MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO.
2, SUMMER 2007
A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE
A CHANCE FOR PEACE?
Harald D. Frederiksen
Mr. Frederiksen, formerly head of the Water Resources Advisory Unit for
the World Bank’s South and East Regions following management positions
in two international consulting firms, is a private consultant in the field of
water resources.
T
here is increasing pressure to
resolve the Israel-Palestine
conflict. The fundamental issue
has been the form of the Pales-
tine entity: an independent sovereign state,
an “autonomous” region under Israeli
sovereignty or an integral part of a bina-
tional Israel. Israeli leaders and the
conservative parties seek the goal of a
Greater Israel having a common border
with the Kingdom of Jordan. Others in Israel
pursue an agreement creating a subservient
entity under Israel that would evolve into a
fully incorporated area of Israel. The Pales-
tinians seek a viable, sovereign State of
Palestine, independent of Israel, which would
be free to direct the development and
utilization of its resources and engage with
the international community.
The 1947 UN General Assembly
Resolution 181specified a division of histori-
cal Palestine into two independent sovereign
states: a Jewish state and a Palestinian state.
Provisions stipulated that there would be no
biases. No other options were debated.
Even the legitimacy of the UN resolution to
divide this long-settled land was accepted by
a margin of only one vote.
© 2007, The Author
30
AND JORDAN:
International politics — particularly
U.S. actions — and the acquiescence of
the international community over decades
have granted Israel de facto power to
decide the fate of the resident Palestinians.
Today the international community must
face its responsibility to resume its indisput-
able role and to decide this basic issue —
and then resolve the associated issues
equitably. Otherwise, the deteriorating
human and security situation in these lands
and the bordering countries will produce
prolonged and severe repercussions.
Two options will be described that
represent different forms of a Palestinian
entity: one the goal of Israel, the other that
of the Palestinians. Any program to settle
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also must
fully address other issues affecting Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria and the occupied territo-
ries. The return of land and water re-
sources and compensation for the burden
of refugees driven out by Israel will be
discussed with other measures included in
the proposal calling for the federation of a
sovereign State of Palestine with the
Kingdom of Jordan.
Journal Compilation © 2007, Middle East Policy Council
 FREDERIKSEN: A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE AND JORDAN
60 YEARS UNDER ISRAELI
APARTHEID
Israel methodically pursues an alterna-
tive to a viable sovereign State of Pales-
tine. This has been evident in its long-term
strategy and in the provisions of the most
recent Israeli proposals for a settlement
with the Palestinians.1 The ultimate
objective is the permanent expansion of
Israel’s long-established apartheid condition
of Israeli Arab citizens beyond Israel’s
current borders to include those living in
the occupied territories.2 The conse-
quences of this option warrant a clear
understanding of Israel’s Basic Laws and
their application to areas under Israeli
control.
These Israeli laws violate provisions of
the 1947 U.N. Resolution 181. Part I
states that the Future Constitution must
include “guaranteeing to all persons equal
and non-discriminatory rights in civil,
political, economic and religious matters
and the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. . . .The Constitu-
tions of the States shall embody Chapters 1
and 2 of the Declaration. . . .” Declaration,
Chapter 2: “No discrimination of any kind
shall be made between the inhabitants on
the ground of race, religion, language or
sex. All persons within the jurisdiction of
the State shall be entitled to equal protec-
tion of the laws.” Chapter 3 prohibits
States from enacting biased citizenship
laws: “1. Citizenship: Palestinian citizens
residing in Palestine. . ., as well as Arabs
and Jews who, not holding Palestinian
citizenship, residing in Palestine. . .shall,
upon the recognition of independence,
become citizens of the State in which they
are resident and enjoy full civil and political
rights. . . .”3
31
Nevertheless, once the State of Israel
was established, it adopted legislation to
withdraw basic rights from its Arab citizens
and expropriate their assets. Of greatest
consequence, the Basic Laws established
two levels of "citizenship" for residents of
Israel based on religion and race. Only
those Basic Laws relating to the land and
water rights of non-Jewish citizens of
Israel will be summarized below.
Israel’s Basic Laws are equivalent to
the constitution of Israel and include the
“social and political rights” of Israel’s
inhabitants. The Law of Return, the Law
of Citizenship, the Entrance to Israel Law,
and the Status Law effectively created two
types of status for Israeli inhabitants:
Israeli “citizenship” (citizens) and Jewish
“nationality” (nationals). “Citizenship
(erzahut) may be held by Arabs as well as
Jews while nationality (le’um), which
bestows significantly greater rights than
citizenship, may be held by Jews alone.”4
“The Law of Return (1950) grants
every Jew, wherever he or she may be, the
right to come to Israel as an ‘oleh’ (a Jew
immigrating to Israel) and become an
Israeli citizen and a national. For purposes
of this Law, ‘Jew’ means a person ….”5
Christian and Muslim Arabs remaining
within its borders at the conclusion of the
War of 1948 are only eligible for Israeli
citizenship.
