Legal Logic

Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University
Mid La Union Campus

College of Law
San Fernando City, La Union
Reading Assignment No. 3
Legal Logic
Eymard Moises M. Estalilla

CY 2015 - 2016
People v Del Monte | P a g e | 1
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

NORBERTO DEL MONTE Y GAPAY @ OBET, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with modification
the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant
Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of violation of Section 5,[3] Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."
On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of

Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of
the information reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and
legal justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug
consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram.[4]
The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.
When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de

oficio, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.[5] On 17 February 2003, the pre-
trial conference was concluded.[6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M.

Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted
against appellant, and a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
assigned with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional
Office 3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed at the Field Office,
Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a

confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay

Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling
shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation
against appellant was conducted. The team was composed of SPO2
Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the
poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio Barreras as back-up operative. After the
briefing, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to
Poblacion Dike for the execution of the buy-bust operation.
When the team arrived at appellant's place, they saw the appellant
standing alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino
approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to
appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave
appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100 bills.[7] The bills were
marked with "GT JR," PO1 Tolentino's initials. Upon receiving the P300.00,
appellant took out a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to
PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette
signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived,
arrested appellant and recovered from the latter the marked money.
The white crystalline substance[8] in the plastic sachet which was sold to
PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3,
Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of
the any dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was
signed by SPO2 Maung.[9] Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002,[10] the
substance bought from appellant was positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who
examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both
prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on
the fact that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their
office for laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was
indeed conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[11]
For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his
common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.
From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this:
On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister's house in

Poblacion Dike when a commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro
Lim, was shouting because the latter, together with appellant's common-
law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was being punched and kicked by
several police officers. When appellant tried to pacify the policemen and
ask them why they were beating up his common-law wife and other
relatives, the policemen arrested him, mauled him, punched him on the
chest, slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained swollen
face, lips and tooth. His common-law wife was likewise hit on the chest
with the palo-palo.
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house
located in the middle of a field where the former demanded P15,000.00 for
their liberty. The next day, appellant was brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police
officers who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she
and appellant could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her
child and cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but
appellant was detained. She does not know why the police officers filed this
case against appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money
from them.
Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia

Mendoza.
On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced
him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused
Norberto del Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00.
With cost.
The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of
the government. The Branch of this Court is directed to turn over the same
to the Dangerous Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof for
proper disposal thereof.[12]
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr.
to be credible and straightforward. It established the fact that appellant
was caught selling shabu during an entrapment operation conducted on 10
December 2002. Appellant was identified as the person from whom PO1
Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of shabu as confirmed by Chemistry
Report No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial court was not
convinced by appellant's defense of frame-up and denial. Appellant failed
to substantiate his claims that he was merely sleeping and was awakened
by the screams of his relatives who were being mauled by the police
officers.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004.[13] With the filing

thereof, the trial court directed the immediate transmittal of the entire
records of the case to us.[14] However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo,[15] the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.[16]
On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but
reduced the fine imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed of the
case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision dated March 8,
2004 of the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-
M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No.
9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine imposed upon
him is reduced from P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.[17]
A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of
Appeals forwarded the records of the case to us for further review.[18]
In our Resolution[19] dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within
30 days from notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to file a
supplemental brief on the ground they had exhaustively argued all the
relevant issues in their respective briefs and the filing of a supplemental
brief would only contain a repetition of the arguments already discussed
therein.
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF
THE ARRESTING OFFICERS TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A.
9165.[20]
Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen's failure to strictly
comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures
of him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken
immediately upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone
prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio
Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of the drug allegedly
seized and confiscated, did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in
his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to
abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of
the evidence adduced against him.
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers'
alleged non-compliance with Section 21[21] of Republic Act No. 9165 for the
first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to
do so. In People v. Sta. Maria[22] in which the very same issue was raised,
we ruled:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However,
whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the
buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain
unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of
the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations
of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before
the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In
no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there
were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
In People v. Pringas,[23] we explained that non-compliance with Section 21
will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In the case at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and
disposition of the drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that
the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which
examination gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
drug seized from appellant not to have been compromised.
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,

particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in
evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule
which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence
must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it
by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which
has been altered and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His
failure to do so shall make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is
clearly provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will
bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs
due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The
issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be
given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence
depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[24] What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[25]
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution
clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the
shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur
buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per
Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson
Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by
PO1 Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined
and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together
with the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more than sufficient to prove
the crime charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold
and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the
assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental
rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which
involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial.[26]
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.[27] Finding no compelling reason to
depart from the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we
affirm their findings.
Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was

framed, the evidence against him being "planted," and that the police
officers were exacting P15,000.00 from him.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the
subject of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto,
his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial of
the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing
evidence, must simply fail.[28] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with
caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in
prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29] For this claim to
prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their
duties in a regular and proper manner.[30] This, appellant failed to do. The
presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present

clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly
perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his

nephew, Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway. We find both
witnesses not to be credible. Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be
given credence without clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as
well as that of appellant, that they were maltreated and suffered injuries
remain unsubstantiated. As found by the trial court:
The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself from
liability raised the defense of frame-up. He alleged that at the time of the
alleged buy bust he was merely sleeping at the house of his sister. That he
was awakened by the yells and screams of his relatives as they were being
mauled by the police officers. However, this Court is not
convinced. Accused failed to substantiate these claims of maltreatment
even in the face of his wife's and nephew's testimony. No evidence was
presented to prove the same other than their self-serving claims.[31]
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what time
the arresting policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained:
To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 10, 2002 when he was roused from his sleep by the policemen
who barged into the house of his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His
common-law wife, however, testified that it was 10-11 o'clock in the
morning when the policemen came to the house (TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p.
6). On the other hand, Alejandro Lim testified that he went to sleep at 11
o'clock in the morning and it was 10 o'clock in the morning when the
policemen arrived (TSN, Feb.2, 2004, p. 6). He thus tried to depict an
absurd situation that the policemen arrived first before he went to sleep
with appellant.[32]
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting
the illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellant's
conviction.
The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act

No. 9165. Said section reads:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity
and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1

Tolentino, and there being no modifying circumstance alleged in the
information, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2)[33]
of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the
fine at P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00.
Both amounts are within the range provided for by law but the amount
imposed by the Court of Appeals, considering the quantity of the drugs
involved, is more appropriate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28
May 2007, sustaining the conviction of appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a.
Obet, for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes,

JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate
Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring. Rollo, pp.
93-105.
[2]
Records, pp. 112-116.
[3]
Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transporation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals.
[4]
Records, p. 2.
[5]
Id. at 11.
[6]
Id. at 17.
[7]
Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2; records, p. 62.
[8]
Exh. B; id. at 61.
[9]
Exh. A; id. at 60.
[10]
Exh. C; id. at 61.
[11]
TSN, 16 June 2003, p. 10.
[12]
Records, p. 116.
[13]
Id. at 119.
[14]
Id. at 121.
[15]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[16]
Rollo, p. 62.
[17]
Id. at 104.
[18]
Id. at 111.
[19]
Id. at 19.
[20]
Id. at 73-74.
[21]
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs,
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
[22]
G.R. No. 171019, 23 February 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633-634.
[23]
G.R. No. 175928, 31 August 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 842-843.
[24]
People v. Adam, 459 Phil. 676, 684 (2003).
[25]
People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 187,
198.
[26]
People v. Julian-Fernandez, 423 Phil. 895, 910 (2001).
[27]
People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA
537, 547.
[28]
People v. Sy, G.R. No. 171397, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 772,
783.
[29]
People v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 146805, 16 January 2003, 395 SCRA 317,
323.
[30]
People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 138 (2000).
[31]
Rollo, p. 57.
[32]
Id. at 81-82.
[33]
ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
xxxx
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two

indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:
xxxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
People v Salvador | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190621 February 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GLENN SALVADOR y BAL VERDE, and DORY ANN PARCON y DEL
ROSARIO, Accused,
GLENN SALVADOR y BALVERDE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to

photograph the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest
illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have been
preserved.1
Factual Antecedents
For review is the Decision2 dated September 24, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03230 that affirmed in toto the
January 15, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-03-120799-800. The said RTC
Decision found. Glenn Salvador y Balverde (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (illegal sale), and accused Dory
Ann Parcon y Del Rosario (Parcon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 11 (illegal possession), both of Article II, Republic Act
No. 9165 (RA9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The Information4 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 filed against

appellant in Criminal Case No. Q-03-120799 has the following accusatory
portion:
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there,
willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as
broker in the said transaction, one (1) plastic sachet of white crystalline
substance containing zero point zero four (0.04) gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
While the pertinent portion of the Information6 for violation of Section 11 of

Article II, RA 9165 filed against Parcon in Criminal Case No. Q-03-120800
is as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to possess or
use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his/her possession and control one (1) plastic sachet of
white crystalline substance containing zero point zero four (0.04) gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon motion of the prosecution,8 the cases were consolidated. On

November 4, 2003, appellant and Parcon were arraigned. They entered
separate pleas of ‘not guilty’.9
During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted the following facts which
the prosecution offered for stipulation:
x x x [T]hat [Police Inspector Leonard T. Arban (P/Insp. Arban)] is a

Forensic Chemist of the PNP; that he received a letter-request for
Laboratory Examination for certain specimen which was marked as Exhibit
"A"; that together with the said request is a brown envelope marked as
Exhibit "B"; that said brown envelope contained a plastic sachet marked as
Exhibit "B-1" and thereafter he conducted the examination of the said
specimen and submitted a report marked as Exhibit "C"; the findings
thereon that the specimen was positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit "C-1" and the signature of the said
police officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2". Thereafter, said police officer
turned over the said evidence to the Evidence Custodian and retrieved the
same for purposes of the hearing today.10
Trial ensued. Parcon failed to attend the scheduled hearings, hence, she
was tried in absentia.11
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano) to testify on

the entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of appellant and
Parcon. From his testimony,12 the following facts emerged:
While PO2 Soriano was on duty in Police Station 2, Baler Street, Quezon
City on September 2, 2003, a confidential informant (CI) arrived at around
9:00 a.m. and reported that a certain alias Bumski was engaged in the illicit
sale of dangerous drugs in Barangay Pag-asa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano
immediately relayed this information to Police Chief Inspector Joseph De
Vera (P/C Insp. De Vera). A surveillance operation conducted the same
day on alias Bumski, who turned out to be the appellant, confirmed the
report. Thus, a police team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation.
PO2 Soriano was designated as poseur-buyer while PO2 Richard Vecida,
PO1 Alexander Pancho, PO1 Alvin Pineda (PO1 Pineda) and P/C Insp. De
Vera would serve as his backup.
At around 2:45 p.m. of September 3, 2003, the team arrived at Road 10,
Barangay Pag-asa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano and the CI proceeded to
appellant’s house while the rest of the buy-bust team positioned
themselves within viewing distance. The CI introduced PO2 Soriano to
appellant as a drug dependent who wanted to purchase P200.00 worth of
shabu. During their conversation, Parcon arrived and asked appellant for
shabu. Appellant gave her a small heat-sealed plastic sachet that she
placed in her coin purse. Thereafter, PO2 Soriano handed to appellant the
buy-bust money consisting of two 100-peso bills and the latter, in turn, gave
him a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
PO2 Soriano then immediately arrested appellant and recovered from his
right hand pocket the buy bust money. At this juncture, PO2 Soriano’s
teammates rushed to the scene. PO1 Pineda arrested Parcon and
recovered from her a plastic sachet also containing white crystalline
substance.
Appellant and Parcon were then taken to the Baler Police Station. The
items recovered during the buy-bust operation were marked by PO2
Soriano as "SJ-03" and "AP-03" and turned over to the designated
investigator, PO1 Vicente Calatay (PO1 Calatay). PO1 Calatay then
prepared a letter-request for laboratory examination, which, together with
the confiscated specimen, was brought by PO2 Soriano to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
The prosecution intended to present PO1 Calatay and PO1 Pineda as

witnesses, but their testimonies were likewise dispensed with after the
defense agreed to stipulate on the following facts:
PO1 Calatay
[T]hat he was the police investigator assigned to investigate these cases;

that in connection with the investigation that he conducted, he took the
Joint Affidavit of Arrest of PO2 Richard Vecida, PO2 Sofjan Soriano, PO1
Alvin Pineda, and PO1Alexander Pancho marked as Exhibits "F" and "F-1";
that the specimen[s] consisting of two (2) plastic sachets marked as
Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" were turned over to him by the arresting officers;
that in connection therewith, he prepared the request for laboratory
examination marked as Exhibit "A" and received a copy of the Chemistry
Report, the original of which was earlier marked as Exhibit "C"; that the
buy-bust money consisting of two (2) pieces of Php100.00 bill marked as
Exhibits "D" and "E" were likewise turned over to him by the arresting
officer; that he thereafter prepared a letter referral to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City marked as Exhibits "G" and "G-1".13
PO1 Pineda
[T]hat he was part of the buy-bust team which conducted a buy[-]bust

operation on September 3, 2003 at about 2:45 a.m. at Road 10, Pag-asa,
Quezon City; that he acted as back-up to PO2 Sofjan Soriano, the poseur
buyer in the said operation; that he was with PO2 [Richard] Vecida and
PO1 Alexander Pancho during said operation; that after the consummation
of the transaction between PO2 Sofjan Soriano and Glenn Salvador, he
assisted in the arrest of accused Doryann Parcon; that upon [body] search
of accused Parcon, he recovered from the latter a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance; that said plastic sachet was marked as Exhibit
"B-2".14
Version of the Defense
In his testimony,15 appellant claimed that at about 11:00 p.m. of September

2, 2003, he was parking his tricycle outside his residence at 135 Road 10,
Brgy. Pag-asa, Quezon City when a patrol car suddenly stopped in front of
his house. Three policemen alighted, aimed their guns at him, and forced
him to board their vehicle. Already inside were two men in handcuffs sitting
on the floor. The police car then proceeded to Police Station 2 in Baler,
Quezon City, where he and the two other men were taken to a room and
frisked by policemen who demanded P20,000.00 from each of them. They
were told to call their relatives to inform them of their arrest for engaging in
a pot session. When appellant refused to oblige, PO2 Soriano said to him:
"matigas ka, hindi ka marunong makisama dapat sayo ikulong." He was
thereafter detained and no longer saw the two men he mentioned. Two
days later, he was presented to the Prosecutor’s Office for inquest.
Appellant accused the police officers of falsehood but could not file a case
against them since his parents were in the Unites States of America and he
did not know anyone else who could help him. He denied knowing Parcon
and the arresting officers and claimed that he saw Parcon for the first time
during the inquest and the arresting officers when they arrested him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant and Parcon for the crimes
charged. It did not find impressive appellant’s claim of extortion by the
police officers and instead upheld the buy-bust operation which it found to
have been carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards. It ruled that absent proof of evil motive on the part of the
police, the presumption of regularity which runs in their favor stands. Thus,
the dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused GLENN SALVADOR y BALVERDE guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 charged in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-120799. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount
of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) PESOS.
On the other hand, judgment is likewise rendered in Criminal Case No. Q-

03-120800 finding accused DORY ANN PARCON y DEL ROSARIO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 11, Article II of the same

Act. Accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
MINIMUM to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as MAXIMUM and to pay a fine in
the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.17 In his Brief,18 he imputed to the RTC

the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING

THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS
UNDER R.A. No. 9165.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL

WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION’S
EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
APPREHENDING TEAM TO PROVE ITS INTEGRITY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ONLY ON PO2 SOFJAN
SORIANO’S TESTIMONY.19
Aside from the prosecution’s failure to prove the elements constituting the
crime of illegal sale of shabu, appellant asserted that the apprehending
officers failed to immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items and photograph the same as mandated by Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules of RA 9165; that the chain of custody was broken
since PO2 Soriano could not determine with certainty whether the plastic
sachet allegedly seized from him was the same specimen subjected to
laboratory examination; that the prosecution was unable to substantiate its
claim that the two 100-peso bills were the same money used in purchasing
shabu since the said bills were neither dusted with fluorescent powder nor
was he subjected to fingerprint examination; that the failure to coordinate
the buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) was prejudicial to his substantive right; and, that PO2 Soriano and
the buy-bust team did not accord him due process by failing to apprise him
of his rights after he was arrested.
The People of the Philippines, on the other hand, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) asserted in its Brief20 that the Decision of the RTC
must be affirmed since the guilt of appellant was established beyond
reasonable doubt; that the prosecution proved all the elements of the illegal
sale of drugs; that the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation and their positive identification of appellant as the seller
of the shabu prevail over the latter’s denial; that the chain of custody of the
illegal drug seized from appellant was sufficiently established; that the
failure to use fluorescent powder in the marked money does not result in a
failure of the buy-bust operation since the same is not a prerequisite to
such operation; that the failure of the law enforcers to conduct a physical
inventory or to photograph the seized items in accordance with Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 is not fatal; that the failure of the buy-bust team to
coordinate with the PDEA does not invalidate appellant’s arrest; that PO2
Soriano’s failure to recall the markings on the specimen shows that he was
not coached as a witness; that appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up
are unconvincing; and that the failure to apprise appellant of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is not fatal since such rights
apply only against extrajudicial confessions.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. Anent the defects
in the chain of custody alleged by appellant, the said court ruled that the
evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs sold by
appellant to PO2 Soriano was taken to the police station and marked
therein and then forwarded to the crime laboratory where it was found
positive for shabu; the marked money used in the buy-bust operation was
the same money introduced in evidence; and that the failure of the
arresting team to faithfully observe the requirements of conducting physical
inventory and coordinating the buy-bust operation with PDEA are not fatal
since the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were
preserved. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant

appeal is perforce dismissed. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated
January 15, 2008 insofar as the accused-appellant Glenn Salvador Y
Balverde is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.22
On February 8, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental

briefs.23 The OSG opted to adopt the brief it submitted before the CA as its
appeal brief while appellant filed a Supplemental Brief 24 which, however,
contains practically the same arguments he advanced before the CA.
Again, aside from questioning the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
against him, appellant questions the arresting officers’ alleged failure to
comply with the chain of custody rule.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.

