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Security and Special
Operations
SOE and MI5 during the Second World War
Christopher J. Murphy
Security and Special Operations
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Security and Special
Operations
SOE and MI5 during the Second World War
Christopher J. Murphy
© Christopher J. Murphy 2006
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
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save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
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The author has asserted his right to be identiﬁed
as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2006 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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Companies and representatives throughout the world
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave
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ISBN-13: 9780230002418 hardback
ISBN-10: 0230002412 hardback
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Murphy, Christopher J. (Christopher John), 1976
Security and special operations : SOE and MI5 during the Second World
War / Christopher J. Murphy.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0230002412 (cloth)
1. World War, 19391945“Secret service“Great Britain.
2. Great Britain. Special Operations Executive. Security Section.
3. Great Britain. MI5. I. Title.
D810.S7M79 2007
940.53 1“dc22 2006046060
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
For my parents, Olive and John Murphy
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Contents
Acknowledgements viii
Note on Sources ix
Introduction x
1 The Origins and Development of SOE’s Security Section 1
2 Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’ 25
3 Security Abroad 50
4 Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 74
5 Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 96
6 Approaching Section V 132
7 Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 148
8 Double Cross and Deception 170
9 Unfinished Business 195
Postscript on Sources: SOE at The National Archives 214

Notes 218
Bibliography 243
Index 248
vii
Acknowledgements
The archival research on which this book is based was made possible
by a Leverhulme Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Centre for
Contemporary British History at the Institute of Historical Research. I am
grateful to my colleagues at CCBH, particularly Pat Thane and Michael
Kandiah, for their support during my time there. I would also like to
thank Philip Murphy of the University of Reading for his continued
support and advice. Michael Strang at Palgrave Macmillan and his
assistant Ruth Ireland have ensured a smooth publication process and
my thanks are due to them, and to project manager Vidya Vijayan.
Information about SOE’s Security Section is not always easy to locate
in the SOE archive, as much of it is buried in the files of the opera-
tional Country Sections; my thanks are due to Duncan Stuart, former
SOE Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who pointed
me in the right direction with a single sheet of paper. Howard Davies
at The National Archives arranged the release of numerous Personnel
Files of members of the Security Section – along with the PFs of those
it investigated – which provided much useful information, and I am
grateful for his assistance. First-hand accounts from members of the
Security Section are particularly difficult to come by; fortunately, some
such testimony has been preserved by the Imperial War Museum Sound
Archive. My thanks are due for permission to reproduce extracts from
its interviews here.
Two friends deserve special thanks: Christian Ellingsen for taking the
time to read and comment on the whole manuscript; and Carl Rann
for his computer skills that saved Chapters 1 and 8 when they vanished
into the electronic ether.
viii
Note on Sources
Some aspects of SOE and MI5 activity during the Second World War
are considered too sensitive to be released into the public domain even
today. When this is the case, the original papers are photocopied, the
offending words blanked out and the ‘redacted’ version substituted in
the file. Such redactions are indicated by [ ] throughout the text.
ix
Introduction
Much has been written about the activities of the Special Operations
Executive (SOE), the body responsible for conducting sabotage and
fermenting resistance on an international scale during the Second World
War. Yet despite this vast literature, little attention has been given to
the work of SOE’s Security Section, an absence which is striking when
one considers the attention that has been given to some of SOE’s oper-
ational failures, which raise questions about the nature of, and attitude
towards, security within the organisation. In the case of the consid-
erable memoir literature that has attached itself to SOE, the absence
of the Security Section can be explained by the nature of its work. As
Mark Wheeler has observed, ‘What the ex-operatives of SOE have not
abandoned is their desire to carry on by literary means the bureaucratic
in-fighting and the rearguard defence of their organization’s functions
and achievements which proved necessary from its very birth in 1940.’1
As the Security Section was brought in when things went wrong, an
examination of its work would hardly be the best means of defending
the legacy of SOE. Certain aspects of the Security Section’s work, while
in themselves successful, inevitably draw attention to deficiencies else-
where in the organisation. For example, while a holding facility for
failed recruits at Inverlair was run efficiently and without incident by the
Security Section, it was made necessary due to problems with SOE’s early
recruitment and training practices that hardly show the organisation in
a good light.
The release of the surviving SOE-related archive, combined with SOE-
related papers found in recently released MI5 files and oral testimony,
allows this absence to be addressed. It quickly becomes apparent that
the Security Section was not popular within SOE. As former Security
Officer Aonghais Fyffe recalled during an interview, ‘We weren’t very
popular we were always looked upon with a slight suspicion.’2 Resent-
ment, or at least irritation, towards ‘security’ could be provoked simply
by stepping into an SOE building and being asked to produce an identity
pass. A security officer recorded the trials faced by security watchmen:
I do not think it would be unfair to say that for the most part
they are much more reliable in inspecting passes than some of
our personnel are in producing them for inspection. It really is a
x
Introduction xi
remarkable thing that a request to show or make out a pass is, to

some people, tantamount to asking them for their finger-prints or
accusing them of treason and the watchmen do occasionally have
rather a rough time with such people.3
The Security Section found itself subject to unfavourable comparisons

to Hitler’s instrument of security, particularly its Field Security officers
who accompanied agents on their training courses. As one such officer
recorded, ‘Usually there is a period of a few days when the students look
upon me with some suspicion and the idea of “Gestapo” at the back of
their minds.’4 The Security Section also had the power to inquire into the
details of operational work being carried out by the Country Sections.
As these sections worked as self-contained entities, and guarded their
secrets jealously, a dislike of such interference is hardly surprising. This
tension particularly affected the work of SOE’s Special Security Section,
Bayswater.
Despite facing hostility and suspicion within SOE itself, the work of
the Security Section was vital. Its key function was obvious: ensuring
the security of the organisation, an all-encompassing job which can
be usefully subdivided into what former Security Officer Peter Lee has
described as ‘physical’ and ‘esoteric’ security. By ‘physical’ security, Lee
means the practical matters: ‘seeing that the tradesmen didn’t know
what was going on inside one of the training schools, things of that
sort’.5 This work also included accompanying agents on their training
courses (‘to see what kind of chaps they were and what their characters
were like’), giving periodical reminders to all of SOE’s staff of the dangers
of ‘Careless Talk’, and ensuring the maintenance of SOE’s ‘cover’ as
the ‘Inter-Services Research Bureau’, the strict monitoring of which Leo
Marks discovered to his cost in 1942.6 Lee notes that the ‘esoteric’ side
of security work included ‘the double cross system, running double
agents [and] the very high grade interrogation of people coming out
of occupied territories’.7 Much of this activity was carried out by SOE’s
Special Security Section in conjunction with MI5. Indeed, most of SOE’s
dealings with MI5 were canalised through the Security Section, and as
such it comes as little surprise that the relationship between SOE and
MI5 has, similarly, never been the subject of in-depth examination.
In the first official study of SOE, William Mackenzie noted that there
was ‘little conflict of interest’ between SOE and MI5, and that the
most significant problem faced was the practical one of establishing
an effective liaison procedure.8 Further investigation reveals a more
complicated relationship. Liaison resulted in cooperation on a wide
xii Introduction
variety of security-related issues, mirroring the ‘physical’ and ‘esoteric’

division described by Lee. On the ‘physical’ side, this included an MI5
officer putting ‘the fear of God’ into an old lady at a nursing home
who was suspected of spreading gossip about resistance work in the field
told to her by a returned agent, while on the ‘esoteric’ side, it included
discussions on the use of SOE agents in the field known to be ‘blown’
for the purposes of strategic deception through the double cross system,
run by MI5 under the supervision of the Twenty Committee. As we shall
see, such discussions produced little by way of results; but not for want
of trying.
The relationship between SOE and MI5 was not without its prob-
lems. Tension arose over the issue of operational security, which saw
the Security Section caught uncomfortably in between the competing
priorities of MI5 and SOE’s Country Sections. Fuelled by a belief that
the Germans were trying to penetrate SOE through agents caught in the
field, ‘turned’ and sent back to the UK, in cases where an agent’s loyalty
was brought into question MI5 encouraged caution, to the extent of
cancelling operational plans without definite proof of guilt. In contrast,
SOE’s Country Sections favoured the benefit of the doubt, resenting
such caution that could have a negative impact upon their plans. The
Security Section was hard pressed to satisfy both points of view, and
could only hope to reign in the extremes on either side.
Such difficulties were forgotten as the war in Europe drew to a close.
Prior to leaving SOE in May 1945, Director of Security John Senter
wrote to O.A. Harker, Deputy Director General of MI5, highlighting the
support MI5 had given the Security Section: ‘I shall always remember
that you were a friend indeed right from the beginning whatever we
have been able to achieve on the Security side here owes a great deal to
your sympathetic help and support.’9
1
The Origins and Development of
SOE’s Security Section
The Security Section of the Special Operations Executive, known by

the symbol D/CE, formed part of the larger Intelligence and Security
Directorate, under the overall control of Air Commodore Archibald
Robert (‘Archie’) Boyle.1 Born on 11 August 1887, Boyle embarked upon
a career in the army in 1907, and won two Military Crosses during the
First World War.2 He entered the civil service in 1922 under a scheme
established at the end of the war, and following a brief spell at the
Foreign Office was posted to the Air Ministry, where he rose to the
rank of Assistant Under Secretary of State.3 On the outbreak of the
Second World War, the Secretary of State for Air ‘asked him to relin-
quish his civil service status and put on the uniform of an airman’,
and he succeeded Air Commodore Buss as Director of Intelligence.4 In
this capacity, Boyle became involved with the double cross operations
being developed by MI5. J.C. Masterman acknowledges Boyle’s role in
The Double-Cross System, noting how he ‘chanced his arm’ in ‘approving
information for the SNOW network’.5
It was widely felt that following the outbreak of war Air Intelligence
had ‘not come up to a very high level’, and likely as a consequence
of this a further reorganisation at the Air Ministry saw Boyle pushed
sideways into the position of Air Liaison Officer, with responsibility for
‘all Air Attaches all over the world’ and for ‘liaison with Foreign Air
Ministries in this country’.6 Although there was ‘no real soreness’ on
Boyle’s part towards the Air Ministry as a result of this move, it became
known that he felt ‘somewhat badly treated’ and was unhappy with
his new position. SOE moved quickly, as Boyle was known to have
expressed an interest in joining the organisation. SOE’s Chief, Sir Frank
Nelson, felt that Boyle, who was ‘highly thought of in most quarters’,
would represent a ‘valuable acquisition’ for SOE, ‘by reason of his long
1
2 Security and Special Operations
experiences, his very valuable contacts and last, but not least, because of
his charming personality’. Boyle was later recalled by another security
officer, Aonghais Fyffe, as a kind, approachable man, never dictatorial
or domineering, who was ‘highly respected’. In a description evocative
of the fictional spymaster George Smiley, he recalls how Boyle would
attend meetings and listen to the proceedings with his eyes closed. The
difference, in Boyle’s case, being that he did so while smoking a pipe,
and ‘on one occasion he actually did close his eyes and dropped his
pipe!’7 But, as M.R.D. Foot notes, behind the kind facade of ‘dear old
Archie Boyle’ lay a ‘keen and suspicious mind, honed by twenty years’
experience of air intelligence’.8
Boyle joined SOE on 7 July 1941 as policy adviser to Nelson. Given
responsibility for the Intelligence and Security Directorate, his appoint-
ment coincided with an extensive shake-up of SOE’s existing security
machinery. SOE’s original Security Section (D/T Section) had been a
very small scale affair. Established in October 1940, it had been headed
by Lt Col Edward Calthrop, who divided his time between security
and his other duties as SOE’s liaison officer with the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS). A keen sportsman who had served in France and Belgium
during the First World War, he had been confined to a wheelchair in
the early 1930s, and went on to become SIS Head of Station in Brussels.9
Under Calthrop, D/T Section was responsible for rudimentary matters of
security, also supporting the fledgling Country Sections in their search
for suitable recruits by ‘furnishing them with names obtained from the
records of aliens registered with the Police’.10
Calthrop’s staff consisted of Captain E.R.W. Breakwell – who was soon
replaced as his deputy by E.C. Whetmore – J.D. O’Reilly, and a civilian
administrator. Born in London in September 1896, Edwin Charles Whet-
more had been studying for a degree in Modern Languages at King’s
College London when the First World War broke out. He left King’s,
becoming a Second Lieutenant in the Durham Light Infantry in May
1915, and was wounded in France the following year. In April 1918
Whetmore became an officer in the Intelligence Corps, proceeding to
hold a number of military posts during the 1920s before becoming
involved in the textile export business.11
John (‘Jack’) Dermot O’Reilly was seconded from Scotland Yard, and
given responsibility for SOE’s liaison with the police. He was godfather
to SOE’s well-known cryptographer Leo Marks, who recalled being given
a severe dressing down from him for being ‘the first NDO [Night Duty
Officer] in the history of SOE who had failed to report a single one of
the scraps of paper which the security department deliberately left lying
The Origins and Development of SOE’s Security Section 3
around as a trap for indolent young watchpuppies like me!’12 O’Reilly

had been a member of the Intelligence Corps during the First World
War, after which he joined Special Branch, spending 8 years as liaison
officer in Paris and Brussels. He was initially appointed to SOE in January
1941 for a three-month trial period as liaison officer with Special Branch,
joining the organisation on a full-time basis at the time of the shake-
up in July. A personnel report on O’Reilly acknowledged his ‘marked
talent for making contacts’. This, combined with his ‘knowledge of
the Continent gained in his previous Police work’, made him a ‘most
successful liaison officer’.13
With Boyle’s appointment as Director of Intelligence and Security
in July 1941, Calthrop’s association with security came to an end, as
liaison with SIS was separated from security work. Major General John
Henry Foster Lakin, who had previously served in the Indian Army
and more recently with MI5, was appointed head of the new Security
Section under Boyle. Lakin was a distinguished soldier who had held
high military office in India, and was aide-de-camp to King George V
from 1931 to 1933. At an unknown point following his ‘retirement’ in
1936, Lakin joined MI5.14 This, in turn, led to his appointment with
SOE. The Director General of MI5, Sir David Petrie, later wrote to Lakin
stating that ‘the best thing I did was to get you out of a very minor
post here into one in which your energy and experience would have
full scope. The benefit to S.O.E. no one can doubt.’15
Lakin took responsibility for liaison with MI5 on Director General and
Deputy Director General level, and on matters of operational security,
such as they existed at this early stage in SOE’s operational development.
As his deputy, Whetmore took responsibility for the physical security
of the organisation, along with liaison with the Home Office and the
armed forces. Former Security Officer Peter Lee recalls that Whetmore
was tremendously popular within the Section, but within months of the
new security set-up he was replaced as deputy head of Security by John
Watt Senter, who had joined the Section with Lakin, taking responsib-
ility for day-to-day liaison with MI5. Writing about Whetmore’s depar-
ture in November 1941, at which point his transfer to SIS was under
consideration, Boyle noted that ‘we have parted with his services because
he did not fit in’, going on to note that although ‘undoubtedly a
capable person’, Whetmore ‘did not appear to be cooperative here under
the new organisation his presence here would not enhance security
or general happiness of the staff’.16 There was likely more behind Whet-
more’s departure from SOE than an inability to ‘fit in’. In the same letter,
Boyle went on to note that ‘We cannot deny employment with “C” ’s
organisation even though we may have suspicions that the subject

is not a trustworthy person. We have, at present, no proof.’ He did not
elaborate further.
Unsuccessful in his attempt to join SIS, Whetmore ended up in
Gibraltar, where he became Chief of Staff to the temporary Governor
Admiral Sir G. Frederick Edward-Collins and later General Mason
Macfarlane’s ‘personal operation staff officer’. Whetmore founded the
Gibraltar Joint Intelligence Centre in September 1942, and remained
‘most anxious’ to join SIS when the war came to an end. SIS did not
want him, having received adverse reports on his behaviour in Gibraltar,
where he had interfered ‘to a serious extent with “Y” and R.S.S. affairs,
which were not his legitimate concern’ – part of what appeared to be
‘a considerable programme of Empire building’ by Whetmore to ‘make
himself the sole channel for Intelligence of the special material and
all other types in Gibraltar’. On top of this, he was considered to be
‘singularly lacking in discretion’.17
Despite such characteristics, Peter Lee later recalled that Whetmore’s
departure from the Security Section was considered ‘an absolute tragedy.
Everybody adored Whetmore in SOE’, a marked contrast to the prevalent
attitude towards his successor, John Senter: ‘nobody liked Senter very
much. He was a very shrewd, tough, self-made barrister. Very clever
man.’18 Another security officer recalls Senter as a ‘very autocratic’
figure.19 Born in Edinburgh in May 1905, Senter studied law at Edin-
burgh University, and was called to the Bar (Middle Temple) in 1928.20
Rejected by the Army on medical grounds when called up in July
1940, he went on to become a ‘Civilian Assistant’ at the War Office
prior to joining SOE, a description which obscures the fact that he
had joined MI5.21 Senter initially took responsibility for matters of
day-to-day liaison with MI5, such as security vetting, censorship and
legal questions. In November he was promoted, taking Whetmore’s
place as Head of General Security and deputy head of the Section as
a whole.
Jack O’Reilly, meanwhile, continued to conduct liaison with the police
within the reorganised Section. In addition, he undertook liaison with
the Registrar General’s Department, Ministry of Labour, H.M. Customs
and the Board of Trade, assisted by Captain Arthur Maldwyn Baird, who
joined the Security Section as Assistant Police Liaison on 4 July. Captain
Norman Mott, a ‘much liked, laconic pipe-smoker who was never seen to
be anything less than cool and controlled, however dreadful the crisis’,
took responsibility for the security of Headquarters and other buildings
in the London area.22 Mott is remembered fondly by Peter Lee, who
recalls that he ‘did the most marvellous imitations of Donald Duck.

When we were being bombed all night, and tempers were rather frayed,
he used to keep us sane.’23 Born in London in September 1910, prior to
the outbreak of war Mott had worked in insurance in the City, spending
the 1930s as an internal auditor for Sun Life Assurance. He joined the
Queen’s (West Surrey) regiment in 1940, and was commissioned into the
Intelligence Corps in January 1941. In February he joined SOE, initially
as a Field Security Officer.24
Peter Lee himself took responsibility for SOE’s Field Security Police. He
joined SOE following a six-month spell at the War Office, during which
time he ‘discovered in the basement two very secret rooms’: one was
staffed by SOE, the other by SIS. As Lee later recalled, he went looking
for a job, with no success, but later received a phone call when a position
became available unexpectedly. He went ‘haring off’ to the basement,
where he met Whetmore:
Eventually, on June 1st, I arrived at SOE and I was briefed. I was

dressed as a lieutenant, and Whetmore, this very nice major as he
then was, then told me about the organisation that I had joined.
To my astonishment I was going straight into the sort of books that
one read at prep school, I couldn’t believe my ears! This went on
for three hours, and at the end of it he said, ‘Well now we’ll break
for lunch, but what are you doing dressed as a lieutenant? Go out
and buy some pips, it’s a captain’s job’. And when I came back, now
dressed as captain, he then let me know I was in charge of three
field security sections for the next two and a half years I started
to organise the physical security of our establishments all over the
country.25
Field Security non-commissioned officers constituted a vital part of

the Security Section’s physical security arrangements. On 19 December
1940 Whetmore applied to the War Office for three Field Security
Sections to be allocated to SOE, requesting personnel who could speak
a variety of European languages.26 These were granted, with a fourth
added later in the year.27 The main function of the Field Security
personnel was to accompany recruits through the various stages of
training, recording their progress and highlighting any flaws in their
characters that could possibly prove fatal in the field.28 In a memo
circulated on 8 February 1941, Calthrop notified Country Section heads
that ‘all parties of students should be accompanied by one or more
F.S. personnel from the very outset of their training’.29 He asked for
3-day notice when a party was due to undergo training, along with
details of its composition – the size of the party, nationality, training
centre to be used – so that the most appropriate personnel could be
allocated. In order to allay any suspicions, Calthrop emphasised that
‘F.S. personnel are clearly instructed that their outward function is not
contra-espionage, but that of assisting trainees in every possible way,
including their contacts with the training staff’, acting as interpreters
if necessary. Their presence, however, invariably drew suspicion from
those undergoing training, especially those who had escaped from occu-
pied Europe: ‘Usually there is a period of a few days when the students
look upon me with some suspicion and the idea of “Gestapo” at the
back of their minds’, wrote Lt Turnbull in April 1943.30 Peter Lee recalls
that the Commandants of the Special Training Schools also thought
that Field Security ‘were part of the Gestapo’.31 The schools were run by
regular army officers, who ‘had an almost paranoiac dislike of anything
to do with security, which they regarded as something to do with espi-
onage and spies’.
As well as dealing with such suspicion and hostility, the job was
physically demanding, as Field Security personnel participated fully in
the training process, ‘assisting instructors when necessary as interpreters,
and giving the trainees every help both in absorbing the instruction, and
in adjusting themselves to the conditions of our service’.32 Reporting on
a recruit in his early forties, a man who refused to be outdone by any
of the younger trainees, C.S.M. Thomas recorded that ‘Only the most
earnest pleading can restrain him from over-doing all his training’; his
determination to show his fitness was proving ‘a little discouraging for
us weaker vessels who stagger along painfully behind on cross-country
runs etc’.33
The Field Security NCOs who accompanied recruits on their training
were ‘purposely not shown any of the individual dossiers on recruits
held at H.Q. before training commenced’, to prevent the formation
of any preliminary opinions.34 Rather, they followed the principle of
‘really getting to know a person by living and working with him’. As
such, Field Security personnel required ‘a natural faculty for assessing
another man’s character correctly, quickly and without prejudice’ in
addition to ‘an expert knowledge of the languages and countries of
the trainee’. In order to ensure that this criterion was met, candid-
ates were ‘hand picked’ and underwent interviews at the Intelligence
Corps Depot – a special concession made to SOE by the Commandant,
Lt Col Brooks.
Field Security NCOs paid particular attention to the attitudes of

trainees towards the unholy trinity of drink, money and women, as
Peter Lee recalls,
If you’ve got a garage mechanic who’s an absolutely brilliant radio

operator, and was recruited for that job, [if he] had a very modest
wage as a garage mechanic and was then dropped into France with
half a million Francs around his belt as the paymaster for the circuit,
you had to be absolutely sure that that chap would not suddenly
start going into expensive hotels and taking out beautiful girls you
had to be absolutely sure. You had to know exactly how they reacted
when they’d had ‘one over the eight’. My NCO’s used to spend as
much time as possible with them, especially when they were on
leave after the courses were over, to see how they behaved with
women because, after all, intelligence services in any country use
women as agent provocateurs.35
Weekly reports on trainees were prepared, and submitted to Lee via the
School Commandants. Copies were then forwarded by Security to the
Country Section concerned. It was later claimed that these reports were
‘of great assistance’, as ‘important details were occasionally revealed
to the F.S. N.C.O.s which were not likely to be admitted in formal
interviews conducted by commissioned officers’:
The best known instance was that of a recruit who privately

informed an F.S.P. during training that in peace time he had
been a smuggler across the Franco-Belgian frontier. The account
which he had originally given to his interviewing officer amounted
in fact, to a ‘cover’ version of his civilian activities, and this
important qualification for courier work might have been overlooked
altogether.36
Lee describes the work of Field Security as ‘almost a sort of branch

of the Red Cross – we really had to try and make it possible for
the agents to do their extremely dangerous work and come out of
it alive. The only way to do that was to have a very, very keenly
developed sense of security.’37 A similar sentiment was expressed in
a report on Field Security activity compiled at the end of the war:
‘They set out to make each trainee as security conscious as possible,
in his own interest, as well as that of the Organisation as a whole’,
while the reports on trainees were felt to have fulfilled a valuable

function:
The importance attached to the judicious selection of agents was at

all times self-evident. Mistakes were inevitable, but anything which
reduced the margin of error was an important contribution to the
ultimate success of S.O.E. in the field. The Reports of F.S.P. on trainees
were of great assistance from this point of view and this represents
the most important service rendered to S.O.E. by F.S.P.38
The importance of the service provided by Field Security was not always
appreciated by the Country Sections, which exhibited a certain hostility
towards any kind of interference in their operational affairs, even when
it was in their own best interest. Lee recalls having to exhibit a consid-
erable degree of tact when dealing with the Country Sections. Of
the process whereby Field Security Reports were prepared for Country
Section heads, he notes,
I always used to go through all the reports with them [the FSP NCOs]
before I sent it to the Country Section head, to make quite sure
that my NCO and I really understood the form we had to be very
careful what we said – couldn’t upset operations by just being stupid.
But at the same time, we had to warn the Country Section head if
we’d found anything that was liable to jeopardise their operations
once they went into the field. After all, it’s fairly important for people
to stay alive in a set-up like this 39
Difficulties arose with Belgian Section Head Hardy Amies in the case
of an unnamed mechanic who, while a capable wireless operator, was
considered by Field Security to be ‘absolutely appalling’, exhibiting a
fondness for drink, no responsibility with money and a tendency to pick
up ‘the most awful women’. Lee duly informed the Belgian Section of
these concerns, but his report was overruled and the mechanic sent to
the field, where he promptly picked up a peroxide blonde and took her
to the Palace Hotel in Brussels, which was ‘absolutely stiff with Gestapo
people’. According to Lee, as a result of his arrest 18 people were shot.
In particularly serious cases, Security could take further steps to make
its concerns known, as it did in the case of the Dutch Section agent
Arnoldus Albert Baatsen, alias Bouwman. Bouwman’s behaviour initially
raised concern in November 1941, when he was given leave to spend
the weekend in Cambridge but was seen at the Salisbury Hotel in Hert-
ford ‘with a female companion who he introduced as a friend from
London’. Upon his return, the ‘seriousness of this action from the
security point of view’ was impressed upon him.40 By December 1941
Bouwman was being considered ‘as a candidate for the Cooler’, described
by Lee as having ‘gone sour’.41 It was noted that ‘the rest of the party
with whom he was working had little or no confidence in him, and
he was becoming a bad influence on them’.42 Pending a decision on
his disposal, Bouwman was held at the Field Security Depot in King-
ston. Lee was unsurprisingly thrown when he discovered in late January
that a complete volte-face had taken place and that Bouwman had been
chosen for a mission. He wrote to Lakin, noting that ‘I have not had
until yesterday anything in writing that he was to be used on an opera-
tion, or that he was not in fact being considered as a candidate for the
Cooler.’ Lee questioned this decision to ‘use a man who has such a poor
security record and seems to be a foolish, theatrical and boastful type’.
So serious was Security’s concern that Senter appealed directly to SOE’s
Director of Operations, Colin Gubbins:
I feel that I must bring to your notice the fact that Bouwman has
been reported to us on many occasions for extreme lack of discretion.
I suggest that you should be satisfied that the importance of the
project entrusted to Bouwman justified this risk.43
However, even this was not enough to prevent Bouwman being sent
to the field, as the Head of the Dutch Section Charles Blizard turned
security’s concerns on their head, portraying them as strengths that
could prove advantageous in the field. Defending his agent, Blizard
wrote that he did not see the matter in the same ‘somewhat gloomy
light’ of the Security Section:
It is felt that, although Bouwman is admittedly boastful and apt

to dramatise himself in any circumstances, he has other peculiar-
ities of character, more especially a way with women, which should
aid him in escaping detection. He is, furthermore, full of grit and
determination. I see no reason to anticipate that he would, under
grilling, disclose more details of our organisation and of other agents
than any man in a similar position. His lack of discretion would,
I feel, be tempered by the thought of imminent danger to his own
person.44
Operational considerations weighed heavier than security concerns, and

Bouwman was sent to the field, where he was greeted by a German
reception committee and subsequently ‘poured out to his captors a
torrent of detail about where he had been trained, and how, and
by whom’.45
In August 1942, Senter replaced Lakin as Director of Security, as
ill health forced Lakin to take less exacting duties.46 His departure
drew comment from the Director General of MI5, Sir David Petrie,
who wrote,
We shall part with General Lakin with regret. Our relations with him,
both official and personal, have been of the happiest, and we hope
that his health will improve with the less exacting duties of his new
post. Much the same applies to Senter, than whom there could be no
more acceptable successor to General Lakin, and whom we shall be
glad to continue to help in any way we can.47
As a result of Senter’s promotion, Lt Col the Hon Thomas Gabriel Roche

was appointed to fill his former position. A barrister by profession, Roche
was commissioned in the 92nd Field Regiment RA (TA) in April 1938 and
served in France between September 1939 and June 1940. He originally
joined SOE in March 1941 as a member of the Intelligence & Planning
Section, becoming personal assistant to both Col Anstruther, Director
of Intelligence, and Lt Col Bryson, Director of Plans. In June he became
Head of the General Intelligence Section. In October 1942 he transferred
to the Security Section, becoming Head of General Security and deputy
head of the Section as a whole under Senter. Roche’s personnel reports
describe him as having a ‘reserved personality’ with ‘a high standard
of personal efficiency’.48 He was thought to combine ‘acumen with a
readiness to master detail’.
Despite relinquishing the role of Section head, Lakin did not leave
the Section altogether. It was felt by Sir Charles Hambro, Nelson’s
successor, that SOE’s security arrangements in Scotland could be
improved – a concern which coincided with Lakin’s need for ‘less
exacting duties’. Lakin duly established a security office in Rothesay
Terrace, Edinburgh, in September 1942.49 The office was responsible
for coordinating the security of operations mounted by SOE’s Norwe-
gian Section from their Shetlands and Burghead bases, and the security
of SOE’s Training Schools at Arisaig.50 For ‘administrative purposes’,
Scotland was divided into a Western and an Eastern Area. In addition to
commanding the holding facility for failed recruits at Inverlair (covered
in Chapter 2), Major Albert Adamson (‘Aonghais’) Fyffe was responsible

for the Western Area, which included Special Training School (STS) 21
(Arisaig House) and 25 (Garamor House), as Security Liaison Officer,
STS Scotland. The Eastern Area covered all other security issues in Scot-
land, which were dealt with from the Edinburgh office by the Assistant
Security Officer, Pilot Officer the Hon John Leslie.51
Fyffe also went on to take responsibility for the security of the recently
established para-military training complex at Aviemore (STS 26), where
he arranged for a small security detachment to be quartered, reporting
to him ‘but available to help in any way required’.52 Consisting of
three requisitioned lodges (Drumintoul, Glenmore and Forest), STS
26 was a Norwegian-only training facility. The area was chosen for
the training of Norwegian agents ‘because of the reasonable simil-
arity of terrain – mountains, lochs, high passes, and snow in quantity
in the winter months’. Fyffe was responsible for approaching ‘the
Service and civil authorities concerned in the exercises, schemes, and
rehearsals, or in whose areas or districts these were to take place’. He
also enjoyed the trust of Aviemore’s first Commandant, Major Charles
S. Hampton, and participated in some of the training exercises that were
arranged.
Lakin was not replaced upon his death in February 1943, as the
number of raids upon the Norwegian coast mounted from Scotland
had begun to decline by this point. Instead, in addition to his existing
responsibilities, Fyffe became SOE’s Chief Security Officer in Scotland,
and embarked upon a punishing weekly schedule:
I used to leave Inverlair each Monday morning about three o’clock to

catch the first ‘milk-run’ ferry at North Queensferry to get to my office
in Rothesay Terrace, Edinburgh, where I had a staff of two officers
and four NCOs to maintain a link with Scottish Command, and to
keep an eye on what that Command was doing that might impinge
on any of our STS in Scotland; in addition that office kept watch on
the SOE Signals station at the former Belhaven School at Dunbar.
I usually left Edinburgh on Tuesday night to return to Inverlair; on
Wednesday morning I visited Ballina [ie Burghead], usually for lunch,
and went south to Drumintoul [ie Group 26] for reports from my
detachment there As a rule I was back at Inverlair by Thursday
night at latest to go to Group A Arisaig for all of Friday. Saturday was
C.O.’s inspection at Inverlair with a full parade ground by the firing
ranges. Sunday was a ‘free’ day but it was back to the merrygoround
early Monday morning.
Fyffe continued to maintain this schedule until February 1944, at which

point he was replaced by Samuel Leonard Darby. A schoolteacher, Darby
had taught at Winchester College and Bromsgrove Academy, where he
was Senior Classical Master during the late 1930s. He enlisted in the
Intelligence Corps in October 1940, and joined SOE as a Field Security
Officer in the Hertford area in January 1942, proceeding to join the
Military Security sub-Section in the spring of 1943.53 Fyffe returned to
London, where he was appointed head of the Military Security sub-
Section as preparations for D-Day gathered pace.54
As SOE continued to grow, the work of the Security Section developed
into two distinct areas: general and operational security. The main body
of the Section, General Security, handled all non-operational security
matters, including liaison with the Security Sections of SOE’s over-
seas Missions, for which the Security Section developed a watching
brief (explored in greater detail in Chapter 3).55 General Security was
further divided into three sub-sections: Travel Control, General and
Military. Travel Control dealt with ‘all travel control questions and
censorship of mail’; the General Section ‘handled vetting questions,
maintained personnel records, arranged training schemes liaised with
the J.A.G.’s Branch on legal matters, controlled the allocation of code
numbers, etc’ while the Military Section took responsibility for Field
Security, liaison with the Home Forces and acclimatising new Security
personnel prior to overseas posting. (‘There was generally a junior officer
attached to the Section for training prior to taking up an appointment
overseas.’)56
By the autumn of 1942, SOE’s ‘physical’ security had reached, or
surpassed, the standards set by the War Cabinet Panel on Security
Arrangements in Government Departments. Mott wrote a detailed paper
on the subject in October, noting that ‘I think that I can fairly say
that we are rather ahead of the great majority of the recommendations
made especially as regards the Physical Security of our Buildings and
the Recruitment, Selection and Supervision of Staff.’57 Although further
improvements were possible in theory, in practice they were likely to
prove difficult to implement. Mott pointed to the negative attitude
towards security exhibited by certain members of staff, particularly when
it came to showing passes to the security watchmen:
It really is a remarkable thing that a request to show or make out a

pass is, to some people, tantamount to asking them for their finger-
prints or accusing them of treason and the watchmen do occasionally
have rather a rough time with such people.
This did not bode well for the suggestion that the inspection of passes
should be stepped up to include personnel leaving buildings; as Mott
observed, it was ‘a question whether the undoubted gain in security
control of access would justify the friction which would certainly
be caused’. Such friction was likely to find expression at a high level;
irritation at having to show a pass, Mott explained, was ‘chiefly to
be found in the upper strata of our community’. Security also had to
balance its concerns with the needs of operations. For example, Mott
thought it would be impossible to introduce a more rigorous vetting
process for proposed members of staff without upsetting the Country
Sections:
Judging by the impatience of most sections when confronted with

a week’s delay in vetting, I am certain that the addition of another
three or four weeks in making definite enquiries, and this is a very
conservative estimate of the time involved, would be denounced as
quite impracticable.
Similarly, any hope of providing a course of instruction for new secret-

aries, covering such basic security topics as how to despatch documents
securely, was likely to be frowned upon: ‘sections usually require their
secretaries in a Dickens of a hurry, and would not be willing to wait a
week or so before they commenced work’.
While the Security Section had succeeded in making SOE’s ‘phys-
ical’ security as efficient as was allowed, an even greater challenge
for the Section emerged at the end of 1942, as the focus of concern
shifted from physical to operational security. As SOE’s Country Sections
developed to a point at which they were able to undertake offensive
action, considerable pressure fell upon the Security Section to ensure
that effective operational security arrangements were in place. From this
point, Security’s secondary function, protecting SOE against debilitating
restrictions imposed by Whitehall adversaries in the name of security,
became increasingly apparent. Not only were the lives of agents poten-
tially at risk; so too was the operational freedom of SOE as a whole, as
the Security Section History later explained:
S.O.E. would retain its freedom of action only if it satisfied and

convinced the other national Security organisations of its bona fides
and of the energy with which it applied its own internal security
precautions.58
In response to the growing question of operational security, Flying

Officer Cyril Thomas Gibson Risch Miller was appointed in September
1942 to work in the new ‘Security “Grill Room” ’, where he interrogated
agents upon their departure to, and return from, the field. Writing to
Col N.B. Crockatt of MI9, Boyle confided that Miller would ‘be the first
thoroughly trained person who can assure himself and ourselves that the
people we send overseas are in fact likely to play their part, if interrog-
ated, adequately’. A barrister specialising in maritime and international
law, Miller had been Counsel to the Ministry of War Transport before
joining SOE, and Boyle felt that his knowledge of law and experience in
cross-examination would be ‘most useful’. Recalling his wartime activ-
ities in 1949, when invited to give evidence to the Dutch Parliamentary
Commission investigating the ‘Nordpol’ affair, Miller noted that his
legal training ‘enabled him to weigh evidence and form a conclusion as
to whether the person whom he was interrogating was telling the truth
or not’.59
The need for greater attention to operational security became increas-
ingly apparent within the Security Section during the final months of
1942. Having settled into his new position, on 21 November Miller
wrote to Senter on ‘the danger of “penetration” by returning Agents
who have gone sour’:
the recent Belgian trouble illustrates this, and we really ought to have
within our own Organization a standardized check on all returning
Agents so as to avert this danger. As the war gets ‘closer’ into the
enemy, I suspect that he will increase his efforts in this direction; and
it is potentially a very real danger.60
The extent of the potential penetration problem facing SOE in Belgium

was uncovered largely by accident, as MI5 explored the possibility of
‘playing back’ an SOE wireless set in Belgium that was known to be under
enemy control. The standard investigation, carried out by C.P. Harvey
of MI5’s B1(a) Section, indicated that the rot had spread far further than
one blown transmitter:
At an early stage it appeared to me that the blown Belgian trans-

mitters could not possibly be used by B.1.A. since it was almost
impossible to tell at any moment of time who was blown and who
not or, where an agent was known to be blown, how far the area of
compromise extended from the security point of view the general
picture is extremely disquieting since any refugee who claims to have
escaped from Belgium in recent months may be presumed at some

time or other to have been in touch with one of S.O.E’s agents or
their contacts. Since the agents seem to be in frequent (if unauthor-
ised) touch with each other and since an uncertain number of them
are already brulés any such refugee may, in fact, be a German spy.61
The report sent a shockwave around MI5.62 As the Security History

later recorded, MI5 now ‘felt bound to regard all escape lines as penet-
rated not only were all refugees arriving in this country under suspi-
cion, but also S.O.E. accredited agents, upon the ground that they might
have been “turned” by the enemy and sent back’. The Security Section
thus found itself ‘obliged to treat all agents who had been in enemy
hands as of security interest, and as suspect of having escaped with
the connivance of the enemy, until the contrary was proved’ – a posi-
tion which did little to endear Security to the operational Country
Sections, which had a tendency to think the best of its returning agents.
A routine order was published on 15 January 1943, entitled ‘Interrog-
ation of Returned Agents’, which advised Country Sections of the new
procedure to be followed:
D/CE is now able to cover the interrogation of agents who return

from the field and to assist in testing the cover stories of agents
proceeding to the field. C.D. has indicated his view of the importance
of this development, and wishes Country Sections to make contact
with D/CE.G [Miller] in order to work out the necessary procedure.
He should be advised in particular of all cases of returned agents,
and in the case of those who have had any contact of any kind
with the enemy advance information should be given to D/CE.G and
provision is to be made for D/CE.G to interrogate any such agents
before any interrogation is undertaken by the Country Section. This is
of particular importance in view of our great responsibilities towards
the Security authorities, and is regarded as having an important
bearing upon the maintenance of the privilege we at present enjoy
for special immunity from security control in the case of accredited
agents, etc.63
The realisation that a significant number of SOE’s agents in Belgium had

been compromised further focused SOE’s attention upon its operational
security, and soon led to the development of the Grill Room into a
fully fledged ‘Special Security’ Section in its own right.64 Its creation was
announced in a circular from Senter on 19 March 1943.65 On account
of the location of its offices, the Special Security Section quickly became
known as Bayswater. Essentially SOE’s own counter-espionage section,
Bayswater developed close links with MI5 and later with Section V
of SIS.
Bayswater was headed by Major Richard Henry Atkinson (‘Dick’)
Warden, a member of the Security Section since January 1941. Described
by Lee as a ‘wonderful character’, Warden was born in December 1908
in London, and educated at Harrow and Cornell University. Following
university, Warden returned to England and became well-known as an
amateur steeplechase rider, riding in the Grand National, before going
on to spend 3 years as an assistant racehorse trainer in Chantilly. Warden
served in the Intelligence Corps from 21 October 1940 to 15 January
1941, at which point he joined SOE as a Field Security Officer. In May
he joined the Security Section for ‘special external security work’. His
duties consisted of ‘Security work connected with students and opera-
tional security of the Shetland Islands’, along with ‘Some experience of
small scale raiding parties with S.T.S.62’. Warden proceeded to become
an assistant liaison officer with MI5, dealing with both Travel Control
and the London Reception Centre (LRC), the MI5-run facility which
screened travellers from overseas upon their arrival in the UK. In his first
confidential report, Senter described Warden as ‘alert and sophisticated.
He can be trusted to carry out any job with intelligence, assiduity and
resource.’ Boyle concurred with this view, adding his own opinion that
Warden was a ‘very painstaking and efficient officer with unorthodox
but effective methods’. Senter repeated his remarks in his next two
reports on Warden, although when signing off the second one Boyle
inserted a rider: ‘A good officer, though perhaps slightly immature in
judgement.’
Miller’s early practice of interrogating agents prior to their departure
to the field, providing them with valuable experience of interrogation
method, soon had to be discontinued owing to pressure of work in
conducting interrogations of returning agents, along with investigations
into groups in the field ‘who were suspected of having fallen into the
hands of the enemy’.66 The Security History later claimed that, through
its work, Bayswater was able to appease the concerns of MI5 as to the
state of SOE’s operational security:
There can be little doubt that these security interrogations were of

great value as is shown by the fact that the national Security author-
ities were prepared to accept clearance as a result of such interroga-
tions as equivalent to a clearance by their own officers.67
What the Security History failed to mention was the uphill struggle
Bayswater faced in making the Country Sections fully appreciate the
importance of the security interrogation of returning agents. A further
Routine Order was issued on 2 July, which refined the instructions
given in January and emphasised the importance of the new security
procedure, which was clearly being ignored by some Sections:
In view of our agreements with other Services, and in order to retain

the immunity from normal security control which we enjoy, it is
most important that Country Sections should strictly adhere to the
procedure. In particular, agents who have been in enemy hands
will NOT be interrogated by Country Sections before the security
procedure outlined has been completed.68
It was found necessary to tighten the procedure further in August,

following an investigation into the behaviour of the recently returned
French Section agent Barry Knight. Knight had been in German hands,
but the French Section failed to notify Security. This meant that no
special arrangements were laid on for his arrival, which resulted in a
storm of protest from MI5 (the incident is explored in greater detail in
Chapter 5).
Bayswater faced additional difficulties in the form of ‘passive resist-
ance’ from the Country Sections. Returned agents who had not been
in enemy hands were instructed to write an account of their mission,
which was analysed at Bayswater. The agent was then interrogated on
any questionable points raised by their report. The first difficulty faced
by Bayswater was in acquiring the reports: ‘After just over three weeks
of constant nagging’, wrote Warden in August 1943, ‘the “report” of
the Cockles has arrived at Bayswater’.69 Obtaining the report was only
the beginning; the second problem for Bayswater was its content. In the
case of the Cockles report, Warden used the word with caution, noting
that it was actually ‘what I can only describe as some bumph’. This tend-
ency was widespread: in March 1944, Warden noted that ‘we usually
find agents’ reports on their missions misleading and sadly lacking in
essential details’.70
By the summer of 1943 it had become apparent that for SOE’s allotted
role in the invasion of Europe to be carried out successfully, ‘added
responsibilities’ would be placed upon the Security and Intelligence
Directorate as a whole. To accommodate these, the Directorate was reor-
ganised. In March, following the resignation of John Hanbury-Williams
as Hambro’s ‘Second Deputy’, Boyle was appointed by SOE’s Minister,
Lord Selborne, to take his place, becoming Chairman of SOE’s

Commissions and Promotions Board in addition to retaining overall
responsibility for intelligence and security matters.71 Over the following
months, Senter became Boyle’s General Deputy, maintaining his role
as Director of Security, while both Warden and Roche were both made
Assistant Directors of the Security Section, retaining their existing divi-
sion of work that saw Warden focus on operational security at Bayswater,
while Roche took responsibility for general security matters.72 There was
some concern over Roche’s ability to handle the promotion, particu-
larly his ability to take over Senter’s contacts, along with further criti-
cisms directed at his ‘unmilitary appearance’.73 Colin Gubbins, who had
recently replaced Charles Hambro as Chief of SOE, was among those who
took this view. Soon after the move, Senter came to Roche’s defence,
pointing out for the benefit of any remaining doubters that Roche had
both successfully adopted his old contacts and ‘smartened up’; the point
was conceded by Gubbins. In his reports on Roche, Senter highlighted
the value of his legal background to the Security Section, as it found
itself dealing with ‘difficult and high level security problems’.
Roche’s former post of Head of General Security and deputy head of
the Section as a whole was filled by Hugh Eames Park. A barrister, Park
had been a Private in the Royal Army Pay Corps, prior to joining the
Royal Air Force. He attended RAF Officers School in late 1941 before
being appointed Pilot Officer with the Air Ministry. Park joined SOE as
a security officer in January 1942, with responsibility for liaison with
MI5 and for legal security work. A personnel report described Park as
‘non-assertive and universally liked’, qualities which were considered
advantageous for his liaison duties with MI5.74 His work was considered
of a high standard and his experience as a barrister ‘of constant value’.
By late 1943, the Security Section was heavily involved in the invest-
igation into German penetration of SOE’s circuits in Holland (discussed
in Chapter 7). The investigation revealed the need for the Routine
Order regarding the interrogation of returned agents at Bayswater to be
tightened still further. As Senter pointed out, the existing order specified
the need to notify security of cases where agents ‘have been in enemy
hands’. The instruction, which Senter considered to be too narrow,
was being followed to the letter by the Country Sections, which were
neglecting to mention any other types of contact with the enemy that
may have occurred. Senter believed that ‘between now and D-Day a
wider test than having been in enemy hands is called for’, and proposed
amending the wording of the order to cover ‘contact of any kind with
the enemy’.75 Following discussion, Senter wrote to the head of SOE’s
operational ‘London Group’, Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, noting that

‘recent events have shown that the “security” cases may embrace a wider
category than those covered in these Routine Orders’, and proposing
extending their scope to ensure that Bayswater was informed in cases of
agents ‘who are known or thought to have been in contact with persons
known or suspected to have been working for the enemy’.76 The link
between security and SOE’s continued operational freedom was stressed
once again, the draft order noting that ‘in order to retain the immunity
from national security control which we enjoy, it is most important that
Country Sections should strictly adhere to this procedure’.77 Mockler-
Ferryman agreed, and the order was issued on 22 January.78
Stricter security measures aimed at ‘all sections responsible for
despatching agents to the field’ were also introduced by Routine Order
in December 1943, with ‘a view to preventing leakage of informa-
tion regarding the details of our organisation or in respect of forth-
coming operations’.79 No ‘personal mail or written message’ was now
permitted to leave England, with conducting officers becoming ‘person-
ally responsible, shortly before the moment of departure, for making
a thorough search of the person, clothing and articles carried by each
agent’. Equally strict measures were to apply to returning agents; only
‘short personal letters, not exceeding 36 words in length’ were to be
brought back, and these could ‘refer only to family matters, and should
give neither address nor surname of the writer, only some identifi-
able Christian or code name’. The Country Section officer meeting the
returning agents was required to ‘take from him all documents other
than identity documents’ and to ‘conduct a search to see that there are
no further documents’. Official papers brought back would remain the
property of the Country Section concerned, while personal letters for
delivery would be sent to the Security Section for censorship. Crews of
aircraft or boats were also prohibited from carrying any papers.
Such an increased emphasis upon security precautions served to pre-
empt wider security initiatives that followed in the spring of 1944.
From 1 April, ‘all unauthorised travel to and from a coastal zone from
The Wash to Land’s End and an area around the Firth of Forth was
forbidden, other communications to and from those areas were consid-
erably restricted and travel to and from Ireland was suspended’.80 A
few days later, all leave for British forces in the UK was suspended,
while limitations were placed on the movements of Allied troops. This
increase in security precautions saw the dual purpose of the Security
Section – good security and its promotion – face its greatest challenge,
as SOE’s continued operational freedom found itself at its most exposed.
Roche wrote to an overseas security officer on 29 June, explaining the

pre-Overlord security arrangements that had been put in place in order
to prevent ‘anything or anybody’ leaving the country. ‘As the whole
trade of S.O.E. is to export persons to enemy-occupied territory’, he
continued, ‘you can see they were rather a facer’. The problem was
solved ‘by inducing the various departments to relax their restrictions in
our favour in return for undertakings that everything would be done in
accordance with the drill approved by the Security Directorate of S.O.E.’,
which ‘meant a lot of work both in laying matters on with the other
departments and in supervising the internal security drill’.81
Boyle had been quick to see how events were moving, his thoughts
sharply focused by the actions of SIS. On 10 April, Sir Stewart Menzies,
Chief (‘C’) of SIS, had proposed a ban on ‘the transport of agents from
this country to France and the Low Countries by sea’.82 As he was
‘willing to be placed under a total prohibition on outward traffic by
sea of personnel from this country’, Menzies assumed that a ‘similar
total prohibition would also be placed on all similar operations by other
clandestine organisations’. A copy of Menzies’ paper was forwarded
to Boyle, who informed the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) that,
beyond sea operations already laid on for 15 April, SOE agreed ‘entirely
with “C” ’s views’.83 Boyle was quick to anticipate the appearance of
further such restrictions, which would combine to effectively cut off
SOE’s links with the field. Writing to Senter, Boyle predicted that ‘the
next thing we can expect is an enquiry by the J.I.C. or some other body
into the passage by air’.84 Boyle’s concern was quite valid; in an internal
minute discussing the issue of continued transportation of SOE agents
written in March, MI5’s Guy Liddell noted his belief that ‘The only
really satisfactory way of dealing with this question would be to stop all
agents going into the field for 2 months prior to D-day. I doubt whether
anybody would be much worse off, and many of us might feel easier
in our minds.’85 SOE needed to move quickly to emphasise that it was
taking security seriously, by imposing its own restrictions upon opera-
tional activity before worse were imposed from outside: ‘Before D-day’,
wrote Boyle, ‘we must be in a position to cover ourselves in every way’.86
To achieve such security cover, Boyle proposed the establishment of a
Special Security Panel, which would have responsibility for preventing
the leak of information relating to Overlord through the establishment
of temporary special security arrangements, coordinating these with the
‘larger security interests’ of MI5 and SHAEF.87
Boyle took his concerns to the SOE Council. He wrote to Mockler-
Ferryman on 14 April, emphasising the points he had made at that day’s
Council Meeting: ‘namely, how important it is in my opinion that we

should be in a position to set the pace regarding our own security prob-
lems against D-day, rather than to become the prey of the large band
of persons who will be looking for culprits from now onwards’. Boyle
emphasised his desire to ‘keep one pace ahead of all the security prob-
lems which will come our way’, noting that SOE would ‘be very much
less vulnerable’ if such foresight could be applied.88 Boyle’s concerns
had been given further urgency by the circulation of a War Cabinet
memorandum on security on 12 April, which led him to reiterate the
view that, should SOE wish to stay ahead in the security game, ‘We must
constitute our Special Security Panel immediately.’89 The War Cabinet
memorandum directed all government departments to ‘examine what
internal measures each should take to prevent the leakage from this
country of any information relating to the Allied plans for the invasion
of Western Europe’.90 On Boyle’s instruction, Senter drafted a minute
which set out the objects and terms of reference for the Special Security
Panel (SSP), to be ratified by the SOE Council.91 The proposal received
the Council’s blessing, and the first SSP meeting was held on 18 April. It
was agreed that Boyle should approach Sir Findlater Stewart, the senior
civil servant on the Home Defence Executive who headed a committee
on Overlord security, to ‘see if he will act as co-ordinator for all outside
security bodies and also for his general advice’.92 Boyle wrote to Find-
later Stewart, informing him that the Panel had been established ‘for the
protection of secret information relating to invasion plans’. Stressing
the seriousness with which SOE viewed security, he explained that SOE
had ‘already examined some of the immediate Security problems’, and
‘taken action on the recommendations contained in the recent paper of
the War Cabinet Security Panel’. Noting that ‘One of the first decisions
was the desirability of acquainting you with these steps and of asking
for your general guidance’, Boyle requested a meeting to discuss matters
further, which took place on 24 April.93 Boyle reported back to the SSP
that Findlater Stewart ‘agreed with our suggestion to report to him from
time to time, keeping him generally informed of all matters dealt with
by the S.S.P’. Boyle also attended a further meeting convened by Find-
later Stewart the following day, at which Churchill’s dictum that ‘no-one
shall leave this island’ was discussed. This meant that each exception
would need to be ‘specially considered’, with reference to two key ques-
tions: ‘Is their journey really necessary before D-day?’ and ‘Are they fit to
travel?’94 Boyle was also asked about the search of agents prior to depar-
ture and whether students spent their leave in restricted areas. He was
‘happily able to report’ that an ‘intensified search’ of departing agents
had been arranged, SOE having acquired the services of two Customs
officials for this purpose, while the practice of allowing students to take
leave in restricted areas had been stopped in March.
Boyle wrote to Findlater Stewart again on 27 April, highlighting the
action taken by the SSP to ensure SOE’s security prior to D-Day at its
first three meetings.95 From Boyle’s summary, it is clear that an imme-
diate impact upon existing security arrangements had been made. He
informed Findlater Stewart that steps had been taken to make all SOE
personnel aware of the issues raised by the War Cabinet Security Panel’s
report; a letter had been drafted to be sent to all Directorate heads,
informing them of the need to convene meetings to emphasise the need
for employees to avoid ‘careless talk’, along with a brief paper on the
subject.96 In addition, a summary of the War Cabinet Security Panel
security paper had been compiled, highlighting the issues of relevance
to SOE.97 These papers were amended and agreed at the second SSP
meeting on 20 April, and a telegram version, to be sent to all Missions
and Groups overseas, was also prepared. Boyle also informed Findlater
Stewart that ‘We have tightened up our arrangements for the support of
outgoing agents and have borrowed the services of two Customs Officers
to assist’, and that arrangements had been made ‘for the censorship of
all Allied courier which passes through our hands, both incoming and
outgoing’.98 In addition, he noted that the Panel had ‘reviewed the ques-
tion of Allied personnel who have access to this Headquarters for liaison
purposes’, and had ‘given particular attention to the question of wireless
transmitters under our control in the country’, particularly those used
by students during their training. Boyle noted that all wireless exer-
cises which gave students use of transmitters ‘without full control’ had
been discontinued, and that the secure storage of transmitters at Schools
and Stations had been addressed. On the thorny issue of the continued
despatch of agents to the field Boyle informed Findlater Stewart that
each case would be ‘specifically referred to Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman,
so that he may decide whether despatch before D-day is operationally
necessary’. He also drew attention to SOE’s ‘very close working arrange-
ments with M.I.5’, which would facilitate Findlater Stewart’s wish ‘of
consultation with M.I.5 in any case where any doubt might arise’. Boyle
closed by noting that he would be ‘most grateful if you would let us
know of any other points that occur to you which you think might
usefully be examined by our Security Panel’.99
As the manner in which Boyle dealt with Findlater Stewart indic-
ates, not only was good security vital, so too was the ‘spin’ put on
it. Tightening SOE’s security arrangements was not in itself sufficient,
without spreading word of such action to the right people – a vital

move when a ban on travel overseas was in force. However, getting the
security authorities on side was only half the battle. Here, as we have
seen in other matters of security, the Panel had to contend with SOE’s
Country Sections and their dislike of rules and regulations, which were
considered as bureaucratic obstacles that stood in the way of their oper-
ational goals. That certain parts of the organisation continued to behave
as though travel restrictions did not apply to them had the potential to
jeopardise continued travel for SOE as a whole, by destroying the image
of total control over security that Boyle was determined to maintain
during the run-up to D-Day. Boyle had been aware of the issue when
advocating the creation of the SSP, observing that ‘Our French friends
are most determined in their efforts to evade regulations’, which sat
uncomfortably alongside ‘abundant evidence of their own insecurity
and of the attempts being made by the Germans to penetrate’.100 At the
SSP meeting held on 8 May, the recently issued Routine Order which
detailed the procedure to be followed regarding overseas travel was
discussed, and concern expressed as there ‘seemed to be still a loophole’;
it had been discovered that two officers, Col Roper-Caldbeck and Major
Truskowski, had ‘obtained transport for Italy on a Polish plane leaving
Hendon’, bypassing the necessary procedure.101 It was agreed that Boyle
should raise this serious transgression with a higher authority. He wrote
to John Venner, SOE’s Director of Finance, on 11 May, outlining the
incident and noting that it ‘shows that the effect of the Routine Order
has not been appreciated by all Sections’.102 Despite such incidents, the
measures taken by the Panel ‘as part of the official policy to “seal off”
the U.K. in the months preceding D-day’ meant that SOE ‘retained its
freedom of action’ and travel between the UK and SOE’s Missions abroad
was able to continue, within reason.103 Boyle later recalled,
The success of the pre-D day Security Panel was noteworthy.

