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The Sources and Evolution of Indian Labour Relations Policy

Author(s): Van D. Kennedy


Source: Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jul., 1965), pp. 15-40
Published by: Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27760575
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l/an IP. Kennedy

THE SOURCES AND EVOLUTION


OF INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY

"IF one would understand the course and character of industrial


- relations in free India, he should begin with the government policy;
for Indian unionism and labour relations are not a product only of their
environment and internal forces. True to the belief of India's leaders
that man can shape his society to his own design, government has been
zealous and persistent in trying to create the kind of industrial relations
system it desires. To this end it has used legislation, administrative
action, tripartite consultation, persuasion and education. This essay
seeks to trace the main outlines of the government policy affecting
unionism and labour relations since 1947, including the main points
of controversy, the new departures and the modifications which have
marked its evolution. Since our purpose is to understand, let us also
see the government policy and the changes made in it.

1947-1956 : stalemate and policy by default


When India became self-governing in 1947, she did not, of course,
start with a clean slate in labour matters. A trade union movement
had existed for over 25 years. A considerable body of labour legis
lation, some of it going back to the 1920's, was on the statute books.
Associated with them was a labour relations system of sorts and a pat
tern of government regulations and intervention which the British
had established. The Indian National Congress, long before Inde
pendence, had gone on record favouring the improvement of the condi
Dr. Van D. Kennedy is Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of
California, Berkeley (California), U.s.A.
The author thanks the Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Cornell University,
Ithaca, N.Y., for kind permission to incorporate in this article material from his
article, "The Conceptual and Legislative Framework of Labour Relations in
India", which appeared in its issue, Vol. 11, No. 4, July 1958, pp. 487-505.

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16 VAN D. KENNEDY

tions of industrial workers through government action, freedom


for the development of strong trade unions and determination of em
ployment conditions through voluntary negotiation wherever possible.
So the question for the new national government after 1947 was to
what extent and in what way it should replace or amend existing legis
lation and alter government's already established labour relations
role in pursuance of the long-standing goals of the independence move
ment.
The new government had more important things to do than make
a full-dress study of labour relations policy. Besides, labour relations
during the first few years of Independence continued to be quite un
settled. This was partly the aftermath of Second World War and the
dislocations it introduced into employment relations. Particularly
disturbing was the decline in real wages because of price inflation. It
was partly that the creation soon after 1947 of three new national trade
union centres, each with its own political affiliation, to compete with
the existing communist-controlled All India Trade Union Congress
introduced a very disturbing competition for members and employer
recognition into the labour relations picture. Under these conditions
what government needed most was to maintain the maximum amount
of industrial peace while it gained time to take up its manifold tasks.
There was every reason, then, for government to continue the existing
legislative and policy pattern, for it was aimed primarily at preserving
industrial peace. This was true especially of the Industrial Disputes
Act, passed early in 1947, to make permanent and formal the machinery
for settling disputes without strikes which had grown up during the
War.
In view of these considerations, it is noteworthy that in 1947
Parliament did pass legislation amending the existing labour relations
law in significant respects. It happens that the amendments never
came into effect, but this does not alter the point, namely, that as free
India embarked on its labour relations history fresh thinking was being
done in government circles and that in spite of a strong case for stay
ing with the pre-1947 pattern India came near making a sharp break
with that pattern. Let us review first this framework of law which
India took over from the British and then return to a consideration of
the changes which were proposed in it.

Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926


This Act deals exclusively with the requirements of unions which
wish to become and remain registered under the law and with the rights
of registered unions. Only a few points need to be made about its
bearing on labour relations. It permits a trade union to be registered

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 17

by any seven or more members. The only protection a union acquires


through registration is immunity for its members and officers from
criminal conspiracy proceedings and from civil suits growing out of
trade disputes. The requirement on registered unions to be noted is
that not more than one-half of the total number of officers of a union
may be outsiders.

Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and


other laws that regulate conditions of employment
The Standing Orders Act requires every industrial establishment
employing one hundred or more persons to have a set of certified
standing orders defining the conditions of employment to be maintained
in the establishment. The conditions to be defined are prescribed in
the Act and may be added to by administrative regulations. They in
clude such matters as classification of workmen, shift schedules, atten
dance rules, tardiness, leave and holidays, discipline for misconduct,
termination and grievance procedure. Each set of orders must conform
"so far as is practicable" with the model standing orders published by
the appropriate government and must be certified by a government
officer. This officer must submit the proposed orders to the trade
union, if any, or to the workers involved for their objections, and he
must give the employer and workers' representatives an opportunity
to be heard. Thereafter, he may modify or add to the employer's
draft as necessary to make the orders certifiable. Once they are certi
fied, the employer must post his standing orders at a conspicuous point
in his establishment.

In addition to the Standing Orders Act, one must note the exis
tence of the Factories Act which applies to all factories and a large num
ber of more or less counterpart Central and State laws which apply,
respectively, to mines, plantations, transport industries, and to shops
and commercial establishments in the main urban centres. In general,
these laws prescribe certain minimum terms with respect to daily and
weekly hours of work, rest intervals, overtime pay, holidays with pay,
annual paid leave, employment of young persons, safety measures,
welfare facilities and the like. The Minimum Wages Act requires the
Central and State Governments to fix minimum rates of wages, including
cost of living allowances and overtime rates, for a very large number
of industries coming under their jurisdictions. One may note here,
too, the amendments of the Industrial Disputes Act which provide
compensation to laid-off workers and for advance notice and compen
sation to retrenched workers. Not all of this legislation existed prior
to 1947, but enough of it did to say that the pattern was already esta
blished.

