VOL.

37, JANUARY 30, 1971 195

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

24

ESTRELLA BENIPAYO RODRIGUEZ, MANUEL D.

BENIPAYO, DONATO BENIPAYO, JR., JAIME D.
BENIPAYO, MAXIMA BENIPAYO MORALES,AURORA
BENIPAYO DE LEON,FRANCISCO D.
BENIPAYO,ALEJANDRO D. BENIPAYO,TERESITA

196

196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

BENIPAYO DE LOS SANTOS,LYDIA BENIPAYO

CLEMENTE, and JULIA C. MERCADO, petitioners, vs.
HON.JUAN O. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Manila Court of First Instance, Branch XXI,
ALBERTO D. BENIPAYO,DR.JOSE N. DUALAN and
VICENTE SAYSON, JR., respondents.

Civil law; Mortgage; Caveat emptor; Mortgage is merely an

encumbrance on the property.—The maxim “caveat emptor”
applies only to execution sales, and this was not one such. The
mere fact that the purchaser of an immovable has notice that the
required realty is encumbered with a mortgage does not render
him liable for the payment of the debt guaranteed by the
mortgage, in the absence of stipulation or condition that he is
plain: the mortgage is merely an encumbrance on the property,
entitling the mortgagee to have the property foreclosed, i.e., sold,
in case the principal obligor does not pay the mortgage debt, and
apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of his credit.
Mortgage is merely an accessory undertaking for the convenience
and security of the mortgage creditor, and exists independently of
the obligation to pay the debt secured by it. The mortgagee, if he
is so minded, can waive the mortgage security and proceed to
collect the principal debt by personal action against the original
mortgagor.
Same; Obligations and contracts; Novation; Buyer cannot
obligate himself to replace the debtor in principal obligation nor do
so in law without creditor’s consent.—By buying the property
covered by TCT No. 48979 with notice that it was mortgaged,
respondent Dualan only undertook either to pay or else allow the
land’s being sold if the mortgage creditor could not or did not
obtain payment from the principal debt when the debt matured.
Nothing else. Certainly the buyer did not obligate himself to
replace the debtor in the principal obligation, and he could not do
so in law without the creditor’s consent. Article 1293 of the Civil
Code governs.
Same; Same; Same; Obligation to discharge the mortgage
indebtedness.—The obligation to discharge the mortgage
indebtedness remained on the shoulders of the original debtors
and their heirs since the record is devoid of any evidence of
contrary intent.
Same; Same; Liability of respondent to discharge mortgage by
paying or settling with the mortgage creditor when original
mortgagors fail to satisfy the debt.—Upon the other hand, the
orders complained of, in so far as they require the vendors-heirs
to clear the title to the land sold to respondent Dualan, when the
latter did it with full knowledge that the same was

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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

subject to a valid and subsisting mortgage, is plainly erroneous.

In submitting his bid, Dualan is presumed to know, and in fact
did know, that the property was subject to a mortgage lien that
such encumbrance would make him, as purchaser, eventually
liable to discharge mortgage by paying or settling with the
mortgage creditor, should the original mortgagors fail to satisfy
the debt. Normally, therefore, he would have taken this
eventuality into account in making his bid, and offer a lower
amount for the lot than if it were not encumbered. If he intended
his bid to be understood as conditioned upon the property being
conveyed to him free from encumbrance, it was his duty to have so
stated in his bid, or at least before depositing the purchase price.
He did not do so, and the bid must be understood and taken to
conform to the normal practice of the buyer’s taking the
mortgaged property subject to the mortgage. Consequently, he
may not demand that the vendors should discharge the
encumbrance aforesaid.
Same; No meeting of the minds on the bidding is belied by the
conduct.—The claim that there was no meeting of the minds is
not only inconsistent with petitioners’ own argument on the main
issue, but, is belied by their conduct. The fact is that an offer to
sell was advertised, a bidding was conducted, and the winning
bidder deposited the price. A rebidding would have been proper
had all the parties agreed to it, but did not. Instead, the
petitioners authorized their lawyer to negotiate for the
redemption of the property, thereby implying that they have
accepted the validity of the sale and that their questioning it row
is but an afterthought.
Same; Annulling of the sale for the participation of the
respondent’s counsel.—The third ground relied upon in the
petition for annuling the sale is the participation of Atty.
Ambrosio Padilla in the auction sale on behalf of respondent
Bualan while still the counsel of record for respondent Benipayo.
The ground lacks merit, for the reason that petitioners have not
shown that they were in any way prejudiced, and they had, by
their conduct, accepted the validity of the sale

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with

preliminary injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     De Santos & Delfino for petitioners.
          Padilla Law Offices for respondents Alberto D.
Benipayo and Dr. Jose N. Dualan.
          Ledesma, Guytingco, Mendoza & Associates for
respondent Vicente Sayson, Jr.