The rights associated with these status
distinctions are not clearly defined in any
one law. Instead, it is through the connec-
tions among the country’s Basic Laws that
these become evident. For example, the
Status Law of 1952 established a joint
authority between the Israeli government
and certain national institutions operating
inside Israel and extraterritorially. These
national institutions include the World
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2007
Zionist Organization (WZO), the Jewish
Agency (JA), and, through the Jewish
Agency, the Jewish National Fund (JNF)
and its subsidiaries. Bound by their respec-
tive charters, these national institutions may
only serve Jewish people/nationals.
Through the joint authority, these national
organizations administer a number of
Israel’s social programs and own and/or
control most of Israel’s state water, power,
infrastructure and land.
Thus, “[t]he government, serving a
‘citizen’ constituency, can at any time, give
the Jewish Agency, or a like group, author-
ity to deliver the services to its ‘national’
constituency.”6 In this manner, there are
two levels of services (including water) for
Israeli citizens, depending on that person’s
ethnicity and religion.
The Absentees’ Property Law (1950)
… applied to the land of any Palestin-
ian who fled or was forced to leave
their property during the 1948 war.
The same law was later applied to
Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza after the 1967 war. The property
rights were transferred to the Custo-
dian of Absentee Property, without
compensation to the property owner
or provision … to appeal…. Those
who fled in 1948 and in 1967 were
prevented by Israel from returning to
their property.7
Absentee property could then be
legally transferred to Israel’s Custodian for
Absentees’ Property under the control of
the Israel Land Administration. All land
(and associated water) under the Israel
Land Administration is state land according
to the Basic Law on Israel Lands, adopted
in 1960.
32
The basis of the law is the special
relationship between the People of
Israel and the Land of Israel and its
redemption. The law ensures that the
state lands, which constitute about 90
percent of the lands in the state,
should remain national property. The
Law prohibits the transfer of owner-
ship over lands owned by the State,
the Development Authority of the
Jewish National Fund, either by sale or
any other means, with the exception of
types of land or transactions, that
have been specified in the law.8
The use of this land is allowed through
99-year renewable leases, which are
offered only to Israeli inhabitants of Jewish
nationality and issued by the state, the JNF
or the Land Development Authority. Many
leases stipulate that any employment
opportunities occurring on state lands be
filled by Jewish nationals. Thus, Palestin-
ians may not lease or, for the most part,
work on Israeli land, which constitutes 93
percent (as of the mid-1980s) of the land in
Israel. By these laws, Israel expropriated
essentially all land and associated water
resources without compensation for use by
its “nationals” — Jews within Israel and all
new Jewish immigrants.
.. Susan Nathan has lived in South Africa
and England, but moved to Israel in 1999 to
experience what she assumed others had
when they moved to this Jewish land. After
she developed a concern with what she
encountered during work in Tel Aviv and
observations elsewhere, she relocated to
an Arab town of 25,000 to teach English.
Two years later, she wrote a book about
the conditions:
Now, after more than five decades of
aggressive land confiscation policies
toward Palestinian citizens, 93 percent
 FREDERIKSEN: A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE AND JORDAN
of the Israeli land is owned either by
the state or the Jewish National Fund.
… This, in itself unremarkable, is
significant because the land is held by
the state not for the benefit of its
citizens, all Israelis, but in trust for the
Jewish people around the world.
…The rest, 7 percent, is split between
private Jewish and Arab owners. Even
so, much of the 3 percent … held by
the country’s Arab population has
been put under the jurisdiction of
Jewish regional councils, which refuse
to give Arab citizens permits to
develop it.9
Today there are hundreds of settle-
ments exclusively for Jews across Israel,
part of what the state terms its
“Judaization” programs; moving Jews into
traditionally Arab areas so that Arab
communities can be brought under Jewish
dominion.10
“The 93 percent of the land owned by
the state and the JNF is leased to commu-
nities like the kibbutzim, moshavim and
mitzpim — the backbone of the apartheid
system identified by Uri [Davis].”11 (Dr.
Davis has been actively engaged in Arab
property disputes with Israeli bodies. He
was born in Israel but has relocated to the
UK.)
More than 100,000 Arab citizens, or
one in ten of the Arab population, are
classified under the Planning and
Building Law as living in what the
state considers ‘unrecognized
villages.’ …about 70,000 Bedouin, live
in appalling conditions in the Negev
Region … forced to live in tents or tin
shacks, because anything more
permanent would be demolished by
the authorities.12
33
Though the Arab population continues
to increase, Arab villages may not expand.
Israel does not allow any new Arab
villages, and there is no space for additional
houses or businesses.13 Arabs citizens of
Israel may not join the Israeli military for
reasons of security. However, this also
prevents Arab youth from participating in
the college-education and other support
programs provided to reserve and active
IDF members.14
Ali Abunimah in an op-ed in the
December 26, 2006, Wall Street Journal
describes some Israeli apartheid actions.
Non-Jewish schools receive a fraction of
the funding received by their Jewish
counterparts. A Jewish person from
anywhere in the world may settle in Israel,
yet family members of Arab citizens, even
those refugees living in neighboring coun-
tries or refugee camps, may not set foot in
Israel.
