CID v.
Javier from the wall of the house of
June 30, 1960 | Barrera, CJ. | Easements
Digester: Villafuerte, Beatriz C.
SUMMARY: The issue in the present case
is whether respondents owners of
building standing on their lot with
windows overlooking the adjacent lor
had acquired by prescription an
enforceable easement of light and view
arising from a verbal prohibition to
obstruct such view and light. The Court
held that respondents did not acquire
the easement.
Doctrine: Easements are in the nature of
an encumbrance on the servient estate.
They constitute a limitation of the
dominical right of the owner of the
subjected property. Hence, they can be
acquired only by title and prescription,
in the case of positive easement, only as
a result of some sort of invasion,
apparent and continuous, of the servient
estate. By the same toke, negative
easements cannot be acquired by less
formal means. Hence, the requirement
that the prohibition should be by “a
formal act”, “an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public”
FACTS:
} Parties in this case are neighbors.
} Respondents Irene Javier et.al are
owners of a building standing on
their lot with windows overlooking
the adjacent lot, owned by petitioners
Laureana Cid.
} The respondents’ house as well as
that of the petitioner, are within their
respective properties. The
respondents’ wall stands only 50 cm
from the boundary of the 2 lots.
Whereas, the wall of the petitioner’s
building was constructed 1 meter
from the boundary or 1m and 50cm
respondents. As a result, it was found
by the lower court that the eaves of
the 2 houses overlap by 24
centimeters. (This fact was derived
from the 1961 resolution of the
Supreme Court)
} Allegedly in 1913 or 1914, before the
New Civil Code took effect, the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioner
were verbally prohibited by the
respondent to obstruct view and
light.
} It was found by the Court of Appeals
that both lots were covered by
Original Certificates of Title.
However, in both of them, it does not
appear any annotation in respect to
the easement supposedly acquired by
prescription, which counting the 20
years from 1913or1914, would have
already ripened by 1937, date of the
decrees of registration.
} Trial Court –ruled in favor of Javier.
Repsondents acquired the easement
} CA – affirmed trial court’s decision
RULING: Decision of the CA is reversed
Whether the respondents Javier had
acquired by prescription an enforceable
easement of light and view arising from a
verbal prohibition to obstruct such view
and light—NO.
} The alleged prohibition having been
made in 1913 or 1914 before the
present CC took effect, the applicable
leagal provision is Article 538 of the
Spanish Civil Code which provides
that: to acquire by prescription of
negative easement, the time of
possession shall be computed from
the day on which the owner of the
dominant estate has, by a FORMAL
ACT, forbidden the owner of the
 servient estate to perform any act acknowledged before a notary
which would be lawful without the public."
easement.
} The law is explicit. It requires not any
form of prohibition but exacts the
doing not only of a specific, particular
act, but a formal act.
FRANCISCO v. PAEZ AND JABSON
} Formal – or pertaining to form, September 20, 2010 | Romualdez, J. |
characterized by one due form or
Easement- extinguishment
order, done in due form with a
Digester: Venturanza, Maria
solemnity regular; relating to matters
of form. SUMMARY: Francisco claims a right of
} Act—in civil law. A writing which way across the land of defendants Paez
states in legal form that a thing has
and Jabson. However, the trial court
been done, said or agreed.
ruled that his action is barred by
} From these definitions, it would prescription because he filed it only 18
appear that the phrase “formal act” years after the right of the original
would required not merely any
owners to claim a right of way arose.
writing but on executed in due form
The Court held that this is not a case of
or solemnity.
prescription by non-use, but a claim to
} That this is the intendment of the law exercise legal easement. Thus, the action
although not expressed in exact is imprescriptible.
language is the reason for the
DOCTRINE: Prescription affects all
clarification made in Art. 621 of the
easements lawfully arisen although they
Civil Code which specifically requires may not have been used. Nevertheless,
the prohibition to be in an instrument the second paragraph of article [631]
be acknowledged before a notary
refers to an easement in use, for one
public.
cannot discontinue using what one has
} Easements are in the nature of an
never used.
encumbrance on the servient estate. Regarding legal easement, the right or
They constitute a limitation of the the power to claim the exercise of legal
dominical right of the owner of the
easement does not prescribe.
subjected property. Hence, they can
be acquired only by title and by FACTS:
prescription, in the case of positive } In a complaint filed on 1 September
easement, only as a result of some
1927, plaintiff Marcelo Francisco
sort of invasion, apparent and
claims a right of way, upon payment
continuous, of the servient estate. By
of indemnity, across the land of
the same token, negative easements defendants Timoteo Paez and
cannot be acquired by less formal
Ricardo Jabson; that the latter
means. Hence, the requirement that
recognize the plaintiff's ownership of
the prohibition (the equivalent of the
a piece of land of 23.46 square
act of invasion) should be by "a meters, that they vacate it, and that
formal act", "an instrument the defendant indemnify him for the
 damages arising from said
occupation.
} Defendant Paez answered with a
general denial and set up the special
defense of prescription. Defendant
Jabson, in turn, also answered with a
general denial, and by way of special
defense denied that the plaintiff has
any right of way over his land,
because outside of it there is another
possible way to the street, which is
shorter and less prejudicial.
CFI of Manila
} The trial court held that the plaintiff’s
action to enforce his right of way over
defendant Paez’s land is barred by
the statute of limitations based on the
following grounds (the court now
narrates the origin of dispute):
- The parcels of land originally
belonged to a certain Paulino
Castañeda y Francisco. He
obtained decree No. 3138 in
proceeding No. 4865, and
subsequently, certificate of title
No. 1449.
- On 20 October 1909, this parcel of
land was subdivided into two
parts, one containing 193.66
square meters, situated in the
inner portion of the space
between Padre Rada and Ilaya
Streets, and the other containing
173.71 square meters,
conterminous with said streets.
- The first of these parcels, that is,
the interior portion, after
successive transfers became the
property of the plaintiff herein,
and the second portion, after
several transfers also, became the
property of defendant Jabson.
- From 20 October 1909, or when
the property was subdivided,
there arose the right of the
original owners of the interior
parcel to claim a right of way over
the adjacent land which was then
the land abutting upon P. Rada
and Ilaya Streets, through which
was the nearest and shortest way
to said streets. However, none of
the previous owners exercised
the said right until plaintiff filed
the complaint 18 years later.
- Section 40 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that the
action to recover ownership or
possession of real property, or an
interest therein, may only be
exercised within ten years after
the cause of said action arises.
Thus, plaintiff’s action is barred
by the statute of limitations.
RULING: The judgment appealed from is
modified and it is held that, upon
payment of the proper indemnity, the
plaintiff is entitled to a right of way
through the shortest and least
prejudicial portion of the servient estate,
from plaintiff's lot designated No. 3 in
the plan Exhibit A, through defendant
Timoteo Paez's lot No. 12 according to
said plan, to P. Rada Street, as provided
in articles 564, 565 and concordant
articles of the Civil Code.
Whether the plaintiff’s right of way over
defendant Paez’s land has prescribed–
NO.
} It is true that easements are
extinguished by non-user for twenty
years (no. 1 of article 546, now 631 of
the NCC). Nevertheless, the case at
bar does not deal with an easement
which has been used, while the legal
provision cited is only applicable to
easements which being in use are
later abandoned.
} The Court cites Manresa, who says:
“Prescription affects all easements
lawfully arisen although they may not
have been used. Nevertheless, the
second paragraph of article [631],
number 2, refers to an easement in
use, for one cannot discontinue using
what one has never used, and there
can be no act, at least in all the cases,
adverse to an inchoate easement.”
} Regarding legal easement, such as the
one in question, Manresa also says:
“…the right or the power to claim the
exercise of legal easement does not
prescribe, as occurs especially in the
case of the right of way and easement
of aqueduct”.
} In his appeal, plaintiff cites No. 5 of
the said provision, which refers to
extinction of easement by waiver.