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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

REYES, J.B.L., J .:

Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance

1
of a
writ of preliminary injunction, filed by some of the
children of the deceased spouses, Donato Benipayo, Jr., and
Pura Disonglo, seeking to have this Court set aside the
order issued on 28 April 1964 by the Hon. Juan O. Reyes in
Civil Case No. 52188 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled “Estrella Benipayo-Rodriguez, et al. vs.
Alberto D. Benipayo,” approving the sheriff’s sales of
properties owned in common by the plaintiffs and
defendant aforesaid, subject to the condition that the
vendors should clear the titles thereof from any
encumbrance in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines. The petition further sought to compel the
respondent judge to cause a re-bidding of the properties
involved, at public auction, or to approve the sales
aforementioned without the condition imposed upon the
vendors.
Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00
this Court ordered the issuance
2
of a writ of preliminary
injunction on 25 June 1964.
It appears that on 13 November 1962, petitioners filed
with the respondent court a complaint against their
brother, respondent Alberto D. Benipayo, for the partition
of the properties held by them in common as heirs of the
late spouses, Donato D. Benipayo and Pura Disonglo (Civil
Case No. 52188). After respondent Benipayo had answered
the complaint, the court set the case for a pre-trial
conference, and in the course thereof the parties agreed to
have the properties in litigation sold at public auction to
the highest bidder. Pursuant to an order issued by the
respondent judge, the parties submitted to the court a list
of the properties to be sold, among which were some lots in
Albay, and the following parcels of land, with their
improvements, that were at the time mortgaged to the
Development Bank of the Philippines:

_______________

1 Some of the 11 petitioners denied having authorized the filing of the

petition. (Motion, dated 13 June 1964, Rollo, pages 162-169)
2 Rollo, page 192.

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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

“1. Lot No. 6-A. Block 2124, with an area of 314.70 square
meters, evidenced by TCT No. 48978, Manila;
2. Lot No. 6-B-2, Block No. 2124, with an area of 389.90
square meters, evidenced by TCT No. 48979, Manila;
3. The improvements erected on the above two lots
denominated as No. 664 Misericordia, Manila.

The above improvements and two lots are mortgaged with the
Development Bank of the Philippines with an outstanding
mortgage capital of about P50,000.00.”

The respondent judge first directed the sale at public

auction of properties located in Albay. After the
consummation of the sale and the approval thereof, His
Honor ordered the sale of the two Manila lots and
improvements described above. Pursuant to the order, the
sheriff of the City of Manila scheduled the auction sale on
30 March 1964 at 10:00 o’clock A.M. Notice thereof was
duly posted and published, with the following warning:

“NOTE: According to information furnished by the plaintiffs’

counsel, Atty. Gonzalo D. David, the real properties described
above are mortgaged with (sic) the Development Bank of the
Philippines, under which there is allegedly an outstanding
balance in the sum of P37,121.76.
“Prospective buyers and bidders are hereby enjoined to
investigate for themselves the titles to the real properties
described above, as well as the encumbrances thereon, if any
there be.”

