’, Byzantion 66 (1996), pp. 101–19.
16
Moorhead, Justinian, pp. 72–88, 101–9, for conquest of Italy, and esp. pp. 101–7 for the effect
of lack of resources on Byzantine fortunes in Italy. For more on Justinian’s finances see, C.
Gordon, ‘Procopius and Justinian’s Financial Policies’, Phoenix 13 (1959), pp. 23–30.

296 Jamie Wood
the first to posit the limes theory, attempting to show that the Byzantine
defences were the prototype for a Visigothic limes which was later
directed against the Basques and Cantabrians in northern Spain.17 The
kind of frontier imagined by Barbero and Vigil and their followers is of
a double articulation, structured as follows: an interior zone consisting of
a network of fortified cities, interspersed with smaller defensive positions
and, in more advanced positions, a series of small fortified positions
(castra, castella), linked by roads and defended by limitanei soldiers.18
Although Barbero and Vigil’s conclusions concerning the existence of
limes in northern Spain have been criticized, their thesis concerning the
Byzantine–Visigothic frontier has formed the basis for many subsequent
studies. These studies in turn, have formed the interpretative framework
within which some distinctly ambiguous archaeological findings have
been situated historically.19
Those who believe that there was a limes frontier in sixth- and seventh-
century Spania base their theories on three literary sources. None of this
evidence stands up to detailed examination. Firstly, Paul the Deacon’s
eighth-century Historia Langobardorum states that the wife and son of
Hermengild, a sixth-century Visigothic rebel, fell into the hands of
Byzantine troops ‘who were residing in the border area opposite the
Spanish Goths’.20 This reference implies that Byzantine soldiers were
stationed on the edges of Spania to defend the province from the Visig-
oths. However, the Historia was not written until the 790s, in Lombard
Italy. Thus its utility in demonstrating the existence of a fortified Spanish
limes (such as that envisaged by Barbero and Vigil) two hundred years
earlier is nugatory.
17
Barbero and Vigil, Los orígenes.
18
Barbero and Vigil, Los orígenes, pp. 71–4; L. García Moreno, ‘Vándalos, visigodos y bizantinos
en Granada (409–711)’, in N. Marín Díaz (ed.), In Memoriam Agustín Díaz Toledo (Granada and
Almería, 1985), p. 139; M. Vallejo Girvés, ‘El sistema viario peninsular en los límites de la
provincial bizantina de Spania’, Camineria Hispanica. Actas del II Congreso Internacional de
Camineria Hispanica, 3 vols (Madrid, 1996), I, p. 95; F. Salvador Ventura, ‘El poblamiento en
la provincial de Granada durante los siglos VI y VII’, Antigüedad y Cristianismo 5 (1988), p. 346.
19
For criticisms of Roman limes in Spain see: Arce, El último siglo, pp. 67–72; for acceptance see:
L. García Moreno, ‘Organización militar de Bizancio en la península ibérica (ss. VI–VII)’,
Hispania 33 (1973), pp. 5–22. Visigothic limes, L. García Moreno, ‘Estudios sobre la organisación
administrativa del Reino Visigodo de Toledo’, Anuario de historia del Derecho Español 44 (1974),
pp. 5–157. For criticisms of the northern limes theory see M. Lovelle and J. Quiroga, ‘De los
Suevos a los Visigodos en Galicia (573–711); Nuevas hipótesis sobre el proceso de integración del
noroeste de la península ibérica en el reino visigodo de Toledo’, Romano-Barbarica 14 (1996–7),
pp. 265–80; see J.J. Sayas Abengochea, ‘El supuesto “limes” del norte durante la epoca bajoim-
perial y visigoda’, Spania: estudis d’antiguitat tardana oferts en homenatge al profesor Pere de Palol
i Salellas (Barcelona, 1996), pp. 246–7 for doubts about the existence of a limes in the north
directed against the Sueves and the other ‘northern peoples’; he is equally dubious about
applicability of the archaeological evidence to the limes in the south.
20
Paul the Deacon, Historia Langobardorum III.21, ed. G. Waitz, MGH Scriptores rerum
Langobardicarum 1 (Hanover, 1878), pp. 103–4: ‘qui in limite adversum Hispanos Gothos
residebant’.

The two other literary references derive from Isidore of Seville’s early
seventh-century Historia Gothorum: Leovigild (569–86) took ‘certain
forts (castra)’ that had been occupied by the Byzantines, and Swinthila
(621–31) ‘captured Roman forts (castra)’.21 García Moreno has stated that
since limitanei troops usually occupied castra in other parts of the empire,
one could legitimately suppose the existence of limitanei in Spania and
thus the presence of a limes-style frontier.22 However, the validity of
comparing Isidore’s description of Byzantine defences in Spania, of
which he is likely to have known very little, with that used to describe
fortifications in Italy, Africa and the east, about which he must have
known virtually nothing, must be questioned. While Isidore’s definitions
of castra in the Etymologies demonstrate that he believed that the struc-
tures fulfilled military functions, he is inconsistent in his usage of the
terms. He defines a castra as a place ‘where a soldier would be stationed’;
but in some cases he sees these as fixed positions, in others as temporary
and moveable, while in other instances alternative terms are used to
describe fortifications or population centres in frontier zones.23 Castra of
the sort that Isidore tried to define are thinly attested in historical or
archaeological sources; the same may be said for the limitanei and the
putative limes. Additionally, it is by no means clear that Byzantine limi-
tanei did always fulfil a frontier-defence role elsewhere in the empire. By
the end of Justinian’s reign, the practical military differences between
field troops and limitanei were unclear; field units were often perma-
nently garrisoned nearer to the frontier than limitanei.24 Even if the
presence of limitanei was securely attributed in Spania, which it is not,
their presence is not necessarily indicative of a frontier defence role.
In both of these instances, therefore, Isidore simply stated that Roman-
held defensive strong points were taken by Visigoths. There is no indi-
cation that these defences were constructed or positioned in special
relation to one another, to any frontier, or to any other defensive system.
21
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 49 (both redactions): ‘quaedam castra ab eis [the Byzantines]
occupata’; c. 62 (second redaction): ‘Romana castra perdomuit’, ed. Rodríguez Alonso, pp. 254,
274.
22
García Moreno, ‘Organización militar de Bizancio’, p. 9.
23
Isidore, Etymologiae IX.3.44, ed. W.M. Lindsay, Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi. Etymologiarum sive
Originum Libri XX, 2 vols (Oxford, 1911), trans. S.A. Barney, W.J. Lewis, J.A. Beech and O.
Berghof, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 390–2: ‘A camp (castra) is
where a soldier would be stationed.’ See also IX.2.99, trans. Barney et al., p. 197 (burgus as
frontier forts, related to castra); IX.4.28, trans. Barney et al., pp. 204–5 (burgi as dwelling places
established along frontiers); XV.2.5, trans. Barney et al., p. 305 (oppidum named from its walls);
XV.2.6, trans. Barney et al., pp. 305–6 (oppidum named because it gives protection; differs in
size from castellum); XV.2.13, trans. Barney et al., p. 306 (ancients called a town sited on a very
high place a castra); XV.3.10, trans. Barney et al., p. 309 (the army does not stay in camp grounds
– metatum – but passes through).
24
Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, pp. 67, 69.

298 Jamie Wood
Additionally, the evidence definitely does not prove that the Byzantines
built new fortifications; they may simply have reused existing structures.
However, other literary and archaeological evidence suggests that there
had been greater fortification throughout the southern Iberian country-
side in the fifth century and a movement to settlements sited on hills,
suggesting perhaps an increased sense of danger.25 Discerning a ‘Byzan-
tine frontier’ amongst these changes is virtually impossible.
The other strands of the limes theory, the presence of fortified cities in
the interior of the province and the use of comparative evidence of a limes
system from other parts of the empire, do not survive detailed scrutiny.
References to cities in Spania demonstrate the existence of urban centres,
but not that they were necessarily fortified, nor that they formed part of
a limes structure.26 As observed above, comparative evidence from else-
where in the Byzantine empire is often adduced in support of the limes
theory.27 But, even in Byzantine Africa, the province that is most fre-
quently compared to Spania, the term limes is actually synonymous with
a province, or the ‘military circumscriptions of a dux’; it therefore defined
a geographical area, not a linear boundary.28 More generally, the chief
characteristic of the Byzantine defensive ‘system’ was the ‘permeable
frontier’; invaders were not stopped at the frontier, nor were they brought
to battle, except in the most favourable circumstances.29 As Isaac has
argued, in Byzantine usage
[a] clear distinction is made between limites and the frontier . . . the
term limes refers to specific districts where forts are built rather than to
the system of forts itself . . . To my knowledge there is no passage
anywhere in Byzantine sources which states that a limes was built or
constructed. Reference is made to structures in the limes as distinct
from the limes itself . . . there is in Latin no term to indicate what
modern frontier studies describe as a limes, a defended border. It must
25
John of Biclarum, Chronicon 20 (s.a. 571) ed. C. Hartmann, Victoris Tunnunensis Chronicon cum
reliquiis ex Consularibus Caesaraugustanis et Iohannis Biclarensis Chronicon, CCSL 173A (Turn-
hout, 2001), p. 63: Leovigild took the rebelling city Cordoba (the city may not have been
previously occupied by the Visigoths; John may simply be referring to its independence and
opposition to the expansion of Visigothic power); ‘and [Leovigild] regained many cities and
forts’ (‘multasque urbes et castellan . . . revocat’); John of Biclarum, Chronicon 46 (s.a. 577), ed.
Hartmann, p. 69: Leovigild ‘entered the Orospeda and occupied cities and forts of the same
province’ (‘Orospedam ingreditur et ciuitates atque castella eiusdem prouinciae occupat’). This
evidence suggests that these areas were fortified prior to occupation by the Visigoths. Perhaps
the Byzantines inherited a similarly fortified area. K. Carr, Vandals to Visigoths. Rural Settlement
Patters in Early Medieval Spain (Ann Arbor, 2002), pp. 142–6.
26
Contra Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 381.
27
E.g. García Moreno, ‘Organización militar’, p. 9.
28
D. Pringle, The Defence of Byzantine Africa from Justinian to the Arab Conquest, BAR Interna-
tional Series 99, 2 vols (Oxford, 1981), I, p. 97.
29
J. Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204 (London, 1999), p. 69.