However, the Court says that in the
case of intermittent easements, such
as the right of way, the waiver must
be, if not formal and solemn, at least
such as may be obviously gathered
from positive acts, and the mere
refraining from claiming the right is
not sufficient for the purpose.
} Manresa says: “It seems then that as a
general rule, an express waiver
should be required, but without
prejudice to having the courts decide
in exceptional cases that there is an
evident waiver, inferred from acts
which reveal it beyond all doubt.”
} The mere fact that the plaintiff and
his predecessors refrained from
claiming the easement, without any
positive act to imply a real waiver,
does not bring the case within the
provision of the aforesaid article
[631], No. 5, of the Civil Code.
} The Court’s conclusion is that such a
right of way, provided by the law for
the benefit of private individuals,
may be waived.
} In support of this, the Court once
again cite Manresa: “Legal easements
established in the interest of private
individuals may be waived, but not so
those of public utility… But the court
holds, for the reasons stated above,
that said article 546, No. 5, Civil Code,
is not applicable to the instant case,
with reference to waiver, nor is No. 2
of the same article, regarding non-
user; and therefore, the plaintiff 's
right of way cannot be deemed
extinguished.”
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
DUMADAG
March 11, 2013 | Peralta, J. | Easements
Digester: Agustin, Chrissete
SUMMARY: This is a case for certiorari
(originating from an accion publiciana
complaint). This is a case about property
considered as easements (which is
occupied by squatters). Petitioner filed a
complaint for accion publiciana against
the squatting respondents. The Court
held that the land being occupied by the
respondents is part of the 3-m easement
required by law along the bank of the
Mahabang Ilog Creek, and is therefore
part of public land. Petitioners and
respondents both have no right or title
over it.
DOCTRINE: Easement is an
encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different
owner or for the benefit of a community,
or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.
While the general rule is that the owner
of the servient estate retains the
ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use
the same in such a manner as not to
affect the exercise of the easement, there
is an exception in the Code that states
that all matters concerning easements
established for public or communal use
shall be governed by the special laws
and regulations relating thereto.
FACTS:
ARGUMENT BY THE PETITIONER:
} July 1, 2002 – petitioner filed a
Complaint for accion publiciana with
damages against respondents for
allegedly building their shanties,
without its knowledge and consent,
in its 5,613 m2 property located at
Daisy Road, Phase V, Pilar Village
Subdivision, Almanza, Las Piñas City.
It claims that said parcel of land,
which is duly registered in its name
under TCT No. 481436 of the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Rizal,
was designated as an open space of
Pilar Village Subdivision intended for
village recreational facilities and
amenities for subdivision residents.
ARGUMENT BY THE RESPONDENT:
} In their Answer with Counterclaim,
they denied the material allegations
of the Complaint and briefly asserted
that it is the local government, not
petitioner, which has jurisdiction and
authority over them.
} Trial ensued. Both parties presented
their respective witnesses and the
trial court additionally conducted an
ocular inspection of the subject
property.
} RTC – May 30, 2007 – Dismissed
petitioner’s complaint, finding that
the land being occupied by
respondents are situated on the
sloping area going down and leading
towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek,
and within the three-meter legal
easement; thus, considered as public
property and part of public dominion
under Article 502, which could not be
owned by petitioner. TC opined that
respondents have a better right to
possess the occupied lot, since they
are in an area reserved for public
easement purposes and that only the
local government of Las Piñas City
could institute an action for recovery
of possession or ownership.
} CA – March 5, 2010 – Sustained
dismissal of the case. Referring to
Section 2 of A.O. No. 99-21 of the
DENR, CA ruled that the 3-m area
being disputed is located along the
creek which, in turn, is a form of a
stream; therefore, belonging to the
public dominion. It said that
petitioner could not close its eyes or
ignore the fact, which is glaring in its
own title, that the 3-meter strip was
indeed reserved for public easement.
By relying on the TCT, it is then
estopped from claiming ownership
and enforcing its supposed right.
} Unlike the trial court, however, the
CA noted that the proper party
entitled to seek recovery of
possession of the contested portion is
not the City of Las Piñas, but the
Republic of the Philippines, through
the OSG pursuant to Section 101 of
C.A. No. 141 (The Public Land Act).
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The March 5, 2010 Decision
and October 29, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
90254, which affirmed the May 30, 2007
Decision of the Las Piñas RTC, Branch
197, dismissing petitioner’s complaint,
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Whether the petitioner owns the subject
lots – NO. They are easements.
ARGUMENT BY THE PETITIONER:
} Anchoring on Art. 630, petitioner
contends that although the portion of
the subject property occupied by
respondents is within the 3-m strip
reserved for public easement, it still
retains ownership thereof since the
strip does not form part of the public
dominion As the owner of the subject
parcel of land, it is entitled to its
lawful possession, hence, the proper
party to file an action for recovery of
possession against respondents
conformably with Articles 428 and
539.
COURT:
} An easement or servitude is a real
right on another’s property,
corporeal and immovable, whereby
the owner of the latter must refrain
from doing or allowing somebody
else to do or something to be done on
his or her property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement; it is jus
in re aliena, inseparable from the
estate to which it actively or
passively belongs, indivisible,
perpetual, and a continuing property
right, unless extinguished by causes
provided by law.
} The Code defines easement as an
encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different
owner or for the benefit of a
community, or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong.
} Two kinds of easement according to
source: by law (legal) or by will of the
owners (voluntary). A legal easement
or compulsory easement, or an
easement by necessity constituted by
law has for its object either public use
or the interest of private persons
} While Article 630 of the Code
provides for the general rule that
“[t]he owner of the servient estate
retains the ownership of the portion
on which the easement is established,
and may use the same in such a
manner as not to affect the exercise
of the easement,” Article 635 thereof
is specific in saying that “[all] matters
concerning easements established for
public or communal use shall be
governed by the special laws and
regulations relating thereto, and, in
the absence thereof, by the
provisions of this Title [Title VII on
Easements or Servitudes].”
} In the case at bar, the applicability of
DENR A.O. No. 99-21 (June 11, 1999),
which superseded DENR A.O. No.
97-05 (March 6, 1997) and
prescribed the revised guidelines in
the implementation of the pertinent
provisions of RA No. 1273 and PD
Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be
doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to
further the government’s program of
biodiversity preservation.
} Section 2.3 of A.O. No. 99-21 contains
provisions such as “the strip of three
(3) meters which falls within urban
areas shall be demarcated and
marked on the plan for easement and
bank protection” and “three (3)
meter wide strip along the banks of
rivers or streams shall be observed
 and be made part of the open space
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.
The strip shall be preserved and shall
not be subject to subsequent
subdivision.”
} In the case of residential
subdivisions, the allocation of the
3-meter strip along the banks of a
stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek
in this case, is required and shall be
considered as forming part of the
open space requirement pursuant to
P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977.
Said law is explicit: open spaces are
“for public use and are, therefore,
beyond the commerce of men” and
that “[the] areas reserved for parks,
playgrounds and recreational use
shall be non-alienable public lands,
and non-buildable.”
} Even the Water Code of the
Philippines (Art. 51) provides that
“The banks of rivers and streams and
the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and
within a zone of three (3) meters in
urban areas x x x are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest
of recreation, navigation, floatage,
fishing and salvage. No person shall
be allowed to stay in this zone longer
than what is necessary for recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any
kind.”
} Petitioner’s right of ownership and
possession has been limited by law
with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone
along the banks of Mahabang Ilog
Creek.
} The Court cannot agree with the trial
court’s opinion, as to which the CA
did not pass upon, that respondents
have a better right to possess the
subject portion of the land because
they are occupying an area reserved
for public easement purposes. Similar
to petitioner, respondents have no
right or title over it precisely because
it is public land.