Sir Findlater Stewart more than once expressed approval of the
work done by the Security Directorate of S.O.E., and the happy
relations existing between S.O.E. and the Departments organising
pre-D-day Security simplified our work and helped to produce most
ample dividends.104
Security’s role as ‘operational protector’ of SOE became increasingly

redundant following D-Day, as the Section’s attention shifted to
unanswered security questions that had been raised earlier in the war,
along with other ‘clearing up’ tasks. In matters of both general and
operational security that had occupied the Section up to this point,

it can be seen that the Security Section succeeded in establishing and
maintaining a high standard of security procedure, under the keen eye of
Archie Boyle. However, the ultimate effectiveness of such procedure in
practice was always reliant upon the support it received elsewhere in the
organisation; in this respect, security always remained uncomfortably at
the mercy of the operational Country Sections.
2
Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop
School: ‘The Cooler’
The Security Section found itself responsible for SOE’s recruiting

mistakes, in the form of men who proved unsuited to the rigours of
life as an agent in the field. Usually removed as their unsuitability
became apparent during training, these men were held at the ‘No. 6
Special Workshop School’ at Inverlair Lodge, Inverness-shire, a facility
which has achieved an unfair notoriety in the post-war world.1 Offi-
cially known in London as ‘the Cooler’, but simply as ‘Inverlair’ north of
the border, the facility provided the inspiration for George Markstein’s
1974 novel, The Cooler.2 It has been claimed that Markstein found out
about Inverlair while working as a journalist on the US forces magazine
Stars and Stripes in post-war Europe. While The Cooler has faded into
obscurity, the influence of Inverlair can also be seen in the cult televi-
sion series The Prisoner, which Markstein developed with the show’s star
Patrick McGoohan.
The SOE reality was far less sinister than the nightmare vision of ‘The
Village’ faced by McGoohan’s character ‘Number 6’, from which escape
was impossible. As the Security History emphasised, the Cooler was ‘in
no sense a punishment or detention camp’. Rather, it was
intended for the housing and employment of alien personnel who,

for security reasons, had to be removed from the Training Courses,
but who, on account of the knowledge which they had gained, had
to live in retirement for some time.
Charting the origins of Inverlair is to throw light on the perhaps inev-

itable deficiencies of SOE’s training and recruiting practices in the early
days of the organisation. Three of the earliest residents at Inverlair –
Leonida Rosa, Rinaldo Purisiol and Charles Bertoli – were sent there
25
following an unsuccessful attempt to recruit Italians for subversive

activity from ‘material available in this country’, including those who
had been interned on the Isle of Man upon Italy’s entry into the war in
June 1940, a result of Churchill’s order to ‘collar the lot’.3 Pressure to
make progress in Italy came from the top; SOE’s Minister, Hugh Dalton,
recorded his ‘explosive’ impatience over the Italian situation in his
diary.4 Such pressure helps account for decisions to recruit questionable
candidates that may not have otherwise been taken. A similar problem
was also faced by the Spanish Country Section, which found itself with a
number of recruits on its hands which it was soon keen to be rid of. Such
removal was complicated by the SOE training process; while the defi-
ciencies of poor recruits eventually became apparent, in the meantime
they accumulated a certain amount of knowledge about SOE, which led
to the serious problem of how they could be disposed of safely.
Rinaldo Purisiol first came to SOE’s attention in August 1940, when
he was brought from the Palace Internment Camp on the Isle of Man to
be interviewed at MI5’s interrogation facility, the Oratory School. Born
in Venice in 1893, Purisiol fled Italy as a political refugee in 1931. He
arrived in Britain in May 1940, and was described as ‘a tough type of
man who has worked as a ship’s machinist in the Mediterranean and
around the Belgian and English coasts’. The SOE officer who conducted
the interview recorded,
This man appears to be an international adventurer who fought as a

Republican in the Spanish War. I should say that he is pretty ‘red’:
he admits, in fact, to having worked for the Free Masons in France
(he would not say what kind of work). He looks very tough and has
worked as a ship machinist in the Mediterranean and around the
Belgium and English coasts. He says he knows how to navigate. I
should say that he was genuinely anti-Fascist and would be a useful
man for us if carefully handled.5
A second interview was arranged, and Purisiol was taken on by SOE.6 He

quickly became the cause of some concern. Field Security Officer L/Cpl
Searle was given instructions to keep a watch on Purisiol in early January
1941, as ‘he was liable to cause dissatisfaction amongst the trainees’.7
Searle, however, defended Purisiol, arguing that his behaviour may have
been ‘caused by the fact that he had been in a poor state of health at
the time’, exacerbated by the age gap between Purisiol and the other
trainees: ‘At 48 he is, perhaps too old to be put with men of twenty.’
Searle did concede that ‘His voice sometimes runs away with him’, but
Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’ 27
pointed out that he ‘apologises afterwards’. Searle remained a supporter

of Purisiol when he wrote again later in the month, describing him as
a ‘revolutionary with a reasoning mind’.8 He believed that Purisiol was
prepared ‘to go to any length to destroy fascism’, and was confident
that ‘he may well be trusted with the Cause of Britain and demo-
cracy, and that he should be given an opportunity for an “active part” ’.
Reports on Purisiol written during February and March by other Field
Security Officers continued to highlight concerns, primarily the state of
his health and his liking of discussion. He was removed from training
in early February when he ‘started questioning a party of students on
the course and volunteered the information that he had been para-
chute training at Manchester’, and ‘Talked of the central heating of
another establishment’.9 Purisiol was taken to STS 31, The Rings at Beau-
lieu, where he remained under Searle’s supervision. Life quickly became
‘irksome to him’ due to his desire to return to training. Searle impressed
upon Purisiol the need to ‘keep his opinions to himself’ if he was to be
allowed to return.10 The point being made, he returned to training in
late March.11
Leonida Rosa came to SOE’s attention when an officer visited the
Pioneer Corps Training Centre at Ilfracombe to interview potential
recruits.12 Rosa was among five men whom the officer thought ‘might
be of use to us’.13 Born in Ventimiglia, Rosa was formerly head waiter
in the restaurant at the Piccadilly Hotel. He had been brought up in
France, spoke both French and Italian and knew the French and Italian
Riviera ‘extremely well’. Married to a Scotswoman, Rosa had lived in the
UK since 1920. It was thought that Rosa showed considerable potential:
Struck me as a solid, reliable fellow. Courage in abundance and a

fairly agile mind. Would like to have a job where he could serve
country of his adoption better than in his present one. Not at all
afraid of risks.14
The five men began their preliminary training by mid-March. A report

from STS 2 (Bellasis in Dorking, Surrey) at the end of the first week
described Rosa as showing ‘great keenness and intelligence. His handling
of weapons is good. Has plenty of “guts” and should be a good man at
his job.’15
Released from confinement at The Rings, Purisiol joined the training
party ‘for a refresher course and as a kind of stiffening’.16 Arrangements
were also made for Charles Bertoli, an interned civilian, to be released
and join the training group.17 Bertoli had lived in Belgium for most of
his life, where he worked as a waiter. He had fought as a member of

the Belgian Volunteer Contingent in the Finnish war, after which he
volunteered for the Pioneer Corps. However, he was rejected as medically
unfit on account of varicose veins which left him unable to stand for
long periods. Bertoli’s name had originally been put forward when an
SOE officer visited the Isle of Man for a second time, casting around
for any further suitable men. The three intelligence officers he spoke
to were only able to suggest Bertoli, along with another man who had
since been released, as being of possible use for SOE. The officer noted
that Captain Myers of the Palace Camp, where Bertoli was being held,
considered him a ‘good man’. However, in addition to the questionable
state of his health, he noted that ‘Unfortunately it would appear that
he has not been much in Italy.’18
The reports on Rosa, Bertoli and Purisiol compiled following comple-
tion of the course at Bellasis were far from glowing endorsements
of their abilities. Rosa was considered ‘rather selfish, individualist as
Frenchmen generally are Could not make a leader but may prove a
very useful subordinate if well led’. Purisiol was described as having a
‘good, perhaps too good, opinion of himself and is, at times, inclined
to boast’. Bertoli was described as ‘Not very intelligent or educated.
No moral standard Could make a soldier of a kind and in special
circumstances his crafty disposition could be made use of.’ However, no
suggestion was made that the men should be removed, and plans were
made for the group to proceed to STS 23 (Meoble Lodge, Inverness-shire),
for the para-military stage of training.19
Purisiol was the first of the three to have doubts cast upon his ulti-
mate suitability for SOE. He ‘run amok’ during the journey to Meoble
Lodge, after which it was decided that he should be separated from
the rest of the party ‘as much as possible’. This isolation subsequently
became complete segregation and consideration of ‘whether he should
be removed from the party and, if so, where he should be kept’.20 A later
report of the incident suggests that the description of his having ‘run
amok’ was quite an exaggeration: ‘On the journey up here he refused to
partake of refreshments and did not cease to complain of the conditions
of the journey.’ Purisiol’s behaviour, however, had continued to deteri-
orate following his arrival at Meoble, and his motivation for undergoing
training had come into question:
It seems clear that he consented to undertake the course purely to

secure his release from internment and he was unwilling to make
any great effort. It is true that his health does not seem of the best
and it is probable that the physical exertion demanded of him was

beyond his powers. But it is also true that he put no good will into
the training. He has now been sent away from this S.T.S. (No. 23) In
my opinion he is dangerous.21
By this point, similar problems were also being faced by the Spanish
Country Section. On 27 January, Whetmore was notified of ‘consider-
able unrest’ among the Spaniards in training at STS 21, ‘owing to the fact
that an indiscretion on the part of one of the officers had disclosed the
information that one of the party was not considered to be reliable and
should be removed’.22 The proposed removal of the recruit, L/Cpl Juan
Martin (a.k.a. Nicolas Del Rio), raised the problem of his accumulated
knowledge:
he is well educated and intelligent, and for this reason cannot be

allowed to return to his Unit, since he is wise enough to put two and
two together and realise the purpose of this particular kind of training.
All that I can do is to ask that he be removed from the aegis of the
Training Section and kept in safe custody somewhere apart from all
Training establishments.
The lack of options for dealing with the removal of unsuitable recruits
led to the quite extraordinary situation whereby the Training Section
had no option but to keep Martin in training, thereby continuing
to accumulate knowledge about SOE, as there was simply nothing
else to do with him.23 Martin, however, continued to cause trouble,
and by 19 March it was proposed that a ‘surgical operation’ was
necessary to remove the ‘undesirable elements’ within the training
party.24 Listed among them, Martin was now described as a man
‘not to be trusted’. A note scribbled across the bottom of the letter
suggests that both he and another recruit, Jose Muntane, were returned
to the Pioneer Corps; an unsatisfactory move but the only option
available.
By April, the need to weed out unsuitable recruits at an early stage,
prior to their gaining sensitive information about SOE, was being
stressed by the Training Section. A circular was sent to all Training
School Commandants, which noted,
More emphasis is to be laid on the necessity for removing ineffi-

cient and insecure students at the end of the period of Preliminary
Training Such personnel will be returned to their Unit or the place
from which they have come. Apart from lectures by the O.C. on the
subject of security generally they will not have been taught anything
which is outside the normal scope of ordinary military training At
the end of the period of Para-Military training the conduct and
standard of students will again be scrutinised closely. All those who
are in any way below the standard of our requirements or who are
felt to be insecure will be removed Even after this training the risk
of anything of value being given away is not very great.25
Such increased scrutiny was now being applied to the Italian trainees;
by 5 April, in addition to Purisiol, Bertoli had also come under close
observation, with a view to being ‘thrown out after the para-military
course’.26 Two days later the SOE officer monitoring the Italians, known
by the codename ‘JA’, wrote to Whetmore. He expressed his growing
belief that both Purisiol and Bertoli would ‘have to be thrown out’.27
By 14 April, arrangements had been made with Whetmore for Purisiol
to be removed and employed temporarily on the staff of one of SOE’s
Field Security Stations, first at Hertford and subsequently at Guildford.28
Bertoli had also been removed from the training group by April 13, and
was sent to Garramor (STS 25) for holding. He was considered ‘physic-
ally and morally unfit for the course’, and it was now thought certain
that he had ‘volunteered in order to get out of internment’.29 Over the
following weeks, Whetmore tried in vain to secure employment for Puri-
siol away from SOE, arguing in a letter to the Military Liaison Officer to
the Home Office that ‘to re-intern him would mean that a potentially
useful individual would be rendered idle’.30 However, Purisiol’s poor
health and argumentative personality, along with his poor command of
English, made him an unattractive prospect.31
No concern had yet been expressed about Rosa who, along with the
remaining recruits, had completed the para-military stage of training.32
However, his report from Meoble was less than encouraging:
Secretive nature, speaking rarely to his companions. Courageous,

obstinate, possesses a certain amount of common sense. Hard worker.
Looses his temper easily and is then inclined to sulk. ‘Very touchy’
and lacking sense of humour. Has been for twenty five years a waiter
and this has marked his character to a certain extent.33
It was noted during training that Rosa had not seen his wife for over a year,
and suggested that if he could be granted leave to visit her ‘it would
be a great relief to him and might encourage his efforts’.34 The request
was granted, and appeared to have the desired effect; upon his return,
L/Cpl Beaumont noted that ‘His few days leave has refreshed this student
and made him much more contented.’35 However, doubts about Rosa’s
suitability soon began to grow; a paper written the following week noted
that ‘Nobody has quite made up his mind about him.’36
Despite such uncertainty, it was agreed that Rosa should complete his
SOE training with an intensive course in sabotage, ‘especially against ships
and electric railways’, at one of the Beaulieu Finishing Schools.37 Rather
than removing him before the final course – which would remove any
lingering doubt as to the job he was being trained for – it was thought
that this revelation would provide the final ‘test’ of his character. Beau-
mont noted that he ‘would like to see his reaction to the final stage
of training before passing an opinion on him’.38 Rosa’s reaction was
certainly decisive. On 29 April, London received a phone call from the
Commandant of Beaulieu, Lt Col J.W. Munn, who reported that Rosa
‘has stated quite firmly that he will not go any further with any work
indicated by the nature of the training which he is receiving’. Munn was
told to ‘lay off the training’ until the matter had been discussed.39 At
the request of the Chief Instructor S.H.C. Woolrych, Rosa was quickly
removed from Beaulieu and taken to Bellasis, where he was interviewed
by an SOE officer who confirmed that Rosa was ‘useless for our purposes’.40
The case of Rosa further complicated the issue of how to deal with
failed recruits, as it was universally acknowledged that he was not a
troublesome bad influence, nor was he unreliable; he was simply not
suited to the rigours of life as an SOE agent. As Whetmore pointed
out, Rosa was ‘a misfit’, who remained ‘very well disposed and content
to serve as an ordinary soldier’.41 Indeed, following his removal from
training, Rosa received a number of glowing reports. L/Cpl Alexander
recorded that Rosa had ‘been a real help’ with the cooking and ‘done
extremely well’. He was later taken to ‘Section HQ’ where, according
to Sgt Rees, he proved to be ‘extremely useful He has made a most
favourable impression from the date of his first arrival.’42
Meanwhile, further ‘pruning’ of Spanish recruits in training was
discussed on 27 May. By this point it had been concluded that the
recruit referred to only as ‘Romeo’ was ‘a talker and unreliable’. Yet
there remained no satisfactory solution in such cases, the only available
option being to return Romeo to the Pioneer Corps:
I have spoken to Whetmore who agreed that while it is unfortunate

that men who know so much should be sent back to their unit in
Plymouth, it is inevitable.43
At an unspecified point between late May and early June a Country

Section Course was held at Beaulieu, which provided a forum at which
Country Section officers could discuss matters of common interest. The
issue of failed recruits was foremost among the subjects discussed. A
précis of the comments was forwarded to Nelson, which noted that
‘some water-tight method must be found of dealing with potential
agents who turned out unsatisfactory’ that did not include returning
them to their original employment.44
By 17 June, it had been decided to enlist Rosa, Bertoli and Purisiol in
the Pioneer Corps and continue to employ them within SOE. Whetmore
explained that it was felt that such a move would allow greater room
for manoeuvre in dealing with the men:
The reference to enlistment in the A.M.P.C. does not mean that

the three trainees in question are to return to an A.M.P.C. unit. On
the contrary, they were never recruited into the A.M.P.C. but taken
straight from internment into training by us. The object of recruiting
them now into the A.M.P.C. is to formalise our position towards
them so that we can take severe disciplinary measures against them
if we decide that this is necessary.45
Rumours and circumstantial allegations now compounded the growing

sense of unease about Purisiol, who ‘appears to be distrusted by all those
with whom he has been’ (‘on one occasion Purisiol admitted to another
member of the party that he had only volunteered for service with us in
order to get out of internment’; ‘Although there is no reason to suppose
that he did not fight in the Spanish Civil War, other members of his
party all maintain that he has never been able to give any instance of
having been anywhere near any fighting’). Bertoli, who had ‘quickly
proved unsatisfactory’, was now described as ‘a very nasty piece of work’.
Having been segregated in Scotland with Purisiol, it was advised that he
‘should on no account be allowed any liberty’.46 Rosa, meanwhile, was
still considered to be ‘a nice fellow’, despite having ‘made up his mind
that he would not go on’.
By this point, plans for a holding facility had been made, and it
was recommended that Purisiol should ‘go immediately to the holding
establishment as soon as this is ready’.47 A minute entitled ‘Holding
Camp for Unsatisfactory Trainees’, dated 19 June, set out the decisions
that had been reached regarding the future of the Italian trainees.48
Three further trainees – Rivoli, Campi and Salsilli – were now listed
alongside Purisiol, Bertoli and Rosa as having ‘proved unreliable’:
We suggest that serious consideration should be given to removing

Rivoli and Campi from civilian life and sending them to the Special
Holding Camp as they know too much for safety. Unless some early
employment can be found for Salsilli which he would accept we
think that he should certainly be sent to the Special Holding Camp.
Purisiol and Bertoli are definitely dangerous and should certainly be
sent to the Special Holding Camp. Rosa is a borderline case; but we
could have no certainty regarding him unless he is under our control;
and we suggest that he be installed in the Special Holding Camp to
take charge of catering arrangements.
Whetmore responded to the recommendations made in the minute

on 24 June, making the first documented reference to ‘the workshop
school’. While he agreed with the course of action proposed for Purisiol,
Bertoli, Salsilli and Rosa, he objected to the need to detain Rivoli and
Campi, who he described as men ‘of sedentary character’ who had been
‘extraordinarily ill-chosen for our purposes’, described by a Field Security
Officer as ‘hard working and extremely docile, and completely lacking in
heroic quality’.49 Whetmore’s objections were conceded. By 2 July, the
number had been whittled down further to Purisiol, Bertoli and Rosa.
It was also proposed to hold Corporal Willem de Koning of the Dutch
Army. Selected as a member of the Dutch (N) Section’s boat crew, he
had ‘shown himself to be extremely indiscreet. He knows the skipper
and the boat crew, and the project which took place last weekend’,
a reference to the failed small-boat operation ‘Rhodium I’.50 Removed
from the boat, he had been taken under escort to the headquarters of
SOE’s Field Security Section at Kingston, where he had since been held.51
It was proposed that Captain Glanville Brown, accompanied by three
Field Security Officers, would escort the group to the Holding School,
and ‘constitute the temporary establishment for the house’, remaining
there until a Commandant had been appointed and permanent staff
arranged. All necessary equipment would be drawn from the SOE stores
depot at Camberley or otherwise borrowed from the training school
at Arisaig ‘until such time as furniture and equipment for the house
itself becomes available’. Sir Frank Nelson gave his final approval for the
arrangements on 4 July.52
The job of Commandant was given to Major Alfred Adamson (‘Aong-
hais’) Fyffe, who ran Inverlair from August 1941 to February 1944.
Unknowingly, Fyffe had been responsible for deciding the location of
the holding facility. Prior to joining SOE he had been a member of
49 Field Security Section in Fort William, and had been asked by his
Commanding Officer, Major Gavin Brown, to recommend ‘a place suit-

able for a military unit, the purpose of which he could not tell me. It
had to be outside the PA (Protected Area), ideal from the security point
of view, reasonably isolated, but within easy access to a rail link.’53 After
giving the matter some thought, Fyffe set off to inspect a number of
houses that had come to mind and duly wrote a report, in which he
recommended Inverlair Lodge, and put the matter out of his mind.
After a brief meeting at Fort William railway station with Colin
Gubbins in April 1941, Fyffe joined SOE. He became Intelligence Officer
for the Spanish Country Section, stationed at their Special Training
School at Thame Park, which would later become an SOE wireless
station. At the beginning of July, Major General Lakin visited Thame.
Fyffe recalls being ordered to show him around, with the instruction
‘hide nothing from him, because he’s security’. He was concerned at the
excessive amount of time that had been allocated for what would be a
short tour (‘There wasn’t very much of Thame to show I had to draw
things out a bit’). By the afternoon, there was ‘hardly anything left’ to
show Lakin, who was ‘very pleasant’ and ‘tried to look interested’. Fyffe
was left wondering why he had been ‘landed with a Major General for
half a day – I hadn’t even got my second pip!’ Unaware of the plans to
establish a holding camp, it was only later that Fyffe realised that Lakin
had likely been sizing him up for the job of running Inverlair.54
For Fyffe, his appointment to Inverlair came ‘out of the blue’. On leave
for a long weekend with his wife in London, Fyffe paid a courtesy visit to
Whetmore at Baker Street on Monday morning. His arrival was the cause
of some relief: ‘As soon as I entered the door, I was yelled at. “Where
the hell have you been? We’ve been looking for you since Friday.” ’55
Whetmore was in a meeting, and Fyffe recalls being ‘pushed into a chair
and told not to budge’ until they were able to contact him.56 Upon his
return, Whetmore instructed Fyffe to collect his kit from Thame Park
and meet him at Euston Station that evening, where they would board
the 7.15 night sleeper to Inverness.57 On board, Whetmore told Fyffe
that their destination was Inverlair, adding, ‘You should know Inverlair
because you recommended it.’ When Fyffe asked what he was going to
do there, Whetmore replied ‘You’re going to command the place.’ The
statement took Fyffe by surprise:
I protested that I was totally ill equipped to command any such

unit All he said was, ‘If I didn’t think you could do the job you
wouldn’t be offered it, so that’s all there is.’ He then went on to
detail the purpose and function of Inverlair No 6 Special Workshop
School, as it was to be called. There would be no Standing Orders

given me, nor any kind of Constitution, nothing at all on paper. I
just had to listen to my remit as he gave it that evening. It was rather
a frightening one too, as he set it out 58
Whetmore explained to Fyffe that he would ‘be getting all sorts of

foreign nationals’, men who had ‘fallen by the wayside’, who would be
sent to Inverlair ‘to see that they forgot what they learned about our
subversive business’.59
There was much work that needed to be done in order to prepare Inver-
lair for the arrival of SOE’s failed recruits, most importantly the selection
of suitable staff along with some building work (‘a large shed had to be
built to house the transport, look-out posts had to be established which
could be manned in the event of emergency’).60 Within days of taking
up the post, Fyffe suggested the name of the facility should be changed
from ‘No. 6 Special Workshop School’, a name which ‘excited curiosity
and questions’. His suggestion, simply ‘Inverlair’, was ‘accepted without
demur’, although London continued to refer to ‘the Cooler’ in its corres-
pondence. Fyffe was also clear about the specific qualities that would be
necessary in those who would run Inverlair, which he explained when
visiting the Camerons Depot in Inverness:
I said ‘Sir, I want NCO’s. Not the sort of “shut your bloody mouth,
man!” ’, I said, ‘I want men who have a fatherly attitude to the men
under them This is very important, sir. I want men who have
families of their own, and can understand young people.’61
As a result of his request, Fyffe was given Simon Vass as his adjutant.
Born in Cawdor, Nairnshire, in December 1892, Vass enlisted in the
Cameron Highlanders in November 1909, serving in India, France and
Salonika. He went on to serve with the King’s African Rifles in East Africa
from May 1917 to October 1919, and was posted to the army reserve
upon his return to the UK. In November 1921, he was discharged and
pursued a career with the Post Office, joining the Cameron Highlanders
as a territorial in April 1924. Vass joined SOE in December 1941. Fyffe
recalls that he was ‘a great help, my Adjutant, very fatherly figure. When
I was away Vass ran the place like clockwork.’62 He remained at Inver-
lair until November 1943, at which point he was transferred to SOE’s
Training Section.
Fyffe remembers Rosa and Bertoli, both of whom were already resident
at Inverlair at the time of his appointment. He recalls that Rosa ‘would
never have fitted in’, and was ‘physically unfit to be an agent’, while
Bertoli ‘wasn’t strong mentally or physically’.63 However, they did have
other skills that were very much appreciated. By 10 July, Rosa was ‘acting
as cook’ at Inverlair, and ‘working very well’.64 A later report noted that
both he and Bertoli were ‘constantly occupied in the cookhouse’, where
they were ‘working well and giving us no trouble’.65 A further early
report recorded that Rosa ‘is a great asset to the establishment. He has
acted responsibly and has co-operated well, is always punctual with the
meals which continue to be excellently prepared.’66 Purisiol’s arrival at
Inverlair was delayed by a brief spell in hospital at Fort William (under
the guise of ‘Andrew du Pont, a Free Frenchman’). Taking up residence
at Inverlair on 24 July, it was noted that Purisiol ‘works well and gives
no trouble. He has proved extremely helpful and we are all very pleased
with him.’67 Fyffe recalls Purisiol as a ‘great chap, I had a lot of time for
him’. However, he believes that Purisiol ‘couldn’t have made an agent
because he was so outstandingly ugly. He’d be recognised anywhere –
once seen, never forgotten. He had no teeth at all, except two gold tusks,
two incisors.’68
Fyffe was aware that he was sitting on a potential powder keg, given
the mix of nationalities at Inverlair, some of which were ‘at daggers
drawn we had to try and jolly them along together’.69 In addition,
detention itself could cause resentment and fuel trouble. Reports on
Rosa’s behaviour were initially positive (‘Works hard and by producing
excellent meals does a great deal to sustain the morale of the estab-
lishment’; ‘A decent, reliable and hard working man, and a first class
cook, who does wonders with army rations’), but cracks began to show
as time wore on. By mid-July, L/Cpl Pickering recorded that he was
‘apt to get rather moody at times’.70 He made some attempt to explain
this, noting ‘This is probably due to the sense of confinement suffered
by all the students at Inverlair House.’ Of potentially greater concern,
Pickering continued, was Rosa’s belief that he ‘will only be here for a
matter of three or four weeks’, leading to a belief that ‘a prolonged stay
at this place would have a very bad effect on him if he remains here
long he will become discouraged and difficult to handle’. Cpl Holland
emphasised the point on 31 July, observing that Rosa ‘seems to think
his stay is only temporary’. In early August, Glanville Brown recorded,
‘He seems to think that when I go back he will return with me and I
do not know what effect it will have on him when he finds out that
this is not the case.’ The result, Beaumont noted in late September, was
depression, which manifested itself in the form of a considerable drop
in the standard of cooking: ‘there seems at present to be a certain ill-will
prevailing in the kitchen’. Rosa became ‘liable to extreme irritability

at the slightest provocation’. The situation continued to degenerate to
such a degree that, by 4 October, Rosa was ‘relieved of his cookhouse
duties’. He ‘seemed rather hurt because we were not sorry, and more
so when we praised the work of Bertoli, his successor’. The competition
appears to have helped snap Rosa out of his depression; by the end
of the month he was back in the kitchen, and by November he had
regained his standing as a ‘first class cook’. Indeed, during November
Fyffe reported that ‘Rosa is taking increasing interest in his cookhouse,
and meals are better than ever. He is, of course, always on the lookout
for praise.’71 Rosa continued to work in such a fashion that, by March
1942, his position at Inverlair had become blurred as to whether he was
a resident or, as one report described him, ‘really part of the staff’.72
Similarly, positive reports on Purisiol’s behaviour continued through
August and into September (‘a steady worker and always helpful, giving
no trouble at all, and appearing quite contented’; ‘Has throughout
worked with tremendous energy He has also been most polite and
well behaved in every way’; ‘Shows continued zeal in all tasks set for
him’). As September wore on, however, it became clear that his good
humour was linked, as was Rosa’s, to his hope of leaving Inverlair – if
only for a short period:
Loves work and is happy. To a certain extent his content is due to

the fact that he expects to go on leave to London, where he proposes
to see Gatti, Secretary to the Free Italy movement.73
On 25 September, Beaumont noted that Purisiol was ‘hoping to go

on leave in London soon, since he has had none since he joined the
Army’.74 By early October, Purisiol had developed a close affinity with
the heating system at Inverlair:
Works very hard indeed – housework – tending the boiler and

learning English. From the loving care he gives to the boiler
(commonly known to the staff as ‘Mrs. Purisiol’) even to the extent
of getting up in the middle of the night to feed it, it might appear
that he would welcome some work connected with mechanics.75
Purisiol did make a trip to London during October, as a job interview

had been arranged for him there. Unsuccessful, this served only to make
matters worse upon his return to Inverlair. By the end of the month,
Purisiol had grown increasingly disenchanted with his lot. Cpl Mendes
reported an ‘outburst’ which occurred on 30 October:
Would very much like to lay hands on those responsible for his
presence back here. Expressed himself in unusually violent terms on
this subject. After this outburst has calmed down and reconciliated
himself with his boiler.76
Such outbursts continued. In November, L/Cpl Blacka recorded that Puri-

siol could be ‘rather hot-tempered over trifles, but cools down rapidly’.77
To help prevent boredom and resentment setting in, under Fyffe,
Inverlair developed into a useful production facility, establishing its own
small iron foundry and a cobbler’s shop, repairing boots sent from SOE’s
nearby paramilitary training schools (known collectively as ‘Group A’).78
The metalwork was made possible due to a combination of the scrap
metal found nearby and the fact that Purisiol was a qualified engineer.
Fyffe recalled how he ‘scoured the countryside with these boys’:79
All around the Lochaber area there was an abundance of metal which
was the left-over debris from the various constructions connected
with the Aluminium works and the tunnels for the conveyance
of water to the works at Fort William. There were iron rails from
the miles of narrow gauge railways, steel joists, corrugated sheets,
aluminium in sheet and extruded wire form, all left as unwanted
rubbish. I arranged with the Fort William board, some of whom
I knew from before my Inverlair days, that we would clear the area,
moor and hill, of the bits and pieces and turn them over to the iron
works in Lanarkshire. This was agreed and we sent, I think, three or
four railway wagons of metals to these works But a lot of useful
material we retained, and a small foundry was set up at the Lodge,
where we erected a forge, blown by hand bellows made from old
truck tyres.80
Such activity helped to keep the residents busy, and had a particularly
positive effect upon Purisiol. In May 1942, Fyffe reported that since a
forge had been acquired, Purisiol ‘has been like a bairn with a new toy’,
making ‘all kinds of things out of the scrap metal’.81 The work also made
a valuable contribution to the training carried out at nearby Aviemore:
we made various operational equipment for them in the way of

grapnels, climbing gear, boat-hooks and other necessary impedimenta.
At one point, in 1943 Captain Sykes from Group A asked if we could

fabricate a steel bow, made in two halves which could be hidden
on the person, firing arrows with accuracy up to 80 yards. After
trials with various lengths of long bow we decided on a bow of
‘cupid’ type. It fired wooden arrows, flighted with thin aluminium less
than a millimetre thick, and firing wooden arrows with a hardened
tip, with enough penetrating power to go through a wood target
of over one inch thickness. This was passed to London where the
Training Section felt, I believe, that training would take overlong; the
weapon passed to the Commandos who did, I was told, make use of it.82
With the help of such activity, there were few instances of trouble at
Inverlair. Certain precautionary measures had, however, been taken.
Prior to Fyffe’s arrival, Glanville Brown had ‘set aside one room, which
was a larder – a cold store, in fact – as a cell’, although Fyffe was advised
by Whetmore not to use it too often. Fyffe recalls that he ‘tried to be
friendly’ with the men at Inverlair, but on one occasion a stricter line
had to be taken, following an incident in which a resident Dutchman
struck a Belgian, seemingly without motivation:
He was a man who feigned sickness every so often, and this partic-
ular morning he feigned sickness and he missed his dinner, and the
Belgian was mess orderly that day in the men’s canteen, and he just
came downstairs and bashed the Belgian, just like that, without any
explanation And then, of course, he was restrained by the others
standing around, and then the fracas outside the mess and my office
at lunchtime, and he was breaking the walls!83
There was also one occasion on which two residents tried to escape, by
which point Fyffe had left Inverlair, becoming head of Military Security
in London. Boyle noted in 1944 that during the three years of its exist-
ence ‘we have been fairly lucky we have only had one escape from
the Cooler’. The man, ‘a guest from S.I.S.’, had been recaptured within
12 hours.84
Over the 4 years of its existence, a total of 82 men were sent to
Inverlair, one of whom was sent there twice, while two others were held
on behalf of SIS.85 Fyffe is keen to dispel the myths that have developed
surrounding Inverlair since the end of the war, particularly the negative
implications that the word ‘Cooler’, slang for prison, gives to those who
ended up there. As he points out, Inverlair
was a place [for] those unfortunates – male only – who were unable to
complete the [training] course. Not necessarily through their fault at
all, they simply couldn’t manage to take all the stresses and strains of
the various exercises they were required to do they were wrongly
selected by the Country Sections – they hadn’t done their home-
work on these particular individuals I had to keep them happy,
for their short or longer stay – and some stayed years. They were
not malcontents at all. I know they were referred to as being ‘in
the Cooler’, but that was miles and miles from the atmosphere at
Inverlair certainly there was no restraint.86
Archie Boyle pointed to the lack of restraint in July 1944, observing

that Inverlair ultimately exerted little more than a ‘moral hold’ over its
residents:
The important point about all S.O.E. quarantine arrangements is that

in the last resort they are dependent upon the consent of the subject,
because we have no barbed wire or guards. The question of man-
power and works would render that impossible and, in any case, it
would be most undesirable, as most of the people turn out all right
in the end and it is our aim in life to release them in a satisfied frame
of mind. Barbed wire would be quite impossible from this point of
view. Moreover, if we did have barbed wire and guards we should
soon be involved in Parliamentary questions and accused of running
private concentration camps.87
Boyle’s point was echoed at an interdepartmental meeting on intern-

ment facilities held later in the month, at which the Cooler was
described as ‘a purely military establishment for Other Ranks’, which
was ‘intended and only suited for persons who require normal military
discipline and not prison guard’.88
From surviving papers, it is clear that the Security Section was firmly
opposed to the use of Inverlair as any sort of punishment facility, and
maintained a determination to see that it was not used as anything
other than a last resort – and particularly not as a place where Country
Sections could simply offload their problems. Whetmore pointed this
out in response to a request to deal with another troublesome Span-
iard, Private Laiseca, received soon after Inverlair became operational.
The head of the Spanish Section (H) wrote to Whetmore, explaining
that Laiseca had ‘been misbehaving he accused one of the officers in
public of misappropriating his pay, refused to sign the Acquittance Roll,
and made a scene in front of the others’. H believed that ‘disciplinary

action must be taken’, advocating that Laiseca should be ‘taken away’
by armed guard: ‘I do not know where the Armed Guard will take him
to but I think it is important that he be removed from Thame until he
has suffered his punishment.’89 Whetmore, however, was reluctant to
involve the Security Section in such a case. He argued that Laiseca was
guilty ‘of a disciplinary offence. It would be contrary to the interests
of security if security personnel became involved in action arising from
the punishment of disciplinary offences.’90
Further requests for the removal of Spaniards to Inverlair were
made by Captain Blake of Thame Park in December. The three men
concerned had attended a ‘special course’ at Beaulieu during the previous
September, which provided a convenient gloss of security concern to
what was otherwise little more than a blatant attempt to be rid of three
perennially troublesome recruits. As Blake wrote,
For reasons of security I do not think it advisable that they should be

returned to their unit. Further, as they have been the root of much of
the trouble we have experienced in the past, I consider they should
be removed to a place where they will not be heard of again. They
are useless to us.91
Despite receiving support from the School Commandant, Blake’s request

was not greeted with sympathy from Peter Lee, who concluded that
there was ‘practically no case to put forward for transferring the men
to the Cooler’. Lee echoed Whetmore’s earlier determination to main-
tain a clear distinction between security issues and disciplinary matters,
observing, ‘My own view is that it is almost entirely a case for discip-
linary action and that security problems do not arise.’ Even the question
of the knowledge the men had gained during their time at Beaulieu
was not in itself considered of sufficient security concern to guarantee
detention without further elaboration. Lee wrote,
I do not know of what this course consisted and upon this point I
should be most grateful if you would let me have your considered
opinion as to the danger involved, should these men be returned to
their A.M.P.C. Company, in view of the information they may have
acquired at Beaulieu. If you consider that this course was sufficiently
secret to warrant a period of incarceration, then we shall have no
alternative to consider them as candidates until their information
dies down.92
The Security Section was not always able to maintain a distinction

between disciplinary offences and security concerns that warranted a
period of detention at Inverlair. This can be seen in the case of Raymond
Andre Holvoet, who spent 3 months there for ‘Youthful irresponsib-
ility in the field’, a decision taken for purely political reasons. Holvoet,
known as ‘Badger’, was a Belgian agent, born in Coutrai in January 1924.
From the time of his recruitment, concerns had been raised on account
of his youth; it was felt that Holvoet was lacking a ‘degree of maturity’.93
However, Holvoet was also considered ‘honest of purpose’ and ‘strong of
character’, and ‘satisfactory’ from a security point of view.94 He was sent
to the field as W/T operator for Walther Gauthier, known as Alphonse
Jean Louis Gerard or ‘Griffin’, in February 1943.95 The acting Belgian
Section Head, Hardy Amies, wrote to Roche on 27 July, noting that ‘we
have received extremely bad reports on this man’s activities in the field
from Surete sources’, on account of which Col Marissal of the Belgian
Deuxieme Section had requested that Holvoet be put under close arrest
immediately upon his return to the UK.96 Upon his arrival, he was duly
held in segregation. Holvoet argued that the allegations made against
him were unjustified, and Warden was asked to go ‘very carefully’ into
the matter before Holvoet was handed over to the Belgian authorities.97
Holvoet was interrogated on 6 August. The following day, a security
officer wrote to Roche, noting,
It is quite clear that a bad mistake was made ever to have recruited
such a completely irresponsible young man to work as a W/T oper-
ator for an important organisation. He himself admits to having
his photograph taken, dressed in his parachute kit, to having given
demonstrations of his arrival, to pretending to be joint head of the
organisation, to having been sent by the British to spy on his leader
Griffin and to having deliberately passed on untrue information to
his chief.
This criticism of Holvoet was balanced with further criticism directed at

the Belgian Section and the actions of Griffin:
The reports which we have received from his own Section may exag-
gerate his crimes and show up the organisation for which he was
working in better colours than that which they deserve. My own
view is that Griffin himself committed a number of grave blunders
and was, right from the start, a very bad example to such a young
and inexperienced agent. This, however, cannot excuse Badger and
I consider that, under no circumstances should he be re-employed

by S.O.E.98
Warden communicated these conclusions to the Belgian Section and

Senter wrote to Amies, noting that ‘it is clear that this agent is completely
irresponsible and unfit for any secret employment I assume that steps
will be taken to dispense with Badger’s services and possibly to suggest
some form of disciplinary action’.99 In response, Belgian Section officer
‘TH’ noted that ‘the question of taking disciplinary action against Badger
is under consideration. We have put forward the suggestion that he
should be removed to the Cooler.’100 After having seen Holvoet again,
who had ‘admitted that the reports made on him were substantially
correct’, TH proposed that he should be ‘sent to the Cooler for an initial
period of three months’.101
The Security Section objected to this blurring of boundaries between
security and disciplinary matters. Senter wrote to Roche on 11
September, noting that ‘this is not regarded as a suitable case for the
Cooler’:
TH frankly admits that the student is not in a position to compromise

any operations and no good purpose would be served, so far as this
organisation is concerned putting him in the Cooler. It is, in fact,
a disciplinary problem which the Belgians will have to face on this
student being returned to them.102
Roche passed Senter’s views to the Belgian Section on 14 September.

He also wrote to Amies directly, noting that he considered Holvoet’s
operational knowledge ‘so stale as not to render it essential for him to
go to the Cooler’.103 However, the matter was complicated when Robin
Brook, Regional Director for France and the Low Countries, informed
Roche that ‘Colonel Marissal feels very strongly in the contrary case’. For
this reason, it was felt necessary to reach a compromise. Roche wrote,
Just as Colonel Marissal has often met us when we considered it

necessary for some person to go to the Cooler so I am prepared
to accept his standpoint in this matter. Please submit disposal form
recommending Cooler for period of two or three months on the
ground of youthful irresponsibility in the field.104
On the proforma for dispensing with a student’s services, it was noted

that Holvoet was to be sent to the Cooler ‘in view of his bad security
and youthful irresponsibility in the field’. It was also pointed out that
‘Col. Marissal, of Belgian 2eme Section, strongly supports the above
recommendation’.105 The recommendation that Holvoet be sent to the
Cooler was approved, and Holvoet arrived at Inverlair early in October.
At Inverlair, Holvoet became ‘Number 59’. The first report on his
behaviour, written within days of his arrival, noted that he ‘seems a
quiet type, and a good worker, although perhaps a little immature. I do
not expect any difficulty with him.’106 A later report from November
again drew attention to his immaturity, but was otherwise uncritical,
considering him a ‘good type’ who ‘might well be used yet’.107 A report
from 30 November noted that he had ‘behaved very well I feel sure
that he has learned his lesson and that he will profit by it He is quite
a good influence in the house, and has made many friends.’108 Having
spent over 2 months at Inverlair, on 16 December the Belgian Section
was asked whether there was any objection to Holvoet’s release being
set in motion. No objection was forthcoming, and his case was reviewed
in early January.109 Holvoet was sworn out of SOE on 12 January, and
returned to his unit the following day.110
In line with Security Section’s belief that Inverlair was not a permanent
solution for problematic recruits, efforts to find Purisiol a suitable job
continued; as we have seen, these progressed as far as his attending
an interview in London. However, this was unsuccessful, and Puri-
siol returned to Inverlair. Whetmore wrote to Fyffe on 5 November,
instructing him to ‘impress on Purisiol that he must make every effort
to improve his English’:
One of the principal stumbling blocks in getting him suitably placed

is his limited knowledge of the language of this country. He has been
with British people for some length of time now, and should have
made himself fairly good in conversational English.111
The prospect of Purisiol leaving Inverlair was frowned upon by the

Italian Section, which wanted him to remain there on a permanent
basis. Writing to the head of Section, Whetmore again emphasised the
limited purpose of Inverlair:
it is not consistent with good policy to place under restraint for the
rest of the war a student who ‘goes stale or goes bad’.
We are handling several hundred students. The qualities which are
required in the finished product are rare, consequently the number
of rejects is large. If failures on any account had to be kept under
restraint vastly larger accommodation would be needed than is at

present forthcoming, or than the military authorities to whom we are
dependent would be prepared to staff. The fact that failures were kept
under restraint would become known amongst those people from
whom we recruit. The reaction would be to reduce very considerably
the number of men who would be prepared to accept training from us.
The authorities charged with the control of Foreign Contingents
would in the course of time, object to the permanent loss of men
who were still potentially good soldiers.
This system would lead to an accumulation of individuals who,
in the main, might serve some useful purpose, but who through
faulty treatment on our part would become progressively useless and
diseffective. [sic]
I imagine that in time the Treasury would object. It is also difficult
to find a legal basis for holding a man permanently in restraint, unless
a charge can be produced against him.
It is on these grounds that I feel it right to dispute your opinion
regarding the further detention over a prolonged period of Purisiol.
He has been out of touch with the training system for many months,
nor has he any knowledge of the tasks, or the possibly tasks allotted
to other students of his nationality.112
However, JA remained insistent that Purisiol would constitute a danger

‘if returned to civilian life’, pointing to his knowledge of other recruits
who had been successfully trained and were now operating in the field:
If at large he is certain sooner or later to be in contact with members

of the Italian colony in London and it seems to me inevitable that
these students will be discussed and conjectures made as to their
present activities, about which Purisiol is in a position to form more
accurate guesses than the rest of the Italian colony.113
JA’s position led to a temporary respite from further consideration

of the question of Purisiol’s departure from Inverlair, as the Security
Section conceded that he should stay ‘Up North’ until January 1942,
at which point his future would be reconsidered.114 By the end of
January, Purisiol was reported as ‘working extremely well’, having taken
over responsibility for the paraffin lamps, which he kept ‘exception-
ally clean’. He was considered ‘a good worker’, who ‘never grumbles at
anything’.115
Against the wishes of the Italian Section, efforts to find suitable

employment for Purisiol were made once again, but with little improve-
ment in his grasp of English these came to an end in December 1942.
Peter Lee wrote to Hugh Park, noting that ‘Much as your efforts are
appreciated, it would seem that No. 5 is better in the Cooler, as he wishes
to stay there.’116 Lee wrote to the Finance Directorate on 20 January,
explaining that Purisiol
is a more or less permanent inhabitant of the Cooler and will probably

be there for the duration. His English is atrocious and he has expressed
his desire to profit by his stay in our Establishment by improving it.117
A request for some books to help facilitate Purisiol’s study of English

was turned down by the Finance Directorate.118
Not all of Inverlair’s residents remained on such a permanent basis as
Purisiol, Rosa and Bertoli; as with Holvoet, others spent shorter periods
of time ‘Up North’. Free French (RF) Section trainee Clement Armanet
(a.k.a. Clement Bourland) spent a brief spell in the Cooler in the autumn
of 1943. Born in Limoges in 1901, Armanet came to the attention of
the French authorities following an incident in August 1940. Returning
by train from his brother’s funeral in Grenoble, Armanet was over-
heard criticising the Government with a group of soldiers, and using
‘an offensive term in connection with Petain’.119 This came back to
haunt him in December 1941, at which time he was ‘called to the
Gendarmerie at Perigneux’ and confronted with the man who had over-
heard him. Put before the Tribunal at Perigneux over March–April 1942,
he was sentenced to 2 months’ imprisonment and a 6000 franc fine.
Following an appeal against the sentence, the term of imprisonment was
extended to 4 months. Determined not to go to prison, Armanet decided
to flee. A railway driver since 1923, Armanet used his contacts and
took advantage of the ‘international solidarity’ amongst railway workers
to arrange passage to Spain. He arrived in Barcelona on 20 February,
and travelled on to Madrid. On 24 March he left Madrid for Gibraltar,
where he embarked upon the Empire Pride, which docked in Liverpool
on 5 April. Interviewed by MI5 at the LRC, Armanet was cleared from a
security point of view, and it was suggested that he ‘could probably be
found useful employment in the F.F’.120
Beginning his training as a Free French Section agent in early June,
doubts were soon raised about Armanet’s suitability. 2/Lt Turnbull, the
Field Security Officer accompanying the training group, recorded on
25 June:
I am not certain about this man. He is sincere and anxious to be

useful but tends to grumble at the irksome parts of the training which
do not seem to have an immediate bearing on the work he imagines
himself doing. He attracts attention outside with his loud voice, and
the more he drinks, the louder he shouts. The drink question if the
one I am doubtful about. With him it seems to be rather a craving;
he is constantly trying to get beer (as there is nothing else) from
the canteen at impossible hours, and his idea of an outing is to wait
impatiently for the pubs to open and then get down to the solid
business of consuming large quantities of whisky and beer. He has
told me hair-raising stories of driving trains after drinking Gargantuan
quantities of wine. I think he is probably safe, but I shall report more
fully after further outings.121
Further outings served to confirm Turnbull’s concerns. In July, he wrote,
This man is not secure. He has a craving for drink and is constantly
trying to slip off and have one. He is [in] debt, having borrowed
money from me and from other students. He is a chain-smoker. He
was the first to find a woman in the district, and when she asked
him where he was stationed, in spite of security talks and constant
stressing, he told her that ‘he was not allowed to say.’ He shirks
anything that is arduous if there is not a drink at the end of it, and
will never have it that he is in the wrong – very argumentative.122
RF Section was informed of Turnbull’s concerns by security, and told that

Armanet ‘appears to be a very doubtful character unless he improves’.123
Three days later, he was removed from the training course and sent to
Malvern Court ‘for holding’.124 There was now serious concern over the
knowledge Armanet had acquired during the training course:
As this student is aware of some of the intentions of the F.F as regards

railway sabotage, they are anxious that he should not be allowed
to circulate for some while, and they therefore propose that if it is
decided to withdraw him entirely from training it will be a good
thing to keep him some time in the cooler.125
The decision to withdraw Armanet from training permanently was taken

on 10 July, at which point a Disposal Form was completed, which recom-
mended that he should spend some time at Inverlair.126 The submission
passed through the usual channels, and a final recommendation was
made on 17 July that Armanet should be sent to Inverlair for up to

3 months but released earlier if requested, which was approved. At Inver-
lair, where he was known as ‘Number 50’, Armanet made a particularly
bad impression:
This man is one of the worst we have had at this establishment. He is

definitely lazy and whenever possible, he will dodge all work at the
expense of his fellows. He is deceitful and shows nasty traits in his
character. He has teamed up with 49, who has become a kind of tool,
used by 50 to do all the dirty work which 50 thinks up they have
taken care to go only so far, and to stop just short of the point when
their conduct would have brought upon them just and immediate
retribution. I am convinced that 50 is the worse of the two. I cannot
find any redeeming features in his character, and I feel that we should
be rid of him as soon as possible. He is very argumentative, and loud-
voiced, and is mean and petty by nature. He is untidy in habits and
slovenly in appearance.127
A report in late August indicated that Armanet ‘has not improved in the
slightest. He continues to try all the “old soldier’s” trick[s], and plays on
the idea that he understands no English. He has now had his last chance
to reform.’128 The ‘promise of summary action being taken against him’
had resulted in a considerable improvement in Armanet’s behaviour by
early October:
This man has made great strides during the last few weeks; he
was always the ring leader in any trouble, and tried to play the ‘Old
soldier’ on every occasion. The sight of the guardroom was sufficient
to cool his ardour in this direction, and since then he has been a
model worker.
Armanet revealed himself to be ‘a very efficient engineer and metal

worker, and the jobs which he has done deserve the highest praise’.129
By early November, Armanet was described as ‘an excellent engineer
and has proved to be most useful here’. It was also recorded that he
had ‘expressed, on more than one occasion, a very definite desire not to
fight anymore’.130 The report suggested that he ‘would be most useful
to the general war effort in a factory where his skill would be best
used’. By 11 November, the French had agreed to Armanet’s release from
Inverlair. By the end of the month, it was recorded that he had ‘really
“opened up” ’, and had changed his mind about what he wished to do.
(‘He does not wish to get a job in a factory but earnestly hopes to
remain in a fighting unit of his own forces.’) The report pointed out
that Armanet ‘is an excellent craftsman and an expert on railways, and
might be of real use to some Sapper unit’. He was sworn out of SOE
on 11 December, by which point the more disagreeable aspects of his
character had reappeared:
A deceitful and uncontrolled character of whom we are well rid. He

regarded the Cooler as ‘prison’ but realises its necessity. I have no
confidence that he will not talk when the cooler is forgotten but he
knows little now and he is thoroughly frightened.131
Rosa, Purisiol and Bertoli were still resident at Inverlair by November

1944. Rosa and Bertoli’s eventual fate remains unknown: Rosa’s
Personnel File offers no clues, while no PF for Bertoli has survived. In the
case of Purisiol, efforts were made to find the employment he desired as
a ship’s engineer. However, through discussion with the Shipping Feder-
ation, it was made clear to Jack O’Reilly that this would be impossible
to arrange.132 O’Reilly then contacted A.C. Cartwright (Regional Officer
of the Ministry of Labour and National Service for London and the
South East). He glossed over the time Purisiol had spent at Inverlair,
simply noting that ‘For the last three years he has been serving with this
Dept. on one of our Scottish bases.’ An interview for Purisiol was duly
arranged for late February, by which point Purisiol, along with Bertoli
and Rosa, had been discharged from the Pioneer Corps.133 Cartwright
wrote to O’Reilly on 21 March, noting that Purisiol had ‘been placed as
maintenance engineer with Cumberland Hotel, Marble Arch’.134
The exact date on which Inverlair was closed down remains unclear.
Roche wrote to Boyle in April 1945, noting that ‘Trade at the Cooler
has been very slack since October last but as there are still 160 agents
in training its maintenance until the end of the fighting war in Europe
seems a necessary insurance.’ In any event, Roche found it ‘difficult to
believe that it will not be closed by or before September’.135 The Security
History noted that the ‘Security establishment in Scotland’, presumably
a reference to Inverlair, was ‘finally liquidated at the end of June’.136
3
Security Abroad
Looking back at the work of the Security Section in January 1946, with
SOE within days of dissolution, Boyle recalled the difficulty that had
been experienced in ‘keeping fully in touch with S.O.E. overseas on
Security matters’.1 SOE established Missions in North Africa, Egypt, Italy
and India, all of which had their own security needs. Matters of overseas
security did not originally fall within the remit of the Security Section in
London, but greater participation developed over time, although never
to the extent of seeing all of SOE’s security needs directly controlled by
London. The involvement of a London-based section in overseas affairs
was not without its own problems, particularly the risk of being inter-
preted as unwelcome interference in the Mission’s sphere of responsib-
ility. In order to successfully ‘franchise’ the security practice developed
in London overseas, the Security Section had to be careful not to offend
the sensibilities of the Mission Commanders.
The Security Section’s first significant links abroad were forged in
September 1942, at which point the head of SOE’s Cairo Mission
reported to London that the security situation there was ‘unsatisfactory’,
and requested assistance.2 The poor state of security during the Mission’s
early days was recorded by the Countess of Ranfurly, who worked for
SOE Cairo for a brief spell in an administrative capacity. On 27 February
1941, she wrote,
I am now sure there is something wrong with my office. Security is

almost non-existent. If you give our office address to a Cairo taxi driver
more often than not he’ll say ‘Oh, you want to go to “secret office.”’3
The Countess took it upon herself to do something about the situation,

and informed Eden, who was staying at the British Embassy in Cairo,
50
Security Abroad 51
of her concerns (‘I told him briefly but strongly with great emphasis
on security).’ She also proceeded to discuss the situation with General
Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, who, she discovered, was
also ‘worried over their lack of proper security’. She agreed to act as his
informant, duplicating ‘worrying’ documents for him at night. The irony
of the situation was apparently lost on the Countess, whose security
concerns thus led her to commit a serious breach of security. During the
summer, assisted by Ranfurly’s willingness to provide internal papers,
an ‘Anti-SO2 Dossier’ was compiled by SOE’s enemies in Cairo, which
included criticism of security matters.4 However, upon reading through
the ‘dossier’, SOE Staff Officer Bickham Sweet-Escott was in no doubt
that much of it was based ‘on mere hearsay I am no lawyer, but
it was quite obvious to me that none of these reports could possibly
for one moment be treated as evidence in any court of law, and that
they proved nothing’.5 Ranfurly left SOE at the end of June 1941, but
was informed in August that SOE was ‘being cleaned up’.6 Whatever
action was taken at this point failed to make a significant impact on
the security situation; a Mission Security Section was created at some
point prior to September 1942, but this quickly lost the confidence
of the operational Country Sections and ended up doing very little
security work.7
By the time the request for security assistance from London was made,
the Mission was undergoing an extensive reorganisation, which aimed
to ‘assimilate the Cairo organisation to that of SOE in London’.8 In
response, the Security Section obtained a suitable officer from MI5,
Major Godfrey A. Gillson, who underwent an SOE training course and
was attached to the Section in London for a few months. Arriving
in Cairo in March 1943, Gillson soon discovered the enormity of the
task before him. ‘My job here’, he later wrote, ‘has not been so much
re-organization of this department, but the reformation of Security.’9
The lack of attention that had been given to security meant the records
of previous security cases were – at best – incomplete, while the previous
half-hearted attempts to improve security provision meant that Gillson
faced the ‘mistrust’ of the Country Sections; the situation between the
Security Section and the Country Sections had deteriorated to such an
extent that the Country Sections ‘were attempting to carry out their
own security needs’, with security personnel ‘handling the disposal of
bodies and practically nothing else’. As Gillson noted,
For the first week after I arrived I had three incoming telephone
calls and one visitor. There was a complete lack of confidence in the
capabilities of Security Section, and a more or less complete ignorance

of its proper functions.
The enormity of Gillson’s task was eased by the ‘total co-operation

and help’ offered by Brigadier ‘Bolo’ Keble, Chief of Staff to the Head
of Mission, without which Gillson believed his job would have been
‘virtually impossible’. Although he described Keble as a bully, Sweet-
Escott acknowledged that he was also capable of great support: ‘once
he had given a man his confidence, he would back him all the way’.10
Gillson clearly gained this confidence, writing later that his achieve-
ments ‘could not have been accomplished without the ready under-
standing and backing of the COS, whose appreciation of countless points
of security expedited the Augean task set me’.11
While Gillson found internal security to be reasonably satisfactory,
improvements to the recruitment process were required, from pre-
appointment vetting to the arrangement of security talks for newly
appointed personnel. The procedure for recruiting foreign personnel
in particular needed to be improved; the poor relationship with the
Country Sections meant that Security ‘is not even consulted in many
cases, and do not even possess a complete record of the foreign personnel
employed!’ This left the Mission vulnerable to the risk of enemy infiltra-
tion, which could only be remedied by the development of ‘extremely
close liaison’ with the Country Sections. In addition to poor internal
relationships, Gillson quickly discovered that external relationships with
the Middle East branches of MI5 (SIME), SIS (ISLD) and the Defence
Security Officer at GHQ were also in a poor state. Recognising that
the ‘very fullest understanding and co-operation’ with these bodies was
‘essential for our wellbeing’, Gillson held discussions and concluded
that good relations could be fostered ‘providing we “play the game”
with them’.
Gillson also noted that ‘disposal’ was becoming an acute problem, the
existing arrangements in Kenya having reached saturation point. The
‘Kenya Scheme’ had originally been developed in December 1942 as a
solution to ‘the question of the presence of undesirable ex-agents who
were embarrassing Cairo by their continued residence in the Middle
East’.12 Having investigated the alternatives, Cairo recommended ‘the
evacuation of these undesirables to Kenya, where we shall find suit-
able lodging (and supervision) for the evacuees after they arrive. If
possible they will be found employment.’ The proposal found support
in London; Roche thought it was ‘well designed’ for harmless cases,
although he pointed out that it ‘would not of course be suitable for
Security Abroad 53
persons of the really “vicious” class who require internment as opposed

to residence and work in a place where they can do little harm’.13
The work necessary to bring security up to an acceptable standard was
too great for Gillson to achieve alone. He believed that the immediate
provision of two officers and two administrative staff was vital, and
predicted that further increases would prove necessary.14 In a message
to London on 7 May, Gillson increased his requirements to a minimum
of four ‘first class fully trained Security Officers thoroughly familiar with
[the] organisation’ to be sent out by ‘highest air priority’ in order to
cover the security of training schools and outstations. He explained
that such ‘drastic action’ was ‘imperative’ in order to provide adequate
security provision at Cairo. ‘Without such assistance’, Gillson continued,
‘I sincerely state security of organisation will be in thoroughly unsat-
isfactory state and in danger.’15 In response, Gillson was told that the
utmost would be done to help,16 and within days he was cabled the
details of five officers, and asked for his comments on their suitability.17
Gillson gratefully accepted all five men.18
By June, Gillson noted that ‘considerable progress has been made in
various directions’.19 He had managed to win over the Country Sections,
which were now bringing their security problems to his attention. He
also set about mending fences with local security bodies. He wrote to
Lt Col C.D. Roberts, the Defence Security Officer in Syria, admitting
that ‘in the past, there has been a tendency not to co-operate as fully
as we should have done with your people’. He asked Roberts for his
opinion of SOE security in his area, and enquired whether ‘there were
any urgent or vital alterations to be made’, noting that ‘I would be
grateful for any criticisms you may have.’20 A similar letter was sent
to Captain J.J. O’Sullivan at Field Security in Haifa, in which Gillson
expressed his determination ‘to see that the unnecessary troubles you
have had in the past are stopped’.21 Gillson also repaired the Mission’s
relationship with the Defence Security Officer in Egypt and the Pass
& Permit Officer, MEF. He recorded that he was initially ‘treated with
considerable suspicion, almost hostility, by the D.S.O.’, on account of
the fact that the Mission was ‘in the habit of deliberately misinforming
them in regard to applicants’ particulars, thereby causing confusion and
waste of time and effort later, when an individual was inadvertently
picked up by Field Security, and found not to be the person he was
declared to be on the particular pass he carried’. Gillson made moves to
‘cultivate the confidence of the D.S.O. and the Pass & Permit Officer’,
and a detailed procedure was duly introduced to cover the issue of all
passes.22
Gillson also set about improving the disposal situation, which he

described as ‘One of the first apparent and urgent problems to be faced
on my arrival here’. He noted that the Kenya Scheme, while ‘apparently
operating successfully’, failed to address all of the Mission’s disposal
issues, which meant that ‘no arrangement existed to deal with the many
other classifications of disposal necessary for the Security of M.O.4’.
After discussion, Gillson received permission to establish a holding and
interrogation centre. A suitable house was rented at Helwan, which
would operate ‘under the auspices of S.I.M.E’. By September, a further
Cooler was being prepared in Khartoum, with staff supplied by the
Sudan authorities.23 The arrangements were made by Gillson with the
Commissar of Police, and the facility ‘proved useful for mild cases’.24
Along with the Kenya Scheme and the house at Helwan, Gillson felt that
this meant ‘virtually fool-proof’ arrangements were in place ‘to provide
easy disposal for all classifications of bodies’.
Later in June, Gillson expressed his belief that ‘the majority of our
troubles are at an end’, and that August would ‘see satisfactory security
measures applied, accepted and on routine lines’, providing that further
Field Security personnel and conducting officers could be provided.25 In
August, London sent out a complete Field Security Section, consisting
of 1 Field Security Officer and 11 other ranks. In September, Gillson
noted that liaison with outside bodies was now ‘better than any I have
previously encountered during the war. It is really first-class.’26 As the
security position at the Mission continued to improve, Gillson became
increasingly restless. Looking for his next challenge, his thoughts turned
to the security of SOE’s other Missions:
From experience gained here, the Second War Capital, where one
would have expected Security to have had a recognised and assured
position it is reasonable to infer that if, in this most important of our
centres, Security was a Cinderella, the same probably applies to other
Missions.27
Gillson took a particular interest in reviewing security at SOE’s mission

in India. Keble refused to release him immediately, but agreed to review
the situation again later in the year.28
Gillson’s work in Cairo saw the beginning of the global expan-
sion of the Security Section, as knowledge and experience gained
in London was put into practice in other SOE Missions. From
London, contact with the ‘overseas branches’ of security, as they were
later described by the Security History, was maintained by General
Security Abroad 55
Security, while there was ‘generally’ an officer attached to the Military