All the elements for the prosecution of
illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently
established in this case.
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu,

the following elements must be established: "(1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti"25 or the illicit drug in evidence. "[T]he commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs x x x merely requires the consummation of
the selling transaction, which happens the moment the exchange of money
and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place."26
In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the elements of

illegal sale of shabu. The testimony of PO2 Soriano reveals that an
entrapment operation was organized and conducted after they confirmed
through a surveillance operation the information that appellant is engaged
in drug peddling activities. Designated as a poseur-buyer, PO2 Soriano,
together with the CI, approached appellant outside his residence. After
having been introduced by the CI to appellant as a drug user, PO2 Soriano
asked appellant if he could purchase P200.00 worth of shabu. PO2 Soriano
handed to appellant the marked money consisting of two P100 bills and the
latter, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. PO2 Soriano then
arrested appellant and recovered the buy-bust money from the latter.
Immediately thereafter his back-up who were monitoring the transaction
from viewing distance arrived. Forensic examination subsequently
confirmed that the contents of the sachets bought from appellant and
recovered from Parcon were indeed shabu.
Prosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Their narration of the
incident, "buttressed by the presumption that they have regularly performed
their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be
given weight."27 Here, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that the testimonies
and facts stipulated upon were consistent with each other as well as with
the physical evidence. Thus, there is no justification to disturb the findings
of the RTC, as sustained by the CA, on the matter.
The defenses of denial and frame-up

are unavailing.
The Court cannot convince itself to reverse the finding of facts of the lower
courts on the basis of appellant’s self-serving allegations of denial and
extortion/frame-up.
Denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of a prosecution

witness. "A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving,
deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative
matters."28
Appellant cannot likewise avail of the defense of frame-up which "is viewed
with disfavor since, like alibi, it can easily be concocted and is a common
ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law."29 To
substantiate this defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and
should show that the buy-bust team was inspired by improper motive or
was not properly performing its duty.30 Here, there is no evidence that there
was ill motive on the part of the buy-bust team. In fact, appellant himself
admitted that he did not know the police officers prior to his arrest. There
could therefore be no bad blood between him and the said police officers.
Moreover, there was no proof that the arresting officers improperly
performed their duty in arresting appellant and Parcon.
Non-compliance with Section 21,

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is
not fatal.
In arguing for his acquittal, appellant heavily relies on the failure of the buy-
bust team to immediately photograph and conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items in his presence. In this regard, Section 21(1), Art. II of RA
9165 provides:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
However, failure to strictly comply with the above procedure will not render
an arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence. Substantial
compliance is allowed as provided for in Section 21(a) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 9165.31 This provision reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied).
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and photographed the objects confiscated does
not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render
inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to the proviso added
in the implementing rules stating that it must still be shown that there exists
justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence have not been preserved.32 "What is crucial is that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will be
used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."33
The links in the chain of custody must be established.
"The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved
for as long as the chain of custody of the same are duly established."34
"‘Chain of Custody’ means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court. Such record of movements and custody of seized
item shall include the identity and signature of the person who had
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer
of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition."35
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-
bust situation, namely: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and,
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court."36
In this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and

evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. There is no evidence that PO2
Soriano lost possession and control of the seized shabu from the time it
was recovered from the appellant until its turnover to the police station. He
marked the seized item immediately upon arrival at the police station. He
turned it over to PO1 Calatay, the investigating officer, who prepared the
letter request for the laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic
sachets. These facts were admitted by the appellant.37
On the same day, PO2 Soriano personally brought the letter request and
specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory where they were received by
Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Arban who conducted the examination on the
specimens submitted. During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted
the purpose for which P/Insp. Arban’s testimony was being offered.38 The
marked sachet of shabu and the marked money used in purchasing the
same were both presented in evidence.
Appellant’s contention that the marking of the seized sachets of shabu

should have been made in his presence while at the scene of the crime
instead of in the police station fails to impress. It is clear from the earlier
cited Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165
that in a buy-bust situation, the marking of the dangerous drug may be
done in the presence of the violator in the nearest police station or the
nearest office of the apprehending team. Appellant should not confuse buy-
bust situation from search and seizure conducted by virtue of a court-
issued warrant. It is in the latter case that physical inventory (which
includes the marking) is made at the place where the search warrant is
served. Nonetheless, "non-compliance with [the] requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."39
Appellant’s claim that the testimony of PO2 Soriano does not deserve
credence due to his failure to identify and/or recall the markings he made
on the subject specimen also fails to convince. His failure to immediately
recall the markings on the specimens only show that he is an uncoached
witness.40 "Such momentary lapse in memory does not detract from the
credibility of his testimony as to the essential details of the incident." 41 It
must also be considered that aside from the fact that police officers handle
numerous cases daily, he testified three years after appellant’s arrest. It is
therefore understandable that PO2 Soriano could no longer easily
remember all the details of the incident.
Lastly, appellant’s argument that the entrapment operation is fatally flawed

for failure of the buy-bust team to coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant
consideration. "[C]oordination with PDEA, while perhaps ideal, is not an
indispensable element of a proper buy-bust operation;"42 it is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.43
Penalty
All told, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of
shabu, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
Under this law, the penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless
of its quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the enactment of RA
9346,44 only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed.45 Thus, the
penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA is proper.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals that affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 82, insofar as the conviction of Glenn Salvador y
Balverde for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9346, and the penalty of life imprisonment
and payment of fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon him are concerned, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, February 6, 2013, 690
SCRA 180,199.
2
CA rollo, pp. 125-137; penned by Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this court) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and
Antonio L. Villamor.
3
Records, pp. 235-241; penned by Judge Severino B. De
Castro, Jr.
4
Id. at 2-3
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id. at 6-7.
7
Id. at 6.
8
See Motion for Consolidation, id. at 1.
9
Id. at 29.
10
Id. at 36.
11
Id. at 91.
12
TSN, September 6, 2004, pp. 4-8; TSN, January 12, 2005,
pp. 2-5.
13
Records, p. 155.
14
Id. at 162.
15
TSN, November 6, 2007, pp. 3-7.
16
Records, p. 241.
17
Id. at 264.
18
CA rollo, pp. 51-68.
19
Id. at 53-54.
20
Id. at 79-115.
21
Id. at 137.
22
Id. at 140-141.
23
Rollo, p. 20.
24
Id. at 27-38.
25
People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394, 409 (2007).
26
People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, February 6, 2013, 690
SCRA 61, 70.
27
People v. Llanita, G.R. No. 189817, October 3, 2012, 682
SCRA 288, 300-301.
28
People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010, 611
SCRA 706, 714.
29
Id.
30
People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 71, citing People v.
Capalad, G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 717, 727.
31
People v. Llanita, supra note 27 at 305.
32
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569
SCRA 879, 898.
33
People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, February 6, 2013, 690
SCRA 106, 119.
34
People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 76.
35
Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
Series of 2002; re Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of
Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment.
36
People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610
SCRA 295, 307-308.
37
See Records, p. 155.
38
Id. at 36.
39
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165, Sec. 21(a).
40
People v. Dilao, supra note 25 at 406.
41
Id.
42
People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA
683, 696.
43
Id., quoting People v. Roa, G.R. No. 186134, May 6, 2010,
620 SCRA 359, 368-370.
44
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.
45
People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012, 669
SCRA 322, 339.
People v Lazaro | P a g e | 1
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO

LAZARO, JR. A.K.A JUN LAZARO Y AQUINO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02258 which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]
dated 27 April 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio
City, in Criminal Cases No. 23227-R, No. 23228-R and No. 23229-R,
finding accused-appellant Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. a.k.a Jun Lazaro y Aquino
guilty of illegal sale, possession and use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, under Sections 5, 11, and 15,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:
On 17 June 2004, two separate informations were filed before the RTC
against appellant for illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the
informations read:
Criminal Case No. 23227-R
The undersigned accuses ALFREDO LAZARO, JR. a.k.a JUN LAZARO y

AQUINO for VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT
9165 otherwise known as the COMPREHENSIVE Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, committed as follows:
That on June 15, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, and
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, distribute and/or deliver One (1) small heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
known as Shabu in the amount of P3,000.00 [should be P300], weighing
0.05 gram to Poseur Buyer SPO1 Dennis G. Indunan, knowing fully well
that said Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu is a dangerous
drug, in violation of the aforementioned provision of law.[3]
The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO y AQUINO for VIOLATION OF

SECTION 11, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 committed as follows:
That on June 15, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused x x x, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession
and control One (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu weighing 0.04 gram, a
dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription in
violation of the aforecited provision of law.[4]
On 18 June 2004, an information was filed with the RTC against appellant
for illegal use of shabu under Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, thus:
The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO for VIOLATION OF SECTION 15

[ARTICLE II] OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165 [otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002], committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 2004, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use
Dangerous Drugs particularly Methamphetamine per the result of a
Qualitative Examination conducted on the urine sample taken from him, in
violation of the aforecited provision of law.[5]
Subsequently, these cases were consolidated. When arraigned on 28 June

2004, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to each
of the charges.[6] Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Hordan T.

Pacatiw, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Dennis G. Indunan, SPO1 Emerson
A. Lingbawan and PO3 Paulino A. Lubos, all of whom are members of the
Philippine National Police and were assigned at the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, Anti-Illegal Drugs Team unit, Baguio City. Their
testimonies, taken together, bear the following:
On 15 June 2004, at about 12:30 p.m., an informant went to the Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Anti-Illegal Drugs Team unit
(AIDT), Baguio City, and reported to PO3 Paulino Lubos (PO3 Lubos) the
drug trafficking activities of appellant in Central Bakakeng, Baguio City.
PO3 Lubos relayed the information to Police Senior Inspector Hordan T.
Pacatiw (Inspector Pacatiw), head of AIDT, who in turn, referred the matter
to Senior Superintendent Marvin V. Bolabola (Superintendent Bolabola),
chief of CIDG, Baguio City, for appropriate action. Superintendent Bolabola
formed a team and planned a buy-bust operation. The team was composed
of Inspector Pacatiw who would act as the team leader; SPO1 Dennis G.
Indunan (SPO1 Indunan) as the poseur-buyer; PO3 Lubos as the seizing

officer; and SPO1 Emerson A. Lingbawan (SPO1 Lingbawan) as the
arresting officer. Superintendent Bolabola handed SPO1 Indunan three
One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills to be utilized as buy-bust money. SPO1
Indunan marked the monies with "DG-06-15-04." Thereafter, the team
coordinated the planned buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
At around 2:30 p.m. of the same date, the team, together with the
informant, went to appellant's house at 181 Km. 3, Central Bakakeng,
Baguio City. Upon arriving thereat, the informant and SPO1 Indunan saw
appellant standing at the balcony of the third floor of the three-storey
house. The informant proceeded inside appellant's house and talked with
appellant at the balcony of the third floor, while SPO1 Indunan stood
outside the house at a distance of 10 meters. The rest of the team
positioned themselves outside appellant's house at a distance of 25
meters. Later, the informant signaled SPO1 Indunan to approach him and
appellant at the balcony of the third floor. Thereupon, the informant
introduced SPO1 Indunan to appellant as user and buyer of shabu. The
informant subsequently excused himself and left SPO1 Indunan and
appellant. Appellant then asked SPO1 Indunan how much worth of shabu
he would want to buy. SPO1 Indunan answered he would like to purchase
three hundred pesos (P300.00) worth of shabu. Appellant knocked at the
door of a room in the balcony and called a certain "Bong." Bong is
appellant's brother whose full name is Ferdinand Bong Lazaro. A man
opened the door and handed a green box to appellant. Appellant opened
the green box, took a plastic sachet from it, handed the plastic sachet to
SPO1 Indunan, and demanded payment from the latter. After examining
the contents of the plastic sachet and believing that the same contained
shabu, SPO1 Indunan gave the three marked one hundred peso bills to
appellant. At this juncture, SPO1 Indunan removed his sunglasses and
placed it in his pocket as pre-arranged signal to the other members of the
team.
The other members of the team rushed to the crime scene and identified
themselves as police officers. Appellant tried to resist arrest but he was
subdued by the team. Inspector Pacatiw then apprised appellant of his
constitutional rights. Afterwards, SPO1 Indunan frisked and recovered from
appellant the buy-bust money and the green box which contained another
plastic sachet with white substance. SPO1 Indunan marked with "DG-06-
15-04" the plastic sachet containing white substance sold to him by
appellant, as well as the plastic sachet with white substance found inside
the green box.
Meanwhile, Inspector Pacatiw knocked at the door of a room on the

balcony and called on Bong to open the door but to no avail. Inspector
Pacatiw and some members of the team then forcibly opened the door.
Although the team found no one inside the room, they, however,
subsequently saw a man, whom they believed to be Bong, running down
the basement of the house and exiting through its back door. The man then
disappeared.
Thereafter, the team discovered and seized at the third floor of the house
several drug paraphernalias. The team made a written inventory on said
paraphernalias, as well as the plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1
Indunan and the plastic sachet recovered in appellant's possession, in the
presence of representatives from media, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the barangay. Said representatives signed the inventory document on
the seized items. Inspector Pacatiw took custody of the said seized items.
The team immediately brought appellant, as well as the items seized, to the
office of the CIDG, Baguio City. Thereupon, the team made a booking
sheet, arrest report, a "Joint Affidavit of Arrest" and an "Affidavit of Poseur-
Buyer" as regards the buy-bust operation. Superintendent Bolabola made a
written request for physical examination of appellant to the PNP Benguet
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. After conducting a physical examination
on appellant, Dr. Elizardo D. Daileg, medico-legal officer of the PNP
Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, issued a medico-legal
certificate attesting that no injuries were found on appellant's body.
Superintendent Bolabola also made separate written requests to the PNP
Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for drug test on appellant and a
laboratory examination on the plastic sachet containing white substance
sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan and the plastic sachet with white
substance found in appellant's possession. After conducting a laboratory
examination on the urine sample taken from appellant, Police Officer 1
Juliet Valentin Albon, Forensic Analyst of the PNP Benguet Provincial
Crime Laboratory Office (Forensic Analyst Albon), issued a report stating
that appellant was positive for shabu. Likewise, after making laboratory
tests, Forensic Analyst Albon issued a chemistry report certifying that the
plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan contained 0.05 gram of
shabu while the plastic sachet recovered from appellant's possession
contained 0.04 gram of shabu.[7]
The prosecution also adduced documentary and object evidence to

buttress the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) joint affidavit of the
arresting officers signed by Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3
Lubos (Exhibit A);[8] (2) affidavit of the poseur-buyer signed by SPO1
Indunan (Exhibit B);[9] (3) booking sheet and arrest report for appellant
(Exhibit C);[10] (4) request to conduct laboratory examination on the two
plastic sachets recovered from appellant which was signed by
Superintendent Bolabola;[11] (5) request for drug test on appellant signed by
Superintendent Bolabola (Exhibit D);[12] (6) request for physical examination
on appellant signed by Superintendent Bolabola (Exhibit E);[13] (7) medico-
legal certificate signed by Dr. Daileg (Exhibit E-1);[14] (8) chemistry report on
the drug test of appellant signed by Forensic Analyst Albon (Exhibit H);[15]
(9) chemistry report on the content of plastic sachet sold by appellant to
SPO1 Indunan and the content of the plastic sachet recovered from
possession of appellant signed by Forensic Analyst Albon (Exhibit I);[16] (10)
inquest disposition issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor, Baguio City
(Exhibit J);[17] (11) written inventory on the items seized from appellant
signed by representatives from the media, DOJ and barangay (Exhibit
M);[18] (12) coordination sheet with the PDEA (Exhibit N);[19] (13) receipt of
the items seized from appellant signed by the members of the buy-bust
team (Exhibit O);[20] (14) two plastic sachet containing shabu sold by and
recovered from the possession of appellant (Exhibit K);[21] and (15) buy-
bust money confiscated from appellant (Exhibit L).[22]
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of appellant and his
father, namely Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. to refute the foregoing accusations.
Appellant denied any liability and claimed he was framed.
Appellant testified that on 15 June 2004, between 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.,
he was sleeping in his room at the third floor of a three-storey house
located at 181 Km. 3, Central Bakakeng, Baguio City. He was roused from
his sleep by the barking of dogs outside his house. He opened the door of
his room and saw PO3 Lubos, Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan, SPO1
Indunan and some members of the CIDG, Baguio City, namely Warren
Lacangan, Jojo Unata and Jun Digula approaching. PO3 Lubos tried to hit
him with the gun but he evaded it. Inspector Pacatiw hit him several times
in the stomach with a gun. Said policemen kicked him several times
causing him to fall on the floor. Thereafter, the policemen destroyed the
door of his brother's (Ferdinand Bong Lazaro) room and entered therein.
He was dragged inside the said room. Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan
and PO3 Lubos then took the laptop, diskman, Buddha coin bank and
power tools inside the room. Subsequently, the policemen brought him to
the second floor of the house where he saw Jade Salazar (Jade), the live-in
partner of his brother, Renato Lazaro. The policemen apprehended Jade,
took the latter's bag and a green box, and asked her the whereabouts of
Bong. He and Jade were later brought to the CIDG office, Baguio City.
Thereupon, the policemen took his wallet, demanded an amount of
P200,000.00, and told him to contact Bong so that the latter may help him
settle his case.
While appellant and Jade were being held at CIDG office, Baguio City, a
certain Rosita Salazar (Salazar), allegedly a Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Judge from Abra and Jade's grandmother, arrived and introduced herself to
the policemen. The policemen ignored Salazar as the latter did not have
any identification card. The policemen then brought appellant and Jade to
the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office where they were
subjected to physical examination. Upon their return to the CIDG office, the
policemen showed them three plastic sachets of shabu which would be
used against them as evidence. Later, however, appellant learned that
Jade was released by the policemen in exchange for a certain amount of
money. During his detention in the CIDG office, he saw PO3 Lubos
preparing the marked money. At that point, he realized that a case would
be filed against him in court.
Appellant denied having sold to SPO1 Indunan one plastic sachet

containing 0.05 gram of shabu on 15 June 2004. He claimed that it was
impossible for the back-up members of the buy-bust team to have
witnessed his alleged sale of shabu to SPO1 Indunan because there were
big trees beside the three-storey house which blocked the view of persons
on the ground looking up to the balcony of the third floor. He denied having
received from Bong a green box during the alleged buy-bust and averred
that Jade owned the green box.[23]
Alfredo Lazaro, Sr., appellant's father, testified that on 15 June 2004, at

about 2:00 p.m., he was watching television inside his room at the third
floor of the three-storey house situated at 181 Km. 3, Central Bakakeng,
Baguio City. Later, he heard the barking of dogs outside the house.
Curious, he opened the door of his room. He then saw PO3 Lubos and
several policemen mauling appellant. Shocked, he uttered "apay dayta?"
(Why is that?). PO3 Lubos and the policemen stopped beating appellant.
As he was already experiencing chest pains, he returned to his room.
Subsequently, he saw the policemen carrying a backpack and a plastic bag
the contents of which belonged to Bong.[24]
The defense also submitted a written undertaking of Jade and a receipt of

custody signed by Salazar in support of its contentions.[25]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant in all of the
criminal cases. In Criminal Case No. 23227-R, appellant was found guilty of
violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 23228-R, appellant
was found guilty of violating Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal
use of shabu) and was penalized with six months drug rehabilitation in a
government center. With respect to Criminal Case No. 23229-R, appellant
was found guilty of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal
possession of shabu) and was meted an imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum. He was
further ordered to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 18 July 2008, the Court of

