Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.

Colombia)
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against
the Republic of Colombia in respect of a dispute concerning “a group of related legal issues
subsisting” between the two States “concerning title to territory and maritime delimitation”. On 28
April 2003, Nicaragua filed its Memorial within the time-limit laid down by the Court. On 21 July
2003, Colombia filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction, leading to the suspension of the
proceedings on the merits.

In its Judgment on the preliminary objections, rendered on 13 December 2007, the Court found that
it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute concerning sovereignty over the maritime features claimed
by the Parties, other than the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. The Court held
that the treaty signed in 1928 between Colombia and Nicaragua (in which Colombia recognized
Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and the Corn Islands, while Nicaragua recognized
Colombia’s sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, and the
maritime features forming part of the San Andrés Archipelago) had settled the issue of sovereignty
over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, that there was no extant legal
dispute between the Parties on that question and that, therefore, the Court could not have
jurisdiction over it under the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (also known as the Pact of
Bogotá and invoked by Nicaragua as basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in the case). On the other
hand, as regards the question of the scope and composition of the rest of the San Andrés
Archipelago, the Court considered that the 1928 Treaty failed to provide answers as to which other
maritime features formed part of the Archipelago and thus that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on
the dispute regarding sovereignty over those other maritime features. As for its jurisdiction with
respect to the maritime delimitation issue, the Court concluded that the 1928 Treaty had not
effected a general delimitation of the maritime areas between Colombia and Nicaragua and that, as
the dispute had not been settled within the meaning of the Pact of Bogotá, the Court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

On 25 February 2010, Costa Rica filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case. In its
Application it contended, among other things, that “[b]oth Nicaragua and Colombia, in their
boundary claims against each other, claim maritime area to which Costa Rica is entitled” and
indicated that it wished to intervene in the proceedings as a non-party State. On 10 June 2010, the
Republic of Honduras also filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case, asserting that
Nicaragua, in its dispute with Colombia, had put forward maritime claims that lay in an area of the
Caribbean Sea in which Honduras had rights and interests. Honduras stated in its Application that it
was seeking primarily to intervene in the proceedings as a party. The Court rendered two Judgments
on 4 May 2011, in which it ruled that the Applications for permission to intervene filed by Costa
Rica and Honduras could not be granted. The Court noted that the interest of a legal nature invoked
by Costa Rica could only be affected if the maritime boundary that the Court had been asked to
draw between Nicaragua and Colombia were to be extended beyond a certain latitude southwards.
However, following its jurisprudence, the Court, when drawing a line delimiting the maritime areas
between the two Parties to the main proceedings, would, if necessary, end that line before it reached
an area in which the interests of a legal nature of third States might be involved. The Court
concluded that Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature could not be affected by the decision in the
proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia. With respect to Honduras’s Application for
permission to intervene, the Court found that Honduras had failed to satisfy the Court that it had an
interest of a legal nature that might be affected by the decision of the Court in the main proceedings.
It ruled on the one hand that, since the entire maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua
in the Caribbean Sea had been settled by the Judgment of the Court rendered between those two
States in 2007, there were no extant rights or legal interests that Honduras might seek to protect in
the settlement of the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. On the other hand, the Court held
that Honduras could invoke an interest of a legal nature, in the main proceedings, on the basis of the
1986 bilateral treaty concluded between Honduras and Colombia, but clarified that it would not be
relying on that treaty to determine the maritime boundary between Colombia and Nicaragua.
In its Judgment rendered on the merits of the case on 19 November 2012, the Court found that the
territorial dispute between the Parties concerned sovereignty over the features situated in the
Caribbean Sea — the Alburquerque Cays, the East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño,
Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo — which were all above water at high tide and which were therefore
islands capable of appropriation. The Court noted, however, that Quitasueño comprised only a
single, tiny island, known as QS 32, and a number of low-tide elevations (features above water at low
tide but submerged at high tide). The Court then observed that, under the terms of the 1928 Treaty
concerning Territorial Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua, Colombia not only had
sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but also over other
islands, islets and reefs “forming part” of the San Andrés Archipelago. Thus, in order to address the
question of sovereignty, the Court first needed to ascertain what constituted the San Andrés
Archipelago. It concluded, however, that neither the 1928 Treaty nor the historical documents
conclusively established the composition of that Archipelago. The Court therefore examined the
arguments and evidence not based on the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty. It
found that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia had established that it had title to the disputed maritime
features by virtue of uti possidetis juris (the principle that, upon independence, new States inherit the
territories and boundaries of the former colonial provinces), because nothing clearly indicated
whether these features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Colombia. The
Court then considered whether sovereignty could be established on the basis of State acts
manifesting a display of authority on a given territory (effectivités). It regarded it as having been
established that for many decades Colombia had continuously and consistently acted à titre de
souverain in respect of the maritime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority had been
public and there was no evidence that it had met with any protest from Nicaragua prior to 1969,
when the dispute had crystallized. Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s acts of administration with
respect to the islands was in contrast to the absence of any evidence of acts à titre de souverain on the
part of Nicaragua. The Court also noted that, while not being evidence of sovereignty, Nicaragua’s
conduct with regard to the maritime features in dispute, the practice of third States and maps
afforded some support to Colombia’s claim. The Court concluded that Colombia, and not
Nicaragua, had sovereignty over the islands at Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays,
Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.