then be asked whether . . . the military organisation, as represented by

the physical remains, should be explained along different lines. In
other words, there can be no justification for calling any chain of forts
on a frontier a limes.30
Hence, the concept of a limes as fortified frontier dividing two clearly

defined political entities does not suffice to describe most Roman or
Byzantine frontiers.31 The comparative and theoretical terminology
adduced in support of the Byzantine limes in Spania has been wrongly
interpreted and applied, and the literary evidence used to support the
theory does nothing of the sort.
The main, recent opponent of the limes theory has been Gisela Ripoll
López.32 For her, the geographical extent of the province was fairly limited
and no significant frontier existed between the Visigothic and Byzantine
zones of influence: Spania was centred on several small enclaves that were
not united territorially. This theory is attractive because it takes account
of the geography of southern Spain that consists of a relatively thin
coastal strip, intersected by river valleys and separated from the inland
zone by a series of mountain chains.33 Byzantium maintained control of
this coastal strip as a result of its dominance of the Mediterranean.34
Ripoll López’s criticism of the limes theory is based on the small amount
and ambiguous nature of the textual evidence as well as the lack of clearly
defined archaeological evidence:
archaeologically speaking, no evidence for this supposed limes has ever
been traced, neither archaeological sites nor finds to encourage such an
interpretation and artefact typologies are insufficiently precise to iden-
tify ‘Byzantine’ era objects in Spain.35
30
B. Isaac, ‘The Meaning of the Terms limes and limitanei’, Journal of Roman Studies 78 (1988), pp.
125, 136–7, 146; see also p. 125: ‘modern studies do not hesitate to describe as a limes any set of
Roman forts encountered in a frontier zone’; B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire. The Roman Army
in the East, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1992), pp. 372–418 for a generally scathing attack on the tendency
to attribute a grand strategic vision to Roman leaders, which is based on a series of assumptions
that are themselves ‘inspired by notions of modern strategy and warfare’. For a rebuttal of Isaac,
see E.L. Wheeler, ‘Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I’, The
Journal of Military History 57 (1993), pp. 7–41; ‘Methodological Limits and the Mirage of
Roman Strategy: Part II’, The Journal of Military History 57 (1993), pp. 215–40.
31
Martin, La géographie, p. 287, thought that the limes in Spain would be best conceptualized as
a territorial sector, not as a linear construction.
32
G. Ripoll López, ‘On the Supposed Frontier between the Regnum Visigothorum and Byzantine
Hispania’, in W. Pohl, I. Wood and H. Reimitz (eds), The Transformation of Frontiers from Late
Antiquity to the Carolingians (Leiden, 2000), pp. 99, 107, 115.
33
S. Keay, ‘Introduction: Early Roman Baetica’, The Archaeology of Early Roman Baetica, in S.
Keay (ed.), Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series 29 (1998), pp. 12–13.
34
F. van Doorninck, ‘Byzantium, Mistress of the Sea: 300–641’, in G.F. Bass (ed.), A History of
Seafaring Based on Underwater Archaeology (London, 1972), pp. 133–58.
35
Ripoll López, ‘On the Supposed Frontier’, pp. 108–9.

300 Jamie Wood
This means that, despite the undoubted richness of the archaeological

remains of the sixth and seventh centuries, it is not yet possible to talk
with confidence of ‘Byzantine’ artefacts in the areas of supposed imperial
occupation during this period.36 In the absence of such diagnostic, date-
able evidence, judgements about the ascription of sites to a temporal
period or a zone of political control must be suspended.
While one can largely agree with Ripoll López’s conclusions on the
textual evidence,37 material recorded by archaeologists working in this
area can add significantly to the debate. Much of this is, admittedly,
ambiguous and overly influenced by the limes model, but there is some
evidence for limited defensive construction in the Byzantine province in
the early Middle Ages. Ripoll López states that ‘the sources always
mention only urban centres and never make reference to the territories
that were conquered or dependant on these cities’.38 Firstly, it should be
noted that in the period under consideration the obvious way to describe
an area was in relation to the nearest city, especially in southern Spain, a
landscape dotted with urban centres since pre-Roman times (see Fig. 1).39
Secondly, and more importantly, the textual evidence does actually
suggest that the Byzantines controlled some inland territory and therefore
that a more thoroughgoing occupation, defence, and particularly admin-
istration of the area existed than Ripoll López is prepared to allow.
The evidence for Byzantine defences

The following section utilizes archaeological, geographical, epigraphic,
literary and numismatic evidence to determine the character and possible
extent of the Byzantine defences. For analytical purposes it is divided into
two parts, each centred on a Byzantine-controlled city: Cartagena and
Málaga (for the following discussion, see Fig. 1). This enables a discussion
of the evidence pertaining to the defence of each city and its hinterland,
both of which we should expect to have been fortified in the Byzantine
period if a limes did exist. Conversely, if the coastal enclave theory is
closer to historical reality, we should expect little evidence of a Byzantine
presence inland. This section does not analyse the fairly substantial
evidence that has been discovered for occupation by Byzantines (or
‘Byzantine’ material remains) of various sites; it focuses instead on the
military-frontier evidence. It should be noted that much of the
36
A. González Blanco, ‘Romanidad y Bizantinismo en el sudests Hispano durante la Antigüedad
Tardía’, Spania: estudis d’antiguitat tardana oferts en homenatge al profesor Pere de Palol i Salellas
(Barcelona, 1996), p. 133.
37
Ripoll López, ‘On the Supposed Frontier’, p. 98.
38
Ripoll López, ‘On the Supposed Frontier’, p. 98.
39
A.T. Fear, Rome and Baetica. Urbanization in Southern Spain c.50 BC–AD 105 (Oxford, 1996).

terminology used by archaeologists and historians who have analysed the

sites under consideration is ambiguous; the vocabulary is reproduced here
in order to demonstrate the shakiness of much of the evidence base of the
limes theory. Reasons for such uncertainty include the possibility that
some sites were occupied by the Byzantines and then reused by the
Visigoths, or vice versa, or that the attribution to the Byzantine period
refers to an ill-defined chronological period (sixth and seventh centuries,
or parts thereof ) and not the the period of the actual Byzantine ‘occu-
pation’ of south-eastern Spain.40
Cartagena
Cartagena, the likely capital of Spania, has the best evidence for defensive
construction.41 Parts of the Byzantine wall and a semi-circular tower have
been discovered in excavations in Calle Soledad / Calle Nueva, while
excavations at Calle Orcel revealed a continuation of the same wall.42
Terra sigillata pottery of a type usually dated to the period 580–620 has
been discovered in the excavations, raising the possibility that these are
the fortifications erected by Governor Comentiolus in 589/90, described
by contemporaries as ‘the high summits of the towers and the entrance of
the city, strengthened by a double gate to the right and to the left,
supported by two pairs of arches, above which is placed an arched vaulted
roof ’.43 Additionally, the hill called Cerro de la Concepción, a site which
often played a defensive role in the past, may have been reoccupied in the
sixth and seventh centuries.44 According to Isidore, the Visigoths finally
took and devastated Cartagena in 624.45
40
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, pp. 384, 387; Salvador Ventura, ‘El
poblamiento’, p. 346.
41
For urban archaeology of Cartagena see S. Ramallo Asensio, ‘Aproximación al urbanismo de
Carthago Nova entre los siglos IV–VII D.C.’, Spania: estudis d’antiguitat tardana oferts en
homenatge al profesor Pere de Palol i Salellas (Barcelona, 1996), pp. 201–8, who notes that the
archaeological evidence suggests that the life of the city and its Hispano-Roman population
continued as it had before the Byzantines arrived – with wealth based on its status as an
important port – and was only interrupted with Visigothic conquest in the 620s.
42
S. Ramallo Asensio and R. Méndez Ortiz, ‘Fortificaciones tardoromanas y de época bizantina
en el sureste’, Historia de Cartagena 5 (Murcia, 1986), pp. 82–8; Ramallo Asensio, ‘Aproximación
al urbanismo de Carthago Nova’, p. 204.
43
Ramallo Asensio and Méndez Ortiz, ‘Fortificaciones tardoromanas y de época bizantina’, pp.
88–94; Prego, ‘La inscripción de Comitiolus’, pp. 91–100, 383: ‘QVISQVIS ARDVA
TVRRIVM MIRARIS CVLMINA / VESTIBVLVMQ. VRBIS DVPLICI PORTA FIR-
MATVM / DEXTRA LEVAQ. BINOS POSITOS ARCOS / QVIB. SVPERVM PONITVR
CAMERA CVRVA CONVEXAQ. /’ The inscription was interfered with at some point; the
transcription above is the best current reading of the first part of the text; cf. J. Vives (ed.),
Inscripciones cristianas de la España romana y visigoda, 2nd edn (Barcelona, 1969), n. 362.
44
Ramallo Asensio, ‘Aproximación al urbanismo de Carthago Nova’, p. 207.
45
Isidore, Etymologiae XV.1.67, trans. Barney et al., p. 305.