On the date set for the sale, petitioners moved for its
postponement on the ground that they were not in a
position to actively participate therein, but upon objection
of respondent Benipayo’s counsel, His Honor denied the
motion and the sale was held as scheduled.
Herein respondent, Jose N. Dualan, successfully bid at
the auction sale the sum of P235,000.00 for Lot No. 6-B-2,
Block No. 2124, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
48979, issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Manila; while respondent Vicente Sayson’s bid of
P173,000.00 was the highest for Lot No. 6-A of Block No.
200

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

2124, covered by Transfer 3

Certificate of Title No. 48978
issued by the same office.
After the sheriff had filed his return with the respondent
judge, petitioners moved for the approval of the sale,
deducting from the total amount of P408,000.00 the sheriffs
percentage, and the expenses incurred by petitioners for
the publication of the notice of sale. Commenting on the
aforesaid motion, respondents Benipayo and Dualan
prayed that the respondent judge order (1) the payment of
the mortgage debt in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines in the amount of P37,121.96 from the proceeds
of the auction sale; (2) the issuance by the sheriff of Manila
of a certificate of sale in favor of Dualan of the property
sold to him free from all liens and encumbrances; and (3)
the payment to respondent Benipayo of 1/12 of the proceeds
of the sale after deducting therefrom the payment to the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
After hearing the arguments of the parties on the
motion, the respondent judge apparently entertained some
doubts as to whether there had been a meeting of minds on
the question of who was to discharge the mortgage
obligation in favor of the Development Bank, so he
suggested that the properties be subjected to another
“bidding” “with a clear-cut understanding that the 12 heirs
shall assume all obligations
4
and that they should not be
paid by the buyers.” The suggestion was not accepted by
the buyers; and the respondent judge, on 28 April 1964,
issued the order complained of, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Manila Sheriff’s Report dated March 30,

1964, and the Quezon City Sheriff’s Report dated April 6, 1964,
are hereby approved, subject to the following conditions:

1. That the vendors or the owners of the properties sold shall

clear said properties of all encumbrances that were
incurred by them long- before the auction sales;

_______________

3 Per Sheriff’s return on auction sale, Annex “P” to Petition, Rollo,

pages 65-68.
4 T.s.n., 18 April 1964, pages 29-31,

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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

2. That since the taxes on said real estates are not

encumbrances incurred by the owners of the properties,
but are proper charges attached and against the
properties themselves, the real estate taxes shall be borne
by the owner or owners of the said properties on the date
when said taxes become due for payment.”

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted

order having been denied, the present petition for certiorari
was filed by them.
 After the respondents had filed their answer to the
petition and the parties had submitted their respective
memorandum, the petitioners, jointly with respondents
Vicente Sayson and Alberto Benipayo, submitted a
compromise agreement, on 8 May 1970, cancelling the sale
to respondent Vicente Sayson of the property (TCT No.
48978) previously bidded for by him, upon the
consideration that the amount paid to the Sheriff by
Sayson be returned to the latter. As respondent Jose
Dualan interposed no objection to the approval of the said
compromise agreement, this Court rendered, on 30 June
1970, a partial decision, approving the compromise
agreement and ordering the compliance with its provisions
by the parties thereto, and, as prayed for, dismissed this
case as against Vicente Sayson, leaving only Jose N.
Dualan, purchaser of the property covered by TCT No.
48979 of the City of Manila, as party respondent.
The petitioners seek to apply the doctrine of caveat
emptor to the successful bidder Dualan, and contend that
under said rule Dualan bought at his own peril and, having
purchased the property with knowledge of the
incumbrance, he should assume payment of the
indebtedness secured thereby.
We find the stand of petitioners-appellants to be
unmeritorious and untenable. The maxim “caveat
emptor”applies
5
only to execution sales, and this was not
one such. The mere fact that the purchaser of an
immovable has notice that the required realty is
encumbered with a mort-

_______________

5 Albay vs. Benito, 43 Phil. 576; Laxamana vs. Carlos, 57 Phil 722.

202

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

gage does not render him liable for the payment of the debt
guaranteed by the mortgage, in the absence of stipulation
or condition that he is to assume payment of the mortgage
debt. The reason is plain: the mortgage is merely an
encumbrance on the property, entitling the mortgagee to
have the property foreclosed, i.e., sold, in case the principal
obligor does not pay the mortgage debt, and apply the
proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of his credit.
Mortgage is merely an accessory undertaking for the
convenience and security of the mortgage creditor, and
exists independently of the obligation to pay the debt
secured by it. The mortgagee, if he is so minded, can waive
the mortgage security and proceed to collect the principal
debt by personal action against the original mortgagor.
By buying the property covered by TCT No. 48979 with
notice that it was mortgaged, respondent Dualan only
undertook either to pay or else allow the land’s being sold if
the mortgage creditor could not or did not obtain 6 payment
from the principal debtor when the debt matured. Nothing
else. Certainly the buyer did not obligate himself to replace
the debtor in the principal obligation, and he could not do
so in law without the creditor’s consent. Our Civil Code,
Article 1293, explicitly provides:

“ART. 1293. Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor

in the place of the original one, may be made even without the
knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the
consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor him the rights
mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.”

