XI.

THE FAMILY
A. Members of a Family
Nature and Scope of Family Relations
Art.149, FC: “The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or
agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.”

Tolentino says:
 Importance of Family
- Family is an essential factor in general, social and political life.
- Living together of its members contributes to development of a sense of duty, aptitude for heroic
sacrifices, and love by future generations of the traditions of those who came before them.
- The vitality and strength of the State depends on the solidarity of the family, hence the State’s
interest in protecting the family as an institution.
 Sphere of Law on Family
1. External Relations – The only sphere that law can govern, because it is only here that the
interests of the public and of third persons are raised.
2. Internal Relations – Essentially natural, moral and sacred, and is inaccessible to the law. It is
here that the family accomplishes their religious, spiritual, emotional and psychological
purposes. (e.g. Sexual relations, choice of professions for their children, customs, etc.
 Characteristics of Family Law
1. Increasing intervention of the State in the consideration and solution of the problems affecting
the family. This intervention is justified by the influence which the family has on the social
organization.
2. The obligatory character of the laws relating to the family, because they affect public order or
public policy. They cannot be set aside or modified by agreement of the parties, except in very
exceptional cases. The rights and duties arising therefrom are, therefore, generally inalienable,
intransferable, imprescriptible, and not subject to waiver or renunciation. They cannot be
performed through agents or representatives.

Art.150, FC: “Family relations include those:

1) Between husband and wife;
2) Between parents and children;
3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.”

Tolentino says:
 Classification of Relationships
1. Natural relationships – By consanguinity (by blood; legitimate or illegitimate) or by affinity (by
marriage; in-laws)
2. Civil relationships – Created by law (ex. Adoption)
3. Religious relationships – Created by the administrations of religious sacraments (ex. Baptism,
confirmation)
Sempio-Diy says:
 Rules on Family Relations
1. Family relations exist even if they do not live together.
 2. Other relatives like cousins, nephews and nieces, domestic helpers, who grew up or are living
with the family, are members of the household but not the family.
3. Illegitimate children are not included in family relations under this provision, because they have
their own families. Also, this Chapter refers to the family as an institution, hence it cannot include
illegitimate children.
4. Adopted children are part of the family, and are included here.
5. Nephews and nieces, uncles and aunts, are not included because they have their own families.
6. Relatives mentioned in this Article include those of the husband as well as those of the wife.

Art. 151, FC: “No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.”

Tolentino says:
 Limitation of Suits
- Suits are limited to the relationships mentioned in Art. 150 of this Code. The ground of the suit
must be the subject of a valid compromise (non-compromisable issues: validity of marriages or
legal separations, claims for future support, jurisdiction of courts, civil status of persons, grounds
for legal separation, future legitimes).
 Reason for this Article
- “Because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that
a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.” (Code
Commission)
Sempio-Diy says:
 Application of this Article
- In order that a suit between the members of the family (Art. 150) may prosper, the following
requirements must be observed:

1. Verified complaints or petition must show that efforts toward a compromise have failed.
2. Petition or complaint is required to be verified as an assurance of the truth that efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but have failed.
3. Reason for the rule is to avoid or diminish litigations among members of the same family.
4. However, even if the required allegation is made but it appears at the pre-trial that the same
is not true, the case must be dismissed.
5. If the case can be compromised at the pre-trial, this author (Sempio-Diy referring to herself in
the 3rd person) sees no reason why the case should be dismissed. After all, the compromise will
end the litigation.

PENOBSCOT AREA HOUSING DEV. CORP. V. CITY OF BREWER (MAINE) [438 A. 2d. 14 (1981)]
Facts:
 Petitioner, Penobscot Corp. is a private non-profit organization that provides housing to
retarded citizens.
 They negotiated a purchase and sale agreement to acquire a house and lot in a residential
zone intended for use of single families.
 They want to use the area to house six retarded adults (or older minors), to be supervised by
two staff members, and have it serve as a State Boarding House.
 They were prohibited from doing so because they aren’t covered by the zoning ordinance
prescribed, as their case doesn’t fall under the definition of “family.”
 Instead, they were advised to meet additional requirements in order to classify the housing as
a nursing home. The corporation declined this, and instead brought their case to the Court of
Appeals to seek review of the decision.
 Plaintiff argues that their case does fall under “family” because the requirement for a
domestic bond to be formed has already been met by the relationship formed by the residents
as they lived and worked together in their “family environment.”
 Also, they argue that the Brewer ordinance deprives them of their fundamental rights,
because it violated due process and the equal protection of the law. The ordinance excludes
the proposed home from single family districts based on distinctions irrelevant to legitimate
zoning concerns. They argue that the power to control land use is being confused with the
power to distinguish persons making use of the same land.
Issue:
1. WON the decisions should be reversed (No. Affirmed.)
2. WON the ordinance is unconstitutional (No.)
3. WON the individuals in question can be considered a family (No.)
Held:
 Petition denied: No, the County decision and CA decision are affirmed. Plaintiffs did not
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the ordinance. Individuals cannot be
considered a family.
 “Family is a single individual or collective body of persons doing their own cooking and living
together upon the premises as a separate housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship based
upon birth, marriage or other domestic bond as distinguished from a group occupying a
boarding house, lodging house, club, fraternity or hotel.”
 Ordinance’s requirements to be a family:
1) Doing own cooking
2) Domestic bond exists – Traditional family-like structure of household authority. The staff
members in charge cannot be considered as central figures of household authority here
because:
a) They wouldn’t necessarily reside in the home.
b) They would serve only on a rotating basis.
3) Quality of cohesiveness and permanence
a) Average stay of a resident would only be 1 and ½ years (not permanent)
b) They would not be able to choose or control who would become new residents, and
when other residents would leave the “home.” (no cohesiveness)
 The ordinance does not violate due process or equal protection, because the language of the
ordinance itself actually provides for domestic bonds other than those by birth or marriage.