Appeals promulgated its Decision partly granting the appeal. The appellate
court affirmed the conviction of appellant in Criminal Cases No. 23227-R
and No. 23229-R. However, it reversed the RTC's ruling in Criminal Case
No. 23228-R by acquitting appellant in the said criminal case.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 August 2008.[26]
In his Brief[27] and Supplemental Brief,[28] appellant assigned the following

errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT

OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSESS WHILE TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE PROSECUTION'S

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN RA
9165.[29]
In the main, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish his
guilt for illegal sale and possession of shabu.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential

elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment thereof. In prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu,
what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[30]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish, through
testimonial, documentary and object evidence, the said elements.
SPO1 Indunan, the poseur-buyer, testified that appellant sold to him shabu
during a legitimate buy-bust operation.[31] Per chemistry report of Forensic
Analyst Albon, the substance, weighing 0.05 gram, which was bought by
SPO1 Indunan from appellant for P300.00, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. SPO1 Indunan narrated the
transaction with appellant as follows:
Q What happened next when you were already at the residence of the
accused?
A When we were near the house, we saw a man standing at the

balcony, Sir.
Q How many storeys is the house of the accused?
A About three (3), Sir.
Q Where is the balcony where the man was standing?
A At the third floor, Sir.

Q What happened next?
A The Informant told me to wait first and he would go ahead and talk
to Jun, Sir.
A After talking, the Informant signaled me to go near them, sir.
xxxx
A The Informant signaled me to go near them, Sir.
xxxx
A I was introduced to Jun as user and buyer of shabu, Sir.
Q Were you introduced by name?
A No, Sir.
A The Informant excused himself, Sir.
Q And them?
A We talked with Jun and asked me how much will I buy, Sir.
Q In what language or dialect?
A Tagalog, Sir.
Q How?
A "Magkano bang bibilhin mo" and I said "tatlong daan lang," Sir.
A He knocked at the door and called out for "Bong." Sir.
A Bong opened the door and handed Jun something a green box, Sir.
Q How did you know that it was Bong?
A That is what I heard, Sir.
Q Were you able to see the face of Bong during that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q After Bong had opened the door, what happened next? All this time
you were beside Jun?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next after the green box was handed to Jun?
A The person told Jun "eto na yong box," Sir.
A And Jun opened the box and brought out one (1) plastic sachet and
handed it to me and demanded for the payment, Sir.
Q How?
A He said "akina yong bayad," Sir.
Q After he handed to you that sachet and asked for the payment what
did you say also?
A I first examined the content and after believing that it was shabu, I
handed the marked money, Sir.
xxxx
Q After that what happened next?
A After handling him the money, I gave the pre-arranged signal, Sir.
Q What was your pre-arranged signal?
A By removing my sunglasses and placing it in my pocket, Sir.
Q After you have made the signal what happened next?
A My back-up team rushed to where I am (sic), Sir.
xxxx
PROS. CATRAL:
Q The subject of your operation you already know him initially as Jun,
did you eventually come to know his full name?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What is his full name?
A Jun Aquino Lazaro,Sir.
Q If Jun Aquino Lazaro is in the courtroom would you be able to

identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a male person who gave his name as Jun

Lazaro.[32]
Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3 Lubos corroborated the

aforesaid testimony of SPO1 Indunan on relevant points.
The prosecution adduced as its documentary and object evidence the

transparent plastic sachet of shabu sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan
during the buy-bust operation, the chemistry report of Forensic Analyst
Albon confirming that the plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan
contained 0.05 gram of shabu, and the marked money used during the buy-
bust operation.
Parenthetically, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, such as shabu,

the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.[33] All these elements have been established. SPO1 Indunan
testified that after appellant sold to him shabu, he (SPO1 Indunan) and the
members of the buy-bust team arrested appellant. He then frisked
appellant and recovered from the latter a green box which contained plastic
sachet with white granules. The chemistry report of Forensic Analyst Albon
confirms that such plastic sachet found inside the green box contains 0.04
gram of shabu. The relevant portion of the testimony of SPO1 Indunan is
as follows:
A After we controlled Jun we brought him to our office, Sir.
Q Immediately?
A Yes, Sir.
Q He was not searched at the area of operation?
A He was searched, Sir.
Q Who searched him?
A I, Sir.
Q What was the result of your search?
A I was able to find the marked money, Sir.
Q Aside from the money what else did you recover from the person?
A The content of the box there is still one (1) sachet, Sir.
Q If this sachet which you recovered from the accused will be shown
to you again will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How sure are you that you would be able to identify it?
A I placed my initials, Sir.
Q I am showing to you another sachet, please tell us if this is the

same sachet that you said that was confiscated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please point to your initial?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When did you place that?
A After the arrest of the accused, Sir.
PROS. CATRAL:
The other sachet may we pray that this be marked as Exhibit "K-1",
your Honor.
COURT:
Mark it please.[34]
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding appellant's illegal

sale and possession of shabu are consistent with the documentary and
object evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to be credible.
Both courts also found no ill motive on their part to testify against appellant.
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect because trial courts have the advantage of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if
such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.[35]
To rebut the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, appellant

interposed the defense of denial and frame-up. Appellant denied he sold
shabu to SPO1 Indunan and he possessed a green box containing shabu
during the buy-bust operation. He claimed that said green box was seized
from Jade and that the arresting officers tried to extort money from him in
exchange for his freedom.
The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs
Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence.[36] In the cases before us,
appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims.
Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to
bolster his allegations.
It is true that appellant submitted a written undertaking of Jade and a

receipt of custody signed by alleged Abra MTC Judge Salazar in support of
his contentions that the green box was seized from Jade and that he was
framed. Nonetheless, there was nothing in said documents which proved
his defenses. In the said undertaking, Jade merely declares (1) that on 15
June 2004, at about 2:30 p.m., she was apprehended in the house of
appellant by the officers of the CIDG, Baguio City, for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 9165; (2) that she was informed of her constitutional
rights by the CIDG officers; (3) that she was humanely treated by the CIDG
officers during her investigation and that none of her personal property was
taken or damaged by said officers; (4) that she had no complaint
whatsoever against the CIDG officers; and (5) that she promised to appear
if called upon in the investigation regarding said incident. On the other
hand, the receipt of custody signed by Salazar merely states (1) that she
received in good health the living person of Jade from the custody of CIDG,
Baguio City; and (2) that she promised to present Jade for investigation as
regards the incident if required by the proper authorities. Indeed, the
above-cited documents merely describe the circumstances and conditions
of Jade during and after the incident. There was no reference at all to
appellant's claim that the green box was seized from Jade and that he was
framed.[37]
Further, it should be noted that appellant has not filed a single complaint for
frame-up or extortion against the buy-bust team. This inaction clearly
betrays appellant's claim of frame-up.
Appellant imputes ill motive on the part of the buy-bust team by

asseverating that he had a previous quarrel with PO3 Lubos and that he
knows some members of the buy-bust team. Withal, this allegation is
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated. Hence, the imputation of improper
motive should be negated. When the police officers involved in the buy-
bust operation have no motive to testify against the accused, the courts
shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties
regularly.[38]
Moreover, motive is not essential for conviction for a crime when there is no
doubt as to the identity of the culprit, and that lack of motive for committing
the crime does not preclude conviction for such crime when the crime and
participation of the accused are definitely proved.[39] In the instant cases,
SPO1 Indunan positively identified appellant as the one who sold to him
shabu during the buy-bust operation. He also testified that he recovered
shabu from appellant's possession during said incident.
The defense presented appellant's father, Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. to

corroborate appellant's version of the incident. Initially, it must be
emphasized that the testimony of Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. should be received
with caution he being the father of appellant.[40] Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. testified
that upon opening the door of his room, he saw PO3 Lubos and some
policemen beating appellant. He uttered "apay dayta?" (Why is that?), left
the scene, and went back to his room. There was no testimony at all from
him that he tried to restrain PO3 Lubos and the policemen from mauling
appellant, or that he immediately called or sought the help of barangay
officials or higher authorities. His court statement hardly inspires belief as it
would be highly unnatural for a father not to react defensively or sought
help if his child is being maltreated in his presence. In addition, the physical
examination report on appellant states that no injuries were observed on
appellant's body immediately after his arrest. His testimony, therefore,
deserves scant consideration.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the positive and credible testimonies of

the prosecution witnesses prevail over the defenses of denial and frame-up
of appellant.
Appellant tried to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses

based on the following reasons: (1) there was inconsistency in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to what language was used in
apprising appellant of his constitutional rights; (2) the informant was not
presented as witness during the trial; and (3) there was no buy-bust
operation because appellant was merely instigated by the informant to sell
shabu to SPOI Indunan.[41]
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as

basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or
innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which
has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the
acquittal of the accused.[42]
The inconsistency cited by appellant refers to trivial matter and is clearly

beyond the elements of illegal sale of shabu because it does not pertain to
the actual buy-bust itself - that crucial moment when appellant was caught
selling shabu. Such inconsistency is also irrelevant to the elements of
illegal possession of shabu. Besides, the inconsistency even bolsters the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses as it erased any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.[43]
Anent the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of the

informant, it is well-settled that the testimony of an informant in drug-
pushing cases is not essential for conviction and may be dispensed if the
poseur-buyer testified on the same.[44]
As to the claim of instigation, where the police or its agent lures the
accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him and which is
deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause,[45]
there is nothing in the records which clearly and convincingly shows that
appellant was instigated by the informant to sell shabu to SPO1 Indunan.
What is apparent therein is that the informant merely introduced SPO1
Indunan to appellant as a user and buyer of shabu and that the informant
did not in any way allure or persuade appellant to sell shabu to SPO1
Indunan.[46] Also, after such introduction, it was appellant who hastily asked
SPO1 Indunan how much worth of shabu the latter would want to buy.[47]
This obviously manifests that the idea to sell shabu originated from
appellant without any instigation from SPO1 Indunan or the informant.
Indeed, what have transpired in the instant case was a legitimate buy-bust
operation and not instigation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police
officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense.
Appellant further posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the
procedures laid down in Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
because: (1) although the written inventory of the seized items bore
signatures of representatives from the DOJ, the media, and the barangay,
only the representative from the media was named; (2) no pictures of the
seized items were taken; (3) Forensic Analyst Albon did not testify with
regard to her chemistry report on the subject drugs; (4) there were gaps in
the chain of custody of the subject drugs because the officer who received
the request for laboratory examination of the same did not testify, and the
custodian of the subject drugs from the time they were examined up to their
presentation in trial was not identified; and (5) the prosecution failed to
show the condition of the subject drugs and the precautions taken in
preserving their condition.[48]
It should be noted that appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first
time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so.
In People v. Sta. Maria[49] in which the very same issue was raised, we
held:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However,

whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the
buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain
unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of
the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations
of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before
the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In
no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there
were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection.
Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time
on appeal." (Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, we have held in several cases[50] that non-compliance with

Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not
render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[51]
In the present case, the integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was
preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the instant
case was shown not to have been broken.
Records revealed that after SPO1 Indunan confiscated two transparent

plastic sachets containing shabu from appellant, he marked each of the two
sachets of shabu with "DG-06-15-04" and turned them over to
Superintendent Bolabola, who, in turn, handed them to Inspector Pacatiw
who brought the same to PO1 Guingahan of CIDG office, Baguio City. The
latter then delivered the two plastic sachets each marked with "DG-06-15-
04" to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for laboratory
examination. The same two sachets were received by SPO1 Carino of PNP
Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office.[52] After a qualitative
examination conducted on the contents of the two sachets each marked
"DG-06-15-04," Forensic Analyst Albon found them to positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Upon being weighed, the one
plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan was found to be
containing 0.05 gram while the other plastic sachet found in appellant's
possession was determined to have 0.04 gram of shabu.
When the prosecution presented the two sachets of shabu each marked
with "DG-06-15-04," SPO1 Indunan positively identified them as the very
same sachets he bought and recovered from appellant in the buy-bust
operation. The two plastic sachets containing 0.05 and 0.04 gram of shabu,
respectively, each had the marking "DG-06-15-04" as attested by Forensic
Analyst Albon in her chemistry report. The existence, due execution, and
genuineness of the said chemistry report, as well as the qualifications of
Forensic Analyst Albon were admitted by the defense.[53] Further, SPO1
Indunan categorically declared during the trial that he put "DG-06-15-04"
marking on each of the two transparent plastic sachets of shabu recovered
from appellant. Clearly, the identity of the drugs recovered from appellant
has been duly preserved and established by the prosecution.
The fact that Forensic Analyst Albon and the persons who had possession
or custody of the subject drugs were not presented as witnesses to
corroborate SPO1 Indunan's testimony is of no moment. The prosecution
dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Analyst Albon because the
defense had already agreed in the substance of her testimony to be given
during trial, to wit: (1) that she examined the subject drugs; (2) that she
found them to be positive for shabu; and (3) that she prepared and issued a
chemistry report pertaining to the subject drugs.
Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are
required to testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in
any rule implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As long
as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to
have been broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly
the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who
came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.[54] In
People v. Zeng Hua Dian,[55] we ruled:
After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find that the chain of
custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution
did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-
presentation as witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the
evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on duty, is not a crucial
point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by
the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the
discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom
it wishes to present as witnesses.
Since appellant's violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act

No. 9165 were duly established by the prosecution's evidence, we shall
now ascertain the penalties imposable on him.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the unauthorized sale
of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, carries with it the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Pursuant, however, to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," only life
imprisonment and fine shall be imposed. Thus, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals were correct in imposing the penalty of life imprisonment and fine
of P500,000.00 on appellant in Criminal Case No. 23227-R.
Section 11(3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that illegal
possession of less than five grams of shabu is penalized with imprisonment
of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years, plus a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Appellant was charged with and found to be guilty of illegal possession of

0.04 gram of shabu in Criminal Case No. 23229-R. Hence, the RTC and
the Court of Appeals aptly sentenced appellant to imprisonment of 12 years
and one day, as minimum, to 15 years, as maximum, and fined him
P300,000.00, since said penalties are within the range of penalties
prescribed by the aforequoted provision.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02258 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales,* Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,** and Abad,*** JJ., concur.
*
Per Special Order No. 744, dated 14 October 2009, signed by Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales to replace Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, who is on official
leave.
**
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro was designated to sit
as additional member replacing Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per
Raffle dated 20 April 2009.
***
Per Special Order No. 753, dated 13 October 2009, signed by Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad to
replace Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., who is on official
leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate
Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores
concurring; rollo, pp. 2-23.
[2]
Penned by Judge Antonio C. Reyes; records (Crim. Case No. 23229-R),
pp. 293-304.
[3]
Records (Crim. Case No. 23227-R), p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
TSN, 23 November 2004, 4 April 2005, 5 April 2005, 26 April 2005, 30
May 2005, 1 June 2005, 13 September 2005 and 14 September 2005.
[8]
Records (Crim. Case No. 23229-R), pp. 6-7.
[9]
Id. at 6-7.
[10]
Id. at 8.
[11]
Id. at 15.
[12]
Id. at 13.
[13]
Id. at 11.
[14]
Id. at 12.
[15]
Id. at 14.
[16]
Id. at 16.
[17]
Id. at 181.
[18]
Id. at 8.
[19]
Id. at 139.
[20]
Id. at 18.
[21]
Id. at 45 and 237.
[22]
Id. at 10.
[23]
TSN, 15 and 16 November 2005.
[24]
TSN, 30 November 2005.
[25]
[26]
CA rollo, p. 146.
[27]
Id. at 51-69.
[28]
Rollo, pp. 35-39.
[29]
CA rollo, p. 61.
[30]
People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, 28 July 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 449;
People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, 23 April 2008, 552 SCRA 627, 637-
638; People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 175326, 28 November 2007, 539 SCRA
198, 212.
[31]
TSN, 5 April 2005.
[32]
TSN, 5 April 2005, pp. 13-28.
[33]
People v. Naquita, supra note 30; People v. Del Monte, supra note 30;
People v. Santiago, supra note 30.
[34]
TSN, 5 April 2005, pp. 22-24.
[35]
People v. Naquita, supra note 30 at 444; People v. Santiago, supra note
30 at 217; People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, 27 June 2008, 556
SCRA, 421, 440.
[36]
Id.
[37]
[38]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 173795, 3 April 2007, 520 SCRA 458, 468-
469; People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 187,
204; People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 172116, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA
280, 288.
[39]
People v. Quillosa, G.R. No. 115687, 17 February 2000, 325 SCRA 747,
754-755.
[40]
People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 153573-76, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 333,
349; People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 131924, 26 December 2000, 348 SCRA
663, 669; People v. San Pascual, G.R. No. 137746, 15 October 2002, 391
SCRA 49, 63; People v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 117802, 27 April 2000, 331
SCRA 95, 114.
[41]
[42]
People v. Santiago. supra note 30.
[43]
Id.
[44]
People v. Naquita; supra note 30; People v. Santiago, supra note 30.
[45]
People v. Boco, 368 Phil. 341, 367 (1999).
[46]
TSN, 5 April 2005, p. 14-15.
[47]
Id. at 15.
[48]
[49]
[50]
People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, 26, 566 SCRA 571-595; People v.
Naquita, supra note 30; People v. Concepcion, supra note 35; People v.
Del Monte, supra note 30.
[51]
Id.
[52]
Id.
[53]
[54]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, 18 June 2009.
[55]
G.R. No. 145348, 14 June 2004, 432 SCRA 25, 32.
People v Manlangit | P a g e | 1
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189806, January 12, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