The obligation to discharge the mortgage indebtedness,

therefore, remained on the shoulders of the original debtors
and their heirs, petitioners herein, since the record is
devoid of any evidence of contrary intent. This Court has so
ruled in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Concepcion é
Hijos, Inc., 53 Phil. 806, from which We quote:

“But the plaintiff argues that in American jurisprudence,

_______________

6 “ART. 2129. The creditor may claim from a third person in possession of the
mortgaged property, the payment of the part of the credit secured by the property
which said third person possesses, in the terms and with the formalities which the
law establishes.

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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

the purchaser of mortgaged property who assumes the payment of

the mortgage debt, may for that reason alone be sued for the debt
by the creditor and that that rule is applicable in this jurisdiction.
Aside from the fact we are not here dealing with a mere
assumption of the debt, but with a subrogation, it may be noted
that this court has already held that the American doctrine in this
respect is not in harmony with the spirit of our legislation and has
not been adopted in this country. In the case of E. C. McCullough
& Co. vs. Veloso and Serna (46 Phil., 1), the court, speaking
through its present Chief Justice, said:

‘The effects of a transfer of a mortgaged property to a third person are

7

well determined by the Civil Code. According to article 1879 of this Code,
the creditor may demand of the third person in possession of the property
mortgaged payment of such part of the debt, as is secured by the property
in his possession, in the manner and form established by the law. The
Mortgage Law in force at the promulgation of the Civil Code and referred
to in the latter, exacted, among other conditions, also the circumstance
that after judicial or notarial demand, the original debtor had failed to
make payment of the debt at maturity. (Art. 135 of the Mortgage Law of
the Philippines of 1889.) According to this, the obligation of the new
possessor to pay the debt originated only from the right of the creditor to
demand payment of him, it being necessary that a demand for payment
should have previously been made upon the debtor and the latter should
have failed to pay. And even if these requirements were complied with,
still the third possessor might abandon the property mortgaged, and in
that case it is considered to be in the possession of the debtor. (Art. 136 of
the same law.) This clearly shows that the spirit of the Civil Code is to let
the obligation of the debtor to pay the debt stand although the property
mortgaged to secure the payment of said debt may have been transferred
to a third person. While the Mortgage Law of 1893 eliminated these
provisions, it contained nothing indicating any change in the spirit of the
law in this respect. Article 129 of this law, which provides for the
substitution of the debtor by the third person in possession of the
property, for the purposes of the giving of notice, does not show this
change and has reference to a case where the action is directed only
against the property burdened with the mortgage. (Art. 168 of the
Regulation.)’”

_______________

7 Now Article 2129, New Civil Code.

204

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

Upon the other hand, the orders complained of, in so far as

they require the vendors-heirs to clear the title to the land
sold to respondent Dualan, when the latter bid for it with
full knowledge that the same was subject to a valid and
subsisting mortgage, is plainly erroneous. In submitting
his bid, Dualan is presumed to know, and in fact did know,
that the property was subject to a mortgage lien; that such
encumbrance would make him, as purchaser, eventually
liable to discharge mortgage by paying or settling with the
mortgage creditor, should the original mortgagors fail to
satisfy the debt. Normally, therefore, he would have taken
this eventuality into account in making his bid, and offer a
lower amount for the lot than if it were not encumbered. If
he intended his bid to be understood as conditioned upon
the property being conveyed to him free from encumbrance,
it was his duty to have so stated in his bid, or at least
before depositing the purchase price. He did not do so, and
the bid must be understood and taken to conform to the
normal practice of the buyer’s taking the mortgaged
property subject to the mortgage. Consequently, he may
not demand that the vendors should discharge the
encumbrance aforesaid.
Thus, the questioned order of the trial court ordering the
vendors-heirs to clear the property of all its encumbrances
is not in accordance with law.
The second and fourth grounds for the petition for
certiorari are that the minds of the parties allegedly never
met, so that the court should have ordered a re-bidding.
The claim that there was no meeting of the minds is not
only inconsistent with petitioners’ own argument on the
main issue, but is belied by their conduct. The fact is that
an offer to sell was advertised, a bidding was conducted,
and the winning bidder deposited the price. A rebidding
would have been proper had all the parties agreed to it, but
they did not. Instead, the petitioners authorized their
lawyer to negotiate for the redemption of the property,
thereby implying that they have accepted the validity of
the sale and that their questioning it now is but an
afterthought.
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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