MENDOZA V. CA, 19 SCRA 756 (1967)

Facts:
 Luisa Mendoza (respondent in this case) brought a complaint before the court.
  Luisa claims that when her husband Cecilio went to the United States to pursue further studies
and practice his profession, he did not provide support for her. She was pregnant and sickly
then, but he still refused to provide maintenance.
 Her husband filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but was denied by both the Court of First
Instance and Court of Appeals.
 Cecilio argues that the complaint of his wife must be dismissed because her complaint did not
indicate or show proof that efforts to come to a compromise had been made (hence her
complaint supposedly lacked cause of action), as is required by Art. 222 of the Civil Code:

“No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
Issue:
 WON the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals erred in denying the dismissal of the
complaint
Held:
 No, on both counts.
 The complaint involved a claim for future support, that under Art. 2035 of the Civil Code,
cannot be the subject of a valid compromise, and is therefore outside the sphere of Art. 222.
 The husband also argues regarding the validity of their marriage. However, this also falls
under Art. 2035 as not being the subject of a valid compromise.
 Both issues he raises cannot be covered by Art. 222, hence him alleging that his wife’s
complaint lacks proof that efforts were made for compromise are superfluous and
unnecessary.
 Hence, the wife’s complaint regarding future support is a non-compromisable issue, and is a
valid cause of action.

MENDEZ V BIONSON & EUGENIA (1977)

Facts
- Zoila Mendez and Matilde Bionson with 10 others vs Gumapon and more Bionsons for the partition
of 2 parcels of land in Cebu.
- Judgment: divide among litigants into 3
- The defendants in that case alleged in their answer that they are the absolute owners of the land -
asked for moral damages, for the agreed monthly rent, and for the rentals in arrears for the last 10
months rented by Zoila Mendez. Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
- The court erred in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint against the Bionsons for lack of earnest
efforts being exerted by the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement before the action was
instituted, the parties being part of the same family.
Held
- The litigants are not family members within the contemplation of the law. The parties are collateral
relatives who are not brothers and sisters. Only members of the same family are required to exert
efforts to arrive at a settlement before an action is instituted. No error was committed by the TC.

Guerrero v RTC, Ilocos Norte (1994)

Facts
1. Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-in-law, their wives are half-sisters.
They both claim ownership of a lot.
- RTC ruled that the parties should have alleged in the complaint that earnest efforts were exerted
towards compromise because they belong to the same family.
Held
- Brothers-in-law are NOT members of the same family as enumerated in Art 151. No earnest efforts
toward a compromise are needed.

Hontiveros v RTC, Iloilo City (1999)

Facts
- Jan 23, 1975: Land Registration Case filed by respondent, Gregorio Hontiveros
- Apr 12, 1984: Decision from previous case modified in favor of petitioners (Augusto and Maria
Hontiveros) who won title to land
- Aug 7, 1985: Transfer of property to petitioners
- Dec 3, 1990: Filing of complaint against Gregorio Hontiveros and his wife, Teodora Ayson
-Petitioners said they were deprived by the respondents of income from the land because of
the filing of the land registration case. That such income consisted of P66K per year from
1968-1987, and P595K per year thereafter. (dafuq?)
- Respondents deny this. Hontiveros is a widower and Ayson is single. They alleged that the
petitioners were indeed in possession of the land since Aug 7, 1985 and they have been receiving
rentals from tenants ever since, and that complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not
allege that earnest efforts were made to arrive at a compromise. Augusto and Gregorio are brothers.
- TC held that complaint was not verified as required by Art 151 - therefore, it did not believe that
earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.
Held
2. TC erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint on the ground that, although it alleged that
earnest efforts were made toward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint
was NOT verified which made the TC not believe the veracity of the allegation. The verification in Art
151 is a FORMAL requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters alleged are true and
correct. If the court doubted the veracity among members of the same family, it could simply have
ordered petitioners to verify them. The absence of verification does NOT affect the court’s
jurisdiction over complaint.
3. Whenever a stranger is a party to a case, Art 151 will NOT apply. The inclusion of respondent
Ayson and Maria Hontiveros is out of ambit of said article because they do not refer to “members of
the same family” which refer to blood-relatives.

Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include
his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a)

Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each
other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
 (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound
to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of
the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (291a)

Tolentino Says:
- The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such. Once the marriage has been
annulled, then the wife is no longer entitled for support.
- If the wife is obliged to resort to the court to compel the husband to give support, she is entitled
to the expenses of the litigation. In case of absolute separation of property, from the property of
the defendant husband; in case of relative community of property, from the conjugal property.
- If the wife is forced to leave the conjugal home, she is entitled to separate maintenance from the
husband. This includes lodging allowance.
- A spouse will not be obligated to support the other when there is an allegation that a ground
exists to suspend the obligation (i.e. adultery, concubinage, etc.)
- The husband cannot use as a defense that he has other people to support because the wife is
conferred a preferred status, second only to that for the children under parental authority.
- Illegitimate descendants (grandchildren) whether from legitimate or illegitimate children are
entitled to support from the grandparents.
- Brothers and sisters are entitled to support however, if the need for support of the brother or
sister in need, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant’s fault or negligence, then
he shall not be entitled to any form of support.

Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers
and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged
to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which
shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community
or of the conjugal partnership. (n)

According to Tolentino, the properties answerable for support for each class of recipients:
(a) The spouses – property of absolute community or the conjugal partnership. In case of absence of
community property, each spouse is answerable for the support of the other.
(b) Legitimate children from legitimate parents - property of absolute community or the conjugal
partnership. In case of absence of community property, if there is no common property the
separate properties of the parents shall be solidarily liable (in relation to Arts. 94 and 121)
(c) Legitimate parents from legitimate children – property of the children, under the present article
(which is the separate property of the person obliged to give support, if there is no separate
property, the conjugal partnership but shall be deducted upon liquidation.)
(d) Descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, from the legitimate parents of their parent
(grandparents) - property of the children, under the present article (which is the separate
property of the person obliged to give support, if there is no separate property, the conjugal
partnership but shall be deducted upon liquidation.)
(e) Illegitimate children from parent – separate property of the parent.
 (f) Brothers and sisters – property of the obligor, if there is no separate property, the conjugal
partnership but shall be deducted upon liquidation.)

Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of
nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of
mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order
that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a)

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

Tolentino says:
- The reason for such obligation is that it is imposed upon those who are more closely related to
the recipient. It is only in default of those nearer in degree of relationship that those more remote
are called upon to discharge the obligation.
- Action for support may be brought against those who are obliged to give it upon the presentation
of evidence that those before the obligor are without means to give such support.

Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same
shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to
furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share
due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally
obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in
the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child
subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)

Tolentino says:
- The provision makes the obligation of the same grade of obligors joint and not a solidary one. The
share will still depend on the proportion of the resources of each.
- In case of emergency, the court may order only one among the many obligors to pay, but the one
who paid, will have the right to claim the share of the other obligors.
- A child of the obligor is given preference over all other relatives including the spouse.

Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)

Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. (297a)
 - The judgment of a court for support may always be modified because of varying conditions
affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed as support, and also upon the ever
changing needs of the recipient himself.
- A judgment increasing or decreasing the amount of support does not have retroactive effect.
o The recipient does not have to return any amount already given to him in case the amount
has been reduced.
o The obligor also does not have to pay the difference in case the amount has been
increased.

Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extra-judicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies,
his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)

- The right to demand for support arises from imperative necessity. So the law presumes that such
necessity does not exist unless support is demanded.
- The obligation to give support is demandable from the moment the necessity arises; but the
alimony is payable only from the time of extrajudicial demand or the filing of the complaint asking
for support.
- The period of prescription of the action for support should be counted, not from the date of
abandonment, but from the time the support was needed.
- The heirs of a deceased person entitled to support need not return whatever he may have
received in advance for such support.

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle
thereto. (299a)

- The second option granted by the provision has 2 requisites: (1) that the obligor has his own home
or domicile, and (2) that there are no moral or legal reason preventing the recipient of such
support from living in the obligor’s home or domicile.
- Moral and legal obstacles may prevent the court from upholding the option of the obligor to
support the obligee in his own home.
o i.e. if the father has already marred a woman who is not the mother of the child, there
would be a moral reason that would prevent the mother from visiting the child in the
house of the father.
- If the court finds that a spouse has not given a reason to justify his/her establishing a separate
domicile, he/she will not be granted separate maintenance.

Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such
support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a)

Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger,
the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without
intention of being reimbursed. (2164a)
 - So that one may recover the expenses incurred under this article, there are 4 requisites to be
complied with, (1) that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give support but
who fails to do so; (2) that the support was furnished by a stranger; (3) that the support was given
without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty; and (4) that the support must not
have been given without the expectation of recovering it. (the support must have been given with
the expectation of recovering it?)
- “Stranger” – a person who does not have any obligation to support the person given support.

Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of
reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the
father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to
the child when urgently needed. (2166a)

- Difference with the preceding article:

o Article 206 – the obligor fails to give support
o Article 207 – the obligor unjustly refuses to give support; it is also not necessary that the
obligor has no knowledge that the support is being furnished be another.

Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required
for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due
to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. (n)

There are articles in the Civil Code that were not included in the Family Code.
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor can it be transmitted to a third person.
Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
However, support in arrears may be compensated and renounced, and the right to demand the same may
be transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title.(151)
Art. 303. The obligation to give support shall also cease:
(1) Upon the death of the recipient;
(2) When the resources of the obligor have been reduced to the point where he cannot give the
support without neglecting his own needs and those of his family;
(3) When the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work, or
has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence;
(4) When the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;
(5) When the recipient is a descendant, brother or sister of the obligor and the need for support
is caused by his or her bad conduct or by the lack of application to work, so long as this cause
subsists. (152a)
Art. 304. The foregoing provisions shall be applicable to other cases where, in virtue of this Code or of any
other law, by will, or by stipulation there is a right to receive support, save what is stipulated, ordered by
the testator or provided by law for the special case. (153a)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8972