FRANCISCO MANLANGIT Y TRESBALLES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the August 28, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273, which affirmed in toto the
Decision dated July 12, 2007[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 03-4735 and 03-4961
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC
found accused-appellant Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes guilty of drug-
sale and drug-use penalized by Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On November 25, 2003, an information was filed charging Manlangit with

violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November 2003, in the City of Makati,
named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there
willfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver zero point
zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which
is a dangerous drug.[3]
On December 11, 2003, another information was filed against Manlangit for
breach of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, to wit:
That sometime on or before or about the 24th day of November 2003, in the
City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to use
dangerous drugs, and having been arrested and found positive for use of
Methylamphetamine, after a confirmatory test, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously use Methylamphetamine, a dangerous drug in
violation of the said law.[4]
During the arraignment for both cases, Manlangit pleaded not

guilty. Afterwards, the cases were tried jointly.
At the trial of the case, the prosecution adduced evidence as follows:

On November 24, 2003, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)

Cluster 4 office received information from an informant that a certain
"Negro" was selling prohibited drugs along Col. Santos Street at Brgy.
South Cembo, Makati City. The MADAC thereafter coordinated with the
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSTOF) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to conduct a joint MADAC-police buy-
bust operation. A team was assembled composed of several members of
the different offices, among which Police Officer 2 Virginio Costa was
designated as the team leader, with MADAC operative Wilfredo Serrano as
the poseur-buyer and Roberto Bayona as his back-up. The team prepared
buy-bust money for the operation, marking two (2) one hundred peso (PhP
100) bills with the initials "AAM."
Upon arrival on Col. Santos Street, Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, the team
spotted Manlangit standing in front of his house. The informant
approached Manlangit and convinced the latter that Serrano wanted to
purchase shabu from him. Manlangit asked Serrano how much shabu he
wanted, to which Serrano replied that he wanted two hundred pesos
(PhP 200) worth of shabu. Manlangit went inside his house and later
reappeared with a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. Manlangit handed over the plastic sachet to Serrano who, in
turn, gave Manlangit the marked money. Then Serrano gave the pre-
arranged signal of lighting a cigarette to indicate to the rest of the team that
the buy-bust operation had been consummated. Thus, the rest of the team
approached Manlangit and proceeded to arrest him while informing him of
constitutional rights and the reason for his arrest. The marked money was
recovered from Manlangit's pocket. The plastic sachet was then marked
with the initials "FTM" and sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for analysis. The PNP
crime laboratory identified the white crystalline substance as
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride in Chemistry Report No. D-1190-03.
Manlangit was also brought to the PNP crime laboratory for a drug test,
which yielded a positive result for use of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride.[5]
Manlangit denied that such buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed
that the recovered shabu was not from him. He claimed that he was
pointed out by a certain Eli Ballesteros to Serrano and Bayona. Thereafter,
he was allegedly detained at the Barangay Hall of Brgy. Pitogo. There, he
was allegedly interrogated by Serrano as to the location of the shabu and
its proceeds, as well as the identity of the drug pushers in the area. He
also claimed that whenever he answered that he did not know what
Serrano was talking about, he was boxed in the chest. Later on, he said
that he was brought to Camp Crame for drug testing.[6]
On July 12, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735, finding accused Francisco

Manlangit y Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of Violation of Section 5, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-sale)
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. Said accused
shall be given credit for the period of his preventive detention.
2) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735,[7] finding accused Francisco

Manlangit y Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of Violation of Section 15, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-use),
and sentencing him to undergo rehabilitation for at least six (6)
months in a government rehabilitation Center under the
auspices of the Bureau of Correction subject to the provisions of
Article VIII, RA 9165.
It is further ordered that the plastic sachet containing shabu, subject of

Criminal Case No. 03-4735, be transmitted to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the latter's appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[8]
From such Decision, Manlangit interposed an appeal with the CA.
In his Brief, accused-appellant Manlangit claimed that the prosecution

failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support such
contention, accused-appellant claimed that there was no buy-bust
operation conducted. He pointed out that he was not in the list of
suspected drug pushers of MADAC or of the AIDSTOF. He further
emphasized that the buy-bust operation was conducted without first
conducting a surveillance or test buy to determine the veracity of the report
made by the informant. He assailed the fact that despite knowledge of his
identity and location, the buy-bust team failed to secure even a search
warrant.
Accused-appellant also raised the issue that the buy-bust team failed to
comply with the procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited
drugs under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. He argued that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official function was overturned by the
officers' failure to follow the required procedure in the conduct of a buy-bust
operation, as well as the procedure in the proper disposition, custody, and
control of the subject specimen.
On August 28, 2009, the CA rendered the decision which affirmed the
RTC's Decision dated July 12, 2007. It ruled that contrary to accused-
appellant's contention, prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity
of a buy-bust operation. The case was a valid example of a warrantless
arrest, accused-appellant having been caught in flagrante delicto. The CA

further stated that accused-appellant's unsubstantiated allegations are
insufficient to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, in this case the members of the buy-bust team; thus, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. After examining the
testimonies of the witnesses, the CA found them credible and found no
reason to disturb the RTC's findings. Finally, the CA found that chain of
evidence was not broken.
Hence, the instant appeal.
In a Manifestation (In lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated February 22, 2010,

accused-appellant expressed his desire not to file a supplemental brief and
reiterated the same arguments already presented before the trial and
appellate courts.
The Issues
The issues, as raised in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated

September 29, 2008, are:
1. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant

despite the prosecution's failure to prove his built beyond reasonable
doubt.[9]
2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the procedure for the
custody and control of prohibited drugs was complied with.[10]
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Accused-appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt
The first paragraph of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 punishes the act of selling

dangerous drugs. It provides:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals.¾The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species
of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis supplied.)
While Sec. 15, RA 9165 states:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs.¾A person apprehended or

arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug,
after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of
six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided,
That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also
found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug
provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions
stated therein shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)
People v. Macatingag[11] prescribed the requirements for the successful

prosecution of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as follows.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material
to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.
The pieces of evidence found in the records amply demonstrate that all the
elements of the crimes charged were satisfied. The lower courts gave
credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, which established the
guilt of accused-appellant for the crimes charged beyond reasonable
doubt. The testimonies--particularly those of the police officers involved,
which both the RTC and the CA found credible--are now beyond
question. As the Court ruled in Aparis v. People:[12]
As to the question of credibility of the police officers who served as

principal witnesses for the prosecution, settled is the rule that prosecutions
involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is a fundamental rule that findings
of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility
are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of
facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a
better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, as in the present case.
Moreover, accused-appellant's defense of denial, without substantial

evidence to support it, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of
the police officers' performance of official functions. Thus, the Court ruled
in People v. Llamado:[13]
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be

given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute
such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated denial. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Contrary to accused-appellant's challenge to the validity of the buy-bust

operation, the Court categorically stated in Quinicot v. People that a prior
surveillance or test buy is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, as
long as the operatives are accompanied by their informant, thus:
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy
does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to
the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to
apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is
not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by
their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police
work. We have held that when time is of the essence, the police may
dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the instant case, having
been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling
the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any
prior surveillance before they undertook the buy-bust operation.[14]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, accused-appellant's contention that the buy-bust team should

have procured a search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is
misplaced. The Court had the occasion to address this issue in People v.
Doria:[15]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not

unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another."
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a

warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an
offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of
a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant.
The Court reiterated such ruling in People v. Agulay:[16]
Accused-appellant contends his arrest was illegal, making the sachets of

shabu allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accused-
appellant's claim is devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an
arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant
inasmuch as it is considered a valid "warrantless arrest," in line with the
provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private


actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has

been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates
from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the
offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
Second Issue:
The chain of custody of the seized drug was unbroken
Accused-appellant contends that the arresting officers did not comply with
the requirements for the handling of seized dangerous drugs as provided
for under Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

and/or Laboratory Equipment.¾The PDEA shall take charge and have

copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (Emphasis supplied.)
In particular, accused-appellant argues that:
While the marking of the specimen was done in the place of incident by
MADAC operative Soriano, the inventory of the item was done at Cluster 4.
There was no photograph made of the plastic sachet in the presence of the
accused, media, any elected local official, or the DOJ representatives, in
clear violation of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165.[17]
Based on such alleged failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the
procedural requirements of Sec. 21, RA 9165, accused-appellant posits
that he should, therefore, be acquitted. Such reasoning is flawed.
In People v. Rosialda,[18] the Court addressed the issue of chain of custody

of dangerous drugs, citing People v. Rivera, as follows:
Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the issue that there is a
violation of Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, particularly the requirement that the
alleged dangerous drugs seized by the apprehending officers be
photographed "in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel." Rosialda argues that such failure to comply with the provision of
the law is fatal to his conviction.
This contention is untenable.
The Court made the following enlightening disquisition on this matter in

People v. Rivera:
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized

dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates:
The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing

Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers

conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and
does not automatically render accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the
implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso added that `non-
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.' The same provision
clearly states as well, that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable
grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
have been preserved.
This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if any,
since the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, this
Court has explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the
dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the
function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity
of the evidence are removed.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or

testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between
the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was
tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it
was offered in evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of

evidence. His only contention is that the buy-bust team did not inventory
and photograph the specimen on site and in the presence of accused-
appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official. However, as ruled by
the Court in Rosialda, as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken,
even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of RA
9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be
affected.
And as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was
not broken as established by the facts proved during trial, thus:
Lastly, the contention of appellant, that the police officers failed to comply
with the provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the
proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs, is
untenable. Record shows that Serrano marked the confiscated sachet of
shabu in the presence of appellant at the place of incident and was turned
over properly to the investigating officer together with the marked buy-bust
money. Afterwards, the confiscated plastic sachet suspected to be
containing "shabu" was brought to the forensic chemist for examination.
Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed their "Pinagsanib na
Salaysay sa Pag-aresto" immediately after the arrest and at the trial,
Serrano positively identified the seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution
evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized
drugs from the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the
forensic chemist. Thus, there is no doubt that the prohibited drug presented
before the court a quo was the one seized from appellant and that indeed,
he committed the crimes imputed against him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA's August 28, 2009 Decision
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez,

JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-9. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Francisco P.
Acosta.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 17-24. Penned by Judge Maria Cristina J. Cornejo.
[3]
Id. at 15.
[4]
Id. at 16.
[5]
Id. at 100-102.
[6]
Id. at 102.
[7]
Should be Criminal Case No. 03-4961.
[8]
[9]
Id. at 40.
[10]
Id. at 46.
[11]
G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 361-362.
[12]
G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010.
[13]
G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552; citing
Dimacuha v. People, G.R. No. 143705, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 513.
[14]
G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 458, 470.
[15]
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 704.
[16]
G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 593-594.
[17]
[18]
G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010; citing People v. Rivera, G.R. No.
182347, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 879.
People v Umipang | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SAMMY

UMIPANG Y ABDUL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA)[1] affirming the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the Pasig
City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and
No. 14936-D-TG.[2] The RTC Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul
(Umipang) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as follows:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was
selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig
City, a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special
Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was
dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer
(PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a
?500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant
sauntered the length of the street while the other members of the team
strategically positioned themselves. The confidential informant saw the
man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential informant and PO2
Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said
“Sam, pa-iskor kami.” Sam replied “Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?” The
confidential informant said “Five hundred pesos.” Sam took out three (3)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price
tags–500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the
marked P500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as
the pre-arranged signal that the sale had been consummated. Sensing
danger, Sam attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and
arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised
of their team leader, Police Senior Inspector (PS/INSP.) Obong, Senior

Police Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3 Hajan, PO3 Maglana, PO3 Salem,
and PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more
plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were
recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials “SAU”
[which stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the
middle initial, of accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the
police station where he was booked, investigated and identified as
accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the
confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all
tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as
“shabu,” a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and

his brother Nash Rudin Umipang. According to them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-appellant

and his family were awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons
outside shouted “Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto kung hindi gigibain
namin ito.” Accused-appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5)
policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at him. Against his will
and amid the screams of his wife, accused-appellant was brought to a
waiting vehicle and brought to the police headquarters. At the Taguig
Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him P100,000.00 for his
release. He denied the charges and that the alleged evidence were all
“planted” by the police.[3]
Consequently, the following charges were brought against Umipang:
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell deliver and give away to poseur
buyer PO2 Ruchyl Gasid, one heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, which substance was
found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known
as “shabu” a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of P500.00, in
violation of the above-cited law.
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in his custody and
control five (5) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing
0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.04 gram and 0.04 gram with a total
weight of 0.23 gram of white crystalline substance, which substances were
found positive to the tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also
known as “shabu” a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
RTC Ruling
In its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found accused-
appellant guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165. The RTC gave
more weight to the testimonies of the arresting officers on how they
conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-appellant’s claim of
frame-up by the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No.
14935-D-TG), Umipang was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500,000. For violating Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-
D-TG), he was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen
(14) years one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.
CA Ruling
In its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007 Joint
Decision of the RTC. According to the appellate court, the elements
necessary for the prosecution of the illegal possession and sale of
dangerous drugs were present and established. Thus, it no longer
disturbed the RTC’s assessment of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Furthermore, the CA found that there was no showing of
improper motive on the part of the police officers. With the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, it ruled against the denials of
accused-appellant, and his defense of frame-up.
We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the

lower courts is not a function that is normally undertaken in appeals before
this Court. However, after a careful scrutiny of the CA Decision, we find it
proper to reevaluate the factual issues surrounding the present case,
especially since it is not clear from the Decision whether the proper
implementation of the strict procedural safeguards laid down in R.A. 9165
was established.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-
appellant of the alleged sale and possession of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, which are violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively,
of R.A. 9165.
Discussion
Accused-appellant argues[4] that since there were two versions presented

during trial – one, that of the prosecution; and the other, that of the accused
– the latter version must be adopted, because the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties should not take precedence over the
presumption of innocence of the accused. He also contends that a
surveillance of just 30 minutes was insufficient to establish that Umipang
was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Lastly, accused-appellant claims
that the fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was not
clearly established, and that the evidence allegedly confiscated from him
was merely planted.[5] Alluding to the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points
out that the former did not see him holding the drugs, and that the sachet
was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the
affirmation of the RTC Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in
accord with law and evidence.[6] The OSG argues[7] that the necessary
elements to convict a person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It then contends that, absent independent proof and
substantiated evidence to the contrary, accused-appellant’s bare-faced
denial should be deemed merely as a self-serving statement that does not
hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no evidence of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely
against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and
credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance

of the procedural safeguards outlined in
R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust
operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our
pronouncement in People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of
operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal
transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-
bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the
attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse,
the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People
v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that “by the very nature of anti-narcotics
operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams
of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial
hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility
of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant
in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.” Accordingly, specific
procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been
laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow.
The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have
been followed in proving the elements of the defined offense.[8] (Emphasis
supplied and citations omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards [9]

that are applicable in cases of buy-bust operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall
be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative
and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which

shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be
issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time
frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally
issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-
two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four
(24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the
same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society
groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the
guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such
item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s
of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated,
used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a
representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of
destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the
representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted
to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the
representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as
determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be
allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and
his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case
the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative
after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within
seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the
evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member
of the public attorney's office to represent the former; x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86

of R.A. 9165, which requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to
maintain close coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related
operations:
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on

Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of

the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective
organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being
conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is
found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA
shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall
immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the
NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, the 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR) set
the following procedure for maintaining close coordination:
SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units

on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies — The

PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the
PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to
conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA: Provided, that the
said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA prior to
anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in any case, said agencies
shall inform the PDEA of their anti-drug operations within twenty-four
(24) hours from the time of the actual custody of the suspects or
seizure of said drugs and substances, as well as paraphernalia and
transport equipment used in illegal activities involving such drugs
and/or substances, and shall regularly update the PDEA on the status
of the cases involving the said anti-drug operations; Provided,
furthermore, that raids, seizures, and other anti-drug operations conducted
by the PNP, the NBI, and other law enforcement agencies prior to the
approval of this IRR shall be valid and authorized; Provided, finally, that
nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement
personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions
of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive

procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully
before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the
operations. Although we have ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses
in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the
prosecution’s cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items have been preserved,[10] courts must still thoroughly
evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple
procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or
deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law.
Consequently, Section 21(a) of the IRR provides for a saving clause in the
procedures outlined under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, which serves as a
guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects that may be relaxed under
justifiable grounds, viz:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

and/or Laboratory Equipment. — x x x:
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph

shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis
supplied.)
We have reiterated that “this saving clause applies only where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the
cited justifiable grounds” after which, “the prosecution must show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
preserved.”[11] To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will
not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1) the
noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.[12]
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the

official duties of law enforcers,[13] we stress that the step-by-step procedure
outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be
simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions
were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police
abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment. In People v. Coreche,[14] we explained thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering

with evidence found legislative expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on
the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in
place a three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of
inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs the duty to “immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof”. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Consequently, in a line of cases,[15] we have lain emphasis on the

importance of complying with the prescribed procedure. Stringent
compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed
strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.[16]
Otherwise, “the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service.”[17]
Material irregularities in the conduct

of the buy-bust operations
In the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the following:
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine

hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only
carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but
also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the
State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish
the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the
prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody
of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity
of the prohibited substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap
renders the case for the State less than complete in terms of proving
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato
deserves exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of frame-up
became plausible in the face of the weakness of the Prosecution’s
evidence of guilt.[18] (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which
raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized

items. According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the
complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to
mark the confiscated sachets. The marking was done immediately after
Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony of
PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge of the complete initials of
accused-appellant, standing for the latter’s full name, was not clearly
established. Thus, doubt arises as to when the plastic sachets were
actually marked, as shown by PO2 Gasid’s testimony:
A [PO2 Gasid]:We conducted a buy-bust operation on April 1, 2006.