302 Jamie Wood
The Cartagena region has received much attention from archaeolo-

gists. This has led to the identification of several potential defensive sites.
However, many of these sites need further excavation to confirm the
assumptions that they were Byzantine in origin and use. Castillo de los
Garres and Castillo de la Puebla, to the west of Cartagena, both control
passes and may have been bases in the defence of Cartagena. Alterna-
tively, they could have been constructed by the Visigoths to defend
Cehegín.46 The ceramic record of Mula suggests continuity of occupation
from the fourth to the ninth centuries, and some of the material matches
that found at other Byzantine sites. However, it is not yet possible to
identify Byzantine phases at Mula, and the ceramic material cannot be
clearly ascribed to them.47 The sites of Castillo del Río and ‘Zambo’ may
have been defensive positions dominating routes between Aspe and Elda,
although this cannot be confirmed without excavation. Ascription to
either side, or even secure dating to our period, is thus impossible.48 At
the strategically located city of Lorca, excavations have revealed that the
hill of ‘Cerro del Castillo’ was occupied by a fortress between the fifth and
seventh centuries. The material remains at the site are similar to those
discovered at Cartagena. These two pieces of information led to the
assumption that the site played an important role during the imperial
occupation, although this can be confirmed definitively by neither the
archaeological nor the documentary records.49 It is easy to suppose that
the strategically located city of Baza had some sort of military function,
since it was the furthest point of Byzantine penetration into the interior
and dominated roads west from Cartagena. Although there is no defini-
tive evidence that this was the case, our sources report that Leovigild took
the city in 569.50
There is virtually no archaeological evidence for the construction of a
military frontier in the Vinalopó Valley (around Elche), although discov-
eries at some sites suggest a Byzantine context. For example, the unusual
concentration of late sixth- or seventh-century African Red Slipware and
Byzantine period amphorae and the absence of fourth- to mid-sixth-
century African Red Slipware on the highland site of Cerro de San
Miguel (near to modern Orihuela) suggests that it was a Byzantine
46
Ramallo Asensio and Méndez Ortiz, ‘Fortificaciones tardoromanas y de época bizantina’, pp.
95–6; Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 387.
47
S. Ramallo Asensio and E. Ruiz Valderas, ‘Cartagena en la arqueología bizantina en Hispania:
estado de la cuestión’, V Reunión de Arqueología Cristiana Hispánica (Barcelona, 2000), pp.
318–19. P. Fuentes Hinojo, ‘Sociedad, ejército y administración fiscal en la provincia bizantina
de Spania’, Studia Histórica: Historia Antigua 16 (1998), p. 317 ascribed the site to the Visigoths.
48
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 388, Vistalegre, may also have been a
defensive position.
49
Ramallo Asensio and Ruiz Valderas, ‘Cartagena en la arqueología bizantina en Hispania’, p. 320.
50
John of Biclarum, Chronicon, c. 12, (s.a. 569), ed. Hartmann, p. 62.

outpost guarding an entrance to the valley.51 At Elche a Justinianic coin (a

follis), minted at Carthage in 539/40, was discovered and may be evidence
of a military presence there since such coins were probably minted to pay
the Byzantine invasion forces of North Africa; they are not found in
Byzantine layers at Carthage itself and are restricted to military contexts.52
However, the invasion of Spain did not occur until over a decade after the
minting date, and a solitary coin could easily have found its way to
Spania through other means.53 It has also been argued that the defences of
Denia, the city controlling the coast north of Cartagena and securing the
Balearics, were reinforced in the earlier sixth century, sometime before
the Byzantine invasion, and may therefore have been reused by the
Byzantines.54
In sum, Cartagena itself witnessed significant defensive construction in
the Byzantine period, probably owing to its importance as capital of the
province and its strategic role in maintaining control of the Mediterra-
nean. Although the vast majority of the evidence for the defence of the
region is inconclusive, many of the potential sites in the interior show
some signs of Byzantine influence, if not definite occupation, and were
closely associated with key strategic positions, controlling roads, river
valleys and the coast. The evidence for the Cartagena region is therefore
insufficient to suggest that an organized, fortified limes system existed in
Spania, although it does suggest more Byzantine influence in the area
than Ripoll López’s theory allows.55
Málaga
Málaga’s strategic location to the north-east of the Straits of Gibraltar,
its harbour and its easily defensible situation means that it is likely to
have been well protected. This might explain why it did not fall when
attacked by King Leovigild in 569.56 However, there is no definite evi-
dence that new fortifications were built there by the Byzantines.57 It has
been supposed that the original Byzantine occupation of Málaga led to
51
P. Reynolds, Settlement and Pottery in the Vinalopó Valley (Alicante, Spain) AD. 400–700, BAR
International Series 588 (Oxford 1993), p. 21.
52
Reynolds, Settlement and Pottery, p. 21.
53
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 382, posited that the late Roman walls of
Elche were reused by the Byzantines, although this has not been confirmed archaeologically.
54
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 382.
55
Ripoll López, ‘On the Supposed Frontier’, pp. 108–9.
56
John of Biclarum, Chronicon, c. 12, (s.a. 569), ed. Hartmann, p. 62; Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y
la España tardo antigua, pp. 150, 179–80, 382.
57
I. Navarro Luengo, et al., ‘Malaca bizantina: primeros datos arqueológicos’, V Reunión de
Arqueología Cristiana Hispánica (Barcelona, 2000), p. 272, in the Byzantine period structures
were built against the Roman wall, making it unlikely that in certain sectors the wall was reused
defensively.

304 Jamie Wood
Ta jo
TOLEDO
Sagunto
LUSITANIA Valencia
Balearic Islands
MÉRIDA CARTHAGINENSIS Denia
Villanueva
de la Fuente
El Tolmo de
Minateda Elda
Aspe
BAETICA
Elche
u iv ir Cehegín Orihuela
d a lq
Gua
Orospeda Mula
Córdoba
Lorca Vistalegre a
Écija Cabra CARTAGENA Se
SEVILLE
Montefrío Baza
an
Guadix
Villarícos a ne
Antequera Granada r
Teba
Villanueva er
Pizarra del Rosario it
Las Delicias d
Málaga e
Cádiz Gigonza N
M
Medina Cártama
Sidonia
Algeciras
Ceuta 0 100 200 km
Fig. 1 Byzantine and Visigothic Spain in the sixth and seventh centuries: places
mentioned in the text
the conquest of inland cities such as Illiberis (near to modern Granada)

and Guadix. For example, Qastiliya, a site near Granada, has been inter-
preted as forming part of the Byzantine defences on the basis of later
Islamic sources, and Byzantine-type discoveries.58 The necropolis of
Montefrío has elicited varying interpretations: some see it has having
held a Byzantine garrison; others, due to its northerly position, interpret
it as Visigothic; still other scholars are non-committal.59 The area around
Illiberis was probably taken by the Visigoths during Leovigild’s cam-
paign of 569 because it is sited between the two cities he is known to
have attacked in that campaign, Málaga and Baza, the second of which
he captured. However, in the cases of both Guadix and Illiberis, we
possess no definitive evidence that they ever belonged to the Byzantine
province.60
Medina Sidonia’s strategic location, together with literary evidence,
suggests that it was of some significance to the defences of western
58
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 387.
59
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 387; Salvador Ventura, ‘El poblamiento’,
p. 342.
60
Salvador Ventura, ‘El poblamiento’, p. 340. García Moreno, ‘Vándalos, visigodos y bizantinos
en Granada’, p. 143 believes that there may have been a Byzantine presence at Illiberis; Salvador
Ventura, ‘El poblamiento’, p. 341, is more dubious.