Security sub-Section for training before taking up a security appoint-
ment overseas.29 Despite the references to security ‘branches’ overseas,
the Security Section never achieved formal control over Mission security.
The kind of ill-feeling such a radical change would likely foster was
indicated when Gillson approached the subject in a paper written in
June 1943:
I am, I believe, the first Security Officer to be sent abroad to another

Mission by S.O.E., and, as such, am in a position to provide London
Security Section with information that previously was denied them,
not through intention or design, but through the ignorance of
the Security Officer here, and, no doubt, elsewhere. As Security
rates extremely high in the efficient development, maintenance and
successful fulfilment of all S.O.E. operations, and is a highly special-
ised duty, it will be impossible to achieve any pattern of Security
throughout the Missions unless the Officers taking up those duties
have a thorough knowledge of London methods, and are capable of
applying London principles to local conditions.30
Gillson had felt a need for global security co-ordination since his arrival
in Cairo. His first progress report to London, written in April, had
concluded with the observation that a greater exchange of personnel
between London and the Missions would be necessary in order to attain
‘something like a “pattern” of Security for all countries’.31 By June, his
opinion had hardened:
At first I thought the achievement of any pattern of Security

throughout all Missions would be impossible, but I am now
convinced that it is not only possible, but essential, that all Missions
should apply London methods to local conditions.
A Security Officer as such, and not possessing the benefit of
knowing London methods, is going to apply Security as he sees it.
Consequently you are going to produce a wide disparity of method,
which is obviously undesirable when a close understanding between
the Mission and London is so desirable.32
Keble strongly disagreed with Gillson’s recommendations, particularly

his suggestion that the London-based Security Section should assume
responsibility ‘for the Security of all Missions’. He scribbled on the side of
the page: ‘I do NOT agree. Head of Mission must be responsible.’ Gillson
also proposed that he should be permitted to return to London to ‘advise

on local conditions and the effect it [sic] has on all requirements’, and
to ‘advise on the type of man required and the training necessary to
enable him to carry out his duties satisfactorily’; Keble dismissed this as
an ‘Unnecessary waste of time’. That Gillson had touched a raw nerve
in advocating outside control over mission security was made clear in
the comments Keble scribbled at the foot of the paper:
This is all very well but D/H 147 [Gillson] is our security officer and
is of more use and necessarily useful to us here than running around
collecting reports for D/CE.
D/CE should have an inspector to do this. D/H 147 has too much to
do to go home now.
Head of Mission NOT D/CE must be responsible for security of his

Mission.33
This sort of defence of the power of the Head of Mission ensured that
the London-based Security Section failed to achieve total control over
SOE security on a global basis as advocated by Gillson.
Adequate security provision was similarly overlooked in the case of
SOE’s North African Mission, Massingham. Security had been considered
during the initial planning stage for the mission in October 1942. Advoc-
ating the creation of a North African Mission in a paper to Hambro,
Gubbins noted that ‘We shall need there a microcosm of what we have
here in London.’34 As such, the proposed draft organisational chart for
the mission included an ‘Intelligence and Security’ branch. However,
this was not considered of sufficient priority to see Peter Lee arrive in
Algiers as the Mission’s Security Officer until May 1943, a few weeks
after his field security staff. As Lee recalls,
They didn’t send us out there until the mission had been established.
They went out there in November–December 42 – my men didn’t get
out there ’til April. So that’s four months with no real security taking
place at all. The paramilitary side of our organisation, the uniform
side, couldn’t see any reason at all why they shouldn’t go driving
around North Africa with ‘SOE’ in reflective paint on their jeeps –
couldn’t see anything wrong with it! So we spent a lot of our time in
the four, five months I was in North Africa trying to instil reasonable
security attitudes in the minds of these very efficient operational
chaps.35
Security Abroad 57
Lee’s experience in having to catch up on security matters in Algiers

resulted in his insistence upon proper security representation for No. 1
Special Force (known as Maryland), an offshoot of Massingham which
was established to work into Italy, ‘so we could at least get the security
side of it off to a good start’.36
Maryland established itself at Monopoli, near Bari. Commanded by
Gerald Holdsworth, it was designed to act as an ‘operational “outsta-
tion” to take prompt advantage of a new jumping-off ground’.37 The
security aspect of the mission represented a departure from the norm,
as Lee noted in a Security Report copied to London:
this is the first time in my experience with the firm when it has been
possible for security to get in at the beginning and start level with
all the other departments and in some small measure help to get
the thing going. It is invigorating to be here with all one’s services
contacted before the work starts in earnest and not be in the usual
position of trying to catch up on six months work.38
Although ‘security work proper’ did not start immediately, Lee noted
that the early arrival of security personnel meant they were ‘fully in the
picture and know the background to our set-up’, and were consequently
‘much more useful as security men than they would be if they arrived
later’. He also pointed out that their very presence ‘encourages other
departments to think and plan along secure lines where in the past this
subject has received scant attention’.
Lee’s early optimism was short-lived, as he came to appreciate the
inadequate number of security officers at his disposal. SOE’s security
arrangements in Italy soon became more complicated. On 8 November,
Lee wrote that ‘The man who was D.CE5 in April 43 has arrived’; a refer-
ence to Arthur Baird, who had arrived in Italy with Advance Force 133,
an offshoot of the Cairo Mission, heading its security representation.39
It did not take long for the idea of ‘pooling’ the security personnel of
both forces to be raised. Lee saw this as the perfect way to overcome the
shortage of security personnel he faced. He noted that ‘some of the best’
Field Security personnel were attached to Baird’s unit, and was particu-
larly irritated to find that they were ‘being used on non-linguist jobs’,
which he considered ‘a tragedy in view of the chronic shortage of FSP
for this theatre’. Lee’s hope for a quick pooling arrangement was overly
optimistic. By the time of his next report, he was still bemoaning his lack
of adequate security staff, which meant that ‘Security work in general
is being skimped willy-nilly’, a situation that was ‘further aggravated
by the time which has to be spent in doing administrative jobs of a

purchasing nature which can only be done by Italian speakers’.40 This
was experienced first hand by Lt Donaldson, a security officer who was
also the first Italian speaker attached to the mission:
During the initial phase of our life here we all had to lend a
hand at doing some job which was not strictly our own. Since then,
however, I have been asked, and even ordered, on many occasions to
do jobs which were absolutely no part of my duties I have bought
countless pairs of stockings and packages of cosmetics for officers to
send home; I have bought table-lamps, typewriters, and office equip-
ment; I have spent a lot of time finding and employing domestic
staff, carpenters, electricians, mechanics, and the like If someone
wishes a request for something to be made to the mayor or the police,
I am sent. If civilians are to be turned out of requisitioned property
elsewhere, I am sent.41
In terms of contact with Baird, Lee noted that ‘We exchange circulars
and generally keep each other informed of this and that’, but there was
no indication that any further progress had been made on the idea of
pooling staff, much to Lee’s concern:
The personnel situation is now really desperate. Those of us who are

here have now had 21/2 to 3 years experience of D/CE work, and this
is our third area of operations. We are in the bitter sweet position
of knowing how much D/CE work is needed wherever the firm goes,
of knowing that practically everything which D/CE does in the U.K.
should be commenced from the start in a new theatre and yet being
virtually powerless to put it into operation through lack of staff.42
The shortage of staff exacerbated the problems Lee faced over the issue
of vetting, on account of the lack of MI5 representation in the area:
the absence of a centralised English Security Service and index in this

theatre makes secure vetting most difficult and involved unneces-
sary waste of time in contacting other indexes – none of which are
complete in themselves.
As such, Lee noted that he was ‘trying to compromise between normally

secure vetting, operational needs, and completely inadequate staff’, and
Security Abroad 59
stressed that his Section ‘cannot possibly accept responsibility for saying
that all recruits taken on by MARYLAND are O.K.’
The security situation had ‘not improved’ by Lee’s next report in
late December.43 To make matters worse, even the most basic security
precautions were being neglected:
Three senior officers were overheard discussing students, an operation

and false identity documents in the ante room of the officers’ mess
in the presence of an Italian servant who understands English It
is curious that after 21/2 years work officers of this organisation still
appear to be ignorant of the elementary requirements of security.
Donaldson considered this ignorance an aspect of the abstract problem

of ‘Passive Indifference’:
This is the attitude of the majority of the officers in MARYLAND to

security as I see it, and as I have learnt to know it in the Organisation.
‘Shop’ continues to be talked in the Mess, symbols continue to be
misused, Security orders are derided, as also are Security personnel.
[Lee] and I have been subject to a not inconsiderable amount of
mockery here by people who seem to have neither the will nor the
ability to appreciate the importance of our side of the work. To them
the war seems to be of such short duration as to cancel the necessity
for the security training of students. To them also a system of passes,
controls, and card-indexes above all, seems a huge joke.44
Lee wrote again on 19 January, noting that security had ‘struggled along’,
helped by the arrival of a number of new security officers (‘a blessing but
it will not be until next month that their numbers will be felt’).45 Some
progress had been made on the subject of pooling security personnel,
although nothing had been finalised.
Improvements to security arrangements in Italy, including action on
the issue of unified security representation, resulted from a visit by
Senter to the Mediterranean in February–March 1944, in response to
‘an invitation from Cairo to send a senior Security officer from England
to report and advise’.46 He arrived at Massingham on 28 February, and
travelled on to Cairo on 5 March. He remained there until 18 March,
travelling to Bari that day. He visited Naples on 20 March, travelling
on to Monopoli 2 days later. On 24 March he returned to Cairo, where
he prepared a report and recommendations for Major General W.A.M.
Stawell, who had taken over SOE Cairo in November 1943 and since
moved forward into Italy, where he headed the newly constituted Special
Operations Mediterranean (SO(M)). Senter acknowledged the ‘impossib-
ility of obtaining a complete view of this highly complex problem in
the time available’, and moved to pre-empt Mission sensibilities by
emphasising that he had ‘not approached the problem with the idea
that London practice is necessarily applicable to Mediterranean prob-
lems’. By this point, however, London’s position when dealing with the
Missions had been strengthened, as Senter was quick to point out:
In the past the arrangement has been that every group or mission
overseas was regarded as self-contained for all services, and commu-
nications on most matters have been indirect and not fully system-
atic. In view of CD’s policy decision of January of this year that all
technical services overseas should be in direct communication with
their opposite number at home, some modification of the past policy
is called for this does not imply any derogation from the prin-
ciple of unified command in the theatre, but rather that the Security
officers should be fully in touch with Security policy and practice
elsewhere, so as to be able more fully to advise the Force Commander
on whose staff they serve.
Senter believed that ‘certain guiding principles’ had become apparent

in London and it was worth examining their application overseas. In
particular, he was keen to encourage the Missions to adopt operational
security procedures analogous to those developed in London and carried
out by Bayswater. He eschewed detailed comment on practical security
arrangements, focusing instead upon the ‘main development’ in London
over the past 18 months: the need to address ‘the problem of penetration
by the enemy’ through proper operational security.
Having outlined the basic premise of operational security as it existed
in London, Senter went on to deal with each Mission in turn. At
Massingham, he noted that ‘the team spirit is conspicuously good which
facilitates cooperation in Security and in other matters’. He noted that
the senior Security Officer, Major J.M. Oughton, was ‘well qualified
for this post, is well liked and enjoys the confidence of the Force
Commander’. Senter was satisfied with the relations with other depart-
ments, and with the state of security records. He suggested that there
‘could usefully be a fuller exchange of information on the Security
and Intelligence side’ between Massingham and London, and urged
the development of ‘the operational security side’, which would mean
putting Oughton ‘rather more fully in the operational picture, to attend
Security Abroad 61
the operations meetings and to see traffic from the field’. He also felt
that, time permitting, it ‘would be advantageous for Major Oughton
to travel to London for, say, a month in order to study headquarters
practice in the Special Section’.
Senter acknowledged the extensive work that had been carried out by
Gillson in raising the standard of security at the Cairo Mission. However,
he pointed out that Gillson had not tackled operational security, an
absence which needed to be addressed. Having held discussions with
the Country Sections, Senter was confident that they would ‘welcome
the extension of Security along operational Security lines’. He noted
that James Klugmann of the Yugoslav Section (with whom Senter had
also met in order to assess his potential security risk to SOE as a
known Communist) ‘welcomed the prospect of developing operational
security’.47 Due to staff shortages, Klugmann noted that study of the
implications of a casualty in the field upon the security of other agents
‘might well require one or two weeks intensive work’; a situation that
could be improved with the provision of adequate operational security.
While Senter believed that the Security Section should ‘be encouraged
to work in more closely on the operational side so as to develop
operational security’, it was clear to him that the section ‘was hardly
in a position to undertake extensive new work’. He urged two new
security appointments ‘without delay’: a general assistant for the section
head, who could stand in for him in his absence, and an interrogating
officer.
Senter’s most extensive recommendations were reserved for Italy.
Here, he had already reached agreement with Stawell for the appoint-
ment of a GSO1 Security. After much deliberation, the post was filled by
Lt Col Hoyer Millar, formerly of 21 Army Group, who, ‘after the usual
attachment and training with S.O.E. in London, went out to the Medi-
terranean to co-ordinate all Security measures there’.48 Senter’s target
was the nature of the security organisation in Italy that Hoyer Millar
would oversee. He emphasised the ridiculousness of a situation that saw
security officers of Maryland and Advance Force 133 working in the
same building but entirely separately, and argued that such artificial
barriers needed to be broken down:
if for no other reason than the shortage of experienced officers, it

is necessary and desirable that our Security arrangements should be
made on an all-Italian basis, and that there should not be a watertight
division as between the Security arrangements of Force 266 (Advance
Force 133) and those of No. 1 Special Force.
Senter recognised that what seemed a blindingly obvious course of

action from a security perspective was frowned upon elsewhere, partic-
ularly by Gerald Holdsworth, Commander of No. 1 Special Force:
Commander Holdsworth’s point of view is quite simple – that he is

the Commander of No. 1 Special Force, that Major Lee appears as a
G.II on his staff, and that he ought to be with No. 1 Special Force
in order to carry out his work under the directions of Commander
Holdsworth.
Senter urged Stawell to dismiss Holdsworth’s objections, and overhaul

the entire SOE security apparatus in Italy, creating one cohesive whole
that would be sub-divided along London lines into two areas of ‘general’
and ‘special’ security responsibility:
I strongly recommend that you should lay it down as your decision

that the Security and Security/Intelligence set-up for Italy should be
on a unified basis so as to make possible the pooling of personnel
both Security officers and FSP and consequent economy in man
power.
Senter recommended that Lee should be charged with the formation

of a Security Intelligence Panel (SIP) to serve both Maryland and the
rest of SOE in Italy, while Baird would be appointed ‘Area Security
Officer for all our Italian interests’, with responsibility for the physical
security of all installations. Based on Bayswater, the Security Intelli-
gence Panel would ‘be mainly concerned with working in closely with
the operational sections of these forces, serving notice of our interests
in the field on the outside Security/Intelligence bodies, and ensuring
an efficient two-way flow of intelligence’. Pointing to existing liaison
arrangements between security and other departments, Senter noted
that the relations Lee had established were ‘admirable’, and claimed that
outside security bodies would ‘welcome’ the creation of the Panel, and
expressed his confidence that Lee ‘would get the best out of collabora-
tion with them’.
On 18 April, Stawell gave his approval for the pooling of security
personnel as suggested by Senter, which he described as a ‘sound and
inevitable’ recommendation.49 With Stawell’s blessing, Lee submitted
proposals for the organisation of the Security Intelligence Panel. On
16 May he wrote to Senter, noting that ‘I am sure you will be glad to
know that at approximately 10.30 hours yesterday morning, [Stawell]
Security Abroad 63
agreed in toto to the S.I. paper which I had submitted to him at his
request.’50 A three-page paper outlined the three main functions of SIP,
which conformed closely to Bayswater in London:
(a) To control enemy penetration of resistance work organised by S.O.E.

(b) To assess the extent of such penetration when it occurs, or the
implications of any arrest.
(c) To obtain information affecting S.O.E. from other sources and
from documents not otherwise available to Country Sections.51
The Panel was formed quickly, and by the end of May its work had
‘progressed tremendously’.52 Discussions were held with representatives
of Section V of SIS (Lee noted that liaison between SIP and Section V
was ‘friendly and close’) to ensure that the Panel’s records were main-
tained in a fashion which would allow for easy handover ‘when the
time comes’.
Before long, with Senter back in London, the new security arrange-
ments in Italy ran into trouble as the original issues of turf warfare, offset
by Senter, resurfaced, masked by organisational and procedural issues
over a proper establishment for the Panel. Despite having the support of
General Stawell, the Panel had never been placed ‘on a very satisfactory
footing’:
As a result of [Senter’s] visit the General issued a letter on 18 April

stating that it was intended to set up the Panel and that proposals
would be submitted by [Lee] which would be discussed at a later
meeting of those interested. This meeting was never held but [Lee]
outlined his proposals to the General and, I understand, obtained his
approval.
An investigation into ‘the deficiencies of No. 1 Special Force in compar-

ison with their commitments’ reported that Lee, ‘with a staff and
transport of which part, if not all, comes off No. 1 Special Force Estab-
lishment’, was working in Rome ‘on matters which do not specific-
ally concern No. 1 Special Force’.53 An explanation of the work being
carried out by Lee, and why it was based in Rome, was demanded.
In response, Hoyer Millar pointed to Stawell’s ruling on the pooling
of security personnel, which saw their disposition ‘irrespective of the
establishment on which they may be held’, strategically located ‘to
the best advantage having regard to the nature of the work and the
resources available’. In that context he pointed to the current import-

ance of Rome:
i. This is where the raw material, i.e. recruits, returned agents, etc. is
available.
ii. It is necessary to carry out day to day checks against the records
of other organisations, i.e. S.C.I., P.W.B., etc. which are installed, at
present, in Rome. The move of the Panel was in fact co-ordinated
with that of these other organisations.54
Hoyer Millar updated Roche on the deteriorating situation after

spending a week with Lee in Rome. He noted that ‘everything is far from
plain sailing’ due to the continued conflict between Lee and Holdsworth
over the work of SIP:
the relations between [Holdsworth] and [Lee] are by no means as

happy as one could wish them to be [Holdsworth] undoubtedly
regards [Lee] as his Security Officer in the most literal sense of the
word and resents his having divorced himself, physically at least,
from Maryland, and possibly this situation has not been handled as
tactfully as it might have been.
Hoyer Millar tried to persuade Holdsworth that, rather than having lost
a security officer, he had gained access to a larger security staff, but met
with only partial success (‘while this is accepted it is, I’m afraid, not with
great enthusiasm’).55 Holdsworth’s belief that the Panel was of little or
no relevance was based upon the para-military nature of the activities
now being conducted, which in his view rendered it ‘only of academic
or post-war interest’.
Holdsworth was not alone in this analysis: as Hoyer Millar observed,
there was a ‘considerable volume of opinion’ at SO(M) that considered
the work of SIP to be ‘purely academic and of little value to the
Country Sections or is work which is really the responsibility of some
other organisation’. Entering the dispute on 30 July, J.G. Beevor echoed
Holdsworth’s point, arguing that ‘The speed at which events in Italy
are moving and the development of open Partisan guerrilla activities
have gone far to remove Italy from our category of a purely clandes-
tine country where a more highly developed security organisation is the
first necessity.’56 Beevor believed that the ‘immediate priority needs of
SOM and its units is to meet urgent operational commitments in the
next three months which may well be the climax of the war’, and felt
Security Abroad 65
that resources should be allocated accordingly. Hoyer Millar, however,

maintained that the Panel was carrying out useful work, and pointed to
the ‘valuable information’ it had collected in Rome. He argued that there
was ‘no doubt that the Country Sections are receiving useful information
through the efforts of the Interrogation Section’.57
Hoyer Millar forwarded Senter copies of the correspondence dealing
with the panel, noting that ‘we are not on too good a wicket’, and
that the future of the Panel remained ‘under discussion’.58 The actions of
the Security Section in London during the following weeks illustrated the
kind of informal influence it was able to exert over security affairs tech-
nically beyond its remit. Senter fired off a number of lengthy letters to
Hoyer Millar, outlining the arguments he needed to put forward to keep
SIP alive, and bolstering his flagging resolve to fight for its survival.
Although Senter was aware that Holdsworth held ‘strong views on
the subject of the identity of his command’, he was surprised by the
development. Having discussed the matter with him during his recent
visit, Senter ‘thought he agreed with me that efficiency required the
pooling of Security and Security/Intelligence resources in Italy’.59
Senter proceeded to outline the approach Hoyer Millar should take to
the ‘short term’ operational arguments he faced:
I know from considerable experience over the last three years that
operational sections of an organisation such as ours do not always
instantaneously perceive the need for advanced Security arrange-
ments, and it has been an up-hill job in some places advising opera-
tional sections of the need for creating, for example, adequate records
if our operations are to be attended with due Security and if we are
to conduct a profitable two-way liaison with other Security author-
ities I believe that some operational sections tend to underrate
the work that is required and the staff that is required to conduct
profitable liaison with other Departments.
Senter noted that he had been keen to emphasise the importance of

‘Security Intelligence’ during his visit, pointing to recent developments
in France as a comparison:
even in France, which has also developed along strongly para-military

lines, the essential sub-stratum of clandestine work remains and
that creates special security problems and under-lines the need for
the closest possible working arrangements with other secret organ-
isations. These arrangements cannot be made unless the S.O.E.
Security/Intelligence side is equipped with rained personnel with

adequate records and with adequate communications.
Senter also moved to prevent Hoyer Millar, who appeared willing to

concede that much of the work carried out by the Panel was largely
irrelevant to SOE, from wavering:
I do not think it is a fair criticism to say that some of the work

may merely be of post-war value, since S.O.E. as a secret organisation
with its own Minister in the Cabinet, has a responsibility in connec-
tion with post-Armistice conditions, which cannot be disregarded.
Whether the various S.O. types of work will be done by this or by
other organisations in post-Armistice conditions is another matter,
but it is not disputed in connection with C.I. plans for post-Armistice
conditions that we shall be called upon to help in various ways, both
as regards furnishing certain experienced personnel and in furnishing
information.
As an organisation improvised in war-time conditions, we have
had occasion to learn the disadvantages of not having the kind
of established records created by older and more permanent
organisations.
He closed by noting his support for Hoyer Millar in his struggle: ‘if there
is anything at all that we can do to reinforce your efforts, I hope you
know that calls from you have a high priority’. Senter provided further
reinforcement later in August, by which point he had received copies of
further correspondence between Hoyer Millar and Beevor on the work of
the Panel. He encouraged Hoyer Millar to discuss the points he had made
with Beevor, to the extent of suggesting that Hoyer Millar should show
him their correspondence on the subject. While he hoped Beevor would
‘realise that I do not underrate his difficulties on the priority side’, Senter
maintained his belief that Security Intelligence was a necessity, not a
luxury, for work in the field, emphasising that it was ‘a contribution
to operational security’.60 The Panel was not abolished; Senter wrote
again on 5 September, by which point he was ‘delighted’ to hear of the
progress Hoyer Millar had made in securing an establishment – and with
it a future – for the Panel, noting ‘I am sure that as the campaigning
phase approaches, you will find, as we have found in France, that the
C.I. side is fully employed.’61
Maintaining the connection between London and the Mediterranean,
Roche visited Italy later in the year, and expressed ‘great satisfaction’
Security Abroad 67
with the security arrangements in place. Hoyer Millar notified both Lee
and Baird of Roche’s approval, adding his own thanks for the ‘very
great deal which you have done towards the present satisfactory state
of affairs’.62 By December, Lee reported that SIP’s ‘information, records
and methods of interrogation’ concerning operations in Italy were ‘as
nearly complete as is possible’:
There is no longer the almost desperate scramble for odd bits and
pieces of information which characterised the previous months.
Instead, when a ‘returned Joe’ appears, we know almost immediately
what to ask him and in most cases we have a shrewd idea as to
whether or not the subsequent interrogation is likely to be difficult.63
The position of security in Italy did not, however, remain stable for
very long. In late November, Lee permitted an Inspector of Army Equip-
ment to enter an SO(M) establishment, where he found ‘many breaches
of existing regulations’.64 Hoyer Millar wrote to Lee on 21 December,
berating him for his attitude towards regulations and administrative
affairs:
Admittedly in this organisation we can allow ourselves a certain

amount of latitude in these matters but you have unfortunately
allowed yourself to be manoeuvred into revealing a more or less
complete disregard of administrative regulations with the result that
you are temporarily administratively on the spot and will have to
watch your step.65
The incident, little more than an irritant in itself, was the final straw for
Hoyer Millar, who wrote to Senter on 16 January, having ‘very reluct-
antly decided that the time has come when we must, I’m afraid, replace
Peter Lee’.66 Hoyer Millar revealed that he had felt this to be neces-
sary for some time, having concluded that Lee ‘seems temperamentally
unsuited to ensure smooth running either with his own staff or with
Maryland’. While Hoyer Millar readily admitted that Lee ‘did a first-class
job in bringing the S.I.P. into the world and in running it under difficult
conditions’, he pointed out that he was ‘also responsible for it being a
little beloved and rather unhappy child’. Although relations with Mary-
land were ‘infinitely more cordial now than they have ever been and
the service which the S.I.P. can provide is at last being appreciated’, Lee
was ‘still not “persona grata” with Maryland (nor Maryland with him)’,
and the improvement in relations was due to the care exercised by Lee’s
staff in their dealings with Maryland. Hoyer Millar’s concern for the SIP
staff was revealed as he continued:
Peter seems to be quite incapable of maintaining a happy atmo-

sphere. His staff now is quite first class, doing a good job really well
and capable of even more The whole thing should be running
like clockwork but on practically every visit I find the atmosphere
disturbed and some section of the staff upset for reasons which I’m
afraid usually emanate from the head.
As Hoyer Millar put the point more bluntly in a letter to Roche, ‘he is
clearly, from the point of view of his own staff, unnecessarily difficult
to work for and I assess the staff at a higher value than Peter himself’.67
Aside from such issues of personality, much of the problem stemmed
from Lee’s interest in post-war intelligence issues:
Peter is, as you know, firmly imbued with long-term views of a

post-war aspect for which he is inclined to use the S.I.P. as an
omnibus I have spoken to Peter time and time again on this point
and I’m sure he does his best to conform but it is practically a disease
which he cannot control.68
In view of his ‘definite post-war ambitions in the intelligence field’,

Hoyer Millar hoped that it would prove possible to find ‘some opening’
for him with SIS. The issue was not easily resolved, and Lee continued
to run the Panel during 1945.69
Unlike Peter Lee’s initially positive experience with Maryland, the
Security Section of SOE’s Mission in India (Force 136) had to contend
with ‘late arrival in the field’. The Mission, founded in 1941, was without
a Security Section until February 1944. This ‘imposed certain limitations’
on the Section when it was finally constituted, as the ‘lack of records and
experience of the Mission’s early activities’ proved a ‘serious obstacle’.70
While the section was able to play a significant role in security matters,
it ‘never played as full a part as it might have done in matters of oper-
ational security’, concentrating instead on what was described as the
‘administrative side’ of security.
The creation of a Security Section of the India Mission was first
considered in the summer of 1943. At this point, the Finance and
Administration Section dealt with ‘the issue and enforcement of security
instructions’, while the Country Sections dealt with their own opera-
tional security needs as required. As the Mission continued to expand,
Security Abroad 69
the arrangement became increasingly unsatisfactory, and ‘a recommend-

ation was sent to London that a qualified officer should be sent out
to review the whole security position and, if possible, remain with
the Mission as Chief Security Officer’. The matter hung in abeyance
until February 1944, at which point Godfrey Gillson, who had long
expressed an interest in the security of the India Mission from Cairo,
was sent out from the Middle East to assess the situation. The position of
Chief Security Officer, however, was earmarked for Lt Col J.R.E. Guild.
While Gillson assessed the situation, Guild – who had been attached
to MI5 since 1939 – underwent an SOE training course and a period
working with the Security Section. Gillson prepared two assessments
of the security situation in India. While some of the deficiencies were
reminiscent of those he had found in Cairo, he experienced an atmo-
sphere that was markedly different:
It is quite apparent at H.Q. that there is a real awareness of the need of

security and an atmosphere of appreciation and co-operation vastly
different to what I found in the Middle East the job of the Security
Section here will mainly be to canalize – build up necessary records
and take over existing machinery and, provided efficient officers can
be found reasonably quickly, I feel that the Security Section should
be working on smooth routine lines in about six months.71
Gillson was killed in an aeroplane accident shortly before his return to

the UK. Guild arrived to take up the position of Chief Security Officer in
March. He began by touring the Mission’s establishments in India and
Ceylon, building on the work carried out by Gillson. He concluded that
‘internal security was on the whole good’ and the staff were ‘security
minded’, but security had ‘suffered from a lack of co-ordination and
planning and in consequence was inclined to be patchy’.72 By June,
Guild had made considerable progress in tightening existing security
procedure, ‘setting up machinery to deal with specific problems which
had hitherto been the responsibility of no one in particular and were in
consequence tending to get out of hand’.
Guild felt that it would be necessary to divert from the London security
model in India, that ‘initiative and imagination’ would ‘yield better
results than attempts to adapt European methods to the Asiatic field’:
Some of the major problems, such as the security of Asiatic opera-

tional personnel, especially Chinese, are very complex and present
difficulties unknown in other S.O.E. fields. While the basic principles
developed in the European theatre can be adhered to, entirely new

methods will have to be devised to deal with certain security prob-
lems inherent to S.O.E. operations in Asia.73
The ‘complex’ security problems specific to the region were predicated,

for the most part, upon a lack of cultural awareness and poor language
skills, and constituted little more than a manifestation of racism. For
example, it was thought necessary for agents to be fingerprinted prior to
their departure to the field; a security precaution against possible ‘substi-
tution of agents by the enemy’. Unsurprisingly, this caused considerable
resentment amongst Chinese agents. Similar thinking guided security
when dealing with ‘Asiatic servants’:
Their numbers and homogeneity render the infiltration of the enemy

agent comparatively easy, and while the average coolie probably lacks
the intelligence to appreciate the significance of all he sees, there are
few Indian or Ceylonese servants who would be deterred either by
considerations of security or loyalty from passing on information,
particularly if it benefited their pockets or their vanity to do so.
A lack of language skills meant that the role of Field Security officers
accompanying agents on training courses was far more limited than
elsewhere, as it was realised that ‘information obtained in other theatres
by security personnel in the course of accompanying duty could only
be gathered from the Country Section officers who alone were qualified
to express an opinion’.74
One very real, as opposed to cultural, difference for security work in
India resulted from the ‘geographical disposition’ of the Mission. In the
official history SOE in the Far East, Charles Cruickshank highlighted the
logistics of work in India, where it ‘took a day and a half by air from Delhi
to Colombo, and five days by train. Delhi to Calcutta took six hours by
air, and thirty by train. It was a day’s flight from Calcutta to Kunming
over “the thump” – the Himalayas – weather and the Japanese air force
permitting’.75 The distances separating the Mission’s main centres led
to ‘the decentralisation of security control, in order to assure prompt
action where necessary’, along with an unprecedented reliance upon
telephones to discuss secret matters. The Mission was divided into five
security areas: Headquarters (Meerut), Calcutta, Ceylon, Poona–Bombay
and Madras. A Security Officer was stationed at the ‘principal H.Q.’ of
each area, responsible to both Guild and the local Area Commander.76
Security Abroad 71
The Security Section also found itself responsible for the surveil-
lance of Chinese recruits during their stay in India, a task that was
unheard of in London, where it was a point of policy ‘to abstain from
Security measures of a “snooping” character and to rely upon close
relations between the Security department of the organization and the
appropriate outside Security authorities to bring to notice any personal
Security cases’.77 The situation in India was quite different. A ‘large
percentage’ of the agents employed by the Mission were Chinese –
three out of every four agents in training in the spring of 1944 were
Chinese – which was of some concern to the Government of India as
‘it was considered highly probable that the Chinese agents supplied to
the Mission were expected to report back to China matters of interest
to their own Government’.78 The Mission initiated negotiations with
the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which resulted in the creation of a Chinese
Intelligence Section (CIS). Working under cover of the Calcutta Police,
CIS had ‘the two-fold object of maintaining a watch on the activities
and contacts of the Mission’s Chinese agents and keeping the police
supplied with information about Chinese intelligence and other activ-
ities in Calcutta’. Established in March 1945, CIS was headed by Lt Col
K.M. Bourne, CBE, MC. Close liaison was maintained with the Security
Section, ‘under appropriate cover arrangements’, which supplied ‘all the
necessary information about the Mission’s Chinese employees’. By the
autumn of 1945, when CIS was ‘beginning to show a return’, the end
of the war ‘resulted in the decision that S.O.E. should withdraw from
participation in the scheme’.79
In other respects, the difficulties facing Guild were familiar to those in
other theatres. As Lee discovered in Italy, a serious problem was posed
by the lack of an organisation ‘corresponding to M.I.5 in the United
Kingdom or S.I.M.E. in the Middle East, through whom we can carry
out almost all our enquiries’. The most appropriate alternative was the
IB of the Central Government, a police security intelligence department
which worked ‘under the auspices of the Viceroy and the Home Depart-
ment of the Government of India’.80 The Director of the Bureau, Sir
Denys Pilditch, proved to be ‘most helpful and well-disposed towards
this organisation’.81 While it was admitted that the vetting procedure
established was ‘by no means as thorough’ as that carried out in the UK
in consultation with MI5, liaison with IB, in conjunction with access to
local police force records, proved satisfactory: ‘the number of rejects on
security grounds proved the value of the innovation’.
Another familiar problem concerned the need for suitable arrange-
ments for the detention of unreliable agents, divided into the usual
two categories of those ‘who turned sour or definitely hostile during

training’, and those ‘who refused to go on operations at the last minute
through cold feet or for some other reason’. While both groups were
thought to represent a ‘considerable security danger’, it was recognised
that differing levels of risk were involved. Due to its late formation,
the Security Section inherited a situation where an approach to the
Indian Government had been made on the subject of detention, but no
‘conclusive results’ had been forthcoming. Pending a decision, arrange-
ments had been made to detain serious cases at Camp B of the para-
military Eastern Warfare School at Kharakvasla, near Poona, while less
serious cases were dealt with under the ‘Madras Scheme’, whereby they
were ‘lodged in remote parts of the Madras Presidency on the estates of
European planters who undertook to assist the Mission in this way’. By
the time the Security Section took control in June 1944, 18 agents were
being detained; 10 were held at Camp B while 8 were ‘in the care of
the Madras planters’. The Security Section immediately set about legal-
ising the holding arrangements, consulting with the Home and War
Departments of the Indian Government. Requests for official sanction
for detention were reserved for serious cases at Camp B; it was felt that
the ‘Madras Scheme’ could continue without legal sanction, ‘provided
that the period of segregation on the planters’ estates did not exceed
six months’. Closer inspection revealed that only one man was held
at Camp B under a Detention Order (‘an Anglo-Indian employee of
O.S.S.’), while there was ‘insufficient evidence’ in the cases of the other
nine to apply for such an order, and arrangements for their release
were made. No further ‘serious’ cases for detention arose, but consider-
able use continued to be made of the ‘Madras Scheme’, which was also
offered to both the Inter-Service Liaison Department (ISLD, i.e. SIS) and
the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), at a charge of Rs. 6 per
man per day, which was accepted by both organisations. A total of 71
agents, mostly Chinese, were held under the scheme, which included 8
on behalf of OSS and 6 for ISLD.
A further well-known problem that surfaced in India concerned the
provision of sufficient security personnel. This proved particularly prob-
lematic early on, as ‘the establishment of the Security set-up in India
coincided with the peak demand for Security Officers both for the Medi-
terranean and the projected invasion of the Continent’.82 In order to
help alleviate the situation, ‘seven NCOs were obtained from the British
Base Reinforcement Camp, Deolali’, following a brief attachment to
the Field Security Section at G.H.Q. (I). The employment of inexperi-
enced NCOs was done ‘with some misgivings’, but owing to the fact
Security Abroad 73
that their duties were routine and did not involve ‘the more intricate
tasks’ of accompanying and surveillance carried out by Field Security
in the UK, the appointments proved successful.83 Operational activity
in the Far East increased during the winter of 1944–45, which ‘taxed
the section’s resources to the utmost’. Reinforcements, including four
Field Security Officers, arrived from December onwards, which helped
to narrow ‘the gap between the Section’s responsibilities and its ability
to fulfil them’.
4
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation
The relationship between SOE and MI5 got off to a rather inauspicious
start. Senter later recalled that ‘in MI5, as in other departments, some
who afterwards became friends of S.O.E. apparently began by regarding
it as an unorthodox and somewhat irresponsible newcomer’. He went on
to single out O.A. (‘Jasper’) Harker, Deputy Director General of MI5, and
T.A. (‘Tar’) Robertson, head of B1(a), the Section that dealt with double
cross agents, as two early supporters of SOE.1 Boyle concurred with
Senter’s comments, observing that ‘Until S.O.E. became accepted by
the always (and rightly) suspicious permanent Security officials, troubles
were frequent.’2 One of the most significant hurdles the relationship
between SOE and MI5 faced in the early days was the lack of adequate
liaison machinery, which led to some rather roundabout efforts to make
contact. In November 1940, an unnamed member of SOE contacted
the Deputy Chief of SIS, Valentine Vivian, asking for assistance in a
matter that clearly came under the auspices of MI5. A somewhat puzzled
Vivian telephoned Calthrop, who explained that SOE had no direct
liaison with MI5. As such, Calthrop went on to note that he would be
immensely grateful if Vivian would contact MI5 and obtain the required
information on SOE’s behalf. Vivian agreed to help, albeit reluctantly –
concerned that the incident had the potential to establish an undesirable
precedent (‘S.O.(2) is no longer a part of our organisation and we are
not responsible for its administrative work’).3
The fledgling SOE was keen to learn from MI5, particularly about
its experiences of German agents and saboteurs despatched to the
UK. Anthony Blunt, who had joined MI5 in June 1940, assisted
Whetmore in his efforts to gain such information, introducing him
to Lord Rothschild, an anti-sabotage specialist employed in B Division.
It is likely that Rothschild was able to provide Whetmore with such
details of the kind of specialised equipment used by German saboteurs
74
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 75
as MI5 possessed (although at this point such equipment was considered

‘rather elementary’).4 Whetmore went on to ask Blunt whether he would
be prepared, ‘from time to time’, to pass on to SOE any information
that came into MI5’s possession regarding German sabotage methods,
explaining that trainees ‘might benefit considerably by learning from
the mistakes of the enemy when he comes over here as an agent or a
parachutist and falls into your hands’.5 Blunt passed this request to Dick
White, Assistant Director of B Division, who explained to Whetmore
that SIS would be in a better position to provide detailed informa-
tion, as the organisation was one step ahead of SOE, having already
studied MI5’s information and drawn ‘certain conclusions about how
not to send agents into enemy territory from the methods employed
by the Germans thus revealed’.6 Adding his own opinions, based upon
his knowledge of the Abwehr agents sent to the UK as part of Opera-
tion Lena, White pointed to ignorance of British Aliens Regulations as
the Germans’ biggest failure, while their forgeries of papers had been
‘clumsy’.7 A further point which struck White ‘forcibly as an error in
German technique’ was the ‘almost complete standardisation of the
equipment’ given to agents, along with one further important oversight:
Such has been the hasty manner of their training and dispatch that
one rather important matter has usually been overlooked – i.e. they
have not been taught how to descend by parachute, with the result
that several have sustained injuries which have prevented them from
immediately making their escape.8
The advice of MI5 continued to be sought later in the year. In

December, Senter forwarded White the ‘particulars of a proposed
scheme’, and asked for his comments and observations. The scheme
concerned Gestapo search procedures for clandestine transmitters, and
how SOE could thwart them. Suggestions that had been put forward
included the issuing of duplicate transmitters (‘cheap, second-hand
receivers’), with the rationale that ‘from a psychological point of view
the Gestapo having removed one receiver, will not be likely to look
under the floor boards for a second one’, and the hiding of money or
documents under the floor boards ‘in the hope that if the Gestapo start
tearing up the floor boards they may feel satisfied, having found some-
thing, and relinquish their search’. Senter also noted that efforts were
also being made to place wireless operators ‘in large blocks of flats where
the Gestapo may tire of tearing up floor boards before they reach the
point where the hidden treasure lies’.9 In response, White noted that
while such precautionary measures were ‘sound’ in terms of beating a

general search, he warned that ‘If there are grounds for suspicion against
a man justifying a search, I doubt if the Gestapo would be put off quite
so easily.’10
MI5, then, was willing to assist its new sister organisation. However,
its goodwill was strained by the lack of a clearly organised liaison struc-
ture. Formal liaison arrangements between the two organisations were
finally agreed by Harker and Lakin in August 1941. Lakin was later
credited with being largely responsible for improving SOE’s relationship
with MI5 by Senter, who recalled Lakin’s efforts to ensure that SOE’s
approaches to MI5 were channelled through the Security Directorate at
the ‘appropriate level’, a move which ‘did much to create confidence
within M.I.5. in the young S.O.2. organization and to put an end to
haphazard and non-functional personal contacts which had led to some
friction and confused responsibility’.11 As Lakin’s successor as head of
Security, Senter continued to strengthen ties with MI5, aiming to go ‘as
high as possible on the working level and then to be as forthcoming as
possible’; an approach which, he felt, ‘avoided unnecessary, confusing,
and irritating mystery’ and made for ‘interested cooperation’.
As much as Lakin and Senter may have favoured improving the liaison
process, the actual impetus for change came not from the Security
Section but from the top of the Security Service. In July, Director General
Sir David Petrie wrote to SOE’s Chief, Sir Frank Nelson, requesting a
meeting to discuss the regularisation of liaison between their respective
organisations, proposing that a ‘single experienced and responsible
officer should conduct liaison relations between our two departments’.12
Discussion of the matter was shelved 2 days before the meeting was
due to be held, when Petrie wrote to Nelson and changed the agenda
to discuss, instead, the question of overlap in work between the two
organisations. At the meeting, MI5 revealed that it had given some
considerable thought not only to ways in which it could be of assist-
ance to SOE, but also to how SOE could reciprocate. It was noted that
MI5 would be ‘glad to carry out special inquiries’ into agents who were
recruited for ‘especially important jobs’, providing that the number of
such requests remained ‘within reasonable limits’.13 MI5 also suggested
that it could be of assistance to SOE in its search for recruits. In return,
MI5 asked to be kept informed of SOE activity, particularly training exer-
cises that saw recruits sent to infiltrate low-security targets. MI5 wanted
prior knowledge of the dates upon which such exercises were planned
to take place, in order to ‘take the necessary steps to ensure that no
difficulties arise with the local police authorities’. The ‘desirability of the
S.O.2. Security Officers attached to the various training establishments

in the country being in direct contact with M.I.5’s Regional Officer
in that area’ was also raised, along with a desire for a more thorough
vetting process, whereby incoming foreigners of interest to SOE could
be ‘cleared by M.I.5 on landing before they are recruited’.
MI5 was also keen to develop a greater mutual exchange of intelli-
gence with SOE, and expressed its interest in ‘any information which
S.O.2. might receive from time to time from abroad, regarding develop-
ments in connection with organisations over whose activities in England
M.I.5. maintained a close supervision’. As a quid pro quo, MI5 suggested
that it ‘might be able to supply S.O.2. with useful intelligence regarding
conditions in countries abroad in which S.O.2. were operating’ obtained
‘from new arrivals in this country’. While there is no indication as to
how SOE responded to this mutually beneficial proposition, MI5 pushed
too far when it expressed an interest in being told ‘of any S.O.2. agent
abroad who is suspected of having come under enemy control’. Perhaps
reluctant to do anything with the potential to throw its somewhat
precarious relationship with SIS off balance, the SOE representatives
‘pointed out that in such cases S.O.2. would normally keep “C” fully
advised, and the latter would automatically make the information avail-
able to M.I.5’.
The liaison question was the main focus of a further meeting, between
Lakin and Harker, held on 6 August. At this point, a regular liaison
procedure between SOE and MI5 was finally laid down, and the Security
Section became SOE’s ‘gatekeeper’, the only conduit through which the
organisation could contact MI5. SOE would be represented by Lakin
and Whetmore ‘in matters of policy and principle and in enquiries of
special importance’, while Senter was given the key responsibility for
‘day to day liaison’, becoming the main conduit for SOE to contact MI5,
receiving requests for meetings with MI5 officers from Country Section
officers which would be passed on. Where matters had an intelligence
aspect, it was agreed that Boyle would take responsibility for contacting
the ‘appropriate member’ of MI5, a vague reference that was expected
in practice to mean Guy Liddell, Director of B Division. From the MI5
point of view, it was felt that the procedure that had evolved, whereby
Lt Col Hinchley-Cooke (or Major Langdon acting on his behalf) took
responsibility for passing SOE requests to the appropriate MI5 division
for action, should continue.14
The arrangements were almost immediately subject to revision. On
10 September, Rothschild wrote to Petrie and Harker, expressing concern
that his personal contact with Major Langdon and Squadron Leader Pyle
of SOE, with whom he discussed work of a ‘specialist nature’, would

be upset, and sought assurance that it could continue.15 As far as the
MI5 Secretariat was concerned, the overriding concern – the fragmented
nature of SOE liaison – had been dealt with: ‘we have achieved our
main object, i.e. there are only three officers in S.O.2. whom the office
generally will recognise or deal with’.16 As such, MI5 was willing to bend
the rules and allow Rothschild’s contact to ‘remain as a special arrange-
ment’. Meanwhile, an MI5 minute pointed out that there was little need
for the involvement of either Hinchley-Cooke or Langdon, and that
Senter should simply contact the head of the appropriate Division or
Section.
Harker notified Lakin of the wish to ‘drop the rather artificial liaison
with Colonel Hinchley Cooke or Major Langdon and leave it to Senter
to get in touch with the head of the Division or Section concerned’.17
While MI5 was eager to see the end of the multiplicity of its contacts
with SOE, it was quite happy for its own end of the liaison process to
become somewhat vague. Lakin questioned the proposal:
we feel that there is something to be said for putting Langdon in a

position comparable to that of Senter here there are certain ques-
tions of interest to us which may involve more than one Division
or Section in M.I.5. In such cases it would be of value to have a
co-ordinator.18
The MI5 refused to reconsider. Harker argued that it ‘would not be prac-
tical’ to place Langdon in a position comparable to Senter. However, he
did concede that in ‘doubtful cases’, in which the appropriate Divisional
contact was unclear, Langdon ‘would be available for consultation about
the best method of procedure’.19
Further amendments to the liaison procedure – to which Lakin noted
that SOE attached ‘the greatest importance’ – were made in January
1942, on account of Whetmore’s departure and Senter’s promotion.
While Lakin wanted as much to remain unchanged as possible, he was
‘anxious that some delegation of [Senter’s] functions on specific matters
should be immediately agreed’.20 As such, he proposed that while MI5
should still refer to Senter on day-to-day matters, heads of Divisions
and Sections should be warned that ‘these matters may be dealt with
on his behalf by officers responsible to him’, nominating Dick Warden,
Arthur Baird and Hugh Park for this work. MI5 raised no objections to
the development.
While MI5 wanted its liaison with SOE regularised to involve dealing
with a limited number of people, it had little appetite to see all of its
dealings with SOE automatically canalised through the Security Section,
believing that it could benefit from direct contact with other parts of
the organisation. On 6 August 1941, the day on which the Security
Section became recognised as the only conduit through which MI5
would receive requests from SOE, Liddell recorded in his diary:
I lunched with Lakin who seems anxious to canalise the relations

between ourselves and S.O.2. through himself. This certainly has
advantages as it should ensure that we are not flooded with ex-Sinn
Feiners and other undesirables. On the other hand I think direct
contact in some places may be more profitable.21
One such ‘profitable’ area concerned SOE’s Training Section. It is ironic

that perhaps the most significant defining moment in terms of SOE
coming of age in the eyes of MI5 was the result of an unofficial meeting,
arranged by the Security Section, that completely ignored the established
liaison straightjacket. Discussion began in December 1941 over the ques-
tion of MI5 officers attending SOE training courses, as Tar Robertson
was keen to ‘obtain first hand some knowledge about how an agent
was trained in this country for work which he was subsequently to do
abroad’.22 He discussed the matter with Harker, who approached Boyle
(‘who was apparently sympathetic’), and it was agreed that Robertson
should discuss the matter with Senter. Robertson took Senter to lunch at
his club on 17 December, later recording that he proved ‘most helpful’
and ‘extremely anxious to help in every way possible’. One of the sugges-
tions Senter put forward, subject to Boyle’s approval, was to introduce
Robertson to J.W. Munn, the Commandant of SOE’s training school at
Beaulieu. Senter described Munn as ‘an extremely discreet person’, to
whom Robertson should ‘tell the whole story from my point of view. He
will be the best person to give advice as to the best method to get one
of our officers trained in the “S.O.2 school for agents.” ’23 Senter also
loaned Robertson a copy of SOE’s training syllabus, which he passed
to J.C. Masterman for his comments. Masterman was impressed, noting
that it was ‘so carefully done and so full that it is difficult to make many
useful suggestions or criticisms’.24
Senter introduced Robertson to Munn at his London flat on
21 December. Having arranged the introduction, Senter continued to
impress upon Robertson ‘most forcibly’ that the meeting was considered
a ‘concession’ made ‘purely as a matter of goodwill’, and that ‘the circle
of people who know about this arrangement must be kept extremely

small within both Departments’.25 According to Robertson, Munn ‘was
most helpful and in fact arranged that an officer should be allowed
to attend the next course which begins in the first week of February’.
Robertson proceeded to discuss the meeting with White, Marriot and
Masterman. They agreed that a member of B1(a) should attend the
training course.
Robertson returned the training syllabus to Senter on 21 January,
expressing his admiration for the comprehensive document:
I am very much of the opinion that it is the sort of document which

should have been drawn up by us some considerable time ago for
the instruction of officers doing counter-espionage work. If I had my
way, I should circulate this document through-out the office to all
members who are engaged on active counter espionage work. With
the exception of certain lectures, it could be described as the Bible of
counter-espionage work.26
He concluded the note by stating,
The more I see this type of work the more certain am I that the closest
co-operation should exist between our various departments in order
that we may derive the fullest benefit from each others experiences.
In response, Senter noted that both Boyle and Lakin were ‘in
wholehearted agreement with your conclusion in favour of close
co-operation’.27 Robertson ended up attending the course at Beaulieu
himself. As with the syllabus, the course made a considerable impact
on him, and upon his return to the office he encouraged Petrie, Harker,
Liddell and Brigadier Allen, the Director of C and D Division, to read
his paper on the subject.28 He recorded that he had come away feeling
‘deeply impressed not only with the substance of the lectures but
with the immensely efficient way in which they were delivered by the
instructors’. Discussions with the Chief Instructor at Beaulieu, S.H.C.
Woolrych, and his staff left Robertson ‘with the feeling that I had learnt
a great deal more about counter-espionage method than I have learnt
during the time I have been in M.I.5. I was, in fact, quite unable to add
anything to their store of knowledge.’29 Robertson proposed that further
interchanges of personnel should take place (‘certain chosen people
from M.I.5 engaged on counter-espionage work would I know benefit
greatly by attending a course of instruction as I did’). Additionally, he
believed that it ‘might be very useful for certain members of the Special
Training School to come up to M.I.5 for a short time in order to get first
hand knowledge of the activities of this organisation’. Robertson went
on to outline a number of ways in which MI5 could foster further links
by providing greater assistance to SOE’s training schools. Referring to
the ‘96 Hour Exercises’ for agents, he wrote ‘I am sure that M.I.5. can
help very considerably in making these possibly more realistic than they
are at the moment’, by involving ‘certain selected Chief Constables’,
who would ‘have to be taken into our confidence to a certain extent in
order to ensure that they play to the fullest possible degree’. Robertson
also encouraged a greater exchange of information:
The more information that we can pass on to the instructors at the

Special Training School about the German methods of espionage
both here and abroad the better. It is on these discoveries that the
lecturers can base a great deal of the knowledge which they impart
to the students.
To this end, he suggested passing on recent papers prepared by Curry and