The laws of Israel provide irrefutable
information on what would evolve under
arrangements for a state of Palestine that
is in any manner directly or indirectly linked
to Israel: apartheid for the Palestinians.
In 2005, Israel confirmed its intent to
apply its Basic Laws to the Arabs in the
occupied territories too. As reported by
Haaretz January 20, 2005, the government
applied the Absentee Law to West Bank
farmers from Bethlehem and Beit Jala
whose properties were isolated on the
Israeli side of the Israeli-built barrier wall
in East Jerusalem. “The state’s response
stated that the lands ‘no longer belong to
them, but have been handed over to the
Custodian for Absentee Property’. At
stake are thousands of dunam of agricul-
tural land on which the Palestinians grew
olives and grapes throughout the years.”
There will be no compensation.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2007
The toleration by the United States and
the international community of Israel’s
blatant violation of international law and the
most basic human rights underlies the
Palestinians’ firm rejection of any link to
Israel — and their 2006 vote. Have we
forgotten the history of South Africa?
WATER CRISIS
The equitable resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict must be an integral part
of the settlement of issues between Israel
and its neighbors. Two aspects of the
dispute are involved. One is the imposition
on Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria
and Jordan of the 3.9 million Palestinian
refugees Israel forced out of their villages
and off their lands in Israel. This equals 60
percent of the entire present population of
Israel. The second is the direct loss of land
and water resources taken by Israel from
the occupied territories and the three
neighboring countries.
Table 1: Location of Palestinian
Refugees in 2002
Gaza 865,242 (462,547)
West Bank 618,512 (166.066)
Lebanon 384,198 (215,653)
Syria 396,248 (110,597)
Jordan 1,662,227 (291,244)
Total Refugees
Total registered 3,926,787
Refugees in camps (1,864,601)
(From National Geographic. October. 2002)
34
The expulsion15 — 750,000 in 1948-49
and 200,000 in 1967 — had wide-ranging
impacts. By 2002, a total of 3.93 million
refugees were registered, 1.86 million still
living in refugee camps constructed after
the 1949 and 1967 events. Gaza and the
West Bank have 1.47 million refugees,
Lebanon and Syria have close to 400,000
each, and Jordan has 1.7 million.16 In
every case, they burden meager resources
— land and water — as well as services
and infrastructure. The human costs are
far greater, triggering outrage and violence.
The severity of the water crisis in
these countries is a measure of the
conflict’s impact. A report by the World
Water Council provides estimates of the
quantity of annual renewable water
available per capita (expressed as cm/y/
cap) in the 20 Arab countries in the years
1990 and 2025.17 The Arab countries
constitute the most water-deficient group in
the world. The present Palestinian water
shortages are or soon will be matched or
exceeded by the neighboring three coun-
tries as indicated in Table 2.
Table 2: Annual water quantity
available to countries
neighboring Israel and Palestine
(cubic meters/year/capita)
Country 1990 2025
Lebanon 1,770 1,150
Syria 2,100 700
Jordan 350 150
(From “Water Vision for the Twenty-first
Century in the Arab world”)
 FREDERIKSEN: A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE AND JORDAN
The United Nations classifies a
quantity of 1700 cubic meters of water per
capita as “periodic” stress. 1000 cm/y/cap
is classified as “chronic” stress, and 500
cm/y/cap as “absolute” stress. These
quantities per capita are to satisfy all of a
country’s water demands: industrial,
commercial, agricultural, environmental and
domestic. Jordan was already in a condi-
tion of absolute water stress in 1990,
consuming more water than is replenished,
by over-pumping its groundwater. Leba-
non is entering the level of periodic stress
and will be under chronic stress by 2025,
with Syria approaching a level of absolute
stress in 2025. The estimates for Syria do
not fully reflect Turkey’s increasing
retention of Euphrates water.
Further, these quantities are average
annual values. The supply during pro-
longed droughts for most Middle East
countries will be substantially less, an
inevitable human and economic crisis of
unimaginable proportions. The adverse
effects of global warming are already
documented in Morocco.
The second impact of the conflict
multiplies the consequences of the refugee
problem. Through military actions, Israel
has taken control of critical sources of
water that were formerly under the
sovereignty of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and
the West Bank. Syria lost the Golan
Heights and access to the Jordan River
and Lake Tiberius. Lebanon has lost land
adjacent to Mt. Hermon and the Litani River.
The Palestinians of the occupied territories
have lost control of their aquifers underlying
Gaza and the West Bank and their equitable
allocation of the Jordan River. The refugees
driven from their Israeli homes and lands lost
the water that underpinned their economic
activities and their well-being.
35
There is no water available from
outside the Jordan Basin. Turkey is well
along in its construction of the massive
Southeast Anatolia Project. It will retain
over 50 percent of the Euphrates flow,
reducing the supply to Syria by 40 percent
and to Iraq by 60-80 percent. Some
estimates predict even greater reduc-
tions.18 Historically, these downstream
riparians depended upon this source for
their agricultural and urban supply. A
similar reduction will occur on the Tigris
with a smaller impact on Syria but substan-
tial consequences for Iraq. Strained
relations due to these changes affect Syria,
Iraq and Turkey. Given this antagonism,
there will be no remedial supply to the
Jordan basin countries from Turkey, Iran or
Iraq. Indeed, the Euphrates is the primary
supply for the Sunnis living in the western
region of Iraq — another grievance souring
their attitude towards the “new” Iraq.