Spania. John of Biclarum (550/6–621/31) writing in 590 described it as

fortissimam civitatem when it fell to Leovigild in 570.61 Sagontia (Gigonza)
was probably a forward post for Medina Sidonia, since it controlled the
road inland to Seville and Isidore stated that the Visigoths had captured
some Byzantine soldiers there during Witteric’s reign (603–11).62 If
Isidore’s comment reflects the presence of a garrison at Sagontia rather
than a reference to the capture of mobile forces, it would imply that
the Byzantines had subsequently retaken Medina Sidonia and then
re-established forward defensive positions. Byzantine material has been
discovered at Gades (Cádiz: Byzantine coinage) and Carteia (Algeciras: an
epitaph in Greek dated to 616; Byzantine official weights), both of which
are coastal sites with good harbours.63 These sites are likely to have been
closely connected to Septem (modern Ceuta in North Africa), which was
garrisoned by naval and land forces, and whose commander was required
to observe events in Spain.
Numerous sugestions have been made about a large number of sites on
the coast around Málaga and in the interior. For example, it has been
argued that Antequera may have been a defensive position on roads
running through the mountains north of Málaga, while numismatic and
legal evidence suggests that the city of Barbi, seven kilometres to the west
of Antequera, could have been reconquered late in the reign of Gundemar
(610–12).64 The sporadic reuse in the late sixth century of a necropolis at
the strategic site of Teba that is situated in the same mountain range,
together with the scarcity of burials from the period of reuse, has encour-
aged the supposition that it was a Byzantine defensive position, although
others interpret it as part of the Visigothic frontier.65 Las Delicias, which
was on an important strategic route linking Málaga with the Baetican
interior, has elicited controversy. Fuentes Hinojo interpreted the site as a
Byzantine garrison, owing to the Byzantine influence on the grave-goods
and a small number of infant burials; other scholars, such as García
61
John of Biclarum, Chronicon, c. 17, (s.a. 570), ed. Hartmann, p. 63.
62
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 58 (second redaction), ed. Rodríguez Alonso, pp. 268. Fuentes
Hinojo, ‘Sociedad, ejército y administración fiscal’, p. 316; Vallejo Girvés, ‘El sistema viario
peninsular’, p. 100.
63
Carteia: J.B. Curbera, ‘Two Greek Inscriptions from Spain’, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und
Epigraphik 110 (1996), pp. 291–2; P. de Palol, ‘Ponderales y exagias romano-bizantinas en
España’, Ampurias 11 (1949), p. 133. Gades: T. Marot, ‘Aproximación a la circulación monetaria
en la Península Ibérica y las Islas Baleares durante los siglos V y VI: la incidencia de las emisiones
vándalas y bizantinas’, Revue Numismatique 152 (1997), p. 183.
64
Vallejo Girvés, ‘El sistema viario peninsular’, p. 100. P. Bartlett and G. Cores, ‘The Coinage of
the Visigothic King Sisebut (612–621) from the Mint of Barbi’, Gaceta numismática 158 (2005),
pp. 13–17.
65
Fuentes Hinojo, ‘Sociedad, ejército y administración fiscal’, p. 316; Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la
España tardo antigua, p. 385.

306 Jamie Wood
Moreno, have seen it as part of the Visigothic defences.66 The same

conjunction of circumstantial evidence has led to the necropolis of Vil-
lanueva del Rosario (Málaga–Granada boundary) and another site situ-
ated in the Sierra de la Alhamilla being interpreted as imperial frontier
castra.67 A late Roman settlement with possible fortifications and defen-
sive towers has been discovered at Villarícos, on the coast between Carta-
gena and Málaga. Although controlling this site would have been
strategically desirable, there is no definitive proof that it was used by the
Byzantines.68
Contrary to the ambiguous nature of much of the archaeological
material, evidence from the Second Council of Seville, held in 619,
demonstrates that the Byzantines did control a significant amount of the
territorium of Málaga. This council resolved disputes between the bishops
of Málaga, Écija, Illiberis and Cabra. Apparently, the latter three had
taken control of territory and churches that had previously belonged to
Málaga. Elsewhere in the acta, the assembled bishops devoted a great deal
of attention to refuting the opinions of Gregory, an eastern bishop who
was described as belonging to the heresy of the Acephali.69 It is thus highly
likely that the conciliar acts record the efforts of the Visigothic church of
the province of Baetica to reorganize into administrative and pastoral
networks territories recently reconquered from the Byzantines. The city
and its environs had to be reintegrated into the traditional ecclesiastical
structure in the face of opposition from those inside the Visigothic
church who had benefited from the division of the bishopric of Málaga:
‘Concerning which matter it is pleasing that all of the parishes which
were proved by ancient authority to have been held by their church
[Málaga] before the military hostility should be restored to its privilege.’70
There were, thus, three identifiable stages to the Visigothic conquest of
the Málaga region from the Byzantines. In 569–70 Leovigild took the
outposts in the mountains to the north and Medina Sidonia to the west.
66
Fuentes Hinojo, ‘Sociedad, ejército y administración fiscal’, p. 316; Salvador Ventura, ‘El
poblamiento’, p. 342, 345; García Moreno, ‘Vándalos, visigodos y bizantinos en Granada’, p.
143.
67
Fuentes Hinojo, ‘Sociedad, ejército y administración fiscal’, p. 316 did not name the second site.
68
Vallejo Girvés, ‘El sistema viario peninsular’, p. 100; Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo
antigua, pp. 382, 387; Pizarra and Cártama may have been defensive positions associated with
the road network.
69
For the Second Council of Seville see L.S.B. MacCoull, ‘Isidore and the Akephaloi’, Greek,
Roman and Byzantine Studies 39 (1998), pp. 169–78; for Isidore and the Acephali more generally
see J. Wood, ‘Heretical Catholics and Catholic Heretics: Isidore of Seville and the Religious
History of the Goths’, in D. Hook (ed.), From Orosius to the ‘Historia Silense’. Four Essays on Late
Antique and Early Medieval Historiography of the Iberian Peninsula (Bristol, 2005), pp. 17–50, at
pp. 40–5.
70
II Seville, I, ed. Vives, pp. 163–4: ‘Pro qua re placuit ut omnis parrochia quae ab antique ditione
ante militarem hostilitatem retinuisse ecclesiam suam conprobaret eius privilegio restitueretur.’

There seems to have been some military action during the reign of
Witteric (603–11) when the Visigoths captured some Byzantine troops at
Sagontia, and which may imply that the Byzantines had re-established
their control – or at least some operational capability – inland. In 613–
15/16 Sisebut captured the city of Málaga itself.71 There is some circum-
stantial evidence for the existence of frontier defences on the borders
between Málaga and Granada. However, without definite textual refer-
ences or further excavation it is impossible to confirm whether these sites
had distinctive Byzantine or Visigothic phases, or even if they had a
military function at all. Similarly, in the absence of evidence for the
fortification of Málaga during its Byzantine phase, the existence of an
interior defensive line behind Málaga based on cities proves ephemeral.
In the case of the Málaga region, as with Cartagena, there is no definitive
evidence for a limes-style frontier but neither is there support for the
minimalist position.
Zones of interaction
Numismatic evidence also has a bearing on the limes debate. Kurt has
demonstrated that much of the minting in the south of the peninsula in
the late sixth and seventh centuries was associated with Visigothic–
Byzantine military interaction.72 The Visigoths set up mints at places
such as Barbi, Acci (modern Guadix) and Seville, close to those areas in
which they were especially active in defence or offence against the
Byzantines, in order to pay troops and remint imperial coinage. As the
centres of their military operations shifted so also many of the mint sites
went out of use, especially in smaller or strategically unimportant towns.
Although this material suggests that the Visigoths made a serious effort to
take Spania and reminted Byzantine gold, it does not support the exist-
ence of a fortified frontier on the Visigothic side and can tell us nothing
about whether it was opposed by a limes-style frontier on the Byzantine
side. However, Kurt’s demonstration that the nodal points of Visigothic
efforts to disrupt the impact of Byzantine political and economic power
were significantly inland does suggest that Byzantine influence was felt
71
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 288. L. García Moreno, Historia de España
visigoda (Madrid, 1989), p. 149. Fredegar, Chronicon 33, ed. J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Fourth
Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar and Continuations (London, 1960), p. 21: ‘Sisebut captured
several of the imperial cities along the seaboard and razed them to the ground’ (‘plures civitates
ab imperio Romano Sisebodus litore maris abstulit et usque fundamentum destruxit’). Fredegar
goes on to add that Sisebut was deeply disturbed by the slaughter of the Romans.
72
A. Kurt, ‘Visigothic Minting and the Expulsion of the Byzantine from the South in the Early
Seventh Century’, The Picus (1996), pp. 133–66; A. Kurt, ‘Minting, State and Economy in the
Visigothic Kingdom ca. 418–ca. 713’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto (2002).