 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES TO SOLO PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote the family as the foundation of
the nation, strengthen its solidarity and ensure its total development. Towards this end, it shall develop
a comprehensive program of services for solo parents and their children to be carried out by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA), the National Housing Authority (NHA), the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and other related government and nongovernment agencies.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - Whenever used in this Act, the following terms shall mean as follows:
(a) "Solo parent" - any individual who falls under any of the following categories:
(1) A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against chastity even
without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, That the mother keeps and raises
the child;
(2) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to death of
spouse;
(3) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the spouse is
detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least one (1) year;
(4) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to physical and/or
mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner;
(5) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal
separation or de factoseparation from spouse for at least one (1) year, as long as he/she
is entrusted with the custody of the children;
(6) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a church as long as he/she
is entrusted with the custody of the children;
(7) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to abandonment
of spouse for at least one (1) year;
(8) Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his child/children
instead of having others care for them or give them up to a welfare institution;
(9) Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child or
children;
(10) Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a result of
the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of the parents or solo
parent.
A change in the status or circumstance of the parent claiming benefits under this Act,
such that he/she is no longer left alone with the responsibility of parenthood, shall
terminate his/her eligibility for these benefits.
(b) "Children" - refer to those living with and dependent upon the solo parent for support who
are unmarried, unemployed and not more than eighteen (18) years of age, or even over
eighteen (18) years but are incapable of self-support because of mental and/or physical
defect/disability.
(c) "Parental responsibility" - with respect to their minor children shall refer to the rights and
duties of the parents as defined in Article 220 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines."
 (d) "Parental leave" - shall mean leave benefits granted to a solo parent to enable him/her to
perform parental duties and responsibilities where physical presence is required.
(e) "Flexible work schedule" - is the right granted to a solo parent employee to vary his/her
arrival and departure time without affecting the core work hours as defined by the employer.
Section 4. Criteria for Support. - Any solo parent whose income in the place of domicile falls below the
poverty threshold as set by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and subject to
the assessment of the DSWD worker in the area shall be eligible for assistance: Provided, however, That
any solo parent whose income is above the poverty threshold shall enjoy the benefits mentioned in
Sections 6, 7 and 8 of this Act.
Section 5. Comprehensive Package of Social Development and Welfare Services. - A comprehensive
package of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families will be developed
by the DSWD, DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA and DILG, in coordination with local government
units and a nongovernmental organization with proven track record in providing services for solo
parents.
The DSWD shall coordinate with concerned agencies the implementation of the comprehensive package
of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families. The package will initially
include:
(a) Livelihood development services which include trainings on livelihood skills, basic business
management, value orientation and the provision of seed capital or job placement.
(b) Counseling services which include individual, peer group or family counseling. This will focus
on the resolution of personal relationship and role conflicts.
(c) Parent effectiveness services which include the provision and expansion of knowledge and
skills of the solo parent on early childhood development, behavior management, health care,
rights and duties of parents and children.
(d) Critical incidence stress debriefing which includes preventive stress management strategy
designed to assist solo parents in coping with crisis situations and cases of abuse.
(e) Special projects for individuals in need of protection which include temporary shelter,
counseling, legal assistance, medical care, self-concept or ego-building, crisis management and
spiritual enrichment.
Section 6. Flexible Work Schedule. - The employer shall provide for a flexible working schedule for solo
parents: Provided, That the same shall not affect individual and company productivity: Provided,
further, That any employer may request exemption from the above requirements from the DOLE on
certain meritorious grounds.
Section 7. Work Discrimination. - No employer shall discriminate against any solo parent employee with
respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his/her status.
Section 8. Parental Leave. - In addition to leave privileges under existing laws, parental leave of not
more than seven (7) working days every year shall be granted to any solo parent employee who has
rendered service of at least one (1) year.
Section 9. Educational Benefits. - The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall provide the following benefits and
privileges:
(1) Scholarship programs for qualified solo parents and their children in institutions of basic,
tertiary and technical/skills education; and
(2) Nonformal education programs appropriate for solo parents and their children.
The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall promulgate rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this
program.
Section 10. Housing Benefits. - Solo parents shall be given allocation in housing projects and shall be
provided with liberal terms of payment on said government low-cost housing projects in accordance
with housing law provisions prioritizing applicants below the poverty line as declared by the NEDA.
Section 11. Medical Assistance. - The DOH shall develop a comprehensive health care program for solo
parents and their children. The program shall be implemented by the DOH through their retained
hospitals and medical centers and the local government units (LGUs) through their
provincial/district/city/municipal hospitals and rural health units (RHUs).
Section 12. Additional Powers and Functions of the DSWD. — The DSWD shall perform the following
additional powers and functions relative to the welfare of solo parents and their families:
(a) Conduct research necessary to: (1) develop a new body of knowledge on solo parents; (2)
define executive and legislative measures needed to promote and protect the interest of solo
parents and their children; and (3) assess the effectiveness of programs designed for
disadvantaged solo parents and their children;
(b) Coordinate the activities of various governmental and nongovernmental organizations
engaged in promoting and protecting the interests of solo parents and their children; and
(c) Monitor the implementation of the provisions of this Act and suggest mechanisms by which
such provisions are effectively implemented.
Section 13. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - An interagency committee headed by the DSWD, in
coordination with the DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA, and DILG is hereby established which shall
formulate, within ninety (90) days upon the effectivity of this Act, the implementing rules and
regulations in consultation with the local government units, nongovernment organizations and people's
organizations.
Section 14. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be
included in the budget of concerned government agencies in the General Appropriations Act of the year
following its enactment into law and thereafter.1awphil.net
Section 15. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, administrative orders or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 16. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other
provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 17. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete
publication in theOfficial Gazette or in at least two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
Approved.
(Sgd.)
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
President of the Philippines

LACSON VS. LACSON (J. Garcia

Facts:
Petitioner is the father of the respondent sisters. Before the second birthday of the elder sister, the
petitioner left the conjugal home. The mother and the respondents were forced to shuffle from one
dwelling to another. Edward (petitioner) failed to give support to his daughters. He merely gave meager
amounts for school expenses. The mother and the respondents were forced to rely on their uncle, Noel
Daban (brother of respondent’s mother, brother-in-law of petitioner). RTC ordered the petitioner to pay
the respondents P2,496,000 for support in arrears.
Issue:
1. WON the respondents are entitled for support in arrears from 1976 to 1994
2. WON the uncle of the respondents is entitled for reimbursement from plaintiff
Held:
1. The Court held that the respondents ARE entitled for support in arrears. The petitioner invoked
Article 203 – (the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who
 has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.) saying that the respondents are entitled only to receive
support from the date when a demand for support was made upon him, which was 1995.

However, the petitioner’s contention cannot be given due weight for the petitioner could not
plausibly expect any of the sisters to demand for support during their tender years, with the fact
that even the mother of the respondents had a hard time herself communicating with the
petitioner. Moreover, even if there was no formal written demand, the demand contemplated
by the provision may be very well cover the act of asking one to comply with his obligation to
support.