There can be no permanent Middle
East peace without the return of captured
land and water resources to the Palestin-
ians, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and the
water expropriated from the Palestinian
refugees now living in camps or as citizens
in these four countries.
FEDERATION WITH THE RETURN
OF RIGHTS, LAND AND WATER
It is proposed that a sovereign State of
Palestine be created and that it join in a
federation with the Kingdom of Jordan.
The State of Palestine would be indepen-
dent of Israel and would have sovereignty
over the lands comprising the entire area
within the boundaries existing before the
1967 war. Its water resources and those
of its neighbors would be fully restored,
and the water of the Palestinian refugees
confiscated by Israel would be reallocated
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2007
to the neighboring countries in which they
reside. Negotiations would address the
other issues stemming from the conflict.
The required measures can be readily
identified, and mechanisms to ensure
equitable treatment of issues have been
defined by international instruments.
No independent international agency
has completed a thorough study to ascer-
tain the minimum attributes of a viable
sovereign State of Palestine. Total free-
dom from outside political, economic and
military pressures, plus land and water
resources adequate for a robust economy
and future growth, are essential. These, in
turn, largely determine the acceptable
decisions regarding most other issues. The
evolution of the Palestine situation, obvi-
ously, has created many particularly
emotional issues.
Independence from Israel
The first question of viability pertains
to the structure of a State of Palestine.
There must be a two-state solution as
called for in UN Resolution 181. A fully
sovereign self-sufficient nation of Palestine
was the intent of the United Nations and
the countries that signed the resolution.
The Palestinians have demonstrated their
desire for and ability to function as a
democracy — if they were free from
external interventions.
The behavior of Israel and the United
States, however, has never been directed
toward that goal, as is evident in the state-
ments of Israeli officials and agencies.19 It is
demonstrated by Israel’s Basic Laws and its
actions within Israel, as well as in its continu-
ing violations of international laws. A linkage,
regardless of its form, of Palestine with Israel
would ensure widening instability within the
Middle East and far beyond.
36
Israel has proposed a transfer of West
Bank lands to Jordan and, in May 1968,
discussed it with King Hussein in London.
The proposal was a compromise among
Israeli factions. One opposed an Israeli
annexation of the entire West Bank. Other
ideological factions wanted Israel to
incorporate all of the West Bank into
“Greater Israel.” The resulting West Bank
area offered to the king contained “those
lands not needed by Israel.” This would
have altered the boundary to an extent
unacceptable to King Hussein. West Bank
leaders had the same reaction to the
“autonomy” offered earlier by Israel.20 The
Palestinians wanted their land and their
independence.
A State of Palestine can only survive
by owning and managing all its land and
water resources and guiding its own
economic policies and development.
Palestine must be able to attract outside
investments and international assistance. It
must have open and free access for
international commerce, particularly to
allow its products to reach regional mar-
kets in a timely manner. Jordan would gain
direct access to the Mediterranean by way
of Gaza, strengthening the economies of
both Jordan and Palestine.
Israel will, of course, express its
security concerns in ways that have proven
so effective for obtaining blanket support
for its belligerent actions. These concerns
can be answered by the proposed federa-
tion. The people of Palestine and Jordan
have much in common. Importantly, a
federation would allow both entities better
economic opportunities in terms of invest-
ments, development and markets. The
security and freedom gained by the Pales-
tinians would facilitate the pursuit of a
coherent joint foreign policy.
 FREDERIKSEN: A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE AND JORDAN
Land Resources
The basic land resources necessary to
sustain an economically healthy and secure
country in the particular setting of the
occupied territories are substantial.
Today’s population of the West Bank and
Gaza, the registered Palestinian refugees in
the three neighboring countries, and a
realistic future population growth of
Palestine are involved. The question has
been conveniently ignored in the proposals
made by Israel and the United States.
There can be no question that the area
defined by borders before the 1967 war
would be an absolute minimum for a viable
Palestine. This is a mountainous dry area,
much of it with shallow soils and rock
outcrops. It will require a multi-billion-dollar
investment in land reclamation to remedy
damage from settlements, roads and
wastes shipped in from Israel (Haaretz,
April 4, 2005) and the removal of all barrier
walls constructed within the territories.
This allocation to Palestine would still leave
Israel with 77 percent of historic Palestine,
the long coastal access, the most produc-
tive lands and the potential for economically
desalting a limitless supply of seawater.
The issues of “right of return” and
restitution for confiscated Palestinian
assets can be pursued in parallel. This will
help restore hope and support among
Palestinian refugees within the camps and
among the Palestinian diaspora and provide
a desperately needed source of investment
funds. It will calm the violence.