308 Jamie Wood
quite far from the coast and therefore that the coastal enclave theory goes
too far.
Some scholars have discerned the development of a religious frontier
between the Visigoths and Byzantines. Poveda linked the foundation of
the see of Elo (Elda) by the Visigoths to their attempts to reconquer
Spania, suggesting that the see was founded in the late sixth century in
military and ecclesiastical opposition to the well-established and
Byzantine-controlled see of Illici (Elche).73 Following the Visigothic con-
quest of Illici, the two sees coexisted until 681, when Elo disappeared from
the conciliar records, presumably because it was subsumed by the older
bishopric.74 Similarly, based upon the building techniques and materials
that were used in renewed fortifications at Begastri (near modern
Cehegín) in the decades around 600, it has been argued that military
construction was related to conflicts between the Byzantines and the
Visigoths, and the raising of the city to episcopal status by the Visigoths
was a challenge to nearby Cartagena’s traditional status as the metropoli-
tan bishopric of Carthaginiensis.75 It has been suggested that the Byzan-
tines initiated similar policies on their side of the ‘frontier’ because of the
evidence for urban renewal and refortification at Ilunum (modern El
Tolmo de Minateda).76 This would have made strategic sense because the
site controlled the most direct route from Cartagena to Toledo, the
Visigothic capital.77 Although the putative ‘ecclesiastical frontier’ is
another powerful indicator of the considerable efforts that the Visigoths
and the Byzantines made to ensure their control of the local populations,
the issue does not significantly illuminate the limes debate.
A zone of interaction thus developed between the Byzantine and
Visigothic spheres of influence. The nature of the interactions that took
place within this zone varied. Although many were oppositional, and
sometimes military in nature, a limes frontier did not develop. The zone
varied in nature, extent and over time. As the Visigoths were in very loose
73
A. Poveda Navarro, ‘La creación de la sede de Elo en la expansión toledana de finales del s.VI
en el S.E. Hispánico’, Actas del XIV Centenario del III Concilio de Toledo (589–1989) (Toledo,
1991), pp. 615–17.
74
XII Toledo, ed. J. Vives, p. 401.
75
L. Abad Casal and S. Gutiérrez Lloret, ‘Iyih (El Tolmo de Minateda, Hellín, Albacete). Una
civitas en el limes visigodo-bizantino’, Antigüedad y Cristianismo 14 (1997), p. 597; Vallejo
Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, pp. 240–2. G. García Herrero and A.J. Sánchez Ferra,
‘Iberos, Romanos, Godos y Bizantinos en el marco histórico de Begastri’, Antigüedad y Cris-
tianismo 1 (1984), p. 35. A. González Blanco, ‘El decreto de Gundemaro y la historia del siglo
VII’, Antigüedad y Cristianismo 3 (1986), pp. 159–70 suggested that it was refortified by the
Byzantines and then reused by the Visigoths.
76
Abad Casal and Gutiérrez Lloret, ‘Iyih (El Tolmo de Minateda, Hellín, Albacete)’, pp. 592,
594–7. These changes were similar to those taking place in Cartagena at the same time: Ramallo
Asensio and R. Méndez Ortiz, ‘Fortificaciones tardoromanas y de época bizantina’, p. 96.
77
Abad Casal and Gutiérrez Lloret, ‘Iyih (El Tolmo de Minateda, Hellín, Albacete)’, pp. 592, 596.

control of southern Spain in the early sixth century, direct military

contact between the two sides would have been minimal in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Byzantine invasion in the 550s. Once greater
contact had occurred, especially after Leovigild’s operations in 569–70,
the zone is likely to have become more fortified. However, warfare seems
to have consisted of the raiding of enemy territory, without much effort
being made to gain extended control over specific strong points. The 569
attack appears to have been just such a raid, while Reccared, Witteric and
Gundemar are all described as acting against Spania but are only recorded
as having taken Gigonza between them. Additionally, in the 610s the
Byzantines captured Bishop Cicilius of Mentesa (modern Villanueva de la
Fuente), whose see was inside Visigothic territory.78 If military interaction
was sporadic and low-level, the construction of a systematic frontier may
have been less important than the control of the road network and the
construction of places of refuge for the local population, for which we
have some evidence (for example, fortification of defensive plateaux such
as El Tolmo de Minateda).79
There are strong grounds for supposing that the interior line of the
limes system was never established, although the defences of some urban
centres were improved. Cartagena definitely saw fortification under Byz-
antine rule, while, on the basis of its geographical situation and John of
Biclarum’s description, it is almost certain that Medina Sidonia was a
strong point on the western frontier. Although it is probable that Málaga
was fortified, we cannot yet discern whether any construction there
resulted from the Byzantine occupation. Away from the cities, sites
definitely associated with Byzantium were usually either coastal or linked
to the road network. This was probably because Byzantine troops were
thinly spread, and speed of movement and supply would, therefore, have
been essential; troop positions did not necessarily have anything to do
with a permanent frontier. Ripoll López’s suggestion that the Byzantines
did not control any territory in the interior is too extreme: Medina
Sidonia and the territory surrounding it lie inland, as do Baza and a
significant part of the territory of Málaga. Given the lack of hard evidence
for the existence of a limes and the likelihood that Spania was more
extensive than Ripoll López has allowed, it is necessary to suggest an
alternative hypothesis about the ways in which the Byzantines defended
Spain and interacted with the Visigoths.
78
The Byzantine treatise on strategy, the Strategikon, dated between 575–628 gives the impression
that raiding of an opponent’s territory was at least as frequent an activity as long sieges,
Maurice, Strategikon X, ed. G.T. Dennis, Das Strategikon des Maurikios, Corpus Fontium
Historiae Byzantinae 17 (Vienna, 1981), pp. 336–50.
79
Abad Casal and Gutiérrez Lloret, ‘Iyih (El Tolmo de Minateda, Hellín, Albacete)’, pp. 591–600.

310 Jamie Wood
Diplomacy and defence

Warfare has long been privileged as the dominant mode of interaction
between Visigoths and Byzantines. For instance, Claude surveyed every
case of contact between the Visigoths and the eastern Roman empire,
concluding that military action was more important than diplomatic
activity in the minds of contemporaries.80 While this may be true on the
level of contemporary perceptions, especially from the ultimately victo-
rious Visigothic perspective, non-military contacts make up the largest
proportion of contemporary or near-contemporary references to interac-
tion between Spania and the Visigothic kingdom. From the Byzantine
point of view, warfare was often a last resort; although the Byzantines of
the later sixth and seventh centuries were willing to use force, they
preferred to deal with problems through the use of proxies, diplomacy, or
interference in the internal politics of their enemies.81 An anonymous
sixth-century Byzantine treatise on strategy states: ‘negotiating for peace
may be chosen before other means, since it might very well offer the best
prospect for protecting our own interests’.82
The authorities in Spania sought to protect their interests by a famil-
iar combination of negotiation and interference. As noted above, Athan-
agild’s rebellion and subsequent request for help from the Byzantines
precipitated Justinian’s invasion. In a number of other cases, the Byz-
antines may have been involved in, or sought to take advantage of,
dissent within the Visigothic kingdom. In 571 and 576 Leovigild sup-
pressed revolts in Córdoba and the Orospeda region respectively.83
Although there is no direct evidence for Byzantine involvement, both of
these regions bordered Spania and some kind of direct or indirect inter-
ference is possible. A more substantial case for involvement can be made
for the rebellion in the early 580s of Leovigild’s son, Hermenegild. John
of Biclarum is the only Iberian historian to suggest Byzantine involve-
ment, stating that Hermenegild ‘migrated to the empire’ after his
80
D. Claude, ‘Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen dem Westgotenreich und Ostrom
(475–615)’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 104 (1996), pp. 13–25.
For diplomatic activity in the earlier period see M. Vallejo Girvés, ‘Relaciones del Reino
Visigodo de Tolosa con el Imperio. El Papel de las Embajadas’, Arqueología, Paleontología y
Etnografía Monográfico IV. Los Visigodos y su Mundo (Madrid, 1997), pp. 72–9.
81
For Italian examples, C. Wickham, Early Medieval Italy. Central Power and Local Society
400–1000 (London, 1981), pp. 31–2.
82
The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy, c. 6, ed. G. Dennis, Three Byzantine Military
Treatises, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 25, Dumbarton Oaks Texts 9 (Washington,
1985), pp. 22–3; J. Haldon, ‘ “Blood and Ink”: Some Observations on Byzantine Attitudes
towards Warfare and Diplomacy’, in J. Shepard and S. Franklin (eds), Byzantine Diplomacy
(Aldershot, 1992), pp. 284, 294.
83
John of Biclarum, Chronicon 20 (s.a. 571), 46 (579), ed. Hartmann, pp. 63, 69.