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18 VAN D. KENNEDY

The implications of all this legislation for Indian labour relations


and for government policy are clear. Standing orders cover many
subjects that are regularly to be found in collective bargaining agree
ments. The mere fact that the employer must develop them, get .them
certified and post them introduces an element of order and predictability
into employment relations, as a collective agreement does. The nece
ssity of conforming to model orders fixed by government presumably
gives some assurance that minimum standards will be observed. Even
prior review by worker representatives is provided. The other legis
lation mentioned assures to workers in the principal industries of the
country at least minimum protections regarding several of the central
subjects of collective bargaining. The total effect of all these laws,
it can be argued, is to make a sufficient and orderly provision for
the key employment conditions so that workers need not be dependent
upon unions for these protections and government need not feel com
pelled to promote the method of collective bargaining.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947


As its name implies, this Act is concerned primarily with dispute
settlement and does little about other aspects of labour relations. It
gives any workman who is a party to a dispute the right to be represen
ted in any proceeding by the officer of any trade union connected with
his industry whether or not he is a member. It authorises the Central
and the State Governments to order each industrial establishment
within their respective jurisdictions and employing one hundred or
more workmen to have a works committee. Most governments have
done so. The Act gives these committees a broad assignment: "to
promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations
between the employer and workmen, and to that end, to comment
upon matters of their common interest or concern and endeavour to
compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such matters." *
These words are broad enough to take in the subjects of collective
bargaining, but the Act does not clarify the relations between unions
and committees beyond saying that workers' representatives on works
committees are to be chosen "in consultation with their trade union,
if any," in a manner to be prescribed by the appropriate government.
Most States have directed that workers' representatives or some por
tion of them are to be elected at large.
The provisions of the Act dealing with the prevention and settle
ment of disputes are very detailed and only their main features need
to be indicated here. The circumstances under which strikes and lock
outs are illegal are defined as are the requirements for advance notice
before strikes and lock-outs may take place. Great reliance is put

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 19

on conciliation. A conciliation officer may hold proceedings at his


discretion; he may enter establishments involved in disputes; he may
call for any relevant documents; he may "do all such things as he
thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and
amicable settlement." In practice, most conciliators recommend to
the parties the settlement they consider fair before they terminate the
case. As a final step, the appropriate government may, in its discre
tion, refer a dispute for adjudication by a government appointed court
or tribunal. Such referrals are compulsory on the parties.
From this review it can be seen that India inherited a framework
of labour law that might be called typical of an enlightened colonial
regime. It assumed that Indian trade unionism and labour relations
were undeveloped and would remain so. Certainly the legislation
contained no provisions designed to change that condition or give any
shape or direction to the growth of unionism and collective bargaining.
The only controls to speak of were aimed at preventing strikes. And
government was assigned the paternalistic role of assuring minimum
employment conditions to workers and deciding the merits of labour
disputes.

Proposals to change the pattern : 1947 amendments


In 1947, Parliament enacted a law which, though in the form of
amendments to the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926, really represented
a clear break with the whole posture of the existing framework. It
gave unions basic protections against unfair employer practices and also
defined as unfair certain types of union practices. It provided for
compulsory recognition of representative unions by employers and for
arbitration of disputes over certification of unions. These amendments
were plainly inspired by the American Wagner Act of 1935 which has
often been called the Magna Carta of American unionism.
The 1947 amendments never came into effect because the exe
cutive branch of government did not give the law the necessary noti
fication. No official explanation for this executive veto seems to have
been given, but some of the reasons are apparent. Employers, doubtless,
had little enthusiasm for measures to strengthen unions, but objections
from the labour movement probably had more influence. Non-Con
gress union groups strongly opposed the exclusion from the new
protection s of civil service and other categories of government employees
and of supervisors. This question evidently became a major issue at
the Cabinet level with the important employing ministries strongly
opposed to having their personnel covered by the amendments. There
must have been uncertainty among unions about these new measures
in any case. The fluid conditions in the movement in the first years

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20 VAN D. KENNEDY

after Independence with the rapid creation of rival unions in many


industries made the impact of compulsory recognition of representative
unions quite uncertain. The Congress government and the Indian
National Trade Union Congress, which had been sponsored by Con
gress leaders, probably had the most reason for concern on this score.
At the time, communist and socialist leadership still dominated the
movement and the Congress high command could well be apprehensive
that enforcement of the amendment provisions would play into the
hands of the anti-Congress unions.

The 1950 Bills


Nevertheless, the decision not to put the 1947 amendments into
effect seemed an interim bowing to expediency rather than a considered
adoption of policy. For the Central Ministry of Labour was soon at
work on legislation which proposed an even more drastic departure
from the pre-1947 pattern. By 1950, two new bills had been drafted,
a Labour Relations Bill and a Trade Unions Bill. These were designed
as comprehensive pieces of legislation which would replace existing
labour relations laws. Only their most important provisions can be
indicated here. They reinstituted the 1947 amendment provisions for
compulsory recognition of unions and basic protections against unfair
employer practices. Recognised unions were given such rights as
collecting subscriptions and holding meetings on employer premises.
Employers could be ordered to recognise unions by labour courts.
Collective bargaining was made compulsory for both employers and
unions under stipulated conditions. Labour courts were empowered to
certify unions as falling into one of three categories of bargaining agents
depending on where each union's membership fell between 25 and
50 per cent of employment in its type of bargaining unit. Unions so
certified received exclusive bargaining rights in their units. The conclu
sion of written agreements to be registered with the appropriate govern
ment office was declared to be the purpose of collective bargaining.
All agreements had to provide for final settlement without work stop
page, by arbitration or otherwise, of all questions arising under such
agreements. The existing provisions for conciliation of disputes and
for their referral to tribunal adjudication were retained.
It is clear from this summary that the drafters of the 1950 bills
intended to transform Indian labour policy from its pre-Independence
laissez faire lack of concern for the progress of unionism and bargain
ing to positive promotion of a labour relations system based on strong
unions' exclusive bargaining rights and compulsory bargaining. It
is interesting to note that the proposed changes again drew heavily
on American practice. This was reflected both in the use of such

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 21

terminology as "collective agreement", "certified bargaining agent"


and "unfair labour practice" and in the definition and prohibition of
employer unfair labour practices much of which was drawn verbatim
from the corresponding section of the Wagner Act.
The draft bills were referred to Select Committees which studied
them, made minor alterations and reported them back to Parliament
in December, 1950, recommending their passage. No action was taken
on them, however, and the bills lapsed along with the Parliament
prior to the 1951-52 national elections. The anti-Congress unions
again opposed the exclusion of government employees. There was
apprehension among union leaders that the elaborate procedures pro
vided by the bills to foster peaceful collective bargaining would unduly
restrict the right to strike. The real stalemate occurred once again at
the Cabinet level where the ministries in charge of the railways, defence
establishments and posts and telegraphs strongly opposed extending
the compulsions of the new legislation to their own labour relations.
Although the Indian National Trade Union Congress, at least formally,
supported the bills, some Congress leaders doubtless remained fearful
that the bills would, on balance, weaken the Congress position in the
labour movement.