PROSEC. Against whom did you conduct this buy-bust operation?
SANTOS:
A: Against alias Sam, sir.
PROSEC. What prompted you to conduct this operation against this

SANTOS: alias Sam?
A: We received information from our confidential informant
that one alias Sam is selling shabu at Cagayan De Oro
Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig.
PROSEC. Aside from this information that you received from your
SANTOS: informant, was there anything more that your informant
told you about the real identity of this alias Sam?
A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.[19]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. So, after you have taken the item and paid alias Sam and
SANTOS: then you executed the pre-arranged signal that you have
already purchased from him, what happened then?
A: After I made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung mata
ni alias Sam, para ho bang balisa, siguro napansin nya na
hindi lang kami dalawa (2), aakma syang tatakbo,
sinunggaban ko na po sya.
PROSEC. So, you held Sam already during that time?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What happened after that?

SANTOS:
A: I introduced myself as police officer and at that time I
arrested him.
PROSEC. What about your companions who serves [sic] as your

SANTOS: immediate back up, what happened to them when you were
already hold and arrested [sic] this alias Sam?
A: I noticed my companions approaching us.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. And what did your colleague Ragos do when he arrived at

SANTOS: your place?
A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam, he
was the one who handcuffed him.
PROSEC. Was there anything more that was done in that place of
SANTOS: occurrence during that time, Officer?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. Tell us please?

SANTOS:
A: After arresting alias Sam, I frisk [sic] him for the remaining
items he showed me and the buy-bust money I gave him.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Was there anything that you and your team did in the items
SANTOS: that you confiscated from the possession of the accused
during that time and the shabu that you bought from him?
A: I marked the items I confiscated at the place of incident.
PROSEC. How did you marked [sic] the item that you bought from
SANTOS: this alias Sam?
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. And what does that stand for? That SAU?

SANTOS:
A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.
PROSEC. Is that the only thing that you placed on the plastic sachet
SANTOS: containing the shabu that you bought from this alias Sam
during that time?
A: I marked the shabu I bought as SAU-1.
PROSEC. How about the other five (5) plastic sachets containing the
SANTOS: suspected shabu, what happened to that?
A: I marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and SAU-
6.[20]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Now, after you have marked and inventoried the items
SANTOS: that you bought and confiscated from this alias Sam during
that time, what else happened?
A: After the inventory of the evidences, I turn [sic] them
over to the investigator.
PROSEC. Where did you turn these items to your investigator?

SANTOS:
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. Who was your investigator during that time?

SANTOS:
A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir.
PROSEC. When you turn these items to your investigator, where were
SANTOS: you?
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. What happened to these items that you turn it over [sic] to
SANTOS: your investigator?
A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the items
confiscated.[21]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Now, Officer, this Sam when you have already arrested
SANTOS: him, were you able to know his real name?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What was his real name?

SANTOS:
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.
PROSEC. Is he present here in Court?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.[22]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. When you arrived at the place, by the way, where was your
HERNANDEZ: target area, Mr. Witness?
A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig City.
ATTY. When you were there, you did not buy [sic] anybody to buy
HERNANDEZ: shabu from the accused?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. So, you did not conduct any test buy?

HERNANDEZ:
A: No, sir.
ATTY. Nor did you make any inquiry with Cagayan De Oro Street
HERNANDEZ: regarding the accused?
A: Not anymore, sir.
ATTY. At that moment, you don’t have any idea regarding the
HERNANDEZ: identity of the accused and also whether he was engaged
in illegal activity?
A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the
informant.
ATTY. It was only the informant who knows the accused?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And also your other members, they did not know the
HERNANDEZ: accused?
A: Yes, sir.[23] (Emphasis supplied.)
A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust operation, from the
marking of the confiscated items to the arrest of accused-appellant, is
provided by the testimony of PO1 Ragos:
PROSEC. And what is the effect to you of the act of Gasid taking off
SANTOS: his cap?
A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.
PROSEC. When you saw Gasid acting that way, being the back up of
SANTOS: him during that time, what did you do?
A: I run [sic] towards them.
PROSEC. Were you able to go near him when you run [sic] towards
SANTOS: him?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What happened?

SANTOS:
A: I saw him holding Sam.
PROSEC. When you saw Gasid already holding Sam, what did you
SANTOS: do?
A: I handcuffed Sam.
PROSEC. After that, what happened?

SANTOS:
A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his
initials.
PROSEC. Did you see Gasid marking those things that he took from
SANTOS: this Sam during that time?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. What marked [sic] did he put on these plastic sachets?

SANTOS:
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. Do you know what SAU connotes?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. Tell us?

SANTOS:
A: Sammy Abdul Umipang.
PROSEC. After that, what happened?

SANTOS:
A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights.
PROSEC. After this person was apprised of his rights, was there
SANTOS: anything more that was done?
A: We went back to the office.
PROSEC. All the members of the team went back to the office?
SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. And together with this alias Sam?

SANTOS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. What happened in your office?

SANTOS:
A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator.
PROSEC. Who was your investigator during that time?

SANTOS:
A: PO1 Saez.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. So, after the team has turn [sic] over the evidences to your
SANTOS: investigator in the person of Officer Saez, was there
anything more that transpired in relation to this event, this
incident?
A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. And this information regarding the accused was relayed to

HERNANDEZ: you by your immediate superior?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And this information was the first information regarding

HERNANDEZ: the accused, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. What was told you was that your target person was alias
HERNANDEZ: Sam?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. No photographs of alias Sam was shown to you?

HERNANDEZ:
A: None, sir.
ATTY. You have no derogatory records of this alias Sam in

HERNANDEZ: your office?
A: None, sir.
ATTY. You have no warrant of arrest?

HERNANDEZ:
A: None, sir.
ATTY. This alias Sam was not included in your watch list?
HERNANDEZ:
A: No, sir.[25]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. So, the markings were placed on the plastic sachets?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. After that Mr. Witness, you brought the accused together
HERNANDEZ: with the items to your office?
PROSEC. Already answered, Your Honor. We are just repeating the

SANTOS: same pattern, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. Mr. Witness, you investigated the accused?

HERNANDEZ:
A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused.
ATTY. So, you did not ask the full name of the accused?
HERNANDEZ:
A: It was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir.
ATTY. It was PO1 Saez who got his full name and on you [sic]
HERNANDEZ: part, that was the first time that you were able to
learned [sic] the full name of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. Because you knew him only as alias Sam?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. How about Officer Gasid, it was also the first time that
HERNANDEZ: he learned the full name of the accused?
A: Maybe not, sir.
ATTY. Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it was Officer Saez who
HERNANDEZ: delivered the items to the crime lab?
A: No sir, it was Gasid.
ATTY. But you were not with him when he delivered the specimen
HERNANDEZ: to the crime laboratory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. No further question, Your Honor.

HERNANDEZ:
PROSEC. No re-direct, Your Honor. x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
SANTOS:
The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are

suspect. From their testimonies during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos
both admitted that they only knew their target by the name “Sam.” They
both testified that, after accused-appellant was handcuffed, frisked, and
read his rights, they immediately brought him to the police precinct. They
then said that it was a certain PO1 Saez who investigated him. In fact, in
their joint affidavit, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos stated thus:
Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa pagsisiyasat

at pagtatanong tungkol sa detalye ng kaniyang pagkatao at sa layuning
masampahan ng kaukulang reklamo sa paglabag ng Section 5 and 11 of
RA 9165.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge
of the complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial,
which enabled the former to mark the seized items with the latter’s
complete initials. This suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of
the items raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know about the
initials of Umipang prior to the latter’s statements at the police precinct,
thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where the marking really
took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez
who asked accused-appellant about the latter’s personal circumstances,
including his true identity, and that the questioning happened when
accused-appellant was already at the police station. We thus reiterate:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs

or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence
from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time
they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end
of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting”, or
contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held
that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs
raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and
suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution.
Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v. Casimiro, we held that the failure to
mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts
doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable

doubt. These rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and
People v. Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity of the drug
specimen occasioned by the prosecution’s failure to prove that the
evidence submitted for chemical analysis is the same as the one
seized from the accused suffice to warrant acquittal on reasonable
doubt.[28] (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items at
the place of arrest does not by itself impair the integrity of the chain of
custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.[29] We
have already clarified that the marking upon “immediate” confiscation of the
prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team.[30] We will analyze this
possible seed of doubt that has been planted by the unexplained marking
of the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang, together with the other
alleged irregularities.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to

seek the third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of
R.A. 9165. Under the law, the inventory and photographing of seized items
must be conducted in the presence of a representative from the media,
from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official.
The testimony of PO2 Gasid, as quoted below, is enlightening:
ATTY. Mr. Witness, you also made the certificate of inventory, is

HERNANDEZ:that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And since this is a drug operation, you are required by law to
HERNANDEZ:make a certificate of inventory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And that inventory, you are required by law that there should
HERNANDEZ:be a signature of any representative from the media, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And also representative from the Department of Justice, is

HERNANDEZ:that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. And also elected official, Mr. Witness?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. I’m showing to you Mr. Witness your certificate of inventory,

HERNANDEZ:do you confirm that there are no signatures placed by
any member of the media, representative from the

Department of Justice and any elected official?
A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.
ATTY. And there appears to be an initial of RS above the type

HERNANDEZ:written name Sammy Umipang, who wrote this initial RS?
A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.
ATTY. Who refuse [sic] to sign?

HERNANDEZ:
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.[31]
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. Why was the certificate of inventory not witnesses [sic]

SANTOS: and signed by any members of the media, the DOJ and
elected officials, Officer?
A: That time there is no available representative, sir.
COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available

representative of those officers or persons in the
certificate of inventory?
A: The investigator contacted representative from the
media, Your Honor.
COURT: What barangay this incident happened?

A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.
COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?

A: No, Your Honor.
COURT: What about the barangay councilman?

A: No, Your Honor.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory

and the marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case,
the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson
or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they
contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show
whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ
representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for
failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient time from the
moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the
time of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of
the apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives
pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable – without so much as an explanation on

whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress
that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,[33] or that there was a justifiable ground for
failing to do so.[34]
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory

and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A.
9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial,[35] the Certificate of
Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the
arresting officer who prepared the certificate[36] – thus making the certificate
defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the
seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do so. We reiterate that
these requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be
implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.[37]
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not
automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she
was convicted.[38] This is especially true when the lapses in procedure were
“recognized and explained in terms of [] justifiable grounds.”[39] There must
also be a showing “that the police officers intended to comply with the
procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason.”[40]
However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution
presented in evidence.[41] This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply
invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official
duties.[42] As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully
establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on
the criminal liability of the accused.[43]
For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to
conclude from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case
that the arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards
under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the
integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of
allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve
the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, “as every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.”[44]
As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities “to
exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards
that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our
society.”[45] The need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing
the evidence of the prosecution – especially when the pieces of evidence

were derived from a buy-bust operation – “redounds to the benefit of the
criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at the same time
instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors.”[46]
WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24

July 2007 RTC Joint Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy
Umipang y Abdul is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Cases
No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
The Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02898 was penned by CA
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag.
[2]
The Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 14935-D-TG and 14936-D-TG
was penned by Judge Florito S. Macalino.
[3]
CA Decision at 4-5, rollo, pp. 5-6.
[4]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant at 9-12 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR
H.C. No. 02898, decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, pp. 47-50. In our 5
April 2010 Resolution, this Court noted the Manifestation of accused-
appellant that he is adopting his 13 December 2007 Brief for the Accused-
Appellant filed with the CA as his supplemental brief (rollo, p. 51).
[5]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant at 11 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR
H.C. No. 02898, decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, p. 49.
[6]
Brief for the Appellee at 19 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
02898, decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, p. 97. In our 5 April 2010
Resolution, this Court noted the Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief, as it has already
exhaustively discussed all the issues in its 22 April 2008 Brief for the
Appellee (rollo, p. 51).
[7]
Brief for the Appellee at 8-19 (People v. Umipang, CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
02898, decided on 21 May 2009), CA rollo, pp. 86-97.
[8]
[9]
Id.
[10]
Imson v. People, G.R. 193003, 13 July 2011, 653 SCRA 826.
[11]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8, at 272-273.
[12]
People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, 29 October 2008, 570 SCRA
273.
[13]
Imson v. People, supra note 10.
[14]
G.R. No. 182528, 14 August 2009, 596 SCRA 350, fn. 16 at 358-359.
[15]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8 (citing People v. Nazareno, G.R. No.
174771, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 630; People v. Santos, G.R. No.
175593, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA 489; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
181545, 8 October 2008, 568 SCRA 273; and People v. De la Cruz, supra
note 12).
[16]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8 (citing People v. De la Cruz, supra note
12).
[17]
People v. Martin, G.R. No. 193234, 19 October 2011.
[18]
G.R. No. 173794, 18 January 2012.
[19]
Direct examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, TSN, 22 November 2006, p.
4, RTC records, p. 90.
[20]
Id. at 16-19, RTC records, pp. 102-105.
[21]
Id. at 20, RTC records, p. 106.
[22]
Id. at 25, RTC records, p. 111.
[23]
Cross-examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, id. at 32-33, RTC records,
pp. 118-119.
[24]
Direct examination of Witness PO1 Ragos, TSN, 6 December 2006, pp.
15-17, RTC records, pp. 151-153.
[25]
Cross-examination of Witness PO1 Ragos, id. at 21-22, RTC records,
pp. 157-158.
[26]
Id. at 30-32, RTC records, pp. 166-168.
[27]
Pinagsamang Salaysay ng Pag-Aresto at Paghaharap ng Reklamo o
Demanda, RTC records, p. 69.
[28]
Supra note 14, at 357-358.
[29]
Imson v. People, supra note 10.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Cross-examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, supra note 19 at 47-48, RTC
records, pp. 133-134.
[32]
Re-direct examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, id. at 49, RTC records,
pp. 135.
[33]
See People v. Garcia, supra note 8.
[34]
See People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12.
[35]
Cross-examination of Witness PO2 Gasid, supra note 19 at 47, RTC
records, p. 133.
[36]
RTC records, p. 73.
[37]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8; People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12.
[38]
People v. Ulama, G.R. No. 186530, 14 December 2011.
[39]
People v. Martin, supra note 17.
[40]
Id.
[41]
See People v. Garcia, supra note 8.
[42]
See id.
[43]
Id.
[44]
People v. De la Cruz, supra note 12, at 286.
[45]
People v. Garcia, supra note 8, at 278.
[46]
People v. Coreche, supra note 14, at 365.
People v Martinez | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARNOLD

MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ
Y CAROLINO, AND RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13,
2008 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of
violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings
or Meetings.
The Facts
The Information indicting the accused reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan,
named accused, ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y
FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and
RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law, confederating
together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess dangerous drugs (shabu
residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil,
during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) person[s].
Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.[3]
As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1

Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and
Police Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic
chemical officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45
o'clock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a
concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was
going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1
Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan
City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was
located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused
Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested
him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A.
Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a
room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of
them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items
found in the room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan
Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter
conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic
sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of
used aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The accused were subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were
found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R.