} Squatters have no possessory rights
over the land intruded upon. The
length of time that they may have
physically occupied the land is
immaterial; they are deemed to have
entered the same in bad faith, such
that the nature of their possession is
presumed to have retained the same
character throughout their
occupancy
} Both the Republic of the Philippines
(through the OSG) and the local
government of Las Piñas City, may
file an action depending on the
purpose sought to be achieved. The
former shall be responsible in case of
action for reversion under C.A. 141,
while the latter may also bring an
action to enforce the relevant
provisions of R.A. 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act of
1992). Under R.A. 7279, which was
enacted to uplift the living conditions
in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas and was
envisioned to be the antidote to the
pernicious problem of squatting in
the metropolis, all local government
units (LGUs) are mandated to evict
and demolish persons or entities
occupying danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places
such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds. Moreover, under pain of
administrative and criminal liability
in case of non-compliance, it obliges
LGUs to strictly observe resettlement
 and prohibition against new illegal
structures.
} Petitioner’s proper action is for
mandamus to compel the local
government of Las Piñas City to
enforce with reasonable dispatch the
eviction, demolition, and relocation of
respondents and any other persons
similarly situated in order to give
flesh to one of the avowed policies of
R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban
dysfunctions, particularly those that
adversely affect public health, safety,
and ecology. Indeed, as one of the
basic human needs, housing is a
matter of state concern as it directly
and significantly affects the general
welfare
 west by lands of Francisco
Managen.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
» The eastern line, which joins the
MANILA v PEDRO ROXAS
March 30, 1912 | Trent, J. | Easements hacienda, is 265 meters long.
The claim of right of way starts
Digester: Angat, Christine Joy F.
across parcel L at a point 198
meters from the southern
SUMMARY: Roxas, in order to make his
hacienda accessible from the public extremity of this line.
} During the trial, the parties
highway, filed a claim for a right of way
established the following facts:
across the lot owned by the Archdiocese
» The tract of land (located in
of Manila. He alleged that his tenants
had been using the said tract of land parcel L) which connects Calle
since time immemorial. The Court said Tejeron and the Hacienda, has
grown from a 1.5 to 2 meters
that he has no claim of right of way.
wide to 4 meters wide
Since he based his claim on prescription,
» Since time immemorial, it has
he failed to establish that the right of
way was essential for the beneficial use been used by the tenants of the
Hacienda for the passage of carts
of his hacienda. Further, the tract of land
entering and leaving the
was devoted for the use of the
Hacienda
churchgoers; the fact that his tenants
» A church is constructed near the
were able to use them was due to the
Archdiocese’s toleration. said tract, thus it is not only for
the exclusive use of the tenants of
DOCTRINE: If the ground for a claim of
Roxas’ hacienda, it is also used by
right of way is prescription but the right
of way is not essential for the beneficial the churchgoers, and sometimes
enjoyment of the dominant estate, the by the people living in the Sitio of
Suavoy, and other people
proof showing adverse use—which is an
affirmative claim—must be sufficiently
} Court of Land Registration – denied
strong and convincing to overcome the
presumption of permissive use or the claim of right of way across lot L
license.
RULING: Petition denied.
FACTS:
} Pedro P. Roxas owns the Hacienda de
Whether the claim of right of way should
San Pedro Macati. To enable his be granted– NO.
} A right of way is a charge imposed
tenants to travel from the Hacienda
upon real property for the benefit of
to Calle Tejeron, he filed a claim for a
another estate belonging to a
right of way across parcel L, the lot
owned by the Archdiocese of Manila. different owner. It is a privilege or
advantage in land existing distinct
» Parcel L is bounded on the
from the ownership of the soil.
north by an estero; on the west
» Because it is a permanent interest
by hacienda, on the southwest
by Calle Tejeron; and on the in another’s land with a right to
enter at all times and enjoy it, it can
 only be founded upon agreement or
upon prescription.
» If the ground for a claim of right of
way is prescription but the right of
way is not essential for the
beneficial enjoyment of the
dominant estate, the proof showing
adverse use—which is an
affirmative claim—must be
sufficiently strong and convincing to
overcome the presumption of
permissive use or license.
IN THIS CASE:
} (1) the use of the road by the tenants
of Roxas has not been such as to
create an easement by prescription or
in any other manner (in other words,
Roxas failed to establish that the right
of way was essential for the
beneficial enjoyment of the hacienda)
¥ Roxas’ claim of right of way
cannot prosper as his basis for
such claim is not the necessity
growing out of the peculiar
location of his property, but by
prescription – the immemorial
use by his tenants. It has not been
shown that the tenants’ use of the
road was absolutely necessary in
order to cultivate the hacienda, as
to deprive other people their right
to pass by the same road.
¥ In fact, it was shown that the
tenants’ use of the road was only
for convenience; they can still
reach Calle Tejeron by going
other directions, especially south,
only 198 meters.
} (2) the use of said road by all has been
by permission or tolerance of the
Archbishop of Manila (in other words,
Roxas failed to prove that there was
adverse use, hence the presumption
of permissive use was not
overthrown)
¥ Where a tract of land, attached to
a public meeting house (the
church in this case), is designedly
left open and unenclosed for the
convenience of the members, the
mere passage of persons over it in
common with those for whose
use it was appropriated is to be
regarded as permissive and under
an implied license, and not
adverse. Until the owner of the
land thinks proper to enclose it,
such use is not adverse and will
not preclude it for enclosing the
land when other views of its
interests renders it proper to do
so.
¥ Though an adjacent proprietor
may make such use of the open
land more frequently than
another, the same rule will apply
unless there be some decisive act
indicating a separate and
exclusive use under a claim of
right.
¥ IN THIS CASE: The road was
intended by the Archbishop of
Manila for the convenience of the
members or worshippers of the
church; that the tenants and
other people were allowed to use
it more frequently was just mere
toleration on the part of the
Archbishop. Roxas failed to
establish that he has a claim of
right over the said tract of land,
hence, their use of the land
remain permissive and not
adverse.
} To allow the Roxas’ claim that
because his tenants has used the said
tract of land since time immemorial,
thus amounting to acquisition of a
right of way over said land, will result
to prohibition of travel: a man will
 most likely disallow his neighbor to
pass in his land if after a lapse of
time, he will be compelled to keep the
land open for the neighbor’s benefit
and enjoyment.
EDUARDO CUAYCONG ET AL. v. RAMONA
BENEDICTO ET AL.
Mar. 13, 1918 | Fisher, J. | Limitations on
Property Rights – Legal Easements: In
favor of adjacent properties
Digester: Arreza, Dapor
SUMMARY: For more than 20 years,
plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-
interest have made use of the Nanca-
Victorias road openly, publicly, and
continuously. However, on Nov. 15, 2012,
the defendants closed the said road at the
point at which it crosses Hacienda
Toreno, and refused to allow plaintiffs to
use it, to their prejudice. Plaintiffs
questioned the act of the defendants and
claimed that they were entitled to use the
said road as they have been using it for
the longest time, thus, they have acquired
a right of use by immemorial
prescription over said road. The CFI
dismissed the complaint saying that the
road was a public highway. The Court
reversed the CFI’s decision and held that
the said road was not a public highway.
As such, the defendants were within their
rights when they closed the road in 1911.
DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental principle
of the law in this jurisdiction concerning
the possession of real property that such
possession is not affected by acts of a
possessory character which are "merely
tolerated" by the possessor, or which are
due to his license. This principle is
applicable not only with respect to the
prescription of the dominium as a whole,
but to the prescription of right in rem.