First Five Year Plan


It was in this setting of debate and indecision about labour policy
and legislative changes that the labour chapter of the First Plan was
written. It is not surprising that the Plan does not announce a clear
policy nor outline a definite programme. Instead, it attempts to
state broad principles and, in doing so, deals with ^o many themes
and professes to find harmony and feasibility among such a diversity
of purposes that it betrays either inadequate understanding of labour
relations or a conscious use of sweeping generalisations to cover
government indecision and disagreement. Probably, and quite
understandably, there is some of both.
Let us attempt to summarise here only those leading themes from
the First Plan labour chapter that are most relevant to labour relations.
The two main underlying themes are stated in the following terms:
Taking the period of the next few years... it is incumbent on
the state to arm itself with legal powers to refer disputes for
settlement by arbitration or adjudication... However, the
endeavour of the state has all along to be to encourage mutual
settlement, collective bargaining and voluntary arbitration to the
utmost extent, and thereby reduce to the minimum occasions
for its intervention.. .

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22 VAN D. KENNEDY

The importance of unionism to the system is recognised:


The worker's right of association, organisation and collective
bargaining is to be accepted without reservation as the funda
mental basis of the mutual relationship.
Collective bargaining can derive reality only from the organised
strength of workers and a genuine desire on the part of the
employer to cooperate with their representatives.
But the union is seen as inherently the weaker party:
The community has, therefore, to intervene for redressing the
balance in favour of the weaker party to assure just treatment for
all concerned. Legal provisions relating to trade unions and in
dustrial disputes have to be framed and interpreted in relation to
these objectives.
Some attention is given to the need for orderly bargaining
arrangements:
A legal framework may be created to determine the appropriate
bargaining agency and to fix the responsibility for the enforce
ment of collective agreements. For the success of collective
bargaining it is essential that there should be a single bargaining
agent over as large an area of industry as possible. Separate
unions for industrial establishments in the same industry in a
local area are inimical to the growth of a strong and healthy
trade union and their existence may be justified only in very
exceptional circumstances.
It is declared desirable to have "norms and standards" to govern
mutual relations and dealings between the parties and for the settle
ment of disputes. The most suitable machinery for fixing norms is
a tripartite body. But where this is not possible government alone
should make the decisions. Permanent tripartite wage boards are
visualised to deal with wage problems. So far as possible, however,
disputes over wages and other working conditions should be settled
by voluntary arbitration. The importance of a systematic grievance
procedure served by elected shop stewards is emphasised. Disputes
over the terms of standing orders and over the interpretation of agree
ments should be settled by arbitration. Works committees are called
at one point "the culminating step in the grievance machinery" and,
at another, "the key of the system of industrial relations as conceived
in this Plan." The works committee should not be a rival to the union
and wherever a union is backed by a majority of the workers in a plant
it should select the worker representatives on the works committee.
Finally, it should be noted that the Plan held that the benefits of all
labour laws should be extended to workers in all public undertakings,

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 23

The principles set forth in the First Plan are reported in this much
detail because they continue to reflect official thinking up to the present
time. Only shifts in emphasis have occurred. But the summary has
also revealed that the Plan did not commit the government to a definite
course of action on behalf of these principles. The Plan could be
said to support the legislative changes proposed in the 1950 bills but
failure to enact those bills could not be criticised as a direct violation
of the Plan.

Final rejection of legislated change


Despite having lapsed in 1951, the 1950 Trade Unions and Labour
Relations Bills did not drop out of sight and when V. V. Giri
became Minister of Labour early in 1952 the cause for their adoption
took on a new lease of life. Giri was a Congress leader of good stand
ing and had a long record as a prominent trade union leader. He
made something of a mission of championing collective bargaining
and deprecating the method of government adjudication and pursued
it so widely and energetically that it was soon referred to in the Indian
press and labour relations circles as the "Giri approach". He believed
that legislation along the lines of the 1950 bills was necessary to the
development of collective bargaining. He secured the tripartite Standing
Labour Committee's approval of the principles of the bills and
evidently strove diligently to make his views prevail in the Cabinet and
to get the bills re-introduced in Parliament.

Giri's failure to secure his objective and his resignation as Minister


of Labour on August 30, 1954 must be taken as a turning point for
Indian labour policy. Although the immediate cause of his resigna
tion was his disapproval of government's handling of a banking indus
try labour dispute, Giri left little doubt that his real dissatisfaction was
with the government labour policy as a whole. In his letter of resig
nation to Prime Minister Nehru, Giri said:
For some time past I have been feeling that my services may not
be very useful under the present set-up, either to labour or to the
country or even to yourself. 1 may recall the many hurdles and
obstructions I encountered in drafting the Industrial Relations
Bills. The Ministries of Finance, Defence and Railways have
felt that the industrial establishments under them should be
excluded from the purview of my legislation...
... there is a growing feeling among the employing ministries that
each can have its own way and its own labour policy, thus render
ing the Labour Ministry almost superfluous in shaping the govern
ment's policy in this behalf. It has been my fervent wish that

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24 VAN D. KENNEDY

the government should be the model employer, inspiring other


employers to follow their example. But I have to confess that
the possibility of this hope being fulfilled has become remote.
After Giri's resignation, it became increasingly clear that the
central leadership had abandoned and, in fact, opposed the idea of
comprehensive changes in labour relations legislation. A bill intro
duced in Parliament by a private member in 1955 seeking to bring into
force the 1947 amendments to the Trade Unions Act failed to get
consideration after being opposed by Giri's successor as Labour Minis
ter, Khandubhai Desai. When a similar demand was again raised in
Parliament in 1956, Desai again voiced the administration's opposition
and its view that any compulsory recognition of unions would really
weaken the union movement.

Second Five Year Plan


The labour chapter of the Second Plan reflected this decision
against basic legislative change:
In its essentials the labour policy and the approach to industrial
relations outlined in the First Five Year Plan will also hold for
the period of the Second Plan.
When it asserts that "in the light of the socialist pattern of society..
suitable alterations in labour policy require to be made," it is not hark
ing back to the 1950 type of legislative reform. Instead, it is a reference
to the necessity that "the worker should be made to feel that in his
own way he is helping to build a progressive state." To this end:
increased association of labour with management is necessary...
This could be achieved by providing for councils of management
consisting of representatives of management, technicians and
workers.
Despite the rejection of basic changes in the law, the Second Plan
did reveal an increased awareness of some of the institutional realities
and requirements of unionism and collective bargaining. For example,
in its concern over the multiplicity of rival unions, the Labour
Ministry had submitted a proposal in August, 1955, to the Labour Panel
for the Second Plan which stated:
Since the development of a healthy trade union movement is an
insurance for industrial harmony, the Labour Ministry will
approve of "closed shop" and 4 6 union shop" practices provided
there is no constitutional bar to such arrangements.
Such security devices were to be lined with arrangements for recog
nising one representative union in a bargaining unit on the basis of its