Israel has devised methods to deter-
mine the values of property expropriated
under war conditions. A report by
Diaspora Affairs Minister Natan
Sharansky is discussed by Amiram Barkat
in Haaretz on March 29, 2005, noting the
value of pre-war Jewish property in
37
Poland. Several assessments by the U.S.
and other governments of Jewish property
expropriated during World War II may be
referenced.
Indeed, current Israeli property values
are available. Israeli real estate is booming,
and even Donald Trump is investing, along
with other foreigners, as reported in
BusinessWeek.com, December 27, 2006.
Israel’s Kfar Shalom advertises land in
Yavne’el Valley near Lake Tiberius for
home development. This is located in a
marginal agricultural area that Vice Pre-
mier Shimon Peres believes will soon see
tourist projects and industrial parks
(kfarshalom.com, January 1, 2007). A
comprehensive 1999 study on refugee
claims exists.21
Water Rights and Access
The water issues, though of fundamen-
tal importance, are physically and finan-
cially easier to resolve than any other
issues in dispute. Professor Arnon Soffer
says:
Dr. Martin Sherman of Tel Aviv
University … ascribes to the impor-
tance of water in connection with the
Arab-Israeli conflict and states that
Israel is liable to transfer between 750
and 1,000 million cubic meters of water
(MCM), or 65% of Israel’s entire
potable water potential to the Arabs.
He feels that desalination should
begin immediately and that an annual
amount of 50 MCM per year is not
enough.22
Other Israeli officials also recognize
that Israel will have to return expropriated
rights and that desalination will be Israel’s
major source of supply in the future.
Desalting seawater is already economically
viable for Israel’s coastal centers.23
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2007
“Various areas … contain tens of millions
of cubic meters of brackish water which
can be desalinated at 20-50 cents per cubic
meter.”24
Currently, Israel allows the 3.6 million
Palestinians in the occupied territories less
than 5 percent of the water used by Israel
and Palestine together. Israel’s 6.7 million
people receive over 95 percent. When
including Israel’s large unexploited aquifer
in the Negev25 and its unlimited access to
the Mediterranean for economically
desalted water supplies, Israel allows the
Palestinians an insignificant percentage of
the total water available.
In 1999, Israel used 59.6 percent of its
water supply in its highly subsidized
agriculture. Yet this sector produced an
insignificant 1.6 percent of Israel’s GDP,
employs 3 percent of its workforce and
contributes only 2.2 percent to its ex-
ports.26 Israel uses many times more
water for this minor economic activity than
it allows the Palestinians for their total
needs. Israel’s irrigation serves as a
mechanism for Israel to lay claim to this
water while choking the Palestinians’
economy and imposing harsh living condi-
tions. The alignment of Israel’s “security”
wall inside the West Bank indicates that
one of its purposes is to install deep wells
to expropriate the Palestinians’ access to
their key groundwater and quality agricul-
tural land.27
Disputed water rights in the Jordan
River basin can be physically transferred
with limited infrastructure and costs. This
also is true of the aquifers serving the
occupied territories. It is mostly a matter
of Israel’s reducing or halting surface
diversions and groundwater extraction. It
will have to disconnect its export lines
drawing groundwater from the West Bank.
38
The transfer of water rights to refugees
now living in the occupied territories and
neighboring countries can be provided in a
similar manner, though it will require
substantial infrastructure investments in
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. A fair resolu-
tion of water rights may provide a means
to partially address the issues of “right of
return” and “restitution” for confiscated
assets and foregone income. There are no
legitimate constraints to these adjustments.
It is a question of political realism. Indeed,
the remedial actions can proceed in parallel
with a final agreement.
As part of the agreements, Israel should
be given an equitable source of water for its
people and maintenance of a healthy,
productive economy. A comprehensive
accounting of all available resources —
primary renewable freshwater sources,
reused urban and irrigation water, and
potential sources such as economically viable
desalination of saline aquifers and sea water
and Israel’s unexploited aquifers — should
be compiled for the negotiations.
The water-related negotiation would be a
foundation for the broader actions inherent in
UN Security Council Resolution 1405,
adopted on April 19, 2002. Among other
matters, UN 1405 reconfirms UN 242,
requiring a return to the positions held by all
parties prior to the 1967 war. Eleven specific
water-related measures are identified.
1. Return Jordan River headwaters to
Lebanon and Syria. (Israel made an incursion
into Lebanon in 1982, ostensibly to strike at
terrorists, in the process of which it captured
and retains control of additional Lebanese
and Syrian headwaters of the Jordan River
and a portion of the Litani.)