Martinez, claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of
them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to
meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez
and who was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they
were going around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in
front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While
they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen
emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the
police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and
charged with sniffing shabu.
The Ruling of the RTC
The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN
MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs
During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under
Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and

each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be
disposed of in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness
PO1 Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over
the defenses of denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were
held to have been in constructive possession of the subject items. A
conspiracy was also found present as there was a common purpose to
possess the dangerous drug.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of
the RTC as to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the
accused. It further held that although the procedure regarding the custody
and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was
not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not
sufficiently controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court
praying for the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants

to be having a pot session at the time of their arrest;
2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics

of the police to plant the shabu paraphernalia to justify
the arrest of the accused-appellants without warrant;
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus

delicti has not been sufficiently established;
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated

testimony of PO1 Azardon insufficient to convict the
accused-appellants of the crime charged;
5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-

appellants.
For accused Rafael Gonzales

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE.
II

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED
CONFISCATED DRUG.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds

that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal
reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and
2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not
been duly established.
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if
he fails to raise such issue before arraignment.[5] However, this waiver is
limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[6]
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the
accused, it has been held that this Court has the power to correct any error,
even if unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,[7]
especially when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.[8]
While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than
frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the
doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the
attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat substantive rights.[9] Thus, despite the procedural lapses of
the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the
case at bench. The clear infringement of the accused's right to be protected
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee,

intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers
and effects.[10] Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against

all searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the
following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant -- (i)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;[11] (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.[12]
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful
arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional
guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private


actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and
the subject items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the
testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit[13] with PO1 Dela Cruz,
they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based
solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on
in said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did

he not tell you how many persons were actually conducting the
pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you

were not armed with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged

informant, you did not know personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an]
ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this
report to you placed in the police blotter before you proceeded to
the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or
identity of the person who told you that he was allegedly informed
that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney
but he does not want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an
ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you
immediately formed a group and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael

Gonzales, you could not see what is happening inside the house
of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the
plastic sachet of shabu on the table while you were outside the
premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the
paraphernalia?
COURT:
Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see
them, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person
who told you that he was informed by another person that there
was an ongoing pot session going on inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of
Rafael Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.[14]
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs

(a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable
cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable
cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he
is charged.[15]
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases[16] that
tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless
search,[17] such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because
said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically,
circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest.
None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without
warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informer's tip. The
case of People v. Bolasa[18] is informative on this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man
and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The
police immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked
towards the house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the
house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and
woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced
themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and
arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall

under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is
illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the
time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have
any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it.
Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a
penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there
was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were
illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to
contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and
ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like
manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle,
a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it
cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the
evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have

conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of
the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting
accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to
effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained
during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants;
hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental
law.[19]
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [20]
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no

personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had
no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order
to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that
the accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of
PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had
no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the
accused was based on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?

A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot
session in the house of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the
information originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session

was going on? [No Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged

pot session was going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot

session was going on somewhere in Arellano but you don't know
the exact place where the pot session was going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the

veracity of the alleged pot session because he claimed that he
derived that information from somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an
ongoing pot session, sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?

A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the
alleged pot session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant don't [sic] know physically what
was really happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot
session there, sir.[21] [Emphasis supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The
elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.[22]
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers

intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation
before they discovered the accused with the subject items. If the prior
peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to
constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this
case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of
a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, a
stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance

considering that the identity and address of one of the accused were
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been
secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the
ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on
the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.[23]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The
drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for
the acquittal of the accused.
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors

and judges have glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where
law enforcers are able to present the alleged evidence of the crime,
regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This attitude
tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law
enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the
breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration of society.
While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to
uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the
parameters set by the Constitution and the law.[24]
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the
acquittal of the accused would still be in order for failure of the
apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody requirement in
dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not
established with moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be
questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and
86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03,
Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990.
They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items
conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items taken, no
compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to
give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled
from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime
laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby
producing reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the
presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs

are: (i) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the dangerous drug.[25] Additionally, this being a
case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of
the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have occurred
during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for
conviction. In order to establish the existence of the drug, its chain of
custody must be sufficiently established. The chain of custody requirement
is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are
removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the
seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and
finally to the court.[26] Malillin v. People was the first in a growing number of
cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs
cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires

that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.[27]
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[28] defines chain of

custody as follows:
b."Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used
in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for

safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous
drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the

custody of seized or confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to
ensure their identity and integrity, as follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over
to a supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to the police
crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the
substance changes hand a number of times, it is imperative for the officer
who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking on its
plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that
cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the
trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure
he observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one
and seal the same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach the
laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further,
after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance
in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic container and
seal it again with a new seal since the police officer's seal has been
broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed condition
of the plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on the
procedure he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution
would have to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory
technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter
how briefly one's possession has been. Each of them has to testify that the
substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted
while in his care.[29]
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9165 further elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements

will not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and
invalid, provided that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-
compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable ground is found
availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to properly preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of
the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in
court. A review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the
documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in the
chain of custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the

following were confiscated from the accused, to wit:
a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu

residues.
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2)
pcs colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ).
c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu

residues.
d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu

residues.
e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.[30]

[Emphases supplied]
At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned
items were indorsed to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro
Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for proper disposition.[31] A letter-request for
laboratory examination was prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar
Orduna Basbag for the following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu

residues marked "DC&A-1."
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu
residues marked "DC&A-2."
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked
"DC&A-3."[32]
[Emphases supplied]
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp.

Maranion by SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry
Report No. D-042-06L listed the specimens which were submitted for
testing, to wit:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:
A - A1 to A115 - One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic

sachet with tag each containing suspected shabu residue without
markings.
B - B1 to B11 - Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each
containing suspected shabu residue without markings.
C - C1 to C49 - Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each

containing suspected shabu residue without markings.[33]
[Emphases supplied]
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a
Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz,
which reads:
DCPS AID SOTG 05
September 2006
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006,

we together with our precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and
SWAT members composed of SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia,
PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin Guarin apprehended the following
names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old,
married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR DIZON Y
FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471 Lucao Dist.,
this city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney
driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ, 39
yrs old, married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs old,
separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.
Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought
to Dagupan City Police Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and
indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to record the incident and the sachet of
suspected Shabu Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime
Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.
Seizing Officer:
(sgd.) (s
gd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro
Dela Cruz
Affiant Af
fiant
Remarks:
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed[34]
[Emphases supplied]
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used

aluminum foil, and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all
containing shabu residue, as identified in the Final Chemistry Report, were
presented in court and marked as Exhibits "H" and series, "I" and series,
and "J" and series, respectively. Said items were identified by PO1
Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.[35]
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items
were properly preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
items seized from the accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime
laboratory for examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the
letter-request for laboratory examination.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is

mistaken.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165. After seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical
inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused, or their
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ,
and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed,
and provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1 Azardon,
in his testimony,[36] admitted that no photographs were taken. The only
discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure was that the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you
immediately formed a group and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in
that place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have
pictures taken, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[37]
[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-
compliance. The suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance
with the requirements. The police officers were not prevented from
preparing an inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of warrantless
seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Whatever
effect the suddenness of the situation may have had should have
dissipated by the time they reached the police station, as the suspects had
already been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been held
that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending
officer from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography
of the items at their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the law's
intent to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[38]
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to
comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Some
cases are People v. Garcia,[39] People v. Dela Cruz,[40] People v. Dela
Cruz,[41] People v. Santos, Jr.,[42] People v. Nazareno,[43] People v.
Orteza,[44] Zarraga v. People,[45] and People v. Kimura.[46]
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v.
Sanchez is instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody"
rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that
they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step
initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers
from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and
on allegations of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending

officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s
seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or
an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a
different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container
shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the
next officer in the chain of custody.[47] [Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1
Dela Cruz does it appear that the subject items were at all marked. It was
only in the letter-request for laboratory examination that the subject items
were indicated to have been marked with "DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and
"DC&A-3." There is no showing, however, as to who made those markings
and when they were made. Moreover, those purported markings were
never mentioned when the subject items were identified by the prosecution
witnesses when they took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic
sachets, rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not
specifically pertain to any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was
only in the Chemistry Report[48] that the precise number of each type of
item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents
prior to said report, the subject items were never accurately quantified but
only described as "pieces,"[49] "several pcs,"[50] and "shabu
paraphernallas."[51] Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates that all the
subject items had "no markings," although each item was reported to have
been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the subject
items during laboratory examination and testing.[52] Doubt, therefore, arises
as to the identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral
certainty that the subject items seized from the accused were the same
ones subjected to the laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the
marking of seized items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v.
People,[53] People v. Kimura,[54] and People v. Laxa.[55]
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the
courts below gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on
the day of the seizure of the items, it was prepared only three days after.
More important, the receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were
confiscated and their quantity. These are basic information that a
confiscation receipt should provide. The only information contained in the
Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and the general
description of the subject items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu
paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory." The receipt is
made even more dubious by PO1 Azardon's admission in his testimony[56]
that he did not personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not
know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification[57] issued by the Dagupan Police

Station, the subject items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty
Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper disposition. These were later turned
over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is, however, no showing
of how and when the subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano to
SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of

custody. No witness testified on how the subject items were kept after they
were tested prior to their presentation in court. This Court has highlighted
similar shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,[58] People v. Garcia,[59]
People v. Sanchez,[60] and Malillin v. People.[61]
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the

accused. Contrary to PO1 Azardon's testimony[62] that they were tipped off
by a concerned citizen while at the police station, the Letter[63] to the
Executive Director of the DDB states that the apprehending officers were
tipped off "while conducting monitoring/surveillance." Said letter also
indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and seizure
occurred on September 4, 2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in
the Information. It was also mentioned in the aforementioned Certification
of the Dagupan Police and Joint Affidavit of the police officers that a glass
tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from the
accused. Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory
examination.
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the
prosecution's position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject
items were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by
the CA, the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory
examination, have been shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the
identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases
constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential before the accused can be
found guilty.[64]
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section
86 of R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,[65] this Court held that said
section was silent as to the consequences of such failure, and said silence
could not be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the
participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an
arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall
be the "lead agency" in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related
cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to
perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will
eventually be transferred to the latter.
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165

does not affect the admissibility of the evidence but only its weight.[66] Thus,
had the subject items in this case been admissible, their evidentiary merit
and probative value would be insufficient to warrant conviction.
It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police
officers, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
should prevail. However, such presumption obtains only when there is no
deviation from the regular performance of duty.[67] Where the official act in
question is irregular on its face, the presumption of regularity cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and
proven to be irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain
of custody, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the
presumption of innocence of the accused.[68]
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for
dangerous drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the
proper arrest, search and seizure procedure under the law.[69] Some bona
fide arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of
the accused because drug enforcement operatives compromise the
integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items. It behooves this Court to
remind law enforcement agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules
and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized
drugs.
It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A.

No. 9165 may not always be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-
compliance therewith is not necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in
procedure must be recognized, addressed and explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized must be shown to have been preserved.[70]
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec.

11[71] (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15[72] (Use of Dangerous
Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law
enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges
under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis
for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed
under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be
more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15
instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that
there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The
minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of
residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty
under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six
months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11
on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to
rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for
a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form
of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive
for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the
evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law
enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for
use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should
have been charged under Sec. 14[73] (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs
During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the
maximum penalty under Sec. 12[74] (Possession of Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under
Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of
P50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that
the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have
violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users,
this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs
cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of
dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the
confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated,
the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should

only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other
than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided
for in Sec. 15.
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. HC-NO. 03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment
entered ACQUITTING the accused and ordering their immediate release
from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days
from receipt of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be
furnished the Director-General, Philippine National Police, and the Director-
General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information and
guidance.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over
the seized items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Abad, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-14. Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. with
Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and Associate Justice Japar B.
Dimaampao, concurring.
[2]
Records, pp. 140-145. Penned by Judge Emma M. Torio.
[3]
Id. at 1.
[4]
Id. at 145.
[5]
People v. Palma, G.R. No. 189279, March 9, 2010.
[6]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010.
[7]
C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 Phil 11, 22 (2002).
[8]
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838, 849-850 (2003).
[9]
San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 345,
357-358.
[10]
People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 476,
493.
[11]
Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec. 13.
[12]
People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 (1999).
[13]
Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits, p. 11.
[14]
TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 10-16.
[15]
People v. Ayangao, 471 Phil. 379, 388 (2004).
[16]
Id., People v. Valdez, 363 Phil. 481 (1999); People v. Montilla, 349 Phil.
640 (1998).
[17]
Id.
[18]
Supra note 13.
[19]
Supra note 13.
[20]
People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632 (1999).
[21]
TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 3-5.
[22]
Supra note 13.
[23]
People v. Valdez, 395 Phil. 206, 218 (2000).
[24]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010; citing People v.
Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 484-485.
[25]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA
377, 390-391.
[26]
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259,
274.
[27]
G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632-633.
[28]
Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory
Equipment.
[29]
G.R. No. 188900, March 5, 2010.
[30]
Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits, p. 11.
[31]
Exhibit "G," folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[32]
Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, p. 6.
[33]
Exhibit "D," folder of exhibits, p. 10.
[34]
Exhibit "F," folder of exhibits, p. 12.
[35]
TSN, February 9, 2007, p. 6; and TSN, January 22, 2007, pp. 10-12.
[36]
TSN, February 23, 2007, p. 7.
[37]
[38]
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA
194, 218.
[39]
Supra note 27.
[40]
G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273.
[41]
[42]
[43]
G.R. No. 174771, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 630.
[44]
G.R. No. 173051, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 750.
[45]
G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 639.
[46]
471 Phil. 895 (2004).
[47]
Supra note 38.
[48]
Exhibit "C," folder of exhibits, p. 9; Exhibit "D," folder of exhibits, p. 10.
[49]
Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, p. 6.
[50]
Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits, p. 11; Exhibit "G," folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[51]
Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits, p. 7; Exhibit "F," folder of exhibits, p. 12.
[52]
TSN, January 22, 2007, pp. 10-12.
[53]
Supra note 46.
[54]
Supra note 47.
[55]
414 Phil. 156 (2001).
[56]
TSN, February 9, 2007, p. 7; TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 6-7.
[57]
Exhibit "G," folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[58]
G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762.
[59]
Supra note 27.
[60]
Supra note 39.
[61]
Supra note 28.
[62]
[63]
Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits, p. 7.
[64]
People v. Cacao, G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2010, 610 SCRA 636,
651.
[65]
G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 631-632.
[66]
People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627,
637.
[67]
People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA
140, 156-157.
[68]
People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 173477, February 26, 2010.
[69]
People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762,
784-785, citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580
SCRA 259, 277-278.
[70]
Id. at 785.
[71]
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of
purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy",
paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic
acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the
quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or
more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment
and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous
drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs
and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300)
grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous
drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs
such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and
those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams
of marijuana.
[72]
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or
arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a
confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6)
months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to
the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any
dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall
not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her
possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under
Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall
apply.
[73]
Section 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings. - The maximum penalty provided for in Section 12 of this Act
shall be imposed upon any person, who shall possess or have under
his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body, during
parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in the proximate company of at
least two (2) persons.
[74]
Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging
from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into
the body: Provided, That in the case of medical practitioners and various
professionals who are required to carry such equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the
Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other

paraphernalia fit or intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the
preceding paragraph shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has
smoked, consumed, administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or
used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Section 15
of this Act.
People v Sabdula | P a g e | 1
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184758 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SONNY SABDULA y AMANDA, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the February 8, 2008 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02726, which affirmed the January 29, 2007
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City. The
RTC decision found appellant Sonny Sabdula y Amanda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The trial
court imposed on him the penalty of life imprisonment.
THE FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II

of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 2004, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there,
willfully, and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as
broker in the said transaction, 0.10 (zero point ten) gram of white crystalline
substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 The prosecution presented
Police Officer (PO) 2 Bernard Centeno at the trial, while the testimonies of
PO3 Joselito Chantengco and PO1 Alan Fortea became the subject of the
parties’ stipulations. The appellant and Shirley Sabdula, on the other hand,
took the witness stand for the defense.
The evidence for the prosecution established that in the morning of

February 1, 2004, a confidential informant told the members of the Central
Police District (CPD) in Baler, Quezon City about the illegal drug activities
of one alias "Moneb" at a squatter’s area in San Roque II, Quezon City.
Acting on this information, operatives of the Station Intelligence and
Investigation Branch, Baler Police Station 2, CPD formed a buy-bust team
composed of PO2 Centeno (the designated poseur-buyer), PO1 Fortea,
PO2 Rolando Daduya, PO1 Victor Porte, PO1 Louise Escarlan and PO1
Noel de Guzman.6
At around 7:00 p.m., the buy-bust team and the informant went to the target
area. When they arrived there, the informant introduced PO2 Centeno as
his "kumpare" to the appellant. PO2 Centeno asked the appellant if he
could "score" two hundred pesos worth of shabu.7 The appellant responded
by taking out a plastic sachet from his pocket, and handing it to PO2
Centeno. PO2 Centeno in turn handed P200.00 to the appellant, and then
gave the pre-arranged signal.
As the other members of the buy-bust team were rushing to the scene,
PO2 Centeno introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the
appellant. Afterwards, he frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-bust
money from his right pocket.8
The police thereafter brought the appellant to the Baler Police Station 2 for
investigation. Upon arrival, PO2 Centeno gave the seized plastic sachet to
SPO2 Salinel who, in turn, handed it to PO3 Chantengco who made a
request for laboratory examination that PO3 Centeno brought, together with
the seized item to the Central Police District Crime Laboratory for analysis.9
Per Chemistry Report No. D-140-2004 of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (the
forensic chemist), the submitted specimen tested positive for the presence
of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).10
In his defense, the appellant testified that between 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. on
January 29, 2004, he was on board a taxi at C5 Road, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City, when a group of about five (5) men pointed their guns at him
and told him to get out of the vehicle. After he alighted, the armed men told
him to board a mobile car11 and brought him to the Baler Police Station. At
the station, the police asked him to remove his clothes, and confiscated his
wallet, bracelet, cap and P300.00. The police then told him that he would
be detained for drug charges and that he would be jailed for 40 years.12
Shirley’s testimony was summarized by the RTC as follows:
x x x On February 1, 2004, she was at home when her brother was brought
to Precinct 2, Baler[,] Quezon City. On January 29, 2004, at about 11:00
p.m., she received a text message from Allan Fortea, a policeman, telling
her to call a certain number if she loves her brother. The next day, at about
8:00 a.m., she called Fortea at the number he gave her. He told her that his
brother at Station 2 Baler Quezon City and asked her to produce
P200,000.00 as ransom for her brother. She asked him if he could talk to
him. He allowed her and her brother to talk and the latter pleaded to her for
help and cried. Fortea told her not to talk in their dialect and took the
phone. Fortea then told her to see him at SM North Edsa Car Park on
January 30, 2004 at 7:00 p.m. Fortea did not come. At about 9:00 p.m., she
proceeded to Station 2 and met Fortea. He asked her about the money but
she told him she cannot afford it. Her brother was then detained when she
failed to give in to the said demand.13
The RTC, in its decision dated January 29, 2007, found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered the appellant to pay a
P500,000.00 fine.
THE CASE BEFORE THE CA
The appellant appealed his conviction to the CA where his appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02726. In its decision of February 8,
2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA held that the prosecution successfully established all the elements
of illegal sale of shabu: PO2 Centeno, the poseur-buyer, positively
identified the appellant as the person who gave him shabu weighing 0.10
gram in exchange for P200.00. The CA also ruled that the buy-bust team
were presumed to have performed their duties regularly. It added that the
appellant failed to impute improper motive on the part of the arresting
officers.
The CA further held that the chain of custody over the seized plastic sachet
were properly established, even if the time of the actual marking of the
seized item had not been shown.
THE PETITION
In his present petition,14 the petitioner claims that he was not selling drugs
when the police arrested him. He adds that his alibi was corroborated by
his sister, Shirley. He also argues that the seized plastic sachet was not
properly marked by the police.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the police were
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. It further
maintains that the chain of custody over the seized drug was not broken.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT the appellant for the

prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We restate at the outset the constitutional mandate that an accused shall

be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The burden lies with the prosecution to overcome this presumption
of innocence by presenting the required quantum evidence; the prosecution
must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required evidence, the defense
does not even need to present evidence in its own behalf; the presumption
prevails and the accused should be declared acquitted.16
I. No moral certainty on the corpus delicti