2. The Court held that the uncle is entitled for reimbursement from the plaintiff. According to
article 207 of the Family Code, when the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or
fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support
to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision and resolution AFFIRMED.

FUNERALS
Art 305, CC – duty and right to arrange a funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with order
established for support (Art 199, FC; then Art 294, CC). In case descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the eldest shall be preferred (to make arrangements). In case of ascendants, the
paternal (father’s side) shall have a better right.
- Order of support according to Art 199
o Spouse
o Descendants in the nearest degree
o Ascendants in the nearest degree
o Brothers and sisters
- Descendants of same degree, brothers and sisters:
o Eldest shall organize the funeral
- Ascendants of same degree
o Father’s side shall organize

Art 306, CC – every funeral shall be in keeping with social position of the deceased

Art 307, CC – Funeral shall be in accordance with express wishes of the deceased. In absence of such
expression, his/her religious beliefs or affiliations shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the
funeral form shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same after
consulting other members of the family.

Art 308, CC – No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the
consent of the persons mentioned in Art 294, CC (Art 199, FC) and Art 305, CC.

Art 309, CC – Any person who shows disrespect to the dead or wrongfully interfered with a funeral
shall be liable to the family of the deceased for moral and material damages.

Art 310, CC – The construction of the tombstone or mausoleum shall be part of the funeral expenses,
and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
 THE FAMILY HOME
Art 152, FC – the family home, constituted jointly by husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of the
family, is the dwelling where the family resides and the land on which it is situated
- The family home is a real right; gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment
o Requires registration
- Comprised of the dwelling place and land on which it is situated
- Dissolution does not divide the property but extinguishes the right to it
- Limitations of the Family Home
o Only one family home per family, no other can exist without dissolution of the former
o Can only be constituted in the dwelling place, therefore in the domicile of the family
o Value of the family home must not exceed the limit fixed by law
- Constitution of the family home requires:
o Actual occupancy with intent to dedicate the premises to family use
o Good faith
o Must not be used for business purposes
 Separation of sections of a structure used for business, and that used as
dwelling by the family (sanctity and privacy)
- Upon constitution of the family home, the family must use it as dwelling place
o Abandonment will cause its dissolution
o Leasing certain parts of the home while maintaining some as dwelling does not dissolve
the family home
- The Family Head  according to California Code, Sec. 1261
o Every person, who has residing in the dwelling house with him or her, and under his or
her care and maintenance, any of the following:
 His or her minor child/minor grandchild, or minor child/grandchild of his/her
deceased spouse
 Minor brother/sister, or a minor child of the deceased brother/sister
 A father, mother, grandfather or grandmother
 Father, mother, grandfather, or grandmother of deceased spouse
 An unmarried sister, or any of the other relatives mentioned above, of majority
age but unable to support/take care of himself
o Beneficiaries recognized in the Philippines are given by Art 154, FC
 Head of family himself may be beneficiary irrespective of dependents
- Head of the family ma establish family home, even if the members of his household are not
legally beneficiaries of the said home

Art 153 – Family home constitutes on a house and lot upon time of occupation as family residence.
Family home continues to exist so long as any of its beneficiaries actually reside there. It is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as provided by law.
- Actual Occupation constitutes the Family Home (under FC)
o Judicial or extra judicial proceedings not required and only serve to notify third parties
o Actual occupancy is the clincher. A duly registered public instrument will not constitute
the family home if there is no actual occupancy!
o Might expose third parties to fraud by not duly notifying them of the constitution of the
Home (Tolentino opinion)
- May be constituted judicially or extra-judicially (under CC)
 o From time of court order approving the family home (judicially) or public instrument
creating it is recorded (extra judicially)
- Valid alienation will dissolve the family home but death of the original parties who constituted
it will not.

Art 154 – The beneficiaries of the Family Home:

1. Husband and Wife, or an unmarried person who is Head of the Family
2. Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who depend upon the Head of the Family for support
- Requisites of being a beneficiary:
o Relationships enumerated above
o Living in the family home
o Dependent upon support of the Family Head
- Legitimacy mentioned herein are applicable to provisions in Art 195-196, FC
o If the illegitimate brother or sister’s dependence upon support of the Family Head is
brought about by their own fault or negligence, they cannot be beneficiaries!
- Rights of Beneficiaries
o Right to live within the Family Home and to use the same
o Does not transfer ownership of the property to beneficiaries

Art 155 – Family Home shall be exempt from forced sale, execution and/or attachment EXCEPT:
1. For non-payment of taxes
2. Debts incurred prior to the constitution of the Family Home
3. Debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after constitution
4. Debts to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and other who have aided in
construction of the building
- Enforcement of money judgment may still foreclose the Home if debt was incurred before
constitution
- #4 includes not only construction but also repairs and improvements made after construction of
the Home; to avoid superfluity with #2 (construction always occurs before constitution of family
home)

Art 156 – Family Home must be part of ACP/CPG or Exclusive Property of one spouse with the other’s
consent or may be constituted by an unmarried head upon his own property.
Property subject to conditional sale on installments, where ownership is reserved to guarantee
payment, may be constituted as the Family Home
- Family Home may not be constituted upon property co-owned by a spouse with a third person
- Home created partly on conjugal property and partly on paraphernal property of the wife is
valid (Exclusive property of one spouse with the other’s consent)

Art 157 – Actual value of Family Home must not exceed:

- 300,000 pesos in Urban Areas
- 200,000 pesos in Rural Areas
- Or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law
If value of currency changes after adoption of this code, the value most favorable for the constitution of
a family home shall be the basis of valuation
Urban areas include chartered cities, and municipalities with annual income at least equaling that of
chartered cities. All other are rural areas.
 - The value most favorable for constitution of family home = the one with more value
o In time of inflation (weaker currency), the old value
o In time of appreciation (stronger currency), the new value

Art 158 – the Family Home may be alienated, encumbered, sold, donated or assigned by the owners
thereof, with written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter’s spouse, and the majority
of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of doubt, the Court decides.
- Alienation of Family Home dissolves it, new one may then be constituted
- Mortgaging the Home does not dissolve it so long as beneficiaries still reside in it. Eventual sale
due to foreclosure will dissolve the Home.
- Passing ownership of Home to third persons makes it cease being a Family Home. Purpose of
Family Home is for the family to have a dwelling exempt from attachment and execution. No
Family = no point in exemption.