2. Return Jordan River access and the
Golan Heights and the associated water
resources to Syria. (The 1967 war was
 FREDERIKSEN: A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE AND JORDAN
launched by Israel as the means to take
international water held under a UN
agreement and capture the water associ-
ated with the Syrian lands along the Jordan
River and the Golan Heights while prevent-
ing the planned use of this water by Syria
and Jordan.28)
3. Restore equitable Jordan River
water allocations among all riparians. (The
primary supply of the Jordan River origi-
nates from Mount Hermon, lying entirely
within Lebanon and Syria. The contribu-
tions to the river’s discharge are as fol-
lows: Syria, 50 percent; Jordan, 25 percent;
Lebanon, 20 percent; and 2.5 percent, from
Israel and the West Bank. (The major
tributary arising within Israel also receives
its entire supply from Mt. Hermon. Before
partition, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and
historical Palestine relied upon these
waters to meet their then-existing needs
and to serve as a source for their future
growth.)29
4. Construct Maqarin Dam on the
Yarmuk River for Syria and Jordan.
(Israel pressed Jordan and Syria to con-
struct a very small reservoir on their part
of the Yarmuk River instead of the
Maqarin, which would have provided
much-needed long-term water storage for
their use.)
5. Halt Israeli export of water from
West Bank aquifers. (Israel currently
exports over 80 percent of the West Bank
resources, another 1967 war objective.30
And now the route of Israel’s wall deviates
significantly from the 1967 border align-
ment, to incorporate into Israel Palestinian
areas that are the most productive for
tapping the mountain aquifers.)
6. Construct Israeli desalting plants on
the Mediterranean to serve its coastal
cities and adjacent plains. (Israel can tap a
39
potentially unlimited supply of water by
constructing desalting plants on the sea. As
reflected in Israeli plans, this is an eco-
nomically viable source for its cities and
the coastal plain. This option is not avail-
able to the interior of other countries or the
West Bank, which would incur excessive
additional costs to pump and distribute the
desalted Mediterranean water to mountain-
ous regions inland. Fortunately, these
areas overlie groundwater sources that are
to be returned.)
7. Curtail Israeli irrigation. Israel
pursues irrigated agriculture on 186,000
hectares [450,000 acres] by subsidizing the
excessively high pumping costs,
unaffordable by the agricultural industry,
which in 1999 consumed 59.6 percent of
Israel’s total water supply.
8. Halt diversion of Israeli salt springs
to the Jordan River. (A series of large salt-
water springs arise in the area to the west
of Lake Tiberius that historically dis-
charged into the lake, which diluted their
discharge. To remove this contribution to
the lake’s salt content, Israel diverts the
water into the Jordan River downstream
from the lake. Israel agreed with Jordan
several decades ago to halt this practice
because it renders the remaining Jordan
River water unsuitable for any use.)
9. Develop Israel’s Negev aquifer.
(One Israeli official indicated that the
Negev water was of a quality equal to that
of Lake Tiberius and of a quantity equal to
125 to 250 years’ safe supply from the
Mountain Aquifer.)
10. Recycle wastewater. (Israel
already recycles some wastewater and has
plans for much more.)
11. Transfer refugee water rights,
originally a part of their lands in the areas
comprising Israel and the territory it
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2007
occupies, to the present countries of
residence of those refugees. (Israeli
irrigation and urbanized areas on those
lands are a measure of the expropriated
water rights. Compensation for the loss of
assets by the refugees would be addressed
separately.)
International Instruments
Three groups of international instru-
ments would apply to formulating an
equitable resolution of the water-resources
issues. Most aquifers and all surface
streams involved are international bodies of
water, and all parties involved in the
situation are subject to the provisions of
these instruments. The instruments will not
be discussed in detail, but their application
is evident within the instruments them-
selves and has been cited in several
documents.
1. Those instruments relative to
military actions include the following:
• The Hague Convention on War
(1907),
• The United Nations Charter (1945),
• The International Court of Justice
(1945),
• The Fourth Geneva Convention on
War (1949),
• United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 181 (1947) and others,
• The International Covenants for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966).
Actions that are part of a first step
must be taken to restore resources expro-
priated by military force. Three examples
are these:
• The Geneva Convention on War
prohibits the taking of resources by occu-
pying powers.
40
• UN General Assembly Resolution
1803 prohibits the violation of a people’s
rights to sovereignty over their natural
resources.
• The Covenant of Rights prohibits
interference in the use of another people’s
natural resources.
2. Those instruments relative to disputes
over international water resources are the
following:31
• The ILA Helsinki Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of International Rivers (1966),
• The ILA Seoul Rules on International
Groundwater (1987) augmenting the Helsinki
Rules,
• The Bellagio Draft Treaty on Ground-
water (1989),
• The UN Law of International Water
Courses (1997).
The adopted Helsinki Rules and the UN
Law of the Non-Navigable Uses of Interna-
tional Waters confirm the principles bearing
on the responsibilities of the countries riparian
to an international body of water. Riparians
must observe fundamental principles such as
these:
• Exchange all water-related data,
respect the equity of use by other riparians,
and act to protect the environment.
• Meet the obligation to not cause
significant harm to other basin states.
• Refrain from transferring water out of
a basin without a resolution of the concerns
and needs of all other riparian countries.
• Facilitate the submission of conflicts to
the UN International Court of Justice for
resolution.
3. UN Resolution 181 and numerous
additional UN resolutions (http://
domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/fRecRes) since
then have been directed towards the conflict
or actions by the parties. UN Resolution 181
 FREDERIKSEN: A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE AND JORDAN
set forth the partition of historical Palestine.
