Concept of Cruelty under the Hindu

Marriage Act
Krishna Bahadur*

C R U E L T Y IS a g ro u n d fo r m atrim o n ial relief u n der various personal laws.

U n d e r th e In d ian D ivorce A ct a wife is etitled to presen t a petitio n to the
district co u rt o r to th e H igh C o u rt fo r th e dissolution o f her m arriage on the
ground th a t, since th e solem nisation o f h e r m arriage her husband has been
guilty o f adultery co u p led w ith cruelty, as w ith o ut ad u ltery she w ould have
been entitled to a d ivorce a m ensa et ihoro. As is clear, cruelty u n d er the
above provision, by itself, is no gro u n d for dissolution o f m arriage an d the
wife can sue fo r th e relief only w hen th ere is ad u ltery co u pled w ith cruelty on
th e p a rt o f th e husband.^ T h e h u sb an d shall be co m petent and com pellable
to give evidence o f o r relating to such cruelty.^

U n d er th e In d ian D ivorce A ct, 1869 cruelty as a g round fo r divorce is avai­

lable to a wife only, b u t, u n d er th e Special M a rriag e A ct, 1954 it is available to
th e husband as well as to th e wife w ho m ay p resen t a p etitio n on th e ground
th a t th e resp o n d en t has, since th e solem nisation o f m arriage, tre a te d the
petition er w ith cruelty.® T h e D issolution o f M uslim M arriag e A ct, 1939
enables a w om an m arried u n d er M uslim law to o b tain a decree fo r the
dissolution o f h e r m arriag e on th e g ro u n d th a t the h u sb an d treats h e r with
cruelty.^ T h e rig h t u n d e r th e A c t is u n ilateral a n d is availablie to th e wife
only.

U n d e r th e H in d u M a rria g e A ct, 1955 cruelty is a g ro u n d for claim ing

ju d icial sep aratio n an d is av ailable b o th to h u sb an d an d wife w ho were m arried
either b efo re th e A ct cam e in to o p e ra tio n or th ereafter. T h e A ct provides th a t
either p a rty to a m arriag e, w h eth er solem nised b efo re o r a fte r th e commence*
m ent o f th e Act, m ay p re se n t a p etitio n fo r ju d icial se p a ra tio n on the ground
th a t th e o th e r p a rty h as tre a te d th e p e titio n e r w ith such cruelty as to cause a

•M .A., LL.D., Professor of Law, Allahabad Uaiversity, Allahabad.

1. See s. 10, the Indian Divorce Act, 1869.
2- S. 52, the Indian Divorce Act, 1869.
3. S. 27(1)(/), the Special M arriage Act, 1954,
4, See s, 2(viii), the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 193p,
17i THE HINDU M A R R IA G E & SPECIAL M AR R IA G E ACFS

reaso n ab le ap p reh en sio n in th e m ind o f th e p etitio n er th a t it will be h arm fu l

o r in ju rio u s fo r th e p e titio n e r to live with the o th e r party.®
C ruelty has n o t been defined in th e m atrim o n ial laws. I t has been the
policy o f legislation to avoid such a definition. T he D isso lu tio n o f M uslim
M arriag e A ct, how ever, m entions, by way o f examjple six situ atio n s when
a n act m ay am o u n t to cruelty. T h ese six situ atio n s, available to the wife only
are : {i) th a t th e h u sb an d assaults h er h abitually and m akes h er life m iserable
by cruelty o f co n d u ct even if such con d u ct does n o t a m o u n t to physical ill-
treatm en t; (ii) th a t th e h u sb an d associates with w om en o f ill-repute o r leads
an infam ous life; {Hi) th a t th e h u sb a n d atte m p ts to force her to lead an
im m oral life; (/v) th a t the h u sb an d disposes o f her p ro p e rty o r prevents her
fro m exercising her legal rights over it; (v) th a t th e husband obstru cts her in
th e observance o f h er religious profession or practice; and (v/) th a t the hus­
b and has m ore th an one wives an d does not tre a t h er eq uitably in accordance
w ith th e injun ctio n s o f th e Q u r’an,® T h e w isdom o f these six grounds may be
criticised b u t it w ould be o u t o f context h ere to do so.