Art 159 – Family Home shall continue to exist even after death of Spouses or of the Unmarried Head, for
a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary. The heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule applies regardless of who constituted/owns
the Home.
- Family Home continues for 10 years after death of spouses/persons who constituted the home,
or so long as there is a minor beneficiary
o If no beneficiaries, the Home is dissolved
o If no minor beneficiaries, it exists for 10 years then dissolved unless a minor beneficiary
resides in it again within the 10 year period
- Lapse of the 10-year period (without minor beneficiary) allows the heirs to partition the Home.
- Heirs deciding not to partition the Home will keep the property intact but will not restore its
status to being a Family Home

Art 160 – for creditors not enumerated in Art 155, obtaining judgment in their favor and having
reasonable ground to believe that the Family Home is worth more than the amount specified in Art 157,
the creditor may apply to the court for an order of sale by execution.
Court shall so order if it finds that the actual value is more than the maximum allowed by law at the time
of constitution.
If increase in value, exceeding maximum allowed by law, is caused by improvements done by person or
persons constituting the home, by owners of the property, or by any beneficiaries, the same rule shall
apply.
- Two exceptions to creditors not within Art 155, FC:
o When actual value of the Home exceeds maximum provided in Art 157
 Value at time of levy is immaterial!
 Deterioration of Home until time of levy will not exempt it
o When at time of levy on execution, the actual value of the Home is above maximum in
Art 157 due to improvements done by beneficiaries or owner of the property
 Value of improvements is determinative factor!
- Mere allegation by creditor (not mentioned in Art 155) not enough to levy execution on Family
Home
o Requires appraisal to determine reasonable grounds for creditor claim
- It is only the value in excess of the aggregate amount of all liens and encumbrances, and the
exempted value of the Family Home, that would be available for ordinary unsecured creditors.
 - Property comprising the Family Home may be divided to satisfy said creditor if there is enough
to cover his claim
o It is only when this division cannot be made that the whole property must be sold
- Family Home is ordinarily exempt from seizure and forced sale. Levy of execution merely allows
for appraisal of land and possible division thereof if found to be in excess of maximum allowed
value.
o Excess of maximum value makes lien absolute
- Bid should be sufficient to cover value of Home in excess of maximum as well as amount of all
liens and encumbrances due to creditors
- Distribution of Proceeds of Sale
o Creditors holding liens or encumbrances on the property
o Beneficiaries, for constitution of new Family Home
o Creditors seeking satisfaction of judgment (not in Art 155)
o If any remaining balance, to the owner of the property

Art 161 – For purposes of availing benefits of a Family Home, a person may constitute or be a
beneficiary in only one Family Home

Art 162 – This Chapter also governs existing Family Residences insofar its provisions are applicable

MODEQUILLO V. BREVA
FACTS:
 Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay (petitioners) are ordered by CA to pay jointly and
severally respondents through their goods and chattels.
 Sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a parcel of agricultural land registered in the
name of Jose.
 Jose filed a motion to quash/or to set aside levy of execution alleging that:
 The residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of the case and so it is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Art. 152 and 153, FC.
 Judgment debt sought to be enforced is not one of those enumerated under Art. 155,
FC.
 Trial court: denied motion and likewise denied motion for reconsideration filed thereafter.
 Hence, this present petition. Petitioner alleges that:
 Only a question of law is involved in the petition
 Residential house and lot was duly constituted as a family home under FC which took
effect on Aug. 4, 1988.
 Said property is exempt from payment of obligation enumerated under Art. 155, FC. It is
not one of the instances under Art. 155, FC when the family home may be levied upon
and sold on execution.
ISSUE:
WON said residential land has the characteristic of a family home and is thus exempted from execution
HELD:
NO!
The petitioner misinterpreted Art. 162, FC (“the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.”). This does not mean that Art. 152
and Art. 153 of said code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation and exempt from obligation
incurred before FC’s effectivity.
Art. 162, FC only means that all existing family residences at the time of FCs effectivity are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits of a family home under the FC.
The residential house and lot was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the CC. It became a family home by operation of law under Art. 153,FC upon the
effectivity of the FC on Aug. 3, 1988.
The debt or liability which was the basis of judgment arose at the time of the vehicular
accident (March 16, 1976) and the money judgment rendered by CA (January 29, 1988). Both preceded
the FC’s effectivity on Aug. 3, 1988. Thus, the case does not fall under the exemptions under the FC.