Though not stated in explicit provisions on
water (there were none), the land and water
assets of the residents of the area were
protected. Provisions of UN Resolution 181
that pertain to land ownership and water
rights include the following:
• Residents could remain in the resulting
state with ownership of their assets and full
rights held prior to partition.
• Water rights would remain with
individual landowners.
• Residents would be fully compensated
if they requested relocation.
• International instruments and prin-
ciples apply to all disputes.
RESOLVING THE SITUATION
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
is the principal venue for resolving conflicts
among members of the United Nations and
conflicts between two parties, one of which
is a UN member. The Law of International
Watercourses calls for arbitration or submit-
tal of a dispute to the ICJ. Three articles of
the UN Charter describe the status of the
Court.
Article 92: “The International Court of
Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations.”
Article 93: “1. All Members of the
United Nations are ipso facto parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
2. A state which is not a member of the
United Nations may become a party to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice
on conditions to be determined in each case
by the General Assembly upon the recom-
mendation of the Security Council.”
Article 94: “1. Each Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with
the decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party.
41
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the
obligations incumbent upon it under a judg-
ment rendered by the Court, the other party
may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures
to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”
The politics and complexity of undertak-
ing an equitable resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict have overwhelmed the
present dysfunctional arrangements. Sixty
years of failure to address the conflict in an
unbiased timely manner rule out (a) the
General Assembly (the UN applied its
“power” to execute UN I81, yet refuses to
enforce 181 or any of the other numerous
resolutions issued subsequently), (b) media-
tion (the United States has tolerated the
deteriorating situation, ignored international
instruments and helped fund Israel’s unhelp-
ful actions) and (c) direct negotiations by
Israel and the Palestinians (Israel unabash-
edly and aggressively seeks all of Palestine
and the subservience of the Palestinians).
Unfortunately, ICJ Article 93 contains a
potential obstacle. Since the Palestinians do
not now have a “state,” they cannot — and
Israel will not — submit a request for an ICJ
hearing. In such circumstances, the Security
Council is to decide whether a request should
be submitted on their behalf. The United
States, however, has threatened to veto it,
precluding an approach through the custom-
ary UN procedures. Indeed, in 2006, the
United States campaigned to abolish the ICJ.
The international community as a whole
will have to face up to what it has created.
Through the United Nations, or outside it if
vetoes prevail, it will have to engage the ICJ.
This is the only venue where facts can be
introduced, fair judgment sought and politics
avoided. To accelerate the process, the
community could immediately assemble a
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2007

small commission to proceed with investiga-
tions and preparation of findings for presen-
tation to the ICJ. This use of the ICJ will
require a dedicated leadership in the commu-
nity, needless to say.
CLOSING COMMENTS
After approving the partition of the
Palestinians’ lands in 1947, the international
community abdicated its responsibility to
create a viable State of Palestine in the area
remaining to them. It prohibited a Palestinian
hearing in the ICJ of this unprecedented UN
act of partition. It has given Israel the power
to dictate the future of the Palestinians. The
offers by Israel and the U.S.-mediated
solutions will not lead to peace. Professors
Mearsheimer and Walt have documented the
power of the Israeli lobby and its immense
influence on U.S. foreign policy. This will
continue no matter which political party is in
power.32
King Abdullah II of Jordan governs a
country suffering from the surrounding
Middle East conflicts. His is a voice of
reason that seeks a solution to the crisis
affecting the region’s people. In a Novem-
ber 26, 2006, ABC News interview, he
stated:
…We’re juggling with the strong
potential of three civil wars in the
region, whether it’s the Palestinians,
that of Lebanon or of Iraq …. The issue
is, we have not been able to deal with
the core problem of the Middle East. …
For the majority of us living in this part
of the world, it has always been the
Israeli-Palestinian, the Israeli-Arab
problem. … If we don’t solve the Israeli-
Palestinian problem, then how can we
ever solve the Israeli-Arab problem?
A vigorous, broad and immediate
program by the international community that
leads directly to a viable, sovereign State of
Palestine and a full settlement of claims of
neighboring countries is the most urgent task
facing the world community today. There
can be more “transitions.” The imposition of
hundreds of thousands Iraqi refugees on
Syria and Jordan only worsens the situation.
Without an immediate and dramatic reversal
of its past silence, the world community will
leave an unconscionable, destabilizing legacy
with ramifications far beyond Israel, Pales-
tine and the greater Middle East.

1
Harald Frederiksen, “Water: Israeli Strategy, Implications for Peace and the Viability of Palestine,” Middle East
Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4. Winter 2003, p. 72
2
The Likud Party Platform, provisions; The Palestinians: Self Rule … The Jordan River as a Permanent Border
available on the Israeli government site, found at www.knesset.gov.il/elections/knesset15/elikud_m.htm Accessed
12/15/06.
3
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 181, November 29, 1947.
