business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
Consti2 Doctrines
Fundamental Powers of the State
Pasei vs Drilon
Definition of Police Power
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even
to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits."
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming
necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society."
Limitations
police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably
Department Order No. 1
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14
but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
16
, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical
and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1
to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers
Ichong vs. Hernandez
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business
." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions
of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons,
and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration
of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor
of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation
of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail
business to present for registration with the proper authorities a
verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die,
to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
Police Power
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it
has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need
to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive
with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable.
The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given by the
Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the
exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through
the medium of a treaty or a contract. The law in question was enacted
to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed
by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free the
citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future.
Limitations
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in
the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo
vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a
public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation
or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not
been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute
liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy.
Economic problems sought to be remedied
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in
the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was
unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be
invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big
centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the
beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of
the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the
towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has
replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry
without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to
be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired
not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of
almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries,
drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles.
The Equal Protection Limitation
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is
attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in
that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he
temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting
them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to
his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such
utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes
his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation,
radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never
really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He
undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and
profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the
country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest
in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed
be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of
retail distribution to his hands.
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the
class falls along the lines of nationality.
Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United
Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred
the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as
Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail
trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners
engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the
law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment
to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any
other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating
against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the
United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are
all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing
that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject
to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law
that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of occupation regulated, nor
the due process of the law clause; because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege
Lutz vs. Araneta
Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment
Act
Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a
declaration of emergency, due to the threat to our industry by the
imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the
Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position
in the United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was
expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the
sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize
the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of
its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition
of the export taxes."
In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each
picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3 levies on owners or
persons in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane and
ceded to others for a consideration, on lease or otherwise —
a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the
rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per
centum of the assessed value of such land.
Ratio: SEC. 6. All collections made under this Act shall accrue to a
special fund in the Philippine Treasury, to be known as the 'Sugar
Adjustment and Stabilization Fund,' and shall be paid out only for any
or all of the following purposes or to attain any or all of the following
objectives, as may be provided by law.
First, to place the sugar industry in a position to maintain itself, despite
the gradual loss of the preferntial position of the Philippine sugar in
the United States market, and ultimately to insure its continued
existence notwithstanding the loss of that market and the consequent
necessity of meeting competition in the free markets of the world;
Second, to readjust the benefits derived from the sugar industry by all
of the component elements thereof — the mill, the landowner, the
planter of the sugar cane, and the laborers in the factory and in the
field — so that all might continue profitably to engage therein;
Third, to limit the production of sugar to areas more economically
suited to the production thereof; and
Fourth, to afford labor employed in the industry a living wage and to
improve their living and working conditions
Protection of the Sugar Industry
The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax
provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the
taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6
(heretofore quoted in full), will show that the tax is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act
is primarily an exercise of the police power.
This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is
one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading
position among its export products; that it gives employment to
thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of
the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange
needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime
committed to a policy of currency stability.
The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources
of the state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the
welfare of so great a portion of the population of the State is affected
to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power
of the sovereign. (128 Sp. 857).
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of
the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the
Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is
necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion.
Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure tax measure, it cannot
be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seek
increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-products
and solution of allied problems, as well as to the improvements of
living and working conditions in sugar mills or plantations, without any
part of such money being channeled directly to private persons,
constitutes expenditure of tax money for private purposes
Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Anteus and Hercules
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and
challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing
his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his
adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even
stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to
Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling,
it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could
never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother
Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air,
beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose
invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
Police Power vs Emminent Domain
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the
power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of
both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City
of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the
transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in
exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the
power being exercised was eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials,
which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of
the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in
property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is
not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition
of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession
of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it.
The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use
prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of
just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered
by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play
to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in
the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is
found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the
abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of
this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The cases present no
knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Lozano vs. Martinez
BP 22 and its Constitutionality
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The
penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30
days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of
the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court. 3
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who,
having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or
to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon,
for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 4
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since
this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself
creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment
of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in
or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from
the date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise
if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor,
the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check
by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of
evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and
dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or
written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall
constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check,
and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor
thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee
on such dishonored check." 6
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing
checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or
dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed
by the state because of the injury it causes to t public interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our
statute books which penalize the issuance of bouncing or rubber
checks. Criminal law has dealth with the problem within the context of
crimes against property punished as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud
and deceit. The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage
caused to the property rights of the victim.
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused
of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said
presumptions.
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commis sion of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits;
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in
the bank, or the funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the cheek without informing the payee of such
circumstances.
The constitutionality of the law in question was upheld by the Court,
it being within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in
the exercise of the police power. It was held that "one of the purposes
of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of the employers
who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries
agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties.
"The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an
obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a
practice considered harmful to public welfare.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize
a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is
within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are
not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but
because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can
do this in the exercise of its police power.
Police Power
The police power of the state has been described as "the most
essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution,
but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the
state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual
citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment
of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good
order and welfare." 25
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a
matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check
is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego
NMAT Constitutional
this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who
have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous
Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the
NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,
and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached
by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental power.
Police Power
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice
it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit
of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not
have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other
calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link,
the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they
are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources
must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good
while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to
his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a
plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not
be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his
entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a
course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Due Process
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain
also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron
rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the
guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its
protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own
specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a
legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated
Limitations of Due Process: Exercise of Police Power
There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify
omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on
sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives
of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may
be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he
has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the
interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted
without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
from a clear and present danger.
Police Power
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the
police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State
to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public
needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far
outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
Invalid Exercise of Police Power
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than
in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order,
it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps
so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that
there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant
dead meat.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For
these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF"
provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years
prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.
The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval
of the application.
Police Power
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People
vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May
12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question
not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial
park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation
of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment
and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain
a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory
clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a
memorial park cemetery.
3 Inherent Powers of the State
three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes
with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent
domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50).
It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623).
It has been said that police power is the most essential of government
powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least
limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39
PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power
embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan,
10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-
reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the state
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is
usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the
use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as
opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of
1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.
Manila Memorial Park vs. Secretary of DSWD
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. — Pursuant to Article
XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take
care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of
social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides: "The State shall
provide social justice in all phases of national development." Further,
Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated
and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for
the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and
children."
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to
restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare. The only
limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not
oppressive. In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it
must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of
accomplishing the goal.60
Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government."61
The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare [as long
as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary."62
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State
to take or appropriate private property for public use.63
Because of the exigencies of rapidly changing times, Congress may be
compelled to adopt or experiment with different measures to promote
the general welfare which may not fall squarely within the traditionally
recognized categories of police power and eminent domain. The
judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of
the challenged governmental act and decide, on the basis thereof,
whether the act is the exercise of police power or eminent domain.
Thus, we now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to
determine if it constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent
domain. The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior
citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more
prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy
in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also
that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably
spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino
practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. As to its
nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability
of private establishments to price their products and services relative
to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern.76

The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be

taken without due process of law and the payment of just
compensation.64

Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent

domain. In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by
regulation,65 or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or
restricted66 to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no
compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not
required. Examples of these regulations are property condemned for
being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the
verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene
materials to be destroyed in the interest of public morals)67 as well as
zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes
injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community (e.g.,
dividing a city’s territory into residential and industrial areas).68

It has, thus, been observed that, in the exercise of police power (as
distinguished from eminent domain), although the regulation affects
the right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which constitute
ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.69

On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,

property interests are appropriated and applied to some public
purpose which necessitates the payment of just compensation
therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of the property are
transferred to the expropriating authority. Examples include the
acquisition of lands for the construction of public highways as well as
agricultural lands acquired by the government under the agrarian
reform law for redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries.
However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of title or total
destruction of the property is not essential for "taking" under the
power of eminent domain to be present.70

The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power