1|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

American Military University

The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

CJ319: Global Terrorism

Dustin Reed DeMoss

February 4, 2008
2|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

Overview

Al Qaeda has been at the forefront of headlines and controversy since that

fateful day of September 11, 2001, and from that day the West has found it difficult to

forget that act of terrorism, which created much catastrophe and has not been eliminated

albeit may never be. Every American and perhaps every member of a western nation

remembers where they were on that day and even seven years afterwards individuals are

reminded of the implications of terror on a daily basis by media reports of the situation in

Iraq, Afghanistan, or the various suicide bombings that happen throughout the Middle

East, Asia, Africa, and other random spots in the world. Terrorism and Al Qaeda have

become part of the culture and by extension has invaded the lives of each person whom it

has declared Jihad against, thus it is implausible and impossible to ignore these threats

through the façade of blind ignorance.

The tentacles of this global Islamic Jihadist network operate under a smorgasbord

of different organizations which have influence or operations in every geographic region

of the world. Al Qaeda itself has had known operations in Asia in the southern

Philippines on the island of Mindanao, in Europe, North America, and even in South

America along the tri-border regions where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina intersect.

The official formation of Al Qaeda occurred in Afghanistan fighting the Soviets in the

early 1980s leading to this rise of contemporary Al Qaeda and Jihadist operations that are

a direct result of the victory against the Soviets. As the Jihadist veterans assimilated into

Muslim society after the war there was an urge to continue operations but this time to

counteract suspected tainting of the holy land of Saudi Arabia citing the alliance with the

United States that allows the troops thereof to be stationed and operate in the region. The
3|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

main objective of Al Qaeda immediately following the Soviet defeat was definitively

focused on the withdrawal of American troops from the Saudi Arabian peninsula and to

oppose governments that did not consistently adhere to the radical views of extremist

Islam. Osama Bin Laden issued the newly devised mission statement on February 22,

1998 which stated, “In compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwah to all

Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, including civilians and

military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it

is possible to do it” (Caruso, 2001).

Al Qaeda’s base of operation was located in Afghanistan until 1991 and

again in 1996 to 2001, Pakistan briefly, and the Sudan from 1991 to 1996 (Caruso, 2001).

The structure of the organization is fluid and often transparent enough to cross borders

and function abstractly without complication of operations. Al Qaeda has developed

alliances and fruitful partnerships with affiliate organizations throughout the world

allowing this fluidity to persevere considering the circumstances of unforeseen and

foreseen conditions that cause the network to switch headquarters, and to avoid volatile

situations to senior leadership. These affiliate entities enable advantages such as a

continuous supply of recruits and to help achieve a global reach (Boettcher, 2001).

Terrorism analyst Magnus Ransdorp described the problem with pursuing the

organization in 2001 by stating, “The problem of countering the bin Laden organization

is that it mutates continuously,” and, “It is not only a multinational enterprise with

followers with financial infrastructure across the globe, it mutates, continuously shifting

in order to insulate the organization from an attempts at removing top leadership”

(Boettcher, 2001). This has historically been the main emphasis that constrains the
4|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

pursuit of the organization because with each action there is a counter-action, and with

that counter-action comes another aspect of pursuit which requires complicated initiatives

in order to continue, and not to mention the issues of sovereignty related to making

strategic military strikes against known areas of activity, such as the mountainous border

between Pakistan and Afghanistan which is believed to be a current haven for Al Qaeda

operatives (Al Qaeda 'rebuilding' in Pakistan, 2007). The organization often preys on

areas where it would be politically inconvenient for western forces to pursue it and seeks

out refuge in failed states; the latter being the main concern for United States national

security on the continent of Africa.

The infamous attacks on the embassies of the United States in Nairobi, Kenya and

Dar es Saleem, Tanzania on August 7, 1998 illustrated the ease with which Al Qaeda and

other terrorist organizations can operate on the African continent. The African continent

and many of the sovereign states in the region are literally a perfect example of the

components that enable terrorism to take root, and much of this is relevant to the

contemporary problems posed by a history of colonialism, unstable governing,

corruption, ethnic cleansing, and all the factors that are attributed to the creation of the

failed state. An example of this is Sudan which in the 1990s for a number of reasons

officially gave Osama bin Laden refuge in the nation following the Saudi government’s

decision to revoke his citizenship. Abu Nidal, Hamas, and Hezbollah have official offices

in the capital of Khartoum, terrorist training camps are located outside the city, and Sheik

Omar Abdel Rahman obtained his visa to the U.S. from Sudan (Is Sudan Terrorism's

New Mecca?, 1997). Furthermore, it is widely suspected that the Islamic National Front

along with the Sudanese government’s complicity was involved in the 1995 assassination
5|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

attempt on Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak to curtail the Middle East peace process at

the time (Mr. Mubarak: Valuable and Vulnerable, 1995). The Sudanese affiliation with

terrorist organizations is directly relevant to its status as a failed state unable to govern

effectively and the religious political movement within the system of governance.