4
Roselle Tekiner, “Israel’s Two-tiered Citizenship Laws Bar Non-Jews from 93 Percent of Its Lands,” Washing-
ton Report on Middle East Affairs, January 1990. Available on www.washington-report.org/backissues/0190/
9001020.htm. Accessed 1/12/07, p. 20. See also Roselle Tekiner, “Jewish Nationality Status as the Basis for
Institutionalized Racial Discrimination in Israel,” Middle East Policy, No. 17, Summer 1986.
5
World Conference Against Racism — Durban, “Acquisition of Israeli Nationality,” Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, August 20, 2001 found at www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/8/
Acquisition%20of%20Israeli%20Nationality. Accessed 1/12/07.
6
Roselle Tekiner, “Israel’s Two-tiered Citizenship,” p. 20.
7
Samar Assad, “Reviving the Absentee Property Law: Another Step in Consolidating the Occupation,” Media
Monitors Network, 1/27/2005, found at: http://usa.mediamonitors.net/headlines/

42
 FREDERIKSEN: A FEDERATION OF PALESTINE AND JORDAN

reviving_the_absentee_property_law_another_step_in_consolidating_the_occupation . Accessed 1/12/07. See

also: “Laws of the State of Israel: Authorized Translation from Hebrew,” Vol. 4.(Government Printing Office,
1948-1987), pp. 68-82. Found at: www.geocities.com?savepalestinenow/isrealilaws.fulltext/
absenteepropertylaw.htm. Accessed 1/12/07.
8
The State of Israel, “The Existing Basic Laws: Summary.” Found at: www.knesset.gov.il/description/
eng_mimsha;_yespd2.htm#2. Accessed 1/12/07.
9
Susan Nathan, The Other Side of Israel: My Journey across the Jewish/Arab Divide (Random House, 2005),
p.144.
10
Ibid, p. 144.
11
Ibid, p. 148.
12
Ibid, p. 144.
13
Ibid, p. 152.
14
Ibid, p. 111.
15
Nur Masalha, The Expulsion of the Palestinians; The Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Thought, 1882-1948
(Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 179.
16
Andrew Cockburn, “Lines in the Sand,” National Geographic Magazine, Vol. 202, No. 4, October, 2002, pp.
102-104.
17
Mahmoud Abu-Zeid and Atef Hamdy, Water Vision for the Twenty-First Century in the Arab World, (World
Water Council, 2002), p. 30.
18
See also Diane Ward, Water Wars: Drought, Flood, Folly, and the Politics of Thirst (Penquin Putnam Inc.,
2002), pp. 177-178.
19
See notes pp. 1 and 2.
20
Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 262-263.
21
See Terry Rempel, “The Ottawa Process:Workshop on Compensation and Palestinian Refugees,” Journal of
Palestine Studies, Autumn 1999.
22
Arnon Soffer, “Mapping Special Interest Groups in Israel’s Water Policy,” Efficient Use of Limited Water
Resources, Making Israel a Model State, Barry Rubin, ed., (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA),
Bar-Ilan University, December 2001), p. 146. See also Harald Frederiksen, “Water in the Israeli / Palestinian
Conflict: A History with Few Options.” 5th IWHA Conference Tampere, Finland 2007, Pasts and Futures of
Water, pp. 12-13.
23
Peter Wiseburgh, Preface to Rubin’s Efficient Use of Limited Water Resources. See also Pinhas Glueckstern,
“Desalination: Current Situation and Future Prospects,” in the same book.
24
Joshua Schwarz, “Water Resources Development and Management in Israel,” in Efficient Use of Limited Water
Resources.
25
Discussion by Professor E. Adar at a meeting of the San Diego American Associates of Ben Gurion University,
San Diego Jewish Press-Heritage, December 29, 2002. See also A. Issar, “The Water Resources of Israel, Past,
Present and Future — A Comprehensive Outline,” Palestine Center for Regional Studies, 2000.
26
Arie Sheskin and Arie Regev, Israeli Agriculture: Facts and Figures, Second Edition, (Jerusalem, Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development, December, 2001), p. 7.
27
Clemens Messerschmid, “Separation Wall and Water Resources Perspectives,” authorized English version,
originally published in German in the quarterly Informationsstelle Naher und Mittlerer Osten (INAMO), (http://
www.inamo.org:8080/inamo/backlist/34), 2003.
28
Harald Frederiksen, “Water: Israeli Strategy, Implications for Peace. . .,” pp. 78-81.
29
Harald Frederiksen, “The World Water Crisis: Ramifications of Politics Trumping Basic Responsibilities of the
International Community,” International Journal of Water Resources Development, Vol. 19, No. 4, December
2003, pp. 607-609.
30
Harald Frederiksen, “Water: Israeli Strategy, Implications for Peace. . .,” pp. 78-81.
31
Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Non Navigational Uses (Qxford University
Press, 2001), See also: Joseph Dellapenna, “Water in the Jordan Valley: The Potential and Limits of Law” The
Palestine Yearbook of International Law, (al-Shaybani Society of International Law), and Harald Frederiksen, The
World Water Crisis: Ramifications of Politics Trumping Basic Responsibilities of the International Community.
32
John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 13,
No. 3, Fall 2006.

43