n
T h e legislature has, in alm o st all the m atrim onial laws, left it to the
ju d icia ry to in terp ret, analyse a n d define w hat cruelty is. T he ju d iciary has
crossed lengths and b read th s in discharging its b urden and has declared every
h u m an activity creating physical o r m ental h ard sh ip as am ounting to cruelty.
Physical force which causes bodily injury,® co n duct o f the o th e r p a rty which
p u ts th e h ealth o f the p etitio n er in jeo p ard y , system atic neglect an d abuse,
drunkenness,'-' refusal to co -o p erate in fam ily affairs, false charge o f adultery,'®
cruelty to a child to w ound the m o th e r's feelings, insulting co nduct resulting
in m elancholia, installing a w om an in th e house and th reaten in g to elope w ith
her, association w ith o th e r w om en, conviction fo r a crim inal offence in which
th e o th er spouse is im plicated against h is/h er will, execssive o r revolting sexual
d em ands,'^ sodom y, unjustifiable refusal to have sexual in terco u rse ,’* sterilisa­
tio n by the husband w ithout th e wife’s consent,'® unreaso n ab le insistence on
th e use o f c o n tracep tiv es,^ m isconduct in relatio n to third perso n , com m uni­
ca tio n o f venereal disease, u n w a rra n te d im pu tatio ns o f unchastity,*® insistence
to change his or h e r religion, co m p lete denial o f coitus, have all been held
to be acts o f cruelty.

5. S. W J)[b), the Hindu M arriage Act,

6; The words used in s. 2 (viii) of the Act are “ that is to say” .
7. S. 2(viii)((j) to (/) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, I9S9 defines cruelty.
8. noiii'as V. Tfiumas, (1948) 2 All E.R, 98.
9. Ha// V. Hal/, (1962) 3, All E.R. 518.
10. Carpenter y. Carpenter, (1955) 2 All E.R, 449.
11. Stat/tam v. Statliam, (1928) All E.R. 219.
11 S/te/don V Shcldoii, (1966) 2 All E.R. 257.
13. Bravery v. Bravery, (1954) 3 All E.R. 59.
14. Forbes v, Forbes, (1955) 2 All E R. 311,
15. Iqbal Kaitr y. Pritam Singh, A,I R. 1963 Punj. 242.
 CONCEPT OF CRUELTY UNDER THE HINDU M A R R IA G E ACT 173,

R ussell V. R u ssell, t h e n o ted and m uch recognised case, has given,,

‘illustrations' th a t co n stitu te cru eh y b u t has given no definition o f the sam e.'
I t lays down:

C ruelty, as in th e case o f frau d , cannot be defined by exact definition,

but statem ents can b e fo u n d as to th e elem ents constituting it in a
p articu lar case. T h e C o u rt is to proceed o n th e principles and rules
on which th e E cclesiastical C ourts acted b efore 1857. T h e cases are
n o t a t all in acco rd , b u t they establish o n th e w hole th a t it is not
possible to lay dow n an exhaustive definition, th a t the decisions
i>hould b e looked at as illustrations each depending on its own facts.
Som e negative lim itatio n s m ay be derived fro m the cases; that d an g er
is th e ground u p o n w hich th e C o u rt has generally acted; th a t this
dan g er m ay consist n o t m erely o f th e ap p rehension th a t the accused
perso n m ay inflict bodily injury, but also th a t he m ay p ro voke the
o th e r spouse to com m it c ru e lty ....T h e principle is th a t cruelty consists
o f the wilful infliction o f bodily o r m en tal pain.^’

T h e case fu rth e r illustrates ;

T here is no legal lim itation to th e c h aracter o f the cruelty b u t the

C ourts will consider as an im p o rta n t elem ent o f the conduct in ques­
tion w hether it is likely to p ro d u ce injury to health; or w h e th e r it
is calculated to m ak e th e discharge o f m atrim o n ial duties practically
im possible o r unendurable.^®

T h e co u rt uph eld th a t “ the indignity, th e contum eJy, th e w ounded

feelings am o u n t to cru elty ” .'® Sim ilarly “ th e indifference, neglect, aversion,
unrestrained violence, irritab ility on th e slightest occasion, b u rst o f un co n tro ­
lled tem per, force, w h eth er physical o r m oral, system atically p ractised fo r a
length o f tim e” h ave all been held am o u n tin g to cruelty.®'’ D elineating w hat
cruelty m ay m ean, L ord H alsb u ry , in R ussell v. R ussell observed th e q u es­
tio n is w hether against th e will o f th e suffering spouse, m atrim onial duties are
possible in any intelligible sense when the co n d u ct o f either tow ards th e o ther
m ust excite feelings o f h o rro r an d even lo ath in g .” -^

In Jam ieson v. Jam ieson, i t has been o b serv ed th a t th ere is no h ard

and fast line b etw een th e conduct which is cruel an d th e conduct which is

16- (1897) A.C- 395.