With respect to Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending beyond 200
nautical miles, the Court observed that “any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a
State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] must be in
accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf”. Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the
fact that Colombia was not a party thereto did not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article
76 of that Convention. The Court observed that Nicaragua had submitted to the Commission only
“Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, fell short of meeting the requirements for
the Commission to be able to make its recommendations. As the Court was not presented with any
further information, it found that, in this case, Nicaragua had not established that it had a
continental margin that extended far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile
entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast. The Court was
therefore not in a position to delimit the maritime boundary between the extended continental shelf
as claimed by Nicaragua and the continental shelf of Colombia. Notwithstanding this conclusion,
the Court noted that it was still called upon to effect the delimitation of the zone situated within 200
nautical miles of the Nicaraguan coast, where the entitlements of Colombia and Nicaragua
overlapped.

In order to effect the delimitation of the maritime boundary, the Court first determined what the
relevant coasts of the Parties were, namely those coasts the projections of which overlapped. It
found that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was its whole coast, with the exception of the short stretch of
coast near Punta de Perlas, and that Colombia’s relevant coast was the entire coastline of the islands
under Colombian sovereignty, except for Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. The Court next
noted that the relevant maritime area, i.e., the area in which the potential entitlements of the Parties
overlapped, extended 200 nautical miles east of the Nicaraguan coast. The boundaries to the north
and to the south were determined by the Court in such a way as not to overlap with any existing
boundaries or to extend into areas where the rights of third States might be affected.
To effect the delimitation, the Court followed the three-stage procedure previously laid down by and
employed in its jurisprudence.

First, it selected the base points and constructed a provisional median line between the Nicaraguan
coast and the western coasts of the relevant Colombian islands opposite the Nicaraguan coast.

Second, the Court considered any relevant circumstances which might have called for an adjustment
or shifting of the provisional median line so as to achieve an equitable result. It observed that the
substantial disparity between the relevant Colombian coast and that of Nicaragua (approximately
1:8.2), and the need to avoid a situation whereby the line of delimitation cut off one or other of the
Parties ties from maritime areas into which its coasts projected, constituted relevant circumstances.
The Court noted that, while legitimate security concerns had to be borne in mind in determining
what adjustment should be made to the provisional median line or in what way that line should be
shifted, the conduct of the Parties, issues of access to natural resources and delimitations already
effected in the area were not relevant circumstances in this case. In the relevant area between the
Nicaraguan mainland and the western coasts of the Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés, Providencia
and Santa Catalina, where the relationship was one of opposite coasts, the relevant circumstances
called for the provisional median line to be shifted eastwards. To that end, the Court determined
that different weightings should be given to the base points situated on Nicaraguan and Colombian
islands, namely a weighting of one to each of the Colombian base points and a weighting of three to
each of the Nicaraguan base points. The Court considered, however, that extending the line thus
constructed to the north or the south would not lead to an equitable result, since it would leave
Colombia with a significantly larger share of the relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua,
notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua’s relevant coast was more than eight times the length of
Colombia’s relevant coast. Moreover, it would cut off Nicaragua from the areas to the east of the
principal Colombian islands into which the Nicaraguan coast projected. In the view of the Court, an
equitable result was to be achieved by continuing the boundary line out to the line 200 nautical miles
from the Nicaraguan coast. To the north, that line would follow the parallel passing through the
most northern point of the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Roncador. To the
south, the maritime boundary would first follow the outer limit of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea
of the Alburquerque and East-Southeast Cays, then the parallel from the most eastern point of the
territorial sea of the East-Southeast Cays. In order to prevent Quitasueño and Serrana from falling,
under those circumstances, on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line, the maritime boundary
around each of those features would follow the outer limit of their 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.

Third, and finally, the Court checked that, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, the
delimitation thus obtained did not create a disproportionality that would render the result
inequitable. The Court observed that the boundary line had the effect of dividing the relevant area
between the Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour, while the ratio of
relevant coasts was approximately 1:8.2. It concluded that that line did not entail such
disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.