FACTS:
} Parties:
¥ Plaintiffs-appellees: Eduardo
Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and
Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a
group of haciendas situated
between the southern boundary
of the Hacienda Toreno and the
barrio of Nanca, of the
municipality of Saravia, and that
the appellees Silverio Ginoo,
Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan
Ledesma, are the lessees of part of
said haciendas
¥ Defendants-appellants: Blasa
Benedicto and Ramona Benedicto
are the owners of Hacienda
Toreno, a tract of land in the
municipality of Victorias, Negros
Occidental
} It was alleged in the complaint that for
more than 20 years the appellees and
their predecessors-in-interest have
made use of the Nanca-Victorias road
which crosses the Hacienda Toreno,
openly, publicly, and continuously,
with the knowledge of the owners of
the said hacienda. The purpose was
for the conveying of products of their
haciendas to the town of Victorias and
to the landing place there situated,
and for the purpose of transporting
supplies from those points to their
haciendas, making use of the said road
by means of carts, carabaos, and other
usual means of transportation.
¥ They also alleged that that there
is no outlet to a public road from
the hacienda occupied by these
plaintiffs, the only road and way
by which the products of the
 plaintiffs' property can be taken
to the town of Victorias and to the
landing place there being across
the Hacienda Toreno by the road
marked on the plan attached to
the complaint.
¥ And that on the Nov. 15, 1912, the
defendants closed the road in
question (Nanca-Victorias road)
at the point at which it crosses the
Hacienda Toreno, and refused to
permit plaintiffs to continue using
it. And because plaintiffs were
about to commence to grind their
crop of sugar cane, if they were
prevented from transporting
their sugar across the Hacienda
Toreno to their point of
embarcation, they would suffer
damages difficult to estimate.
} Plaintiffs prayed for a judgment that
they are entitled to use the Nanca-
Victorias road as they have been using
it in the past, and that a perpetual
injunction be issued against plaintiffs
restraining them from impeding such
use. A preliminary injunction was
requested by the plaintiffs while the
case was pending, which was granted
by the lower court.
} Defendants averred the that:
¥ The road crossing the Hacienda
Toreno, over which plaintiffs
claim the right of passage, is the
private property of defendants;
¥ They have not refused plaintiffs
permission to pass over this
road but have required them to
pay toll for the privilege of
doing so.
¥ They also claimed damages for
the use of the road by plaintiffs
during the pendency of the suit,
alleging that the preliminary
injunction had been
improvidently issued upon false
statements contained in the
verified complaint filed by
plaintiffs.
} CFI: Dismissed the complaint with
respect to plaintiffs who claimed the
right to use the Dacuman-Toreno road.
With respect to the Nanca-Victorias
road, the court held that it was a
public highway over which the public
had acquired a right of use by
immemorial prescription, and
ordered the issuance of a perpetual
injunction against plaintiffs,
restraining them from interfering in
any manner with the use of the said
road. It said:
¥ “[as] to the Nanca-Victorias
road we find incontestable
proof that it has been in
existence for at least forty
years.”
¥ It found that hacienderos and
the general public passed
through the land freely and that
it was used for all purposes of
transportation without
interruption until 2 or 3 years
prior when the defendants
announced that the road was
private and that those who
wished to pass over it with
sugar carts would be obliged to
pay a toll of ten centavos—all
other vehicles, it appears, were
permitted to pass free of charge.
This was the arrangement from
1911 til part of 1913 and the
money collected only from
hacienderos and not from
others. It was said that the
reason for the toll originated in
an attempt to raise a fund for
the repair of the road. There is
no evidence that any other
 hacienderos between Nanca
and Victorias or any other
person made any attempt to
close the road or to collect toll.
GENERAL STATEMENTS OF FACT
FOUND BY THE COURT
} The trial judge, in holding that the
road in question is public, bases his
conclusion upon the fact, which he
deems to have been proven, that the
road has been in existence "from time
immemorial," and had been
"continuously used as a public
road…and open to public as such for
thirty or forty years…until…the
defendants undertook to claim it as
private and to collect toll for the
passage of carts."
} There is no doubt that for the past 30
or 40 years a road has existed
between the former site of the town of
Victorias and the barrio of Nanca, of
the municipality of Saravia, and that
this road crosses defendants'
hacienda. It is also true that during
this period the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in the ownership of the
hacienda now held by them have
made use of this road for the purpose
of going and coming from their
haciendas to the town of Victorias; but
the question is whether this use was
limited to the plaintiffs, and their
tenants and employees, or whether it
was, as held by the lower court, a use
enjoyed by the public in general.
} It may be reasonably inferred from
the testimony of the witnesses
presented in court that all persons
having occasion to travel between
Victorias and the haciendas of
Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot,
and Dolores, whether or not they
were owners, tenants, or employees
of said estates, made use of the road
now in dispute, crossing the Hacienda
Toreno, and to this limited extent it
may be said that the public made use
of the road, but there is nothing in the
evidence to indicate that the so-called
public use extended beyond this.
} Apart from the fact that there is no
direct evidence that the road was of
general public use, the records
strongly show that when the
complaint was filed plaintiffs did not
contend that the road was a public
highway, but merely contended that
they had acquired by prescription an
easement of way across the Hacienda
Toreno. It is not averred in the
complaint that the road in question
was used by the public. On the
contrary, it is averred that it was used
by the plaintiffs and their
predecessors. It shows that when they
commenced this action they had in
mind the provisions of articles 564
(now Art, 649), et seq. of the Civil
Code, which relate to the method of
establishing the compulsory
easement of way.
} No evidence was taken to indicate that
at any time since the road in question
has been in existence any part of the
expense of its upkeep has been
defrayed by the general government,
the province, or the municipality. The
municipality of Victorias had no funds
to devote construction and repair of
roads, and the upkeep of the road
depending entirely therefore on the
initiative of the persons who used it,
was attended to only at such times as
repairs were absolutely necessary.
} The court also found that it appears
that the road was already in existence
since 1885, but we do not believe that
 the document in question proves that
the said road was a public highway.
} The court also said that although the
defendants closed the Nanca-Victorias
road in the month of February, 1911,
and since that time have collected toll
from persons passing over it with
carts loaded with sugar, including
those belonging to several of the
plaintiffs, nothing was done by them
to prevent the continuation of this
restriction until December, 1912,
when this action was commenced. It is
natural to assume that if plaintiffs had
considered that the road in question
was public, they would have protested
immediately against the action of the
defendants, and would have either
commenced a civil action, as they
subsequently did, or would have
brought about a prosecution under
section 16 of Act No. 1511.
RULING: For the reasons stated the
judgment of the court below is
REVERSED, the injunction issued against
defendants is DISSOLVED, and the action
is DISMISSED.
Whether the Nanca-Victorias road at the
point at which it traverses the hacienda
Toreno was a public highway – NO
} The defendants are the owners of the
Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title
issued in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, conferring to them
its absolute ownership, subject only to
the limitations of paragraph 4 of
section 39 of said Act. It is admitted
that there is no annotation on the
certificate of title regarding the road
here in question, either as a "public
road" or as a "private way established
by law," and, therefore, the questions
presented by this appeal are to be
determined precisely as they would
be had the Hacienda Toreno not been
brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act. The plaintiffs
being the owners of the property in
question, the presumption of law is
that it is free from any lien or
encumbrance whatever, and the
burden therefore rests upon plaintiffs
to establish the contrary. The court
had previously held in Fabie v.
Lichauco that "It is a settled doctrine
of law that a property is assumed to be
free from all encumbrance unless the
contrary is proved."
} There is admittedly no evidence to
show that the land occupied by the
road here in question was at any time
conveyed to the general government
or any of its political subdivisions by
the present or any of the former
owners of the Hacienda Toreno. The
record fails to disclose any evidence
whatever tending to show that the
Government has at any time asserted
any right or title in or to the land
occupied by the road, or that it has
incurred any expense whatever in its
upkeep or construction.
¥ The evidence shows that the
repairs were made by the
owners of the estates benefited
by the road, and by their
laborers, as a purely voluntary
act for their own convenience
and interest. There being no
evidence that the original use of
the road by plaintiffs'
predecessors was based upon
any express grant of the fee to
the road or of an easement of
way, or that it began under the
assertion of a right on their part,
the presumption must be that
 the origin of the use was the
mere tolerance or license of the
owners of the estates affected.
