experience, of the very things that metaphysics claimed in all naivety,

or perhaps innocence, independently of any such reflection. I do not

need to tell you, but I should at least remind you, since it is not
unimportant for our own purposes, that the Critique of Pure Reason
does not contain a direct critique of metaphysics. If we were to take
it as providing such a critique we would go badly astray. The socalled
Copernican revolution means, among other things, that what
is criticized is not metaphysical propositions as such, but rather the
possibility that our reason can rationally articulate them, or utter valid
judgements about them without violating the rules of discursive logic.
This limiting comment on the scope of the Kantian critique of
metaphysics has far-reaching implications because it reveals the flaw
in the Copernican revolution. For whereas the turn to the subject
appears initially as the sign of strength, of a radical disposition, it
overlooks the fact that the Critique of Pure Reason has nothing
further to say about such matters as God, freedom and immortality.
To put it simply, the intellectually innocent person who takes the Critique
of Pure Reason in his hand because he knows that it deals with
the so-called problem of metaphysics, and who imagines that it will
tell him whether such things as God, immortality or freedom actually
exist, is doomed to disappointment. Direct propositions of this kind
are prohibited here because the Critique of Pure Reason is concerned
not with objects as such, not even the objects of metaphysics, but
simply, as Kant puts it, with our faculty to obtain knowledge of such
objects. This means, however, that positive or negative judgements
cannot be made about the existence of such objects; instead what the
so-called negative conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason amounts
to is an embargo on further enquiry. Reason does not suffice, Kant
asserts, to enable us to say anything absolutely authoritative about
these matters of supreme importance; they remain up in the air.
The remarkable neutrality to be found in the conclusion of the
Critique of Pure Reason, thanks to this turn to the subject, inevitably
has its consequences - and it is vital that you should understand this,
if you wish to understand the larger context in which the work must
be viewed. The chief consequence is that this neutrality points to
a critique of metaphysics as a science, on the one hand, while at
another level, in a different dimension, it leaves open the possibility
of reinstating or salvaging metaphysics. The point I wish to make is
that the turn to the subject is a radical shift in the sense that instead
of enquiring into the validity of our knowledge, we now look to the
root of the matter and reflect on our ability to know. But on the other
hand, because of this process of reflection decisions about the essential
questions of metaphysics are suspended, at least as far as questions