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 25

having a certain percentage of membership in good standing. This


was obviously a proposal to bring into general application a principle
found in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946 which would
apply to only a few industries in that State, most notably, textiles.
That Act grants something like exclusive bargaining rights to a union
having the largest membership in its bargaining unit provided it exceeds
a minimum percentage. Originally 15 per cent, that minimum has
recently been raised to 25 per cent. Because a combination of closed
or union shop compulsion with such rules could be used to entrench
minority unions and because the non-INTUC organisations suspected
that the government machinery for verifying union memberships would
work to their disadvantage, the Labour Panel did not approve the
ministry's proposals.
Hence, the Second Plan only suggests that States make some
statutory provisions for recognition of unions, keeping in mind the
desirability of having one union to an industry. It also proposes that
the number of outsiders who could serve as union office-bearers be
further restricted, that office-bearers be given additional protection
against victimisation and that steps be taken to strengthen the
finances of unions. The importance of avoiding confusion and conflict
of roles between the union and the works committee is recognised:
The representative union should have the sole right of taking up
with management matters or disputes in connection with wages,
allowances and other terms and conditions of service or matters
which are appropriate for mutual discussion.
A differentiation between bargaining and joint consultation is also
made:
Matters which fall within the purview of collective bargaining
should, however, be excluded from the scope of discussion in
the (joint) council.

Summary
Looking back over the whole period from 1947 to the inception
of the Second Plan, we can see that India had real choices to make
between alternative lines of labour relations policy. She started
with a considerable framework of labour relations based upon it. But
these bore the earmarks of a colonial regime. The laws clearly as
sumed that unions and bargaining would not develop to any appreciable
extent and did almost nothing to promote such development. It was
government's job to protect the interests of workers and fix the impor
tant conditions of employment and, in the process, to maintain industri
al peace by preventing strikes and adjudicating disputes. In this view

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26 VAN D. KENNEDY

of things collective bargaining really had little place as a policy objec


tive. Obviously, free India had a much stronger commitment, at
least theoretically, to the development of unionism and bargaining
than its former British rulers. The question was whether and how to
implement it and, of course, both the need and the problem of imple
mentation became more urgent with the fragmentation of the labour
movement after Independence. We have seen that a genuine struggle
over this question went on within the government for several years
and that those who opposed basic legislative changes as a means to
more effective bargaining won out. As a result, India moved into the
Second Plan period with essentially the legal framework that she had
inherited and a policy which, despite giving lip service to bargaining,
differed little in practice from that which preceded it.

THE NANDA PERIOD, 1957-1964

Indian labour relations policy began to take on a new look start


ing in 1957. Whereas, previously, the policy question had been whether
to make a sharp break with the past through legislative action, since
1957 the government has been trying to break with the pre-1947 pattern
by non-legislative means. The years, 1957 and 1958, saw an unpre
cedented burst of new measures. Subsequent years have seen few
additional innovations but continuing efforts to make the new policies
work.

The central fact about the new approach is that it is an effort


to reshape Indian labour relations by securing from the parties mutual
agreement on, and voluntary compliance with, a set of principles and
rules whose observance, it is believed, will produce orderly and effective
labour relations. The voluntary, moral basis of this approach is
clearly stated in the Third Plan labour chapter:

A body of principles and practices has grown up as a product of


joint consultation in which representatives of government, the
working class and employers have been participating at various
levels.. . (They) thus acquire the strength and character of a
national policy operating on a voluntary basis.

... a new approach was introduced to .. . give a more positive


orientation to industrial relations, based on moral rather than
legal sanctions. The stress now is on prevention of unrest by
timely action at the appropriate stages and giving adequate
attention to root causes. This involves a basic change in the
attitudes and outlook of the parties and the new set of readjust
ments in their mutual relations.

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 27

Although the new policies are not based on law, they were initiated
and carried through by the Central Ministry of Labour and resulted in
a set of quasi-legal arrangements and procedures that have come to
characterise the labour scene. The machinery used up by the ministry
consisted mainly of the annual Indian Labour Conference and its
smaller Standing Labour Committee which also meets annually between
Conference sessions. Both are tripartite bodies which bring together
the principal representatives of employer and trade union organisations
along with labour officials of Central and State Governments. But
sub-committees of the Labour Conference, study teams, industry com
mittees and other agencies are also used.
We shall now see briefly each of the major developments of
this unusual period of activity.

Worker participation in management


Pursuant to the Second Plan declaration in favour of joint con
sultation, the Labour Ministry created a tripartite study team which
went to Europe in the Fall of 1956 to study programmes of worker
participation in several countries. The team submitted its report
on time for consideration at the Fifteenth Indian Labour Conference in
July, 1957. The Conference accepted the team's recommendations;
a number of employers in both the private and the public sectors agreed
to introduce worker participation plans in their establishments along
the lines of those recommendations and a sub-committee of the
Conference was assigned the task of working out the details of the
scheme. It was decided to initiate the experiment in 50 different units.
Early in 1958, the Labour Ministry organised a tripartite seminar on
Labour Management Cooperation in Delhi to go more deeply into the
objectives and principles of this venture and to consider its organisa
tional problems.
The objectives of the whole scheme, as stated in the Second
Plan, were, to increase productivity, give employees a better under
standing of their role in industry and, by satisfying workers' urge for
self-expression, to promote cooperation and industrial peace. To
this end, it was considered preferable to exclude wage and bonus issues
and individual grievances from the purview of joint worker-management
councils, but otherwise they should be free to take up any subjects of
mutual concern. It was held that the union should be closely associated
with the participation scheme in each enterprise but that its functions
should be kept reasonably separate.
Workers' education
In January, 1957, with the assistance of the Ford Foundation,
a team of foreign experts came to India to work with local counterparts

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28 VAN D. KENNEDY

in advising the government on setting up an all-India scheme of workers'


education. Its report was considered at the Fifteenth Indian Labour
Conference that same year and most of its recommendations were
accepted. Since that time, the Labour Ministry has been engaged in the
progressive extension of the scheme to all parts of the country. The
relevance of this programme to labour relations policy is that one of
its main purposes is to improve the trade union consciousness of
workers and to train union leaders for more effective organisation and
administration of unions and conduct of union-management relations.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that a somewhat parallel programme
of education in labour relations is available for management personnel
through the National Productivity Council.