17. /^/ at 395,401.
18. W. at 402.
19. hi. at 406.
20. /rf. at 407.
21. Supra note 16 at 421,
2?. (1952) A.C. 525, 52§.
174 T B E HINDU M A R R IA G E & SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACTS

n o t, as it can n o t be m easu red by any ab so lu te o r objective sta n d a rd . L ord

N o rm a n d in this case is very sceptical a b o u t the definition when he refers

w here th e cruelty is o f th e type conveniently described as ‘m ental

cruelty’, the guilty spouse m u st either intend to h u rt th e victim o r at
least be u n w arran tab ly indifferent as to the consequences o f the
victim . T h ere is ro o m fo r difference o f opinion a b o u t w hat k inds o f
case m ay be covered by th e w ords ‘u n w arran tab ly indifferent’.*^

T h e judicial in te rp re ta tio n in In d ia o f th e term ‘cru elty ’ is largely based

on its E nglish co u n terp art.

J t is universally felt a n d accepted th a t ‘cru e lty ’ should n o t be defined; as

any attem p t on it will lead to au to -lim itatio n an d restrictive o p eratio n o f the
concept. It is tru e th a t, as th e m o d ern society becom es m o re com plex, so
em erges th e techniques a n d ways o f inflicting strains a n d h ardships in m a tri­
m onial life; an d , th erefo re, any a tte m p t o f p u ttin g th e concept in to a tight
co m p artm en t w ould fru stra te the m atrim o n ial rem edy based on it. T he u n i­
versal th in k in g is th a t th e co n cep t should be left free and u n restricted so th a t
any act m ay be in terp reted as a m o u n tin g to cruelty. T his h as, how ever, led
to unpred ictab ility and sp ecu latio n . If the established definition is accepted,
it will m ean th a t legislative w isdom in o u r country is eith er incapable o r
unim aginative in providing a definition o f the term .

I ll

A w orkable definition m ay accordingly be suggested as u n d er.

C ruelty shall m ean an d in clu d e :

(a) any m ental p ain sufficient to cause o r w hich causes ;
(0 h u rt to th e sentim ents; or
(li) fear, agony a n d h a ra ssm e n t; or
(ill) shock and surprise; or
(iv) any disease relatin g to g astro o r/a n d nervous system ; o r
(v) depression, listlessness, insom nia o r high/low b lo o d p re s­
sure; o r
{vi) any disease relatin g to h e a rt, m ind, o r skin; o r
(w ) divulging a fam ily or m atrim o n ial secret; or
(viii) calling nam es o r h u rlin g abuses;

33. Id at SJ5,
 CONCFPT OF C R U E LT Y UNDER THE HINDU M A R R IA G E A C T 17S

or

{b) any physical pain o r infliction sufficient to cause o r which

causes ;

( 0 grievous h u rt; or
(if) b eatin g o r use o f force o f any kind; o r
{Hi) restrictions on m ovem ents sufficient to cause wrongful
re stra in t o r w rongful confinem ent; o r
(tV) restrictions on asso ciatio n a m o u n tin g to denial o f fu n d a ­
m en tal rights; o r
(v) d enial o f fo o d , sh e lte r o r o th e r physical facilities; o r
(xi) beating o r causing physical p ain or d enial o f food, shelter
an d o th e r physical facilities to th e n e a r and d e ar ones;

or

(r) m oral injury sufBcient to cause o r which causes :

( 0 a tta c k a n d /o r loss o f rep u ta tio n ; or

{it) denigration o r scandal; or
{Hi) suspicion against ch aracter; o r
(iv) false charge o f h a b itu a l d rin k in g o r use o f any intoxicant
sufficient to cause ann o y an ce or danger to th e petitioner; or
(v) false charge o f keep in g concubine o r p a ra m o u r o r m oving
o r associating w ith w om en o r m en o f ill-repute and b ad
c h a ra c ter w ith o u t re aso n ab le excuse th ereo f; o r
(vi) asp ertio n s o n o r th e u n w a rra n te d accu sations o f th e p erso­
nality a n d achievem ents; o r
(vi7) tarn ish in g o f th e im age; o r
(vr/i) false allegations ag ain st th e virtues, acts and conduct; or
(f.v) false accusation o f leading an im m oral life;

or

(d) social h arm a n d /o r d eg rad atio n by-:-

(/') creating o r p ro p a g a tin g co n tem p t in the society; o r

(//) m aking false accusations to th e m aster, the em ployer, o r the
g u a rd ia n w ith in ten tio n to harm th e p etitioner; or
{Hi) defam ation; or
176 T HE HINDU M AR R IA G E & SPECIAL M A R R IA G E ACTS