White, along with ‘Any other documents which may have been written
from time to time about enemy activities in any country throughout
the world.’
Robertson’s paper and suggestions broadly found favour within
MI5, and Petrie expressed a desire to discuss the matter further with
Robertson, White and Harker.30 Liddell, however, tempered Robertson’s
enthusiasm with certain harsh realities, pointing out that certain
external factors would have to be taken into account before any visit
from SOE personnel could take place:
I think that before we make an offer on our side we should be

quite clear as to what these S.O.E. officers are to be shown. Since a
good deal of our work is now based on ISOS, there may be difficulties,
and it would be unfortunate if the officers who visited us were left
rather at a loose end and went away with a feeling that we were
withholding information which might be of value to them, or that
we were merely inefficient and did not really know what was really
going on.31
The problems caused by differing levels of access to sensitive inform-

ation by SOE, MI5 and SIS are considered further in Chapter 6. After
further discussion, it was agreed that Woolrych should be invited to
spend some time at MI5.32 The invitation was made on 5 June, and
Lakin accepted on Woolrych’s behalf the following day.33 An intensive
programme was prepared for the visit, which took place over 15–20
June.34
Woolrych wrote to Robertson, expressing his thanks for ‘one of the
most interesting weeks I have ever spent’, on 23 June.35 In response,
Robertson expressed his belief that the visit ‘will lead to much closer
relations between your department and mine, which I personally feel is
of the highest importance’.36 Robertson also wrote to Senter. Forwarding
a ‘note on the types of secret ink which are at present being used by the
Germans’, which Woolrych had requested during his visit, he expressed
the belief that the visit had been ‘most useful from both points of view
and will certainly open up the way to further and closer co-operation
between our two Departments, especially with regard to the exchange
of information which may be of use to the School at Beaulieu’.37
Perhaps as a response to these developments, in June Lakin wrote
to Harker, proposing the creation of a series of SOE/MI5 ‘Panels’,
designed to ‘stabilise and extend the liaison which already exists’.38
He suggested two Panels which would take MI5’s liaison with SOE
beyond the Security Section to include the highest possible contacts
elsewhere, although emphasising that these were designed to comple-
ment, not replace, the existing liaison procedure. The first Panel would
build on the foundations of Robertson’s visit to Beaulieu, and deal
with training matters. It would aim to encourage the ‘exchange of
ideas on the training of our agents, co-operation in regard to 96-Hour
Schemes, co-operation in regard to test “grilling” of our agents, and
the reciprocal attachment of selected officers’. The second Panel would
deal with SOE’s communications, as it was recognised that there was
a need for an ‘intensified effort’ to ensure that communications were
secure. Lakin also suggested that it might prove useful to consider the
establishment of a third Panel in which SOE’s operational Country
Sections would participate.
Lakin’s proposal found immediate favour within MI5. White wrote to
Harker on 25 June, noting that Lakin’s ideas were ‘quite acceptable to
us’.39 He was particularly keen to develop further the idea of a Country
Section Panel, pointing to the limitations MI5 faced in its dealings with
the Security Section:
Strictly from the M.I.5 point of view I think that the third type of
Panel suggested might prove to be the most useful. The Country
Sections do have information which would be valuable to us and
I believe that the Security Section of S.O.E. do not always get it. This
is not their fault, however, and I feel that a free exchange between
S.O.E. Country Sections and their opposite numbers here will be of
considerable benefit to us.
White expressed a similar sentiment in a minute to Petrie, in which

the notion that improving liaison with SOE meant moving beyond the
confines of the Security Section was apparent, as he wrote, ‘I think
we have made a good start towards a closer collaboration with S.O.E.
through Woolrych’s visit to us.’40 Harker wrote to Lakin expressing MI5’s
agreement with his proposals on 29 June.41 A preliminary discussion
about the Panels was held on 6 July, which also considered the question
of a Country Section Panel.42 Following the meeting, White prepared a
report for Harker for ‘clarification’. It had been agreed that four panels
should be established. Panel A was the training security panel origin-
ally envisaged, and the first meeting had quickly been arranged for
20 July at St James’s Street, while Panel C constituted the communica-
tions panel. The new Panel B, a strictly Security Section/MI5 affair, was
given the purpose of considering ‘operational security in so far as it
affects the security of S.O.E.’s agents’, while Panel D was the response to
the Country Section Panel proposal, described as having responsibility
for ‘the general consideration of the exchange of information between
M.I.5. and S.O.E.’. It had also been agreed that all Panels would meet
on a monthly basis, in addition to further ad-hoc meetings as deemed
necessary.43
A sceptical Petrie agreed to the proposals as outlined by White on the
condition that he was kept informed of developments (‘the proof of the
pudding etc etc’).44 The Training Panel proved a great success, and meet-
ings were held on a monthly basis until March 1945, with occasional SIS
and OSS participation. One of the functions of the Panel was to arrange
for MI5 officers to undergo SOE training courses. In June 1942, B1(a)
prepared a ‘list of Officers anxious to attend Course at Beaulieu’, and
the subject continued to generate correspondence (now destroyed) until
SOE’s dissolution in 1946.45 Panel C met monthly between July 1942
and June 1944, at which point it was decided that it would be more
appropriate to hold meetings ‘as and when the occasion arose’.46 Panel
B existed for a brief period, but was made redundant by the creation
of the Special Security Section, Bayswater, the sole purpose of which
was operational security. Perhaps the most interesting point to note
from a liaison perspective is that Panel D – the Country Section panel –
was stillborn. At its first meeting on 16 July, it was decided that the
Panel was unnecessary, although it was agreed that a number of steps

could be taken to help facilitate the ‘general exchange of information’.
Senter proposed a series of contacts with geographical ‘experts’ within
SOE, but emphasised that such contacts were designed only ‘for the
general exchange of information’, such as background material on polit-
ical movements. The Security Section had become a little more sensitive
about its own liaison position by this point. Senter went on to stress
that ‘if individual cases arose which we wanted to refer to M.I.5., the
ordinary liaison arrangements, i.e., General Lakin or myself or Park,
should apply’.47 Senter wrote to White on the issue of ‘regular direct
liaison’ with the Country Sections on 1 August, and once again emphas-
ised the limitations that applied:
So far as we are concerned, I think it is quite clearly understood that

these contacts should relate to the general exchange of information
and that the Security Directorate here should be brought in when
any individual cases arise.48
While subsequent chapters will explore liaison between the Security

Section and MI5 in greater detail on such key issues as German penet-
ration, deception, and with regard to major security investigations, it
remains to say something here about the comparatively minor SOE cases
with which MI5 became involved, which give some indication of the
nature of the day-to-day liaison that took place and highlight a good,
productive working relationship between the two organisations.
One area in which MI5 was repeatedly involved concerned ‘careless
talk’. This took various forms, either on the part of the agent, their spouse,
or other relations or friends. Such concern was raised over the wife of
French (F) Section agent John Gilbert Goldsmith in December 1942. The
case saw the involvement of MI5’s network of Regional Security Liaison
Officers (RSLOs), who were stationed throughout the UK and were in
‘close personal liaison’ with the police.49 Gerald Glover, deputy head
of Regional Control in London, wrote to Park relaying the details of a
report received from the Manchester RSLO regarding Mrs Goldsmith.50
Over dinner at the Midland Hotel Manchester on 28 November,
Mrs Goldsmith had asked another member of the dining party, Mary
Stassen, who claimed to be ‘doing voluntary work for the French Consul
in Manchester’, to assist her in sending a food parcel to France. She
confided that it was for her husband, who ‘works for the British Intelli-
gence I have recently had a letter from him dated the 5th November
1942 which was brought by somebody coming out and was posted in
London’. Mrs Goldsmith proceeded to tell Stassen that her husband ‘had
recently gone through a Commando training school’. Stassen – who did
not really work for the French Consul, but had told Mrs Goldsmith this
‘because she did not want her to know what her employment really was’
(something which was also a mystery to MI5) – proceeded to report the
conversation.
Park forwarded the information to Maurice Buckmaster, Head of F
Section, on 28 December (‘it would appear that Mrs. Goldsmith should
be warned not to advertise the fact that her husband is in the British
Intelligence Service in France’)51 and wrote to Glover on 1 January,
noting SOE’s concern ‘that Mrs. Goldsmith appears to be a somewhat
indiscreet person’. Park noted that he would ‘very much like to have her
interviewed and warned not to advertise the fact that her husband is in
the British Intelligence Service in France’, and asked Glover to arrange
this.52 An MI5 officer saw Mrs Goldsmith on 8 January, reporting:
At first she denied that she had ever told anyone that her husband
was working for the British Intelligence in France or elsewhere, or
that anything was said at the party about his activities. After I had
pointed out that this was obviously absurd, she admitted that there
had been some talk at the party about her husband. She said that she
was not responsible but that her mother had talked on a previous
occasion to the Americans who were at the party and that they had
again referred to this at the party.53
The officer ‘made it clear’ to Mrs Goldsmith that he did not accept her
denial, and ‘warned her that she must not talk about her husband in
any way in the future’, and also instructed her to ‘tell her mother that if
the Authorities discovered that she was talking about Goldsmith in the
future she might find herself in gaol’.
The seriousness with which loose talk was treated can be seen again in
the case of Marie Therese Le Chene, another F Section agent. A report on
Le Chene during her training had recorded that she was ‘excitable and
talkative’, qualities that, unless kept under rigid control, ‘might prove a
danger’.54 These eventually proved a greater irritant than a danger, but
nonetheless occupied both the Security Section and the MI5 for much
of August–September 1943. On 21 August a security officer informed
Buckmaster that a ‘reliable source’ – later revealed as Mrs Bateson,
an SOE FANY – had reported that Le Chene had ‘informed a person
who knows nothing whatever about our work or organisation that she
“worked for the Secret Service in Baker Street and that she went to France
on a destroyer and has recently returned from that country” ’.55 The
information had been contained in a letter Mrs Bateson had received
from her mother. The Security Officer asked that arrangements be made
for Le Chene to be seen about this ‘bad breach of security’. Buckmaster
met with her on 24 August, and quickly concluded that she was ‘a silly
old woman’.56 He suggested that she ‘should be formally reprimanded’,
and, while leaving her ultimate fate to security, noted that he was ‘not
averse’ to her facing serious punishment (‘which I think she thoroughly
deserves’). MI5 was informed by the Security Section on 27 August that
Buckmaster had decided to dispense with her services and, concerned
that Le Chene would ‘probably harbour rather bitter feelings’ against
SOE, asked MI5 to keep a watch on her, providing her address.57 Before
Le Chene’s departure from SOE could be arranged, further trouble arose.
On 1 September, Mrs Bateson presented another letter she had received
from her mother to F Section, which was forwarded to the Security
Section. It began,
Dearest M, Mrs. and Captain Le Chene have now both got safely back
(Secret Service) They are so interesting. Their H.Q. is 23, Nottingham
Place and Mrs. Lechene is having an interview with your MTC Head,
Mrs. Gammel, I think
Concerned by Le Chene’s continued tendency to talk,58 Buckmaster was

asked about the extent of her ‘operational knowledge’, which raised
further alarm as it was revealed that this was ‘considerably more compre-
hensive than is usually the case when an Agent returns from the field’:
She came to know at least 20 and possibly 30 of our agents out

there, involving some 10 circuits. In addition to this she does, of
course, know all the F Section H.Q. staff and the locations of various
schools. Beyond this knowledge of personnel she has been in a posi-
tion to see a great deal of the methods and techniques with which
we operate in the field.
As such, the French Section felt that Le Chene was very dangerous, being
‘exactly the sort of person who is, because of her complete inability to
hold her tongue about her work, a potential source of valuable inform-
ation to any enemy agent who might come upon her’. Mrs Bateson,
meanwhile, was ‘seriously perturbed by her mother’s capacity for gossip’,
and felt that ‘it would be a good thing if someone saw her and tried to
bring home to her the danger of careless talk’.
MI5 was informed of the development, and discussions on how to

proceed were held on 4 September. The threat posed by Mrs Bateson’s
mother, Mrs Stringer, from her nursing home was taken seriously (‘Mrs.
Bateson tells us that her mother is very talkative, and is certain to spread
the information about Mrs. Lechene throughout her circle of friends’).
It was agreed that an MI5 officer should visit her and ‘obtain a state-
ment’, without revealing her daughter’s involvement. Glover visited
Mrs Stringer at her Red Cross-run nursing home on 5 September. The
mystery of Le Chene’s connection with Mrs Stringer was solved as it was
discovered that Le Chene had previously worked there as a cook. Glover
spoke with both Mrs Stringer and the commandant of the Home, Lady
Alethea Eliot. Through ‘two hours of extensive conversation (verging on
interrogation)’, he discovered that Le Chene had asked for permission
to leave her position in order to carry out ‘a hush-hush job for the War
Office’ in early 1942: ‘and so it was that a popular French cook left the
convalescent home for a hush-hush job’.59 Following Le Chene’s return
to the UK she had visited the home, and a tea party had been held
(Glover diligently recorded the names of all of those who had attended),
at which the conditions of life in France had been discussed. Glover
asked Mrs Stringer if she had told anyone of Le Chene’s visit: ‘she denied
flatly that she had done so, and with her eyes opening wide and putting
on an innocent expression said she could not think of anybody who
would be interested’. However, as an afterthought, she admitted that she
gave Le Chene a letter of introduction to her daughter. (‘My daughter
is in the MTC in London and I thought it would be so nice for the two
to meet.’)
Glover formed an ‘extremely favourable’ impression of Lady Eliot, and
felt satisfied that, as a result of his interview, he had ‘put the fear of God’
into Mrs Stringer, who he described as ‘a garrulous old lady’. While the
case was considered serious, Glover felt that Le Chene’s indiscretion was
not as bad as had been feared:
although she committed the offence of telling her friends that her
work had taken her underground to France and had brought her back
safely I could not elicit from any of her friends any evidence that she
had told them of the nature of her work.
F Section was informed of Glover’s action and conclusions on 11

September. The possibility of interning Le Chene was considered, but
it was felt by MI5 that there was ‘not sufficient evidence’ to do so.60
It was agreed that SOE should proceed with arrangements for her
discharge, and that she should be given a ‘very strong security talk’. In
the meantime, steps were taken to ‘keep an eye on her private address’.
Le Chene was given a ‘strong swearing out talk’ on 4 October, at which
point she refused to sign the Official Secrets Act without first seeking the
advice of her husband, also an F Section agent.61 Informed of this, MI5
felt that one of its officers should visit the couple. An unnamed officer
met with them on 3 December, stressing ‘that there must be no further
complaints of any loose talk’, with which the matter was considered
closed.62
Not all cases of leaked information were concluded as easily, and
despite considerable effort from MI5 remained unsolved. Two such
cases had particularly worrying implications, as SOE notified MI5 that
information received from the field indicated that the Germans had
knowledge of its operational plans, raising the fear that a traitor was at
work in London. The first case arose in August 1942, when SOE received
a telegram from its mission at Stockholm which warned that there ‘is
evidently a traitor in London’. The message stated that the Germans
had known of the despatch of a group of agents to Denmark, and were
also aware that the men concerned had attended a ‘goodbye feast’ in
London prior to their departure. The news came as a particular blow as
the agents were part of the ‘TABLE’ operations, an attempt by SOE to
develop a sabotage network in Denmark.63 Notifying Dick White, Senter
confirmed that a group of Danish agents had gathered at the Three
Vikings, a Danish restaurant in Glasshouse Street, Soho, on 22 July, and
that the group had included two men who had subsequently left for
Denmark.64
There is no faint trace of irony in the fact that the subsequent investig-
ation to find the traitor was headed by Anthony Blunt. Having explored
the possible channels of communication through which the informa-
tion could have been transmitted to the Germans, by December Blunt
had arrived at the tentative conclusion that, despite SOE’s fears, it was
unlikely that the leak was ‘due to a conscious traitor’. Rather, he felt
it was probably the result of an alcohol-fuelled lunch that had been
‘fairly loud and fairly indiscreet’.65 The agent who had arranged the
lunch, known only as Birktoft, admitted to Blunt that the group had
‘talked shop’ at the restaurant. While he explained that they disguised
names and ‘always spoke of “Umbrellas” instead of parachutes’, Blunt
was left with the impression that ‘any intelligent person listening to
their conversation would have known at once that something fairly odd
was being discussed, and could almost certainly have formed a pretty
good idea of what was going on’.66 As such, he felt it likely that the
information relayed to the Germans could have been overheard by a

well-placed listener,67 and writing to Harker on 31 December outlined
this as the ‘most probable theory’.68
The investigation continued to focus upon the Three Vikings
restaurant, where suspicion fell upon its predominantly foreign staff,
specifically five waiters – three German, one Swedish and one Austrian –
and the Danish waitress manageress. These members of staff were placed
under the observation of the Watchers from B(6), who monitored their
movements both in the vicinity of the restaurant and at home. With
no new information forthcoming, observation was withdrawn in early
February,69 by which point Roche had written to Blunt about a further
leak about SOE’s Danish activities; it had been reported that the Germans
knew of the imminent arrival in Denmark of an agent known as ‘Arthur’.
As SOE had been ‘particularly careful’ to impress upon Arthur the need
for him to avoid places where he was known prior to his departure, this
was felt to help eliminate the Three Vikings from the inquiry, but did
little to advance the investigation elsewhere.70
Geoffrey Wethered took over the case from Blunt in April 1943
in his capacity as liaison officer with SOE’s Special Security Section,
a role examined in greater detail in Chapter 5. Wethered dismissed
further investigation of the Three Vikings and began casting around for
other leads.71 The most promising of these involved a Danish Section
agent, Carl Immanuel Starup. It was known that Starup was a ‘first-class
radio telegraphist’, and upon joining SOE in April 1941 had under-
gone training as a wireless operator.72 Attention had been brought to
Starup during Blunt’s investigation, when it was discovered that he had
a transmitter locked away in his room. Further suspicion had been raised
in November 1942 when a garbled message was picked up by SOE’s
W/T Station on Starup’s frequency, which he denied sending. Brought
to Blunt’s attention, the incident was subsequently dismissed, as SOE
informed MI5 that ‘it would be impossible for STARUP to have used his
transmitter’ and that ‘the whole thing was a mistake on the part of the
home station’. Blunt had little choice but to accept SOE’s conclusion,
as following an internal investigation the relevant records had been
destroyed, denying MI5 the opportunity to inspect them.73
Wethered’s interest in these events was roused in late May, when
notified by R.C. Hollingworth, head of SOE’s Danish Section, that he
had received information from Denmark that the Danish Police had
recently discovered, and gained the confidence of, a group of German
agents, one of whom was a wireless operator. While he claimed to be
in contact with Berlin, the Danish Police were ‘convinced that he was
in wireless touch with England’,74 a conviction which was based on

the fact that ‘the aerial was pointed towards England, and was the type
which would be used to contact this country’, and also upon the regu-
larity of the transmissions, which were made at the same time each
day. (‘When England and Denmark changed to European Summer Time,
Germany had not done so, and a week elapsed before Germany made
the same change. During this week the transmissions went on at the
same time.’) Wethered jumped upon the news as supporting the sugges-
tion that Starup had indeed been making illicit transmissions to the
Germans. Referring to MI5’s earlier interest in Starup, he claimed that
Starup ‘must have known’ that it was ‘illegal’ to keep a W/T set outside
of training hours.75
By this point Starup had left SOE, having refused to return to Denmark
as an undercover agent, but was known to be staying at the Rhodesia
Court Hotel in London. As SOE had ‘excellent relations’ with the propri-
etor and his wife, Wethered noted that there would be no difficulty
in arranging for his possessions to be searched.76 Liddell, persuaded by
Wethered’s interpretation of the case, agreed that ‘full checks and some
sort of observation’ should be kept on Starup.77 Wethered also asked
for a list of the dates upon which Starup had attended SOE’s Training
Schools, which showed that during the timeframe under investigation
Starup had been at STS 52 (Thame Park) and STS 45 (Hatherop Castle).
On 14 June, Wethered informed Senter that this meant Starup ‘would
have had access to a transmitting set’ at the time both leakages had
taken place, and that while evidence against Starup was ‘by no means
direct’, MI5 was ‘taking it seriously’.78 Wethered visited the Rhodesia
Court Hotel while Starup was out on 10 June.79 His suitcases were locked,
which meant Wethered had to make a second visit on 19 June, this time
equipped with the necessary tools to force the locks without leaving a
trace, provided by Superintendent L. Burt of B(5).80 The cases contained
nothing relevant to the enquiry.
The shaky case against Starup finally collapsed when Wethered inter-
viewed him, accompanied by Lt Ray of SOE’s Danish Section, on 31
August. Wethered now learned that, contrary to his earlier comments,
it had been perfectly in order for Starup to keep a transmitting set in his
possession while at STS 45.81 Of greater significance, he also discovered
that his earlier assumptions regarding Starup’s access to transmitting
equipment were also incorrect; during the timeframe under investiga-
tion for the first leak, at which point Starup had been training at Thame,
he had not had access to a transmitter. As such, Wethered concluded
that ‘we must accept that STARUP has given a reasonable explanation
of the suspicions against him, and that there is nothing further in his
case to follow up’.
The source of the leak remained elusive. In September, Wethered wrote
to Blunt before he reluctantly ‘put the files away’:
It is unsatisfactory that this case should be closed without a more

definite conclusion, but at the present moment I see no further
course so far as I can see no further enquiries can now be made.82
Wethered almost immediately found himself involved in another

similar case. In October a message was received from RF Section officer
Forest ‘Tommy’ Yeo-Thomas, who was on his second mission in France.
He warned London that a list of the real names of the French agents
trained by RF Section and dropped in France during the recent September
moon period was in German hands, adding, ‘Leakage somewhere your
end’.83 Considered ‘very reliable’, Yeo-Thomas’ message caused consid-
erable disquiet within SOE; an internal investigation was immediately
conducted, and MI5 informed.84 Initially, Wethered questioned the like-
lihood that the leak came from London, pointing to recent arrests in
the field as an alternative explanation, but by November the sugges-
tion was being taken seriously. Dick White wrote that it ‘was necessary
to treat the case forthwith as though the leakage had taken place in
London’, and instructed that lists be compiled of all those who may
have had access to at least some of the real names of the agents, each of
whom would be investigated by MI5, working on the assumption that
‘a successful espionage enterprise by Abteilung III of the Abwehr’ had
taken place.85
The case was complicated as, unlike Buckmaster’s French Section, RF
Section existed to service the needs of agents selected for missions by
the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action (BCRA), the Free
(or Fighting) French Intelligence Service.86 The nature of the relation-
ship between RF Section and the BCRA meant that the leak could have
originated with either organisation. Although White considered it ‘more
probable’ that the source of the leak would be found in the Free French
organisation rather than RF Section,87 Roche nevertheless provided a
full list of RF Section staff for investigation, noting that while there was
currently ‘no reason at all to suppose that anyone in Dorset Square has
“spoken out of turn” if you are to scrutinise the B.C.R.A. personnel it is
only right that you should have the right of doing the same with ours’.88
The investigation was hampered by the slowness of the BCRA to
provide the necessary names for investigation. By early December,
Wethered was still waiting for a list of BCRA personnel ‘who might
have been involved with the leakage’.89 When he finally received the
list on 8 December it consisted of surnames only, which caused further
frustration.90 Meanwhile, evidence of insecurity at the offices of the
BCRA began to reach MI5, adding to the suspicion that the Free French
were the source of the leak. This included a claim made by a student in
training who alleged that he had overheard a secretary from the BCRA
office in Duke Street discussing operational matters in a nearby cafe that
was also frequented by the staff of the Selfridges department store, some
of whom appeared to be taking considerable interest in what they could
overhear.91
One particularly promising lead was brought to Wethered’s attention
by SOE’s police liaison officer, Jack O’Reilly, in December. A source
from his Special Branch days informed him that a woman working
for the counter-espionage branch of the BCRA, Mlle. Lemaire, had
admitted to providing secret information to her lover, Jean Denis
Absine, an adjutant in the Belgian Army.92 Their affair over, Absine was
continuing to demand further information from her ‘under the threat
of exposure’.93 Wethered informed Maxwell Knight, and asked him to
interview Lemaire as soon as possible. (‘I can think of no one better
qualified than you to carry out such a ticklish interview.’)94
Further investigation led to a dead end as it became apparent that
Lemaire was not the source of the leak under investigation. Knight inter-
viewed Lemaire on 4 January. Initially evasive, she eventually discussed
‘her indiscretions and ABSIL’s [sic] questions to her’.95 Lemaire admitted
looking up names from Free French records at Absine’s request, but when
Absine himself was interviewed by Wethered he explained that they
were personal acquaintances, and his only motive in asking for inform-
ation was to try and discover what had happened to them.96 When
Lemaire had abruptly ended their relationship, Absine had threatened
to reveal that she had provided confidential information ‘in order to
induce her to return to him’. Later in January Wethered conceded in a
letter to Cyril Miller that it was ‘going to be one of those cases which
have little chance of being solved’.97
Other SOE cases that came to involve MI5 appear in comparison to be
relatively trivial, yet were similarly time-consuming. A letter from B1(l),
the section responsible for ‘Espionage through Merchant Shipping Crews
and Personnel of Air Liners’, in March 1943 alerted Park to the Belgian
Seaman Jan Baptiste Schools. Schools had worked briefly as an informant
for B1(l), but soon gave it up, noting that he ‘didn’t like to make friends
with anyone and then have to quiz them just to obtain information’.98
However, according to reports received from Liverpool, he wished ‘to do

something active for the allies and he does not mind how dangerous it is’.
Park forwarded the letter to Claude Knight, head of the Belgian Section,
for consideration, and Schools was interviewed on 7 April.99 It was felt that
‘his specialised knowledge of the Antwerp Dock area may be extremely
useful’.100 By the end of April, Schools and four other Belgian seamen
had been ‘loaned’ to SOE by the Belgian authorities for training.101 Jack
O’Reilly passed the relevant information to Chief Inspector John Scurr at
the Aliens Registration Office, with the request that he inform the Chief
Constable of the Liverpool City Police that the men were now ‘under
the aegis of the War Office’.102 Having done so, the Aliens Registration
Office received a letter from the Chief Constable of St Helens, Lancashire,
which noted that Schools had recently married, and that his new wife
had a criminal record. She was also known to be ‘of a “talkative nature”
and not likely to keep information to herself’.103 O’Reilly forwarded
the letter to Knight, and suggested that it should be considered ‘in all
seriousness’.104 Soon after, Schools’ marital problems began to emerge.
According to the Conducting Officer accompanying Schools through
training, after his arrival in the UK the previous year he had had ‘a very
merry time’, indulging in a few days of ‘wine, women and song’. Some
days after this ‘eventful celebration’, he realised that he had got married;
he visited the Registry Office to ‘find our that, in fact, he had signed
the marriage certificate and gone through some form of marriage’.105
While Schools completed the training course successfully, he remained
throughout ‘mentally ill-at lease and worried about his wife’.
In July, a Belgian Section officer wrote to the Security Section. As MI5
had originally recommended Schools, he hoped that the organisation
would be willing to assist by investigating both the circumstances of the
marriage and the character of Schools’ wife. Writing to the unnamed
MI5 officer (likely the Head of Section, J.R. Stopford) who had previously
recommended Schools, Park noted,
As we think that Schools is under the impression that he was tricked

into marriage, we would very much like to obtain some further evid-
ence as to the circumstances in which he came to be married It is
considered that if Schools could be assured that he was not tricked
into marriage, and that his wife, apart from her convictions, is not
unfaithful to him, his mind would be put at ease.
Alternatively, if the wife is little better than a prostitute, he could
be told that the dissolution of his marriage could, in due course, be
effected.106
In response, the officer noted ‘I will see what I can find out and let you
know.’107 From ‘our contact in Liverpool’, he discovered that Schools
went down to the Registry Office three days before the wedding with
the woman who is now his wife and gave notice of his intention to
marry her, subsequently carrying out his intention Our contact
says that whilst there was some trouble at the beginning between
Schools and his wife, they now appear to be quite happy.108
He concluded that ‘it does not seem as if there is any justification for
School’s anxiety’. The information was quickly passed on to the Belgian
Section, along with a copy of the marriage certificate.109
Further problems followed. Park wrote to his MI5 contact in
November, informing him that ‘The matrimonial troubles of Schools
have broken out again.’110 Park outlined the details of two incidents that
had occurred. First, following a telegram from Schools’ father-in-law,
‘notifying him that his wife Peggy had gone away and that her address
was not known’, a telegram was received from Mrs Schools herself,
stating that she was in London. However, this had been received too
late for Schools to meet her, leaving him with ‘no further information
as to his wife’s whereabouts’. This was followed by an altogether ‘more
serious matter’ of indiscretion on Schools’ part:
we have discovered that his wife has been told that Schools will be
returning to Belgium to do underground work. She also knows that
he has taken a course in parachute jumping so that if she had any
intelligence she can probably guess the means by which he will be
sent to Belgium.
Recalling the Police report which described Mrs Schools as ‘being of

a talkative nature’, Park noted that ‘we should very much like to
know whether Mrs. Schools has in any way talked about her husband’s
employment and if so to what extent’, and asked for the officer’s assist-
ance, or that of the Regional Security Liaison Officer, Major Towns, in
investigating the matter further.
Park discussed the matter with A.H. Robertson of B1(l) on 6 November,
after which Robertson ‘asked our Liverpool representative to arrange
that one of our sources who knows Mrs. Schools should report any
information he can obtain without provocation about her contacts and
discretion’.111 Mrs Schools was subsequently located and was seen, along
with her husband, by Park. Schools was ‘completely satisfied’ that he
had ‘not told her anything more than that he is returning to Belgium
by parachute at some vague date in the future’, and had ‘certainly not
given her any information about the mission which he is to carry out’.112
Park also saw Mrs Schools alone, and while she initially ‘denied that
she knew anything about her husband’s work’, she later admitted that
he ‘had told her something’. As this tallied with Schools’ own account,
Park was satisfied that her knowledge was limited.
Robertson provided further information on 17 November, noting that
one of his sources had ‘paid a visit to St. Helens on 10th November, and
called at Mrs. Schools’ home’.113 While Mrs Schools was not present,
the source ‘spoke to two of her sisters’, who noted that Schools was
‘expected to return to St. Helens any day now for his last leave before
going “overseas” ’:
When asked by source what was meant by ‘overseas’ and if Schools

had joined the Army, one of the sisters replied ‘No, he has not joined
the Army, but has been very reluctant to talk about his next trip’.
Nothing further was said on this subject.
Park expressed his thanks, and noted that he would be ‘interested to

receive anything else on similar lines from your source’.114 The lack of
further papers suggests that no further matrimonial troubles followed.
5
Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict
As we have seen, after a somewhat shaky start SOE developed a good

working relationship with MI5. Relinquishing the position of Security
Section head in autumn 1942, Lakin wrote to Petrie, thanking him for
the ‘invariable kindness and sympathy which you and all at St James St
have shown me during the past year’:
I am glad to think that a real and enduring atmosphere of mutual

understanding has grown up between the Security Service and
ourselves, which is so vital to our work and without which we could
not hope to play an effective part in winning the war.1
In response, Petrie noted that ‘All of us here reciprocate very heartily

all you have to say about our present happy relations and the need of
maintaining them. To that we shall spare no pains for it is something
very much worth while.’2 Such mutual expressions of goodwill were
soon to be tested; it was shortly after Lakin’s departure that the issue
of operational security emerged as a point of tension between the two
organisations.
The difference in attitude between SOE and MI5 on matters of
operational security was rooted in the nature and function of each
organisation, analogous to the incompatibility between secret intelli-
gence gathering and subversive operations that underpinned the diffi-
cult relationship between SOE and SIS. SOE had been formed to stimu-
late and carry out subversive action; if an allegation was made against
an agent in the field, but could not subsequently be proven, then oper-
ational priorities dictated that the agent in question should be given
the benefit of the doubt and allowed to continue with their work. MI5,
with its overriding concern for national security and the consequences
96
Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 97
should any such questionable agents return to the UK having, in fact,

been ‘turned’ by the Germans, tended towards an interpretation of incid-
ents where treachery could not be proven as cases where the necessary
evidence was not yet available, rather than cases where the agent was,
in fact, innocent. The criticism that SOE exhibited a steadfast determin-
ation to believe the best of its agents in questionable circumstances has
long been acknowledged; the tendency of MI5 to go to the opposing
extreme has not. This difference of approach meant that by the time
allegations were made against the well-known agent Henri Dericourt,
resentment had begun to mount within SOE over the power of suspicion
alone to throw operational plans into disarray.
Such conflict over operational security had the result of placing the
Security Section in the particularly invidious position of trying to please
MI5 without alienating the Country Sections; a virtually impossible feat
which meant the section faced constant unpopularity with either one
or the other. Caught in the middle, the Security Section had to balance
its awareness that MI5 could make life difficult for SOE from a security
point of view with its awareness of the operational needs of the Country
Sections. This difficult area was compounded by less tangible, but no less
real, issues of personality, particularly that of Geoffrey Wethered, who
was appointed MI5’s operational security liaison officer with Bayswater
in early 1943.
MI5 had good reason to be concerned over the security of SOE agents
in the field. Fears about the extent of undetected German penetration of
SOE networks in Belgium, raised during the winter of 1942–1943, were
compounded by the ‘increasing number of cases’ of agents returning
to the UK having been captured by the Germans and ‘turned’, a staged
escape preceding their return to the UK with a German mission.3 MI5’s
concern was heightened by its failure to establish the truth in two
such cases of returned agents, one of whom worked for SOE, who had
‘escaped’ with the connivance of their captors and returned to the UK
with a German mission. MI5 was reluctant to see this failure repeated.
A flurry of internal papers on the subject, the first written by Christopher
Harmer, were circulated in the spring of 1943, as MI5 concluded that it
needed to drastically reconsider its procedure for dealing with returning
agents, belonging to both SOE and SIS.
SOE agent Tor Gulbrandsen (‘Anchor’) was one of those who had
participated in a false escape, and whose cover story MI5 had been
unable to crack. Gulbrandsen had been sent on a mission to Norway
in February 1942. Badly wounded upon his arrest in May, Gulbrandsen
spent several months in hospital, partially paralysed, during which
he was subjected to interrogation. He eventually broke down and, being

‘an important organiser’, was able to ‘disclose a great deal’.4 According
to the account Gulbrandsen gave upon his return to the UK, he had
escaped by inventing a story about an arms dump in the woods. Taken
to the spot by car, he ‘attacked the guard using “unarmed combat” ’,
and ran off into the woods. After a few days in hiding, he arranged to
be evacuated to Sweden and from there returned to the UK.
Gulbrandsen’s account was ‘regarded with some suspicion’ by MI5
(‘the interrogators were left with a strong feeling of uneasiness’), but
all efforts to break him failed.5 The truth was discovered by accident;
as the case was about to be closed down, ‘reliable information was
received from Norway which enabled Anchor to be broken’. This came
from another Norwegian agent, Ernst Kirkby Jacobsen (‘Crow’), who
had also escaped following arrest in Norway, and who ‘stated that
one of the Gestapo chiefs had told him that Gulbrandsen had given
the Germans information and that his “escape” was being arranged
for him to be sent back to England’. Confronted with this allegation,
Gulbrandsen ‘finally stated that he wished to make some alterations to
his original statement’, and admitted that the escape had been arranged,
after he had agreed to a proposal put to him by a Gestapo chief that he
should ‘go back to England and work for the Germans’, his principal
task being
to obtain further information about S.O.E., the names of agents

intended for the field etc. and also the names of people in Norway
we suspected of working for the Germans. If possible he was to return
to Norway again as an S.O.E. agent.
While it was possible to have some sympathy for the predicament

Gulbrandsen had found himself in (he was warned that, if he tried to
double-cross the Germans, they would kill his parents, fiancée and other
relations), from the MI5 perspective the emerging German strategy of
arranging escapes was worrying:
When Gulbrandsen was first interrogated here the story he told was
exactly what did happen. By that is meant all he had to conceal was
that the escape was arranged. Otherwise he was narrating events that
actually took place and so he could not be ‘broken’ by questioning.
A similar situation had occurred when MI5 interrogated Armand

Walenty (‘Brutus’), head of the Polish ‘Interallie’ resistance organisation
in France, who arrived in the UK following an earlier arrest by the

Germans. Walenty eventually admitted the truth, that his escape had
been arranged, but was never ‘broken’ by MI5. Harmer noted that
‘although his story left a vague feeling of uneasiness in the minds of
everybody, he would probably have got away with it if he had not
confessed’. Based on these two cases, and their ‘extreme similarity of
approach’, Harmer concluded that the Germans were ‘acting very clev-
erly’ and considered the problem ‘a very grave one’:
They reason out, quite rightly, that on arrival in England he will not
be searched and therefore can bring in with him all the impediments
of a spy, that he will be treated in an informal and friendly manner
and that any sort of hostile interrogation of an agent, who has risked
and almost lost his life in our service, is extremely distasteful and
improbable, that in telling his story there will be no point on which
he will have to lie and therefore no possibility of ever catching him
out and that the agent will be debarred from telling the truth to the
British, not only by his feeling of shame at having betrayed them but
also for fear of reprisals against himself and against the hostages who
remain in German hands.
It was this part of the German ‘plan’, the execution of a real lie (‘a story
which he can tell and which so far as the escape is concerned, is the
literal truth’), that particularly concerned Harmer:
It cannot be overstated that the above sort of escape story is an

extremely difficult one to break. One may be left with all sorts of
vague suspicions, but they are practically impossible to prove and
over and above everything will remain the feeling that it is inequit-
able to imprison a man who has rendered faithful service in the past
as an agent.
Further papers on the subject were prepared by H.P. Milmo of B1(b)

and J.C. Curry of Research, who raised similarly alarming points. Milmo
noted that ‘it is fast becoming obvious that enemy penetration of S.I.S.
and S.O.E. constitutes an immediate and serious threat to the internal
security of this country and that this particular technique is finding
increasing favour with the enemy’.6
It was within this highly charged atmosphere that MI5 embarked
upon an investigation of the SOE agent Fenrik Herluf Nygaard, a
member of the Lark network in Norway, who had returned to the UK
having escaped from German detention. Here, MI5 readily adopted the
opposing stance to that exhibited by SOE: while SOE gave its agents the
benefit of the doubt, MI5 was convinced of Nygaard’s ‘guilt’ from the
outset, on the basis of inconclusive evidence mixed with gut instinct;
the ‘vague feeling of uneasiness’ described by Harmer in his paper on
escape cases. Despite its determination to think the worst, MI5 could
not escape the fact that their suspicions lacked solid evidence, and a
long and protracted dispute with SOE’s Norwegian Section, carried out
through the filter of the Security Section, followed.
The account of Nygaard’s escape, as he related it, was indeed fortu-
itous, but it was not wholly implausible. Having been beaten up severely
by the Gestapo, he ‘confessed to having had some dealings with an
underground organisation’, but made no mention of his connection
with the UK. Having provisionally accepted his story, the Gestapo
decided to move him from their headquarters to the local prison:
He was marched through the streets on the evening of Saturday,

December 19th, loosely chained to another prisoner with an armed
German guard following him. On arrival at the steps of the prison
he allowed the guard to draw level and then slipped his chain and
disappeared, ultimately finding his way to Sweden.7
Nygaard had returned to London on 6 January, and immediately set

about writing an account of his experiences and escape. Notifying
Senter, Jack Wilson, Head of the Norwegian Section, wrote that ‘There
is to my mind no reason to disbelieve Nygaard’s story’, but raised
no objection to MI5 involvement in the case, should it be deemed
necessary.8 On 11 January, Cyril Miller informed Wilson that it would be
necessary to involve MI5 in the case as it involved a wireless set known
to be blown, and therefore presented a potential avenue for strategic
deception (a procedure outlined in Chapter 8).9 On 18 January, Wilson
forwarded a translated copy of Nygaard’s completed report to Senter,
noting that Nygaard was available for interrogation when convenient.
It is difficult to gauge the exact attitude of the Security Section towards
the case at this point. Miller retained the view that the ‘MI5 interrog-
ator’ (presumably a reference to Harmer) should attend the interroga-
tion and, making the necessary arrangements, revealed considerable scep-
ticism about the case, noting, ‘This is a queer story, and merits, I am
sure you will agree, very careful investigation.’10 However, this was not
the impression Miller gave Wilson, who noted that Miller ‘believes that
Nygaard has given a true account of his escape, but M.I.5 are extremely
suspicious of it’.11 Following the interrogation, a clear difference of

opinion emerged between Miller and Harmer over the case and how
to proceed. The interrogation had been sufficient for Harmer to
conclude that there was a ‘strong probability’ that Nygaard’s escape
had been orchestrated by the Germans. Following the interrogation,
on 15 February Harmer wrote, ‘in my view [Nygaard] will ultimately
be broken and confess to having had his escape arranged’.12 Harmer,
Miller informed Wilson, ‘desires that Nygaard should be told that we
have information that his story is not true, and that his escape was
arranged’.13 As no such information existed, such a high-risk strategy
illustrates the degree of confidence felt by MI5 that the escape had been
arranged, and that such a bluff would be sufficient to break Nygaard’s
version of events.
In the meantime, the Security Section tried to secure sufficient evid-
ence to conclusively prove Nygaard’s innocence. To this end the inter-
rogation of another recently returned Norwegian agent, Oivind Sorli,
the original organiser for the Lark group, was arranged, in the hope that
he would be able to corroborate Nygaard’s story. Sorli was duly inter-
rogated, but the case remained inconclusive: ‘So far as it goes’, Miller
wrote, ‘he corroborates Nygaard’s story of his escape in every detail, but
this is of course not conclusive, as even if the escape was phoney, it was
acted in every detail’.14 Another security officer interrogated a further
recently returned Norwegian, Olaf Reirsen, on the subject of Nygaard
at the London Reception Centre in April, again inconclusively: Reirsen
‘had no impression that Nygaard’s escape was arranged by the Germans’,
and believed that Nygaard himself ‘certainly considered that he had
made a genuine escape by his own efforts’.15
As the Nygaard investigation continued, and with the first signs of
disagreement between SOE’s and MI5’s respective investigating officers,
Senter entered into a debate with MI5 over the nature of operational
security, raising a number of concerns over the procedure adopted in
cases of returned agents of dubious loyalty. He met with Robertson on
13 March to discuss the issue, and recorded the points raised in a letter
to White. Senter outlined the position, as he saw it, as one in which the
Security Section should judge the level of interest MI5 should take in
each such case:
as regards returned accredited agents, it is in the first place a task

which we must discharge to see whether they are of possible security
interest in terms of the security of this country, and as having a
possible connection with the ‘penetration’ problem it would be
wise to continue the technique that has been established in recent

cases. Under this, we assemble the available material, based on the
agents traffic, etc. and make any necessary additional enquiries, and
that forms the ‘brief’ for the use of Miller, who is our interrogator and
your nominated officer, hitherto, Christopher Harmer. If there has
been any residual doubt about the story, we have had a conference
with the head of the country section here, Tar, Miller and myself, in
order to decide on further treatment.16
Satisfied with the existing procedure, Senter pointed out to White his
reluctance to see any increase in the level of suspicion facing the
returned agent, stressing the concern that too great an emphasis on
security could inadvertently hamper SOE’s operational considerations:
Of course we recognise that if there is any prima facie suspicion that

the agent has been allowed to return, the case must be treated as
being potentially one of espionage, but we are also concerned that if
a good agent is broken down to some extent, and is prepared to tell
the truth, he should not be so treated that he is rendered useless for
the rest of the war.17
In an internal memo, Robertson noted that Senter’s letter represented

a ‘step in the right direction so far as returning S.O.E. accredited agents
are concerned’, but continued to emphasise that the recent investig-
ations into returning SOE agents, such as Gulbrandsen, had revealed
‘extremely disturbing’ features which ‘point very definitely to my mind
towards the fact that the Germans are very busily penetrating S.O.E.’s
organisation and using it as a medium for getting agents into this
country’.18 As such, and with several internal reports on German penet-
ration methods circulating within MI5, it is easy to see why Senter’s
concern for individual agents cut little ice with White, who responded
by emphasising MI5’s responsibility for national security, which meant
a blanket approach to ‘suspicious’ cases, with no room for the Security
Section to exercise its judgement as to what was considered sufficiently
suspicious to bring to MI5’s attention. MI5 was willing to sacrifice the
occasional SOE agent upon whom suspicion had been wrongly attached:
We consider that, as the Service responsible for the Security of this

country, it must be we who examine and decide upon cases of British
agents who, on returning to this country, are considered to be under
suspicion for any reason whatsoever or, in particular, have been in
touch with the enemy or been captured by the enemy during the
course of their mission abroad when any of your agents fall under
suspicion either from your side or from ours, or fall into the category
of those who have been in touch with the enemy or been captured
by the enemy, we should be called in at once by you or, if we initiate
the case, should be entitled to receive from you all the relevant back-
ground information.19
Along with Warden and Miller, Senter met with White, Robertson
and Milmo on 16 March to discuss the situation. A solution of sorts was
found in the agreement that an MI5 officer should be sent on second-
ment to work at Bayswater; it was agreed that White should propose
such an arrangement to Petrie.20 Following the meeting Senter wrote to
White, noting that SOE ‘accepted the principle that, where one of our
returned agents came to this country and where there were any circum-
stances of suspicion the position and responsibility of the Security
Service must be fully recognised’.21 Yet while recognising the ‘funda-
mental security responsibility which it is yours to discharge and our
anxiety to co-operate along the most efficient lines’, Senter continued to
press SOE’s operational concerns, arguing that an overly sensitive MI5
would damage SOE’s operational prospects needlessly, and ensured that
White’s comments on this matter were also placed on record:
You also recognised that, where there was residual suspicion falling
short of suspected espionage, it would be wrong in the national
interest to consign the returned agent to Camp 020 [Latchmere
House, West London, where captured enemy agents were held and
interrogated by MI5] or otherwise to treat him so that, upon his
coming completely ‘clean’, he would be of no further use to this
organisation.
The recent Nygaard case is a good example where I think we all feel
the man may not have told the whole truth about the circumstances
of his escape, but where no one feels that there is any question of
his having undertaken any mission to work for the enemy in this
country.
Internal discussion over the nature of the MI5 appointment at Bayswater

followed. White, Robertson and Milmo concluded that the work ‘ought
to be done by an officer in B.1.B. who should be responsible for all
such cases when they occur, either in S.O.E. or S.I.S.’.22 As White
continued, this meant that ‘the need is simply for one officer and,
for this position, I should like to recommend Major Wethered’. One of

MI5’s Regional Security Liaison Officers, a significant factor that played
in Wethered’s favour was that, having gone through an SOE training
course himself, he was considered persona grata with the organisation;
‘an important point’, as White observed. Liddell supported White’s
proposal, believing that enemy penetration of both SOE and SIS consti-
tuted ‘one of our greatest dangers, and needs the whole time services
of a competent officer’. He thought that ‘If Major Wethered can be
spared, I am quite sure that he would do the job extremely well.’23
While expressing doubt as to whether investigating cases of penetra-
tion constituted ‘anything like a full time job’, Petrie was ‘agreeable to
Major Wethered being turned on to it for 2 or 3 months, after which his
future employment can be decided by the experience acquired in the
meantime’.24
Senter was officially informed of the proposal to appoint Wethered
by White on 24 March. White expressed his hope that Wethered would
be an acceptable choice to SOE, and explained that he would be ‘in the
closest possible touch with Robertson’s section and with Milmo’s, so that
he will not lack expert advice over the problems with which he will have
to deal’.25 Senter replied that Wethered ‘will indeed be acceptable as the
“nominated officer” and we shall do everything possible to help him’.26
He noted that he saw the appointment as ‘an important step forward
in the co-operation which we have so fully enjoyed – especially from
yourself and Tar – throughout’. Over the coming weeks and months,
Senter would have cause to question whether Wethered’s appointment
was, indeed, an ‘important step forward’.
Geoffrey Peter Wethered was born in 1908. The son of a colonel,
he was educated at Lancing and Sandhurst. Wethered joined the Second
Gloucestershire Regiment as a Lieutenant at the end of August 1928.
At about the same time, he began to read for the Bar. He resigned his
commission in 1933, at which point he turned his attention to a career in
law. The exact circumstances in which he came to join MI5 are unclear.
After the war, Wethered became an Account Director for an advertising
agency. A Junior Account Executive who worked with him recalled the
office rumour that ‘he had worked in the Intelligence Services’, and
remembered Wethered as ‘one of the nicest and most polite people you
could ever meet’, who was ‘something of a perfectionist, both in his
attitude to work and certainly in his attitude to dress, which verged
on the dapper’.27 His perfectionism was apparent in his dealings with
SOE, and he quickly became a stern critic of the organisation’s security
arrangements.
Wethered’s introduction to SOE did little to give him confidence in

the security of the organisation, as he found himself investigating the
circumstances of a blown wireless operator, ‘Bishop’. ‘Bishop’ was one
of the codenames used by Marcus Bloom, a Londoner sent to the field
in October 1942 to act as W/T operator for ‘Alphonse’ (Tony Brooks),
who ran a circuit in Toulouse known as PIMENTO. Technical difficulties
prevented Bloom from transmitting for some 5 months following his
arrival, during which time he ‘worked actively as second in command
of the circuit, helped to organise parachute receptions, and took part
in several sabotage operations’.28 Bloom did not work solely for the
Brooks’ circuit; he was also in touch with another circuit in the Toulouse
region run by ‘Eugene’ (Maurice Pertschuck) known as PRUNUS. In the
official history SOE in France, Foot notes that Bloom was a friend of
Pertschuck, the pair having trained together in the UK, and that they met
up immediately upon Bloom’s arrival, before he had even made contact
with Brooks.29 Bloom’s technical difficulties were finally overcome with
the arrival of the W/T operator ‘Catalpha’ (Adolph Rabinovitch). Now
able to transmit, Bloom worked for both the PIMENTO and the PRUNUS
circuits.
London was alerted to a problem in Toulouse by a message received
from Rabinovitch on 14 April. He reported that Bloom had been
arrested by the Germans the previous day. No messages were received
from Bloom between 12 and 23 April, and when his traffic resumed,
the messages received in London were considered ‘suspicious’. As the
case involved a transmitter that appeared to be blown, MI5 was duly
informed in order to explore the possibilities of using the link for
deception. On 18 May, Robertson wrote to Senter, informing him that
from preliminary investigations it was Christopher Harmer’s view that
Bloom was ‘working under control’. He advised Senter to ‘ask Buck-
master to mark time on the whole Toulouse set-up’.30 In his report,
Harmer concluded that MI5 could not use the transmitter for decep-
tion purposes, and by the end of May it was clear that Robertson’s
Section had ‘no further interest in the case’.31 However, the case
had come to Wethered’s attention, who proceeded to continue the
investigation.32
Wethered was shocked when he discovered the poor security prac-
tice in the field that saw contact made between circuits, which meant
that a single arrest could lead to a widespread round-up of agents, and
immediately drew attention to the fact that supposedly independent
circuits active in the Toulouse region were ‘interlocked’.33 Wethered’s
concerns were further heightened by the interrogation of Denise Bloch,
a recent arrival from France. Bloch had been acting as courier for ‘Hilaire’
(George Starr), who was based in Agen, delivering messages to Pertshuck
for transmission by Bloom to London – linking yet another circuit
with the blown transmitter.34 Bloch’s interrogation also raised a further
instance of poor security that left Wethered exasperated. Having been
instructed to return to England via Spain to report on the situation in
the field, Starr gave Bloch a four-page letter, written ‘en clair’, addressed
to the French Section Operations Officer Captain Morel, in which he
detailed recent developments. Bloch was instructed not to worry if
she was searched by the Spanish police and the letter discovered and
confiscated ‘as it would be forwarded by the Spanish Authorities to
the British Embassy at Madrid’.35 Wethered noted that it was ‘incred-
ible that HILAIRE, an Englishman trained in this country by S.O.E.,
should have been so improvident’, referring elsewhere to his ‘unbeliev-
able stupidity’.36 He returned to the issue of overlapping between circuits
in a wide-ranging report on his investigative work later in the summer,
by which point he had come to realise the widespread nature of the
practice:
Agents in the Field are of course bound to enlist certain local inhab-
itants in the course of their job. They are not supposed, however,
to make contact with other organisations. Unhappily it appears
that in almost every case different parts of the same organisation
and even different organisations are aware of each other’s activities.
Consequently when as in the BISHOP case penetration is effected in
any one sector, other sectors and other organisations may also be
affected. The evils of this in the Field are obvious, and in investigating
the matter complications are considerable because of the various
points at which penetration seems possible.37
Meanwhile, the Nygaard case continued to drag on, and the first signs
of Country Section resentment began to emerge. Jack Wilson soon made
clear his intention to keep a close eye on developments when asked
by Miller for further particulars on the Lark organisation in February.
While Wilson had no objection to providing such information, he
added, ‘I must also be informed I hold myself personally respons-
ible for all security cases of this nature and will not be pushed aside.’38
Wilson proceeded to protest Nygaard’s innocence, discussing the case
with Lt Breida, a member of the staff of the Norwegian Commander-
in-Chief, informing Warden that he had ‘no doubt in his own mind
that Nygaard’s story is entirely bona fide, and that there is no reason to
believe that the enemy connived at his escape’.39
By the end of April, Wilson had grown increasingly impatient with
MI5’s handling of the affair. On 6 May, an unnamed MI5 officer wrote
to Warden, agreeing that ‘it is time we made up our minds about this
case’. After ‘very careful consideration’, it had been agreed that an MI5
officer (likely Wethered) should interview Nygaard, ‘telling him that a
large amount of consideration has been given by different people to
his case, and that no one feels they can accept the story of his escape’.
While the officer did not believe that Nygaard had been given a mission
to complete in the UK by the Germans, he thought it ‘quite possible
that he was allowed to escape on condition that he did something
for the Germans in Norway’. Even before the interview had taken place
it was clear that, as far as MI5 was concerned, Nygaard’s career as an
SOE agent was finished:
Whether or not we can obtain an admission from him I feel that he

should not be kept in his present employment any longer after
the interrogation we should, I think, make appropriate arrangements
with the Norwegians for Nygaard to join the Norwegian forces in
some capacity where he would be safely employed.40
MI5’s determination to find Nygaard guilty could not, perhaps, have

been made more explicit: if he confessed, he should leave SOE; if he
did not confess, he was lying and should leave SOE. The interview took
place on 14 May, and the ‘modified form of bluff technique’ employed
by the MI5 officer proved woefully ineffective:
I explained to Nygaard that the story of his escape had not been
accepted. I produced the limited bluff technique, and Nygaard agreed
that his story must seem to be a strange coincidence to anyone
reading it I then asked him if any fact had occurred to him which
made it appear possible that the escape had been arranged, perhaps
without his direct complicity. He assured me that there was no
such fact, and that he did not honestly think that such a thing
had happened. Although he fully appreciated the position he was
in, Nygaard adhered to his belief that he had had great luck and
that the escape was genuine. I discussed with him this matter for a
considerable time, and was unable to extract any sort of admission
from him.41
The MI5 officer wrote to Warden 3 days later, noting that ‘we have
reached a decision in the case of Herluf Nygaard’. He was ‘satisfied with
the account of the events leading up to his escape’, but felt that it
was ‘quite possible’ that the Germans had arranged the escape itself,
although ‘both Harvey and I were satisfied that Nygaard himself played
no part in this arrangement’. Despite this apparent clearance of Nygaard
of the charge of collusion with the enemy, MI5 refused to give up its
suspicion. Again, the officer noted that ‘there is no doubt in our minds
with regard to Nygaard’s proper destination’:
I understand that Colonel Wilson is no longer particularly anxious

to retain Nygaard’s services, and we feel that in the circumstances
they should certainly be dispensed with. There is no case for his
detention. Therefore in our view he should be posted as soon as
possible to the Norwegian Forces Although we do not think that
there is any question of Nygaard having worked for the Germans
or intending to do so, there is still a slight element of doubt in the
case, which it will be possible to resolve by posting Nygaard to a
station where he would not be brought into touch with further secret
information.42
Wilson was incensed by MI5’s assumption that it could dictate the

future of one of his agents on the basis of a ‘slight element of doubt’,
and in the absence of substantiated proof of guilt. He wrote to Senter
on 25 May, noting his belief that ‘M.I.5’s suggestion that Nygaard
should be returned to ordinary military duty with the R.N.A. should be
resisted’:
As a matter of principle, I am very strongly of opinion that since

M.I.5 have returned a verdict of ‘non proven’ it is not for them to
issue any form of sentence.
Beyond the matter of principle, there were also practical considerations;

such action would potentially have negative operational consequences:
I desire to retain Nygaard’s services in order that he may act as an

adviser for the Trondheim area. There is a possibility that we may be
involved in a new ‘TITLE’ operation, and in this connection Nygaard’s
services would be of the greatest value.43
Senter was also troubled by MI5’s approach. He wrote to White on