Code of Discipline
Certain general principles of discipline in industry were agreed up
on by the participants at the Fifteenth Indian Labour Conference and
a tripartite sub-committee was created to study additional questions
and develop the materials in the form of a code. The resulting draft
was discussed at the Standing Labour Committee meeting in October,
1957, and at another meeting of the sub-committee, and the final form
of the Code of Discipline was approved at the Sixteenth Indian
Labour Conference in May, 1958.
The Code of Discipline, which is supposed to apply equally in
the private and the public sectors of industry, has become the keystone
of government labour policy and deserves particular attention. It
consists of three sets of principles or commitments to be observed by
the parties to labour relations. One set obligates managements and
unions jointly: to comply with existing machinery for dispute settle
ment; "to settle all future differences, disputes and grievances by mutual
negotiation, conciliation and voluntary arbitration"; to renounce coer
cion, intimidation, victimisation, go-slow, litigation, sit-down and
stay-in strikes and lock-outs; and to establish mutually agreed grievance
procedures.
A second set of obligations applies to management. It is not
to increase workloads "unless agreed upon or settled otherwise".
It will avoid unfair labour practices designed to discourage union acti
vity among its employees. Here we see the protections of unions
which failed to achieve the form of law either in the 1947 amendments
or the 1950 draft bills finally becoming part of a voluntary code.
Management also agreed to be prompt in settling grievances and imple
menting settlements and awards. In disciplining workers, it will
distinguish between situations justifying immediate discharge and those
where warning, suspension or other action should precede discharge.

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 29

It agrees to provide grievance appeal in all cases. Management is to


recognise unions in accordance with a set of criteria appended to the
Code. These provide that to qualify for recognition a union must
observe the Code and must have a membership in good standing of at
least 15 per cent of the workers concerned. Where there is more than
one union, the largest should be recognised but only if it has been
functioning for at least one year. A union may claim recognition as
the representative union for workers in all establishments in an industry
in a local area if it has a membership of at least 25 per cent of the work
force. But if a different union has membership of 50 per cent or more
of the workers in one of those establishments, it may represent its
members in purely local matters such as grievances.
The third set of obligations in the Code of Discipline applies to
unions. They are not to engage in physical coercion or rowdyism and
unpeaceful acts in demonstrations. There will be no union activity
during working hours unless permitted by law or agreement. Such
practices as negligence of duty, careless operation, damage of property,
interference with work and insubordination will be discouraged. Set
tlements and awards will be implemented promptly and officers and
members who violate the spirit of the Code will be disciplined.

Model grievance procedure


The Standing Labour Committee meeting in October, 1957,
requested the Labour Ministry to work out a model grievance procedure
and submit it to a tripartite sub-committee for consideration. The
principles developed by this committee were approved by the Sixteenth
Indian Labour Conference in 1958 and the final draft of the procedure
was prepared by the sub-committee later that year. It is understood
that this is the model to be used by the parties in negotiating grievance
procedures in compliance with the Code of Discipline.
In the model procedure document, there is first a statement of
guiding principles including suggestions about grievances machinery
and the selection of grievance representatives. This defines grievances
as being complaints affecting one or more individual workers in respect
of wage payments, overtime, leave, transfer, promotion, seniority,
work assignment, working conditions, interpretation of service agree
ments, dismissals and discharges. It suggests that where "the points
at dispute are of general applicability or of considerable magnitude",
they should not be handled through the grievance procedure.
The model procedure is set forth in considerable detail. It
provides essentially five steps for the consideration of a worker's
grievance. If he desires, a worker may be accompanied by a union

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30 VAN D. KENNEDY

representative at all steps after the first. It is not required that grie
vances or answers be put in writing, but time limits are set for action and
appeal at each step. The final step is phrased: "If no agreement is
still possible, the union management may refer the grievance to volun
tary arbitration." However, the alternative is also mentioned of
carrying the grievance to conciliation and adjudication like any other
dispute. In the case of a grievance over dismissal or discharge, the
earlier steps of the procedure may be skipped and it may be taken
directly to the appropriate top management.

Evaluation and implementation machinery


At the Sixteenth Standing Labour Committee meeting in 1957, there
was discussion of the problem of delays in implementing, and either
partial or complete non-compliance with, labour laws, settlements,
awards, and agreements. As the result of recommendations at this
meeting, the Labour Ministry created its own Evaluation and Imple
mentation Division under a Joint Secretary and established a tripartite
Central Implementation and Evaluation Committee. The States were
requested to set up counterpart machinery and committees and most
of them have done so. It was hoped that in important industrial centres
local committees would be formed. One of the most important func
tions of these arrangements is to promote the observance of the Code
of Discipline.
There is no authority anywhere in this machinery, of course,
to enforce either the Code or legislation or adjudication decisions.
It has to rely on the influence of disclosure, inquiries by government
officers, confrontations between employer and union representatives
at tripartite committee meetings and governmental displeasure and
persuasion. To this end, parties are requested to report all instances
of non-implementation to the appropriate government office. Inter
vention by central employer and union organisations is sought. A
number of inquiries into major dispute situations have been conducted
by the Central Evaluation and Implementation Division. The result
ing reports have been considered by the tripartite Implementation
Committee and several have been published.

Code of Conduct
Immediately following the Sixteenth Indian Labour Conference in
May, 1958, the Labour Minister convened a meeting of representatives
of the four central trade union organisations to discuss the problem
of inter-union rivalries. The meeting agreed on a Code of Conduct
by which the officers present committed themselves and, presumably,
their union organisations to observance of the following principles:

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 31

Every worker shall be free to join a union of his choice without


coercion. There shall be no dual membership of unions. Unions
will function democratically and hold regular elections of officers
and executive bodies. Unions will not exploit the backwardness of
workers, make excessive demand, appeal to caste, communal or pro
vincial prejudice or use violence, coercion or personal abuse in inter
union dealings. The formation or continuance of company unions
will be opposed.

Verification of trade union membership

The 1958 Indian Labour Conference recommended that the pro


cedure for verifying the membership strength of unions and determining
the representative character of unions be strengthened and that parti
cipation in the process by representatives of the central trade union
organisations be provided for. A revised procedure was thereafter
worked out and made public by the Labour Ministry. It will be re
called that the Code of Discipline aims at a labour relations system
based on one representative union to an establishment and that re
presentative status as between two or more rival unions goes to the
union with the largest membership. Thus, the securing of reliable
information on union membership is of great importance in maintaining
order and equity in labour relations in face of bitter union rivalries.