The third ground relied upon in the petition for annulling

the sale is the participation of Atty. Ambrosio Padilla in
the auction sale on behalf of respondent Dualan while still
the counsel of record for respondent Benipayo. The ground
lacks merit, for the reason that petitioners have not shown
that they were in any way prejudiced, and they had, by
their conduct, accepted the validity of the sale.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petition for
certiorari is hereby granted and the orders complained of
are reversed and set aside in so far as they require
petitioners to clear the property sold from the mortgage in
favor of the Development Bank. The writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. No costs.

     Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee,

Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
     Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., did not take part.

Petition granted.

ANNOTATION
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP

1. Conjugal Property

A— Presumption
Tltat all properties acquired during marriage are conjugal
is merely a rebuttable presumption.—The legal
presumption that all properties acquired during the
marriage are conjugal is rebuttable. In the case at bar, the
property in question is paraphernal despite its having been
acquired during coverture as proven by the following
circumstances: the disputed land is in the name of the wife:
the property was of such substantial value as the husband
then by himself could not have afforded to buy the
purchase price was furnished by the wife’s mother; it was
established that it was a practice of the wife’s parents to so
provide their children with money to purchase real-
206

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

ties for themselves; and, the husband expressly

acknowledged in the deed of sale that he did not have any
interest in the property. Laperal, Jr. vs. Katigbak, 10
SCRA 493.
Rule under old Civil Code on property acquired during
marriage.—Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the law
applicable to the case at bar, the property acquired for
onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed
conjugal or separate property depending on the source of
the funds employed for its acquisition, irrespective of in
whose name the property was acquired. Castillo, Jr. vs.
Pasco, 11 SCRA 102.
 Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal property.—Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, 23 SCRA 637;
Bucay vs. Paulino, 23 SCRA 249; Pijuan vs. Vda. de Gurrea
18 SCRA 898.

B— Registration in Name of One Spouse

Friar land bought during marriage is conjugal property
registered in the name of widow.—The provision of the
Friar Lands Act to the effect that upon the death of the
husband the certificate of sale is transferred to the wife is
merely an administrative device designed to facilitate the
documentation of the transaction and the collection of
installments, and does not produce the effect of destroying
the character as conjugal property of the lands purchased
and converting them into paraphernal property. The case of
Arayata vs. Joya, 51 Phil. 654, is not applicable to the case
at bar because it refers to the superior rights of the widow
recognized in section 16 of Act No. 1120 over transfers
made by the husband which have not been approved by the
Director of Lands. Pugeda vs. Trias 5 SCRA 617.
When property in the name of one spouse is not presumed
to be conjugal.—The presumption that property is conjugal
refers to property acquired during the marriage. When
there is no showing as to when the property was acquired
by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse’s
207

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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

name is an indication that the property belongs exclusively

to said spouse. Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474.
Registration alone of the properties in the name of the
husband does not destroy the conjugal nature of the
properties.—Bucoy vs. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248.
Where the contention that the property in question was
conjugal was belied by the certificate of title.—Where the
certificate of title shows that the property is registered in
the name of Antonio Banzon only and there is no evidence
that would show that said property was acquired during
his marriage with his present wife, the contention that the
same property was conjugal cannot be sustained.
Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Banzon, 26
SCRA 268.

C— Construction on Separate Property of Spouse

House constructed on separate lot of a spouse does not
automatically become conjugal.—The construction of a
house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of a
spouse does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true
that, in the meantime, the conjugal partnership may use
both the land and building, but it does so not as owner but
as usufructuary. The ownership of the land remains the
same until the value thereof is paid. This payment can only
be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership.
Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474.