defeat.84 Another contemporary, Gregory of Tours, was sure that the

rebellion had been encouraged by the Byzantines. In his account,
Hermenegild ‘was united with the generals of Emperor Tiberius’ (cum
ducibus imperatoris Tiberii fuerit coniunctus); while Leovigild gave
thirty thousand solidi to the Emperor’s commander (praefectus
imperatoris) in order to secure the recall of the Byzantine army
(exercitus).85 Additionally, the sacking of a monastery in the region of
Sagunto by Leovigild’s troops during the rebellion has been interpreted
as a show of strength intended to discourage Byzantine intervention.86
Furthermore, Gregory the Great states that Leander of Seville
visited Constantinople in the early 580s to persuade the emperor to
support Hermenegild. He is likely to have passed through Cartagena on
his return.87 After the rebellion had been defeated, Hermenegild’s wife
and son fled to the protection of Byzantine troops.88 Significant events
elsewhere, such as Lombard pressure on imperial possessions in Italy
and diplomatic entanglements with the Franks, are likely to have
changed the imperial attitude towards involvement in Spain and led
Emperor Maurice to extricate himself from any commitment to Herme-
negild.89 It may be difficult to discern fully the extent to which the
Byzantines were directly involved in the rebellion, but they were
certainly open to offers from the usurper and, as it turned out, from his
father Leovigild.
Reccared’s decision to convert from Arianism to Catholicism in 587
was closely followed by a series of conspiracies and rebellions (in Mérida,
Toledo, Narbonne, and one by Argimund, dux of an unknown province),
84
John of Biclarum, Chronicon 68 (s.a. 583), ed. Hartmann, p. 74: ‘ad rem publicam conmigrante’.
K. Wolf, Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain (Liverpool, 1990), pp. 7–10, 22. For
more on Hermenegild’s rebellion, J.N. Hillgarth, ‘Coins and Chronicles: Propaganda in
Sixth-Century Spain, and the Byzantine Background’, Historia 15 (1966), pp. 483–508; W.
Goffart, ‘Byzantine Policy in the West under Tiberius II and Maurice. The Pretenders
Hermenegild and Gundovald (579–585)’, Traditio 13 (1957), pp. 73–118.
85
Gregory of Tours, Libri Historiarum X V.38; VI.18; VI.43–4, ed. B. Krusch and W. Levison, pp.
243–5; 287–8; 314–16. Gregory has Hermenegild vocatis Grecis (V.38); plotting by imperial
envoys (VI.18); Hermenegild de imperatoris solatio fretus (VI.43).
86
Gregory of Tours, Libri in gloria confessorum 12, ed. W. Arndt and B. Krusch, Gregorii Turonensis
Opera MGH SRM 1, 2 (Hanover, 1885), p. 755; Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua,
pp. 206–7.
87
Gregory I, Moralia in Job, Epistola, I, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 75 (Paris, 1862), cols 509–12; Licinianus
of Cartagena referred to Leander’s visit to Cartagena, Epistula 1, ed. J. Madoz, Liciniano de
Cartagena y sus cartas. Edición crítica y estudio histórico (Madrid, 1948), pp. 92–6; Vallejo Girvés,
Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 202 dated the trip 580–2. For Gregory the Great’s positive
depiction of Hermenegild, see A.T. Fear, trans., Lives of the Visigothic Fathers (Liverpool, 1997),
p. 92, n. 193. J. Orlandis, ‘Gregorio Magno y la España visigoda-bizantina’, Hispania y Zaragoza
en la Antigüedad Tardia. Estudios Varios (Zaragoza, 1984), p. 97.
88
Gregory of Tours, Libri Historiarum X VI.44, ed. B. Krusch and W. Levison, p. 314–16; Paul the
Deacon, Historia Langobardorum III.21, ed. G. Waitz, pp. 103–4.
89
Goffart, ‘Byzantine Policy in the West under Tiberius II and Maurice’, pp. 73–118.

312 Jamie Wood
at least three of which involved an Arian element.90 The conversion was

announced officially, after this opposition had been overcome, at the
Third Council of Toledo in 589.91 The dispatch of the Governor
Comentiolus to Spania and the resulting upsurge in activity there may,
therefore, have been part of an attempt to take advantage of disquiet over
the conversion. Fortunately for Reccared, he was able to crush the revolts
before the Byzantines could destabilize the situation further.
The Byzantine administration had a reasonably good idea about what
was going on inside Visigothic Spain and as a result was able to take these
essentially opportunistic measures when dealing with the Visigoths. At
times the Byzantines were able to intervene directly to influence the
situation there and were thus regarded as a real threat by the Visigothic
hierarchy. However, in none of these instances is there any necessary
implication that Byzantine and Visigothic troops met in battle, but it is
clear that the imperial authorities were aware of what was happening in
Spain and sought to benefit from events there whenever possible. So,
in the case of Hermenegild, the emperors Tiberius and Maurice engaged
in diplomatic activity, presumably holding out the ‘carrot’ of military
assistance in the hope of gaining advantage later on. Once it was clear
that there was limited scope for territorial gain and that it would be better
not to antagonize Leovigild, the decision was taken to abandon Herme-
megild in return for payment.92
The administration of Byzantine Spania

Numismatic evidence supports the proposition that the Byzantine prov-
ince of Spania was organized in a manner consistent with the rest of the
empire. Grierson suggested that Spania minted its own coins like the
other western provinces, on the basis of stylistic similarities between coins
minted during a period corresponding to the Byzantine occupation, their
common differences from coins minted elsewhere in the empire, and
various parallels between this group and other ‘Spanish’ coins of the same
period (i.e. similar gold content, stylistic commonalities). The putative
existence of a Byzantine mint in Spania has been obscured by the short
time for which the province existed and the success of the Visigoths in
reminting Byzantine coinage when it entered their realm. Few specimens
90
John of Biclarum, Chronicon, c. 84 (s.a. 586); c. 87 (s.a. 587); c. 89 (s.a. 588); c. 94 (s.a. 589), ed.
Hartmann, pp. 78–9, 83; Vitas Sanctorum Patrum Emeritensium V.10–12, ed. A. Maya Sánchez,
Vitas Sanctorum Patrum Emeritensium, CCSL 116 (Turnhout, 1992), pp. 81–94.
91
R. Collins, ‘¿Dónde estaban los arrianos en el año 589?’, Actas del XIV Centenario del III Concilio
de Toledo (589–1989) (Toledo, 1991), p. 211.
92
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, pp. 187 and 204–5.

therefore survive.93 Nevertheless, Spania would have required bureacu-

ratic structures to organize and oversee the minting of coinage. The
existence of a more intense bureaucracy than has previously been envis-
aged has clear implications for understanding the importance of the
province to the empire and the likelihood that concerted efforts were
made to maintain it.
Justinian entrusted the first expedition to Spain to Liberius, a patrician
of great status and experience, who had dealt with the Visigoths earlier in
his career.94 A body of evidence also survives – and will be discussed later
– concerning the administration of the province in the early seventh
century. Isidore of Seville says that King Swinthila (621–31) defeated two
Byzantine patricians, presumably governors.95 Letters also survive record-
ing interactions between another patrician, Caesarius, and King Sisebut
in the 610s. One of these letters refers to the presence of iudices (judges)
in Spania.96
All of the above suggests that there was a more thoroughgoing
administration of the province than the coastal enclave theory allows,
an administration that was responsible for dispensing judgement,
arranging for the military and fiscal organization of the province, and
interacting with foreign powers. Furthermore, that this bureaucracy was
headed by figures of the highest patrician status is similarly incommen-
surate with Spania being little more than a ‘listening post’. When Jus-
tinian had established such a ‘listening post’ across the Straits of
Gibraltar at Septem, shortly after conquering Africa, it had been com-
manded only by a tribune.97
The best example of the activities of the patrician governors of Spania
comes from the 590s, the period of Comentiolus. Improvements on the
Persian front in the late 580s freed Emperor Maurice (582–602) to devote
more energy to affairs in the Balkans and the west. As a result, various
93
P. Grierson, ‘Una ceca bizantina en España’, Numario Hispanico 4 (1955), pp. 305–14.
94
Jordanes, Getica 303, ed. T. Mommsen, Jordanis ‘Romana’ et ‘Getica’, MGH AA 5.1 (Berlin, 1882;
repr. 1961), p. 136; J.J. O’Donnell, ‘Liberius the Patrician’, Traditio 31–72, does not think that
Liberius made the voyage to Spain; cf. Presedo Velo, La España Bizantina, pp. 38–43, who is
more positive on this point.
95
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 62 (second redaction), ed. Rodríguez Alonso, pp. 274–6: ‘He
increased the power of his title in that conflict by prevailing over two patricians, one of whom
he defeated with his wisdom, the other by his strength.’ (‘Auxit eo proelio uirtutis eius titulum
duorum patriciorum obtentus, quorum alterum prudentia suum fecit, alterum uirtute sibi
fecit.’)
96
Epistolae Wisigothicae, no. 5, ed. Gundlach, pp. 666–7.
97
For the relationship between Spania and the Byzantine provinces in Africa, see Fuentes Hinojo,
‘Sociedad, ejército y administración fiscal’, pp. 304–7; M. Vallejo Girvés, ‘Byzantine Spain and
the African Exarchate: An administrative Perspective’, Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik
49 (1999), pp. 13–23; Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 358; Martin, La
géographie, pp. 286–7; Claude, ‘Diplomatischen Beziehungen’, pp. 24–5.

314 Jamie Wood
administrative reforms were implemented and experienced commanders

were dispatched westwards.98 As part of this policy, the patrician
Comentiolus, who had held several important military positions under
Maurice, was sent to Spain by 589.99 The inscription (dated September
589–August 590) that was raised by Comentiolus in Cartagena was prob-
ably related to the Byzantine response to the Visigothic conversion to
Catholicism. As the Visigoths could no longer be depicted as heretical
Arians, the Byzantines reverted to the old opposition of Roman versus
barbarian. The Visigoths are thus described as a barbarian enemy (hostis
barbarus) and the text emphasized the permanence of the Byzantine
presence in Spain:
Thus Spain always rejoices in such a governor as long as the [north and
south] poles are being rotated and as long as the sun circles the earth.100
Prior to the conversion of the Visigoths to Catholicism, the Byzantines

