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DE VERA, Christianne Noelle B.

11689706
Succession G03
Atty. Pedron

1. Identify the instances when the law appears to be not just or fair to the affected
parties. Quote the provisions in full and discuss.

Par. 2, Art. 900


If the marriage between the surviving spouse and a testator was solemnized with
articulo mortis and the testator died within 3 months from the time of the marriage, the
legitime of the surviving spouse, as the sole heir, shall be 1/3 of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living together as husband and wife for more than 5 years.

This rule lowly regards a marriage celebrated for a shorter time. It prejudices the
surviving spouse whose marriage to the testator was solemnized in articulo mortis and
where the deceased died within the 3 months of marriage. In Filipino society, custom and
tradition frowns upon common law marriages or live-in arrangements. It is not, however,
uncommon for couples to be in relationships for long periods of time where they have
building trust, caring for each other and loving not only each other, but each other’s
respective families. While it is understandable that the law seeks to protect the estate of
the testator from those who aspire to take advantage of their impending death, if with
illness, of old age or through possible evil machinations, such protection is prejudicial to
the spouse who has built and treasured years of love and care for the deceased prior to
their marriage and albeit only having been husband and wife for a short time.

Art. 902
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Read together with Art. 992, the aforementioned provision illustrates that the illegitimate
heirs of an illegitimate child are placed in a better position than the illegitimate heirs of a
legitimate child. Both a legitimate and an illegitimate child is accorded the right to
represent an illegitimate parent, but the right of representation of a legitimate parent is
only limited to the legitimate child. To this day, the provisions of the law and numerous
interpretations evidently accord greater value to the legitimate child or legitimate family,
when the illegitimate child is not at fault for being born illegitimate.

Art. 992.
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father and mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The court’s interpretation of this provision is supported by the case of Diaz vs. IAC
which reads that “Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family, there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by
the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family.” While
admitedly, the Supreme Court is within reason for the purpose behind the subject
provision; this particular provision is starkly unfair to the illegitimate child who has
found acceptance and love in the arms of the legitimate family. The evolution of societal
norms has illustrated that such a situation is possible and that denial of the right to inherit
ab intestato is a denial of the right that should be duly accorded and evaluated in favour
of children, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Art. 1027
The following are incapable of succeeding:
1. The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness or the
minister of the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him during the same period;
2. The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the
church, order, chapter, community, organization, or institution to which such priest or
minister may belong;
xxx
5. Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer, or druggist who took care of the
testator during his last illness.
xxx

The law prevents succession of the mentioned personalities in Art. 1027 to the free
portion of the estate. As such, the law is construed to protect the rights of those who are
provided by law to succeed to their proper legitimes as the legitimes are transmitted by
operation of law. Commentaries illustrate that it is highly likely that the mentioned
persons have exercised undue or improper influence or pressure on the testator, whether
or not undue influence was exerted. It is established that where no specific
disqualification is mentioned, it must be established that undue influence was exercised
on the testator. Such presumption is unjust and unfair to those to whom shares are
bequeathed to for the sole reason of fondness and/or long years of service. In a country
where the concept of utang na loob is prevalent and strong, it is a matter so practiced that
such a bequest might stem from the free will of the decedent. Such prohibition, then,
instead of being a means to achieve a just partition and protect relationship ties, merely
tramples upon the intent of a decedent and strains existing relationships.

To illustrate more clearly, Art. 1027, par. 5, designates any physician, surgeon, nurse,
health officer, or druggist who took care of the testator during his last illness as one who
is incapable to succeed. While the law is interpreted to exclude from the prohibition
ascendants, descendants, siblings, or spouse as it is natural and customary for members to
take care of family, such law excludes some of the most important people that might have
had a hand in extending the life of the deceased such as his/her doctors, nurses, druggists,
etc. These are people to whom the deceased might have wanted to extend gratitude
towards and the law, in this prohibition, limits, if not totally excludes, the aforementioned
personalities from benefiting from the good will of the deceased.

Art. 1032.
The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of unworthiness:

(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to lead a
corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
xxx

Statutory construction dictates that where the law is free from ambiguity, such must be
regarded in its plain meaning. This prohibition only lays down a rule for daughters, to the
exclusion of sons. This prohibition is discriminatory against sons who have been induced
by their parents to lead a corrupt or immoral life or sons whose virtues have been
attempted against. While women and girls are deemed to be more vulnerable than the
opposite sex, such is no reason to exclude sons in the aforementioned protective
provision. Prevalent in this time and age, parents who would willingly allow their
children, whether son or daughter, to engage in whatever means of revenue making such
as in the cases of People vs. Hirang and/or People vs. Manalili-Bebang. If parents
mentioned in paragraph 1 of Art. 1032 are designated by law as incapable of suceeding
by reason of unworthiness, such prohibition must not be solely limited to daughter.

2. Identify Supreme Court cases where justice was not served. Justify.

Diaz vs. IAC

Where petitioners are illlegitimate children, the Supreme Court held in the case of Diaz
vs. IAC that they are not entitled to inherit from their grandfather by way of
representation of their father. The Court, in arriving at this conclusion, applied Art. 992
of the New Civil Code which states that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Read
together with Art. 902, by operation of law, the properties of a legitimate child cannot be
passed to a legitimate child. Properties of an illegitimate child, however, can be passed on
to either a legitimate or illegitimate child. In the case, petitioners are illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero, who is the legitimate son of Simona Pamuti. The court decided that the
illegitimate children did not acquire any right of represenation, and so, is in capable to
inherit that which could have gone to their father. This is unjust because, had Pablo
Santero been an illegitimate son, the petitioners would be able to exercise their right of
representation. While it is understandable that what the Court and the laws wish to
discourage having children born out of wedlock or children born outside of valid and
subsisting marriages, it is unfair to fault such children for something that they were born
into the world with without their fault.
In Re: Changliongco

The matter in this case refers to the claim on the retirement benefits filed by the heirs of
Atty. Changliongco. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Changliongco and an only son,
Mario, it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C., Jr., both born
out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except
Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age. Applying the
rules, the Court gave ½ share to Mario (legitimate son), ¼ share to Dra. Changliongco
and 2/16 share to the illegitimate children. The law applied the following rules:

The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime which is
regarded as his share as a legal heir (Art 888, Civil Code).

The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents also


her share as a legal heir (Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code).

The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes
to the illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime, Pursuant
to the provision that the legitimate of the illegitimate children shall be
taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator,
provoked that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate
children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the
surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied (par., art. 895, Civil
Code).

Such is unjust for the sole reason that it is as if the illegitimate child should be an after
thought to the legitimate children and/or surviving spouse. To push it even further, it
might be highly possible that the illegitimate child, in certain cases, would not be able to
receive anything. This, then, is contrary to the spirit of the law in according legitimes
where it seeks to ensure the bonds and ties of familial relationships beyond the grave.

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