D— Installments on Property Bought by Spouse before

Marriage, Etc.
When obligations contracted by one spouse before marriage
are chargeable against conjugal assets.—As a general rule,
debts contracted by the husband and wife before the
marriage, as well as fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal
partnership. However, such obligations may be enforced
against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 of the New Civil Code have
already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive
property or the same is insufficient. Lacson vs. Diaz, 14
SCRA 183.
208

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

2.. Obligation of Spouses

Burden of proof is on creditor to show requisities for
applicability of exception are obtaining.—Considering that
the enforceability of the personal obligation of the husband
and wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception
to the general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who
invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the
requisites for its applicability are obtaining. Lacson vs.
Diaz, 14 SCRA 183.
Necessity of liquidating conjugal partnership before sale
of personal estate.—The sale of the alleged personal estate
of the deceased husband cannot be authorized where his
widow claims that some of the items thereof are conjugal or
are her own personal property. The conjugal partnership
must first be liquidated and the issue of ownership
adjudicated. Anderson vs. Perkins, 1 SCRA 387.
3. Separation of Properties
With judicial approval, a conjugal partnership may be
dissolved upon agreement of the spouses, under Article 191
of the Civil Code.—In re Voluntary Dissolution of the
Conjugal Partnership of Jose Bermas, Sr. and Pilar Manuel
Bermas, 14 SCRA 327.
In a proceeding for dissolution of a conjugal partnership
under Article 191 of the Civil Code, it is essential that
children of previous marriages be personally notified of said
proceeding.—Id.
When separation of property of spouses and dissolution of
conjugal partnership are permissible.—The law allows
separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership through compromise agreement
of such spouses, provided judicial sanction is secured
beforehand. Thus, the new Civil Code provides: “In the
absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a
judicial order” (Art. 190). Article 191, paragraph 4, of
209

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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

the same Code likewise provides that: “The husband and

the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. x x x.” Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson, 24 SCRA 837.
Approval of regime of separation of property and the
dissolution of conjugal partnership does not legalize a de
facto separation of the spouses.—In so approving the regime
of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership, the Supreme Court does not
thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto
separation of the spouses, which—in the language of
Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54. 60—is a “state
which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all
concerned.” We would like to douse the momentary
seething emotions of couples who, at the slightest ruffling
of domestic tranquility—brought about by “mere austerity
of temper, petulance of manner, rudeness of language, a
want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion” without more—would be minded to
separate from each other. In this jurisdiction, the husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support
(Art. 109, new Civil Code). There is, therefore, virtue in
making it as difficult as possible for married couples—
impelled by no better cause than their whims and caprices
—to abandon each other’s company. Id.

4. Management of Conjugal Partnership

Sale of conjugal realty by husband.—A conveyance of
conjugal real property made by the husband without the
wife’s consent is merely voidable. Article 173 of the New
Civil Code gives the wife ten years within which to bring
an action for its annulment. Reyes vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA
369.
Ratification by wife.—A pacto de retro sale of conjugal
real property, effected by the husband without the wife’s
consent, was considered ratified by her when she gave her
conformity to the extension of the period of redemption by
signing the annotation on the margin of the deed. Id.
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210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

Contract entered into by husband without consent of wife is

null and void in toto.—The contract, in its entirety,
executed by the husband without wife’s consent, may be
annulled by the wife. Bucoy vs. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248;
Villocino vs. Doyon, 18 SCRA 1094.
Reasons.—The reasons for the rule are that (1) the
conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while
the conjugal partnership exists; (2) the conjugal property is
even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the
responsibilities in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been
covered if it turns out that the spouse who is bound
thereby, “should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient; and that (3) lack of consent of an
indispensable party to the contract under Article 166 is a
ground for nullity. Bucoy vs. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248.
The husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership.—The husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. This is a right clearly granted to him
by law (Article 165, Civil Code). More, the husband is the
sole administrator. The wife is not entitled—as of right—to
join administration (De la Rosa vs. Barruga [unreported],
L-2368, June 30, 1950). The husband may even enforce the
right of possession against the wife who has taken over the
administration without his consent. And, the wife may be
punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the
conjugal assets (Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 211). She
may be required to render full and complete accounting of
such properties (Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.
271, 281). Ysasi vs. Fernandez, 23 SCRA 1079.
When wife may ask the court to remove administration of
the conjugal properties from the husband.—Of course, it is
the wife’s prerogative to ask the courts to remove
administration of the conjugal properties from the husband
for her protection. This, Article 167 of the Civil Code
concedes, thus: “Article 167. In case of abuse of
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Rodriguez vs. Reyes