are likely to have encouraged interaction between the Catholics of Spania
with those in the Visigothic kingdom in the hope of destabilizing the
Arian Visigothic monarchy. There is strong evidence for contact between
Catholic ecclesiastics in the Byzantine province and clerics in the Visig-
othic kingdom. Severus of Málaga wrote a libellus against Vincentius of
Zaragoza, who had moved from Catholicism to ‘semi-Arianism’ as a
result of the pressure Leovigild placed on Catholics to convert.101 Licin-
ianus of Cartagena also maintained contacts with high-level ecclesiastics
in the Visigothic realm, such as Eutropius of Valencia and Leander of
98
Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, pp. 220–7; Haldon, Warfare, State and Society
in the Byzantine World, pp. 70–1: Maurice established the exarchates of Ravenna (584) and
Carthage (591), in response to Lombard and Berber threats, augmenting the exarchs’ military
and civil jurisdictions. J.N. Hillgarth, ‘El Concilio III de Toledo y Bizancio’, Actas del XIV
Centenario del III Concilio de Toledo (589–1989) (Toledo, 1991), p. 302.
99
J.R. Martindale, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, vol. 3A (Cambridge, 1992), pp.
321–5; Prego, ‘La inscripción de Comitiolus’, pp. 383–91 argued that this was a different person,
since the inscriptions reads ‘Comitiolus’. Nevertheless, the gap in the career of the easterner, the
aggressive reaffirmation of Byzantine power represented by the inscription and the context of
the recent conversion of the Visigoths makes it likely that this was the same person – the
emperor needed a trusted figure to maintain the Spanish province.
100
M. Vallejo Girvés, ‘Commentiolus, Magister militum Spaniae missus a Mauricio Augusto contra
hostes barbaros. The Byzantine Perspective on the Visigothic Conversion to Catholicism’,
Romano-Barbarica 14 (1996–7), pp. 289–306. For transcription, Prego, ‘La inscripción de
Comitiolus’, p. 383: ‘ . . . SPANIAE SIC SEMPER SPANIA TALI RECTORE LAETETVR
DVM POLI ROTANTVR DVMQ. SOL CIRCVIT ORBEM ANN. VIII AUG. IND VIII’.
For a similar interpretation of earlier city walls see, C. Fernández Ochoa and A. Morillo, ‘Walls
in the Urban Landscape of Late Roman Spain: Defence and Imperial Strategy’, in K. Bowes and
M. Kulikowski (eds), Hispania in Late Antiquity (Leiden, 2005), pp. 299–341; W. Mierse,
‘Augustan City Walls in the West’, Journal of Roman Archaeology 3 (1990), pp. 258–60.
101
Isidore, De viris illustribus, c. XXX, ed. C. Codoñer Merino, p. 151; Thompson, The Goths in
Spain, pp. 83–7.

Seville.102 Epigraphic and archaeological evidence points to the presence

of a large number of eastern merchants and eastern-produced goods in
the Iberian Peninsula in this period. Also, easterners controlled the bish-
opric of Mérida for a period during the later sixth century.103 Once the
Visigoths were no longer Arian heretics, such contacts between the
Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchies of Spania and the Visigothic kingdom
were a potential threat to Byzantine control. Interaction may have
increased the anxiety of the imperial government about the loyalty of the
local Catholic population.
Three letters of Pope Gregory I, dated August 603, reinforce the
impression that Byzantine attitudes towards the population of Spania
hardened after the Visigothic conversion. The letters order the
defensor John to Spain in response to Comentiolus’ deposition and the
exile of two bishops, Januarius of Málaga and Stephen, whose see was not
specified.104 The weight of legal material that Gregory sent with John
suggests that he wanted to establish incontrovertibly that Comentiolus
had acted illegally.105 Several scholars have suggested that the poisoning of
Bishop Licinianus of Cartagena at Constantinople may have been the
result of his failure to toe the imperial line after the Catholic conversion
of the Visigoths, although the source for this, Isidore of Seville, is gen-
erally very hostile to the empire and so must be read carefully.106
The canons of the Second Council of Seville, held in 619 under Isidore
of Seville, provide a complementary perspective. This Council sought to
resolve difficulties emerging from the Visigothic conquest of parts of
southern Baetica from the Byzantines. 107 The presence of two important
royal officials, Sisisclus, rector rerum publicarum, and Suanilanus, rector
rerum fiscalium, at the meeting demonstrates the close involvement of the
102
Isidore, De viris illustribus, c. XXIX, ed. C. Codoñer Merino, pp. 150–1; Licinianus, Epistula 1,
ed. J. Madoz, Liciniano de Cartagena y sus cartas. Edición crítica y estudio histórico (Madrid,
1948), pp. 84, 92–3.
103
Vitas Sanctorum Patrum Emeritensium IV, ed. Maya Sánchez, pp. 25–46.
104
Gregory I, Registrum Epistolarum XIII.47–50, ed. Hartmann, II, pp. 410–18. See also M. Vallejo
Girvés, ‘Bizancio ante la conversión de los visigodos: los obispos Jenaro y Esteban’, Actas del XIV
Centenario del III Concilio de Toledo (589–1989) (Toledo, 1991), pp. 477–83.
105
Orlandis, ‘Gregorio Magno y la España visigoda-bizantina’, pp. 90 and 100–3; R. González
Fernández, ‘Las cartas de Gregorio Magno al defensor Juan. La aplicación del derecho de
Justiniano en la Hispania bizantina en el siglo VII’, Antigüedad y Cristianismo 14 (1997), p. 292.
John the Deacon, Vita Gregorii II.11, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 75 (Paris, 1862), col. 92, also mentions
John’s mission, although he gives no more details.
106
Isidore, De viris illustribus, c. XXIX, ed. C. Codoñer Merino, El ‘De viris illustribus’ de Isidoro
de Sevilla, Theses et Studia Philologica Salamanticensia 12 (Salamanca, 1964), p. 151, Licinianus
‘died by poisoning at Constantinople, so they say, having been destroyed by his rivals’ (‘occubit
Constantinopoli, ueneno, ut ferunt, extinctus ab aemulis’); Thompson, The Goths in Spain, pp.
159–60; Vallejo Girvés, Bizancio y la España tardo antigua, p. 427; F.-M. Beltrán Torreira (1991),
‘El conflicto por la primacía eclesiástica de la Cartaginense y el III Concilio de Toledo’, Actas del
XIV Centenario del III Concilio de Toledo (589–1989) (Toledo, 1991), pp. 499–500.
107
MacCoull, ‘Isidore and the Akephaloi’, pp. 169–78.

316 Jamie Wood
Visigothic monarchy in proceedings.108 The twelfth canon condemned a

Syrian bishop, Gregory, who belonged to the heresy of the acephali, and
much of the text was devoted to refuting his errors.109 Although this
formed part of Visigothic attempts to demonstrate their Catholic ortho-
doxy and denigrate that of the Byzantines, Gregory’s presence in Spain
also hints at deliberate attempts by the Byzantines to develop their own
form of ecclesiastical organization in Spania, the orthodoxy of which did
not tally with the ideas of Isidore and his fellow bishops. Such a reading
of the evidence also helps to explain Isidore’s negative attitude towards
Byzantium in his historical writings: he opposed the Byzantines because
they presented a serious threat to the spiritual as well as the political
integrity of Spain.110 The first canon of the council resolved jurisdictional
conflicts concerning the area around Málaga and criticized the Byzantines
for carrying the possessions of churches into poverty with ‘barbaric
savagery’ (barbarica feritas).111 The issue of the material conditions of the
population in Spania seems to have been an important one because
Isidore has the following to say in the first redaction of his Historia
Gothorum, written when the Byzantines were still threatening in the
southern Spain:
And from then up to this point in time the Romans, who remain in
the kingdom of the Goths, embrace them to such a degree that it is
better for them to live poor with the Goths than to be powerful among
the Romans and bear the heavy yoke of tribute.112
By attacking Byzantine orthodoxy, Visigothic propagandists also, there-

fore, sought to demonstrate that the Byzantine treatment of the local
population, including the church, had negative economic and religious
consequences.
Byzantine–Visigothic interaction
Despite the negativity pervading Visigothic–Byzantine rhetoric in the
late sixth and early seventh centuries, archaeological, epigraphic and
textual research has demonstrated that commercial contacts between
108
II Seville I, ed. Vives, p. 163.
109
II Seville XII–XIII, ed. Vives, pp. 171–85; MacCoull, ‘Isidore and the Akephaloi’, pp. 169–78.
110
Wood, ‘Heretical Catholics and Catholic Heretics’, pp. 39–45.
111
II Seville I, ed. Vives, p. 163: ‘Sicut enim per legem mundialem his quos barbarica feritas captiva
necessitate transvexit, postliminio revertentibus redditur antiqua possession . . . ’
112
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 15 (first redactions), ed. C. Rodríguez Alonso, Las historias de los
godos, vándalos y suevos de Isidoro de Sevilla (Léon, 1975), p. 196: ‘Unde et hucusque Romani, qui
in regno Gothorum consistent, adeo eos amplectuntur, ut melius sit illis cum Gothis pauperes
vivere quam inter Romanos potentes esse et grave iugum tributi portare.’