4 June, expressing Wilson’s views and adding his own concerns:
The point on which I felt a difficulty was the use of the word ‘decision’
and the substance of that ‘decision’ – namely that this agent of ours,
against whom I gather there is no residual suspicion, should be posted
away from the work on which we are employing him.44
In the light of SOE’s response, MI5 quickly backed down and clarified
its position; the ‘decision’ was re-branded as a ‘recommendation’ which
was thought to be in keeping with Wilson’s own views on the case.
It is difficult to find this explanation altogether convincing; the more
compelling explanation remains that MI5 felt that suspicion alone was
a sufficient indicator of guilt, and intended to work on that assumption
unless challenged.
As we have seen, the Security Section did what it could to defend the
Norwegian Section against the debilitating effects of excessive caution
on the part of MI5. However, at the same time it had to defend the posi-
tion of security within SOE, and ensure that arrangements made with
MI5 were adhered to, which meant maintaining a difficult balance. By
the summer of 1943, it is easy to see why Wilson was disenchanted with
the procedure for dealing with returned agents who had escaped from
German custody. With the ongoing Nygaard case no doubt in mind,
in July he appealed to the Head of SOE’s operational London Group
Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman for ‘some exception’ to Routine Orders to
be taken in the case of the return of one of his agents who had briefly
found himself in enemy hands:
When he arrives back in the U.K. this N.C.O. will have spent a consid-
erable number of weeks in a neutral country, rendered his report to
our branch in Stockholm and been questioned there by both S.O.E.
and the Norwegian authorities.
I take it that some exception, therefore, will be made to the general
procedure as laid down in this Routine Order. In the circumstances
of the case, to segregate a member of an Allied Army immediately on
his return to the U.K. could easily create bad blood and be taken in
the nature of an insult.45
Despite the Security Section’s sympathy with, and support for, Wilson
over the severity of MI5’s approach to such cases, and their joint prot-
estations over Nygaard, it now had to support the MI5 case in order to
prevent security shifting too far in the opposite direction. In response

to an enquiry on the subject from Mockler-Ferryman, Senter noted that
we must not forget that an arrest by the enemy, followed by a release,

might be a cover for an attempt by the enemy to turn an agent round.
There may be cases in which we have to risk resentment of our Allies
on the facts of a case I do not anticipate any disagreement with SN
in practice he knows the obligations to the Security Authorities in
this country which we have to discharge.46
The Security Section had to front two opposing sides of the same argu-
ment, taking the opposite stance with the Country Sections to that
which it took when discussing procedure for returned agents with MI5.
The precarious balancing act in which the Security Section was
engaged was made even more difficult by Wethered’s attempts to extend
the scope of his investigative liaison position. After 2 months in post, he
wrote a lengthy paper for White, detailing how the liaison process had
worked in practice. While he conceded that the ‘system for dealing with
cases of S.O.E. agents who return to this country under suspicion seems
to be working satisfactorily’, Wethered was concerned by ‘the problem
of liaison and interchange of information between our two Organisa-
tions’; while the work for which he had been appointed was proceeding
satisfactorily, he wanted to do more.47 Specifically, he wanted greater
access to SOE papers in order to extract any information which could
be of use to MI5. Wethered also wanted to expand his investigative role
to become more proactive in seeking out trouble, by gaining access to
information that would reveal ‘Organisations in the field whose traffic
is suspicious but does not suggest to the S.O.E. Section that the Organ-
isation is necessarily blown’.48
The cause of Wethered’s concern was his investigation into the Bishop
case, which had opened his eyes to the difficulties of conducting security
investigations, as the French Section proved reluctant to cooperate fully
with him. As his investigation into the Bishop case progressed, Wethered
harboured a growing suspicion that pertinent information was being
deliberately withheld by the Section. His initial inquiries at the LRC
Information Index, which held information obtained from new arrivals
in the UK, were hampered by scanty information provided by the French
Section (‘If S.O.E. could be prevailed upon to give us the surnames
used in France by the various agents mentioned, there would quite likely
be traces’).49 His patience was soon tested further as he learned, quite by
chance, of the arrest of another agent in France linked to Rabinovitch
(the wireless operator who had fixed Bloom’s set).50 Thinking that this
may have a bearing on his ongoing investigation, Wethered quickly
made a request for further information, and learnt that the agent,
‘Spindle’, was ‘connected with the BISHOP organisation’. He expressed
his frustration that such potentially important information was not
automatically brought to his attention in a note:
It is almost incredible that this section should expect us to invest-

igate the security of their organisation and yet fail to give us such
simple and vital information as the arrest of another member of the
organisation, which reached my notice only by chance 51
Wethered’s suspicions were further fuelled when he read the report of

Denise Bloch’s interrogation, in which she mentioned ‘a large number
of other members of the organisation whose names have not been
given to us’. While he conceded that it was possible that some of those
mentioned may have been recruited in the field, and were consequently
unknown to the French Section, he continued to note, ‘I cannot help
suspecting that some of them have records with S.O.E. which have
never been mentioned to us.’52
While Wethered was no doubt motivated by a desire to conduct more
thorough investigations, and improve the situation he had faced during
the Bishop case, by trying to achieve permission for MI5 to be given
permission to visit individual Country Sections in order to root around in
their files, he was pushing both his liaison remit and his luck. Wethered
was aware that such access would ‘meet with considerable opposition
from most of the Section Leaders’, and of his own limitations in gaining
such access (‘there is a considerable difference between being on terms
of friendly co-operation with a Country Section and actually ferreting
among their records’). In receipt of Wethered’s letter, there is no indic-
ation that White did anything to in any way reprimand or discourage
him from trying to expand his remit in such a fashion. More seriously,
Wethered’s activities had not gone unnoticed within SOE, and had
begun to cause concern. In particular, his investigation into the Bishop
case had itself caused considerable disquiet, as SOE had been under the
impression that MI5’s interest in the case was limited to exploring the
possibility of using a blown transmitter for deception purposes. Senter
outlined the course of the Bishop investigation in a letter to Warden:
The Bishop matter was first mentioned as a ‘blown’ set and in

that connection Robertson of M.I.5. was asked to send an officer to
look into the matter. We were all under the impression, in partic-
ular F and myself, that the investigation was being done in the
‘blown’ set connection, but apparently from the M.I.5. end the
matter was being treated as an investigation on the penetration side.
I discussed this quite frankly with Dick White, Robertson and [ ]
and it has been agreed that the M.I.5. investigation rather went off
the rails.53
Wethered’s investigation was viewed by SOE as an unwelcome piece of

private enterprise, through which he had overstepped the mark, as there
were no grounds to suspect that any penetration had taken place that
would have implications for the return of agents from the Toulouse area
to the UK.
Frank discussion of Wethered’s actions in the Bishop case likely took
place at a joint SOE/MI5 meeting held on 31 May to discuss ‘Geoffrey
Wethered’s position with us’. On 3 June, Senter wrote a long letter to
White, recording the main points that had been raised. Senter was keen
to see Wethered stick to his agreed mandate, before any lasting damage
was caused to the existing relationship between the two organisations.
At the meeting, for which Wethered was in attendance for part, Senter
had discussed with White and Robertson ‘the need for a clear under-
standing as to [Wethered’s] duties so that these do not cut across existing
liaison arrangements between our two Departments’.54 Wethered, Senter
wrote, was ‘the attached Case Officer specially concerned with cases of
our people who return to this country after contact with the enemy,
and is in a position to look after your interests in such cases on the lines
set out’. While acknowledging that, in practice, Wethered also attended
further interrogations and was permitted free access to all information
held by Bayswater, Senter was adamant that no further expansion of
his role should take place. He pointed out that Wethered should not
interfere in liaison between SOE and the London Reception Centre (‘you
agreed as to the risk of crossed lines’), nor should the issue of ‘blown’
wireless sets come within the scope of his duties. Senter conceded that
‘there may be cases from time to time where we agree that, by reason of
his contacts with us and increasing knowledge of our organisation, he is
the appropriate M.I.5. officer to carry out an enquiry where your Depart-
ment is interested’, but closed by reiterating that ‘we should not run the
risk of impairing this hopeful experiment in intensive co-operation by
any inadvertent disregard of the interests or susceptibilities of our oper-
ational sections’; a veiled threat that the ‘experiment’, and with it, the
close liaison enjoyed by Wethered, could be halted should he continue

to exceed his remit.
The MI5 took the point. White, Robertson and Wethered all agreed
that Senter’s letter was a fair summary of the meeting, and accepted
it ‘as laying down the terms of reference for Wethered vis a vis your
organisation’.55 Internally, the matter was dealt with quite lightly. In a
minute to Wethered, White pointed out his belief that ‘everything you
have done seems to me to have been on the right lines and, subject
to those modifications of your position and approach to the subject
mentioned at our meeting you should continue as before’.56 The incident
passed, but Wethered would go on to cause more headaches for the
Security Section – and Senter in particular – later in the year, as he
began meddling in SOE’s liaison arrangements with SIS, an incident that
is explored in Chapter 6.
A further period of tension was caused by Senter’s growing suspicion of
Wethered’s behaviour in September–October 1943. According to Senter’s
version of events, Wethered had written to Miller on 29 September, with
‘a copy of an intercepted air mail letter-card’. Miller’s ‘bewilderment as to
how this matter fell within his duties as an interrogator of S.O.E. agents’
led him to refer the matter to Senter. Annoyed, Senter wrote, ‘I cannot for
the life of me see what this has to do with Wethered’s duties in connexion
with the return of S.O.E. agents who have had contact with the enemy in
occupied territory.’ Senter wrote to Wethered on 7 October, noting that
I had hoped that it was clear – especially from our meeting on the
31st May – that the arrangements for you to deal with S.O.E. agents
returned from abroad who had had hostile contacts must not be
allowed to upset the existing liaison arrangements with your Depart-
ment, especially in view of the importance attached by both our
Departments to adherence to these published arrangements.57
Senter also wrote to White, emphasising the consequences it was felt

such action would have. He emphasised that Wethered’s role meant
liaison with Warden (‘I should be glad if you could help towards seeing
that Geoffrey Wethered deals with the Head of our Special Section’),
reminding White of concerns that had been raised earlier in the year
regarding Wethered’s position, and the concern that it should ‘not cut
across the existing liaison arrangements’:
This may seem a small matter, but, unless I raise this point with you
and stress the fact that Geoffrey Wethered is not appointed as general
liaison officer for all purposes with S.O.E., then I think the liaison
arrangements with defined functions which have been settled over
the last two years and sanctioned by the Heads of your Department
are likely to be needlessly upset.58
Wethered responded to Senter on 9 October, clearly unrepentant at his

actions, noting ‘I do not think that our meeting of 31st May or the
matters discussed there are relevant’:
My understanding of the position is that day to day liaison with

S.O.E. should, since you succeeded Whetmore, be conducted with
you or one of the three officers appointed to assist you. One of these
is Warden, with whom I normally correspond. In Warden’s absence
on leave I sent the information, which we thought might be of assist-
ance, to Cyril Miller. The information came from me because it was
a B.1 matter. I am sorry if my effort to be helpful has caused you
inconvenience.59
On 11 October, Senter wrote to Hugh Park, emphasising that Wethered

was ‘not repeat not in any sense a general liaison officer between
M.I.5 and ourselves. You are the General Liaison Officer’, and noting
his intention to monitor the situation closely in future (‘if matters
do reach you from [Wethered] of the kind you have received in
the past or would more appropriately receive direct from a section
of M.I.5, please deal with it on that basis and draw it to the
attention of D/CE’).60 Senter wrote to Wethered the following day,
noting ‘Please do not think that your desire to be helpful is not
appreciated!’ He did, however, point out why Wethered’s actions
were deemed unhelpful by SOE, making reference to the existing
liaison arrangements as set out in the Director General’s Circular of
15 September 1942:
The point I am particularly concerned with is that Hugh Park is there

designated as being the officer for day to day liaison and individual
enquiries. Over the last two years he has established contact with
all your sections and we want Park’s general contacts to continue
undisturbed. Dick Warden is not the proper contact (or Miller in his
absence), except on the special cases of S.O.E. agents returning from
abroad, who have had hostile associations.61
A few days later, Senter emphasised the need for MI5 to adhere to
existing channels for the purposes of liaison in a letter to White:
we are anxious to give full effect to the strong wishes of the Heads
of both our departments, that the prescribed liaisons should not be
disturbed, and I am also anxious that Hugh Park, who is respons-
ible for the general day to day liaison with your department, should
continue to deal with all the sections he has dealt with over the
past two years Neither Warden nor Miller has any concern with
these general enquiries. That is why I raised with you the question
of whether possibly some of the sections in your organisation might
not be under the impression that Geoffrey had been appointed as
a general liaison officer. In making this point, I am not doubting
Geoffrey’s discretion or any of his other admirable qualities but
merely trying to say why I think we should take care to see that the
various channels that have been established, continue to function.62
While it is possible to feel a certain degree of sympathy for SOE’s oper-

ational Country Sections in the face of what can perhaps be described as
‘pro-active suspicion’ from MI5, the Country Sections did little to endear
themselves to MI5, behaving instead in a manner which suggested such
a blasé attitude towards security that it comes as little surprise that MI5
felt the need to maintain a strict stance when it came to SOE security.
Further, by displaying a tendency to withhold relevant information
from the Security Section, the Country Sections served to undermine
it in its relationship with MI5 by highlighting its impotence to deal
adequately with security matters. A clear case of such blatant Country
Section disregard for security occurred in the case of the agent Barry
Knight.
A French Section agent, Barry Knight was described by Wethered as
‘an extremely undesirable type who spent the years before the war, first
as a Hollywood film actor, and subsequently as “a play-boy” living on
the generosity of friends and admirers, chiefly women’, who possessed
‘a fundamental inability to tell the truth and a colossal vanity and self-
satisfaction’.63 Knight was investigated by MI5 during the summer of
1943. He had been dropped into France in April, ‘with a mission of
sabotage against an oil refinery near Autun’. The mission had failed, and
Knight travelled to Paris with another agent, where they were sheltered
by M. and Mme Canardelles. They travelled from Paris to Lyons, where
‘plans for their escape over the Spanish frontier were prepared’. Before
he could leave, Knight, ‘who had been frequenting unsafe restaurants,
contrary to instructions’, was arrested by the Germans and proceeded

to betray to the Gestapo the names of his contacts in Paris, resulting in
their arrest. Returning to Paris under German escort, Knight managed
to escape in a manner considered by Wethered to be highly dubious,
leading to suspicion that it had been ‘facilitated by the Germans’,
although it was later concluded that the ‘incredible details’ were ‘due to
his innate habit of lying and prevarication’. Following his escape, Knight
had returned to Lyons and successfully crossed the Spanish frontier.
Meanwhile, details about Knight’s dubious behaviour reached London
from a variety of sources. An RAF sergeant who had seen Knight in
Lyons after his escape from the Germans was interviewed, revealing a
‘very different account of the escape from that offered by Knight’. The
French couple denounced by Knight and arrested, who had subsequently
escaped and fled to the UK, were also interviewed. They stated that
during interrogation by the Germans they had been told that Knight had
provided their names and address, and shown ‘a deposition in German
signed by a man who was said to be a British Air Force officer named
King. King was Knight’s nom de guerre. His cover story to the Germans
had been that he was an R.A.F. officer.’
While highly critical of the fact that Knight had been permitted to
join SOE in the first place (‘he is about the least suitable type of agent
who could possibly have been employed by S.O.E. or any other secret
organisation’), Wethered saved his most damning comments for the
manner in which the organisation had dealt with Knight following his
return to the UK. As SOE ‘had received a report that he had been in
enemy hands’, Knight should have been segregated until he could be
cleared from a security point of view, in accordance with the Routine
Order outlined in Chapter 1. However, scant attention had been paid to
the agreed security procedure:
He was flown by aeroplane from Gibraltar, but no arrangements were

made by S.O.E. to meet him at the air-field, and he was allowed to
travel to London on his own, and even to call at the house where
his kit was being kept by friends. No control was exercised over him
until much later in the day, when he reported at the address of the
S.O.E. French Section in London.
Wethered’s criticism was aimed squarely at the French Section, which

had kept the Security Section in the dark about Knight’s return to the
UK (‘As soon as the Bayswater Special Section and this office heard of
the case and of Knight’s arrival, arrangements for his segregation were
laid on’). But even this breakdown in procedure paled in comparison

to Knight’s interrogation by Wethered and Maxwell Knight, at which
point it became apparent that Knight ‘had received advance informa-
tion’ about the report made by the R.A.F. sergeant – a copy of which was
held in his SOE file – and was aware that the Canardelles had escaped
from France, and had stated that the Germans had told them that Knight
had denounced them. Without this information with which to confront
Knight, the case against him disintegrated. He ‘was not broken’ during
interrogation, and the case had to be left in ‘an unsatisfactory condition’.
Keen to find out ‘how these very important facts had come into
Knight’s possession’, Wethered discovered that Knight was ‘on friendly
terms with certain officers in S.O.E.’, including Mrs Howard Dove – an F
Section secretary, who later admitted that Knight ‘had on several occa-
sions asked her to find out how his case was going’. As such contact
suggests, arrangements for Knight’s segregation had proved thoroughly
unsatisfactory. He was eventually held at the officers’ mess at an SOE
Training Station near Guildford, but still proved capable of exploiting
trips made to London for his own purposes:
after interrogation in London the car in which Knight was being

transported did not return to the Training Section until nearly
midnight. It was then discovered that the woman driver had allowed
herself to be persuaded to dine and drink with Knight on the way.
On more than one occasion it came to our notice that in spite of
instructions re segregation Knight, while in London for the purpose
of interrogation, had been allowed by his escorting officer to call at
the America Express Company in the Haymarket for letters addressed
to him there.
Wethered felt that the Knight case constituted a ‘very serious example
of inefficiency and incompetence’ which was ‘serious enough for some
representation to be made to S.O.E.’ about the actions of F Section:
the attitude and arrangements of the S.O.E. French Section

throughout the whole of the Knight case, and general S.O.E. arrange-
ments for Knight’s segregation and search from the moment of his
arrival in the U.K. call for very urgent attention and improvement.
Wethered appealed to MI5’s wider concerns when he added, ‘If in the

course of one case so many glaring blunders can be made, one is left
with an uneasy suspicion of what might happen in other cases.’ In spite
of the arrangements made between the Security Section and MI5, how
many other agents who had been in contact with the enemy were being
returned to the UK by their Country Sections surreptitiously?
Justifiably shocked by what his investigation had uncovered,
Wethered noted on the covering minute to White and Liddell that
‘I think you will agree that the situation revealed should not be left
without comment.’ He suggested that ‘the Director General should be
acquainted with the facts, in case he thought that any recommendation
should be made with a view to ensuring that similar mistakes are not
made again by S.O.E.’.64 Having read Wethered’s paper, White described
the Knight case as
a serious indictment of S.O.E. French Section for incompetence

KNIGHT should never have been sent to France at all, and his general
untrustworthiness, his entire lack of any knowledge of the language
must have made him a grave danger to other persons working for our
cause in France The sending of KNIGHT to France was a shockingly
irresponsible piece of work.
This blunt criticism was diluted for communication to SOE. As White

continued,
This having been said, I am doubtful whether we would be well

advised to make an official protest in writing to S.O.E. If you think
to the contrary, might I suggest that the protest be started by you
yourself having a word with Archie Boyle 65
The principal dilemma for B Division was its need to balance such legit-
imate concerns for security against considerations of realpolitik. Pushing
its concerns too forcibly upon SOE was likely to lead to the opposite
of the desired result. White’s desire for a tactful approach to SOE by
means of a quiet word with Boyle was echoed by Liddell, who had
been approached by Duff Cooper and asked whether Liddell thought he
should go to the top and discuss the Knight case with SOE’s Minister
Lord Selborne. Liddell disapproved of the idea:
I explained to [Duff Cooper] that since I last spoke to him Archie

Boyle had asked for a special report from Max Knight. This seemed
to imply that he was really intending to try and put S.O.E.’s house
in order. I thought therefore that if I could have a meal with Archie
Boyle and casually introduce the subject, it would be preferable to
Mr. Duff Cooper seeing Lord Selborne, which could only give the
impression that we had sneaked to a higher authority. If S.O.E. once
thought that we were trying to beat them with the big stick they would
simply dry up and we should never hear about any of their bad cases.
Mr. Duff Cooper saw this point and agreed to leave the matter in
my hands.66
The case effectively exposed the fragility of the relationship between

SOE and MI5. MI5 knew that it needed SOE ‘on side’ for security
work to be effective. As such, despite the seriousness of the transgres-
sion in the Knight case, the manner had to be dealt with lightly, for
fear of prompting alienation, with more serious criticisms consigned
for the most part to internal correspondence and memoranda, barring
the occasional audible outburst from its rogue elephant, Geoffrey
Wethered.
These concerns were not known to the Security Section, which feared
the consequences likely to follow from the Knight case, due to the
manner in which F Section’s actions had undermined confidence in its
ability to manage SOE’s security. Senter voiced the concern that if SOE
did not put its own security in order, MI5 would do it for them:
if we have many more cases like Barry KNIGHT, where he took

advantage of a visit to London to go off on his own, the Security
Service will probably put forward a demand (which may be very diffi-
cult to resist) that any such returned agents should pass straight away
into their custody.67
The Security Section had to take action – no matter how unpopular it

may be. Aware that it would ‘probably raise a storm of protest from
Country Sections’, Senter instructed two of his officers to ‘work out a
drill which will cover the taking over of such a returned agent, arrange-
ments for his custody and arrangements for his transport’. In addition,
as alluded to above by Liddell, Maxwell Knight was invited by Boyle
to conduct an investigation into ‘problems of S.O.E. internal security’,
which was completed by October.68 Knight focused upon ‘the various
aspects of internal security in S.O.E. and the co-operation between
the French Section and Commander Senter’s Special Section’. Rather
than criticising the work of the Security Section, Knight saved his criti-
cism for other aspects of the organisation, Buckmaster’s French Section
in particular, while defending the Security Section and advocating the
extension of its powers. Knight felt that there was a ‘very marked lack
of co-operation between the French Section and Commander Senter’s

officers’:
During the investigation into Barry Knight, there were many occa-
sions when Major Wethered and myself asked Commander Senter
for certain papers or for certain information In spite of the ever-
ready co-operation extended to us by Commander Senter, there were
many instances where either there were interminable delays before
Commander Senter was himself given the information by the Section
from which he sought it, or the information was not forthcoming at
all. There was even a considerable delay before Commander Senter
was able to obtain the personal file of Barry Knight which was in the
possession of the French Section; while in another instance there
was information available in the French Section which was not
disclosed to Commander Senter on request.
He also argued that the powers of the Security Section needed to be

strengthened:
when a case becomes a security case in S.O.E. the demands of the

Special Section should become paramount. All papers even remotely
connected with the subject of the investigation should be immedi-
ately sent to Commander Senter, where of course they would become
available to the officers investigating the case.
There is no indication that the Security Section ever achieved the exten-
sion to its powers advocated by Knight.
The well-known case of F Section agent Henri Dericourt (‘Gilbert’)
provides a further clear illustration of the tensions between operational
and security priorities, and also reveals the growing sense of hostility
towards security on the part of SOE’s Country Sections as the ‘benefit of the
doubt’ shifted from favouring the agent under suspicion to favouring the
case against him, resulting in potentially debilitating effects on operations
in the absence of sufficient or compelling evidence of guilt.
In November 1943, Bayswater was called in to investigate allega-
tions made against Dericourt, who arranged landing sites for aircraft
bringing F Section agents to France, by Jacques Henri Frager (‘Louba’),
who informed London that he had been told by ‘Colonel Hein-
rich’ (who turned out to be the Abwehr Officer Hugo Bleicher)
that Dericourt was working for the Germans. The allegation was
felt to constitute ‘a grave question of operational security’.69 On
16 November, Warden forwarded a report on the allegation, prepared

by Miller following his interrogation of Frager, to both Wethered and
SIS, admitting that on present information it was ‘impossible to assess’
its accuracy. Miller’s opinion of Frager was mixed, describing him as
‘excitable’ and acknowledging that his recollection of detail was ‘often
confused’. However, he was ‘satisfied that he is attempting to the best of
his ability to tell the truth, and that he is genuine’.70 At this point, the
Security Section took operational considerations into account. Miller
noted Buckmaster’s emphasis that Dericourt was ‘a vital link of trans-
port’, who ‘would be very difficult to replace at so critical [a] period as
the present’. Both Miller and Warden felt that, ‘upon the balance of
operational security against considerations of security’, Dericourt could
continue to be used, but on the condition that ‘If any casualty is
traceable to him in the future, immediate steps will be taken to liquidate
him.’71 At a meeting attended by representatives of the Security Section,
F Section, MI5 and Section V, Buckmaster pointed out that Dericourt
‘had been in charge of reception and ex-filtration of S.O.E. agents for
nearly nine months, and his work had been carried out without a single
apparent failure’.72 It was agreed that Frager’s allegation was insufficient
to be acted on. Dericourt was expected to return to the UK in the near
future, and it was hoped that the allegations could be cleared up at that
point.73 Nor was undue suspicion to be attached to him; while it was felt
that Dericourt should return to the UK in order that the allegation could
be cleared up, he would ‘not come to this country as a suspect character
but as the subject of denunciations which we shall be glad to have an
opportunity of exploring’.74 As such, the Security Section found favour
from F Section Head Maurice Buckmaster, who wrote to Miller thanking
him for ‘the patience that you have, as always, shown in unravelling
this tricky case, and the objective manner in which you have dealt both
with this question of the reports and with the personnel involved’.75
Further allegations against Dericourt now came to the attention of the
Security Section. By the end of January 1944, three further allegations
had been made, which were outlined in a further paper on the case
by Miller.76 The first of these came via Yeo Thomas of the Free French
Section. Interviewed upon his return from France, Yeo Thomas stated
that the agent ‘Bel’, with whom he had been in contact, had given him
information regarding two traitors, the second of whom
was a Frenchman holding a commission in the British Army, and

also working for an organisation not controlled by the F.F. He was
in charge of air operations in the Paris and Angers districts. Through
his treachery, two men and a woman, who were landed some time
in August, were picked up by the Gestapo, very shortly after their
arrival.
Miller pointed out that the description ‘strongly indicates Gilbert, who
was, in fact, operating in those districts’. However, it was pointed out
that ‘H.Q has been unable to trace the two men and woman’ mentioned.
The second allegation originated with SIS, and was less conclusive. On
6 December, Wethered wrote to Senter, notifying him that informa-
tion had been received from a returning SIS agent at the LRC that
‘unquestionably refers to Gilbert’, which claimed that he was known
to the Gestapo. Wethered’s certainty, however, was soon questioned
as it became unclear whether the information referred to Dericourt
or another agent, ‘Archambaud’. A further allegation that arrived via
an SIS source tipped the balance of suspicion against Dericourt. On
26 January, Miller visited an SIS Station and ‘interviewed one of their
agents, recruited in the Field and recently come out of France for
training’. Known as ‘Perrier’, Miller described him as ‘a young man of
a particularly impressive type; I am quite convinced of his accuracy
and was much impressed by his intelligence. I unhesitatingly accept the
statements he made to me as being statements of truth.’ Prior to his
departure, Perrier had been given ‘a number of documents to take with
him to England’. One of these was of particular significance:
The document is in the form of a report, drawing our attention to

‘the French Captain serving in the R.A.F. who has, for several months
past, been working for the Germans.’ The copy of the translation of
the full report repeats information that two men and one woman
have been received, given the relevant B.B.C. message, which, in
fact, coincides with that used for Gilbert, gives a description of the
officer in question, which corresponds with that of Gilbert and states
that he frequents a bar, which he is known by F Section in fact to
frequent.
There can be no question that this report refers to Gilbert.
‘Therefore’, Miller concluded, ‘from four independent sources, informa-

tion that Gilbert is working for the Germans has been received by H.Q.’.
Senter wrote to Gubbins and Boyle the following day, noting that while
it had been felt earlier that ‘the facts did not justify a clear case against
Gilbert’, it had now become ‘impossible to ignore the case’.77 Senter
supported a suggestion to see Dericourt brought to the UK immediately
for questioning (‘I personally think that we are justified in asking for
an operation to bring him out’). The plan was approved, and ‘Opera-
tion Knacker’ was mounted on 4 February. Dericourt refused to return
to the UK immediately, eventually returning to the UK on the night
of 8/9 February. His first interrogation was conducted by Warden on 9
February, followed by a second interrogation by an MI5 officer 2 days
later. ‘On both occasions’, Senter wrote, ‘he gave the impression of being
truthful, but it must be added that he confined his answers strictly
indeed narrowly to the points put to him.’78
Relations between the Security and the French Sections now began to
grow tense, with strong echoes of the earlier Barry Knight case. Senter
wrote to Mockler-Ferryman, informing him that arrangements had been
made for Dericourt and his wife to be absent from their accommodation,
in order that ‘special microphone arrangements’ could be put in place.
The French Section, however, failed to ensure that this plan was adhered
to, with ‘the most embarrassing consequences’:
Gilbert and his wife were both there when the mechanic arrived to
carry out his instructions and, not only were his suspicions excited
to such an extent that the whole important check may fail, but his
suspicions may mean that unnecessary publicity has been given to a
secret security measure.79
Senter emphasised ‘how seriously we must take all cases of agents who
return from abroad with any circumstances of suspicion attaching’,
pointing to the stance adopted by MI5:
Not unnaturally, they are concerned with any channel of commu-

nication between this country and occupied territory that may be in
any way tainted and anxious that any undertakings that we may give
in connection with our people returning to this country are strictly
fulfilled.
Senter warned Buckmaster of the consequences that would likely result

from his Section’s reluctance to comply with arrangements agreed with
MI5, particularly in the current case in which Senter had ‘managed to
arrange that Gilbert should not be treated as a “Security” case in the
strict sense’.80 Senter believed that F Section had given MI5 all the reason
it needed to adopt a stricter line.
Further tension followed at a meeting between Security Section and
F Section representatives held on 12 February, at which Senter was
‘strongly pressed’ by Buckmaster to give security clearance to Dericourt,

in order that he may begin ‘conversations with the Air Ministry for the
selection of future landing grounds’ and so that plans could be made for
his return to France ‘to organise further traffic’. Senter refused, noting
that ‘we must await the report of M.I.5’. Senter recorded that Buckmaster
‘pressed me to accept the view that the strain of working in the field
had been such that Louba had invented the allegation against Gilbert’, a
view to which Senter found himself ‘unable to accede’. Senter accepted
that any decision in the case would be difficult. He believed that it was
‘impossible to disregard the allegations against Gilbert’, and was uncon-
vinced by the importance attached by Buckmaster to the point that ‘no
casualty in the field is traceable to Gilbert and that, if he has been a
traitor, it is surprising that the enemy should have neglected to arrest
agents’, pointing out:
if Gilbert is a traitor, the enemy would likely regard him as being

an important agent and would quite likely sacrifice opportunities
of making arrests so as to leave Gilbert wholly free from suspicion
until some vital occasion – possible shortly before what the enemy
conceive to be D-Day – when they would pounce.
Senter predicted that MI5 would conclude that Dericourt did not present
a security threat in the sense of having returned to the UK with a mission
to carry out for the Germans, and that SOE ‘must take the responsibility
of deciding in terms of our own operational security whether it is
safe to send him back to the field to resume his work’.81
The advice of MI5, communicated by Wethered having been agreed
with Liddell, followed along the lines predicted by Senter. Wethered
pointed out that the case was ‘extraordinarily complicated’, and that
the suspicions against Dericourt were ‘serious and unexplained’, leaving
only two possible explanations:
Either Louba’s denunciation and the other adverse reports are

substantially correct, in which case Gilbert is an enemy agent of a
very high grade; or Louba is deliberately lying or grossly exaggerating
about a matter of the greatest possible importance. Louba is a man
whom your organisation thinks reliable enough to send back into the
field in the near future. His unproven denunciation of Gilbert must
therefore be taken seriously.
As such, MI5’s recommendation was clear:
Although it is only fair to say that Gilbert makes a good personal

impression under interrogation, and that his antecedents seem to be
unexceptionable, we should, if the decision were entirely an M.I.5
one, regard the case as serious enough to prevent him undertaking
any further intelligence work outside this country. In view of the
facts indeed we feel that this is the recommendation which we
must take.
Although only given the status of a recommendation (‘since there is no

question so far as we know of Gilbert having a mission in this country or
having come into possession of valuable information while he is here’),
Wethered continued to stipulate a condition to Dericourt’s return to
the field that effectively reduced the chances of such a return to nil: if
the ‘considerable risk of sending him back to the field in spite of the
unresolved doubts existing against him’ was taken, MI5 felt that any
external departments involved, such as the Air Ministry, ‘should be made
aware of the suspicions which exist about his bona fides’, particularly
should it be decided to use Dericourt for pre-D-Day activities. ‘If there
should be any such plan’, Wethered wrote, ‘I am sure you will agree
that it would be essential for the Chiefs of Staff to be informed of the
position.’
In making this condition, MI5 outmanoeuvred F Section. Senter
quickly picked up on the implications in a letter to Mockler-Ferryman,
noting,
I think, in view of the recent J.I.C. enquiry, that M.I.5 are justi-
fied in raising the points about the Air Ministry and the Chiefs of
Staff if by any chance a similar enquiry should arise out of casual-
ties following on the continued use of Gilbert, M.I.5 would, I have no
doubt, be asked as to what their part in the investigation had been
and what advice they had felt bound to tender.82
It was also at this point, after Dericourt had been brought from France to
answer allegations rather than as a ‘real’ suspect, that MI5 decided
to shift the goalposts in terms of how suspicious SOE agents should
be handled. In the eyes of MI5, suspicion was now sufficient to act
upon in the absence of conclusive evidence of guilt, a hardening of
policy that was of particular significance in the case of the Dutch agents
‘Chive’ and ‘Sprout’ (covered in Chapter 7), who were being investig-
ated simultaneously with Dericourt. On 13 February, White explained to
Senter:
we have come to the view that our attitude in all cases of an unsat-
isfactory nature must be stiffened so as to give security interests, and
not the individual, the benefit of any residuary doubt. The question
is at present in course of discussion between ourselves and the Home
Office.83
This change in stance was also recorded by Liddell in his diary. On

Dericourt, he noted that ‘it is quite impossible for anyone to say whether
Gilbert is right or wrong. There is however a strong element of doubt
about the case, and in our view he should not be allowed to return to
the field.’84
The Dericourt case now became a disagreement between MI5 and the
French Section over the correct application of the benefit of the doubt,
which also divided SOE; the Security Section supported MI5, while
SOE’s Chief Colin Gubbins (former Director of Operations) supported
F Section. Liddell recorded in his diary: ‘Archie Boyle and the Security
Section support us in our views. Gubbins takes the line that either we
should have cleared Gilbert or locked him up.’ Having made its ‘recom-
mendation’, based on little stronger than ‘unresolved doubts’, MI5 now
became the focal point for Buckmaster’s wrath. Aware of the allegations
that had been made against Dericourt, Buckmaster did not believe that
sufficient proof that he was working for the Germans existed. In a draft
letter to Mockler-Ferryman, he outlined his predictions for the case,
indicating prior experience of the pattern that was likely going to repeat
itself. Giving ‘the benefit of any residuary doubt’ to security interests,
rather than to the individual against whom an allegation was made,
clearly had the potential to be exceedingly damaging to operational
interests:
I therefore conclude that if any damn fool starts accusing one of my

organisers of being a double agent, and this had happened many
times in the past (for example, Miss Hall was accused for months of
being a double agent in Lyons and as far as I know, no action was
taken by security against her) all work in the field between us and the
agent is liable to be suspended without any guarantee of a satisfactory
decision from security one way or the other.85
Buckmaster emphasised what he believed to be the questionable nature

of the source of the original allegation, describing Louba as ‘a man
who is extremely passionate and emotionally unbalanced’, character-
istics that ‘do not form a firm basis on which to build a case’. However,
he recognised that his hands were tied and that there was little he
could do but defer to security, for fear of MI5 being proved right at a
later date:
It would be too easy for me to ask that [Dericourt] should be sent back
to the field on the assumption that should he be a German agent no
added danger would ensue through pickup operations, as the men
will not know more about D-day plans than the men who have left
in the last six months.
But I do not propose to do so. I do not propose to do so, because
I want to state that at great trouble and risk we brought the man
back to this country and with the completely nullifying result that
nothing can be proved against him.
I fully understand [Senter’s] point of view, and how difficult it is
to give a clearance certificate to anybody under such circumstances.
I am not asking for such a certificate, but on the other hand I am not
prepared to send that man back to France to carry on operations for
my Section and to be faced with the possibility one day of a normal
Lysander incident, in which case the J.I.C. would undoubtedly
decide that the whole of the F. Section organisation in France is
blown and that such an accident constitutes proof that Gilbert is a
German agent.
A somewhat calmer letter was sent by Buckmaster to Senter on

24 February, which highlighted the gulf that separated security as viewed
by MI5 and as seen from an operational Country Section perspective. He
targeted the line in Wethered’s letter that stated that Dericourt should
be prevented ‘from undertaking any further intelligence work outside this
country’, noting,
I feel that there is a tendency to judge agents’ security on what

I will call S.I.S. standards of security, when in fact the standard of the
latter must for obvious reasons be higher than necessary for S.O.E.
agents S.I.S. need to be able to assess the value of intelligence
received, because they need to know whether it is an enemy plant
and therefore dangerously misleading or not. S.O.E., on the other
hand, are after all only primarily concerned with whether a factory
is blown up or not. Whereas a doubt as to a man’s bona fides may

justifiably induce S.I.S. to cease using his services, there is no such
primary consideration in respect of S.O.E. work.86
Before giving up entirely, Buckmaster referred the case to a higher

authority: Harry Sporborg, Vice-Chief of SOE, wrote to Boyle on
16 February, at which point the case appeared to be turning into a high-
level policy clash between SOE and MI5, based on their respective oper-
ational and security concerns. Sporborg noted that he had ‘absolutely
no axe to grind’, but was ‘anxious to avert what I consider to be a serious
miscarriage of justice with the resulting loss of a valuable agent and
possibly other serious consequential damage to our work in France’.87
Considering Wethered’s letter ‘most unsatisfactory’, he proposed writing
directly to Liddell, his draft letter pointing out that
your conclusion is that suspicion against Gilbert cannot be dismissed

because the allegation was made and the accused cannot prove
himself to be innocent. Frankly these grounds do not seem to me to
be sufficient to justify denying to S.O.E. the service of this admittedly
most efficient agent.88
Sporborg continued to ask Liddell to re-open the Dericourt case, with

some urgency (‘if I am right and Gilbert is “acquitted” we have only
just enough time to make the necessary arrangements for the March
programme’).89 A further paper dated 16 February (anonymous but
bearing a great similarity to Buckmaster’s earlier unsent draft) covered
similar points, again highlighting the dangers of setting too great a store
by allegations made against agents:
any allegation of this nature (and these accusations are likely to

become more frequent in the conditions now prevalent in the field)
will suspend indefinitely all work in the field by the agent concerned
without any guarantee of a satisfactory decision from Security one
way or the other it is impossible to carry on a healthy organisa-
tion in such circumstances We brought [Dericourt] back to this
country with considerable trouble and risk and with the completely
nullifying result that nothing can be proved for or against him.
The paper continued to push for a decision to be made, arguing that the
case of Dericourt should ‘be brought to a definite conclusion one way or
the other Gilbert should either be held in this country as a German
agent or be released to continue his mission on the same footing as any

other of our most trusted agents.’
In response to Sporborg’s concern, Senter provided him with a
summary of the case from the security point of view, emphasising
the separate allegations that had been made, and that Dericourt ‘has
produced no explanation or theory to account for them he must be
regarded at least as a person who has attracted dangerous attention to
his activities as a secret agent’.90 The conflict now continued on an
inter-SOE level; Boyle later told Liddell that ‘his section had had a battle
royal with Gubbins and had won’.91 SOE file material does not mention
Gubbins, but rather indicates the continued involvement of his Vice-
Chief, Sporborg. Boyle met with Sporborg on 18 February, giving his full
backing to the Security Section’s interpretation of the case. He wrote to
Senter:
I told him that as far as I was concerned I was quite prepared to stand
on your judgement especially in view of the remarkable record for
right judgement which you and your people have got, and [Sporborg]
agreed that on form we were most likely to be right but he was not
happy about the position in view of F’s insistence and grief.
During his discussion with Sporborg, Boyle emphasised that ‘one thing
which we could never depart from was our anxiety to put and keep
M.I.5. fully in the picture, and in the ultimate M.I.5. had the right to
make the recommendation that a man coming to this country should
be shut up for security reasons’.92 He also offered to put the case to
an arbitrator or ‘neutral adviser’, a suggestion which Sporborg appears
to have taken up; a one-page SIS summary of the case was written by
‘V.B.5f’, who concluded that ‘In my opinion, looking at the facts of the
case it is difficult to assess whether Gilbert is working for the Germans
or not I suggest that until Gilbert’s position is clarified there should
be no question of his leaving the country.’93
Having reviewed the case, Sporborg backed down. On 19 February,
he told Senter that he ‘had come to the conclusion that there was a
stronger prima facie case against Gilbert than he had been led to believe’,
and that he proposed to give Mockler-Ferryman final responsibility for
‘deciding whether he felt able or bound to go on using Gilbert’. Senter
already knew that Mockler-Ferryman ‘personally thought the risk was
too great to take, as if even an accident happened to Gilbert, we should
be in a position of great difficulty in view of the warnings we have
had’. On Monday 21 February, in Senter’s presence, Sporborg phoned
Mockler-Ferryman and told him that ‘although he personally did not

believe Gilbert to be guilty, he did not think we could run the risk of
using him further’.94 Discussion then turned to the complicated ques-
tion of what was to become of Dericourt for the duration of the war, an
issue which is of little relevance to the current study.
From the Country Section point of view, Dericourt had been prevented
from conducting further valuable work because MI5 had been unwilling
to grant him the benefit of the doubt. This attitude was not in itself
without further operational repercussions, which were pointed out to
Buckmaster on 19 March by another member of his French Section:
I should like in parenthesis to point out that our treatment of Gilbert

to date has already had a sufficiently damaging effect on the morale of
some of our best agents. One man in fact has expressed very strongly
the feeling of insecurity he had on returning to the field to think
that any malicious accusation made against him in his absence could
bring down on him this type of reward for his services.95
The frustration felt by the French Section over the power of suspi-
cion to upset operational considerations continued to be felt in the
Norwegian Section over the Nygaard case. Further ‘proof’ of Nygaard’s
collaboration with the Germans emerged when a wine and spirit ration
card in his name was found in the hands of the Gestapo; MI5 quickly
concluded that this was a perk given to collaborators. By 30 December
1943, still waiting for MI5 to clear Nygaard almost a year after his return
to the UK, Wilson noted that he was ‘beginning to feel very strongly
that British justice, as such, is being laid wide open to attack’. Despite
Wilson’s protests, MI5 continued to stall; the case was likely caught up
in the same shift of policy in support of suspicion prior to Overlord as
that of Dericourt. Wilson’s growing impatience was apparent in June
1944, at which point he wrote to Warden noting that he was ‘still subject
to bombardment by the Norwegian High Command in regard to M.I.5’s
extreme discourtesy in not giving any final decision’ on the case:
Is it not possible for something to be done in this matter after so

many months, and after so many approaches to them to this effect?
He will not be sent to Norway on any mission for us pre-D. day,
but to keep the sword of Damocles suspended over his head is, in my
ex-police and ex-magisterial opinion, a criminal act.96
Wilson chased his enquiry again on 28 June. On 6 July, he wrote to

Warden that ‘The sphinx-like silence of M.I.5 does not intimidate me in
the slightest’, stating that ‘If I can get no satisfaction in this way I shall be
compelled to take the case to a higher authority.’97 Warden proceeded to
write to Wethered, who remained reluctant to wholly absolve Nygaard
of all suspicion:
In view of the complicated facts of his escape and of the matter

which you and I investigated more recently concerning the list of
Norwegians in receipt of extra rations from the Germans, it is a little
difficult for us to give 100% clearance or to say that everything which
Nygaard has related is true. I think however that one might say that
in view of the more recent reports we need not maintain our attitude
of suspicion, that we cannot oppose Nygaard’s employment in a
confidential capacity, and that we can feel assured that his presence
in this country has nothing sinister about it.98
Wethered also requested notification if it was proposed to send Nygaard

back to the field as an agent. Nygaard was subsequently sent back to
help reinforce the ‘Grebe’ party (‘covering the railway in the Osterdal
valley’) – although even here MI5 had the last, suspicious, word, by
suggesting that ‘the officer in charge of the reinforcement should be told
to give Nygaard his special attention, and to see that as far as possible
he is not sent to make local contacts’.99
6
Approaching Section V
Through an examination of SOE’s relationship with MI5, it is possible

to explore, albeit to a limited extent, the relationship between these two
bodies and SIS, particularly its counter-espionage division, Section V.
In the case of SOE’s Security Section and MI5’s B Division, each saw
in the other something that it could exploit to its own advantage in
its dealings with Section V. In the case of SOE, this concerned a desire
for greater access to counter-espionage intelligence derived from ‘Most
Secret Sources’ – the Ultra/ISOS intercepts – as the Security Section
did not initially have effective liaison arrangements of its own with
Section V. B Division, meanwhile, came to believe that its relationship
with the Security Section provided knowledge of SOE activity that would
give it the leverage it needed in order to achieve greater involvement
in cases of counter-espionage overseas; specifically, the ability to invest-
igate returning SIS agents who were thought to be of security concern.
Unlike the arrangement that developed with MI5, the Security Section
was not the sole channel through which SOE communicated with SIS.
Beyond Edward Calthrop’s position as SOE’s general liaison officer with
SIS, the two organisations maintained a number of relationships. On
an operational level, SOE’s Country Sections were in contact with their
SIS counterparts, the ‘Production’ (P) Sections, and some of these rela-
tionships were more amicable than others. The most appropriate point
of contact for the Security Section was Section V, which was respons-
ible for counter-espionage and the distribution of Ultra/ISOS intercept
material. Section V was detached from the general organisation of SIS,
which was divided into ‘Production’ and ‘Circulation’ Sections. Located
at Prae Wood near St Albans, along with the SIS Central Registry,
Section V was ‘separately embodied as the Security Section of S.I.S.’. It
was also ‘outside the general direction’ of the SIS Board of Directors,
under the ‘personal supervision’ of Col Valentine (‘Vee Vee’) Vivian,
132
Approaching Section V 133
the Deputy Chief of SIS, in his capacity as Chief Security Adviser to

‘C’, Sir Stewart Menzies.1 Under Vivian’s supervision, Section V was run
by Felix Cowgill. A small unit, Section V had consisted of only two
officers until December 1938, at which point it was increased to three.2
Upon the outbreak of war, this grew to three officers in the UK and two
overseas, increasing further to 12 at home and 12 overseas (‘each with
secretarial staffs and sub-agents of their own’) by the summer of 1942,
a result of the section’s developing role as processor and distributor of
decrypted intercepts – the Ultra/ISOS product from Bletchley Park. At
the time, even this small growth ‘incurred the criticism that the SIS was
developing counter-espionage at the expense of its work on obtaining
operational intelligence for the Services’ – as Dick White later observed,
the P Sections regarded counter-espionage intelligence as ‘a “poor rela-
tion” ’.3 Greater expansion followed, and by 1944, Section V had 60
officers in the UK and ‘about the same number’ stationed abroad.4
While SOE’s Security Section had immediately set about developing
a relationship with MI5, there is little to indicate such contact with
Section V until the summer of 1943 and the signing of the ‘Glenalmond
Treaty’, discussed later in this chapter. Nor did the Security Section have
access to a regular supply of Ultra/ISOS decrypts for counter-espionage
work, as did MI5. Shortly before SOE’s dissolution, Senter wrote that
‘Section V had certain information from time to time of a specially
delicate character and at all times Air-Commodore Boyle himself was
the fully trusted recipient of this information’.5 However, it appears
questionable that this was indeed the case. Prior to the signing of the
Glenalmond Treaty, Boyle looked to B Division as a means of bypassing
Section V and gaining access to such material. In early 1943, he made
life difficult for Liddell by playing on the cooperation that had existed
between his Security Section and B Division over the previous 2 years,
making explicit his wish to see gestures of goodwill from MI5 replaced
with something more tangible. On 20 January, he wrote to Liddell,
expressing his desire to ‘have some extension of our liaison arrange-
ments so as to cover the interchange of material of C.E. interest’. Behind
this lay a desire on Boyle’s part to obtain a copy of an MI5 study of
the German Secret Service prepared by John Curry, which he knew to
contain Ultra/ISOS-derived material. He wrote,
I understand that you have now completed your studies of the

German C.E. machine and have produced treatises on the subject. We
should be very glad, of course, if we might be included in the distribu-
tion and, as we are recipients of most secret source material, I assume
that there would be no impediment on that score. We should natur-

ally respect any stipulations you might wish to make as to treatment
and distribution.6
Boyle’s information was several months out of date. Two editions of

the work in question had been prepared. The first, circulated in June
1942, was known as the ‘esoteric edition’ and was given very limited
circulation, while a second version, intended for a wider audience, had
been released in August. The report, which ‘summarised the informa-
tion available up to the end of March 1942’, consisted of a combination
of ‘information received by the interrogation of German agents arriving
in this country and that derived from the intercepted wireless of the
Abwehr and the SD’.7 The inclusion of intercept material made it
impossible for Liddell to release the report to Boyle without the blessing
of SIS. Boyle’s claim that SOE was already the recipient of most secret
source material was stretching a point; he did not mention that only a
limited amount of Ultra/ISOS product was shown to a select few at the
level of the SOE Council, including himself. Understandably cautious,
Liddell duly contacted Vivian, and notified him of Boyle’s request:
I understand that S.O.E. are recipients of most secret source material,

but presumably it only has a limited circulation. Personally I should
have no hesitation in showing any of our information to Archie
Boyle, but I should like to know where it is going after that. If it is to
be of any use it would presumably have to go to heads of sections.
Liddell closed by noting that he was ‘anxious to help him [Boyle] so far as
it is possible to do so’. In response, Vivian prohibited MI5 from providing
Boyle with a copy of Curry’s work. Instead, Liddell was informed that
Boyle should be told to contact Section V directly: ‘if he will let us
know exactly what he wants, we will try and write it up for him in
a form which can be communicated to his Country Sections’.8 Liddell
informed Boyle of the situation, and received an indignant response
(‘Your letter makes me feel that I have been asking for charity! We
are merely anxious to extend the field of collaboration with you and
S.I.S.’). Boyle closed his letter with a veiled threat:
Senter, at the request of your Director General is contributing all

he can regarding cases of suspected penetration and, without asking
for charity, I do ask for co-operative reciprocity.9
This left Liddell in a tight spot. He had no wish to jeopardise the cooper-
ation MI5 received from the Security Section, but at the same time had
no desire to incur the wrath of SIS, and potentially jeopardise MI5’s
own access to ‘most secret’ material. Liddell tried to explain to Boyle
how his hands were tied (‘I must apologise if my letter made you
feel that I was treating you like a pauper. It was the last thing in the
world that I intended to do’), and pointed to the difficulties caused
by SIS:
unfortunately we are not always our own masters owing to our work
being so inextricably mixed up with that of S.I.S. who place restric-
tions on the circulation of their information not only to outside
contacts but to those in our own office.
Liddell sympathised with Boyle (‘most of these difficulties we are even-

tually able to overcome but I find them extremely trying’), and made a
point of highlighting the value MI5 placed in SOE’s cooperative attitude,
recognising the implicit threat contained in Boyle’s letter:
One thing that I can say without any reservation is that the help
and co-operation that we get from you is of the greatest value and
that it is, in so far as our own work is concerned, our intention to
reciprocate one hundred per cent. I shall moreover do everything I
can to encourage S.I.S. to agree to the release of collated information.
I will let you know as soon as I hear about Curry’s volume on the
German S.S.10
Liddell did indeed proceed to lobby on SOE’s behalf, informing

Vivian that the information requested by SOE would be handled
by Boyle and other of his officers ‘specially appointed to deal with
most secret sources’.11 This did not satisfy Vivian, who continued
to obstruct the process by requesting further information about
these officers:
The appointment of officers in S.O.E. to deal with Most Secret sources

is a new one on us and we should be grateful if, before we give our
O.K., you could find out from John Senter who they are and of what
their duties consist.12
Liddell replied with a vigorous defence of SOE, drawing Vivian’s atten-

tion to the irritation felt by Boyle and explaining that he ‘was merely
anxious to expand the field of collaboration with us and with you in

C.E. work’. As such, Liddell felt ‘a little reluctant to return to the charge
by virtually questioning his discretion in the distribution of information
from most secret sources within his own organisation’. He defended the
distribution proposed by Boyle, noting that it was ‘inevitable, if any
use is to be made of the material, that a certain number of people in
his organisation must know about it and about its origin, otherwise
trouble is bound to ensue’. He closed by noting that he would try to
obtain the desired information from Senter ‘as tactfully as I can’.13 The
following week, Senter informed Liddell that Boyle ‘was going to see
C. about the whole matter’.14 It was not until June 1943 – a year after
the requested information had been collated, and some 5 months after
Boyle’s initial request had been made – that Boyle was able to inform
Liddell that progress on the matter of access to the report had been
made with SIS. Although some points were ‘still the subject of corres-
pondence’, agreement had at least been reached for SOE to receive a
copy of Curry’s work, and Boyle requested that a copy be forwarded.
It remains unclear whether Boyle received the full or expurgated
version of the text.
There are some indications that B Division was not always so reluctant
to alert SOE to information from SIS sources which it considered
pertinent, and was willing to bend the rules, concerned that SIS was
not communicating all relevant information in its possession to SOE. In
a letter to Warden in April 1943, an MI5 officer referred to a previous
letter concerning a Norwegian cutter, asking ‘whether this information
reached you, as it should presumably have done, from S.I.S.’.15 Scribbled
on the bottom of the letter, Warden wrote ‘Yes thanks, I have now had
it.’ A further letter was sent from MI5 to Warden on the same day,
warning that the Germans were aware of a certain British operation in
Norway, and asking whether this concerned SOE’s Norwegian Section.
The letter opened by noting that this information came from a ‘most
secret source’, and concluded with the question ‘Would you also please
let me know as a matter of interest whether you have already received
information on this matter from S.I.S?’16 Warden replied the following
day, noting that SOE was already aware of the information, which ‘was,
on this occasion, confirmed by S.I.S.’.17
SOE also proved that it could be equally protective about the wider
dissemination of its own material, and the ridiculousness of the situation
became increasingly apparent in May, during MI5’s investigation into
the problem of the German ‘penetration agent’, a matter of concern for
both SOE and SIS. A free exchange of information on the subject proved
impossible, as a minute by Curry to Petrie, regarding the distribution of
his initial reports on the issue, made clear:
Captain Liddell asked me to send a copy of the first report, which

is mainly concerned with material relating to S.O.E., to Commander
Senter, as he wanted to discuss certain aspects of it with Air-
Commodore Boyle S.O.E. have asked that at present, while they
are engaged in certain negotiations, we should not show the material
relating to S.O.E. to S.I.S. The second report is partly based on ISBA
material, which S.I.S. regard with peculiar secrecy, and it has a very
limited circulation, and I feel that this part cannot be sent out of this
office without the previous consent of C.S.S. In case you desire to
propose a further enquiry by officers of the three services I attach a
draft letter Before the enquiry can be set on foot it will be neces-
sary to consult Colonel Vivian as to how much of the supplementary
report can be shown to S.O.E. and to consult Air-Commodore Boyle
as to how much of the first report can be shown to S.I.S.18
In the midst of this stand-off between SOE and SIS, B Division came
to see the means by which is could potentially further its own involve-
ment in matters of counter-espionage overseas. B Division was keen
to improve its own ability to investigate cases of suspect SIS agents
returning to the UK; the German penetration problem was not limited
to SOE. Liddell recorded his views on the situation in his diary. Having
read Curry’s ‘extremely good memo’ on the subject, he noted that
‘What emerges more than anything is that lack of unity as between
ourselves, S.I.S. and S.O.E. is a serious menace.’19 Curry stressed the
inability to neatly compartmentalise counter-espionage into differing
spheres of responsibility for MI5 and Section V:
M.I.5 has certain inescapable responsibilities whenever an

Abteilung III agent or an S.I.S. or S.O.E. agent who has been turned
round is sent to the United Kingdom by the Germans. Their respons-
ibilities are conditioned by the fact that while they are bounded
by the three mile limit, the operations of S.I.S. and S.O.E. know
no such boundaries, nor do those of the enemy. Enemy operations
which begin with penetration in occupied territory may bring an
agent to the United Kingdom who, if undetected, would be in a
position to return to the Continent and give information to the
enemy which would enable them to break up a British organisa-

tion on the Continent or the resistance movement of an ally, or to
bring about the arrest and execution or important leaders of such
movements. Again, where a British agent has been turned round he
may, if undetected here, be used to give misleading information to
our authorities at the time of important military operations on the
Continent.20
The prospect of achieving a joined-up approach to counter-espionage

was not helped by the fact that B Division itself had a difficult rela-
tionship with Section V. It had fought successfully to gain sufficient
access to the Ultra/ISOS decrypts, but was unable to achieve its ambi-
tion of controlling counter-espionage on a global basis. In March 1942,
Dick White argued for a change to the division of labour that saw MI5
take responsibility for counter-espionage in the UK, while Section V,
on behalf of SIS, carried out similar work beyond the three-mile limit,
believing this an artificial dividing line. Convinced of ‘how closely the
business of B Division and that of Section V is inter-related’, describing
them as ‘two halves of a logical whole in the Imperial Counter Espi-
onage machine’, White proposed the ‘unification of the two halves of
the C.E. service’, to ‘usher in an entirely new phase in our general
C.E. work’. MI5 proceeded to spend much of the remainder of 1942
discussing the matter with SIS, based on the premise that Section V
should be transferred to MI5. This saw a lengthy exchange of correspond-
ence between Petrie and Menzies, along with meetings and discussions
between various members of B Division and Section V, that ultimately
came to nothing. Menzies’ best offer was the creation of the ‘Department
of Contre-Espionage’ (DOCE), a ‘Joint Section’ for counter-espionage
work answerable to both Petrie and himself. The proposal ultimately
broke down over the location of the section, as Menzies insisted that it
should be housed at Section V’s current home at St Albans. MI5 refused
to agree to any location outside London, and deadlock ensued. By the
end of 1942, responsibility for counter-espionage work remained divided
between Section V and B Division along geographic lines, while further
friction was caused by the personalities of those involved, particularly
Felix Cowgill; by July 1943, Liddell had concluded that ‘as long as he
remained in charge of Section V, there was bound to be constant friction
between our two departments’.21
This was the context into which the question of approaching SIS
with a request to examine and interrogate returning SIS agents, based
on a similar procedure to that established with SOE, was discussed
by MI5 in March 1943. A letter was drafted for Liddell to send

to Vivian, which drew attention to the problem of German agents
entering the UK masquerading as British agents. The letter pointed out
that SIS was not immune to such penetration (‘As far as your own organ-
isation is concerned, I need only cite the cases of Petin, Pelletier and
Brutus’):
My purpose in writing you this letter is to see whether we agree as to

the procedure necessary for the examination of those of your agents
who fall under suspicion, either from something noticed by their own
controlling officers or else, by reason of some special information
obtained by ourselves or Section V.22
Liddell’s proposed course of action to deal with the problem mirrored

that developed with SOE:
May I presume that, in the first place, such cases are invariably
reported to Section V. by the P. Section when the reason for suspi-
cion occurs in the mind of the controlling officer. If this is the case,
then I further presume that Section V. will notify us when cross-
examination is called for, so that we may detach an officer to carry
this out. In order to be prepared for such cases we have appointed
Major Wethered to specialise in this kind of work Perhaps you
will let your Section V. officers know that he is the correct person
to apply to in the first instance when cases of the kind mentioned
above occur.
After further internal discussion, it was decided that the letter should
not be sent. White recorded the discussion that took place between
Robertson, Wethered and himself:
we decided it should not at the present moment be sent. We feel that

it would be best to build up the S.O.E. side of the business on to a firm
basis first, when we should be in a position to bargain with S.I.S. with
a certain amount of achievement behind us. At the present moment,
we feel that the letter might only cause endless arguments and
even have the effect of spoiling such direct connections as we now
enjoy with the P. Sections of S.I.S.23
A further letter for Liddell to send Vivian was drafted by Curry on