A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the
perfunctory presentation of evidence establishing each element of the
crime, namely: the identities of the buyer and seller, the transaction or sale
of the illegal drug and the existence of the corpus delicti.
In securing or sustaining a conviction under RA No. 9165, the intrinsic

worth of these pieces of evidence, especially the identity and integrity of the
corpus delicti, must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique characteristic
that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented
in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-
appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing
under RA No. 9165 fails.17
a. The ‘Marking’ Requirement vis-à-vis the Chain of Custody Rule
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 (which

implements R.A. No. 9165) defines chain of custody as the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to the receipt in the forensic
laboratory, to safekeeping and the presentation in court for identification
and eventual destruction.
The Court explained the importance of establishing the chain of custody

over the seized drug in the recent case of People of the Philippines v.
Joselito Beran y Zapanta @ "Jose,"18 as follows:
The purpose of the requirement of proof of the chain of custody is to ensure

that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug are preserved, as
thus dispel unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence. To be
admissible, the prosecution must establish by records or testimony the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit, from the time it came into the
possession of the police officers, until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition, and all the way to the time it was offered in
evidence.
Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
"Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-
buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Long before
Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, this Court has consistently held that
failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs casts
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is
vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are
seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.19
The records in the present case do not show that the police marked the
seized plastic sachet immediately upon confiscation, or at the police
station. Nowhere in the court testimony of PO2 Centeno, or in the
stipulated testimonies of PO3 Chantengco and PO1 Fortea, did they
indicate that the seized item had ever been marked. Notably, the members
of the buy-bust team did not also mention that they marked the seized
plastic sachet in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
How the apprehending team could have omitted such a basic and vital
procedure in the initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles and alarms
us. We point out that succeeding handlers of the specimen would use the
markings as reference. If at the first or the earliest reasonably available
opportunity, the apprehending team did not mark the seized items, then
there was nothing to identify it later on as it passed from hand to hand. Due
to the procedural lapse in the first link of the chain of custody, serious
uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the
prosecution introduced into evidence.
We are not unaware that the seized plastic sachet already bore the
markings "BC 02-01-04" when it was examined by Forensic Chemist
Jabonillo. In the absence, however, of specifics on how, when and where
this marking was done and who witnessed the marking procedure, we
cannot accept this marking as compliance with the required chain of
custody requirement. There was also no stipulation between the parties
regarding the circumstances surrounding this marking. We note in this
regard that it is not enough that the seized drug be marked; the marking
must likewise be made in the presence of the apprehended violator. As
earlier stated, the police did not at any time ever hint that they marked the
seized drug.
In Lito Lopez v. People of the Philippines20 we acquitted the accused for

failure of the police to mark the seized drugs. The Court had a similar ruling
in People of the Philippines v. Merlita Palomares y Costuna;21 the Court
acquitted the accused for the prosecution’s failure to clearly establish the
identity of the person who marked the seized drugs; the place where
marking was made; and whether the marking had been made in the
accused’s presence. These recent cases show that the Court will not
hesitate to free an accused if irregularities attended the first stage of the
chain of custody over the seized drugs.
b. The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No.

9165, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules

and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; [Emphasis ours]
In the present case, no evidence was produced showing that the members
of the buy-bust team had extended reasonable efforts to comply with these
requirements in handling the evidence. The lapse is patent from the
following exchanges during trial:
FISCAL ROGELIO ANTERO:
Q: x x x After the body frisk and the recovery of the buy-bust money from
the person of the accused, what happened next?
PO2 CENTENO:
A: We went to the station and turned over to the desk officer for proper
disposition.
xxxx
Q: How about the pieces of evidence you recovered?
A: I also turned it over to the desk officer, sir.
Q: Who was the desk officer?
A: SPO2 Salinel, sir.
Q: What did the desk officer do with the evidence?
A: He designated the investigator. Then, the investigator made the proper

request for Crime Lab.
Q: Who was the investigator?
A: PO3 Chantengco.
xxxx
Q: Why do you know that the duty desk officer turned over the pieces of
evidence to Chantengco?
A: I was there, sir.
Q: What happened when this pieces of evidence was turned over to the
investigator?
A: The investigator made the request for Crime Lab.
Q: After the request for laboratory examination of specimen was made.

[W]hat happened next?
A: We immediately brought [sic] to the Crime Lab. for examination.22
These exchanges further show that the apprehending team never

conducted an inventory nor did they photograph the confiscated item in the
presence of the appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, or an elective official either at the place of
seizure, or at the police station. The Joint Affidavit of the police did not also
mention any inventory conducted of any photograph taken. Corollarily,
there was no certificate of inventory or inventory receipt and photographs of
the seized drugs attached to the records.
In People v. Gonzales,23 the police failed to conduct an inventory and to

photograph the seized plastic sachet. In acquitting the accused based on
reasonable doubt, we explained that [t]he omission of the inventory and
photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt,
considering that the inventory and photographing — to be made in the
presence of the accused or his representative, or within the presence of
any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected
official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory —
were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its
IRR.24
We recognize that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No.
9165 may not always be possible. Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR, in
fact, offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements
under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., "non-
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause,
however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural
lapses and thereafter cited justifiable grounds to explain them. In all cases,
the prosecution must have established that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized had been preserved.25
These conditions were not met in the present case as the prosecution did
not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the apprehending
team to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drug.
We stress that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
adequately explained; the Court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist.
II. No Presumption of Regularity

in the Performance of Official Duties
The CA relied on the presumption that regular duties have been regularly
performed in sustaining the appellant’s conviction. This presumption of
regularity, however, is disputable; any taint of irregularity taints the
performance undertaken and negates the presumption.26 It cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt.27
In the present case, the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner due to the failure of the police to mark,
inventory and photograph the seized plastic sachet effectively negated the
presumption of regularity. The procedural lapses by the police put in doubt
the identity and evidentiary value of the seized plastic sachet. Our ruling in
People v. Cantalejo28 on this point is particularly instructive:
As a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the
accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. However,
when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such
presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the

performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot
by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption
of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary

proof and which when challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as
binding truth.29
In fine, we hold that the totality of the presented evidence do not support a
finding of guilt with the certainty that criminal cases require. The procedural
lapses committed by the apprehending team show glaring gaps in the chain
of custody, creating a reasonable doubt on whether the shabu seized from
the appellant was the same shabu that were brought to the crime
laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as
evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drug bought
and sold, the body of the crime - the corpus delicti - has not been
adequately proven. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the
elements of the crime charged.1âwphi1
The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing a serious and
unrelenting campaign against illicit drugs. But we remind our law enforcers
to be ever mindful of the procedures required in the seizure, handling and
safekeeping of confiscated drugs. Observance of these procedures is
necessary to dispel any doubt of the outcome of arrests and buy-bust
operations, and to avoid wasting the efforts and the resources in the
apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws.30
WHEREFORE, in light of all these premises, we REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the February 8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR. H.C. No. 02726. Appellant Sonny Sabdula y Amanda is hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention
unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent the Director, Bureau of Corrections,

Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* In lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per

Raffle dated April 21, 2014.
1
Rollo, pp. 2-7; penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by
Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this
Court) and Vicente Q. Roxas.
2
3
Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
4
Records, p. 1.
5
Id. at 18.
6
TSN, January 12, 2005, p. 3.
7
Id. at 4.
8
Id. at 4-5.
9
Id. at 5-6.
10
Records, p. 11.
11
TSN, March 28, 2006, pp. 3-4.
12
Id. at 5-6.
13
Supra note 2, at 18.
14
15
Id. at 56-70.
16
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008,
570 SCRA 273, 282-283.
17
People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596
SCRA 257, 267.
18
G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014.
19
See People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011,
655 SCRA 279, 289-290.
20
G.R. No. 188653, January 29, 2014.
21
G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014.
22
TSN, January 12, 2005, pp. 5-6.
23
G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 123,
24
Id. at 135-136.
25
See People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009,
580 SCRA 259, 272-273.
26
See People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009,
581 SCRA 762, 783.
27
See People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26,
2010, 616 SCRA 652, 669.
28
G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 777.
29
Id. at 788.
30
See People of the Philippines v. Rogf!lia Jardine! Pepino-
Consulta, G.R. No. 191071, August 28, 2013.
People v De la Cruz | P a g e | 1
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 185717, June 08, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GARRY

DE LA CRUZ Y DELA CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the
February 8, 2007 Decision[2] in Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found
accused Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
In an Information[3] filed on June 3, 2003, accused was indicted for the

crime allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th of May, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the
said transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on July 28, 2003, accused pleaded "not guilty" to the
above charge.[4] Trial[5] on the merits ensued.
After conducting surveillance for a week, the Station Drug Enforcement

Unit in La Loma, Quezon City planned a buy-bust operation against a
certain Garry who was in the Barangay Watch List. The operation was
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
On May 29, 2003, at around 9:00 a.m., the station's Officer-in-Charge

(OIC), Police Inspector Oliver Villanueva (P/Insp. Villanueva), gave a
briefing on the buy-bust operation. Police Officer 2 Edcel Ibasco (PO2
Ibasco) was designated as poseur-buyer, while PO1 Roderick Valencia
(PO1 Valencia), PO1 Alfredo Mabutol, and PO2 Ronald Pascual were
assigned as back-up operatives. Their informant attended the briefing.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban

Streets, Quezon City and arrived there at around 9:30 a.m. The informant
introduced PO2 Ibasco to the accused, who was standing in front of a
shanty, as wanting to buy shabu. The accused asked for PhP 100, and
when PO2 Ibasco paid the amount, the former handed over to him a white
crystalline substance in a plastic sachet. Upon PO2 Ibasco's prearranged
signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached them. The
accused, sensing what was happening, ran towards the shanty but was
caught by PO1 Valencia at the alley. PO1 Valencia introduced himself as a
police officer and frisked the accused, in the process recovering the buy-
bust money.
The buy-bust team then brought the accused to the station. The accused
was turned over to the desk officer on duty, along with the substance in the
sachet bought from him and the recovered buy-bust money. After inquest,
the Information was filed on June 3, 2003. Accused was then committed to
the Quezon City Jail.[6]
Consequently, the substance inside the sachet believed to be shabu was

sent to and examined by a Philippine National Police forensic chemist,
Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (Engr. Jabonillo). The laboratory result confirmed
that the substance was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Only PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified for the prosecution during the
trial. The testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation
by the defense.
The accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused
used the defense of denial and alleged a frame-up by the arresting officers.
The accused testified that he was arrested on May 29, 2003 at around 9:00
a.m. inside his house at Barangay Manresa, Quezon City while he was
alone drinking coffee. While two neighbors were talking in front of his
house, a Tamaraw FX arrived. Five armed men alighted from it,
whereupon his neighbors ran away and were chased by them. The armed
men then returned, saying, "Nakatakas, nakatakbo." (They had escaped
and ran.) One of the armed men saw the accused and entered his
house. It was PO2 Ibasco, who frisked him and got PhP 60 from his
pocket. PO1 Valencia also entered his house and came out with a shoe
box, then said, "Sige, isakay n'yo na." (Take him in the car.) He asked the
armed men what his violation was but was told to merely explain at the
precinct.
In the police precinct, he was investigated and subsequently

detained. They showed him a plastic sachet which they allegedly
recovered from him. Then a man approached him and demanded PhP
30,000 for his release, but he said he did not have the money. Thereafter,
he was presented for inquest.
A witness, Rodolfo Buencamino (Buencamino), narrated that in the

morning of May 29, 2003, he called the police precinct to have a certain
"Taba," an alleged drug pusher in their area, arrested. PO2 Ibasco and
other police officers responded immediately. When the police officers
arrived, Buencamino pointed to "Taba," who, however, was able to evade
arrest. Thereafter, he was surprised to see the accused inside the vehicle
of the policemen. But he did not know why and where the accused was
arrested since he did not witness the actual arrest.
Another witness, Marbelita Collado Lepiten (Lepiten), testified that she was
at the terrace of her house on 135 Manba St., Manresa, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, when she noticed the accused talking to a certain
"Taba," a resident of the area. When a maroon Tamaraw FX stopped in
front of the house of accused, "Taba" ran away and was pursued by two
men who alighted from the vehicle. The two men returned without "Taba,"
who evidently escaped, and entered the house of the accused. She did not
know what happened inside the house but she eventually saw the men
push the accused outside into their vehicle.
The Ruling of the RTC
On February 8, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GARRY

DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.
In convicting the accused, the RTC relied on and gave credence to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Citing
People v. Jubail,[7] which enumerated the elements required to be
established by the prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the
trial court found that the prosecution had established the elements of the
crime.
The RTC pointed out that Buencamino may, indeed, have called the police
to arrest a certain "Taba," an alleged pusher in the area, but he was not
present when the accused was arrested. The trial court likewise did not
accord evidentiary weight to the testimony of Lepiten, who testified that she
saw the accused talking to "Taba" and that when the police officers entered
the house of the accused, she was unaware of what transpired
inside. Thus, the RTC concluded that her testimony did not provide clear
and convincing justification to cast doubt on the candid and straightforward
testimonies of the police officers.
Applying the presumption of the performance of official function, the lack of

showing any ill motive on the part of the police officers to testify against the
accused, and the principle that the bare denial of an accused is inherently
weak, the RTC convicted the accused.
Consequently, with his conviction, the accused started to serve his

sentence[8] and was subsequently committed to the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City.
Aggrieved, accused appealed[9] his conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On June 30, 2008, the appellate court rendered the appealed decision,
wholly affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of appellant.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DENIED and

the assailed Decision supra is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
The CA upheld the findings of the trial court that the essential elements
required for the conviction of an accused for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA
9165 were present in the instant case. The appellate court brushed aside
the irregularities raised by accused-appellant by putting premium credence
on the testimonies of the arresting police officers, who positively identified
accused-appellant in open court. One with the trial court, the CA found no
improper motive on the part of the police officers who, it said, were
regularly performing their official duties. Besides, relying on People v.
Barlaan,[10] the CA held that the irregularities raised that there was no
coordination with the PDEA and that no inventory was made and no
photograph taken of the seized drug, if true, did not invalidate the legitimate
buy-bust operation conducted. Moreover, the CA found that the corpus
delicti, i.e., the confiscated shabu and the PhP 100 bill, were presented as
evidence of the commission of the offense.
The CA also ruled that accused-appellant's mere denial, as corroborated

by Buencamino and Lepiten, deserved scant consideration vis-à-vis the
positive identification by the arresting officers who arrested him in flagrante
delicto. Anent the questioned chain of custody, the CA found it unbroken
and duly proven by the prosecution.
The Issues
Hence, We have this appeal.
Only accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of

Supplemental Brief),[11] while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the People of the Philippines, submitted neither a
Manifestation nor a Motion. Consequently, on July 27, 2009, the Court
dispensed with the OSG's submission of a supplemental brief.[12] Since no
new issues are raised nor supervening events transpired, We scrutinize the
Brief for the Accused-Appellant[13] and the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee,[14]
filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, in resolving the instant appeal.
Thus, accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION
OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL.[15]
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Accused-appellant argues that, first, the prosecution has not proved his
commission of the crime charged for the following irregularities: (1) the
arresting officers did not coordinate with the PDEA, as required under Sec.
86 of RA 9165; (2) no physical inventory was conducted and photograph
taken of the alleged seized drug in the presence of public officials, as
required by Sec. 21 of RA 9165; and (3) the chain of custody was not duly
proved by the prosecution. And second, his denial is worthy of credence
upon corroboration by the credible witnesses presented by the defense.
After a careful and thorough review of the records, We are convinced that
accused-appellant should be acquitted, for the prosecution has not proved
beyond reasonable doubt his commission of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA
9165.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is

caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation
are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to
search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime."[16] However, where there really was no buy-bust
operation conducted, it cannot be denied that the elements for illegal sale
of prohibited drugs cannot be duly proved despite the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the seeming
straightforward testimony in court by the arresting police officers. After all,
the indictment for illegal sale of prohibited drugs will not have a leg to stand
on.
This is the situation in the instant case.
The courts a quo uniformly based their findings and affirmance of accused-
appellant's guilt on: (1) the straightforward testimony of the arresting police
officers; (2) their positive identification of accused-appellant; (3) no ill
motive was shown for their testimony against accused-appellant; (4) the
self-serving defense of denial by accused-appellant; (5) the seeming
irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation and the arrest of
accused-appellant not invalidating the operation; and (6) the testimonies of
Buencamino and Lepiten not showing that the buy-bust operation was not
conducted.
Although the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will
not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight
and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied in a
case under appeal,[17] as here.
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following

elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took
place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus
delicti.[18]
In People v. Doria,[19] the Court laid down the "objective test" in determining
the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust
operations. It is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture
detailing the buy-bust operation--"from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale."[20] We said that "[t]he manner by
which the initial contact was made, x x x the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the `buy-bust money', and the delivery of the illegal drug x x x
must be the subject of strict scrutiny by the courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense."[21]
No Surveillance Conducted
The testimony of PO2 Ibasco on direct examination did not mention an

alleged surveillance conducted by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia prior to
the alleged buy-bust operation, the corresponding intelligence report, and
the written communiqué with the PDEA. The defense in cross-examination
put to task both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia concerning these matters,
as attested to in the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension[22] executed by the two
police officers on May 30, 2003. PO2 Ibasco testified that his unit,
specifically PO1 Valencia and himself, conducted surveillance on accused-
appellant for a week prior to the buy-bust operation on May 29, 2003 which,
according to him, turned out positive, i.e., accused-appellant was, indeed,
selling shabu.
PO2 Ibasco on cross-examination testified, thus:
ATTY. LOYOLA:
Being an operative, you are of course, trained in intelligence work?
PO2 IBASCO:
Yes, sir.
Q: You said you conducted surveillance but you cannot show any
proof that there is an intelligence report, you have no proof?
A: Yes, sir. There is, we were dispatched.
Q: Where is your proof now?