PATRICIO V. DARIO III

FACTS:
 Marcelino Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife (Perla Patricio, petitioner) and his
two sons (Marcelino Marc Dario and Marcelino Dario III, private respondent).
 The wife and two sons extrajudicially settled the estate of their father. Among the properties
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon.
 Petitioner and Marc formally advised Dario III of their intention to partition the subject
property and terminate co-ownership. Dario III refused.
 Trial court: ordered partition: 4/6 to Perla, 1/6 to Marc, 1/6 to Dario III. Dario III filed motion
reconsideration but was also denied.
 CA: denied the MfR at first but later on granted it. It held that the family home should
continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary
thereof. It also held that minor son of Dario III who is the grandson of the deceased was a
minor beneficiary of the family home.
ISSUE: WON the family home can be partitioned at the death of the head of the household
notwithstanding the presence of a minor beneficiary (Art. 154 and 159, FC)
HELD: YES. Under Art. 154, FC, there are three requisites that must concur to be a beneficiary of the
family home:
1. They must be among the relationships enumerated in said article.
2. They live in the family home.
3. They are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
 Moreover, Art. 159, FC provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there
is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefore. However, the minor contemplated in this article must not only reside in the
home but must also be dependent on the head of the family for legal support (as stated in Art.
154, FC).
 FIRST REQUISITE SATISFIED. Lorenzo Dario IV, as the grandson of the deceased satisfies the first
requisite because he is considered a “descendant”.
 SECOND REQUISITE SATISFIED. The grandson has been living in the family home since 1994, or
within 10 years from the death of the decedent.
 THIRD REQUISITE NOT SATISFIED. The grandson has parents capable of supporting him and, thus,
cannot be viewed as dependent on his grandparents for support. The law first imposes the
 obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their
default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
 With such findings, there is no more legal impediment to partition the said property.

VENERACION V. MANCILLA
FACTS:
 Elizabeth Mendinueta, married to Geronimo Veneracion, secured a P1.2M loan from Charlie
Mancilla.
 To secure the payment, Elizabeth executed a real estate mortgage over her residential lot with a
residential house situated thereon. On the face of the title, it says that she was “single” at that
time. It also stated that the property may be foreclose upon failure to pay the loan.
 Due to failure to pay, Mancilla filed a petition in the RTC to for the judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage. He died so his heirs were impleaded as his substitution.
 Elizabeth admitted her failure to pay but also claimed that she was able to secure a loan from
Banco Filipino Savings Mortgage Bank which she intended to use to pay Mancilla. She later
asked for reduction of the monthly interest from 5% to 3%.
 RTC: ruled in favor of the Mancillas
 CA: affirmed RTC. She then filed a manifestation that she was only praying that the accrued
interest be reduced, no longer filing of a brief. CA also dismissed this.
 Property was sold at a public budding wherein the Mancilla heirs were the winning bidders.
 It turns out, however, that Elizabeth had been living with Geronimo Veneracion without the
benefit of marriage. They have 3 children: Mary Grace, Dysie, and Richard. All of them had been
living on the subject mortgaged property.
 The children of Elizabeth and Geronimo seeks the nullity of the mortgage based on the ff. facts:
 Geronimo paid the monthly installments of the property since Elizabeth had no source
of income but the title was only placed under Elizabeth’s name.
 Family home is not liable for the execution because Geronimo did not consent in the
mortgage (Art. 154, FC)
 RTC Decision prejudiced their right to their family home and their hereditary rights.
ISSUE:
WON the family home may be executed with the spouse’s consent wanting.
HELD:
No. But it must be proved first that it was indeed a conjugal home and that their father spent for
the acquisition of such. In this case, it was not proven.
Petitioners failed to append to their petition the copies of the receipts for the installment
payments their father allegedly made. Their claim that their mother had no source of income is blied by
the trial court’s finding that their mother was able to secure a loan from Banco Filipino for P1.2M.
They also failed to append to their petition parts of the records of the RTC showing that the
party is indeed a family home and part of the conjugal property of their parents.
Elizabeth never alleged in all the courts that the property is their family home and is conjugal in
nature. Based from the information, she actually impliedly admitted the correctness of the appealed
decision.

ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA (2008)

PETITIONER: Vilma Arriola and Anthony Arriola (second wife and son of Fidel Arriola, owner of the lot)
RESPONDENT: John Nabor C. Arriola (son of Fidel from his first wife)
SUMMARY: Subject house was built by the decedent on his exclusive property. Said house has been the
residence of petitioners [2nd family] for 20 years. House is therefore the family home. This being so, it is
shielded from partition under Article 159 of FC [family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years and the heirs cannot partition
the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.] The family home cannot be partitioned
this time, even if it has passed to the co- ownership of the heirs, parties herein.
FACTS:
1. Herein respondent filed for judicial partition of the properties of the decedent Fidel Arriola through
public auction.
2. RTC: Moved to partition the properties of Fidel in a public auction.
3. Petitioners failed to include the subject house standing on the subject land in the auction of the house
and respondent prayed that petitioners be declared in contempt of court.
4. RTC: Denied the motion for contempt because the subject house and lot was not alleged in the
information as part of the properties to be partitioned.
5. CA: Allowed the partition of the properties which includes the subject house and lot.
 Ratio: The deceased owned the subject land, therefore, he also owned the subject lot which
is a mere accessory to the land
 Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-ownership with
the heirs.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA correctly ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the contempt
of court and accordingly,
2. WON the land on which the house stands may be included in the public auction
HELD:
1. On Contempt of Court
NO. RTC should not have taken jurisdiction on the motion for indirect contempt because the
respondent did not comply with the mandatory requirements.
2. On the subject house and lot
 NO.Subject house is covered by the judgment of partition because (1) the house deemed part of
the subject land, and (2) Subject house was built by the deceased. Therefore, it is settled that
the property is co-owned by the parties as heirs of their father.
 BUT it should not be AUTOMATICALLY included in the public auction because of the FC provision
on suspensive proscription. Petioners allege that the house was their family home for 20 years
and thus should be considered as the family home.
o The family home is not just the house but the land to which it stands (Art. 152)
o It is shielded from immediate partition under Art. 159, FC. “The family home shall
constitute despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of ten years or for so long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the
heirs cannot partition the same unless the Court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.”
 Ratio: It preserved the family home as a physical symbol of family love, security
and unity by imposing restrictions.
o All other lands outside the family home are subject to immediate partition through public
auction.