If it be held that the road in question is not
a public highway, have plaintiffs proven
their acquisition of an easement of way
over the Hacienda Toreno at the point
traversed by the road in question? – NO
} It is a fundamental principle of the law
in this jurisdiction concerning the
possession of real property that such
possession is not affected by acts of a
possessory character which are
"merely tolerated" by the possessor,
or which are due to his license. This
principle is applicable not only with
respect to the prescription of the
dominium as a whole, but to the
prescription of right in rem. In the
case of Cortes vs. Palanca Yu-Tibo the
Court said:
¥ "The provision of article 1942 of
the Civil Code to the effect that
acts which are merely tolerated
produce no effect with respect
to possession is applicable as
much to the prescription of real
rights as to the prescription of
the fee, it being a glaring and
self-evident error to affirm the
contrary, as does the appellant
in his motion papers.
Possession is the fundamental
basis of the prescription.
Without it no kind of
prescription is possible, not
even the extraordinary.
Consequently, if acts of mere
tolerance produce no effect
with respect to possession, as
that article provides, in
conformity with article 444 of
the same Code, it is evident that
they can produce no effect with
respect to prescription,
whether ordinary or
extraordinary. This is true
whether the prescriptive
acquisition be of a fee or of real
rights, for the same reason
holds in one and the other case;
that is, that there has been no
true possession in the legal
sense of the word."
} Possession, under the Civil Code, to
constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be possession
under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law
equivalent of the term, it must be
adverse. Acts of a possessory
character, performed by one who
holds by mere tolerance of the owner
are clearly not en concepto de dueño,
and such possessory acts, no matter
how long so continued, do not start
the running of the period of
prescription.
} The Court of the opinion, and so hold
that upon the facts established by the
evidence it does not appear that the
road in question is a public road or
way. We are also of the opinion that
plaintiffs have failed to show that they
have acquired by prescription a
private right of passage over the lands
of defendants.
} The Court had held in the case of Ayala
de Roxas v. Case that “"The third
Partida in title 31, law 15…says that
discontinuous servitudes…must be
proved by usage or a term so long that
men can not remember its
commencement. In many judgments
the supreme court of Spain has
refused to accept proof of any definite
number of years as a satisfaction of
this requirement of the law. We are of
the opinion that in order to establish a
 right of prescription [title of
prescription based upon use from
time immemorial] something more is
required than the memory of living
witnesses. Whether this something
should be the declaration of persons
long dead, repeated by those who
testify, as exacted by the Spanish law,
or should be the common reputation
of ownership recognized by the Code
of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us
to decide. On either theory the
appellant has failed in his proof..."
} The same thing may be said in this
case. Witnesses have testified that
they have known the road for a certain
period of years, beginning at a time
prior to the enactment of the Civil
Code, but no evidence has been made
to prove immemorial use by either of
the means of proof mentioned in this
decision cited, nor is immemorial user
averred in the complaint as the basis
of the right. It is evident, therefore,
that no vested right by user from time
immemorial had been acquired by
plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code
took effect. Under that Code no
discontinuous easement could be
acquired by prescription in any event.
} Our conclusion is, therefore, that
plaintiffs have not acquired by
prescription a right to an easement of
way over the defendants' property;
that their use of the Nanca-Victorias
road across the Hacienda Toreno was
due merely to the tacit license and
tolerance of the defendants and their
predecessors in title; that the license
was essentially revokable; and that,
therefore, the defendants were within
their rights when they closed the road
in 1911.
VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ, URRA, et al
v. NORTH NEGROS
December 18, 1925 | Villamor, J. | Legal
Easements
Digester: Aspi, Maria Margarita
SUMMARY: Several hacienda owners of
Manapla entered into a milling contract
with Miguel Osorio. North Negros
subsequently acquired the rights and
interests of Osorio in the milling
contract. The hacienda owners could not
furnish sufficient cane for milling, as
required by the capacity of said central,
so North Negros made other milling
contracts with various hacienda owners
of Cadiz in order to obtain sufficient
cane to sustain the central. This gave
rise to the plaintiffs filing their
complaint, alleging that the easement of
way, which each of them has established
in his respective hacienda, was only for
the transportation through each
hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner
thereof. The Court held that the
easement was created for the benefit of
the corporation, owner of the central.
North Negros may cause its wagons to
pass upon the road as many times as it
may deem fit, according to the needs of
the central. If the plaintiffs do not
produce sufficient cane to cover the
capacity of the central, it would be
unjust to impose upon North Negros the
burden of maintaining a central.
DOCTRINE: The owner of the dominant
estate, in making on the servient estate
the necessary works for the use and
preservation of the easement, cannot
alter it, nor make it more burdensome;
but this does not mean that the
defendant cannot transport in the
wagons passing upon the railroad other
cane than that of the plaintiffs.
FACTS:
} November 17, 1916, several hacienda
owners of Manapla, Occidental
Negros, entered into a milling
contract with Miguel J. Osorio,
wherein Osorio agreed to install in
Manapla a sugar central of a
minimum capacity of 300 tons, for
grinding and milling all the sugar
cane to be grown by the hacienda
owners, who in turn bound
themselves to furnish the central
with all the cane they might produce
in their estates for thirty years from
the execution of the contract.
} Defendant North Negros Sugar Co.,
Inc., acquired the rights and interest
of Miguel J. Osorio in the milling
contract.
} January 29, 1919, Catalino
Valderrama, and on February 1,
1919, Emilio Rodriguez and Santos
Urra, Ignacio Benito Huarte, Adolfo
Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi made
with the appellant other milling
contracts identical with the first one
of November 17, 1916, with some
new conditions.
} In view of the fact that the hacienda
owners, who were up to that time
customers of the central, could not
furnish sufficient cane for milling, as
required by the capacity of said
central, the defendant made other
milling contracts with various
hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros, in order to obtain sufficient
cane to sustain the central; and this
gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their
complaint, alleging that the easement
of way, which each of them has
established in his respective
hacienda, was only for the
transportation through each
hacienda of the sugar cane of the
owner thereof, while the defendant
maintains that it had the right to
transport to its central upon the
railroad passing through the
haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only
the sugar cane harvested in said
haciendas, but also that of the
hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros.
} The plaintiffs, in separate complaints,
prayed the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros to pronounce
judgment, holding that the defendant
had no right, under the easement or
otherwise, to cause its locomotives
and wagons to run across the estates
of the plaintiffs for the purpose of
transporting sugar cane of any
agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros.
} Defendant, as a special defense,
alleged that the plaintiffs respectively
granted the defendant, for the period
of fifty years from the date of the
aforesaid contracts, an easement of
way 7 meters wide upon the lands of
the plaintiffs for the construction and
operation of a railroad for the
transportation of sugar cane; that
said easement of way was established
without any restriction whatsoever,
as regards the ownership of the cane
to be transported over the said
railroad; that said contract was then
in full force and effect and had never
been annulled or modified.
TRIAL COURT
} Defendant had no right to pass
through the lands of the plaintiffs
described in their amended
complaints for the transportation of
 sugar cane not grown from any of the
haciendas of the plaintiffs.
RULING: Judgment appealed from must
be reversed and the appellant absolved,
as it is hereby absolved, from the
complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Whether the use of the easement is
limited only to the transportation of cane
grown by plaintiffs in their respective
haciendas – NO.
} In the contract executed by the
plaintiff Valderrama with the
defendant on January 29, 1919, there
appears: "6th. That in order to have
the obligations herein entered into by
Mr. Valderrama duly registered, in
regard to the rural estates belonging
to him and which are described
hereinafter, an easement of way 7
meters wide and for the period of 50
years from the date hereof is hereby
created in favor of the 'North Negros
Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon his property
hereinafter described, at such place
as said corporation may see fit for the
construction of a railroad."