5 May. In the covering internal minute to White, Curry forcefully set
out MI5’s need for information from SOE and SIS:
To enable B. Division to discharge their responsibility, they must

claim that they should receive all relevant information, from both
S.I.S. and S.O.E., and it is clear from the present condition of affairs
in Belgium, France, Norway and other countries that all intelligence
about organisations which have been penetrated is not only relevant,
but essential for B. Division purposes.24
Again, the letter was not sent. On 6 May, White recorded that Liddell
was ‘not necessarily opposed to the despatch of the letter’, but he
first intended to hold discussions with Boyle on the subject.25 White
informed Wethered of this, adding ‘it may be that we shall then jointly
approach S.I.S. on the whole subject of counter measures against penet-
ration of our services’.26
While MI5 papers continued to refer to problems with both SOE and SIS
in terms of suspect agents, it is clear that their main difficulty concerned
the latter; White wrote to Senter on 13 May, expressing his agreement
that ‘the existing arrangements are satisfactory and suitable for covering
the interchange of information between us’.27 The problem for B Division
remained extracting necessary information from Section V. In particular,
the ‘main obstacle’ was ‘the attitude of Cowgill’; this was the conclusion
drawn by Wethered in June. As we have seen, Wethered had been reprim-
anded for interfering unnecessarily in the liaison process between SOE’s
Security Section and MI5. Instead of acquiescing, and limiting himself to
his appointed work with Bayswater, he responded by ‘giving some thought
to the possibilities of pushing the triangular conception of liaison etc.
a little further in the direction of S.I.S’, and discussed the matter with
unnamed members of B Division. He noted that it seemed ‘very unlikely
that we should ever be able to achieve what we want, but it is perhaps worth
while to continue to try’. He believed that this would mean circumventing
Cowgill, and that some ‘preparatory unofficial moves’ in this direction
should be made – in other words, bypassing Section V and dealing with
the operational P Sections directly.
Wethered noted that he already had the support of an unnamed
member of SIS (‘[ ] is already fairly well disposed towards the general
principle’), and believed that it ‘might be worth while to enlist the
interest of one or two other people in the plan’. Wethered’s plan was
based upon the exploitation of the SOE material he now had access to
by using it to bargain with the P Sections. He proposed that a tentative

approach should be made to an – presumably senior – SIS officer, the
name of whom has been redacted from the documents as released:
I could explain that I had access in the S.O.E. Special Section to

a great deal of general information, obtained from returned agents
and other means, which clearly should be passed to S.I.S. if such an
arrangement could be made with S.O.E. This would appear to be our
best card, for there is no doubt that information such as results from
our enquiries would be valuable to Section V or a fortiori to the
‘P’ Section. I might ask [ ] unofficially what type of information
he would like if I could get it. This might serve to interest him 28
There can be little doubt that a greater exchange of ‘general information’

would have been of interest to SIS. Yet as Wethered’s use of ‘best card’
implies, he was not suggesting this course of action for the benefit of
SIS; there was something in this for B Division. This was further indic-
ated by his concern that Section V should be kept out of the picture and
the plan proposed directly to a representative of the P Sections (‘the S.I.S.
Sections who would be mainly interested in S.O.E. material’), fearing that
Section V may try to reach an arrangement with the Security Section itself:
Section V. would no doubt agree that the information would be

valuable to them, but would attempt to get control of it into their
own hands by suggesting the appointment of a Section V officer to
the S.O.E. Special Section.
Wethered was confident that any such move would end in failure, thus
allowing MI5 to pick up the pieces (‘If they did this I feel sure that
their proposal would not succeed, and it might then be agreed that I, or
someone from this office, would be their best representative’). Wethered
now arrived at what MI5 would gain from such an arrangement:
If something on these lines could be arranged, we should then have

to take up the still more complicated question of trying to arrange for
a two-way exchange of information, i.e. from S.I.S. to S.O.E., which
might conceivably give us the chance of dealing with S.I.S. cases in the
same way as we now deal with S.O.E. ones.29
At its most basic level, Wethered’s goal was to provide SIS with
SOE-derived information, in exchange for which it would gain a greater
foothold in counter-espionage overseas. Wethered’s link with SOE,

investigating suspect returning agents, had given B Division an opening
into the investigation of cases of counter-espionage overseas, which it
wanted to build on. Although he recognised that it would be ‘rather tick-
lish’ to ‘sell’ the idea to SIS, Wethered clearly believed it to be worth a try.
White discussed Wethered’s ideas with Senter and an unnamed SIS
officer. On the basis of these discussions, he considered that such ‘trian-
gular liaison’ was ‘perfectly feasible’. He agreed that the time was not
right to approach the subject formally, but did not object to Wethered’s
moving forward unofficially, through the development of his relation-
ship with the anonymous SIS officer:
If it is to work, it will depend very largely on the good relations which

you can establish between yourself and [ ] If you gain each others
confidence then the thing will work very well indeed.
White told Wethered to report to him on the situation after a month or

two had passed.30
Wethered’s plan was not given time to mature. His belief that the
Security Section and Section V would be unable to reach an accommoda-
tion proved wrong: in August 1943 they signed the ‘Glenalmond Treaty’.
Named after one of the houses occupied by Section V, its purpose was to
clearly define and regulate the relationship ‘which it was thought should
exist with the S.O.E. Security Directorate involving mutual assistance
and the exchange of useful information’.31 The treaty was based on the
premise that:
Section V for S.I.S. and the Security Directorate for S.O.E. should work
to the fullest exchange of information, but should also in each case act
as a filter and consult the other party before imparting certain inform-
ation to the operational branches of the organisation concerned.32
The exact impact of the agreement upon the Security Section’s access
to Ultra/ISOS material is unclear. However, Senter later noted that,
following Glenalmond, relations with Section V underwent ‘a consider-
able improvement’, and emphasised the importance of the Glenalmond
Treaty in generally improving relations between the Security Section and
Section V at a working level. The agreement also included the appoint-
ment of an SIS liaison officer, a move which successfully resulted in the
exchange of ‘an increasing volume of information’.33
In addition to acting as a ‘filter’ with their own respective operational

sections, the treaty ensured that MI5 remained out in the cold when
it came to the investigation of counter-espionage overseas. An extract
of the Treaty which has been released, with the subtitle ‘Penetration of
S.O.E. Organisations Overseas’, reads,
If S.O.E. suspect penetration, it was agreed that Commander Senter

should, at his discretion, invite Major [ ] and the Section V officer
of the country concerned to a conference to discuss the case. M.I.5
would not necessarily be brought in at this stage. Commander Senter
will, however, inform them as soon as he considers it necessary.34
Cowgill wrote to White on 2 August, informing him that an agreement

had been ‘concluded between S.O.E. and ourselves whereby S.O.E. seek
our assistance whenever they suspect that one of their organisations
abroad has been the subject of penetration by the enemy’.35 MI5’s goal
of greater involvement in counter-espionage investigations abroad was
prevented. Cowgill outlined the procedure in detail:
Where such penetration is suggested, the S.O.E. Country Section

submit the known facts and names of all persons involved to Senter
who passes the report on to [ ] for investigation. The names of
the individuals mentioned are traced in our registry and then are
shown to the relevant P. Section so that they may have a chance of
expressing interest in any particular individual. The P. Section returns
with comments the list of names to [ ] who passes such informa-
tion as is relevant and desirable back to Senter. In this way it is hoped
that crossing of lines will be reduced and penetration of both our
organisations by notorious German agents will be avoided.
Emphasising the fact that this was a separate development to any

existing agreement between SOE and MI5, Cowgill concluded by noting:
This agreement does not of course in any way affect any standing
agreement between Senter and Wethered in which the security of
the U.K. or British Empire is involved. Senter will deal direct with
Wethered on these matters as in the past. I hope that this new agree-
ment will result in increased security for both S.I.S. and S.O.E. abroad
and consequently be of assistance to you in providing more informa-
tion about suspicious persons, who may at some distant date attempt
to visit Great Britain or the British Empire.36
In reply, White agreed that the arrangements were ‘both practical and
necessary’, and added his belief that there should be ‘close liaison’
between Wethered and the unnamed SIS officer involved.37
Once this arrangement between the Security Section and Section V was
put in place it was protected fiercely, as Wethered found out when he
was accused by Senter of trying to bypass it. This time Wethered roused
Senter’s wrath over the case of a returned Dutch agent, Koot. Senter
informed White that Harvey had brought the case to Wethered’s atten-
tion, ‘without any reference to the Head of Acting Head’ of Bayswater,
and permitted his presence at Koot’s interrogation. Senter believed that
the case was ‘an S.O.E. mystery which it was for us to clear up in the
first instance’, but accepted that there may have been ‘scope for some
doubt’ about the agent.38 What annoyed Senter was the way in which
procedure for liaison between the Security Section and Section V had
been ignored.
What is important, however, from my point of view, is that none of

the proper references to Section V for look-ups were made and that,
when Geoffrey Wethered and Cyril Harvey were together, one of the
girls in your B.1.A. Registry rang up a friend at Section V, asking if
there were Section V traces on one of the names that emerged, the
suggestion apparently being that this procedure would avoid delay.
Senter proceeded to emphasise that any attempt on Wethered’s part to

act as a ‘middle man’ between the Security Section and Section V would
not be tolerated:
I endeavour to carry out the orders of the Air Commodore in this

matter and he has been insistent throughout that our Section V
liaison must be run on tidy and straightforward lines and, as you
know, one of the things we have particularly tried to avoid is a situ-
ation where your Department should assume the position of repres-
enting our interests with Section V.
The extent of Senter’s fury when told of the incident by Harvey was
described by Wethered in a minute to White on 11 October:
Harvey was surprised to find that Senter flew into a temper and in
fact sacked Harvey on the spot, though I understand that at the end
of the interview he modified this decision Senter told him that he
proposed to issue me with a reprimand for my part in the matter, but

no reprimand has so far been forthcoming.
Wethered’s version of events played the incident down, but he accepted

that the question of SOE–SIS liaison being upset was indeed the cause of
Senter’s anger, although his slant on this served to trivialise the concern
behind it:
It is quite clear to me that Senter’s anger with Cyril Harvey and

complaints about me are caused by the fact that he sees a danger of
his individually arranged channel to Section V. being shown as less
effective than our own.39
Rather than being overly concerned about the efficacy of SOE’s ‘indi-
vidually arranged channel’, it can be suggested that Senter’s anger was
caused by the fact that Wethered’s actions were likely to undermine
the Glenalmond Treaty before the new procedure had been properly
established, combined with the fact that he was aware of the suggestion
put forward by Wethered earlier in the year that would have seen MI5
‘triangulate’ liaison between SOE and SIS.
White wrote to Senter on 12 October, noting that he had ‘gone
into the matter rather carefully’ with Wethered, and had arrived at
the conclusion that ‘he appears to me to have acted in perfect good
faith throughout I think you must really clear him of any intention
to intrude unnecessarily into S.O.E. affairs.’40 Addressing the ‘proced-
ural point’ with which Senter was most concerned (‘that reference
was made to Section V. by Wethered when you are anxious that all
S.O.E. enquiries which require Section V. assistance should be made by
S.O.E. direct to Section V’), he assured Senter that MI5 ‘would natur-
ally never dream of challenging your right to insist on this procedure
being adhered to’. The allegation that ‘one of the girls’ in the B1(a)
Registry had contacted a friend at Section V ‘asking if there were
Section V. traces on one of the names that emerged’ was explained
as a new arrangement between B Division and Section V, where a
member of B Division was now stationed (‘the enquiries did not in
fact go from an M.I.5. girl to a Section V. girl but remained within
the orbit of M.I.5. personnel’). White concluded by pointing out that
he had specifically chosen Wethered for the liaison position with
SOE ‘because I knew him to be a discreet and tactful person, who
would not be likely to abuse the rather special position he had to

occupy’:
To my mind he is a person of sufficient discretion and understanding

in intelligence matters to be left on a fairly loose rein. Please do not
think me indifferent to sound procedure and established methods
of exchange if I say that, for my part, I would like not to have to
impose too bureaucratic an approach to his work upon him. There
seem to me to be many ways in which, by reason of the privileged
position which he occupies in our two organisations, he can be a
most valuable cementing link.
Senter’s temper had cooled by the time he replied to White. He was

willing to concede that Wethered had ‘acted in perfectly good faith
throughout’, and acknowledged that he did not wish to interfere in
the normal course of ‘M.I.5/Section V discussion or collaboration’.41
However, he reiterated Boyle’s determination to prevent ‘automatic
triangulation’ between SOE, MI5 and Section V:
what the Air Commodore is insistent upon and has agreed upon with
Cowgill, is that the situation should not arise where Geoffrey, for
example, is in the position of going to Section V and saying ‘I have
come to see you about this S.O.E. case’, or ‘this S.O.E. agent’ as the
case may be. The purpose of the Glenalmond Treaty is to establish
a close liaison between our Security Department here and Section V,
which would cover, among other things, such enquiries.
This letter appears to have seen the end of the incident. Senter added a
‘PS’, in which he noted that he had discussed the matter with Wethered
in person, ‘and we see no difficulty in practice’:
He agrees as to the point made as to the basis of an M.I.5 approach

to Section V in an S.O.E. case, but rightly points out that the national
security interest in a body actually in this country may well require
consultation with Section V, especially if he is to discharge his inter-
rogation function. The principle of automatic triangulation in any
S.O.E. matter has been rejected both by Air Commodore Boyle and
by Cowgill, but Geoffrey and I feel that in a case of the kind I have
just mentioned, there should be no risk of crossed lines if Geoffrey
advises Warden as the Head of the Special Section, of his intention
to consult Section V as to your interest and it may well be agreed
in any such case that triangular meeting [sic] should take place so
that Warden can speak at first and as to the S.O.E. organisation or
personnel involved, and Geoffrey can discuss at first hand with him
and [ ] any help that Section V can give in clearing the matter up.
While B Division’s hope that it would develop a greater role in

counter-espionage investigations overseas was dashed by the establish-
ment of direct contact between the Security Section and Section V, it did
gain a little more ground later in the year, as the Security Section took
the initiative to fine-tune the three-way liaison procedure. In November,
Senter wrote to Vivian, proposing that SIS and MI5 should work closer
together when investigating traces relating to allegations against SOE
agents. He suggested that Wethered should prepare the information
available in MI5, and proceed to discuss this with an unnamed SIS
officer, with the final ‘answer’ to the look up coming from Section V.42
The SOE proposal was amended by Cowgill, who felt that the details
could stand to be less convoluted,43 and agreed with Dick White.44 This
final settlement was somewhat more favourable to B Division, as it saw
Wethered provided with such information as SIS possessed when this
was requested by SOE, as opposed to its direct communication between
Section V and the Security Section, leaving MI5 in the dark. This was, of
course, far from MI5’s ideal scenario, but it was as close as it would get;
as Jack Curry later noted in his history, MI5 never succeeded in its desire
to investigate cases of suspect SIS agents returning to the UK. The system
that developed with SOE, while not perfect, ‘contrasted very favourably
with that under which the Security Service had no information about
S.I.S. agents who were “blown” and no opportunity of making enquiries
into such cases’.45
7
Security Aspects of the Nordpol
Affair
It would be impossible to write an account of SOE’s Security Section

without addressing the organisation’s greatest operational disaster; the
penetration of its organisation in Holland by the Abwehr. The ‘Nordpol’,
or ‘Englandspiel’, affair has achieved post-war notoriety and attracted
the attention of conspiracy theorists who find it hard to believe that a
failure of such magnitude could have occurred. Yet little attention has
been given to the Security Section’s involvement in the investigation
when allegations of penetration in Holland were raised, an examination
of which casts a fresh perspective on what has otherwise become a well-
known episode. More detailed consideration of MI5’s involvement in
the aftermath of the affair, in the investigations into the two agents who
escaped from German custody, John Bernard Ubbink (‘Chive’) and Pieter
Dourlein (‘Sprout’), is similarly worthwhile; the subsequent detention of
the two men caused a certain amount of tension between SOE and MI5.
The Security Section’s attention was brought to the situation in
Holland as a consequence of a message received from the field by SIS
on 10 June 1943. The message, supposedly from P.J. Six, Chief of Staff
of the Dutch Orde Dienst (OD) resistance organisation, read,
150 for the 10th. For Colonel de BRUYNE. Eight parachutists

including DOULIN and DRAKE were arrested weeks ago. Code key-
word ‘Friend MARIUS’ is known.1
Although the message – which eventually reached SOE on 23 June – was

obscure, there ‘was just enough in it which was known to be accurate
to give rise to anxiety’ (a number of SOE agents had been given ‘I am a
friend of Marius’ as a password to a safe house). The message, along with
others received from the same transmitter, led SIS to express ‘serious
148
Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 149
doubts’ about both SOE’s Chief Organiser ‘Bill’ (K.W.A. Beukema toe
Water) and his reception committees. However, while the Head of the
Dutch (N) Country Section, Seymour Bingham, conceded that one inter-
pretation was that Bill ‘may be under the control of the Germans’, he
attacked the messenger, pointing to the lack of evidence that the set
that had transmitted the message was actually in the hands of the OD:
Some six months ago ‘C’ smuggled two wireless sets via Sweden to ‘X’
in Delfsijl [sic], who had been sending interesting military informa-
tion. ‘X’ was unable to operate these sets but notified ‘C’ by his usual
route when he had managed to give one to the Radio Chief of the
O.D. in Holland. The final disposal of the second set is unknown to
us, but queries about is seem to embarrass ‘C’ considerably. It is not
known to me whether there is any other proof except ‘X’s’ message
that set number one is in fact in the hands of the O.D.
Bingham argued that it was likely the set was, in fact, being operated by
the Germans. In order to clarify the position, he requested a ‘thorough
investigation by an unprejudiced authority’.2
On 25 June, a meeting was held between Bingham and Charles
H. Seymour, Head of the SIS Dutch Section, at which Cyril Harvey
of the Security Section was also present. Harvey recorded the dead-
lock that ensued: ‘S.I.S. considered Bill to be under German control
or at any rate very seriously compromised, whereas S.O.E. considered
the O.D. wireless transmitter to be thoroughly unreliable and possibly
under German control’.3 As such, it was agreed that ‘the facts should
be examined dispassionately and independently in S.O.E. and in S.I.S.
by some persons not concerned with operational side’, and that having
done so the examiners ‘should meet and compare notes and see whether
they could arrive at any agreed conclusions’. Harvey was appointed
as the SOE examiner. He duly investigated the case (Leo Marks recalls
being questioned by Harvey about agents’ codes), and compiled a report
entitled ‘Bill and the O.D.’ which was circulated on 9 July.4 In a letter to
Senter, he noted that ‘I understand from N. that someone in S.I.S. is now
examining the O.D. transmitter on their behalf, from the security angle,
and I take it that in due course my report will be sent to S.I.S., and their
report will reach me.’5 While Harvey’s report highlighted a number of
areas of concern, he found no reason to conclude that Bill was under
German control, and some reason to support Bingham’s suspicion that
the OD wireless set had been compromised. As his report was based
upon SOE material, this was hardly a surprising conclusion. Of greater
significance than the conclusions of the preliminary report itself was

the fact that the Security Section had been alerted that there may be
an operational security problem in Holland, and recognised the urgent
need to compare notes on the situation with SIS.
In the meantime, there was little further the Security Section could
do but wait for SIS to complete its own internal investigation into the
OD transmitter. However, it soon became apparent that no such invest-
igation was being conducted, and that there was little desire within
SIS for further discussion of the situation within Holland with SOE. In
the Official History SOE in the Low Countries, Foot cites Hinsley’s asser-
tion that it was ‘known’ within SIS from the summer of 1943 that the
Germans had penetrated SOE’s Dutch network. However, due to poor
relations between the two organisations, ‘that certainty took months to
spread from the older body to the younger’.6 SIS certainly made no effort
to communicate its knowledge to SOE; rather, the summer months of
1943 were characterised by repeated attempts on the part of the Security
Section to engage in a discussion with SIS over the situation in Holland
that were met with prevarication and obfuscation.
A week after Harvey circulated his report, Senter wrote to Felix Cowgill
at Section V. During the course of a conversation between them it
had become apparent that the proposal put forward at the 25 June
meeting – that Cowgill should nominate a Section V officer to invest-
igate the OD transmitter – had ‘not been put in hand’, but was now being
addressed. As Section V had not been represented at the June meeting,
the implication was that Cowgill had not been advised of the action
that had been agreed upon. Senter hoped that the Section V officer
assigned to conduct the investigation would be ready to discuss the
case with Harvey by the end of July, explaining to Mockler-Ferryman,
head of SOE’s operational London Group, on 23 July that further invest-
igation was ‘held up at the moment pending a parallel Section V
enquiry’.7 The following day, the Security Section received a further
indication that something was amiss with the SIS investigation. Captain
R.A. Wells of the Dutch Country Section wrote to Senter, notifying
him that he had spoken to Captain Seymour of the SIS Dutch Section,
who had told him that he ‘was unable to proceed with his side of the
investigation’:
He said that he had put this matter up to his ‘Chief’, who had ruled
that it was inadvisable to start such an investigation, before they had
received further information through this channel; he was, however,
unable or unwilling, further to elucidate this statement.8
Although Seymour ‘said that he would again take the matter up with his
“Chief” ’, Wells noted that ‘throughout the conversation it was apparent
from his attitude, that Captain Seymour had no real intention of doing
anything whatever in the matter’. Having received no reply to his letter
to Cowgill, Senter wrote to an unnamed SIS officer on 28 July, drawing
attention to Wells’ conversation with Seymour, and emphasising SOE’s
continued interest in the case:
I am not quite clear how we now stand. Our interest in the matter is
a natural one in being advised by you if our agent is compromised
and I should be most grateful if you would look into the matter and
let me know.9
Once again, no reply was received. While the Security Section continued
to wait, on 6 August a further internal paper on the subject, ‘Crossed
Lines in Holland’, was prepared by the Dutch Country Section, which
elaborated upon the Section’s concerns over the reliability of the O.D.
wireless link. In conclusion, the paper reiterated the need for collabora-
tion with SIS:
It is therefore requested that steps may be taken to gain all available

evidence upon these and related matters from S.I.S., with a view to
arriving at a definite conclusion upon future policy and taking steps
finally to remove any perils which at present beset any organisation
which S.O.E. builds up in HOLLAND.10
With mounting suspicion over the state of the SIS investigation, Senter
took his concerns to Boyle, who agreed to write to Claude Dansey, Vice
Chief of SIS (VCSS), about the matter.11 The letter, drafted by Senter and
drawing on his unanswered correspondence, was sent on 18 August.12
It had the desired effect, and a reply was received from Dansey within
days, in which he claimed ignorance of the whole affair:
The first I have heard of this. I am taking it up with D.D./Navy,

suggesting that Seymour must either substantiate his statement with
some written data or withdraw.13
Boyle was aware of a conversation between Sporborg and Frank Inglis,

Head of Intelligence at the Air Ministry, that had taken place on 9 June
in which Inglis had told him of a letter he had received from Menzies
‘saying that a relatively recent incident in Holland had confirmed
the VCSS’s suspicions that the Germans knew all about out work in
Holland, and in fact almost had it under control’.14 As such, Dansey’s
protestations of ignorance were likely greeted with some considerable
scepticism. A meeting between Boyle, Bingham and Col Cordeaux,
an SIS Deputy Director with responsibility for the Netherlands and
Scandinavia (the aforementioned DD/Navy), followed on 31 August.
The following day, Cordeaux wrote to Boyle, and ‘disavowed any
allegation against the S.O.E. main agent, Bill’. However, he agreed
that the original plan – that Section V ‘should make an investiga-
tion concerning the security of the O.D. organisation’ – should still
proceed.15
Rather than warning SOE of its ‘certain knowledge’ that the Germans
had penetrated its organisation in Holland, by the beginning of
September SIS had actively distanced itself from such allegations. Boyle,
however, was not deterred: having finally won a Section V investigation
into the security of the OD, he now pushed further. He told Cordeaux
that he was ‘disappointed that Section V and our chosen represent-
ative from the Security Section do not appear to be permitted to
discuss the matter’, and continued to invoke the spirit embodied in
the Security Section’s recent agreement with Section V, the Glenal-
mond Treaty, noting that ‘As you know by “C” ’s authority, we have
a very happy working liaison with Section V.’16 In his reply, Cordeaux
pointed to the internal politics involved: ‘I know you understand that
my sole fear is that my Dutch colleagues will get to hear that I have
been discussing details of our Organisation with another department.’
He proposed a compromise, which would see a more limited exchange of
information:
We have already put our Section V on to making the inquiries which

I promised when he has done so he will, as arranged between
us, give his opposite number in your Security section his full and
considered opinion concerning the Security of the O.D. organisation
and its communications and any other organisation which might
affect your people in Holland. I will then ask you to let me know
whether you feel that the report which we are able to give you is
sufficient. If you do not, and still wish the details of both organisa-
tions to be discussed between the two people concerned, will you
then take it up with me again.17
Section V concluded its investigation by 4 October. A summary of

the conclusions reached was sent to Senter, which gave the OD wireless
set (referred to by SIS as the ‘Charterhouse’ intelligence organisation) a

clean bill of health:
a) The ‘CHAR’ Organisation is not in our opinion penetrated by the

enemy.
b) In such most secret material as we have received there is no trace of
enemy penetration.
c) Interrogation of captured Dutchmen in the employ of the Abwehr
has also not revealed any major penetration by the enemy.18
Cordeaux rightly anticipated that Boyle would not be satisfied with such
a summary, and would ask for a meeting between the security officers
who had compiled the reports. As such, he authorised an unnamed SIS
officer to show Senter the full report. Cordeaux did this on the condition
that ‘the contents of the report must not be disclosed to anyone else’,
save for Boyle himself.19 Harvey was instructed to revise his original
report, which he sent to Senter on 14 October, emphasising that ‘the
information given in this paper is in no sense guaranteed and may very
well be inaccurate’.20
Instead of dealing with the report personally or sending Harvey, Senter
nominated Warden, Head of Bayswater, to discuss the reports with the
unnamed Section V officer.21 Warden met with the officer in mid-
October. He ‘produced a report dealing with the security of the O.D. but
he said that the S.I.S. Country Section refused to allow the S.O.E. Special
Section to have this report’. However, Warden ‘was invited to read it
then and there, which he did’. Again, there appeared to be no cause for
alarm. Warden’s recollection of the report was that it ‘did not deal with
any question of the insecurity of S.O.E. in Holland’.22
The Section V investigation soon became the cause of controversy.
There were already suspicions within the Security Section that SIS
knew more about the situation than it was letting on. Senter met with
Vivian on 25 November, and raised the question of tension between
the two organisations. He pointed out that ‘we had the impression
that S.I.S. were holding back information, possibly because of some
personal reason connected with our officer in question’. Vivian prom-
ised to look into the matter, and rang Senter the following day. He
confirmed that relations between the two Dutch Country Sections
‘were bad’. More significantly, Senter recorded that ‘Section V were
unable to state definitely whether information was being withheld from
them on that account’; a point that raises the question of tensions
within SIS itself, and the limitations such divisions imposed upon the
Glenalmond Treaty. Although no further details are available due to

the continued closure of the SIS archive, it is possible to speculate that
Section V had itself been kept in the dark because it was known – or at
least suspected – that information given to Section V would likely find its
way to SOE. Even with SOE taken out of the equation, it is possible that
Section V was kept in the dark anyway. There was an internal split within
SIS, which saw Dansey and Vivian engaged in ‘an ongoing round of
internecine bureaucratic hostilities’, the operational Sections controlled
by Dansey on the one side, and Vivian’s Section V, an integral part of his
domain of security and counter-espionage, on the other.23 The tension
between Dansey and Vivian was reflected in the relationship between
the areas of SIS under their respective control; an MI5 officer observed in
1942 that relations between the P Sections and Section V varied widely,
and that ‘where the contact is with Colonel Dansie [sic] or with any
P. Section officer who works to Colonel Dansie, the potentialities for
interchange and stimulation of P. Sections is noticeably restricted’.24
By December, the nature of the situation had changed considerably.
In November, the two Dutch agents who had escaped from Haaren,
Ubbink and Dourlein, reached Berne. A flurry of telegrams arrived in
London from Berne over 22–23 November, through which the extent of
SOE’s troubles in Holland were confirmed. On 29 November, Miller was
informed by Senter that ‘It appears that the enemy have succeeded in
effecting large-scale penetration of N’s organisation in Holland.’ Senter
instructed him to ‘conduct a full enquiry’. The terms of reference set
down covered the operational history of N Section; an opinion ‘as to
how far the information which has come from abroad establishes the
casualties suggested, beyond question’; a detailed study of Ubbink and
Dourlein; an assessment of the question of information leakage from the
UK (‘stating specifically those members or ex-members of this organisa-
tion who would have been in a position to impart the information and
expressing the view as to how far all that information was in the posses-
sion of opposite members in the Dutch service’); the re-evaluation of
past reports on Holland in the light of recent revelations, detailing ‘any
evidence that you may find that S.I.S. has withheld available informa-
tion in connection with these past enquiries’; and the preparation of a
brief for the interrogation of Ubbink and Dourlein upon their return to
London.25
Miller sent the ‘first phase’ of his report to Senter on 15 December,
under a lengthy covering note in which he expounded at length upon
the non-disclosure of relevant information by Section V.26 Senter wrote to
Miller the following day, congratulating him upon his report, which he
described as ‘the indispensable basis for the further investigation’, but

noted that his allegations of non-disclosure raised ‘some rather tricky
points’.27 Instructed to prepare a brief ‘suitable for transmission to M.I.5
and Section V’ by Senter, Miller was told to ‘exclude any matters crit-
ical of S.I.S. in terms of non-disclosure’. It is possible that this indicates
Senter’s awareness that Section V had been kept out of the loop: Miller’s
allegations rested upon the assumption that Section V had itself been
made aware of certain information, and in a position to disclose or
conceal it. As we have seen, an alternative explanation was that Section V
had itself been kept in the dark, and that Senter had no desire to reveal
the internal problems of another organisation – a course of action that
could have had a negative impact upon the Security Section’s continued
relationship with Section V. Alternatively, it is possible that Senter was
reluctant to pursue any allegations of non-disclosure due to the confused
and fragmentary nature of communication Miller revealed elsewhere
in his report, which would make allegations of the ‘who knew what,
when’ variety particularly difficult to prove. As he observed after reading
Miller’s report:
I have asked [Miller] on a number of points that arose in Section B,

whether various points were discussed with S.I.S. He tells me that the
position on this is that numerous conversations appear to have taken
place between Seymour of the S.I.S. Dutch Country Section and N,
but these are not the subject of any formal record. It is therefore very
difficult for anyone to prove or even to state with any particularity
the state of knowledge of S.I.S. and ourselves on particular points and
at particular times.28
Boyle sent near identical letters to Vivian on 18 December and to

Dansey 2 days later, in which he noted that ‘I think in the interests
of both our Organisations it would be desirable if Section V and our
Special Section could get together on the basis of a full disclosure of our
respective interests in Holland.’ Due to the apparent seriousness of the
matter, Boyle was keen to break down the barriers between what the
two organisations’ respective Dutch Sections were willing to share with
each other:
I feel that the matter is so important from the point of view of

both our Organisations and that the Section V/Special Section S.O.E.
liaison has developed sufficiently to make the suggestion to you that
Section V and our Special Section should be allowed to call for any
information from Country Sections of our respective Organisations

and authorised to make such exchange of information as seems neces-
sary in order to get to the bottom of these disasters, even if this should
involve the disclosure to the Country Section in one Organisation of
information as to the interests of the Country Section in the other
Organisation.29
Dansey, however, refused to see Section V involved in any Dutch invest-

igation. In reply to Boyle’s letter, he wrote,
I am all in favour of your Dutch country section and our

Dutch country section comparing notes and making full disclos-
ures, particularly if there is any question of penetration by the
enemy personally, I cannot quite see where Section V. comes
into the matter at all. They do not handle either the agents or the
operations, on your side or on ours. They would be unable to do
anything but express an opinion on evidence produced from your
country section and ours and it seems to me that as the two country
sections do handle the agents and the operations they ought to be
able to arrive at a conclusion without a third party; or, if they are
unable to come to a conclusion, to submit all the facts to a third
party who does understand such operations and would act as an
arbitrator.30
Boyle could be forgiven for thinking that his desire to see the joint
investigation originally mooted in June had come full circle. By
suggesting that the Dutch Country Sections should deal directly with
each other, Dansey set the proposed investigation back to square one;
it was precisely because an arbitrator was necessary that the Security
Section had initially become involved in the affair. In response, Boyle
explained that investigations of this nature were ‘handled under the
machinery contained in what has come to be known as the “Glen-
almond Treaty” ’, of which Boyle understood Dansey to be fully
cognisant.31 Having refreshed Dansey’s memory of the origins of the
agreement, Boyle noted it meant that ‘Section V would deal with any
traces relating to names, etc., disclosed and would be entitled to
impart information they obtain from your Country Section, so that full
discussion could take place’. He expressed his hope that Dansey would
‘see no difficulty in allowing the enquiry to proceed on these lines’,
expressing his belief that ‘the liaison is a useful one – especially in
dealing with the problem of penetration’. Dansey made his disregard
for the Security Section’s liaison arrangements with Section V explicitly

clear in his reply:
Sorry, but I have never heard of the ‘Glenalmond Treaty’. I do not

think you will find my signature, or that of any of those of the
Regional Sections, attached thereto. We do not necessarily adhere to
treaties we do not sign. I am rather indifferent myself as to whether
Section V. take part in this matter or not. I merely repeat that they
cannot be in a position to take up a position, and their knowledge
of such things cannot be compared to that of the Regional Sections
concerned.32
On 30 December, Senter wrote to Miller, noting that he was ‘hoping

that the necessary high level authority will be obtained in S.I.S. so that
mutual discovery may be available’.33 Before this could be taken any
further, the situation changed again, effectively rendering such a pooling
of information redundant.
The full extent of the penetration was revealed in early January 1944,
when Miller received two reports from Spain, based upon interroga-
tions of Dourlein and Ubbink. The reports indicated the full extent
of German penetration in Holland. Both men recorded that they
had been captured upon landing, and upon interrogation ‘each soon
realised that there was very little that the Germans did not know
about S.O.E. Dutch Section and methods of training in this country’.
They also named 11 further agents who had been arrested, most of
them upon landing. The revelation that particularly shocked Miller
was the fact that they alleged that the two agents who had not
been caught immediately – ‘Trumpet’ and ‘Ebenezer’ – were ‘able to
operate only for three months after their arrival’. The significance of
this was not lost on Miller, who pointed out that ‘from the begin-
ning of 1942 the Germans had in their hands the wireless operators
of the two most important reception committees and no doubt
through them had received all our signals, and, in a more sinister
sense, the agents which followed them’. He drove the point home as he
concluded:
it is clear that for two years the enemy have been picking up our
agents in Holland as they descended from the aircraft, occasionally
amusing themselves by shooting down the aircraft on its return and
continually amusing themselves by very skilfully deceiving us with
the traffic.34
Senter forwarded Miller’s comments to Robin Brook, noting that

the reports revealed ‘an even worse state of affairs’ than had been
suggested by Miller’s investigation: ‘the penetration appears to have
been complete – or complete with one exception – and to have taken
place over a period of almost two years’.35
While SOE’s Dutch Section turned its attention towards salvaging
something of the resistance organisation in Holland – which, as we shall
see in Chapter 9, led to further clashes between security and operational
concerns – the focus of the security investigation shifted in early 1944
with the return to the UK of the two escaped agents themselves, Dourlein
and Ubbink, which saw the beginning of MI5’s involvement in the affair.
MI5 had been aware of the concerns over SOE activity in Holland for
some time. Intriguingly, before the events of the summer that alerted
SOE’s Security Section to the situation, there was already some awareness
of growing concerns within SIS over subversive activity in Holland. On
22 February 1943, Liddell recorded in his diary that ‘C’ was ‘worried
about the arrangements between the Dutch and SOE for the reception
of agents. He thinks that things are going badly wrong.’36 There is no
indication that Liddell communicated this concern to SOE. A copy of
Harvey’s July report was sent to Wethered, who felt that it would ‘be
of interest to the Information Index’, and passed it to Major Baxter
at B1(d) without SOE’s permission (‘S.O.E. regard the information, and
particularly the list of names of agents, as very much their own property,
and do not know that I have sent a copy to you. I think it might be as
well if they did not hear of it’).37 MI5 first found itself directly involved
in the affair in late 1943, when it was called to give evidence to the Joint
Intelligence Committee enquiry into the penetration of SOE in Holland.
Before appearing at the enquiry, Liddell met with Boyle and Senter to
discuss the matter and ‘made it plain to them both that we had no wish
to take part in any indictment against SOE’:
We had been summoned to give evidence and we should naturally

have to answer any questions that were put to us. In this connection
I said that Wethered and Victor would be accompanying me to the F.O.
Both Archie and John Senter completely understood our position.38
Liddell recorded MI5’s involvement in detail:
I explained the system by which we dealt with accredited and

unaccredited agents. Wethered was asked whether any unaccredited
agents had proved to be spies. The answer was that although suspi-
cion had attached to some of them there was no proven case. Equally
there was no proven case against any agent who had come out and
been reported to us by SOE. There were cases of agents who had given
others away and bought their freedom on the grounds that they were
going to work for the enemy. There was however no reason to think
that they intended to carry out their assignments.
In the light of the revelations from Dourlein and Ubbink, MI5 was
invited to reconsider the cases of three Dutch agents who had recently
returned to the UK, while it was also recognised that a decision was
needed on the future running of traffic to the transmitters in Holland
now known to be blown, a matter on which MI5 was immediately
consulted. The Dutch were ‘very anxious that we do everything in our
power to keep this wireless traffic going, as they consider that it is an
added safeguard for the lives of the prisoners’.39 A certain amount of
contact was maintained until late March, at which point a member
of Bayswater wrote to Robin Brook’s new deputy, P.L. Johns (D/R.LC),
noting the drop in communication which meant that contact had not
been made for between 17 days and 2 months. ‘One could speculate
indefinitely as to the reason for this’, the security officer wrote, ‘but
presumably the enemy think that Chive and Sprout must have reached
here by now, or even, a possible but hardly likely theory, have only
just grasped the fact that the two had escaped’. As such, he concluded
that ‘there would seem to be little purpose in continuing the traffic any
longer Any hope of profiting from the situation would therefore
seem to be removed.’40 On 31 March, Mockler-Ferryman replied: ‘I agree.
It is not worth while going on with this.’41 His judgement was proved
correct the following day, when the now infamous April Fools’ Day
message was received.
The Security Section was also obliged to explore allegations made by
Ubbink and Dourlein that there was a traitor in Baker Street. When
interviewed upon their escape from Haaren, a cable received from Berne
noted that while they had made no definite accusations of a traitor at
work in London, the statement ‘It may be Bingham’ had been made; a
reference to the Head of the Dutch Country Section Seymour Bingham,
a point which Ubbink raised again later.42 The suggestion that the head
of SOE’s Dutch Country Section may be working for the Germans, albeit
slight, had to be investigated. On 25 November, Senter met separately
with Harker and Vivian. Regarding an internal inquiry into Bingham,
Harker ‘said that M.I.5 would be glad to help in any way possible’.43
Senter wrote to Boyle, informing him that when discussing the case
of Bingham with Johns he had been ‘careful to report that there is no
Security objection in the sense that has been suggested, against this
officer, so far as any available evidence goes, and I should not make that
allegation’. Senter did, however, tell Johns that Bingham was ‘a most
unsatisfactory officer to deal with and two recent cases have come to
my notice where he has tried to obtain information from junior officers
or secretaries, in connection with the current investigation’.44 Senter
wrote to Boyle on the subject again the following day, noting that ‘It is
extremely difficult to get a clear-cut line as to what should and should
not be discussed with N (Bingham) in connection with this. I can say
that the interrogation has not taken the matter any further and the
position remains that there is no case against N. I should personally be
quite happy for him to be told this.’45 Boyle wrote to Mockler-Ferryman
regarding Bingham on 23 February, noting in view of Senter’s analysis
of the case that it ‘would be wrong and unfair to N to allow the
somewhat vague allegations which have been made against him to affect
one’s judgement’. However, Boyle suggested that Bingham ‘should be
informed that no case has been proved against him but that since a
suspicion exists in certain Dutch minds it will be impossible to obtain the
fullest co-operation with the Dutch while he holds his present post and
he will therefore, be transferred to another post in S.O.E.’.46 Bingham
was removed from N Section 3 days later.47
Attention now shifted to the interrogation of Dourlein and Ubbink.
The first interrogation report was circulated on 9 February. Having read
the report, Hugh Park felt that it raised a number of concerns about the
men, pointing particularly to the inconsistencies in the statements they
made when interrogated in Spain, and since their arrival in London (‘At
first sight there would certainly seem to be some grounds for suspecting
that the escape from Haaren was a put-up job, and that these 2 agents
have returned to the U.K. with the connivance of the enemy’).48 He felt
that there was ‘at least a strong case for a further very careful interrog-
ation of the two men in question’. Wethered, in his first paper on the
case, was less concerned, noting that ‘no view of the general position
seems to involve Chive and Sprout in suspicion as double agents’.49
While there were certainly a considerable number of unanswered ques-
tions, the possibility that the Germans had arranged their escape seemed
to Wethered to be ‘scarcely possible’:
Without their information we should not have known that the organ-
isation of which they were members, has been controlled by the
Germans for many months. Moreover, their escape story, if it is a

German plant, must indicate the circumstances of their arrest and,
however they tell it must cause us to infer or suspect the control of a
number of other agents. It is impossible to see any method by which
the Germans could hope to gain in effecting the escape of these two
men and planting such a story upon us in England Further, both
men make a good impression, and there is no reason to suppose
that they are not telling the truth so far as they know it. There can,
moreover, be no doubt that the S.O.E. organisation has been under
control, as stated by Chive and Sprout, since there is amply corrob-
oratory evidence of this fact.
Although Dourlein and Ubbink were not formally served with deten-
tion orders until Saturday 28 May, the decision to detain them was
effectively taken as early as February – the result of a revision of policy
by MI5 that saw concern for Overlord take precedence over the liberty
of the individual. As we have seen in Chapter 5, MI5 did not have
to believe that Dourlein and Ubbink’s escape had been orchestrated
by the Germans for some sinister purpose in order to claim that their
detention was necessary for national security. White echoed Wethered’s
sentiments in a letter to Senter on 13 February 1944:
The evidence available and the statements made by Chive and Sprout
do not in themselves constitute any definite reason for assuming
that the escape of these two agents can have been arranged by the
Germans or that they are telling lies about their activities.50
Despite the inconsistencies and contradictions, White admitted that

‘we should have in the past expressed the view that there was not
enough suspicion against CHIVE and SPROUT to justify their continued
segregation’. However, as he continued to explain, MI5 felt justified in
advocating their continued detention prior to the launch of Overlord,
giving ‘security interests, and not the individual, the benefit of any
residuary doubt’.
Senter replied on 18 February. He acknowledged that MI5’s stance
raised ‘an important point of policy’, which he had referred to SOE’s
Vice Chief Harry Sporborg (V/CD). Senter accepted that ‘there may
be cases between now and D-Day in which the approach of D-Day
becomes an additional factor to be considered’, and having discussed
the case of Dourlein and Ubbink with Johns, was aware that he ‘would
be only too pleased if these people could be put away out of the
reach of talk’.51 He reminded White of an existing agreement between

SOE and MI5 regarding internment, ‘whereby any case in which we
are interested is made the subject of special detention arrangements’,
which meant both ‘effective detention’ for the duration along with ‘an
assurance that these cases will not be allowed to mingle with other
persons in detention who may be the subject of release at any time’.
Senter believed that such arrangements were of particular importance
in the case of Ubbink and Dourlein due to the allegation they had
made against Bingham. Should they be in a position to discuss this with
other detainees who were subsequently released, Senter felt that this
‘might embarrass the war effort on quite a wide front and cause unne-
cessary enquiries’. He enquired whether White’s proposals ‘embrace the
necessary assurances’, adding that if they did not, ‘Mr. Sporborg and
possibly my Minister, might wish to take the matter up before any
general procedure is regarded as settled’.52 Senter wrote to White on the
subject again on 22 February, recording their discussion of the previous
day, during which White expressed ‘full appreciation of our anxiety that
effective arrangements should be made for any personnel with whom
we are concerned and who appear to need detention’.53 Senter reiterated
that Sporborg would be ‘pleased to take the matter up himself or put
it to the Minister if there is any difficulty’, while White agreed to give
‘some further study’ to the issue, ‘as a prelude to an approach to the
Home Office’.
The second interrogation of Ubbink was circulated by Bayswater
officer R.A. Wells on 28 February. Wells remained cautious, believing
that there was ‘absolutely no reason why the escape should not have
been a more or less genuine one evolved by one of the agents and
permitted by the Germans as a cover for the return to this country of
the other agent’. He also circulated a list of discrepancies between the
statements of the two men, which consisted of some 35 separate points.
‘The fact that the two agents both agree on the main outline of the
story and agree in no single respect upon the details’, Wells concluded,
‘leads one more forcibly to the opinion that the whole thing may well
be bogus and have been learned by heart without sufficient attention
having been paid to the filling in of the broad outline.’54 In another
letter written the same day, Wells was slightly more confident in his
conclusions: ‘in its present state of development, it seems more than
likely that these two agents reached this country with the connivance of
the enemy; I am not at the moment prepared to say whether or not they
were given a mission before leaving Holland.’55 Reports on the third
interrogations of the men were circulated by Wells on 23 March.56
On 30 March, Wethered circulated a seven-page report on the case, in

which he revised his earlier analysis. He felt that Dourlein and Ubbink
told a ‘peculiar and somewhat exceptional story’, and described the
account of their escape as ‘daring and sensational’. He proceeded to
point to a number of concerns, drawing further attention to the fact that,
while their accounts were consistent in general terms, they contained
‘a large number of minor discrepancies’, which were ‘not in themselves
very serious but constitute a rather peculiar factor when regarded in
general’. An altogether ‘more serious and extraordinary element’ in their
testimony concerned F.K.J. Van Bilsen, who was suspected (wrongly) by
MI5 of being a collaborator in Holland, who both Dourlein and Ubbink
claimed to be reliable. On this basis, Wethered concluded that, as both
men ‘maintained vehemently that they are speaking the truth’, there
were only two possible explanations: either the men had returned to
the UK ‘with a German-inspired mission’, or they had ‘been used by
the Germans through the agency of Van Bilsen as innocent dupes’.57 In
either case, Wethered felt that this was ‘a suitable case for approaching
the Home Office’ on a recently discussed ‘policy point’ – that is, the
stiffening of MI5’s attitude towards suspicious cases, mentioned previ-
ously by White. He wrote, ‘Whatever may be the true interpretation it
seems clear that national security would require the continued segrega-
tion of Sprout and Chive during the Overlord period.’58 Pointing out that
this was a ‘point of view with which I understand S.O.E. are inclined to
agree’, Wethered suggested to J.L.S. Hale, MI5’s Senior Legal Adviser, that
‘you might perhaps like to arrange for the triangular meeting between
yourself, an S.O.E. representative and the Home Office to take place’.
On 3 April, Roche handed a memorandum on the case to MI5, in light
of the April Fool’s Day message received from the Germans. Although
it was felt that the message did not add ‘any degree of certainty’ to
the case against Dourlein and Ubbink, it was noted that it served to
‘increase the general suspicion and doubt which must surround persons
coming from Dutch underground under suspicious circumstances, and
in particular increases the doubts with regard to Dourlein and Ubbink
being either double agents or dupes’. The memo concluded by stating
that ‘It may well be felt that in view of the critical state of the time
they should be held until after the opening of the Second Front.’59
Ubbink was interrogated for a fourth time in early April, by a Section V
officer Captain Pidcock, with Wells in attendance.60 Writing to Warden,
an unnamed SIS officer recorded that Pidcock’s opinion was ‘that,
so far as the men themselves were concerned, they made a genuine
escape’.61
The issue of the detention of Ubbink and Dourlein developed as

a matter for discussion from mid-April onwards, based upon the earlier
exchanges that had taken place between White and Senter. It marked
the culmination of a difficult relationship between MI5 and SOE on the
subject of internment. As we have seen in Chapter 2, contrary to
the sinister purpose ascribed to ‘the Cooler’ in post-war fiction, the
SOE establishment at Inverlair represented a ‘mild’ form of detention,
with its focus upon agents who, through no fault of their own, had
been found to be ‘not up to scratch’ during their training, and were
held through little stronger than the application of military discip-
line. Inverlair was not equipped to deal with the ‘criminally dangerous’
type – or indeed anyone who was unwilling to submit to authority –
and as such, Home Office-sponsored internment was necessary to
deal with agents who had ‘gone bad’. SOE only had a handful of
internment cases throughout the war, but in each case tension with
MI5 followed. In this regard, the Dourlein and Ubbink case was no
exception.
On 13 April, Senter wrote to Sporborg, noting that Dourlein and
Ubbink were ‘still enjoying our hospitality, and the question of
their disposal should be dealt with’.62 Although there was a growing
consensus that the men were little more than ‘innocent dupes’ of
some unknown German scheme, Senter emphasised that ‘No-one has
yet professed to understand the Dutch case in all its bearings, and
it may yet contain surprises’. He noted that MI5 was ‘engaged in a
long-term study of the papers’, and that their legal expert ‘has not
yet uttered on the subject’. However, Senter – likely having discussed
the case with Wethered – expected MI5 to conclude that the men
‘ought to be detained at least for the present’. Opposed to their deten-
tion at Inverlair (‘our cooler arrangements are not designed for such
cases’), Senter emphasised that ‘if there is a national security objec-
tion to these men enjoying liberty, it is not our responsibility to deal
with it’. Should MI5 ask for the men to be detained until after D-Day,
Senter believed that SOE should offer no objections. However, he did
propose that SOE should insist upon certain conditions for their deten-
tion being met, as he had during his earlier discussion of the case with
Dick White:
I am quite clear that we should absolutely insist upon their segreg-

ation and should oppose the suggestion which, ridiculous as it may
appear, may well be made that an Internment Camp, mixing with
other people, is a suitable habitat.
Senter made no apologies for insisting upon this condition, but acknow-
ledged that it would likely be difficult to meet: ‘the authorities in this
country do not appear to have devised suitable detention arrangements,
except for really big cases, i.e. German agents or near-German agents’.
Although Senter acknowledged that the lack of total understanding
of the situation, combined with the allegations the men had made
against Bingham, made it difficult to recommend that the men should
be ‘handed over to the Dutch as rejects to resume their positions in
the Dutch Armed Forces’, in insisting upon near impossible conditions
for their detention, it can be suggested that SOE was actually trying
to force MI5 into accepting that course of action. Whether or not
this was actually the case, this was how SOE’s attitude was perceived
within MI5, where it was met by a combination of bemusement and
irritation.
On 15 April, Hale minuted Wethered, noting that he had origin-
ally been informed by Roche that ‘he doubted whether if Chive and
Sprout were detained it would be necessary to make any special arrange-
ments for them not to associate with other detainees’. However, Roche
had contacted Hale the previous day, and notified him that SOE ‘had
formed the view that there would be no objection to releasing these
men to the Dutch Army, but they would object to their detention in
association with other detanus’. In what Hale considered ‘these baff-
ling circumstances’, he requested a meeting with Wethered to discuss
the case further.63 On 19 April, Wethered wrote to Milmo, noting that
‘some difficulty’ was being experienced with SOE on the subject of
the disposal of Dourlein and Ubbink. He explained that SOE ‘continue
to insist on segregation and make the additional illogical suggestion
that the men could without harm be released to the Dutch Army’,
adding ‘I personally am convinced that both must remain in deten-
tion, probably for the duration, but at any rate during the OVER-
LORD period.’64 Milmo responded on 29 April. He also felt that the
two men ‘should be detained during the OVERLORD period’, feeling
that their case fell ‘within the category which it has been decided as
a matter of high policy must be interned during the present period’.
He felt that SOE’s position was ‘not only illogical but verging upon the
ludicrous’:
If S.O.E. are prepared to allow these men to be at large it is hardly

possible to see on what grounds it can be suggested that if detained
they must be segregated. I would suggest that the S.O.E. bluff should
be called on this point 65
With little progress on the fate of the two men being made, Roche wrote
to White on 10 May, explaining that ‘the position is fast becoming
desperate’:
They are becoming extremely disgruntled at not receiving a decision

and have approached the Commandant on several occasions with
‘ultimatums’ to the effect that they were either not going to obey
any further orders or were going to desert. Up till now he has always
disposed of their objections, but these scenes are becoming more and
more frequent and I am satisfied that the time has come when I could
no longer guarantee their safe custody. They are in a house which is
quite satisfactory for normal requirements but has no security fence
and is unsuitable for holding people who are really determined to
depart.66
As the two men had been detained for some 14 weeks following their
arrival in the UK on 1 February, Roche raised the question of their
release, wondering ‘if it would not be possible for them to be returned
to the Dutch forces with a warning that they must not be employed
on intelligence duties or in any of the danger areas’. White replied on
16 May, expressing MI5’s continuing resolve to see the two men held,
despite SOE’s conditions. Maintaining his original view of the case,
he wrote,
I think we must take the line that both men should be detained
during the present period. The case is a complicated one but the
possibility that there are facts which have not come out in interrog-
ation cannot be altogether overlooked.67
White also noted that MI5 ‘should not think it necessary to press for
the internment of these men after the Overlord period’. Having decided
that ‘the circumstances of the cases did not warrant the admission of
these two men to Camp 020’, the holding and interrogation facility
for captured enemy agents in West London, he informed Roche that
MI5 had taken ‘the only remaining alternative of giving the agreed
facts in summary to the Home Office and asking them to convene a
meeting between representatives of our two organisations so that the
immediate future of [Dourlein] and [Ubbink] during the Overlord period
might be resolved’. A reply was awaited from the Home Office, and
White instructed Hale to ‘represent to the Home Office that the matter
is urgent’.
The meeting between SOE, MI5 and the Home Office took place on
18 May. Sir John Moylan accepted MI5’s position that ‘Until a month
or two ago these two men might have been allowed their liberty with a
warning to the Dutch authorities’, but that it was now necessary for the
men to be held until after D-Day.68 SOE’s wish to see the men released to
the Dutch authorities was further rejected on the basis of SOE’s previous
recourse to internment, Sir John observing that ‘the grounds for suspi-
cion against these two men were far stronger than others in which an
order had been made’. As such, Sir John concluded that ‘if M.I.5. asked
for an order, [the] Home Secretary would feel bound to grant it’. MI5 ‘felt
bound to ask for an order for a period’, which was accepted by Roche
who added that SOE ‘did not wish them to come in contact with other
detainees’.
Ian Roy of the Home Office Aliens Department sent Detention Orders
for the two men to Hale on 25 May, noting that Sir John had ‘agreed
that they should be detained temporarily in Brixton Prison incom-
municado and in solitude (except in each other’s company)’, and
that the Governor of the Prison was making the necessary arrange-
ments.69 Dourlein and Ubbink were served with Detention Orders
under Article 12(5)A on Saturday 28 May, and detained in segrega-
tion cells at Brixton Prison.70 Discussion turned immediately to the
question of their release and subsequent employment. Although MI5
expected ‘further consultation about this matter nearer to the relevant
time’, it was noted that the proposal put forward by Col de Bruyne,
head of the Dutch intelligence service with which SOE collaborated,
that ‘both men should be reverted to their pre-war professions of the
Navy and the Dutch Merchant Navy respectively’, would likely prove
‘suitable’.
Wethered wrote to de Bruyne on 6 June.71 After answering a number
of questions related to the detention of the two men raised by de Bruyne,
Wethered reiterated the view that ‘we do not feel that it is necessary
from a security point of view for the two men to be detained when
the present invasion period is over’. On 7 June, Wethered wrote to
Senter, confirming a recent telephone conversation on the case, again
reiterating that the detention of the two men was considered essen-
tial only ‘until the conclusion of the OVERLORD period’. He noted
that de Bruyne’s proposal that the men should return to their pre-war
naval professions had been approved by the Home Office, and that the
case would be reconsidered ‘in the course of the next few days’.72 This
information subsequently formed the basis of a letter from Senter to the
Dutch Minister of War on the case.73
Dourlein continued to complicate matters by writing a number of

letters objecting to his detention, one of which was addressed to Prince
Bernhard. ‘I should very much rather it was not delivered’, wrote
Wethered, ‘but I think it must be’.74 Nevertheless, he hoped that Prince
Bernhard would not wish to visit the men at Brixton (‘they are supposed
to be segregated there, and any such visit would obviously be difficult
to arrange and inconvenient to the Home Office’). Writing to de Bruyne
a few days later, Wethered emphasised that ‘it will not be necessary for
Dourlein and Ubbink to be left for very much longer at Brixton We do
not propose to hold the two men in segregation for very much longer.’75
In an effort to pacify de Bruyne, Wethered noted that he understood his
feelings about the continued detention of the men, emphasising that
the decision had been taken ‘with reluctance by the Home Office’. He
was careful to ensure that MI5 would not be blamed for the choice of
Brixton Prison, explaining:
The Security authorities were interested only in having the men

placed under restraint for the invasion period. The organisation
which formerly employed them, however, was anxious that they
should be segregated from other internees. In these circumstances
none of the ordinary interment camps fulfilled the condition of
segregation. There was therefore no alternative to a prison.
Prince Bernhard, meanwhile, took up the matter of the men’s deten-

tion at Brixton with Neville Bland, who wrote to Guy Liddell on
June 14, asking him to ‘look into the matter at the earliest possible
opportunity’.76 In his reply, Liddell emphasised the ‘strong objection’
that had been raised by SOE to Dourlein and Ubbink ‘being detained in
company with any other internees’:
This was a matter upon which we had no strong feeling, but the
S.O.E. officer represented it strongly to Sir John Moylan, who decided
accordingly upon Brixton as the only place where complete segrega-
tion was possible. They could of course have been detained in other
camps, but in none of these would it have been possible to arrange
for their segregation, as pressed for by S.O.E.77
With such comments, not only did MI5 succeed in ‘calling SOE’s bluff’,
but it also managed to have the last word on the matter, ensuring that
the Dutch authorities knew where to direct their anger at the detention
of the two men in Brixton Prison. Liddell also assured Bland that both
men would soon be released. The previous day, Wethered informed