A: It's in our office.
Q: Your dispatch order for the surveillance do you have any?

A: I don't have it now sir but it's in the office.
Q: You said that you conducted surveillance for one week, did I hear
you right?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: So, you are saying you did not actually see him selling drugs at
that time during the surveillance?
A: We saw him, sir.
xxxx
Q: None. You did not even coordinate this operation with the PDEA?
A: We coordinated it, sir.
Q: What is your proof that you indeed coordinated?

A: It's in the office, sir.
ATTY. LOYOLA:
May I make a reservation for continuance of the cross-examination
considering that there are documents that the witness has to
present.
COURT:
What documents?
ATTY. LOYOLA:
The proof your Honor that there was indeed a coordination and the
intelligence report.
COURT:
Will you be able to produce those documents?
A: Yes, sir. "Titingnan ko po."
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
Titingnan?
COURT:
You are not sure? You don't have any copy of those documents?
A: You Honor, what we have in the office is the dispatch.[23]
PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-examination testified:
ATTY. LOYOLA:
Mr. Witness, tell me during the orientation, you will agree with me
that there was no coordination made to the PDEA regarding this
intended buy bust operation?
PO1 VALENCIA:
We have coordinated at the PDEA.
Q: You say that but you have no proof to show us that there was
coordination?
A: We have, sir.
Q: What is your proof?

A: We have files in our office for coordination.
Q: Are you sure about that?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based on the information, you already planned to

conduct a buy bust operation against the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you will agree with me that there was no surveillance against
the accused?
A: We have conducted a surveillance one week before the operation
and we conducted surveillance "Pinakawalan namin ang informant."
Q: What do you mean "pinakawalan ang informant"?

A: So that we have a spy inside to verify whether Garry was really
selling shabu.
xxxx
Q: In fact you don't have any information report?

A: We have, sir. It's in the office. It's with Insp. Villanueva.
Q: And because you claim that you have submitted an information and
report, of course, you should have come up with an intelligence
report.
A: Yes, sir. It's also in the office of Insp. Villanueva.
xxxx
Q: And the alleged recovered item, the plastic sachet which contained
white crystalline substance was brought by whom to the PNP Crime
Laboratory?
A: I cannot remember who brought it sir because it was a long time
ago.[24]
These documents--specifically the dispatch order, the intelligence report of

the alleged surveillance, and the written communiqué from the PDEA for
the conduct of the surveillance and buy-bust operation--were not, however,
presented in court. Evidently, these documents are non-existent, tending
to show that there really was no surveillance and, consequently, no
intelligence report about the surveillance or the averred written
communiqué from PDEA attesting to coordination with said
agency. Worse, the prosecution never bothered to explain why it could not
present these documents. Thus, there is no basis to say that accused-
appellant allegedly sold shabu a week before he was arrested.
Even putting this lapse aside, the other irregularities raised by accused-
appellant in the backdrop of the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino
and Lepiten tend to show that there was really no buy-bust operation
conducted resulting in the valid arrest of accused-appellant.
Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not

mean that no buy-bust operation against appellant ever took place.[25] The
prosecution's failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory
and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of
RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance
with said section is not fatal and will not render an accused's arrest illegal
or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.[26]
No Buy-Bust Operation
But where there are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct
of the buy-bust operation, these irregularities take on more significance

which are, well nigh, fatal to the prosecution.
Putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the

uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, which gave
credence to accused-appellant's denial and frame-up theory. The Court is
not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of
planting evidence to extract information from or even to harass
civilians.[27] This Court has been issuing cautionary warnings to trial courts
to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases, lest an innocent person is
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[28]
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing

evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies
acted in the regular performance of their official duties.[29] Nonetheless,
such a defense may be given credence when there is sufficient evidence or
proof making it to be very plausible or true. We are of the view that
accused-appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up are credible given the
circumstances of the case. Indeed, jurisprudence has established that the
defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution's
evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,[30] as
in the instant case. At the very least, there is reasonable doubt that there
was a buy-bust operation conducted and that accused-appellant sold the
seized shabu. After all, a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[31]
Notably, Buencamino voluntarily testified to the effect that he called the

police asking them to apprehend a certain "Taba," a notorious drug pusher
in their area. PO2 Ibasco and company responded to his call and
Buencamino helped identify and direct the policemen but "Taba"
unfortunately escaped. Thus, Buencamino testified:
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Mr. Witness, who asked you to testify today?
BUENCAMINO:
I volunteered myself to testify.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell us how, when and where the accused was arrested?
A: I was the one who called-up the precinct to arrest a certain Taba
and not Garry. Taba was the target of the operation.
Q: When was that?

A: May 29, 2003.
Q: Why did you call the police station?

A: Ibasco talked to me to arrest Taba.
Q: Why are they going to arrest Taba?

A: Because he is a pusher in the area.
Q: Why do you know Ibasco?

A: Because he was a previous resident of Barangay Manresa.
Q: You said you called police officer [sic] what was the topic. Mr.
Witness?
A: That Taba is already there and he already showed up and they
immediately responded to arrest Taba.
Q: So, Ibasco immediately responded to your call?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: When they arrived in your place what happened else, if any?

A: I pointed to Taba so they could arrest him.
Q: Where they able to arrest Taba?

A: No, sir. He was able to escape.
Q: Whey they were not able to arrest alias Taba what happened, next
Mr. Witness? What happened to Garry Dela Cruz?
A: I was surprised because I saw Garry Dela Cruz already inside the
vehicle and I don't know why Garry was inside the vehicle.[32]
Buencamino's assertion of knowing PO2 Ibasco was likewise not

rebutted. Moreover, the presentation of the police logbook on calls
received in the morning of May 29, 2003 would indeed show if Buencamino
or someone else made a call to the precinct about a certain "Taba," but
then, again, the prosecution did not bother to rebut the testimony of
Buencamino. Verily, this time the presumption "that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced"[33] applies. In fact, the
prosecution did not even assail Buencamino's credibility as a witness but
merely made the point in the cross-examination that he had no actual
knowledge of the arrest of accused-appellant. Thus, Buencamino was
cross-examined:
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
You were not with Garry at the time he was arrested?
BUENCAMINO:
No, sir.
Q: You don't know where he was arrested at that time?

A: I don't know where Garry was, sir.
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
That will be all, your Honor.[34]
More telling is the testimony of Lepiten which, uncontroverted, shows that

there was no buy-bust operation. Her testimony corroborates the testimony
of Buencamino that police enforcers indeed responded to Buencamino's
phone call but were not able to apprehend "Taba." This destroys the buy-
bust operation angle testified to by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Since
the buy-bust operation allegedly happened not inside the house of
accused-appellant but in an open area in front of a shanty, such cannot be
sustained in light of what Lepiten witnessed: The policemen chased but
were not able to arrest "Taba"; thereafter, the policemen went inside the
house of accused-appellant, emerging later with him who was led to the
vehicle of the policemen. Thus, Lepiten testified:
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Mrs. Witness, where were you on May 29, 2003, if you could still
remember?
COURT:
What time?
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
At around 9:00 in the morning.
LEPITEN:
I was at the terrace of the house we are renting while sipping
coffee.
Q: Where is that house located?

A: No. 135 Mauban Street, Barangay Manresa, Quezon City.
COURT:
Where is this, Novaliches?
A: No, your Honor, near San Francisco Del Monte.
xxxx
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
While drinking coffee, what transpired next, Mrs. Witness or was
there any unusual thing that happened?
A: Yes, sir. While I was sitting on the terrace in front of the house
we are renting is the house of Garry. Garry was talking to a
certain Taba whom I know.
xxxx
Q: While you saw them talking to each other, what happened next?
A: Suddenly a maroon FX stopped.
Q: Where?
A: In front of the house of Garry.
Q: When this maroon FX stopped, what happened next, if any?

A: Taba ran, sir.
Q: What happened next, if any?

A: Two (2) men in blue pants and white shirt alighted from the
maroon FX and ran after Taba.
Q: Were they able to arrest Taba, Ms. Witness?

A: No, sir. They were not able to catch him.
Q: When they failed to arrest Taba, what did these two (2) men do, if
any?
A: They returned in front of the house and Garry and I saw them
entered the house of Garry.
xxxx
Q: What did they do, if any?

A: I don't know what they did inside because I could not see them,
sir. Then I saw them went down and pushed Garry towards the
FX.
xxxx
Q: After that what else happened, if any?

A: I just saw that they boarded Garry inside the FX.
xxxx
COURT:
Any cross?
PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
No cross, your Honor.[35]
Thus, taking into consideration the defense of denial by accused-appellant,

in light of the foregoing testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, the Court
cannot conclude that there was a buy-bust operation conducted by the
arresting police officers as they attested to and testified on. The
prosecution's story is like a sieve full of holes.
Non-Compliance with the Rule on Chain of Custody
Moreover, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite chain of

custody of the seized specimen. "Chain of custody" means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic

laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.[36] The
CA found an unbroken chain of custody of the purportedly confiscated
shabu specimen. However, the records belie such conclusion.
The testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia, as well as their Joint
Affidavit of Apprehension, were bereft of any assertion on how the seized
shabu in a heat-sealed sachet was duly passed from PO2 Ibasco, the
chosen poseur-buyer, who allegedly received it from accused-appellant, to
forensic chemist Engr. Jabonillo, who conducted the forensic
examination. While the testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with
upon stipulation by the defense, as duly embodied in the RCT Order dated
March 16, 2004, it is likewise bereft of any assertion substantially proving
the custodial safeguards on the identity and integrity of the shabu allegedly
received from accused-appellant. The stipulation merely asserts:
x x x that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; that his

office received a request for laboratory examination marked as Exhibit "A";
that together with said request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit "B";
which contained a plastic sachet marked as Exhibit "B-1"; that he
conducted a requested laboratory examination and, in connection
therewith, he submitted a Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C". The
findings thereon showing the specimen positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit "C-1", and the signature of the said
police officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2". He likewise issued a
Certification marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-1", and thereafter, turned over
the specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved the same for [sic]
purposed proceeding scheduled today.[37]
While both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the identity of the
plastic sachet duly marked with the initials "EIGC," there was no sufficient
proof of compliance with the chain of custody. The records merely show
that, after the arrest of accused-appellant, the specimen was allegedly
turned over to the desk officer on duty, whose identity was not
revealed. Then it was the station's OIC, P/Insp. Villanueva, who requested
the forensic examination of the specimen. In gist, from the alleged receipt
of the plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of shabu by PO2 Ibasco from the
alleged buy-bust operation, the chain of custody of the specimen has not
been substantially shown. The Court cannot make an inference that PO2
Ibasco passed the specimen to an unnamed desk officer on duty until it
made its way to the laboratory examination. There are no details on who
kept custody of the specimen, who brought it to the Crime Laboratory, and
who received and kept custody of it until Engr. Jabonillo conducted the
forensic examination. The stipulated facts merely made an allusion that the
specimen custodian of the Crime Laboratory had possession of the
specimen and released it for the proceedings before the trial court.
It is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the

suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that
the identity of said drug be established with the same unwavering

exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.[38] This, the
prosecution failed to do. The prosecution must offer the testimony of key
witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody.[39]
As the Court aptly put in People v. Cantalejo:
x x x the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of
the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.
x x x failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation of

the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule,
the testimony of police officers who apprehended the accused is usually
accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have
performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their
duties is tainted with irregularities, such presumption is effectively
destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the

performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot
by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[40]
In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with

the chain of custody, We cannot but acquit accused-appellant on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The law demands that only proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.[41] In all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the
accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.[42] As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten
men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one
innocent man for a crime he did not commit.[43]
In fine, We repeat what the Court fittingly held in People v. Ong, a case
similarly involving a buy-bust operation, thus:
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. While appellant's
defense engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime
charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a
strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to
overcome the presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of
evidence required.
In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence
for the prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of
appellants with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that
which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation,

to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on
reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants' innocence may
be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused.[44]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry

De La Cruz y Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
basis of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated June 30,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727 is SET ASIDE. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of
accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez,

JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-20. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal
and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a
member of this Court) and Vicente Q. Roxas.
[2]
Records, pp. 127-132. Penned by Presiding Judge Severino B. De
Castro, Jr.
[3]
Id. at 1-2.
[4]
Id. at 19.
[5]
During the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses PO2 Edcel
Ibasco and PO1 Roderick Valencia, while the testimony of Forensic
Chemist Engr. Leonard Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by
the defense. On the other hand, the defense presented accused Garry,
Rodolfo Buencamino, and Marbelita Collado Lepiten.
[6]
CA rollo, p. 11, Commitment Order dated July 7, 2003.
[7]
G.R. No. 143817, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 478.
[8]
Rollo, p. 25, Order of Commitment issued on February 27, 2007.
[9]
CA rollo, p. 23, Notice of Appeal dated March 1, 2007.
[10]
G.R. No. 177746, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 849.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 27-29, dated April 22, 2009.
[12]
Id. at 30.
[13]
CA rollo, pp. 37-51, dated September 18, 2007.
[14]
Id. at 73-85, dated January 21, 2008.
[15]
Id. at 39.
[16]
People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179478, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 397, 417;
citing People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 470, 484
and People v. Juatan, G.R. No. 104378, August 20, 1996, 260 SCRA 532,
538.
[17]
People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647, 654;
citing People v. Pedronan, G.R. No. 148668, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA
183, 188.
[18]
People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA
537, 547; People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, December 6, 2006, 510
SCRA 554, 562.
[19]
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668.
[20]
Id. at 698.
[21]
Id. at 698-699; People v. Ong, supra note 16, at 485; People v. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 151205, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 516, 523.
[22]
Records, pp. 8-9.
[23]
TSN, March 16, 2004, pp. 115-119.
[24]
TSN, August 3, 2004, pp. 10-14.
[25]
People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430,
447.
[26]
People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA
571, 595
[27]
People v. Daria, Jr., G.R. No. 186138, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA
688, 709.
[28]
Sales v. People, G.R. No. 182296, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 680, 686.
[29]
Id.
[30]
People v. Mejia, G.R. No. 185723, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 356, 374.
[31]
Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 144026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 593, 613;
citing People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000, 328 SCRA 185,
194.
[32]
TSN, September 12, 2006, pp. 2-4.
[33]
Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 2(e).
[34]
TSN, September 12, 2006, pp. 4-5.
[35]
TSN, January 30, 2007, pp. 2-6.
[36]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA
92, 101-102; People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581
SCRA 762, 777.
[37]
Records, p. 47.
[38]
Sales v. People, supra note 28, at 688-689.
[39]
Catuiran v. People, G.R. No. 175647, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 567, 580.
[40]
G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 777, 788.
[41]
People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640,
653.
[42]
People v. Caiñgat, G.R. No. 137963, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 387,
396; citing People v. Mariano, G.R. No. 134309, November 17, 2000, 347
SCRA 109 and People v. Tacipit, G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995, 242
SCRA 241.
[43]
Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, 598
SCRA 41, 60; citing People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003,
399 SCRA 503, 512.
[44]
G.R. No. 175940 [Formerly G.R. Nos. 155361-62], February 6, 2008,
544 SCRA 123, 141.

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Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University

Mid La Union Campus

Reading Assignment No. 3

Eymard Moises M. Estalilla

[ G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of

When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de

The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a

confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay

On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister's house in

Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004.[13] With the filing

Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,

Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was

presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present

The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act

P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes,

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

G.R. No. 190621 February 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to

The Information4 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 filed against

That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City,

While the pertinent portion of the Information6 for violation of Section 11 of

That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City,

Upon motion of the prosecution,8 the cases were consolidated. On

x x x [T]hat [Police Inspector Leonard T. Arban (P/Insp. Arban)] is a

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano) to testify on

The prosecution intended to present PO1 Calatay and PO1 Pineda as

[T]hat he was the police investigator assigned to investigate these cases;

[T]hat he was part of the buy-bust team which conducted a buy[-]bust

Version of the Defense

In his testimony,15 appellant claimed that at about 11:00 p.m. of September

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding

On the other hand, judgment is likewise rendered in Criminal Case No. Q-

beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 11, Article II of the same

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.17 In his Brief,18 he imputed to the RTC

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.22

On February 8, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu,

In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the elements of

The defenses of denial and frame-up

Denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of a prosecution

Non-compliance with Section 21,

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or