} In the contract of the plaintiff
Rodriguez of February 1, 1919, there
also appears: "6th. That in order to
have the obligations herein entered
into by Mr. Emilio Rodriguez duly
registered, in regard to the rural
estates belonging to him which are
hereinafter described, an easement of
way 7 meters wide and for the period
of 50 years from the date hereof is
hereby established by said Mr. Emilio
Rodriguez in favor of the 'North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon his
estate aforementioned, at such place
as said corporation may see fit for the
construction of a railroad."
} In the contract of Santos Urra and
others of February 1, 1919, there
likewise appears: "7th. That in order
to have the obligations herein
entered into by Santos Urra, Ignacio
Benito Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and
Pedro Auzmendi duly registered, in
regard to their estate hereinafter
described, an easement of way 7
meters wide and for the period of 50
years from the date hereof is hereby
established in favor of the 'North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon their
estate hereinafter described, at such
place as said corporation may see fit
for the construction of a railroad."
PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT # 1
} The aforesaid clause is ambiguous,
and under the first exception of Sec.
285 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
they have the right to introduce
extraneous evidence to explain the
true intent of the parties.
} It is ambiguous because it may be
applied to the transportation of the
cane of the plaintiffs or of other
producers, which is contrary to the
intent of the contracting parties.
COURT
} Said clause is clear enough in its
terms to express what the parties
have intended to agree upon. Had the
clause mentioned only an "easement
of way," there might be a doubt as to
whether or not the easement of way
is for pedestrians, horsemen or
carriages. But when the clause says:
"easement of way 7 meters wide for
the period of 50 years for the
construction of a railroad," there can
be no doubt about what the
contracting parties have agreed
upon: that the plaintiffs have created
 upon their respective haciendas at a
suitable place an easement of way 7
meters wide and for a period of fifty
years, in order to enable the
defendant to build and maintain a
railroad for the transportation of
sugar cane to the central.
} To limit the use of the road
exclusively to the cane of the
plaintiffs and within their respective
haciendas would make the contract
in question ineffective, except as to
the hacienda which is contiguous or
nearest to the central.
} The object of such a milling contract,
from which arises the easement in
question, is undoubtedly to obtain
mutual benefit to the producers of
sugar cane and the corporation
putting up the central. But the
contract could not produce any
benefit to the parties, if the
explanation given by the plaintiffs
would be admitted.
} It is against the nature of the
easement to pretend that it was
established in favor of the servient
estates, because it is a well-settled
rule that things serve their owner by
reason of ownership and not by
reason of easement.
} This is a case of an easement for the
benefit of a corporation, voluntarily
created by the plaintiffs upon their
respective estates for the
construction of a railroad connecting
said estates with the central of the
defendant. Once the road is
constructed, the easement is
apparent because it is continuously
exposed to view by the rails which
reveal the use and enjoyment of said
easement.
} The cane of the plaintiffs is to be
transported to the central by means
of wagons passing upon the railroad;
but as the easement was created for
the benefit of the corporation, owner
of the central, it may cause its wagons
to pass upon the road as many times
as it may deem fit, according to the
needs of the central. If the plaintiffs
do not produce sufficient cane to
cover the capacity of the central, it
would be unjust to impose upon the
defendant corporation the burden of
maintaining a central.
PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT # 2
} By transporting upon the road,
through the servient estates, the cane
of the planters of Cadiz, it would alter
the easement, making it more
burdensome.
COURT
} The owner of the dominant estate, in
making on the servient estate the
necessary works for the use and
preservation of the easement, cannot
alter it, nor make it more
burdensome; but this does not mean
that the defendant cannot transport
in the wagons passing upon the
railroad other cane than that of the
plaintiffs.
} What is prohibited is that the
defendant, in extending the road or in
repairing it, should occupy a greater
area of land of the servient estates, or
deposit excavations or building
materials outside of the area of 7
meters, because in the first case, the
easement will be altered, and in the
second it would become more
burdensome. But nothing of the kind
happens when the defendant
transports on the railroad, crossing
the servient estates, the cane of the
planters of Cadiz; the railroad
 continues to occupy the same area on
the servient estates, and the
incumbrance resulting from the
easement continues to be the same.
} At the time of the execution of the
milling contracts above referred to,
there was no intention on the part of
the contracting parties to limit the
use of the railroad to the
transportation of cane grown by the
plaintiffs in their respective
haciendas, and that is because, while
the duration of the milling contracts
is fixed at thirty years, that of the
easement is at fifty. So that if at the
end of thirty years the plaintiffs or
their successors should no longer
desire to furnish canes for milling in
the central of the defendant, the
latter shall still have the right to the
easement for the remaining period,
but without transporting on the
railroad any cane for the central.
NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. v. SERAFIN
HIDALGO
October 31, 1936 | Recto, J. | Legal
Easements
Digester: Batac, Jeffrey
SUMMARY: North Negros Sugar Co.
constructed a road within its property to
connect its mill site to the provincial
highway. It made the use of such road
available to the general public and the
motorists upon payment of a P0.15 toll
per automobile. In October 1933, it filed
for an injunction to prevent Serafin
Hidalgo, the owner of a tuba saloon
adjacent to NNSC's property, from using
its road. The Court held that NNSC
cannot enjoin Hidalgo from using said
road because: (a) NNSC merely
fabricated allegations against Hidalgo;
and that (b) the subject road was an
easement of way voluntarily constituted
in favor of a community. As such, NNSC
cannot discriminate against anyone so
long as anyone who wishes to use said
road pays the toll.
DOCTRINE: When private property is
devoted to public use in the business of
a public utility, certain reciprocal rights
and duties are raised by implication of
law between the utility and the public it
undertakes to serve, and no contract
between them is necessary to give rise
thereto.
FACTS:
} North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) was
the owner of a site in which was
located its sugar central, with its
factory building and residence for its
employees and laborers, known as
the "mill site." It also owned the
adjoining sugar plantation known as
Hacienda "Begoña." Across its
properties, NNSC constructed a road
connecting the "mill site" with the
provincial highway. Through this
road plaintiff allowed vehicles to pass
upon payment of a toll charge of
P0.15 for each truck or automobile.
Pedestrians were allowed free
passage through it.
} One of the users of said road was
Serafin Hidalgo, the owner of a
billiard hall and a tuba saloon located
at Hacienda Sañgay adjacent to
NNSC's mill site. Like other people in
and about the place, Hidalgo used to
pass through the said road because it
was his only means of access to
Hacienda Sañgay. Later on, by NNSC'
 order, every time that Hidago passed
by driving his automobile with a
cargo of tuba, NNSC's gatekeeper
would stop him and prevent him
from passing through said road. In
such cases, Hidalgo merely deviated
from said road and continued on his
way to Hacienda Sañgay across the
fields of Hacienda "Begoña," which
also belonged to NNSC.
} In October 1933, NNSC filed before
the CFI of Negros Occidental a
complaint praying that an injunction
be issued, restraining Serafin Hidalgo
from entering or passing through
NNSC's properties, specially through
the "mill site." NNSC alleged that
Hidalgo caused trouble among the
peaceful people of the place by
disturbing public order and
molesting NNSC's employees and
their families. The CFI ruled in favor
of NNSC and issued a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Hidalgo from
using said road.
} After the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, NNSC decided to amend
its complaint by dropping its
allegations against Hidalgo. It turned
out that NNSC merely fabricated the
allegations and failed to state that the
subject road was in fact open for the
public to use. The real damage which
NNSC sought to avoid, as it were, did
not consist in Hidalgo's taking tuba
with him while traversing the NNSC's
property, as there was no causal
relation between the act and any
resultant damage, but in the fact that
tuba was disposed of at the Hacienda
Sañgay to which NNSC's laborers had
access. As a result, said laborers
would ingest tuba, become drunk,
and occasionally fight against one
another, to the detriment of the peace
in NNSC's property and the sugar
production.
RULING: Writ of injunction against
Hidalgo denied.
Whether NNSC can enjoin Hidalgo from
using its road. – NO.