powers of administration of the conjugal partnership

property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife,
may provide for a receivership, or administration by the
wife, or separation of property.” Id.
Where the debt contracted by a wife is considered a debt
of the conjugal partnership.—From the testimony of
appellee Jose Garcia in the present case, it seems clear that
he was aware that his wife was in the habit of incurring
obligations without his consent. He also knew the remedy
to prevent his wife from entering into valid contracts which
would bind him to pay his wife’s creditors for as he himself
stated he has been given legal advice by a lawyer whom he
consulted. In spite of all these, however, he did not take
any step to place his wife under guardianship. This, to say
the least, would constitute negligence on his part for which
he should be held liable if his wife enters into contract with
unsuspecting victims. On this basis, the Court of Appeals
held petitioner responsible only for the amount of P2,-000,
but not for the other P2,000.00, because the evidence did
not show delivery of the latter sum to the husband. It is
well to note, however, that the award should be understood
as a debt of the conjugal partnership of the defendant
spouses, support of the family being one of the obligations
of the community (Art. 161, par. No. 5, Civil Code) and the
separation de facto of the consorts being without effect
upon the partnership (Art. 178, Civil Code). Garcia vs.
Cruz, 25 SCRA 224.

5. Paraphernal Property
Property acquired partly with paraphernal and partly with
conjugal funds.—Property acquired during the effectivity of
the Old Civil Code partly with paraphernal funds of the
wife and partly with conjugal funds is held to belong to
both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the
contributions of each of the total purchase price. Castillo,
Jr. vs. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102.
Money raised by loans guaranteed by mortgage on
paraphernal property.—Money obtained during coverture
by loans to the husband or to both spouses, even if
guaranteed

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212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rodriguez vs. Reyes

by mortgage on the paraphernal property of the wife, was

considered, under the old law, conjugal property repayable
at maturity with conjugal partnership funds. Id.
Payment by widow of loan secured by paraphernal
property does not increase her share.—The payment by the
widow, after her husband’s death, with her private funds of
a loan to the conjugal partnership secured by her
paraphernal property, the proceeds of which were used to
acquire property during coverture under the old Civil Code,
does not result in increasing her share in said property but
only in creating a lien in her favor over the undivided share
of the conjugal partnership in the property so acquired for
the repayment of the amount she had advanced. Id.

6. Liquidation of Partnership
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of
the industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
and private debts.—Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, 23 SCRA 637.
Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon spouses
may be charged against the partnership assets even before
the liquidation of the partnership.—People vs. Lagrimas, 29
SCRA 153.
The reason for Article 163 of the Civil Code is in accord
with the principle that every person criminally liable for
felony is also civilly liable.—Id.

7. Miscellaneous
Conjugal property acquired before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code may be alienated by the husband without wife’s
 consent.—Where the property was acquired prior to the
effectivity of the New Civil Code, the wife cannot object to
the disposal thereof by the husband, or the attachment on
execution of the property in payment of a debt contracted
by the husband. De Comilang vs. Delenela, 10 SCRA 598.—
ATTY. PLARIDEL C. JOSE
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Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration

Notes.—Acts constituting estoppel, or waiver of right, to

question validity of auction or sheriffs sale.—(1) Repeated
requests for time to redeem (Tiaoqui vs. Chaves, citing the
following quotation from 59 C.J.S. 1372: “By claiming a
right to redeem, or availing himself of a statutory stay, or
by seeking to impress a trust on the property in the hands
of the purchaser, one affirms the validity of the sale and
may not assail); (2) proposing to repurchase (Tolentino vs.
Philippine Land Improvement Co., Inc., L-2469, Sept. 30,
1950 [unrep.]); (3) seeking to enforce in court one’s right of
redemption (Philippine National Bank vs. Mallorca, L-
22538, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 694); (4) attempts to redeem
the property for a certain amount but which was rejected
(Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, L-
24571, Dec. 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289).

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