Following the bombing of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on

August 7, 1998, President Bill Clinton ordered cruise missiles on August 22nd to strike

targets in both Afghanistan and the Sudan. In Afghanistan the missiles were targeted

towards an Al Qaeda training camp and in Sudan a chemical weapons facility outside

Khartoum which the President Omar el-Bashir asserted was a pharmaceutical plant and

called the attack, “a criminal act” (Bennet, 1998). President Omar el-Bashir further stated

on August 22nd at a rally of nearly 5,000 people in Khartoum, “America is preparing to

attack us because we are guardians of Islam,” and, “We have tasted the sweet flavor of

Jihad and martyrdom, and what we seek now is to die for the sake of God” (CNN, 1998).

The individuals at the rally attacked the British embassy thereafter. The importance of the

words spoken by President Omar el-Bashir in the post 9/11 world is that the complicity of

the Sudanese government and Mr. el-Bashir has not changed, therefore, it would be

logical to assume a certain degree of cooperation is still given by him and his

government. Today, the Sudanese government is committing genocide in the region of

Darfur and in 2005 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited with President Omar el-

Bashir to secure a resolution to the situation, but relations and an attempt to legitimately

deal with the government was strained even further by the bodyguards of Sudan’s

President attempting to physically block western media and not allowing Secretary Rice’s

interpreter which resulted in deafening silence for the first 10 minutes of the meeting
6|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

(Brinkely, 2005). Secretary Rice later stated that she was “outraged” over the incident.

The importance of this incident is that there is a continuation of inept leaders who have

slipped through the cracks of this current War on Terror which enable terrorist leaders to

operate within their borders both historically and in a contemporary sense.

The main contention of this report is that as the United States emboldens

moderate Muslim nations and eliminates terrorist threats in the Middle East than the

radical Islamic Jihadist networks and specifically Al Qaeda will begin a transition to step-

up operations on the continent of Africa which is particularly vulnerable to the influence

of organized terror, specifically North Africa, and may revert to previous areas of refuge.

Organized Terror Groups and Mergers of Terror in Africa

Al Qaeda’s affiliate organization the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat

(GSPC) is reportedly carrying out a plan devised by Osama bin Laden to fuel global

Jihad on the continent of Africa by establishing training centers in eastern Morocco and

referring to Algiers as, “The artery that will supply oxygen to Jihad in Darfur and across

Africa” (Neil Doyle Agency, 2006). The specific mandate of GSPC is to overthrow the

Algerian government and institute an Islamic state and has targeted mainly military

forces in Algiers although occassionally murdering or maiming civilians yet it has taken a

pledge to avoid civilian casualties after splitting from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

which from 1990 to 2000 cost nearly 100,000 civilian lives. The GSPC has been known

to target U.S. and European interests in Western Europe, and officially pledged

allegiance with Al Qaeda in 2003, and Al Qaeda publically approved a merger of GSPC
7|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

with it in 2006 with Ayman al-Zawahiri announcing the initiative. GSPC has been linked

to foot soldiers and suicide bombers in Iraq and to Abu Doha who conspired to blow up

Los Angeles airport (MIPT, 2007).GSPC has operations in Algiers, Mali, Mauritania,

Niger, and changed its official name to Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb

after the 2006 merger (MIPT, 2007).

In Egypt, Al Qaeda partnered with Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiya (GAI) which was

implicated in the 1995 attack on Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia and the organization’s

spirtual leader (Sheik Umar Abd al-Rahman) is incarcerated in the United States for his

attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, and by no means is this an amateur

organization in terrorism. In 1997, the group was split on a ceasefire with the Egyptian

government and splintered into divisive factions with the anti-ceasefire group believed to

have massacred tourists at Luxor (MIPT, 2007). The anti-ceasefire group is believed to

have switched its base of operations to Afghanistan prior to the 2001 invasion by the

United States, and is believed to have been routed to Pakistan following the invasion. The

group’s mandate is similar to the GSPC in that it officially incorporated in order to

overthrow the Egyptian government and institute a pure Islamic state. It’s partnership

with Al Qaeda began in February 1998 following Osama bin Laden’s call on Muslim to

kill Americans. Other groups known to be operating in Egypt include the Battalion of the

Martyr Abdullah Azzam, Egypt’s Revolution, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, International

Justice Group, Islamic Glory Brigades in the Land of the Nile, Islamic Liberation

Organization, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, and the Tawhid Islamic Brigades.

In Eritrea the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) is listed by the U.S.

Department of State as being an affiliate organization of Al-Qaeda, and partly implicated

8|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

Sudanese President el-Bashir in the rise of this organization by stating, “The Bashir

government's ‘Pan-Islamic’ foreign policy, which provided support for neighboring

radical Islamist groups, was partly responsible for this support for the rebels,” and, “The

Bashir government combined internal political repression with international Islamist

activism” (State Department, 2008). EIJM is a composite of many fractions of political

and religious dissidents and is based in Khartoum, Sudan with the mandate to, once

again, overthrow the government and install a system of governance based on Islamic

law. The Eritrean government itself has said that the EIJM is given support, aid, logistical

support, and training by both the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments (MIPT, 2007). It

is unclear when EIJM became an affiliate of Al Qaeda but nonetheless the group is active

and remains a source of terrorism on the African continent.