} NNSC's road is an easement of way
voluntarily constituted in favor of a
community. Art. 531 of the old Civil
Code read that "easements may also
be established for the benefit of one
or more persons or of a community
to whom the encumbered estate does
not belong," while Art. 594 of the old
Civil Code provided that, "The owner
of an estate may burden it with such
easements as he may deem fit, and in
such manner and form as he may
consider desirable, provided he does
not violate the law or public order."
} It is undisputed the road in question
was constructed by NNSC on its own
land, and that it connected the central
or the "mill site" with the provincial
road. NNSC also made this road
accessible to the general public,
regardless of class or group of
persons or entities. Its use has been
extended to employees and laborers
of NNSC, and so also to all those who
have a mind to pass through it, except
that, in cases of motor vehicles, a
passage fee of P0.15, each should be
paid.
} It has also been sufficiently proven in
court that NNSC's road was the only
road that can be used by those living
in Hacienda Sañgay because they
didn't have access to the provincial
road. Therefore, under Art. 564 of the
old Civil Code, there existed a forcible
right of way in favor of the owner and
occupants of Hacienda Sañgay.
 Property becomes clothed with a
public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public
consequence, and affect the
community at large.
} Therefore, as a private property
affected with a public interest, it is
unlawful to make arbitrary
exceptions with respect to its use and
enjoyment. The circumstance that
NNSC is not the holder of a franchise
or certificate of public convenience,
or that it is a company devoted
principally to the manufacturer of
sugar and not to the business of
public service or that the state has
not as yet assumed control or
jurisdiction over the operation of the
road in question by NNSC, does not
preclude the idea that the said road is
a public utility.
} All told, Hidalgo cannot be enjoined
from using said road for no valid
cause, especially since he complies
with the condition set by NNSC to pay
P0.15 as toll every time he uses said
road. He cannot be arbitrarily or
whimsically excluded from its use.
Whether NNSC was in good faith when it
filed for an injunction to prevent Hidalgo
from using its road. – NO.
} The existence of a right violated is a
prerequisite to the granting of an
injunction. The alleged conveyance of
tuba to NNSC's "mill site" or the sale
thereof within its property has not
been established by the evidence
adduced in this case. Neither is there
any evidence to show that Hidalgo
actually created disturbance in
NNSC's properties, including its "mill
site." In other words, there has been a
failure on NNSC's part to establish
either the existence of a clear and
positive right specially calling for
judicial protection through an
extraordinary writ of the kind
applied for, or that Hidalgo has
committed or attempts to commit
any act which has endanger or tends
to endanger the existence of said
right, or has injured or threatens to
injure the same.
} The legal rule is that what the law
does not authorize to be done
directly cannot be hone indirectly. If
NNSC cannot judicially enjoin Hidalgo
from selling tuba at Hacienda Sañgay,
neither can it obtain said injunction
to prevent him from passing over its
property to transport tuba to that
place as long as Hidalgo is ready to
pay the transit fees required by NNSC
and does not sell the said goods
inside the said property.
} NNSC's action is frivolous and
baseless. In petitioning the courts for
an injunction to avert "friction or ill-
feeling" against Hidalgo, NNSC is in
effect attempting to intrust to the
courts a mission at once beyond
those conferred upon them by the
Constitution and the laws, and
unbecoming of their dignity and
decorum.
} The well-known principle of equity
that "he who comes to equity must
come with clean hands" bars the
granting of the remedy applied for by
NNSC. To obtain a preliminary
injunction in this case, NNSC alleged
under oath in its original complaint
facts which it knew to be false, or, at
least, unprobable, because it did not
only eliminate them from the
amended complaint which it filed
after the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, but it failed to
substantiate them at the trial. From
 all this, it follows that NNSC, in order
to obtain a preliminary injunction,
trifled with the good faith of the
lower court by knowingly making
untrue allegations on matters
important and essential to its cause
of action. Consequently, it did not
come to court with clean hands.
NOTES:
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: J.
Laurel
} No servitude of way under the (old)
Civil Code has been created on the
tenement of the NNSC in favor of
Hidalgo. No legal servitude of way
exists in the present case. Hidalgo has
not shown that his right of passage
across the tenement of NNSC exists
by reason of necessity growing out of
the peculiar location of his property.
He does not even own the tenement
where he conducts his business.
} NNSC's construction of a road,
performed wholly upon its own
exclusive property, should not be
construed to constitute the creation
of a servitude. Servitus in faciendo
consistere nequit. "For a man should
not use that which belongs to him as
if it were a service only, but as his
own property."
} The mere opening of the private way
in question to the public did not
necessarily clothe it with a public
interest such as to compel the owner
thereof to allow everybody to pass
thereon. Even on the hypothesis that
such private way is affected with a
public interest, still, it is good law
that the owner thereof may make
reasonable restrictions and
limitations on the use thereof by the
general public.
} NNSC was denied the right as the
owner of the private way to impose a
reasonable limitation upon the use of
its property. Hidalgo in his store sells
and otherwise dispenses tuba which
intoxicates the laborers of NNSC,
incapacitates them for work, and
breaks their morale. The damage to
NNSC is positive and real. It is not
mere "bare possibility." Therefore,
NNSC may prohibit Hidalgo from
using its private property. Stated
otherwise, the use by Hidalgo of the
private way of NNSC may be
conditioned upon his not carrying
tuba.
} Nonetheless, J. Laurel still concurs
with the majority opinion that a writ
of injunction should not be issued in
favor of NNSC because: (a) the relief
sought for by NNSC is an "accion
negatoria," which has been repealed
by the (old) Civil Code; (b) the
granting/denial of an injunction is
not subject to appeal except where
there is a clear showing of abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge,
which abuse is absent in this case; (c)
the remedy sought here is not against
the transportation of tuba by Hidalgo
through the premises of NNSC, but
the entire exclusion therefrom of
Hidalgo regardless of whether he
carries tuba or not; and (d) issuing
the writ of injunction in favor of
NNSC will result in a discriminatory
and unjust condition where Hidalgo
shall become the sole person
excluded from the use of the subject
road while the general public will still
be able to use it.

DISSENTING: J. Villareal
} Writ of injunction should be issued in
favor of NNSC because as the owner
of the private road in question, NNSC
has a right to regulate its use by
imposing reasonable restrictions and
limitations. To prohibit its use by
Hidalgo who has repeatedly
disregarded the warning of NNSC's
auditor not to use the road when
delivering tuba, thus becoming a
persona non grata, is certainly not
unjust.
CASTRO v. MONSOD
February 2, 2011 | Nachura, J. | Legal
Easements in favor of adjacent
properties
Digester: Bathan, Lizzie
SUMMARY: This case is one for the
annotation of Monsod’s adverse claim
against Castro’s property. Castro started
excavations and diggings on the
embankment adjoining the two parties’
properties. Monsod sought to annotate
his claim to prevent Castro from
continuing such activities, since it could
cause the rear portion of his house to
collapse. The Court ruled in favor of
Monsod that a permanent injunction is
necessary in order to protect Monsod’s
interest. However, the annotation is not
necessary anymore since a judicial
recognition of the same already binds
the property and owner of the same.
DOCTRINE: An owner, by virtue of his
surface right, may make excavations on
his land, but his right is subject to the
limitation that he shall not deprive any
adjacent land or building of sufficient
lateral or subjacent support. Between
two adjacent landowners, each has an
absolute property right to have his land
laterally supported by the soil of his
neighbor, and if either, in excavating on
his own premises, he so disturbs the
lateral support of his neighbor’s land as
to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the
pressure of its own weight, to fall away
or slide from its position, the one so
excavating is liable
FACTS:
} Castro (petitioner) is a registered
owner of a parcel of land located on
Garnet St., Manuela Homes,
Pamplona, Las Piñas City covered by
a TCT with an area of 130 sqm.