The details of the verification procedure need not be gone into.


Suffice it to say that it is administered by the Labour Commissioner
of the Central Government and his Regional Commissioners. Pro
vision is made for submitting both the original membership claims
put in by the four central union organisations and the verified figures
returned through the Labour Commissioner's machinery to the union
organisations for their objections. These objections are reviewed and
resolved if possible by a committee representing the union organisa
tions. In the course of verification, the Regional Labour Officers make
spot checks of memberships and may make further investigations to
check objections of rival organisations.

The foregoing review of the flurry of developments in labour


relations policy that took place in the years, 1957 and 1958, makes
it clear that government was trying to bring about a major shift from
the policy of the preceding decade. Later years were not nearly so
eventful. But the Labour Ministry lost none of the conviction that
produced the first developments. It continued to promote the several
parts of that programme at meetings of the Indian Labour Conference
and the Standing Labour Committee, through speeches of ministry
officials and, where possible, by administrative action.

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32 VAN D. KENNEDY

A new emphasis was given to the use of voluntary arbitration


beginning with the Seventeenth Indian Labour Conference in July, 1959.
Voluntary arbitration had been recognised as a desirable dispute set
tlement method as early as the First Five Year Plan and, as we have seen,
the parties pledged themselves to its use in the Code of Discipline. But
at the Seventeenth Indian Labour Conference the method was singled
out for special attention. The parties agreed that there should be
increased recourse to voluntary arbitration in preference to adjudica
tion and that "matters of local interest not having any wider repercus
sions should, as a general rule, be settled through arbitration". Em
ployers agreed to extend their full cooperation in developing this new
approach. It was agreed that panels of arbitrators' names should be
maintained by Central and State Governments for the assistance of
the parties and that the principles and norms so far evolved through
awards and judicial decisions should be compiled and published for
use by the parties and arbitrators. Refusal to accept arbitration by
either side, it was agreed, should be reported to the evaluation and
implementation machinery. Since 1959 the Central Labour Ministry
and a number of States have published lists of available arbitrators
and the Central Ministry has continued to espouse vigorously the
method of voluntary arbitration.

Third Five Year Plan

Given the intensive labour policy developments which have been


summarised above, it was a foregone conclusion that the labour
chapter of the Third Plan, which was drafted in 1961, would highlight
the same policy themes. The Code of Discipline is given the central
role:
The development of Industrial relations in the Third Five Year
Plan rests on the foundations created by the working of the
Code of Discipline which has stood the strain of the test during
the last three years.. .The coming years should witness the
fuller impact of the ideas which have been tried and found
useful during the Second Plan Period.
Voluntary arbitration is to take the place of adjudication:
Ways will be found for increasing the application of the principle
of voluntary arbitration.. .The same protection should be ex
tended to proceedings in this case as is now applicable to com
pulsory adjudication. ..Employers should show much greater
readiness to submit disputes to arbitration than they have done
hitherto. This has to be the normal practice in preference to
a recourse to adjudication as an important obligation accepted
by the parties under the Code.

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 33

The scheme of worker participation in management which had been


taken up as an experiment in the Second Plan is to become general.
A major programme for the period of the Third Five Year Plan
will be progressive extension of the scheme of Joint Manage
ment Councils to new industries and units so that, in the course
of a few years, it may become a normal feature of the in
dustrial system. . .In the course of time, management cadres
should arise out of the working class itself. .. Wherever a re
presentative union exists a Council should come into being as
a matter of course. An intensive programme of workers-'
education will be undertaken in all the establishments where
such Councils are set up.
Once again, as in the Second Plan, there is reference to the in
herent conflict between works committees and unions. But no solution
beyond abstract definition of roles is offered.
The decision to demarcate the functions of works committees,
as distinct from those of trade unions, will remove an obstacle in
the way of the successful functioning of the committees. It is,
thus, essential that works committees are strengthened and made
an active agency for the democratic administration of labour
matters.
No new schemes are proposed and while it is acknowledged that
some parts of the existing programme are not working as they should,
there is no suggestion that they should be changed or that government's
hand should be strengthened by statute. The emphasis is on giving
full scope to the existing programme and on remedying any defects by
education, through the growing awareness of the parties and by their
renewed commitment to their voluntary obligations.

Wage Boards
Although the notion of tripartite wage fixing bodies was broached
as early as 1949 in the report of the Committee on Fair Wages and the
First Five Year Plan recommended the establishment of industrial wage
boards, no action was taken until the Wage Board for the Cotton
Textile Industry was created in 1957. In that same year the Indian
Labour Conference agreed that "the appropriate machinery for wage
fixation would be tripartite wage boards." Even then government
displayed some hesitation in pushing this form of wage determination
as only six boards in all were appointed in the four years, 1957-60.
Since 1961 the idea has gained in favour; ten more wage boards had
been created through 1961 and several more were in prospect.
Other examples of the same principle that might be noted are the two
Central Pay Commissions that made recommendations on pay rates for

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34 VAN D. KENNEDY

Central Government employees and the Bonus Commission which was


appointed in 1961 to make recommendations on the controversial issue
of bonus on an all-India basis.

Although these boards and commissions have only recommending


power, the government and the parties appear increasingly to look
upon their recommendations as binding and the government seems dis
posed to use its influence to obtain compliance, it being recognised on
all sides that legislation is a potential means of enforcement. The
growing use of industry-wide wage boards and the attempt to meet the
bonus issue by establishing national norms, of course, basically modify
the nature of Indian collective bargaining. They remove the fundamen
tal labour cost items from the agenda of negotiations aft the level of
the individual bargaining unit. This is in accord with current govern
ment labour relations policy, as indicated by the following passage from
a speech given by Labour Minister Sanjivayya in November, 1964:
The success we have had so far with the wage boards encourages
me to hope that we will soon reach a time when wage questions
will be discussed outside the arena of conflict. A major disturb
ing factor in industrial relations will then have been removed.