Kenya has the Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) which seeks to create an Islamic state in

Somalia and Ethiopia but operates as a terrorist organization in all three nations. AIAI is

known to have assisted Al Qaeda in the August 7, 1998 bombing of the embassy in

Kenya. Many members of AIAI are reportedly still connected with the Al Qaeda

enterprise (MIPT, 2007).

Libya which under Moammar al-Gaddafi has been a state-sponsor of terrorism with

official and unofficial ties to now defunct organizations such as the Arab Commando

Cells, Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine, Abu Nidal, and Arab

Revolutionary Brigades. Subsequently, in the past few years Colonel Gaddafi has

publicly rejected the notion of creating change through terror, but still a host of Islamic

Jihadist organizations operate within the parameters of Libya though ironically most are

opposed to his leadership now. The Islamic Martyrs Movement or Harakat al-Shuhada'a
9|Page The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

al-Islamiyah officially opposes Colonel Gaddafi and has on more than one occasion

attempted to assassinate him, and the mandate is similar to previously stated ones which

seek to overthrow the government and have a pure Islamic system, therefore, it must be

assumed that the future of the Islamic Martyrs Movement is likely to coincide with Al

Qaeda affiliation. Another group within Libya is the Fighting Islamic Group or al-Jam'a

al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah which is an organization sponsoring international Jihadist

campaigns. Most of the members of the Fighting Islamic Group are indigenous Libyans

that fought in the Soviet-Afghan War and oppose Colonel Gaddafi as well. In November

2007, Al Qaeda officially announced that the Fighting Islamic Group merged into an

affiliate organization with extensive connections with extremist in Egypt and Algeria

(MIPT, 2007). Furthermore, the Yemen Islamic Jihad organization also operates in Libya

with the goal of eliminating Western intervention to include commercial, military, and

civilian presences in the Middle East region, and has been linked to the USS Cole

bombing and an unknown connection to the 1995 assassination attempt on Hosni

Mubarak. The Yemen Islamic Jihad organization is funded by and supported by Al

Qaeda, but so far operates in Libya under unknown circumstances (MIPT, 2007).

The extensive network of Al Qaeda through affiliate organizations extends from

the most southern organization Al-Ittihaad al-Islami in Kenya and Tanzania to Morocco

in Northwest Africa with the training camps of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

(formerly Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat). Al Qaeda has known operations

directly and indirectly through affiliate organizations in Maurtania, Mali, Morocco,

Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya,

Uganda, and Tanzania. It is impossible to ignore the likelihood of Al Qaeda operatives

10 | P a g e The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

stepping-up operations on the continent where it already has intangible assets to include

training camps, fellow Jihadist, and etcetera. The Middle East region of Afghanistan and

Iraq are exclusively where the fight against western forces is but the future of Al Qaeda

depends on influence in Africa.

Conclusion

Al Qaeda is an umbrella organization under which other terrorist organizations

and by extension their networks and affiliates have assimilated into and synchronized

ambitions and plans. The extensive network of Al Qaeda and affiliates is literally global

as described by many and known operations are in Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria,

Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia, Egypt, Eritrea,

Kosovo, France, Germany, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, and

the list continues (MIPT, 2007). The global reach of this organization is of the utmost

importance to its survival and key to its ability to sustain operations, especially in areas of

vulnerable states exemplified in the perspective of the African continent where bands of

rebels can counter a sovereign nation’s military as seen recently in the nation of Chad

(Associated Press, 2008).

The United States and others have focused attention on Iraq and Afghanistan while

the continent of Africa has slowly but surely become a sanctuary for Muslim radicals

essential to the structure of Al Qaeda and can almost assuredly reign in their objectives in

this strategic area without the thorn of justice becoming lodged in their daily activities.

Africa is akin to the Wild West for radicals Muslims that wish to indoctrinate the youth in

the region and have them embark upon a future in international Jihad.

It is also possible that Al Qaeda and friends have gained monetary

11 | P a g e The Re-emergence of Al Qaeda Operations in Africa

resources from the continent of Africa starting with the help of Charles Taylor of Liberia

in the diamond trade business. General Charles Wald warned of this problem in 2004

stating, “The terrorist activity in this area is not going to go away,” and, “This could

affect your kids and your grandchildren in a huge way. If we don't do something about it,

we are going to have a real problem on our hands” (Farah & Shultz, 2004). General Wald

warned of terrorist meddling in the diamond trade but the intelligence community has

disavowed that this knowledge is accurate although Hezbollah is officially known to have

supported its activities via diamonds (Farah & Shultz, 2004).

Africa is promising to leadership of every radical Islamic Jihadist network to

include Al Qaeda but not limited to just that organization. Sovereign nations combating

the problem of terrorism today have focused attention on areas that are indeed havens but

there is a lack of consideration in the prospect of an entire continent that presents itself as

an efficient base of operations. Economic resources, vulnerable states, and ideological

Muslims sympathetic to Jihad are just a few factors significant to the production of terror

products. It is essential to the Global War on Terror that it truly becomes global and

targets the true havens of terror outside the geographic region of the Middle East.

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