Spania, Visigothic Spain, and the eastern empire continued throughout

the period of the Byzantine presence in Spain.113 Attempts to create a
material and an ideological frontier largely failed. Even evidence for
formal interactions between the Byzantine and Visigothic governments
reveals the dual nature of their relationship: there was conflict, to be sure,
but there were also formalized avenues for meeting, discussing, and
resolving disputes. A brief examination of surviving evidence for such
interactions reveals the complex nature of the political realities facing
both sides.
A letter from King Reccared to Pope Gregory I from 599 requested
copies of past treaties between Justinian and the Visigothic kingdom which
had been lost. These treaties were probably the arrangements that were
concluded between Athanagild and Justinian in the mid-550s and which
established the terms for Byzantine intervention and recognized Byzantine
control of parts of south-eastern Spain in its aftermath.114 Hermenegild’s
rebellion in the early 580s had been accompanied by a number of interac-
tions that must have involved some contact between the Visigothic and
Byzantine administration. As noted previously, Leovigild had bribed the
emperor’s commander in 583 in order to prevent him from intervening,
while Leander of Seville acted as Hermenegild’s legate in Constantinople
in the early 580s, returning via Cartagena.
Reccared’s letter to Gregory requesting a copy of the lost treaty resulted
from his negotiations with the administration of Spania in the 590s, after
Comentiolus had returned to the east. This was also the context for
Gregory’s dispatch of the defensor John. Presumably the departure of
Governor Comentiolus led to an attempt to normalize relations through
diplomacy. Claude thought that these negotiations happened because the
Visigoths had reconquered a portion of territory and were attempting to
have their de facto control recognized through a revised treaty.115
The situation in Spania changed dramatically in the early seventh
century. In the east Byzantium came under increasing pressure from
Persia; the reign of Phocas (602–10) witnessed renewed Lombard hostility
in Italy, and the successful rebellion of Heraclius, the exarch of Carthage,
113
L. García Moreno, ‘Colonias de comerciantes orientales en la Península Ibérica. S. V–VII’,
Habis 3 (1972), pp. 127–54; S. Gutierrez Lloret, ‘Eastern Spain in the Sixth Century in the Light
of Archaeology’, in R. Hodges and W. Bowden (eds), The Sixth Century: Production, Distribu-
tion and Demand (Leiden, 1998), pp. 161–84; A. D’Ors, ‘Los “tranmarini negotiatores” en la
legislacion visigotica’, Estudios de Derecho Internacional. Homenaje al profesor Camilo Barcia
Trelles (Santiago de Compostela, 1958), pp. 467–83.
114
Gregory I, Registrum Epistolarum IX, no. 229, ed. L.M. Hartmann, MGH Gregorii I Papae
Registrum Epistolarum (Berlin, 1893), II, pp. 225–6. M. Vallejo Girvés, ‘The Treaties between
Justinian and Athanagild and the Legality of the Byzantine Possessions on the Iberian Penin-
sula’, Byzantion 66 (1996), pp. 208–18.
115
Gregory I, Registrum Epistolarum IX, no. 229, ed. Hartmann, II, pp. 225–6; Claude, ‘Diplo-
matischen Beziehungen’, pp. 18–19.

318 Jamie Wood
with his son Heraclius, the future emperor.116 Despite this, it is remark-
able that owing perhaps to a combination of the success of the Byzantine
defences, the poverty of our sources, or the failure of the Visigoths to
exploit this opportunity, the only recorded Visigothic territorial gain
from the reigns of Witteric and Gundemar (603–12) was Sagontia
(modern Gigonza).117
Nonetheless, in the 610s and 620s the number of references to military
aggression and diplomatic contacts increases. Letters exchanged between
King Sisebut (612–21) and the patrician Caesarius reveal the complexities
of these interactions.118 It appears that the Byzantines lost territory, cities
and prisoners, while on at least one occasion they captured a bishop from
Visigothic territory, Cicilius of Mentesa.119 One letter expressed Sisebut’s
thanks to his internuntius, Ansemundus, for his services in dealing with
Caesarius. Sisebut thanked Ansemundus for participating in the negi-
otiation of a treaty (suscipe federa). Other letters referred to further
diplomatic activity: for example, to Theoderic, Sisebut’s envoy (legatus),
and a priest named Amelius negotiating on the king’s behalf with
Emperor Heraclius in Constantinople. If Amelius was part of the Visig-
othic embassy to Constantinople, it reinforces the impression of the
church acting in concert with the Visigothic monarchy and might help to
explain why the Byzantines were so concerned about the loyalty of the
local clergy after the conversion of the Visigoths to Catholicism.120 These
letters demonstrate that the administration of Spania was in contact with
the Visigothic monarchy, and that it acted as an intermediary in nego-
tiations between the monarchy and the central imperial government. It
was thus closely integrated into the imperial system but also had the
freedom to act autonomously if necessary.
Conclusion
We have argued that the existing evidence does not support the theory
that Spania was defended by a limes-style frontier. Nor was the province
limited to a few coastal enclaves because, in at least three cases, the
written evidence suggests that the Byzantines were in control of signifi-
cant portions of territory. Even if this control was limited to the territo-
rium of a city under Byzantine control the evidence does suggest that
Byzantine influence extended some distance inland, and is supported by
116
García Moreno, Historia de España visigoda, pp. 144–54.
117
Isidore, Historia Gothorum, c. 58 (both redactions), ed. Rodríguez Alonso, p. 268.
118
Epistolae Wisigothicae, nos. 3–6, ed. W. Gundlach, MGH Epistolae 1 (Berlin, 1892), pp. 663–8.
119
Epistolae Wisigothicae, no. 3, ed. Gundlach, pp. 663–4.
120
Claude, ‘Diplomatischen Beziehungen’, pp. 22–4, who argues that Amelius was a Byzantine.

the archaeological evidence for economic contacts between the Visigothic

kingdom and Spania.
There is significant evidence for a more thoroughgoing administration
of the province than has been admitted previously and for an adminis-
tration that was headed by governors of patrician status. The Byzantine
governmental presence was mirrored by that of eastern churchmen in
Spania, as evidenced by the bishops’ efforts at the Second Council of
Seville to reconcile the Syrian bishop Gregory to Catholic orthodoxy and
to reorganize the reconquered territory.121
Although it is clear that some Byzantine troops were in Spania, that
some building work occurred, and that a functioning government
existed, there was no discernable formal frontier system in place. Byzan-
tium was repeatedly opportunistic in its relations with the Visigoths:
Spania was established because of a civil war and the Byzantines sought to
benefit from further internal dissension during the reign of Leovigild.
Contact between the Byzantine and Visigothic administrations was not
continually hostile; provincial governors negotiated with the Visigoths in
the reigns of Athanagild, Reccared and Sisebut, and with both sides
during Hermenegild’s rebellion. The creation of new bishoprics by the
Visigoths following their conversion, the possibility that Byzantium
engaged in similar activity, Byzantine attempts to redefine the identity of
the Visigoths as ‘barbarian enemies’ once they had ceased to be ‘Arian
heretics’, and Visigothic retorts at the Second Council of Seville, all
suggest that the two sides sought to create an ideological as much as a
material frontier.
This ideological frontier, however, was almost wholly the creation of
the ecclesiastical and governmental elites of the Visigothic and Byzantine
areas. The story was one of conflict, to be sure, but a conflict that was
frequently mediated and sometimes resolved via a complex network of
political and religious actors: Byzantine emperors; Visigothic kings and
usurpers; governors and other royal or imperial agents; councils; indi-
vidual bishops; the Pope and his agents. Finally, it is important to note
that, whatever forms these elite interactions and sanctions took, they had
only a minor influence upon people’s everyday lives – material evidence
suggests strongly that the Visigothic and Byzantine territories interacted
extensively and continually.122
University of Manchester
121
II Seville XII, ed. Vives, p. 171.
122
See Presedo Velo, La España Bizantina, pp. 95–163 for detailed summary of evidence for various
‘cultural influences’ on Visigothic Spain, including commercial, religious, legal, artistic, epi-
graphic, numismatic, and ceramic influences.


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Defending Byzantine Spain: frontiers

and diplomacy emed_300 292..319

The centrality of the Reconquista in the historiography of medieval Spain has

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3) 292–319

The Byzantine province of Spania, which incorporated the southern

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

A limes for Spania

Formerly, when his tyranny had already been initiated while he

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

having struggled he could not remove those [imperial soldiers] from

The continued resistance of cities such as Córdoba to Visigothic rule

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

then be asked whether . . . the military organisation, as represented by

Hence, the concept of a limes as fortified frontier dividing two clearly

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

This means that, despite the undoubted richness of the archaeological

The evidence for Byzantine defences

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

terminology used by archaeologists and historians who have analysed the

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

The Cartagena region has received much attention from archaeolo-

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

outpost guarding an entrance to the valley.51 At Elche a Justinianic coin (a

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

the conquest of inland cities such as Illiberis (near to modern Granada)

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Spania. John of Biclarum (550/6–621/31) writing in 590 described it as

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Moreno, have seen it as part of the Visigothic defences.66 The same

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

control of southern Spain in the early sixth century, direct military

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Diplomacy and defence

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

defeat.84 Another contemporary, Gregory of Tours, was sure that the

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

at least three of which involved an Arian element.90 The conversion was

The administration of Byzantine Spania

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

therefore survive.93 Nevertheless, Spania would have required bureacu-

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

administrative reforms were implemented and experienced commanders

Prior to the conversion of the Visigoths to Catholicism, the Byzantines

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Seville.102 Epigraphic and archaeological evidence points to the presence

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Visigothic monarchy in proceedings.108 The twelfth canon condemned a

By attacking Byzantine orthodoxy, Visigothic propagandists also, there-

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Spania, Visigothic Spain, and the eastern empire continued throughout

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

the archaeological evidence for economic contacts between the Visigothic

Early Medieval Europe 2010 18 (3)

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