(iv) encouraging or inciting people for the social boycott o f the

petitioner; or
(v) calling the petitioiier names, in the public; or
(vi) obstructing or attem ptnig to obstruct either himself/herself
o r in association with others the petitioner from the Use of
family, com m unity o r public home, eating houses, parks,
wells, places o f w orship and entertainment; or
(vii) encouraging, p ro pa ga tin g or inciting castefsm, regionalism,
linguism, clannisiipess and untouchability;
or
(e) ignoring, obstructing or attem pting to obstruct family traditions,
practices a n d culture;
or
( / ) causing annoyance, irrtiation and pin-pricks by words, acts or
conduct sufficient to call u po n the m ental an d physical health;
or
(g) insults in private or in public by words, acts o r conduct;
or
(h) unreasonable o r excessive dem ands on th e econom y o f the
family or misuse or abuse o f the family income or property;
or
(/) refusal to norm al intercourse;
or
( j ) n a g g in g ;
or
(k) political incompatability;
or
(/) indifference to nationalism a n d /o r a pa thy tow ards the national
good;
or
(m) making the m arriage impossible to be endured and rendering
life alm ost un bearable.

These grounds should be available to the petitioner fo r seeking divorce

if m atrim onial relief has a t all to be m a d e meaningful.

The above is a tentative break -u p o f w hat cruelty should m ean. T he

reasons for providing a w orkable definition of the term is to avoid ‘speculation’
a n d ‘beating a b o u t the b u s h ’ m e th o d s in defining t h e term . I t would, if n o t
abolish, minimise the o peration o f what is generally know n as ‘judicial
 CONCEPT OF CR U E LT Y UNDER THE HINDU M AR R IA G E A C T 177

hu nch’. A definition would ensure ‘predictability’ which is th e m ost im p o r­

tan t quality o f justice a n d law. In the absence o f any definition, the scope
for judicial speculation is high, so m uch so, th a t sometimes it crosses all
limits o f h u m a n im agination. F o r example, w here cruelty m eans “'a n abso­
lute impossibility tha t the duties o f m arried life can be discharged.” -^ To
quote L ord Halsbury, “ the ph rase ‘impossibility’ m a y ...b e criticised an d it
m ay be suggested th a t in no conceivable set o f circumstances could such a
phrase be justified.” ^® Similarly, difficulties m ay arise to interpret the term
‘violence’, i f used w ith ou t predicate a n d epithets. T o qu o te Lord B rougham
in Patterson v. Patterson,^^ violence m eans “ n o t m erely violence but things
far short o f violence.” Likewise “ w ithdraw ing.from h e r society” may m ean
“ coldness tow ards her; leaving her apartm en t; telling ‘ h e r father th a t he will,
on no account ever ren ew his coh abitation with her; stating th a t he is
wi"etched in consequence o f his m arriage.

According to judicial stretch o f th e term , therefore, ‘cruelty’

may m ean ‘anything and everything’. N o h u m a n w isdom and prudence
will admit ‘anything and everything' to m e a n ‘cruelty’ howsoever
diverse and changing the social, economic, m oral and cultural conditions
of the society m ay be. T h e fear th a t a definition o f the term will
circumscribe th e scope o f judicial in terp retation m ay be baseless as the
‘circumstances’ th a t would constitute cruelty w o uld still be open and
subject to judicial in terp retation, acceptance and verdict. Such ‘circum­
stances’ would always elude a prio ri definition and hence th e judiciary would
always be free to define such ‘circumstances’ within t h e definition given
above. It is a p t to refer to a no te o f caution by L o rd T u cker w herein h e
admits : “ It is in m y view equally undesirable if n o t impossible by judicial
p ro n ou ncem en t to create certain categories o f acts o r c onduct as having o r
lacking the n a tu re or quality which render th e m capable o r incapable in all
circumstances o f a m o u n tin g to cruelty.” ^®

It is not the pu rp o se o f this p a p e r to discuss w hat has already been

said by the courts a b o u t th e interpretation o f th e te rm ‘cruelty’ o r its
analysis. N o r does this p a p e r intend to repro d u c e w hat learned m en have
said and opined a b o u t ‘cruelty’. T h e a p p ro a c h of this p a p e r is exclusively
pragm atic and it tries to m a k e a suggestion to the Law Commission and
the government to provide th e ‘te rm ’ a grou nd to stand upon ra th e r thaq
keeping it hanging.

24. Russell v. Russell, (1897) A.C. 395, 421.

25. Ibid.
26. 3 H.L.C. 308, 328, 333.
27. Supra note 24 at 422.
28. Jamies,in v. Jamiesnn, (1922) A.C. 525-550,