The Industrial Truce Resolution


In October, 1962, the Chinese invasion of India's northern border
created an emergency in the country. The Labour Minister called a
meeting of employers and unions on November 3, 1962, to consider its
implications for industry and labour relations. The parties drew up
and pledged themselves to a Resolution on Industrial Truce. The
main themes of this Resolution are the paramount need to maximise
production and the duties of the parties to exercise restraint and fore
bearance. With reference to labour relations, it asserts that "under
no circumstances shall there be any interruption in or slowing down
of production" and that there should be maximum recourse to volun
tary arbitration especially for all complaints pertaining to dismissal,
discharge and retrenchment of individual workers. In the interest of
fullest use of resources, managements should use all economies, estab
lishments should work extra hours and unions should discourage absen
teeism, negligence and all other behaviour that would interfere with
normal work. All extra returns resulting from such efforts should go
to the consumer or the defence effort. In the spirit of this Resolution,
the government urged the parties to create joint emergency production
committees in each enterprise and over 800 such committees were set
up.
That the emergency was taken seriously and did affect the labour
relations behaviour of the parties was indicated by the fact that the rate

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 35

of man-days lost in connection with labour disputes declined drastically


immediately after the Chinese invasion. The Labour Minister called
the four months, November, 1962, through February, 1963, "the most
peaceful period in the industrial history of India"; However, just as
the acute sense of emergency did not persist long in Indian society at
large so it gave way to more customary attitudes among employers and
unions. As early as the Twenty-first Indian Labour Conference in July,
1963, the Labour Minister had to acknowledge that the "spirit
generated by the emergency has waned somewhat". The government
tried to keep alive some sense of urgency but by the summer of 1964
the fact of the invasion had become remote and had been supplanted
by the immediacies of the food shortage, rising prices and contro
versy over the Bonus Commission report.

Summary
Looking back over the development of Indian labour relations
policy since 1957, one sees a striking contrast with the preceding 1947
1956 period. During the earlier period, policy statements lacked
direction and took a shot gun approach to the subject, showing little
understanding of union-management relations. In practice, govern
ment was so uncertain and divided about developing new policy that
the pre-1947 pattern of the British regime prevailed by default. The
1957-1964 period has had an entirely different look. Government
has had well defined labour relations objectives and has been vigorous
in pursuing them, although by non-legislative means. In addition, it
has shown a much clearer awareness of what an orderly system of col
lective bargaining is.
By 1965, however, there was reason to wonder once again about
the future course of Indian labour relations policy. The sense of
urgency, common purpose and optimism which the Labour Ministry
had managed to impart to the labour scheme by its enthusiastic
espousal of the Code of Discipline and the associated schemes it
introduced in 1957 and 1958 was revived by the Chinese invasion and
Industrial Truce Resolution. But during the latter part of 1963 and
through 1964 the sense of urgency spent itself and disillusionment with
the Ministry's programme deepened as the Code of Discipline was
freely violated by both sides, the worker participation in management
scheme failed to spread or show much success where it was tried,
employers resisted the use of voluntary arbitration and continued
bitter rivalries within the fragmented labour movement discouraged
the spread of orderly union-management relationships. Another
factor in the changed picture was that in 1964 Nanda was succeeded
by Sanjivayya as Labour Minister who, being a man of different

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36 VAN D. KENNEDY

personality and .background, might not display the same convictions


and objectives as his predecessor.

THE SOURCES OF INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY


The foregoing review of the evolution of India's labour relations
policies has been primarily descriptive. No attempt is made in this
essay to analyse or evaluate policy. However, it will contribute
to our understanding of the evolution that has been described to
examine here the background of thought and historical condition
ing out of which India's labour policies have come.

The British heritage


As in so many other matters, the British influence has been per
vasive in Indian labour policy. We have seen how the British-created
system of labour relations became India's system by default after
Independence. But more than this, British thought on labour relations
was wholly in keeping with the rest of the intellectual tradition which
India acquired from Britain. The writings of Sidney and Beatrice
Webb may be said to have furnished the model for India's goals for
unionism and collective bargaining as primary components of industrial
democracy. In the government services, the British Whitley Council
scheme is the basis for programmes of consultation and grievance
handling which have been introduced or are planned. The fact that the
actual legislative framework India inherited from the British was laid
down for a colonial territory and may not have suited goals derived
from the Webb's was not clearly perceived by India's leaders. The
interesting thing is how successfully India has harmonised these British
influences, both the ideas and the concrete law, with the other values
which have shaped her labour policies.
Paternalism
Three value themes may be singled out as being most characteris
tic of the Indian approach to labour relations. These will be designated
here as paternalism, commitment to industrial harmony and belief
in norms. The concrete manifestation of paternalism has been the
extensive programme of welfare legislation enacted by Indian govern
ments and the practice among at least the more enlightened and pro
gressive employers of providing housing, medical, food and other wel
fare facilities for their employees. Our concern, however, is more with
the attitudes behind these actions. Most basic is the idea that Indian
workers are like children and are incapable of knowing or achieving
their own best interests and that government, employers and unions
must protect and act for them. This idea is nourished by the facts

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 37

of worker needs and ignorance, by the long standing patterns of


authority and dependency sanctioned by the Indian social system
and the colonial regime, by Gandhi's trusteeship principle and by the
humanitarian ideals of educated leaders.
Paternalism has unquestionably influenced Indian thinking
about union-management relations. It has tended to make manage
ment think of worker self-help through unions and the use of economic
power as both unlikely and inappropriate to the employer-employee
relation. At a meeting of a personnel management organisation in 1954,
attended by labour officers and personnel directors from leading indus
trial firms, a debate was held on the motion: "That in the present deve
lopment of India the workers' cause will be better served by paternalism
than by trade unionism." The motion was defeated by only a small
majority. Paternalistic thinking in government's approach to labour
relations is manifested in several ways. It may explain why minority
unions are granted representation and bargaining rights. It is evident
in unwillingness to let unions sink or swim by their own bargaining
ability and strength and in the view that it is up to government to re
dress imbalances of power. This view was well expressed by Labour
Minister Desai in 1955:
In the old world economy of laissez faire workers were thrown
on their own resources to seek and secure justice for themselves
and were even encouraged by progressive opinion to rise a cry
or revolt against injustices. But the times have changed.. .When
the entire state is working for ensuring justice for the masses,
it cannot allow injustices to be perpetrated against the weak
sections of society.
In extreme form, government paternalism may find little place for
unions at all. Witness the statement attributed to a State Labour
Minister in 1956:
In a welfare state like India there is no need for trade unions
because the state does more for workers than their own trade
unions. Trade unions could be useful for activities connected
with education, culture and sports.
In statements like these one sees paternalism merging with the Indian
concept of socialism and with the goal of industrial harmony.