C.P. Hill at the Home Office that MI5 saw ‘no objection to the release of
these two men from Brixton on June 20th, i.e. the day after the raising
of the diplomatic ban’.78 The two men were indeed released on 20 June,
leaving a debate on the availability of suitable internment facilities for
any such future cases to rumble on between SOE and MI5, reaching
Ministerial level, for some months.79
8
Double Cross and Deception
The question of whether SOE participated in strategic deception has

long courted controversy. It has provided fertile ground for conspiracy
theorists, and others who do not allow a lack of evidence to get in the
way of a good story, who claim that agents were sent to the field as
deliberate sacrifices, pawns in an overarching grand strategy. Such alleg-
ations continue to the present day; the latest variation on the ‘deliberate
sacrifice’ theme has recently been published in Holland.1 Rebuking such
allegations, it has been pointed out elsewhere that SOE’s involvement
in deception was minimal. M.R.D. Foot has observed that ‘Several books
about secret services, SOE especially, by authors who have not managed
to get right inside their subject, fall back on deception, when they
can see no other explanation of some piece of apparent British incom-
petence.’ He argues that ‘Statements that SOE played a major part in
any major deception scheme are mistaken, with one solitary exception:
operation “Animals” in Greece’, prior to the invasion of Sicily in July
1943.2 The reality lies somewhere between these two extremes. SOE did
have greater involvement in deception than participation in Operation
‘Animals’ alone, but there remains no evidence that such schemes ever
involved the deliberate sacrifice of agents’ lives.
SOE’s involvement in deception had two separate aspects. Through
Lionel Hale, SOE spread ‘rumours’ at the request of John Bevan, head
of the London Controlling Section (LCS), which coordinated all stra-
tegic deception. In this way, SOE participated in Solo I and Overthrow,
the deceptions that preceded the North Africa landings of Operation
Torch in September–October 1942. Although Hale, a journalist by profes-
sion, reported to Archie Boyle, this aspect of deception activity did
not directly involve the Security Section. The second aspect, which
centred on the double cross operations run by MI5 under the control of
the Twenty (XX) Committee, did. Here, through the Security Section,
SOE had some involvement in deception through transmitters in the
170
Double Cross and Deception 171
field known to be under enemy control, with the aim of deceiving the
Germans while they believed they were deceiving SOE.
When London was satisfied that an agent in the field was ‘blown’, and
that any messages received that purported to be from that agent were,
therefore, of German origin, MI5 was invited to consider the possibility
of trying to make further use of what was an otherwise finished agent.
A preliminary paper would be prepared for Tar Robertson from which
a decision would be taken as to whether the agent could be considered
blown, and if so whether there was any potential for deception. Two
important figures in preparing these briefs for Robertson were Chris-
topher Harmer, a solicitor who joined B1(a) Section in March 1941, and
C.P. Harvey.3 Conspiratorial suggestions that SOE agents were deliber-
ately sent to their deaths thus give way to what could be considered a
similarly cold-hearted sense of pragmatism: even blown agents remained
of potential value to the war effort.
Communication between SOE and MI5 when an agent in the field
was thought to be operating under enemy control was a matter of high
policy agreed between the two organisations at an early stage. As we
have seen, MI5 first revealed its interest in blown SOE agents in July
1941. At a meeting attended by Petrie, Harker and Liddell for MI5, and
by Nelson, Boyle and Taylor for SOE, one of the MI5 representatives
expressed an interest in being kept informed ‘of any S.O.2. agent abroad
who is suspected of having come under enemy control’. The overture
was rebuffed; the minutes recorded that MI5 was reminded that ‘in such
cases S.O.2. would normally keep “C” fully advised, and the latter would
automatically make the information available to M.I.5’.4 In November,
Robertson wrote to Harker, and asked him to raise the matter again with
either Boyle or Lakin:
Could it possibly be arranged that in future, after S.O.2 find that

one of their agents has ‘gone bad’ on them and they have evidence
to show that his set is being worked or controlled by the Germans
on the agents behalf, I could be notified. My reason for making this
request is that if a case of this description occurs, I should like to
have permission to take over the running of this end of the traffic.
It is not difficult to see the operational value of controlling a station
which is known to be controlled by the Germans and which they in
turn consider is a bona fide station as far as we are concerned.5
Harker approached Boyle, who ‘was apparently sympathetic’ and

suggested that Robertson should discuss the matter with Senter.6 Their
discussions appear to have ended in agreement; at a meeting of the

W Board, the body formed to guide and coordinate deception policy,
in March 1942, Boyle pointed out that arrangements had been made
to ensure that the Twenty Committee was notified of SOE agents who
‘went “bad” ’.7
By the time of a preliminary MI5 investigation into a blown SOE
agent in spring 1943, it was standard practice to bring such cases to the
attention of B1(a) Section.8 The ‘drill’ that had been developed in such
cases was outlined in a letter from Senter to White, which included the
procedure to be followed should B1(a) express no interest in the case:
Our Country Section, or our Signals Security Section, will report

their suspicions to Warden. If the case is a simple one he will
send short particulars to Tar in the hope that Tar will be able to
decide on that information whether or not the set is of interest for
deception purposes. If it is decided as being of no interest, then
the Country Section will either suspend traffic or continue to send
messages at its discretion in consultation with my Directorate here,
with this proviso: that I shall take the responsibility of seeing that
the continued traffic is of a domestic character and that no general
intelligence is sent without reference to Tar as our most convenient
link with Foley and the deception authorities.9
The SOE’s Country Sections, then, were never in a position to act on

their own initiative with regard to blown transmitters; even when these
were of no tactical interest to the Twenty Committee, and run for
purely ‘humanitarian’ reasons, the Security Section was involved in a
supervisory capacity, ensuring that no information that could jeopardise
active deception operations reached the field.
MI5 did not immediately take on all blown SOE agents; numerous
problems could emerge that would prevent a deception plan from being
developed, and several cases with potential for deception were ultimately
rejected. As Masterman noted in his account of the work of the Twenty
Committee, The Double-Cross System, this was true of all double cross
work. A German agent detected in England ‘could not be used unless
certain conditions were complied with’, conditions which ‘were not
often satisfied, and many apparently promising cases had therefore to
be rejected’.10
Perhaps the most significant problem that does not appear to have
been foreseen by the Twenty Committee was SOE’s position as a coordin-
ating body for resistance movements, which dealt with all manner of
resistance organisations in exile. The problematic nature of carrying out

a deception plan where such an external body was involved emerged
during the case of Sealing Wax, which concerned an agent run by SOE’s
Free French Section. Harmer wrote a detailed paper on the case (‘a long
and very complicated story’) in August 1942.11 Sealing Wax was the
name given to the traffic played back by the Germans, ostensibly from
the transmitter of agent Joel le Tac (‘Overcloud’). News of le Tac’s arrest,
following his return to France from the UK on 2/3 February 1942 with
his brother and a W/T link destined for an SIS agent, had reached SOE
at an early stage. As such, when messages were received from his W/T
operator, but transmitted using the SIS W/T link, from 21 May, the
authorities were ready: ‘From the beginning’, wrote Harmer, ‘the trans-
mitter was known to have been controlled by the Germans and the
traffic has been run accordingly’. In order to maintain German confid-
ence in the set, two payments of 5000 francs had been made, which
SOE considered ‘sufficient to meet the essential requirements’ of the
group. At the same time, questions ‘designed to lead the Germans up
the garden’ had been transmitted, following consideration at a higher
level; the minutes of the meeting of the Twenty Committee held on
25 June 1942 note that ‘Traffic was circulated’ for Sealing Wax.12 Two
days later, a message was received in which le Tac ‘announced that he
had become acquainted with a Police agent who was part of an organ-
isation in Normandy without any contact with England’.13 In response,
SOE feigned interest in the organisation, ‘and played the traffic along
rather on these lines until the beginning of August when the messages
seem to have broken down’. At this point, le Tac sent a message in
which he stated that ‘having waited in vain since the 25th May for
instructions, he would call on the 25/27th of this month and, unless
he received some instructions, he would close down’. With the traffic
‘almost as near as possible to breaking point’, a decision on the future
running of the set was required.
Harmer went on to explain that SOE was ‘anxious’ to continue the
traffic in the hope that it would prove possible to extricate le Tac (‘tell
him to go out into the Free Zone to collect some money and instructions
and trust to his good sense to disappear’). He was mildly attracted by the
proposal, noting that it ‘might indirectly interest M.I.5 from the point
of view of eventually being able to interrogate some man about the
German counter-espionage organisation in France’, in addition to the
usual point that it would ‘take up the time of some counter-espionage
official in France who might otherwise be hunting down other S.I.S. or
S.O.E. agents’. However, the involvement of another Allied agency – the
Free French – led Harmer to conclude that ‘I cannot see that we could
ever use Sealing Wax in the way in which this sort of case can be of
most interest to us, namely for deceptive questions’:
S.O.E. are bound by an agreement which is in force between them

whereby all messages sent have got to be approved both by the Free
French and by Picquet-Wicks. Whatever course is adopted in the
future, this agreement must apparently be kept so that any message
which we pass for the Sealing Wax transmitter must go to the Free
French, either for vetting or for their records the requirement
whereby the Free French must be told would appear to me to preclude
any possibility of using Sealing Wax as part of one of our deception
plans. I cannot see our approving authorities approving any ques-
tion designed to mislead if that question was going to get into the
hands of the Free French later on. It would be equivalent of making
the Free French a present of information of first class operational
importance.
A further factor that was significant in deciding whether blown SOE trans-
mitters could be used for deception purposes concerned the context of
the operator and the circuit. Beyond the involvement of the Free French,
Harmer explained his decision that the set could not be used ‘in the way in
which this sort of case can be of most interest to us, namely for deceptive
questions’ on account of the position of the set’s operator, who was
simply and solely a wireless operator for an organisation for sabotage

and propaganda it would need a lot of careful building up to put
him in the position of receiving questions of operational importance
which would appear to be genuine.14
Concluding that Sealing Wax would not ‘justify the exertions which
would have to be put into it’, Harmer did believe that MI5 should be ‘as
helpful as possible’, and assist SOE in an advisory capacity in sending
out messages with ‘the sole objective of helping eventually to get Sealing
Wax into the Free Zone where he can escape’.
Contrary to Harmer’s advice, the case was not immediately dropped.
On 30 September, an SOE–MI5 meeting was held at which the ‘future
running’ of Sealing Wax was discussed. It was ‘agreed by all parties
that this case should be run in future by Major Foley, in conjunction
with Colonel Hutchinson who would liaise with the Fighting French’.15
Foley, the SIS representative on the Twenty Committee, felt that Sealing
Wax held potential for deception purposes – if only the Free French
could be cut out of the loop:
It is stated that S.O.E. are bound by agreement with the Fighting

French whereby all messages sent have to be approved by the Free
French or S.O.E. I can fully understand that agreement operating, as
long as the agent is a free agent of the Fighting French and S.O.E., but
I doubt the wisdom of its being allowed to stand after an agent has
been captured, and continues to function as an enemy instrument.
My principal objection is based on the consideration that it will
preclude our using the agent for purposes of strategical deception or
for other schemes which we may develop: we may not take anyone,
not even the Fighting French, into our confidence in these matters
of great secrecy.
Rather than dropping the case, as Harmer proposed, Foley conti-

nued to search for some justification for declaring the SOE/Free French
agreement void. In November, Sealing Wax was put forward as a suitable
means for advancing Plan Iago. The exact details of Plan Iago, which
is not referred to by Masterman in The Double-Cross System, remain
elusive, although it appears to have aimed at compromising a German
naval officer. The plan was introduced to the Twenty Committee
on 5 November 1942, and was the subject of a ‘long discussion’.16
Some indication of the nature of the plan is revealed in the minutes
of the following meeting of the Committee, by which time it had
been examined in greater depth by Foley along with F/Lt Charles
Cholmondeley and Commander Ewen Montagu, the representatives of
the RAF and naval intelligence on the Twenty Committee. Montagu:
reported that the Admiralty considered that the plan should be

directed at German rather than Italian U-boat commanders on the
grounds that relations were already strained between the Germans
and Italians and that this plan would add little to the general state of
morale. He added that field post numbers were used for correspond-
ence with U-boat commanders. Major Foley suggested that Sealing
Wax should be the agent employed for despatch of money but that
the Free French still had an interest in this case and it would be
necessary to get the case completely under our own control.17
On the same day, Foley asked Robertson to ‘consider how we can

persuade the Fighting French without disclosing our intentions, and
without wounding their feelings, to retire from part control of an

agent, if not immediately after capture, at least after he has had ample
time and opportunity to escape’.18 Robertson discussed the matter with
Foley on 14 November, and a further meeting with Senter was held
on 16 November. However, despite such further efforts, it remained
impossible to reach Foley’s desired objective. When Plan Iago was
discussed alongside other plans under consideration at the following
meeting of the Twenty Committee, Foley
reported that he had had an interview with Lieutenant Commander

Senter of S.O.E. with a view to seeing whether it would be possible to
side-track the Fighting French in the case of Sealing Wax, which he
had suggested might be used in this plan, but that this side-tracking
could not, for various reasons, be effected.19
Robertson wrote to Senter the following day, noting that
With reference to our conversation with Ferguson and Foley at Glen-

almond today, it was agreed that we could not possibly make use
of any set in which the Fighting French have any say, for putting
over deceptions. It therefore seems that the present set of Sealing
Wax/Overcloud will have to be ruled out of our calculations.20
At the next meeting of the Twenty Committee it was noted by the

Chairman that Plan Iago ‘was in suspense for the reason that no suitable
blown transmitter had yet been found’.21 Replying to Robertson, Senter
expressed his agreement that ‘we could not use a Fighting French set
for deception purposes’. Returning to the conclusions that had been
reached by Harmer in August, Senter put forward a proposal ‘merely to
send messages to try and get him out and not to send any enquiries
for Intelligence, etc.’, requesting permission ‘for this to proceed without
special reference as to these domestic messages’.22
A similar instance of a potential avenue for strategic deception being
rejected due to Free French involvement occurred in the case of Sea
Urchin. Harmer wrote to Robertson on 7 April, noting that he had
discussed the case with Warden and Miller. At this early stage, Harmer
observed that the Free French were ‘mixed up in this business somehow,
but exactly how I do not know’.23 He met with Warden and Miller again
2 days later, and discussed the case further. The Corsica-based Sea Urchin
organisation, he reported, consisted of Scammaroni (‘Sea Urchin Major’,
also known as Captain Sarment), his assistant Amboise (‘Pot A’), wireless
operator Lt Hellier (‘Sea Urchin Minor’), an unnamed assistant wireless

operator known as ‘Rud W’, and Raymondi (‘Rud’), a local organiser in
Corsica. Suspicions had been raised in early 1943, when SOE was ‘warned
by another agent that Sea Urchin Major was contacting Carbuccia,
a Corsican Quisling, and a certain Doriot, a French Quisling (not, of
course, the well-known man)’.24 This suspicion was heightened when
messages from Sea Urchin abruptly stopped: a message received on 15
March was followed by a 3-week silence. During this time, a cable from
Algiers was received in London, which claimed that ‘the Pot team had
been arrested, that the chief had committed suicide, that the radio oper-
ator spoke and this resulted in fifty arrests, and that Rud had flown’.
London was thus on alert when a message was received from Sea Urchin
Minor on 5 April, which put the lack of contact down to illness. Three
days later a further message was received, which noted that ‘During
my providential illness my comrades have been arrested.’ These two
messages were considered to Harmer to ‘ring so false that, in conjunc-
tion with the information received from Algiers, it appears clear, almost
beyond doubt, that SEA URCHIN is being controlled by the enemy’. As
suspicion grew, a message containing a ‘trap phrase’ had been sent, along
with a cable inquiring whether he needed money, at the suggestion of
Cyril Miller.
Despite the accumulating evidence, Harmer noted that SOE remained
reluctant to think the worst. ‘Sea Urchin Minor’, Harmer wrote, ‘is
held in the highest esteem by S.O.E., who consider that whatever pres-
sure was applied he would be very unlikely to work for the enemy
unless he hoped thereby to outwit them they think it inconceiv-
able that he would go over to the enemy 100%.’ Harmer closed his
paper by pointing out that Sea Urchin ‘is a joint S.O.E./Free French
concern’. While Harmer felt that there was ‘no reason why we should
not dictate the policy in this case’, he emphasised that ‘the interests
of the Fighting French must be borne in mind in deciding on any
policy’:
In other words, it would be impossible for us to pass over any message

without notifying the Free French, from which they would be able to
draw their conclusions. I think, nevertheless, that it is of sufficient
importance to us to run if possible.
Robertson duly informed Foley and Bevan of the case.25 On 12 April,

Cyril Miller wrote to Harmer, informing him that no reply had yet been
received to the signal ‘containing the security phrase’. Meanwhile, he
drew attention to a further report that had been received from North
Africa, which stated,
Virtually the whole Sea Urchin group appears to have been arrested.
Capt. Sermont [sic] himself has committed suicide. It is alleged that
the wireless operator, probably the one recruited on the spot, talked. As
a result of this, over fifty other arrests were immediately carried out.26
The case was further complicated when a reply to Miller’s message was
received on 15 April, which led him to question whether the set was
actually transmitting under German control. Writing again to Harmer,
he noted,
I would particularly call your attention to the fact that, in answer to

the question suggested by me as to whether he was short of money,
he has answered that he was not for the moment, and also to the fact
that, as you will see from the previous traffic, we ‘stalled’ him with
regard to the new contacts he required in Algeria, but that he is in
agreement with us in our postponing giving them to him.27
Harmer wrote further on the Sea Urchin case, which he now described
as a ‘complicated set-up’ on 29 April. This followed further discussion
with Miller and Wethered, and further consideration of the fact that
the organisation had two separate wireless links with London. The Free
French Section continued to have ‘complete confidence’ in the first set,
operated by Sea Urchin Minor (Lt Hellier). The operator of the second
set, who had been ‘recruited on the spot’, was ‘believed to have been
the proximate cause of the break up of the organisation’, and was now
‘thought by S.O.E. to be working under control’.28
A joint SOE/MI5 conference was held on 30 April to discuss the case.
Robin Brook, who supervised SOE’s operations in France, Belgium and
Holland, David Keswick, Brook’s predecessor, and Dick Warden repres-
ented SOE, while Tar Robertson and Christopher Harmer attended for
MI5. It was agreed that ‘if it could be shown conclusively that the set
was working under control, the policy governing the messages should
be dictated by Colonel Dudley Clarke’, who ran deception in the Middle
East through ‘A’ Force. The question of whether Sea Urchin Minor was
free or controlled was now hotly debated. A further meeting was held at
Dorset Square, the headquarters of the Free French Section, the following
day, attended by the Section Head Captain James Hutchinson, three
of his officers, Warden and Harmer. At this meeting, the Free French
Section representatives ‘gave it as their opinion that the Sea Urchin set
was being worked by Sea Urchin Minor, who was still free. They did not
think the messages at all suspicious.’29 Dissatisfied with this, Harmer
‘drew their attention to the fact that the bluff check had always been
present and the true check omitted, which they agreed was evidence
of some value to support the theory that he was working under duress.
Once again, however, they all expressed the opinion that identity checks
were of no value at all.’ Pressing the point further, Harmer recorded
that he ‘then pointed out to them the fact that the operator at the
other end had not made the proper reply to the check question. They
again said that they did not regard this of much importance, because he
might have forgotten it.’ The check question had since been repeated
in a further message, but Harmer was disturbed by the attitude of the
Section:
I asked them whether, if he once again ignored the question and

did not give a proper reply, they would then regard him as being
controlled, and they replied that even that would not be conclusive
in their minds. They are reasonably certain that it is Sea Urchin Minor
in person who is doing the actual operating.
Harmer, however, remained sceptical:
My own personal view is that the evidence seems to accumulate to

show that the set is under control. Should the right reply not be given
to the trap question, it will be interesting to see to what length of
wishful thinking they will go to try and show that it is not controlled.
Any lingering doubts over the status of Sea Urchin Minor soon vanished.
On 3 May, Harmer was informed by Brook and Warden that a message
had been received from Massingham, SOE’s Mission in Algiers, which
stated that ‘the Sea Urchin set is incontrovertibly in enemy hands’.
Brook felt that this was sufficient to hand control of the case over to
MI5 to use ‘for strategical deception’.30 Notified by Harmer, Robertson
agreed to bring the case to Bevan’s attention again.31
Having studied Harmer’s papers, Foley wrote to Robertson on 3 May
requesting a meeting to discuss the case. Perhaps remembering the
Sealing Wax incident, Foley was concerned that Sea Urchin would
‘involve very serious dangers if it is used for strategic deception’.32 At a
meeting held on 6 May, he ‘expressed doubts whether it was wise, in
view of the Fighting French interest, to put across deceptive messages
which would indicate to them our probable true intentions’. Despite

this concern, it was agreed that the case ‘must be kept going for the
time being, to see how it developed, and with a view to utilisation in a
limited form later’.33
Harmer met with Warden, along with former RF Section Head Eric
Picquet-Wicks and one of Brook’s officers, J.H.F. Collingwood, on 11
May, and was informed that Sea Urchin had not given the correct reply
to the ‘trap question’. Instead, he had asked for it to be repeated, a
request which was considered ‘most unusual’. However, Harmer noted
that the Free French were ‘still trying to persuade themselves that he is
not working under control’, and had repeated the message as requested.
Harmer did manage to ‘secure the admission that if he still failed to
reply properly to the trap question, he would be considered by one and
all as blown’, and ‘emphasized again as strongly as I could that it would
be madness in my view to take any action, except on the assumption
that the set was being controlled’. With current policy being ‘to mark
time’, it was agreed that Sea Urchin should be sent a request ‘for a report
on the morale and sentiments of the local population following on the
Allied success in Tunisia’, which was thought ‘a neutral sort of message,
which will not disclose our knowledge of the case in any way’.34
Despite the confirmation of the agent’s blown status from
Massingham, the use of Sea Urchin for deception purposes was quickly
rejected. A document that has been entirely redacted – released as a
blank sheet of paper – is followed by a note by Wethered dated 30 July
on Sea Urchin. He recorded a discussion with Robertson, who told him
that he had ‘lost interest in it sometime ago’, and that there was ‘no
question of B.1.A re-opening interest in the transmitter’.35
A similar problem was posed by the involvement of the
Belgian Sûreté, the Belgian security service in exile which, as M.R.D.
Foot notes,‘wished to have a finger in every secret pie: greatly to SOE’s
annoyance’.36 This emerged during an investigation into whether the
Manfriday/Intersection transmitter, which was considered ‘probably or
possibly blown’, could be ‘used’ by B.1(a).37 Oscar Catherine (‘Manfriday’)
and his wireless operator Maurice Aarens (‘Intersection’) had been dropped
into Belgium on the night of 28/29 January 1942. Catherine’s mission
was primarily propaganda, but he was instructed to ‘engage in sabotage
as a sideline when favourable opportunity offered’. He was also
instructed to ‘arrange reception committees for the arrival of supplies
of all sorts and he was to reconnoitre landing grounds for Lysander
operations’. Regular wireless traffic was exchanged, ‘without any suspi-
cion attaching to Intersection’ until September. As Foot notes in the
official history, the Belgian Country Section had been ‘completely

deceived’ for some 6 months.38 In late August/early September, the Polit-
ical Intelligence Department (PID) of the Foreign Office ‘advised S.O.E.
that they had news that Intersection had been arrested’. In November,
MI5 was appraised of the situation, and Harvey was instructed to
conduct an investigation at Baker Street, exploring the circumstances
of several possibly compromised transmitters in Belgium. His ensuing
report was ‘the result of about fifteen hours study of the materials avail-
able’, and focused specifically on the Manfriday/Intersection case, which
he had found ‘so complicated’ that he had no time to investigate any
further transmitters.39
In his report, Harvey noted that ‘it can hardly be said that there were
any definite indications that Intersection was under control during this
period’. As such, in his capacity as organiser, over the period in question
five operations had taken place, dropping both supplies and agents.
There was thought to be potential use for this blown set, which emerged
during Harvey’s discussions of the case with Miller and Ivor Dobson of
SOE’s Belgian Section. However, the problem posed by the involvement
of the Sûreté quickly became apparent:
There had always to be borne in mind the over-riding disadvantage

that, owing to the interference of the Belgian Surete at both ends,
we should never feel that we had any control of the situation and
should always be doubtful whom we were really dealing with.40
In this particular case, beyond the involvement of the Sûreté, any

attempt to use blown SOE agents in Belgium was further complicated
as the extent of German penetration of SOE’s networks there became
apparent. Harvey’s initial investigation raised this issue, in addition to
the dreadful state of SOE record-keeping he encountered during his
investigation, so alien to the methodical, bureaucratically minded MI5
(‘I found the papers connected with the Manfriday/Intersection case
to be in an absolutely chaotic condition Although Manfriday’s case
interlocked with many others there is no cross-referencing anywhere’).41
Harvey quickly reached the conclusion that the blown transmitters
‘could not possibly be used by B.1.A. since it was almost impossible to tell
at any moment of time who was blown and who not or, where an agent
was known to be blown, how far the area of compromise extended’.
Robertson forwarded Harvey’s report to Senter, warning him that
Harvey had been ‘extremely outspoken’, and suggesting ‘a round table
conference about this as soon as you have digested its contents’.42 The
pair met to discuss the case 2 days later. As a result of their discussion,
Robertson drafted a letter to appraise Foley of the situation, but asked
Senter for his views before sending it.43 The draft was a blunt, and largely
negative, summation of SOE’s position in Belgium. Robertson went so
far as to suggest that at least half of the transmitters SOE had dropped
into the country were ‘certainly’ under enemy control, while most of
the remainder were ‘probably’ under enemy control. As such, Robertson
concluded, ‘For these blown transmitters to be run by B.1.A would be
asking for trouble. For all practical purposes we should be playing the
game blindfolded.’
In addition to the involvement of the Sûreté and the confusion
surrounding the extent of German penetration, a further factor that
mitigated against the use of Belgian sets for deception was the context
within which messages were sent to Belgian agents. For the deception
to succeed, this could not simply change overnight, a point which was
raised by Robertson:
we should be unable to sustain a plausible traffic with agents of this

kind. Their normal traffic consists:
(a) of arrangements agreed over the wireless for the dropping of
supplies (and sometimes other agents) by air; the formation of
the reception committees, etc; and finally the fulfilment of these
arrangements by actual operations; and
(b) of a copious flow of names, addresses, passwords, contacts,
rendezvous, etc., which the agents may find useful. Where an
agent is known, or believed, to be blown we obviously cannot
justify the continuation of operations under heading (a). The
most one can do, on the contrary, is to make excuses on such
grounds as bad weather for not conducting these operations at
the usual times. Obviously one cannot keep up this pretence for
more than one or two moon periods. Under heading (b) there
is little that can usefully be done, except perhaps the trans-
mission of names and persons known to us to be Quislings,
in the hope that the Germans will bump them off in their
enthusiasm.44
Robertson did raise the possibility of using the Belgian sets to revive
Plan Iago, but emphasised the need for quick action: ‘there is no time
to lose since one cannot go on making excuses for not sending supplies
by air in the ordinary manner for very long’.45
Robertson’s draft letter was never sent to Foley, as Senter raised

a number of objections which the pair discussed on 7 December.46
An alternative text drafted by Senter was far less damaging from
SOE’s perspective: the doom-laden speculation surrounding the exact
numbers of SOE agents to be considered compromised in Belgium
vanished, replaced with the far less inflammatory statement that,
although there was ‘considerable evidence of German penetration’, it
remained ‘difficult to say with any certainty just how much’. The
point that Robertson ‘should not be prepared to touch it for
deception purposes’ remained. While the suggestion of using the
set to compromise known Quislings was again raised, the letter
conceded that such activity ‘would amount to sniping rather than
any solid plan such as we had envisaged’, and concluded on a down-
beat note: ‘It is disappointing that what looked like a promising
field for deception does not seem to be worth touching, at least at
present.’ The letter was sent to Foley, without further amendment, the
following day.47
Despite these conclusions, Robertson met with Brook to try and
salvage something from the situation. During the course of their discus-
sion (in which Robertson raised Harvey’s criticisms of SOE’s cavalier atti-
tude toward filing, and found Brook ‘extremely anxious to set his house
in order’), the possibility of using some of the W/T sets to denounce
known Quislings was again raised, while it was also suggested that the
transmitters could possibly be used ‘in conjunction with C.C.O. raids on
the Belgian coast’.48 A final decision against the use of the Belgian sets
for deception was reached on 17 December. Harvey recorded a meeting
with Miller, Dobson and Belgian Section Head Claude Knight, which
they ‘discussed at length the question whether B.1.A should make any
use of the blown transmitters and decided definitely not to do so’. The
proposed deception to assist a Commando raid was dismissed; Harvey
observed that ‘it would take so long to get the scheme worked out with
C.C.O. that it would by then be too late to make use of this channel’.
Miller concurred, making no effort to ‘press in any way for the use of
these transmitters by B.1.A.’. Rather, he expressed the view that ‘there
was hardly any tangible advantage which we could hope to gain from
it’. In addition, it was agreed that it was of paramount importance
that SOE should ‘discover the facts’ about the situation in Belgium.49
Robertson wrote to Senter on 19 December, having been asked by Brook
to put MI5’s conclusions on paper. Echoing the points made by Harvey,
Robertson informed Senter that ‘no useful purpose could be served, apart
from the fact that it would be an extremely difficult undertaking, by
trying to operate any one of these sets in connection with an operational

deception’.50
There were a handful of cases in which plans to initiate deception
using SOE did proceed, albeit briefly, but even in these cases obstacles
remained. SOE’s operational Country Sections did not necessarily favour
MI5’s plans for their blown agents, expressing concern for the likely
consequences should the Germans realise that they had been deceived.
These cases centred around Norway, an area described by Masterman as
‘a favourite playground for deception’.51 A telegram from SOE’s Mission
in Stockholm received in London on 4 August 1942 gave notice that a
number of arrests had been made by the Gestapo in the Ostfeld region.52
On 10 August, London informed Stockholm that a telegram had been
received from an agent in the area, Ernest Kirkeby Jacobsen, codename
Crow. Using the correct security check, he wrote that arrests had taken
place in Ostfeld, and requested ‘addresses or advice’. A further telegram
from Stockholm, however, warned that there ‘seems every probability
that message you have received from Crow is a fake in order trap you into
sending further details of organisation’.53 London was not immediately
convinced. Another telegram purporting to be from Crow arrived on 11
August, on which Norwegian Country Section officer Malcolm Munthe
scribbled ‘I’m sure this is from our man all right.’54 London cabled
Stockholm, noting that the message received from Crow was ‘correct
in every detail even to characteristic mistakes’, and suggested that the
true impostor would be found elsewhere.55 Amidst this ambiguity, the
Security Section and MI5 began to take an interest in the case. On 15
August, Senter discussed the case with Robertson, who proceeded to
consult with Col Jack Wilson, head of the Norwegian Country Section.56
Wilson recorded,
I saw Major Robertson of M.I.5 with D/CE this morning. We are all
agreed that the chances of the Crow W/T Operator still being at large
are 50–50. The position is to be watched very carefully and any signals
from him which appear to be suspicious are to be communicated to
Major Robertson.57
Later that day, Stockholm was notified that Jacobsen had been sent
a message asking for his address, and told to make his way to Stock-
holm if he faced ‘real difficulties’.58 Stockholm cabled London 2 days
later, by which point it was thought ‘overwhelmingly probable’ that
messages from Jacobsen were actually under German control.59 Senter
and Robertson discussed the matter further on 17 August, at which point
it was agreed that ‘the position is doubtful’.60 Munthe, Wilson’s deputy,

met with Harmer on 22 August. In his report for Robertson, Harmer
noted Munthe’s willingness to support MI5 in playing the set back:
Munthe appeared to be very keen and co-operative about working

the transmitter. He foresaw that at the least we could discredit certain
collaborators in Norway, and thought it was quite possible to put in
questions of any nature in view of the position the CROW holds as a
channel of communication only. He also agreed with me that it might
be worth running the CROW transmitter to build up their confidence
in the man so that ultimately we might procure his escape through
Sweden by telling him to go there to fetch money. He said that the
sending of money to keep CROW going could be done without any
difficulty at all and without risk. He thought CROW, even if he had
gone bad, was a good chap and worth saving.61
Munthe agreed to prepare a short account of the case for Harmer, to

reach MI5 via the Security Section. Robertson informed Senter of the
meeting, and of Munthe’s belief that it would be possible to main-
tain contact ‘for the time being without giving rise to any suspicion
that we are considering the possibility of Crow being blown’.62 Senter
forwarded the paper to Harmer on 30 August.63 Copies of further docu-
ments requested by MI5 (operational instructions, operation instruc-
tions for ‘Crow’ W/T operator, signal plan and all signal traffic) were
sent to the Security Section by Wilson for their forward communication
to MI5.64
A further message was received ‘under the Crow code’ on
12 September, the text of which was enough even to convince Wilson
that ‘it comes from the enemy’. He noted that ‘No reply will be sent
until M.I.5 advise.’65 On 17 September, Robertson and J.H. Marriott met
with Wilson to discuss how Jacobsen’s transmitter should be handled:
After discussion it was agreed that the essential thing was to carry
on the case in an apparently normal fashion, and that this could be
effected by instructing Crow that an important task might be given
to him in the near future, and that in the meantime his organisation
was to reconnoitre roads and railways in the district and to report
upon any unusual movement on them.66
Later that day, Robertson reported on the ‘Crow case’ to a meeting of

the Twenty Committee,67 while Wilson wrote to Gubbins, noting that
It now seems certain that Crow wireless is being used by the enemy.
The case is being dealt with in consultation with Major Robertson
of M.I.5., and it is intended to try and use Crow to disseminate
important false rumours.68
MI5 was duly informed of the next message received from Crow, and
provided with a copy of the reply that was sent following consultation.69
The draft text of a further message was forwarded to the Security Section
and MI5 on 17 October. An unexpected development occurred later in
the month, as MI5 was informed that news had reached London via the
Stockholm Mission that Jacobsen had been rescued from prison, and
was likely on his way to Sweden.70 As such the case appeared to be at
an end, as Gubbins pointed out in a letter to Wilson:
As soon as the Germans discover Crow’s escape, which is probably

now, they will know the W/T is BUST. This aspect requires consider-
ation; take up with D/CE.71
Such consideration did not prove necessary, as further reports made

clear that the escaped prisoner was not Jacobsen but Tor Gulbrandsen,
to whom we shall return later in this chapter. As Wilson noted on
28 October, this meant that ‘So far as Crow is concerned we return to
the former position, which means that his signal of the 24th should
receive a reply.’72 A discussion between Wilson and an unnamed MI5
officer took place on 29 October, at which the MI5 officer appears to
have handed Wilson a draft message. Wilson wrote to the officer the
following day, noting that he had tinkered with the draft ‘so as to make
the language and form in keeping with the previous messages sent’.73
On 1 November, Wilson informed MI5 that another message had been
received from Crow, which had given him reason to question whether
the set was under German control:
If the above reply has an enemy origin it is a much more clever one
than the previous messages, since the mention of funds and tobacco
is just the sort of think we would expect from one of our people in
the field sending an entirely independent message.74
On 10 November, Wilson wrote to his MI5 contact again. As no reply

to Crow’s message had been given, nor did he ‘appear to have been on
the air since then’, Wilson enquired whether MI5 wished ‘to continue
with the interchange of signals with this enemy Station’, to which
the MI5 officer replied ‘We certainly do want to continue exchan-

ging messages with Crow’,75 explaining that the case was considered a
‘slow burn’:
it is desired to keep the Crow case in its present state for the time
being it is thought that it may be very useful later on. I would
therefore like to discuss with you some plan for keeping the Germans’
interest alive for several months to come. This would appear to
involve the sending of money and the details I have in mind are to
tell them about some bogus expedition or keep them waiting in some
specified locality in Norway for the arrival of new contacts. I will ring
you up in a day or two if I may and come and discuss this.76
The MI5 officer’s next letter, dated 14 November, has not survived,
but Wilson’s response indicates that it explained that MI5 considered
the case to have potential for future use as a means of spreading rumours
of an early Allied landing, likely to correspond with plans that were
being formulated for the double cross agents ‘Mutt’ and ‘Jeff’.77 Wilson
had strong reservations about using the set for such a purpose:
So far as the general question you raise of communicating rumours

of a possible early Allied landing, after consultation with all
those concerned I have decided definitely that this would be very
dangerous, since it would encourage loyal Norwegians to look for
early action. Unfortunately we have had two or three examples that
the raising of false hopes is apt to endanger and sacrifice the lives of
a number of people.78
Wilson continued to express further reservations over the likely

consequences of deception work involving Jacobsen’s transmitter.
Wilson and an MI5 officer met and discussed the case on 31 December
1942. On New Year’s Day, the officer sent Wilson the text of a message
which was to be transmitted ‘as soon as possible’, also noting that ‘we
would like you if possible to go to the lengths of calling yourself in
order to make contact, unless this is entirely contrary to your accepted
practice’. In addition to the earlier view of Crow as a ‘long term’ decep-
tion, MI5 also wanted to use the transmitter to play some short-term
‘mischief’ on the Germans:
we think it would be a good idea to try and fix a rendezvous to bring

to the attention of the Germans in order to confuse them The idea
would be to ask Crow to go to a certain place to meet another of

your agents, which we might justifiably hope would draw off several
valuable Gestapo agents. I suggest the sort of rendezvous we want
is a small hotel or hut up in the hills, far from any of your centres
of activity. The prospect of a few Gestapo officials sitting in a cold
hut on the hillside for a month or two is one which fills me with
considerable pleasure and, quite apart from this, we know their man-
power problem is acute.79
Wilson was not impressed by this proposal. He forwarded the letter to

Senter on 5 January, outlining his concerns about the consequences of
misleading the Gestapo:
I do not think he properly appreciates the fact that everything we

do must have some repercussion, and that while it is all very well to
mislead the Gestapo, they may take it out on some innocent person.80
The question soon became irrelevant: a telegram was received in London

on 7 January 1943 from Stockholm, which contained the news that
Jacobsen had escaped, and arrived in Stockholm with his family.81 Thus,
the case came to an abrupt – and for Wilson, not an entirely unwel-
come – end. Robertson reported ‘the developments in Crow’ at the
Twenty Committee meeting held on 14 January.82
A further Norwegian case exploited for the purposes of deception
concerned the agent Tor Gulbrandsen. Following the revelation that his
escape from German custody had been arranged on the condition that
he reported back to the Germans from the UK, outlined in Chapter 5,
Gulbrandsen – now codenamed Omelette – provided the deception plan-
ners with an opportunity for ‘offensive counter espionage’. Senter wrote
to Wilson on 15 February 1943, noting that he had read the relevant
papers and asked Robertson for ‘an early discussion as to the possible
use of Omelette’:
One line of most interest to us would be a deception plan as to our

operational programme and I should be glad if you would consider
it from that angle and let me have any suggestions.83
Robertson, accompanied by an unnamed MI5 officer, met with

Gulbrandsen on 4 March to discuss ‘the form that his first letter should
take’.84 Gulbrandsen had been given clear instructions on how to report
his status to the Germans:
If things were going badly he was to send a remark about the weather
including the word ‘not’, e.g. ‘the weather is not bad’. If what he said
about the weather was a positive statement, either that the weather
was good or it was bad, then that would mean that he was getting
along alright.
It was agreed that this ‘weather formula’ should be used. Gulbrandsen

was particularly worried by the return to the UK of Jacobsen, the afore-
mentioned Crow: ‘He thinks the Germans must know that the latter
is in a position to betray him and he therefore feels that if they know
Jacobsen has arrived here they will think it odd that he, Omlette [sic], is
in a position to write.’ In order to overcome this problem Gulbrandsen
proposed telling the Germans that he had heard ‘that Jacobsen is going
slightly mental. They will then think that if Jacobsen does betray him
the British Authorities will merely think he is raving.’ The draft letter
concocted at the meeting read:
Dear Borghild,
How are you? I have not heard anything from you since I last wrote,
but there are many postal difficulties nowadays. I have been ill for
some time, but am much better now. How are you getting on?
I heard some news about Jacob last week. He has been very ill, and
has now had a nervous breakdown. I gather he may have gone a bit
crazy. In other respects all goes well here.
I should like to meet you again soon. I think it will be soon too, the
War must stop sometime. The strain for the soldiers on the eastern
Front must be beyond endurance, with the cold and the frightful
conditions, in addition to the fighting. The weather has not been too
bad here this winter, and now, with summer coming it ought to be
much better.
I start my old work soon; it will be fun, and I am looking forward
to it.
Well I hope to write again. In the meantime, enjoy yourself.
Best wishes,
Yours ever,
FRITZ85
As the MI5 officer explained, the letter covered five key points:
(a) That Gulbrandsen has written before (see 1st paragraph)

(b) That Jacobsen is in this country and has had a nervous breakdown
(see paragraph 2)
(c) That things have been difficult for Gulbrandsen during the winter
but he thinks he will be alright now (see last sentence of paragraph 3)
(d) That he is going back into SOE (see paragraph 4)
(e) That he hopes to send in reports as instructed by the Germans (see
paragraph 5).86
The letter was shown to Wilson, who ‘approved it with certain slight
alterations’. Arrangements were made for an officer to meet with
Gulbrandsen on 5 March in order for him to copy out the agreed text
by hand.
Having established Gulbrandsen’s position, further thought was now
given to the use of his channel for deception. On 7 March, Munthe
sent Wilson a list of ‘imaginary plans for operations’ which ‘might be
conveyed to the enemy by war of plausible feint’:
1. Landing large party of guerrillas and saboteurs on the glacier of

Jostedalsbre, by parachute, and forming a depot there, between the
Antrum and Moorhen areas. (This was considered and found totally
impracticable to out aircraft).
2. M.T.B. large scale raid on Lista from sea. (Cheese area). (This coast
is impracticable to us and might detract attention to our renewed
attempts to revive the mountain hinterland near Thrush).
3. Parachute and sea-plane landing of force on large lakes in desolate
area on Norwegian–Swedish frontier in the North Heron area, to cut
Norway in two. (These Lakes would probably never be used by us,
and would require a large number of men and a quantity of transport
to establish an efficient garrison of Germans).
4. Expedition to Narvik and Lofoten. (This would move more enemy
resources to an area we have already found unreceptive).
Munthe noted that, if convincing, ‘a number of Germans would have

to be earmarked for these eventualities’.87
Another Norwegian Country Section officer offered observations on
Munthe’s proposed fake operations. He thought that (1) was ‘admirable
since I am sure the Germans in Norway have by this time a profound
belief in the ability of Norwegian troops especially to sustain themselves
in the most arctic conditions’. He similarly thought that (4) was ‘excel-
lent since any reinforcements sent to the Far North by the enemy
automatically increase his shipping needs and administrative problems
such as leave, rationing, etc’.88 In contrast, he did not believe (2) to
be convincing enough, while he objected to (3) as ‘if at any time we
wished to take Norway, or part of it, this is the district where we should
really have to operate’. The officer proposed ‘the suggestion of large
scale landing of parachute troops in South Trondelag, with a view to
attacks on submarine installations, sea-planes, airfields and oil installa-
tions which are numerous in that area’.
Wilson wrote to Senter on 9 March noting that he had discussed his
request for deception plans with his staff, and noted that ‘we find it
rather difficult to produce any novel ideas’. Wilson’s attitude towards
deception remained ambivalent, as it had been during the Crow case.
He remained particularly concerned that ‘there is always the danger
that when we are misleading the enemy, we might also mislead our
own friends’. Wilson had some experience of this, following rumours
that had been ‘put about of a possible Allied landing in Norway in the
immediate future’, which ‘disturbed our local organisations consider-
ably, and were apt to make the younger members more active and more
talkative than was safe’. While Wilson was not totally opposed to decep-
tion plans on such grounds (‘I realise that it is a danger that has to
be faced’), he emphasised his belief that ‘the very greatest care should
be taken in regard to rumours which may have the effect of causing
those who are loyal to the Allied Cause to endanger themselves unneces-
sarily’. Wilson followed this ‘destructive criticism’ by suggesting three
potential rumours: of a landing party of guerrillas and saboteurs at Joste-
dalsbre and expeditions to Narvik and Lofoten, as originally proposed by
Munthe, along with the suggestion of ‘a large scale landing of parachute
troops in South Trondelag, with a view to attacks on submarine install-
ations, sea-planes, air-fields and oil installations, which are numerous
in that area’.89
No further papers on the use to which Gulbrandsen was put have
been released, and as such it is not possible to tell how much further
immediate use was made of Gulbrandsen as a conduit for deception, or
how effective this was. Gulbranden’s MI5 dossier is of little help, as the
file was filleted in 1960, leaving a mere handful of the original docu-
ments. However, the index sheets offer some clues as to the missing
content. They record a ‘B.1.a note on S.O.E. Deceptions – Plan Pruden-
tial’, dated 18 April 1943.90 While it has proved impossible to find any
further references to this plan – it is not mentioned in the minutes
of the Twenty Committee – it can reasonably be suggested that this

was the name given to the Gulbrandsen deception scheme. There is no
indication that Gulbrandsen’s letters proved a great success; from the
index sheets, it appears that MI5 interest in the case came to an end
during May.
Continued frustrations, coupled with conflicting views over the
consequences of using blown SOE transmitters for purposes of decep-
tion, led to a revision of policy in August 1943, at which point Liddell
proposed that in future no such attempts should be made. He recorded
in his diary:
Harmer has written a note about using blown SOE sets for decep-
tion. He points out many difficulties, the principle one being that
the concern of the SOE section officer is to extricate his agent from a
difficult position. This policy would not be consistent with deception.
The result is that they fall between two stools. The deception is unsat-
isfactory and the agent is generally shot. I have recommended that
the use of blown SOE sets for deception should be discontinued and
that SOE should work out some plan both with their agent before he
goes and within their own organisation, to ensure that the maximum
is done to extricate a controlled agent from his predicament.91
Harmer’s report, if it survives, has not been released to The National

Archives. With Liddell’s support, it resulted in a significant change in
policy towards the use of blown SOE sets. On 9 September, John Bevan,
head of the London Controlling Section, wrote to Robinson, noting that:
There is no doubt in my mind that we should give up the idea of

using S.O.E. blown sets for our work and in this connection I think
the matter is summed up in a nutshell in the last four lines of
report.
Given the context, the edited name is likely a reference to Harmer.

However, Bevan went on to add a rider:
If, of course, S.O.E. are at any time able to offer an exceptionally good
opportunity in this connection we might perhaps look at it again, but
generally speaking, I think we had better leave this matter alone.92
In response, Robertson noted that he was ‘very glad’ that Bevan agreed
with the points made in Harmer’s report. He added that he had discussed
the matter further with Senter, who had ‘put forward what I think is a
very good suggestion, on which I should be glad if you would let me
have your views’:
Commander Senter suggests that in future S.O.E. should not tender

for our use any sets which appear to be blown, but suggests that you,
either directly or through me, should indicate to S.O.E. any particular
area on the Continent in which you are interested, in order than an
enquiry may be put through to S.O.E. with a view to seeing whether
there are any sets in that area which are either available or suitable
for your purposes.
Robertson felt that this was ‘probably the best way of handling this
situation in future’ and, anticipating Bevan’s agreement, proposed to
inform the Twenty Committee at its next meeting.93 Bevan did not
think that Senter’s suggestion called for any revision of the opinion he
had previously expressed, and agreed to keep the suggestion ‘in mind’:
should the occasion ever arise when we are prepared to use an S.O.E.
blown set, I will indicate through you the area on the Continent
where we would like to use such a set if available. As a start, we could
do no harm if we pointed out to S.O.E. that we are interested in the
Pas de Calais and would like the offer of a suitable blown set in this
area any time during the next six months or so.94
Robertson duly communicated this to Senter, and informed the Twenty

Committee of the new arrangement on 16 September.95
Whether by invitation or not, cases of blown SOE transmitters
continued to be brought to the attention of the deception author-
ities, despite the limited interest in their use. In December, Robertson
informed the Twenty Committee of a ‘blown transmitter in Czechoslov-
akia which had been offered in due course’, which he noted would be
discussed with Foley prior to a full report to the Committee.96 At the
following meeting, Robertson noted that he had discussed the ‘Barbara
Station’ with Foley, and that they ‘both agreed that for various reasons
this station was not suitable for use by the Committee in particular,
that as it was being run by the Czechs it could not be used for strategic
deception’.97
In November 1944, J.H. Marriott of B1(a) Section conducted an
investigation into the case of ‘Noah’, a wireless operator linked to
SOE’s Danish Section. Evidence had been slowly accumulating that
Noah – who had been recruited in the field, and whose real name was
not even known by SOE in London – had been arrested, likely caught
through the use of Direction Finding equipment. Marriott concluded
that ‘no exploitation of Noah’s transmitter on conventional lines is
possible’, as news of his arrest was known to be circulating in the under-
ground press: ‘it must be assumed that the Germans will very rapidly
suppose that the news of Noah’s arrest has reached us’. Further, Noah
was ‘only an operator it is obvious to the Germans that he was
not himself intended to be a collector and purveyor of intelligence’.
Marriott did, however, see one potential use for the transmitter: ‘to
send a message straight away to the Germans informing them that we
recognise that they are controlling the transmitter, and thereafter, if the
Germans continue to play, to use the channel as a direct line to the
Germans’.98 Marriott forwarded his paper to Bevan, noting his under-
standing that ‘you may in the near future wish to take action for the
express purpose of lowering the German will to resist, and it occurs to
us that you might find some use in a case of this sort for that purpose’.99
Bevan declined the offer, as Marriott later recorded: ‘L.C.S. stated that
the use of a direct line to the Germans was not yet possible, and they
expressed the view, with which I agree, that if and when it does become
possible we shall be able to find a better case to use than this one’.100
Throughout the war, SOE remained on the fringes of deception
activity, although not through any lack of intent; rather, the lack of
greater involvement was largely dictated by circumstances. While there
is more evidence of SOE involvement in deception activity than has
previously been acknowledged, there remains nothing to suggest that
such involvement included the deliberate sacrifice of agents’ lives.
9
Unfinished Business
The Security Section had faced its greatest challenges in the months
preceding Overlord, both in terms of general security issues – issuing
reminders warning against ‘Careless Talk’ – and the strict control of
operational security through Bayswater, while simultaneously dealing
with the fallout from the Nordpol affair and the ambiguity surrounding
Dericourt. Following Overlord, the Section remained under consider-
able pressure, clearing an increasing volume of returning agents through
Bayswater and tying up numerous loose ends. Such unfinished business
included efforts to discover the fate of missing agents and further explor-
ation of prior security questions through the interrogation of captured
German personnel, in conjunction with MI5. Such tasks were conducted
as staff numbers dwindled, as SOE moved towards its own dissolution
in January 1946.
Prior to Overlord, the Security Section had contributed to the Special
Force Detachments that represented SOE with the Armies in the field.
Formed in January 1944, their purpose was ‘to explain to the army
operational staffs what resistance could and could not do’.1 A security
officer was attached to 21 Army Group, along with further security
personnel at each army headquarters, taken from either the staff of
the Security Directorate or from officers who had been attached to
Bayswater.2 The security officers ‘found themselves mainly assisting
Army C.I. and Civil Affairs staffs to identify and to establish the bona
fides in overrun areas’, and were ‘instrumental in facilitating the return
of S.O.E. agents in the U.K. from liberated areas’.3 Bayswater became
the rear link for the security officers attached to the SF Detachments,
feeding them with counter-intelligence material and answering any
enquiries.
Within days of the launch of Overlord, Warden wrote to MI5 with
the details of three French circuits which were now known to have
been blown (SATIRIST, DELEGATE and BUTLER).4 Informed that little
further investigation could be conducted through the LRC Information
195
Index on the basis of the information provided, Wethered began, once

again, to push for a thorough inspection of the relevant Country Section
files. Writing to Dick White on 12 June, Wethered felt that the cases
raised wider concerns over the state of SOE’s organisation in France.
Considering further penetration a ‘very strong possibility’, he proposed
raising with Senter ‘the desirability of having the S.O.E. French records
and traffic examined with great care by a board consisting perhaps of
an officer from S.O.E. and two from M.I.5’. He noted that he would
‘not mind betting that any such investigation would reveal an alarming
state of affairs which might not be revealed until too late if no such
investigation is carried out’.5 Wethered also wrote to Warden, outlining
the need for research in Country Section records and emphasising his
belief that such work was necessary ‘in view of the possibility that we
may find that the penetration is infectious or has affected other circuits’.
He concluded by asking for confirmation that no member of the blown
circuits had returned to the UK: ‘If he has, we should of course have
to consider with some care whether there is any possibility that he was
controlled.’6 White also tactfully raised the subject in a letter to Senter
dated 26 June. Forwarding Wethered’s preliminary report on the blown
circuits, he continued,
it does seem to me essential, though this is my personal opinion and

I recognise that this department has no standing in the matter, that
a careful examination should be made of the extent of the damage in
the field. This could only be done by someone having access to your
country section’s records and if we can be of any help in the matter
perhaps you would let me know.7
In the introduction to his report, Wethered pointed to the indications

that the blown circuits had maintained links with ‘indigenous French
organisations’, which meant that it was therefore ‘essential to examine
as closely as possible how far the infection may have extended among
indigenous French resistance’.8 He emphasised the limited ability of the
LRC Information Index to provide a full picture from the information
provided by Warden, which gave ‘only a very few names Without
information as to these persons’ contacts or colleagues the L.R.C. records
cannot of course yield very full results’. He also reiterated his view that
a ‘careful investigation in S.O.E. records’ was ‘absolutely essential’.
Events now began to overtake security considerations. This latest
attempt by Wethered to justify an in-depth examination of Country
Section files failed to appreciate the rapidly changing operational
Unfinished Business 197
situation in France, which was likely to render any methodical London-

based investigation out of date before it could be completed. Away on
sick leave, Senter did not respond to White’s letter until 20 July. Allaying
MI5 concerns at any possibility of penetration (‘there have been no
returns affected by these casualties you may take it that the existing
procedure would apply when any security element arose’), he proceeded
to emphasise the futility of any such in-depth investigations, putting
forward the view that ‘one must now look at the problem as a dynamic
operational one it would be useless to expect from this end to have a
complete picture of the set-up of this type of offensive, and in some cases
para-military warfare’.9 He also highlighted the unreasonable nature of
Wethered’s request for details of colleagues and contacts in the field,
noting that
we cannot hope to have full information as to local recruits and all

the active circuits have of course done a great deal of local recruiting.
That will come to light as they are overrun.
Satisfied that the procedure in cases of suspected penetration remained

in place, White was willing to concede the point (‘As regards your
general proposition that we have now entered a dynamic operational
phase, where the types of activities sponsored in France by S.O.E. are of
the para-military type for which locally recruited personnel are increas-
ingly employed, I agree that detailed security scrutiny of such personnel
becomes impractical’).10
Wethered’s liaison work with SOE came to an end in August, at which
point Petrie approved his secondment to SHAEF for work ‘in connec-
tion with post armistice activities’.11 Informed of this by Robertson,
Senter noted that news of Wethered’s departure had been received with
‘great personal regret’.12 With MI5 keen to ‘keep a close liaison going’
with SOE, Wethered was replaced by Major Mark Johnstone. Recently
returned from an 18-month stint in West Africa, Johnstone had a good
knowledge of France which Robertson felt would make him ‘a good
substitute for Wethered’.13
Following the liberation of France, Warden was sent to Paris as
Security Officer for SOE’s Mission there, his ‘specialised knowledge’ of
the country proving valuable.14 Working closely with the representat-
ives of both Section V of SIS and the French Security authorities, his task
was to discover as much as possible about the fate of missing agents,
and to help the authorities to determine ‘whether particular persons
had or had not worked for or assisted the enemy in some way or given
away unnecessary information when arrested’, furnishing them with the

information necessary to ‘trace and punish traitors’.15 Most of Warden’s
work concerned requests for ‘attestations’ from numerous individuals
who claimed that they had assisted the resistance in some manner,
which resulted in an almost continual exchange of telegrams with
London, requesting the look up of names.16 The pattern was repeated
as liberation followed elsewhere: the Security Section was represented
in SOE’s missions to Belgium, Holland and Denmark. The exception
was Norway, where a security officer was sent ‘for a period to conduct
certain security investigations’.17 As with the Special Force Detachments,
Bayswater provided the rear link for the Security Officers ‘on the spot’.
Such Security representation abroad was considered vital, as it was
thought that much of SOE’s operational history would ‘remain obscure
until the enemy’s part of the story was made available’.18 Through their
work, the security officers obtained information that ‘threw fresh light
on the history of S.O.E. operations’.
Such overseas postings combined with unexpected problems to place
additional pressures on the Security Section. In February 1945, Senter
wrote to Hoyer Millar in Italy, noting, ‘The Air Commodore broke his
elbow on the ice and has been off for three weeks, and with the absence
of him and Tom, and Dick Warden (in Paris) I am finding the burden
somewhat heavy just at the moment.’19 The burden had grown heavy
in the immediate aftermath of Overlord, as Bayswater was flooded with
‘miscellaneous returns’, which meant that the existing procedure for
interviewing returned agents had broken down. By October 1944, Senter
was concerned that security had become too lax, taking ‘no action’ in
cases of returned agents. He pointed out that ‘Routine Orders prescribing
for the treatment of returned agents still apply and our responsibility
to the other departments still applies as regards any agents of possible
security interest.’20 In order to continue such work properly, Senter
pressed for the approval of a paper put forward by SOE’s Director of
Training for the transfer of ‘one or possibly two of his present staff
who may not now be over-employed’ to Bayswater, to participate in the
interrogation of returning agents.21 It is clear that the interrogation of
returned agents on security grounds, in conjunction with MI5, did not
lapse entirely.22
Tom Roche’s absence from London in February 1945 was a result of
his secondment to SOE’s Mission in Cairo, where between November
1944 and April 1945 he was engaged ‘on special Security duties with the
S.O.E. Liquidation Committee for the Mediterranean’.23 As a member of
SOELIQ, Roche advised on both security and legal matters. In particular,
he was ‘instructed to give special attention to clearing the Cooler’.24