SPOUSES KELLEY V PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC. (2008)

PETITIONER: Auther Kelly and his wife Dorris who owned a property that is allegedly a family home
RESPONDENT: PPI who bought the questioned land after the spouses failed to pay the consigned
agricultural products and sheriff who sold on execution the subject property.
SUMMARY: Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent PPI in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed action
for sum of money and won. Sheriff sold a property of Kelley spouses to pay for the
amount. It was held that Nueva Vizcaya RTC has jurisdiction over case since only Auther
is a party to the Pasig RTC case. Wife and children are strangers to that case involving the
sheriff selling on execution the alleged family home. Case remanded to RTC to determine
W/N property is family home (must concur with requisites in FC)
FACTS:
1. Auther G. Kelley, Jr., on his own, acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent PPI in 1989
2. For failure to pay despite demand, respondent sheriff sold on execution the subject property and PPI
was awarded the certificate of sale as the highest bidder.
3. Spouses Kelly filed a motion to dissolve the notice of levy of the RTC on the ground that the subject
property is their family home.
 Doris was a stranger to Arthur’s failure to pay and could not be forced to litigate therein
ISSUE: WON the lot should be exempted from sale in order to pay Arthur’s liabilities to PPI.
HELD: Case is remanded to the trial court to determine WON the property is a family home.
 If it is found to be a family home, then it should be exempted from execution provided that the
ff. requisites occur:
o Duly constituted as such
o Constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of the family
o It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is
situated
o Part of ACP/CPG/exclusive properties of either spouse with latter’s consent, or the
property of the unmarried head of the family
o Actual value shall not exceed 300k (urban areas) and P200k in rural areas
o Debts for w/c the family home is made answerable must be incurred after the
promulgation of FC, otherwise it should be shown to have constituted either judicially or
extra judicially pursuant to CC
o Debts are not one of the exemptions provided for in Art. 155, FC.

JOSEF V SANTOS
PETITIONER: Albino Josef, owner of the alleged family home with liability to Otelio Santos
RESPONDENT: Otelio Santos
SUMMARY: Petitioner failed to pay respondent for shoe materials he brought on credit. Petitioner
contends that one of the properties is the family home and thus exempted from
execution. Court held that Petition is meritorious; writ of execution void. CA should have
earnestly determined petitioner’s allegation that property is family home. The family
home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers
upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the
person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Santos claimed that Josef failed to pay around P400K in shoe materials.
2. A real property in Marikina was sold by way of public auction wherein respondent emerged as the
 winning bidder.
3. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that (1) the personal properties in did
not belong to him but to his children (2) the real property covered was his family home
4. CA: dismissed the petition, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the levy and sale of the personal belongings as well as the attachment and sale on public
auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award is legal.
HELD: NO. The lower courts should have conducted a solemn inquiry into the nature of the real property
after the petitioner has alleged that the property is their family home. Trial court should have observed
the following procedure:
 Determine if the obligation falls under the exceptions under Art. 155, FC
 Determine the veracity of petitioner’s claim that it is a family home
o Ocular inspection
o Examination of the title
o Interview with the neighbors
o Submission of photograohs
o Examination of the petitioner and his children
 If it is already found to be the family home, the Court should determine
o If the obligation was contracted before/after the effectivity of FC
o If petitioner’s spouse is still alive, as well as beneficiaries
o If the petitioner has more than one residence
o Its actual location and value (Art. 157 and 160)

On the protection of the family home

The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic
social institution, and since no custom, practice, or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the
veracity of the allegations is unjustified.

SPOUSES DE MESA V. SPOUSES ACERO

Petitioners: Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa
Respondents: Spouses Claudio Acero Jr. and Ma. Rufina Acero, Sheriff Felixberto Samonte and Registrar
Alfredo Santos
Facts:
 A parcel of land was bought jointly by Araceli and Ernesto. They were merely cohabiting then but
soon built a house on the subject property, got married and established a family home.
 Araceli obtained a loan of 100,000 from Claudio, with the subject property as mortgages. A check
was given by Araceli to Claudio but it bounced. Hence, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor’s Office
against petitioner. The case was dismissed by the RTC but they had to pay respondents 100,000.
 A writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte levied upon the subject property. It was
subsequently subject to public action and Claudio won as the highest bidder.
 Spouses Acero leased the land to Spouses De Mesa (and a certain Juanito) but they defaulted in
their payments. Meanwhile, a final deed of sale was granted to Claudio, where the earlier title
was cancelled.
 Spouses Acero filed for ejectment against Spouses De Mesa for defaulting in their payments as
lessors of the land. The MTC granted this to them despite continuing claims of Spouses De Mesa
that they are the rightful owners of the land. They appealed up until the CA but the decision still
stood. *dismissed always for failure to allege being levied
  Spouses De Mesa filed a new complaint to nullify the title held by Spouses Acero, stating that their
family home stood on the subject property and it was exempt from being subject to execution
under Art. 153. RTC ruled that the exemption does not apply. ‘A mortgage was constituted over
the subject property to secure the loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it was levied upon as
payment therefor’. Appealed up to the CA but still denied, CA added that the exemption should
be raised and proved to the Sheriff prior to the execution, forced sale or attachment.
Issues:
(1) WON petitioner are guilty of forum shopping;
(2) WON lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio’s title over the property
Held:
(1) No. The issue of property may have been raised in the ejectment case but the ruling on the property
was only provisional. Ejectment suits and annulment of title suits prosper under different circumstances,
even if they share the same facts and parties.
(2) No. Lower courts were right in dismissing the petition for the nullification of Claudio’s title. PETITION
DENIED
Ratio (2) only:
ON THE FAMILY HOME ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY:
From the case: ‘The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family
homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.’
‘Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no
showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the
subject property was a family home.’
ON THE EXEMPTION NOT BEING RAISED EARLY ON WITH THE SHERIFF:
Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court stated that:
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption
must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x x.