Monsod (respondent) is the owner of
the property adjoining said lot,
located on Lyra St., Moonwalk Village,
Phase 2, Las Piñas City. There is a
concrete fence about 2m high,
dividing the two villages.
} Feb. 29, 2000 – Monsod caused the
annotation of an adverse claim
against 65sqm of Castro’s property.
The claim was filed without any claim
of ownership over the property.
Monsod was merely asserting the
existing legal easement of lateral and
subajacent support at the rear portion
of his estate to prevent the property
from collapsing, since his property
was at an elevated plateau, about 15 ft
above the level of Castro’s property.
Monsod also filed a complaint for
malicious mischief and malicious
destruction before the office of the
Brgy. Chairman for Castro’s alleged
attempt to destroy and/or remove
portions of the existing
 lateral/subjacent land and cement
supports adjoining the two
properties. In fact, a portion of the
easement was already
destroyed/removed, to the
continuing prejudice of Monsod.
} Castro filed a complaint for damages
with TRO/Writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Las
Piñas.
} Prior to the filing of the case, there
were deposits of soil and rocks about
2m away from the front door of the
house of Castro. Because of this,
Castro was not able to park her
vehicle at the dead-end portion of
Garnet St. When she noticed a leak,
she hired construction workers to see
where the leak was coming from.
They were already working when
police officers sent by Monsod
stopped them.
} ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER
(CASTRO): When she bought the
property from Manuela Homes in 94,
there was no annotation or existence
of any easement over the property.
Monsod neither asked permission
nor talked to her with regard to the
use of 65sqm of her property as
easement. She feared that she would
not be able to sell her property.
However, she admitted that her TCT
does not cover the open space at the
dead-end portion of Garnet Street.
} ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT: He
and his family had been residing in
Moonwalk Village since June 1984,
adjacent to Castro’s property. When
he bought it in 1983, the land
elevation of Moonwalk was almost on
the same level as Manuela Homes.
However, in 1985, Pilar Development
Corp. (PDC, developer of Manuela
Homes), bulldozed, excavated, and
transferred portions of the elevated
land to the lower portions of Manuela
Homes, making it lower than
Moonwalk Village. Before excavation,
Monsod complained to PDC and was
assured that an embankment, which
is more than 15 ft higher, will be
retained at the boundary of the two
villages as provided by the National
Building Code. Manuela Homes
retained the embankment consisting
of soil and rocks. Monsod had the
open space riprapped with stones as
reinforcement against any potential
soil erosion, earthquake, or possible
digging by any person. He asserted
that the affidavit of adverse claim
was for the annotation of the lateral
and subjacent easement of his
property over the property of Castro,
in view of her manifest determination
to remove the embankment left by
PDC.
} RULING OF THE RTC – Cancelled
Monsod’s adverese claim, Ordered
him to pay Castro P50k moral
damages, dismissed Castro’s claim for
actual damages, etc. Such claim was
non-registrable considering that the
basis of his claim was an easement
and not an interest adverse to the
registered owner, and neither did
Monsod contest Castro’s title.
Furthermore, the adverse claim failed
to comply with the requisites
provided under Sec. 70 of PD 1529
} RULING OF THE CA – reversed the
RTC and ordered the retention of the
annotation at the back of the TCT, not
as an adverse claim, but a recognition
of the existence of a legal easement of
subjacent and lateral support
constituted on the lengthwise or
horizontal land
support/embankment area of 65sqm
 of Castro’s property. While the
adverse claim could not be
sanctioned because it did not fall
under the requisites for registering
an adverse claim, the same might be
duly annotated in the title as
recognition of the existence of a legal
easement subjacent and lateral
support. The annotation prevents
Castro from making injurious
excavations on the subject
embankment as to deprive the
residential house and lot of Monsod
of its natural support and cause its
collapse. MR of Castro denied.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Decision dated May 25,
2007 and the Resolution dated July 14,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 83973 are hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that the
annotation at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-36071,
recognizing the existence of the legal
easement of subjacent and lateral
support constituted on the lengthwise or
horizontal land support/embankment
area of sixty-five (65) square meters,
more or less, of the property of
petitioner Margarita F. Castro, is hereby
ordered removed.
sO ORDERED.
Whether the easement of lateral and
subjacent support exists on the subject
adjacent properties. – Yes.
} The right of the owner provided in
Art. 437, NCC is not absolute and is
subject to the following limitations:
1) servitudes or easements, 2)
special laws, 3) ordinances, 4)
reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation, 5) rights of third persons.
} Monsod’s assertion that he has an
adverse claim over the 65 sqm is
misplaced since he does not have a
claim over the ownership of the land.
The annotation of an adverse claim
over registered land under Sec. 70 of
PD 1529 requires a claim on the title
of the disputed land. Annotation is
done to apprise third persons that
there is a controversy over the
ownership of the land to preserve
and protect the right of the adverse
claimant during the pendency of the
controversy.
} In reality, what Monsod is claiming is
a judicial recognition of the existence
of the easement of subjacent and
lateral support over the 65sqm
portion of Castro’s property covering
the land support/embankment area.
His reason is only to prevent her
from removing such embankment.
} An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different
owner.
} 2 kinds of easements: Either by law
or by will of the owners. The courts
cannot impose or constitute any
servitude where non existed. It can
only declare its existence. There are
therefore no judicial easements.
} Art. 684, NCC provides that no
proprietor shall make such
excavations upon his land as to
deprive any adjacent land or building
of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. An owner, by virtue of his
surface right, may make excavations
on his land, but his right is subject to
the limitation that he shall not
deprive any adjacent land or building
of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. Between two adjacent
 landowners, each has an absolute part or interest inregistered land
property right to have his land
adverse to the registered owner, arising
laterally supported by the soil of his
subsequent to the
neighbor, and if either, in excavating
date of the original registration, may, if
on his own premises, he so disturbs
no other provision is made in this
the lateral support of his neighbor’s
Decree for registering the same, make a
land as to cause it, or, in its natural
statement in writing setting forth fully
state, by the pressure of its own
his alleged right or interest, and how or
weight, to fall away or slide from its
under whom acquired, a reference to the
position, the one so excavating is
number of the certificate of title of the
liable.
registered owner, the name of the
} In the case at bar, an easement of
registered owner, and a description of
subjacent and lateral support exists
the land in which the right or interest is
in favor of Monsod. The embankment
claimed.
and the riprapped stones have been
The statement shall be signed and sworn
in existence even before Castro
to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
became the owner of the property. It
residence, and a place at which all
was proven that Castro’s diggings
notices may be served upon him. This
and excavations on the embankment
statement shall be entitled to
could cause the foundation of the
registration as an adverse claim on the
rear portion of Monsod’s house to
certificate of title. The adverse claim
collapse, resulting in the destruction
shall be effective for a period of thirty
of ahuge portion of his family
days from the date of registration. After
dwelling.
the lapse of said period, the annotation
} A permanent injunction on the part of
of adverse claim may be canceled upon
Castro from making injurious
filing of a verified petition therefor by
excavations is necessary in order to
the party in interest: Pro vided,
protect the interest of Monsod.
however, that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same
Whether the easement may be annotated
ground shall be registered by the same
at the back of the title of the servient
claimant.
estate – Not necessary
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid,
} The easement exists whether or not it
any party in interest may file a petition
is annotated or registered in the
in the Court of First Instance where the
registry of property. A judicial
land is situated for the cancellation of
recognition of the same already binds
the adverse claim, and the court shall
the property and the owner of the
grant a speedy hearing upon the
same, including her successors-in-
question of the validity of such adverse
interest.
claim, and shall render judgment as may
be just and equitable. If the adverse
NOTES:
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered
Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529:
canceled. If, in any case, the court, after
Adverse claim.—Whoever claims any
notice and hearing, shall find that the
adverse claim thus registered was
frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an
amount not less than one thousand
pesos nor more than five thousand
pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse
of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing
with the Register of Deeds a sworn
petition to that effect.