Labour-management harmony
Harmony in labour relations is one of the most consistent key
notes of policy statements and speeches since 1947. It is subscribed
to by almost all shades of opinion as a practical application of Gandhi's
doctrines of truth and non-violence. At the least, it means avoidance

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38 VAN D. KENNEDY

of violence, strikes and lock-outs and the intense concern with govern
mental dispute settlement machinery is a concrete expression of this
interest. More significant for our purposes, however, is an additional
meaning that is given to industrial harmony by leading exponents of
Gandhian thought and by spokesmen of government labour policy.
It is the belief that in a society committed to "socialistic objectives"
the interests of labour and management are mutual and that recourse
between them to antagonistic attitudes, conflict and, by implication,
coercive methods is contrary both to Indian moral and political princi
ples.
Government leaders have been aware that this interpretation of
industrial peace goes beyond its usual meaning in Western countries
and would rule out certain postures and processes considered essential
to bargaining in the West. So they have been at pains to suggest
that Western labour relations are outmoded in this respect. Speaking
to a group of State labour officials in 1954, Labour Minister Desai
termed the strike method of settling labour disputes "the law of the
jungle" and identified it with the nineteenth century. Prime Minister
Nehru repeatedly insisted that peaceful negotiation and compromise
were the "Indian way", that they were "unique" and "democratic"
methods and that "conflict militates against the spirit of cooperative
endeavour" and represented an "out-of-date mentality which is not
in keeping with the conditions of today''. Gulzari Lai Nanda is reported
even to have questioned the appropriateness of collective bargaining
itself, presumably as a process that virtually guarantees contention:
"Collective bargaining is not suited to our socialistic pattern of society.
It may be valid for a capitalist economy like the United States and the
United Kingdom."
Hope of overcoming or controlling the elements of tension and
coercion in labour relations has been a prime motivation of the worker
participation in management scheme. Desai sounded this theme in
1955:

The foremost (need)... is a feeling of oneness and identity


among management and workers so that what is good for the
industry does not become bad for the worker and vice versa.
It is for cultivating this unity of outlook and purpose that I have,
for some time past, been talking of the participation of workers
in industry.

In 1958, Nanda assured a union audience that worker participation in


management was not an experiment but a "policy that must succeed.. .
But to make it a real force there has to be a good deal of change in the
pattern of industrial relations and the outlook of the parties."

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INDIAN LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY 39

Belief in norms

The strong Indian predilection for peace and harmony in labour


relations is boltered by a further mode of thought that has strong
appeal among union leaders, employers and political leaders. It is
the old belief in the power of reason and science applied to the pro
blem of fixing the terms of employment. Strongly supported by the
Gandhian emphasis on the search for truth and by the faith that socia
lism provides the setting in which it can be attained, it assumed that for
every point at issue between worker and employer there is a solution
which is correct and just according to an objective standard that is
independent of the particular relationship. The term, "social justice",
is frequently used to refer to a body of principles and social criteria
apparent to enlightened citizens of modern India which can be involved
in arriving at such standards.

Representatives of the parties and of government have repeatedly


stated the need for making these standards concrete in the form of
norms which can be used in fixing the principal conditions of employ
ment. Fair wage committees, bonus commissions, wage boards and
various other tripartite bodies have made attempts to develop
such norms but with little success in permanently disposing of issues or
satisfying the parties. However, these failures have not weakened the
commitment of government leaders to the use of tripartite machinery,
the adjudication of disputes and the use of arbitrators and experts to
settle labour relations questions. The reasoning is that since just
decisions can be reached by these means it is wasteful and costly as well
as damaging to social relations to let decisions be reached through use
of threats, conflict and tests of strength.

The concern for production


While paternalism and the belief in industrial harmony and the
use of norms go far to explain policies of intervention in labour relations,
the analysis would be incomplete if we failed to note that government
leaders have also been motivated by very strong practical considerations.
From the first, India's urgent need to maximise output and achieve
higher rates of economic growth has intensified leadership interest
in industrial peace as a means to continuity of production. This note
has been sounded in all three Five Year Plans. When Labour Minister
Nanda addressed the Twentieth Indian Labour Conference in August,
1962, most of his remarks dealt with the none too encouraging
economic situation and the ambitious scope of the Third Plan. It is not
surprising that in this context he made one of the more unqualified
statements of interventionist policy:

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40 VAN D. KENNEDY

The method of state sponsored conciliation and judicial settle


ment of disputes which has come into vogue in this country seems
to be the best suited to its present circumstances.. .This system
should leave no room for occasions for direct action and trials
of strength...
The personal factor
In accounting for Indian labour policy generally and, in parti
cular, for the distinctive turn which that policy took after 1957 one must
not overlook the part played by individuals who occupied the key posi
tion of Central Labour Minister. Jagjivan Ram and V. V. Giri, who
were the principal incumbents of this post up to 1955, were representa
tive neither of the power centre of the Congress Party nor of the main
stream of the Indian labour movement. This helps explain why the
early years were a period of policy inaction and indecision and why
Giri, who was a man with definite labour policy ideas, was unable to
win effective support for them.
The two men who held the Labour Ministership from 1955 to
1964 were* of a very different stripe. Both Khandubhai Desai and
Gulzari Lai Nanda were products of the Gandhian trade union tradition
and had long experience as officers of the Textile Labour Association
of Ahmedabad. This tradition and this union were together the foun
tain source of the trade union philosophy and leadership training which
have been the mainstay of the Indian National Trade Union Congress
which, in turn, has been the trade union centre favoured by the Congress
Party and the government. In addition, Nanda has wielded important
influence in the Party and in the Cabinet. But more than this, Nanda
is one of the Indian leaders who has been possessed by a vision of the
good society. He burns with the conviction that it can be brought
about by men of goodwill working together for it and he has worked
zealously himself. It was he who was primarily responsible for the
succession of new schemes which issued from the Labour Ministry
after 1957, for persuading employer and union organisations to em
brace these ideas and for bringing these schemes up for review and re
affirmation at annual meetings of tripartite bodies. Indian labour re
lations policy today in a very real sense bears the stamp of the Ahmeda
bad labour philosophy given concrete expression by the imagination
and enthusiasm of Nanda. Even though he is no longer Labour Minis
ter, Nanda is still in a position to influence labour policy as a key figure
in the Cabinet and as a persuasive spokesman for the Ahmedabad
tradition who continues to appear before union and employer groups.
It remains to be seen how strongly this influence persists against dis
illusionment among the parties and the presence of a different persona
lity in the Labour Minister's chair.

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