Having visited Cairo a few months earlier, Roche was under no illusion
as to the challenge posed by this task. ‘The Cooler’, he explained, was
‘not any physical place’ as in the case of Inverlair, but ‘a term used to
denote the status of persons for whose services they have no further
use but for whose maintenance and repatriation they remain liable’.
Many of these were ‘long term cases’, living in Kenya under the scheme
outlined in Chapter 3. During his earlier visit, Roche had discovered
that there was ‘no accurate information as to the numbers or location of
these persons still less any accurate records of their personal particulars’;
rather, there was ‘much truth in the statement “out of sight, out of
mind” ’. A security officer was instructed to investigate the position,
which meant that upon his return Roche was able to proceed quickly.
The work raised difficult issues which did not apply in the UK:
In the UK there is little difficulty in obtaining permits for our ex-

agents to remain and take work. In the Middle East the position
is entirely different. Residence permits are extremely difficult if not
impossible to obtain and as a general rule the governments concerned
only admit foreign bodies in return for an assurance that the agency
introducing them (SOE) remains absolutely and permanently liable
for their maintenance and repatriation.25
Roche was left with three possible methods of disposal: repatriation,

legal immigration or ‘transfer to the employment of some other govern-
ment agency who would take over our liability’. Of these, only the first
method was ultimately practicable.
During his time in Cairo, Roche processed over 150 cases. He later
recalled the frustration the work involved: ‘One spends an enormous
amount of time on the affairs of these not very worthy people and at
times one seems to be making little progress.’ While some had genuine
fears of returning to their own country for fear of reprisals, others ‘had
been receiving allowances of from £300 to £500 per annum tax free from
SOE for some years and were much opposed to any alteration in their
status’, and ‘were constantly obstructing efforts to repatriate them’.26
By the time of his departure, 24 cases remained ‘active’, awaiting trans-
portation, visas and other papers, while a further 38 cases, concerning
Hungarians, Germans and Austrians, could not be properly dealt with
until the end of the war. As SOE’s security representation virtually ceased
to exist in Cairo in April, these were eventually put in the hands of a
Central Repatriation Department.27 Roche returned to the UK via Italy,
where he spent some time with Hoyer Millar.28 Upon his departure from
Cairo, Col Henry Benson of HQ Force 133 wrote to Boyle, noting that
Roche ‘has been an invaluable help to me’:
He has cleaned up the ‘Cooler’ problem in a way which few people

in this organisation could have done, and I think SOE can be grateful
that, so far at least, they have had so few ‘come-backs’ from a difficult
class of person who would have had every reason to complain had
they not been handled properly.
In addition to that, Tom Roche has given invaluable advice on legal
security matters, and he has sat on the Personnel Board and helped
to get rid of a large number of bodies in a comparatively short space
of time.29
Back in London, security concerns over Holland remained acute, and

further security/operational tension emerged during the early months
of 1945. From January, Dutch security matters were the concern of
Tom Ansell Wells (BSS/A), a former N Section Officer described by
Boyle as ‘very careful, shrewd and competent’.30 In the aftermath of
the Nordpol affair, both the Security Section and the MI5 proceeded
to regard Dutch resistance with extreme caution, much to the annoy-
ance of the Dutch Country Section, which later recorded in its history
that the Security Section ‘did everything it possibly could do to
discourage further operations in Holland’.31 On 27 January, Wells wrote
to Senter following a discussion with the latest Head of the Dutch
Country Section, Ivor Dobson, who planned to bring over a number of
Dutchmen for short periods of training followed by their swift return
to the field. Dobson was concerned that ‘long delays in the hands of
Security should be avoided’, citing the time that had been taken
for MI5 to clear a recently arrived agent, ‘Rob’. Wells was keen to
disabuse Dobson of his attitude towards security as it applied to Dutch
agents:
Since the majority of these operational recruits which N hopes to

receive will come from Resistance Groups in Holland, attaching to
which there will inevitably be certain Security questions, I do not
think that we can possibly expect to clear them through M.I.5. in a
shorter time than was taken for ROB, i.e. 7 days, and I think that it
would be very wrong for us to guarantee their passage through the
Security mill within this time, let alone to hold out any hopes of
getting them through more quickly.32
The matter was raised again in February, at which point Wells once
again repeated his warning: ‘I would stress the point made by [Senter]
that, despite all our efforts to get speedy treatment for Dutch arrivals in
this country, their cases are so unavoidably complicated that they are
bound to take some time.’33
At the end of March, Dobson received a telegram from the field refer-
ring to ‘some line crossers’, who had produced ‘recommendation papers
from underground organisations stating that said line crossers had infilt-
rated SD on their behalf’. However, under ‘extensive cross examin-
ation’, they were revealed to be working for the SD and had, in fact,
penetrated the underground resistance. The message ended, ‘Advise all
your channels to be extremely careful with such persons.’ On top of the
signal, Wells wrote, ‘A complete vindication for the ultra-careful policy
adopted by this Directorate’, to which Senter added simply ‘Yes’.34
Staff shortages continued to make life difficult for the Security Section.
In April, Senter wrote to Boyle, noting that ‘With the severe depletion
of staff in the BSS Section (Bayswater) owing to officers and secretaries
leaving for posts abroad and otherwise, we are finding it difficult to cope
with the many duties that are falling on BSS’.35 During a medical exam-
ination in May, Senter himself was found ‘unfit for further service and
sent on sick leave prior to being invalided’.36 Roche, who had returned
to London from Cairo in April, now received his final promotion within
the Security Section, succeeding Senter as Boyle’s Deputy. In June, Park
was appointed Head of Section as Roche’s replacement. Also in June
Frank Soskice, who had replaced Cyril Miller as Bayswater’s Interroga-
tion and Case Officer in May 1944, left SOE to contest a seat in the
general election.
As was the case in London, the Security Sections of SOE’s over-
seas Missions were also reduced during 1945. By June, the security
establishment in Cairo consisted of one Field Security Officer, ‘acting
under the orders of the liquidator of S.O.E. affairs there’.37 At the India
Mission, preparatory liquidation work began in May, the main liquid-
ation task assigned to the Security Section there being the compilation
of a record of all non-British personnel employed by, or connected to,
the Mission ‘since its earliest days’, along with the ‘final scrutiny and
disposal of documents’.38 In September, the staff situation ‘underwent a
transformation’, as officers returned to the UK for demobilisation. The
Section headquarters moved to Meerut in December, maintaining only
a minimum staff in Calcutta, Colombo and Kuala Lumpur, to ‘ensure a
satisfactory maintenance of routine security until the final winding up
in each area’.
In Italy, the Security Section was ‘kept working at full pressure’ until
May, at which point it was able to turn its attention to liquidation.39
Despite Hoyer Millar’s calls for Peter Lee’s removal in January, he
continued to head the Security Intelligence Panel, and vigorously
pursued the long-term aspects of the Panel’s intelligence activities. At
a meeting on 23 March, during a visit by Hoyer Millar to London, a
proposal put forward by Lee for the formation of a Political Sub-Section
of SIP was discussed.40 It was unanimously agreed that the proposal
should not be approved, and that Lee was ‘racing ahead in this matter
with long-term objectives which go beyond the proper scope of S.O.E.’.
It was emphasised at the meeting that the function of SIP was ‘to attend
primarily to the Operational Security of SOM’.
In contrast to Lee, Hoyer Millar remained level headed about the role
of security in Italy and the limitations of its role during the ‘liquidation
phase’ of SO(M):
our main task is going to be providing SO(M) with security clearances

in respect of people who are to be paid off, rewarded, etc we should
remain in the closest touch with the other agencies, whose records
we have to consult.41
As such, security liquidation work in Italy followed similar lines to that

conducted by Warden in Paris. A month later, unaware of Senter’s depar-
ture, Hoyer Millar wrote to him noting that the ‘time is approaching
when we shall have to liquidate, by degrees, the [security] staff here’,
and turned his attention to the question of their employment elsewhere
(adding ‘It can be taken that they are not prepared to volunteer for
the Far East’). Hoyer Millar assumed that ‘the eventual destination of
the SIP Records’ would be Section V’s Italian representative, ‘who had
always given us to believe that he will require one or two members of
our staff to go with the records’; he requested a definite ruling on this
assumption from London.
Hoyer Millar was soon faced with the reluctance of Peter Lee to accept
the fact of SIP’s coming demise. He wrote to Roche, noting that
provided we can restrain Peter Lee’s side of the section from chasing
clues which are only going to be of interest to some organisation in
twelve months’ time, we should have completed the bulk of our work
for SO(M) by the end of July’.42
Hoyer Millar had spoken to Lee several times about the need to curb
his enthusiasm (‘I have explained to him that the work which he
contemplates doing is of interest only to other security organisations
and not to SO(M)’), but Lee had ‘definitely made up his mind that there
is going to be work for him to do out here for some time to come’. As
such, Hoyer Millar felt that ‘the time has come when we should obtain a
definite bid from Section V for our records and whatever personnel they
wish to go with them; otherwise there is a danger of the SIP prolonging
its existence indefinitely’.
By Hoyer Millar’s next letter in June, the winding up of security in
Italy was almost complete: ‘The process of liquidation here has gone
very much more quickly than we anticipated the work of this Security
Intelligence section is virtually at an end’, although some security repres-
entation would continue to be necessary due to a small number of
outstanding missions.43 He saw no reason why Section V’s Italian repres-
entative should not inherit the records, and with them such staff as he
was prepared to take on, by mid-July, at which point the remainder of
SIP could be liquidated. He was increasingly concerned for the future
for his now defunct staff, writing to Roche that ‘the main thing is to
place people as well as we can’.44 It appears that Section V agreed to
employ two members of the section (their names have been redacted
from the released documents), one of whom was returning to England
‘for training’. It was also agreed that Arthur Baird would remain at SO(M)
until its ‘final liquidation’, while two further security officers would
remain to deal with the missions that remained operational. Hoyer
Millar returned to the UK in late July; whether Section V did indeed
inherit his Section’s records remains unclear.45
Back in London, closure was brought to the Nordpol affair during the
summer following the arrest of Hermann Giskes, who had masterminded
the deception.46 In response to the news, the SHAEF Counter Intelli-
gence War Room in London cabled its interest in interrogating him.47 As
a member of the War Room, D.I. Wilson, observed, Giskes could ‘prob-
ably provide more information on German penetration activities than
anyone else’.48 On 16 May, Wilson wrote to Wells, informing him that
both Giskes and his deputy Gerhardt Huntemann were in the hands of
12 Army Group, and arrangements were being made for their transport
to the UK for ‘detailed interrogation’ at Camp 020. Wilson wrote that he
would ‘be grateful if you would let me know what particular points you
would like to have clarified if these individuals prove to be forthcoming’.49
Wells responded immediately, noting that the men were of ‘the greatest
possible interest’ to SOE, ‘since they, between them, practically ran
our Organisation in Holland in toto for the best part of 14 months’.

Wells’ enthusiasm at the prospect of their interrogation was clearly
apparent:
One is of course tempted to feel one would like to go through with

them every telegram in our traffic files for the period, but this is
clearly impossible; I think that at any rate to begin with, the most
important point to cover is how they originally got control of our
Organisation, and how from this first starting point, they gradually
absorbed our Organisation in the Field. The initial act of penetration
and the subsequent exploitation of it by the enemy is, after all, what
we really want to know.50
Wells also offered his services, and those of another Bayswater officer,
both having ‘specialized in the Dutch troubles’, to brief the War Room
case officer concerned in preparation for the interrogation of Giskes and
Huntemann. In addition to discussing SOE’s activities in Holland, Wells
provided ‘a complete report of the S.O.E. operations in Holland with
which these two Germans were concerned’, along with ‘the complete
set of traffic for which Huntermann [sic] and Giskes were jointly
responsible’.51 A non-technical paper on codes was prepared by SOE’s
Signals Directorate, while Wells also ‘arranged that 020 can refer to me
at any time when they may have a query to raise’.
On 5 June, Camp 020 circulated a Progress Report on Giskes, which
noted that ‘the case is of such proportions that, up to the present,
it has only been possible to skirt the fringes in very general terms’. It
was predicted that ‘some time must elapse before a complete report on
the case can be made available’.52 The Progress Report was sent to the
Security Section on 18 June.53 A further Progress Report was circulated
on 27 June, which dealt with the arrest of Allied agents in Holland ‘not
connected with Nordpol’ along with Giskes’ and Huntemann’s know-
ledge of British intelligence.54 Nor did the ‘Camp 020 Interim Report’
that followed (circulated on 25 July) cover the Nordpol deception; this
was saved for a separate report circulated in July, entitled ‘Report on the
Investigation into the “Nordpol” Affair: Based on the interrogations of
Giskes and Huntmann’ [sic].55 Wilson sent four copies of the Report,
along with copies of the Interim reports on Giskes and Huntemann,
to the Security Section on 26 July, noting ‘It seems to me that these
documents give a very clear account of the matter.’56
Giskes and Huntemann both engendered a certain amount of respect
at Camp 020. The ‘Monthly Summary’ revealed a sense of professional
admiration for ‘these two efficient members of the enemy counter-

intelligence service’. The ‘successful penetration of an S.O.E. organisa-
tion in Holland’ was described as being
brilliantly handled by the Germans who obtained control of a W/T

set early in 1942 which they played with the result that they were
able to arrest each subsequent agent as he arrived until at one time
they were operating as many as 15 wireless links simultaneously.57
Attention was also drawn to the ‘clever use’ that was made of staged
sabotage during the course of the deception (‘in particular an old hulk
of about one thousand tons loaded with wrecks of old and damaged
aeroplanes was deliberately blown up in full view of the public of
Rotterdam’). With his own experience of running double agents, Tar
Robertson, now Director of the War Room, was particularly interested in
the Nordpol Report, noting that it was ‘most amusing to read how the
Germans encountered the same difficulties as we did in running double
agents, and especially in conducting bogus acts of sabotage’.58 Robertson
was interested to discover whether the Germans had taken ‘the precau-
tion of operating wireless sets from the districts where the agents were
supposed to be located’, recalling that this ‘was considered of primary
importance in cases we were running’. The question was subsequently
put to Giskes, who noted that sets were, ‘whenever possible, operated
from the locality in which it was intended that they should be used’.59
Attention soon turned not to what Giskes and Huntemann had
revealed, but the question of who would be permitted to learn about it.
The Nordpol Report was initially given strictly limited circulation, seen
outside MI5 by SOE and Section V only.60 Wilson wrote to Robertson
asking for his views on the extent to which the paper should be distrib-
uted, and SOE’s failure thus broadcast. He was reluctant to ask SOE its
opinion, fearing that the organisation ‘may try and limit distribution
of a report on a matter in which they were particularly unsuccessful’.61
Robertson noted that such discussion was unavoidable; ‘clearance from
S.O.E.’ would be required for the report to be given wider circulation, and
he instructed Wilson to discuss the matter with the Security Section.62
Roche replied to his enquiry on the subject in August. Noting that ‘I
gather that normally reports of this kind receive a fairly wide distribu-
tion among Secret Services of Allied nations in the hope that they may
gain information of value and raw appropriate lessons’, he gave SOE’s
view that copies should not be given to the French or Belgian author-
ities, ‘as they were not directly concerned’. SOE had ‘no objection to a
copy going to the Dutch Secret Service’, on the condition that SOE could
also send a copy to its Dutch equivalent, the BBO. Roche accepted that
the American OSS would inevitably receive a copy, ‘as they are more or
less partners in these interrogations’.63
No such closure was brought to the Dericourt case by the interrogation
of Hugo Bleicher at Camp 020 during the summer. Described by West
as ‘one of the Abwehr’s most successful and imaginative investigators’,
Bleicher had not been directly involved with Dericourt, whose associ-
ation with the Germans was made through the SD. Bleicher himself had
penetrated SOE’s French networks via Roger Bardet, the trusted deputy
of Jacques Frager who, as we have seen in Chapter 5, made the original
allegation against Dericourt based on information provided by Bleicher,
known at that point only as ‘Colonel Heinrich’, in late 1943 (as Foot
notes, inter-secret service intrigue and rivalry was not the sole purview
of the British: ‘many German counter-espionage agents were more inter-
ested in promoting the status of their own organization as compared
with its rivals at home than in actually coping with the activities of
allied agents in the field’).64 Interrogated during July, Bleicher noted that
he ‘told Frager to beware of Gilbert, who was really a Gestapo agent’.65
When asked for further details of the nature of Dericourt’s contact with
the Germans, Bleicher stated that he ‘worked for the B.d.S., Avenue
Foch, Paris. He worked first for Stubaf. Boemmelburg and then, when
Boemmelburg left for Vichy, for Stubaf. Kieffer.’ Bleicher had no know-
ledge of how long Dericourt had worked for the SD, but believed that
he ‘had certainly been doing so for some time by April, 1943’.
The Security Section remained unconvinced by Bleicher’s allegations.
Roche felt unable to reach a conclusion on the basis of Bleicher’s testi-
mony; either Bleicher was telling the truth, or he was continuing to
maintain a story he had originally fabricated in 1943, perhaps to deflect
attention away from his own informant Roger Bardet.66 Roche was not
entirely satisfied with this as an explanation, as it raised the question
of ‘why, as Bardet’s villainy has now been discovered, Bleicher should
continue to blame Gilbert if he is not to blame’. In a letter to Wilson
he noted that another officer, Major Delaforce, also found it ‘very diffi-
cult to ascertain which of these two possibilities is the correct one’, and
was concerned by the imperfect nature of Bleicher’s testimony (‘Bleicher
does not claim any first-hand knowledge of Dericourt’s treachery but
says he obtained it second-hand’). He also pointed out that ‘in practic-
ally every point where we are able to check Bleicher’s allegations against
Dericourt, Bleicher’s recollection is faulty or he is telling lies and, in
some cases, is confusing Dericourt with a totally different person’.
Roche prepared a page of questions for Bleicher’s next interrogation, in

order to elucidate further details to back up his allegation and to test his
ability to distinguish between agents, ‘in the hope that we shall be able to
tell whether he is in fact telling the truth, or telling lies, or hopelessly
confused’. The interrogation based on these questions was conducted
by S/Ldr Beddard on 15 August, in the presence of both Warden and
Delaforce. Bleicher was asked ‘to amplify his previous statements’ about
Dericourt, and ‘his activities on behalf of the S.D.’. Bleicher did so, but
maintained that he had no knowledge of how Dericourt came to work
for the Germans, emphasising the ‘extremely secretive’ nature of the SD
with regard to its agents. He remained confident in his knowledge of
Dericourt’s activities:
Bleicher stated that he knew of British R.A.F. officers being

arrested, and that he had heard that Gilbert [Dericourt] was respons-
ible for this directly from Stubaf KIEFFER in the course of conver-
sation. These officers were sometimes arrested either on the airfield
immediately after landing, or allowed to walk off the airfield, trailed
by Kieffer’s man and later arrested, and on one occasion they were
allowed to board a train and the train later ordered to stop between
stations when they were arrested. Bleicher, himself, was never present
at any of these arrests and could not say whether the personnel of
the airfield knew that they were receiving Allied airmen or not.67
The questions designed to test Bleicher’s state of knowledge regarding

names of agents produced inconclusive results; he certainly did not
appear ‘hopelessly confused’.
The Security Section’s response to this interrogation is unknown – no
reference to the Bleicher interrogation is made in Dericourt’s Personnel
File as released to The National Archives. A slip attached to the transcript
of the interrogation in an MI5 file on Dericourt noted ‘The true facts of
this case are believed to have been elicited from Fw. Bleicher.’ As such,
it appears that Bleicher’s testimony was sufficient to convince MI5 that
Dericourt had been working for the Germans; but as we have seen, MI5
displayed a tendency to think the worst on inconclusive evidence. The
slip referenced a Camp 020 Interim Report on Dericourt, circulated on
7 September, held in an MI5 file on Dericourt that has not been released
into the public domain, if indeed it has survived. The absence of this
file means it is impossible to know what MI5 did next. It would appear
that continued uncertainty on SOE’s part won through, and no further
action on the Dericourt case was taken by MI5 or SOE.
The Security Section also took responsibility for representing SOE at

interdepartmental meetings to discuss matters relating to War Crimes,
and to organise liaison with the Treasury Solicitor. After a brief spat
over who should take responsibility for collating and editing material
provided by Country Sections from their files, this task was given to
Hugh Park, as it was believed that it would benefit from ‘legal knowledge
and training’.68 It was agreed that Park would act as liaison with the War
Office department responsible for collecting statements from the Service
Departments for transmission to the Treasury Solicitor. On 19 June,
Gubbins issued a circular to all Directors, Regional and Section Heads,
explaining the establishment of a section within the War Office for the
prosecution of War Criminals, noting that SOE ‘clearly had informa-
tion as to such crimes as the shooting of hostages, the torture or ill-
treatment of prisoners, atrocities committed in enemy-occupied territ-
ories and in concentration camps’.69 As prosecution required witnesses,
priority was to be given ‘to cases where the names of living witnesses
are known’, irrespective of their geographical location (‘Arrangements
exist with our Allies to contact them’), and Sections were instructed to
prepare statements for Park by 28 June. Having read the statements,
Park would ‘consult the Sections as to any further information which is
required’. Roche also instructed the Head of Bayswater to put ‘all avail-
able members’ of his staff ‘on to a perusal of Bayswater Reports’, with
a view to finding evidence of ill treatment and atrocities committed by
the German Army.70
The task was not wholly straightforward, as Country Section coopera-
tion was not immediately forthcoming; a further circular from Gubbins
was issued on 11 August, over a month after the original deadline had
passed, in which he emphasised ‘the extreme importance of this matter’,
reiterating the instruction that Country Sections ‘must send without
fail to D/CE all information about such crimes as the shooting of host-
ages, the torture or ill-treatment of prisoners and atrocities committed
in enemy-occupied territories and in concentration camps’, also noting
that Park ‘should be afforded every facility for interrogating officers
who have evidence’.71 Where information was provided, there was a
tendency for it to be inadequately prepared, involving Park in further
correspondence with the Country Section concerned, either requesting
further details or its ‘translation’ into a form that would be intelligible
outside SOE.72
In addition to collating information at headquarters, the Security
Section continued more proactive investigative work to discover the fate
of its missing agents. An SOE Mission to Germany, which set off in May,
included security representation in the form of Aonghais Fyffe and his

assistant. The Security Section had initially planned to mount its own
mission to tour the concentration camps in Germany and Austria, but
this was vetoed by SOE’s Director of Finance, John Venner, for reasons of
economy. Instead, Fyffe and his assistant were ‘grafted on’ to ME42, the
German Section’s Mission headed by Ernest van Maurik. Fyffe sent his
findings back to Tom Wells in London, Bayswater again providing the
rear link. As Fyffe recalls, his task was ‘to try to find out what happened
specifically to the agents who’d got lost. Evaluate the fates, the existence,
or otherwise of those missing agents.’73 Looking for ‘anybody and every-
body’, Fyffe and his assistant had no Country Section-specific remit.
Armed with a Card Index of names, which offered some clues as to
where missing agents may be found, the work of the sub-Mission began:
We had decided first of all to visit all the concentration camps,

whether we knew our agents had been there or not. Have a look
at the records if there were records available – they weren’t always
available – check what were available, and ask questions, and find
out what was behind the surface.74
Where records did exist, Fyffe recalls that they were ‘absolutely
meticulous’:
All the details, gold teeth, the progress of the man or woman through
the camp, when they were ill, what illness they had. Sometimes there
was an entry which mean that he had disappeared into the night,
into the mist. The implication was they had managed to escape but
didn’t escape death. The other little entry was shot while trying to
escape. Of course, there again, it didn’t really mean what it said on
the paper. The man or woman was just shot.75
Such records were not always easy to come by. A Czech ex-inmate of
Flossenburg, ‘who had worked on the records under the Germans’ told
Fyffe in November that ‘the records of the British were kept separately
from the rest and were destroyed by the S.S. before the liberation to
prevent them falling into Allied hands’.76
In addition to reviewing records, interviews with those involved were
conducted where possible; Fyffe recalled that ‘some folks were quite keen
to talk, some weren’t’.77 On 24 October, he interviewed the governess of
the Women’s Prison at Karlsruhe, Fraulein Becker, who he described as ‘a
typical civil servant, who had not actively helped the prisoners, but who
had never, at any time, been responsible for ill treating them’.78 Becker
and one of her staff ‘did all that they could to help which was not very
much as they stated that all their records had been seized at the libera-
tion by the French, and according to them destroyed’. Becker was able
to identify a number of French Section agents who had been transferred
there from Avenue Foch in Paris. However, her information stopped
short of their ultimate fate (‘She confirmed what we already knew of
their departure from the prison, but could give us no information about
their destination, as she had not been in the Gestapo confidence, and
was merely told to get the prisoners ready to leave’).
On 2 November, Fyffe visited the Flossenburg concentration camp,
accompanied by Polish Jew named Silberberg, who had been a prisoner
in the camp for 9 months. Silberberg was ‘able to give us a good deal of
information about the camp’, but was unable to elucidate on 15 British
officers who were known to have been held there, save for the fact
that ‘the only British officer known to have survived at the liberation
was one Thomas Swan of Glasgow, though he could give us no further
details about this man’. It was hoped that Silberberg, who was a ‘member
of a Jewish committee which is in touch with ex-inmates of all the
concentration camps’, would be able to obtain ‘valuable information in
answer to a questionnaire which was left with him’.
Fyffe returned to the UK on 20 December and reported to Boyle, who
now headed a skeleton Security Section. Both Tom Roche and Dick
Warden had both left SOE in September, followed by Hugh Park in
November. SOE was officially dissolved on 15 January 1946, at which
point ‘the amalgamation of S.I.S. and S.O.E.’, and the creation of a
‘Special Operations Branch of the Secret Service’ came into force.79 While
research has drawn attention to the ‘rump SOE’ that was thus incorpor-
ated into SIS, there is little to indicate any substantial migration from
the ranks of its Security personnel.80 Senter resumed practice at the Bar
in 1945, became Deputy Chairman (London) of the Northern Assurance
Company Ltd from 1951 to 1953, and proceeded to become a member of
the General Council of the Bar in 1954. Hugh Park joined a new Cham-
bers and was later called to the bench, and is now best remembered for
sentencing Britain’s largest LSD ring in 1978, while Richard Warden,
the former head of Bayswater, returned to his pre-war occupation of
training and racing horses, becoming a close friend of Sheik Mohammed
of Dubai, whom he persuaded to train and race horses in Britain.81
Archie Boyle died in 1949.
One post-war security link can be seen in the case of Norman Mott,
whose association with the legacy of SOE continued long after the
organisation had been disbanded. He headed the SOE Liquidation

Section (‘paid for out of the SIS budget and under SIS control’),82
spending much of his time dealing with ‘sundry characters’ who claimed
involvement in SOE activity and ‘who now claim some form of recog-
nition on account of their activities’. While such cases were not ‘very
difficult’, Mott noted that they
do take the deuce of a lot of time, if, like myself, one is not very
conversant with the layout of field matters. However, we are plugging
away at it, and, I suppose, it will come to an end sometime, though
just at the moment, I seem to be no nearer the conclusion than I was
three months ago.
It was at this time that the notorious fire took place at Baker Street, the
cause of much speculation and conspiracy theory. To Mott, it appears
to have been more of an irritant, as he wrote in March:
Life is still pretty hectic at this end so far as I am concerned, and

matters have not been exactly improved by the fire which we had here
a few weeks ago, when the whole of the sixth floor was burned out,
including my office. Nothing much of long-term or historical import-
ance was lost, but, unfortunately, all my files, containing contact
addresses, telephone numbers and the hand-over briefs from the
country sections, went in the blase, and I am, accordingly, more than
somewhat handicapped in dealing with things about which, in any
case, I know next to nothing.83
The exact nature and length of Mott’s appointment remains unclear:

on 30 April, he wrote that ‘the shutters finally go up on the old Firm
on the 30th of June, which means in practice, that we shall effectively
shut down on 31st May and spend what remains of the time depositing
our orphans on the doorsteps of doubtless unwilling foster parents’.84
By early June, Mott had moved to SIS premises on Curzon Street (‘what I
sincerely hope will only be transit quarters as we have literally no room
to move among our records’).85 Later in the month he predicted that ‘So
far as I can see, I shall be here for some considerable time.’86 Mott joined
the Foreign Office in 1948 where, as his Times obituary notes, he ‘again
found himself involved in security matters’. He was later responsible
for the initial security vetting of M.R.D. Foot’s SOE in France, the first
official history of SOE to be published.87
The ‘Nordpol’ disaster became the subject of a Dutch Parliamentary

Commission of Enquiry in 1949, and both John Senter and Cyril Miller
were invited by the Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office to
be the interviewed by the Chairman, Dr Donker. Miller wrote that he
would be ‘delighted’ to give any assistance.88 He recalled that he had
been instructed to investigate ‘the whole of our organisation in Holland’
at the end of 1943. While he could not recall the details, he noted that
he produced ‘a very full report, which should still be in the archives’.
Senter proved more reluctant to participate. In reply to the invitation,
he wrote,
it would not be correct to say that I am one of the ‘British officers

who were closely connected with the operations’ in question, and
accordingly I am doubtful whether my meeting Dr. Donker would
be of any assistance to him before any arrangements are made for
me to meet Dr. Donker, it might be best if I had the opportunity
of meeting the appropriate British officer or official concerned with
arranging the meetings with Dr. Donker.89
Senter’s reluctance did not deter the Foreign Office (‘Mr. Attlee is advised
that your knowledge of the security arrangements in force at that time
might be of interest to Dr. Donker, and hopes that you will find it
convenient to meet him’).90 Senter visited the Foreign Office in early
October, at which point he revealed certain concerns over Miller’s likely
testimony:
He added in confidence that he would not be surprised if Mr. Miller

in his interview with Dr. Donker, were to put forward suggestions as
to why the operations had failed which did not come strictly within
his own personal knowledge. He suggested that, in the interests
of objectivity, we might like to consider sending Cd. Senter and
Mr. Miller ‘in to bat’ at the same time.
From what the archives reveal of Miller’s investigation into the Nordpol
affair, as we have seen in Chapter 7, it can be suggested that Senter
was concerned that Miller would raise allegations of non-disclosure
of pertinent information by SIS – which was hardly likely to present
‘British Intelligence’ in a favourable light. The meeting between Dr
Donker, Senter and Miller took place on 5 October. The record of the
meeting, released to The National Archives in redacted form, indic-
ates that Senter gave a very carefully worded account of the ‘correct
procedure’ regarding communication between SOE and SIS, and offered

nothing that related specifically to the case, before going on to answer
questions about the detention of Dourlein and Ubbink at Brixton
Prison.91
MI5 kept an eye on some of the SOE security cases that had come to
its attention for a few years following the organisations’ dissolution (for
example, interviewing a prostitute with whom Dericourt was known to
have associated in 1947), but interest in SOE soon began to wane as the
new security priorities of the Cold War emerged.92 By the time a book
on the German penetration of SOE was brought to its attention in 1951,
MI5 displayed little interest in dredging the affair up again, the officer
who read the book concluding, ‘it is really S.O.E. who is in the dock
and the duty of S.O.E’s ex-chiefs to find out where and why things went
wrong’.93 MI5 thus consigned SOE, and its security, to history.
Postscript on Sources: SOE at The
National Archives
This study has made extensive use of SOE files now open to the public at The
National Archives, Kew. The efficacy of such research on SOE is regularly brought
into question on account of the incomplete nature of the SOE archive. A number
of factors combined to reduce SOE’s paperwork in size following the liquidation
of the organisation, at which point its archive passed into the possession of SIS:
a fire at Baker Street in 1946, a weeding process from the mid-1940s to late 1940s
which saw the destruction of many administrative and financial records, and
a further weeding process in the early 1950s which reduced even further the
number of financial and administrative records and also saw the destruction of
policy files.1
Of these factors, the most well-known is the fire at Baker Street, which has
provided something of a focal point for conspiracy theorists. However, it is
clear that SOE papers did not need to be ‘accidentally’ destroyed: the author-
ised weeding that followed was clearly a far more destructive force than the fire
which, as we have seen in Chapter 9, destroyed the ‘work in progress’ of Norman
Mott’s Liquidation Section. Duncan Stuart, former SOE Adviser at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, has drawn on ‘reliable anecdotal evidence’ to illus-
trate that the first weeding exercise was not necessarily conducted with ‘appro-
priate diligence’: two unnamed officers ‘competed in joyously tossing whole
files, unread, into a waste-bin situated between them’.2 This description of the
nature of the weeding process is supported by David Stafford, who notes that
another weeder, John Edward Wyke (who joined SIS following service with SOE
in the Middle East), ‘approached the task with a dashing verve that bordered on
recklessness’:
In the half-deserted old Baker Street headquarters of SOE, sitting with his
chair tipped at an angle and his feet on the desk, he would pore over the
mountains of files. Behind him was a large waste-paper basket. He would pick
up a file, nonchalantly glance at the title, rapidly reach a decision and then,
with the flick of a practised wrist, consign the condemned documents over
his shoulder to bureaucratic oblivion.3
To give some idea of the scale of destruction that took place during this process,
Duncan Stuart notes that between August 1946 and May 1947 the equivalent of
119 filing cabinets full of papers were destroyed. In 1949, it was estimated that
some 100 tons of material had been destroyed.4 Less detail is available about the
amount of material destroyed during the 1950s, although a report written by
an SIS officer in early 1950 recommended the ‘maximum possible destruction
and reduction’ of material.5 The number of occasions on which the records were
transferred to different storage locations inevitably resulted in further documents
214
Postscript on Sources 215
being lost, the archive being housed at varying points at Marsworth Airfield
and Windsor House, before arriving at a more permanent home at Century
House.
By 1967, the surviving SOE files – more accurately described as ‘bundles of
paper – tied with tape’ – required reorganisation.6 SIS, ‘conscious that the SOE
files lack order’, initiated a sorting process, but this was designed by the organ-
isation for its ‘own purposes’ and not necessarily suitable ‘from a historical
research aspect’. It was estimated that the procedure would take at least 2 years
to complete. The nature of the organisation of the files was raised again in
1969, by which point SIS accepted that its treatment of the SOE archive was
‘a wholly regrettable story of wholesale and indiscriminate destruction, mainly
on account of lack of storage space’.7 It was now felt that the current reorgan-
isation would be adequate for the needs of both SIS and research by the SOE
Adviser, and SIS did not think any further re-organisation for the purposes of
historical research would be necessary.8 However, a professional archivist from
the Public Record Office, Bernard Townshend, was soon appointed to carry out
a further reorganisation of the SOE archive, a task that took him 5 years to
complete. Having completed the reorganisation, Townshend reported that there
was ‘documentary evidence’ that at least 87 per cent of SOE’s papers had been
‘destroyed’.9
Certainly, as a percentage this figure is disappointingly high and leads, quite
reasonably, to the question of just how useful any work that relies on what
remains can be. However, it is worth considering what this raw percentage
actually means in terms of quantifying the surviving paperwork. The surviving
13 per cent means that some 4573 files are now available to researchers at The
National Archives in the HS1–HS8 series, their contents ranging from the occa-
sional single sheet of paper to (more frequently) papers an inch thick, while a
further 137 files remain closed under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. In
addition, SOE’s Personnel Files will continue to trickle into the public domain
over the next decade or so. The National Archives catalogue indicates some 1654
such files, but as these tend to contain approximately seven sub-files on indi-
viduals, the true figure in terms of individuals covered is far higher, somewhere
in the region of 11 000. It is also perhaps worth remembering that the incomplete
nature of the archival record is not a problem exclusive to the study of SOE, and
setting the figure of surviving SOE papers against that of material currently sent
to The National Archives by government departments. Such a comparison was
made during a review of the selection criteria for the preservation of MI5 records
conducted by the Advisory Council on Public Records in 1998:
The outcome of selection policies across government is that some 2 km of

records are added to the Public Record Office’s holdings each year. This
represents at most some 5% of the files held; the remainder are destroyed,
deposited in other places of deposit of public records or presented to other
institutions. These figures, however, are averaged across Government. The
survival rate for Cabinet Office and Prime Minister’s Office records, for
instance, is considerably higher, and is probably lower for departments produ-
cing large numbers of case files that are different from one another only in
detail.10
216 Postscript on Sources
Were a similar study of the SOE archive conducted today, in order to conform with
current retention procedure, perhaps even less than 13 per cent would survive.
Such observations should not, however, be taken as advocating undue compla-
cency on the part of those conducting research into SOE. Any account of SOE’s
Security Section that attempted to work solely from the 64 files catalogued
under ‘Security’ in the HS8 series would certainly be unnecessarily limited. Yet
Townshend’s organisation of the SOE archive along broadly geographical lines,
mirroring the organisational structure of SOE’s operational Country Sections,
along with smaller functional collections such as Security, offers the tempting
illusion that a study of a given aspect of SOE can be completed by reference
to a single self-contained series of files within the archive. Not only would this
overlook those parts of the archive that do not easily conform to geographical or
functional headings, but additionally there is much to be found about SOE in the
files of other government departments. Indeed, while the SOE files were in the
process of being transferred to Kew, the Public Record Office produced a Source
Sheet offering details of where SOE material could be located amongst the records
of the Prime Minister’s Office, Air Ministry, Foreign Office and War Office. This
‘outside looking in’ approach to SOE has a long history, adopted most success-
fully by David Stafford in Britain and the European Resistance, a history of SOE
written without access to a single SOE file. In terms of the current study, beyond
the fact that security runs throughout the files of SOE’s Country Sections (in
addition to the Personnel Files of various individuals of security concern), much
security-related SOE material is to be found amongst the files of the Security
Service, MI5.
As a service that could hardly be described as ‘secret’, SOE offered a safe
means whereby the British intelligence community could contribute to the Open
Government initiative of the early 1990s. Indeed, SIS could appear to be contrib-
uting to this opening of the archives to the public, albeit by offloading SOE files
that it had inherited, rather than created.11 The release of MI5 material into the
public domain – files of a still active organisation that had only been placed on
a statutory basis for less than a decade by the time of the first release of papers
in November 1997 – was far more significant, and MI5 became ‘the guinea pig
in tentatively opening part of the historical archives of traditionally the most
secretive part of the state’.12
As with SOE, MI5’s historical archive is also incomplete. Some indication of its
condition was recently provided by former Director General Sir Stephen Lander,
who acknowledged that ‘given that the Service has worked continuously for over
90 years, there is rather less material than might have been expected’.13 By way of
explanation, Sir Stephen drew attention to the small number of staff engaged by
MI5 at various points during its existence, wartime bomb damage (‘We have
the German Luftwaffe to thank for the destruction of a proportion of our records
when in September 1940 a bomb hit a Wormwood Scrubs outbuilding that
housed our registry’) and an ‘inconsistent approach to file destruction’ which
resulted in the destruction of much material ‘that we wish had not been following
both world wars’. Files relating to SOE did not escape this destruction: a number of
such files were destroyed in their entirety after 1945, and appear to have included
among their number volumes entitled ‘Handling and Traffic Policy for Blown
SOE Transmitters’ and ‘Recruiting of Staff by the I.S.R.B.’, in addition to a file
on France likely to have been concerned with the penetration of the well-known
Postscript on Sources 217
Prosper network. Other surviving SOE-related files were comprehensively weeded

during the 1950s and 1960s (see, for example, what remains of KV4/172).14 In
such cases, the Index/Minute sheets provide at least some record of what has
been lost – undeniably frustrating, but a useful indication of previous content
that is better than nothing. Such fastidious cataloguing of destruction is only
one of the ways in which the MI5 archive serves to illustrate the difference in
ethos between that organisation and SOE. Despite repeated attempts at order, the
SOE archive retains a somewhat haphazard air. MI5 files, in contrast, are ordered,
indexed and cross-referenced, with Index/Minute Sheets at the front of each file
frequently recording the opinions of staff officers on current issues, a window on
departmental thinking wholly absent from the SOE perspective.
It is possible that future releases from the MI5 archive will include further
SOE material. The files that have been released so far usefully complement the
surviving security material found in the SOE archive. Not only do they include
correspondence to and from SOE’s Security Section that no longer survives in the
SOE archive, but even where the papers are copies of the same letter, the MI5
‘version’ offers something extra. The vetting and redaction process undergone
by the MI5 files prior to their release appears to have been less sensitive to that
undergone by the SOE files. Consequently, while the name of Geoffrey Wethered
has been diligently redacted from SOE’s Western Europe files, unedited versions
of the same papers in the MI5 files have revealed his identity. As the relevant
SOE papers are now only available to the public on microfilm, it is unlikely that
this inconsistency will be amended any time in the near future.
Despite the destruction that has taken place, the SOE archive continues to offer
a considerable body of material with which historians can work, which does not
appear to be widely out of step with broader archival retention policy. But there
is no doubt that the surviving material is at its best when used in conjunction
with other material held both at The National Archives and elsewhere.15
Notes
Introduction
1. Mark Wheeler, ‘The SOE Phenomenon’, Journal of Contemporary History, 16(1)
(1981), p. 515.
2. Author’s interview with A.A. Fyffe, 05.11.2001.
3. All references are to documents held at The National Archives (TNA): Public
Record Office (PRO), Kew, unless otherwise stated. HS8/840, D/CE.6 to D/CE,
28.10.42.
4. HS9/23/3, Report by Lt. Turnbull, STS 6, 23.04.43.
5. Imperial War Museum Sound Archive (hereafter IWMSA), Interview with Peter
Murray Lee (7493/10), Reel 5.
6. In a desperate attempt to bolster the staff of the code department, Marks sent
a memo to the Ministry of Labour. The memo, in which Marks referred to
SOE, had been written on ISRB headed notepaper, and was quickly brought
to the attention of Boyle and Senter, who confronted Marks: ‘Brandishing my
memo as if it were scorching his fingers, he [Senter] informed me that no one
in his right mind would make any reference to SOE on a sheet of notepaper
headed INTER SERVICES RESEARCH BUREAU, thereby blowing Baker Street’s
cover! I’d committed a major breach of security.’ (Leo Marks, Between Silk and
Cyanide: A Codemaker’s War, p. 333.)
7. IWMSA Interview with Lee, Reel 5.
8. W.J.M. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 382.
9. KV4/171, Senter to O.A. Harker (JS/3304), 08.05.45.
1 The origins and development of SOE’s Security Section

1. HS8/334, CD to All Sections (CD/OR/513/ADZ), 27.06.41.
2. Denis Rigden, Kill the Fuhrer, p. 102.
3. HS8/336, AD/S to S.O. (F/7406/138/1), 27.02.43.
4. HS8/903, Selborne to Anderson, 08.03.43.
5. J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 101.
6. HS9/196/3, CD to CEO (CD/OR/430), 10.06.41. See also HS8/334, CD to All
Sections (CD/OR/513/ADZ), 27.06.41.
7. Imperial War Museum Sound Archive (hereafter IWMSA), Interview with
Aonghais Adamson Fyffe (23100/10), Reel 8.
8. M.R.D. Foot, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940–
1946, p. 59.
218
Notes 219
9. Nigel West, Secret War, p. 129.

10. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 1.
11. HS9/1580/9, Papers in Whetmore’s Personnel File.
12. Marks, Between Silk and Cyanide, pp. 89–90.
13. HS9/1244/1, Papers in O’Reilly’s Personnel File.
14. See his Who Was Who entry (1941–1950); Obituary in The Times, Friday,
05.02.43, p. 7.
15. KV4/171, Petrie to Lakin, 23.09.42.
16. HS9/1580/9, AD/P to C.D. Copy to D/CE (ADP/KV/304), 27.11.41.
17. HS9/1580/9, , SIS, to Calthrop, 09.12.44.
19. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 8.
20. See his Who Was Who entry (1961–1970).
21. HS9/1341/9, Papers in Senter’s Personnel File.
22. Obituary in The Times, 18 February 1987.
24. HS9/1653, Papers in Mott’s Personnel File.
25. Peter Lee, in The Role of the Intelligence Services in the Second World War, Centre
for Contemporary British History seminar, 09.11.94.
26. HS7/31, FSP Interim Report, p. 1, citing Whetmore to Under Secretary of
State, War Office (ECW/KV/51), 19.12.40.
27. HS7/31, FSP Interim Report, pp. 1–2.
28. HS7/31, FSP Interim Report, p. 3.
29. HS6/961, D/T to All Country Sections, 08.02.41.
30. HS9/23/3, Report by Lt Turnbull, STS 6, 23.04.43.
33. HS9/236/3, Report by C.S.M. Thomas, STS 41, 16.10.43.
34. HS7/31, FSP Interim Report, pp. 3–6.
39. IWMSA Interview with Peter Lee, Reel 5.
40. HS9/69/4, MZ2 to OC STS 6, 04.11.41.
41. HS9/69/4, D/CE 3 to D/Air, 24.12.41.
42. HS9/69/4, D/CE 3 to D/CE, 26.01.42.
43. HS9/69/4, D/CE 1 to M, 24.01.42.
44. HS9/69/4, N to D/R (N/HO/56), 31.01.42.
45. M.R.D. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, p. 121, citing Schreieder, Das war das
Englandspiel (Munich: Walter Stutz, 1950), pp. 124–8.
46. KV4/171, Hambro to Petrie (CH/2823), 28.02.42.
47. KV4/171, Petrie to Hambro (SF.51/30/65/DG), 31.08.42.
48. HS9/1274/3, Papers in Roche’s Personnel File.
49. KV4/171, Hambro to Petrie (CH/2823), 28.08.42.
51. HS7/286, SOE War Diary, August 1942, p. 9.
52. A.A. Fyffe, ‘Group 26 at Aviemore’ (Private paper).
220 Notes
53. HS9/394/5, Papers in Darby’s Personnel File.

56. HS7/31, History: Security Section, pp. 15–16.
57. HS8/840, D/CE.6 to D/CE, 28.10.42.
59. HS9/1034/7, Papers in Miller’s Personnel File; FO371/79558, Cyril T. Miller
to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 29.09.49; Conversations between
Messrs Senter and Miller and Dr Donker, 05.10.49.
60. HS8/852, D/CE.G to D/CE ONLY (DCEG/KV/30), 21.11.42.
61. KV6/10, ‘Report on Manfriday and Intersection (S.O.E. Blown Transmitters)’,
C.P. Harvey, B.1.A., 28.11.42.
62. KV6/10, Robertson to ADB1, DB, 02.12.42.
63. HS8/857, Routine Order No. 320, 15.01.43.
65. HS7/26, SOE War Diary, March 1943, pp. 105–6, citing DCE/OR/2775,
19.03.43.
66. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 9. During its existence, the Section
conducted some 454 interrogations (until June 1945). FO371/79558, Cyril
T. Miller to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 29.09.49.
68. HS8/857, Routine Order 472 (ADE/154), 02.07.43.
69. HS6/430, D/CE/SS to D/CE, 07.08.43.
70. HS2/188, BSS to A/CD (BSS/KV/1189), 27.03.44.
71. HS8/336, Selborne to Cadogan (F/7449/138/1), 05.03.43; HS7/286, SOE War
Diary, March 1943, p. 105, citing CD circular to All Directors, Regional and
Section Heads, 06.03.43.
72. HS7/31, Security History, p. 14; HS8/336, ‘Re-organisation Intelligence,
Security, Personal Services & Liaison Division’, 10.07.43; KV4/171, Boyle to
Harker, 17.08.43.
73. HS9/1274/3, Papers in Roche’s Personnel File.
74. HS9/1145/1, Papers in Park’s Personnel File.
75. HS8/857, AD/P to BSS, Copies to D/CE and D/CE.5 (ADP/35/2/757), 11.12.43.
76. HS8/857, AD/P to AD/E (ADP/Q/934), 04.01.44.
77. HS8/857, Extract from Draft Routine Order.
78. HS8/857, AD/E to AD/P (ADE/830), 07.01.44; AD/P to CD through A/CD,
Copy to D/CE (ADP/10/7/1047), 14.01.44; AD/P to AD/P.PA, 14.01.44.
79. HS8/336, SOE Routine Order 624, 30.12.43.
80. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (Abridged Edition),
p. 442, ft. 1.
81. HS8/874, D/CE to D/H.143 (DCE/5537), 29.06.44.
82. HS8/837, ‘Security of Overlord – Special Operations By Sea’, 10.04.44.
83. HS8/837, Boyle to King-Salter (ARB/132/5130), 11.04.44.
84. HS8/837, A/CD to AD/P (ACD/133/5135), 11.04.44.
85. KV4/76, Minute 56, 09.03.44.
86. HS8/837, A/CD to AD/P (ACD/133/5135), 11.04.44.
87. HS8/837, ‘Security Panel’, attached to A/CD to AD/P (ACD/133/5135),
11.04.44.
88. HS8/837, A/CD to AD/E (Copy to AD/P) (ACD/133/5173), 14.04.44.
Notes 221
89. HS8/837, A/CD to AD/P (ACD/132/5165), 14.04.44.

90. HS7/31, History: Security Section, Appendix A: Operation Overlord – The
Special Security Panel.
91. HS8/837, ‘Draft Minute of S.O.E. Council Meeting’ attached to AD/P to
V/CD (Copies to A/CD, AD/E) (ADP/9/4/1291), 17.04.44.
92. HS8/837, Minutes of Meeting of Special Security Panel, 18 April 1944.
93. HS8/837, Boyle to Findlater Stewart (ARB/132A/5225), 24.04.44.
94. HS8/837, Minutes of Meeting of Special Security Panel, 25.04.44.
95. HS8/837, Boyle to Findlater Stewart (ARB/132A/5257) (Copy AD/P, D/CE),
27.04.44.
96. HS8/837, A/CD to All Members of the Council (ACD/133/5219), 19.04.44.
97. HS8/837, D/CE to Directors and All Section Heads (DCE/5198), 20.04.44.
98. HS8/837, Boyle to Findlater Stewart (ARB/132A/5257) (Copy to AD/P,
D/CE), 27.04.44.
99. HS8/837, Boyle to Sir Findlater Stewart (Copy AD/P, D/CE)
(ARB/132A/5257), 27.04.44.
100. HS8/837, A/CD to AD/E, Copy to AD/P (ACD/133/5173), 14.04.44.
101. HS8/837, Minutes of Meeting of Special Security Panel, 08.05.44.
102. HS8/837, A/CD to D/FIN, Copies to AG/O, AD/A (ACD/32/5364), 11.05.44.
103. HS7/31, History: Security Section, Appendix A: Operation Overlord – The
Special Security Panel.
104. HS8/432, A/CD to D/His (ACD/86A/8411), 03.01.46.
2 Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’

1. Similar facilities for SOE’s overseas Missions, based in Kenya, Poona and
Madras, are detailed in Chapter 3.
2. George Markstein, The Cooler: The secret that can only be told as fiction.
3. HS6/884, ‘Holding Camp for Unsatisfactory Trainees’, 19.06.41. For the
wartime detention of Italians, see Lucio Sponza, ‘The British Govern-
ment and the Internment of Aliens’, in David Ceserani and Tony Kushner
(eds.), The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth Century Britain (London: Frank
Cass, 1993). See also Kent Fedorowich, ‘ “Toughs and Thugs”: The Mazzini
Society and Political Warfare amongst Italian POWs in India, 1941–43’,
Intelligence and National Security, 20(1) (March 2005).
4. Ben Pimlott (ed.), Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 02.12.40, p. 113.
5. HS6/884, D/FP(A) to D/F, Copies to D/FI and D/T, 22.08.40.
6. HS9/1218/2, To MI5 (DG White), 02.10.40; D/T to Section Va, 29.09.40.
7. HS9/1218/2, Report from L/Cpl Searle, 06.01.41.
8. HS9/1218/2, Report by L/Cpl Searle F.S.C., 28.01.41.
9. HS9/1218/2, Report from L/Cpl Keir & Warden, 03.02.41.
10. HS9/1218/2, Report (anon.), 03.02.41; Report from Searle, 03.02.41.
11. HS9/1218/2, MZ advised, 22.03.41.
12. HS6/884, JM to J, 30.01.41.
13. The other four men were Giovanni Verdeu, Rubino Arden, Giacomo Sarfatti
and Ernesto Ottolenghi.
14. HS6/884, JM to J, 30.01.41.
222 Notes
15. HS6/884, Report from OC STS 2. Sent by MZ, 22.03.41.

16. HS6/884, MZ to JA (MZ/IT/1387), 20.03.41.
17. HS6/884, JA to D/Fin.2 (JA/IT/323), 14.03.41.
18. HS6/885, ‘Report on a Visit to the Isle of Man’, 16.01.41.
19. HS6/884, MZ to JA (MZ/IT/1479), 24.03.41.
20. HS6/884, MZ to JA, D/T.1 (MZ/1708), 02.04.41.
21. HS9/1218/2, Report from L/Cpl Beamont, 03.04.41.
22. HS6/961, MZ to A/DB, D/T.1 (MZ/SP/420), 27.01.41.
23. HS6/961, HC to MZ (HC/OR/249), 28.01.41.
24. HS6/961, D/T.1 to H, Copies to D/T, M (DT1/SP/621), 19.03.41.
25. HS6/961, Wilson to OC STS ( JSW/OR/1466), 01.04.41.
26. HS6/884, MZ to JA (MZ/1799), 05.04.41.
27. HS6/884, JA to MZ ( JA/IT/417), 07.04.41.
28. HS6/884, JA to DH.32, 14.04.41; JA to D/JG, 17.06.41.
29. HS6/884, MZ to JA (MZ/1967), 13.04.41.
30. HS6/884, Whetmore to Robertson (ECW/IT/758), 11.04.41.
31. HS9/1218/2, Roy to Whetmore, 10.05.41.
32. HS6/884, JA to DH.32, 14.04.41.
33. HS6/884, Meoble Lodge, 15.04.41. (Dobrski to Curtiss).
36. HS6/884, DH.32 to ADZ (DH.32/IT/450), 23.04.41.
37. HS6/884, DH.32 to ADA (DH.32/IT/460), 25.04.41; MZ to DH.32 (MZ/2054),
25.04.41. At this point, Arden was also removed from the party and placed
in the charge of the Security Section.
38. HS9/1280/8, L/Cpl Beaumont, 26.04.41.
39. HS6/884, ‘32A’; record of a telephone message received from Lt Col Munn,
Commandant Beaulieu Area, at 22.30 hours on 29.04.41.
40. HS6/884, D.H.32 to D.T.1, 11.05.41.
41. HS9/1280/8, Extract from DT1/KV/1253 to AD/A, 02.07.41.
42. HS9/1280/8, Report from L/Cpl Alexander, 22.05.41; Report from Sgt. Rees,
Section HQ, 26.06.41.
43. HS6/961, Anon. to Grayson (Commandant, STS 42, Thame), 27.05.41.
44. HS7/217, ‘Training’, 18.06.41.
45. HS6/884, D/JG to MZ (DJG/IT/617a), 17.06.41.
46. HS6/884, JA to D/JG, 17.06.41.
47. Ibid.
48. HS6/884, JA to DT/1, 19.06.41.
49. HS6/884, D/T.1 to AD/A, D/JG (DT1/KV/1215), 24.06.41.
50. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, p. 85.
51. HS6/884, D/T.1 to AD.A (Copies to AD.Z, D/C.E) (DT1/KV/1253), undated.
Attached to D/JG to AD (DJG/IT/750), 04.07.41. (Also in Purisiol’s PF,
HS9/1218/2).
52. HS6/884, D/JG to AD (DJG/IT/750), 04.07.41.
53. A.A. Fyffe, ‘The Protected Area of Western Scotland and its Military Occu-
pation from 1940’, in David M. Harrison (ed.), Special Operations Executive:
Para-Military Training in Scotland 1940–1944, p. 30. I am grateful to David
Harrison for providing me with a copy of his booklet.
Notes 223
54. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 5. Further support for Fyffe’s employment
came from Maj. T.H.H. Grayson of Thame Park. At the end of the month, in
a wide-ranging letter to Lt. C.H. Scott, he wrote ‘I strongly recommend Fyffe
for the employment you mentioned He would, in my opinion, do the
job well’ (HS6/961, Grayson to Scott (STS/CR/24), 29.07.41). On 1 August
Scott replied, noting that ‘I passed on your message about Fyffe to Major
Whetmore’ (HS6/961, Scott to Grayson, 01.08.41).
56. Fyffe, ‘Group 26 at Aviemore’. I am grateful to Major Fyffe for allowing me
to see this paper.
58. Fyffe, ‘The Protected Area of Western Scotland and its Military Occupation
from 1940’, p. 30.
from 1940’, pp. 31–2.
62. Ibid., Reels 6–7; HS9/1521/6, Papers in Vass’ Personnel File.
64. HS9/1280/8, Report from L/Cpl Stokes, 10.07.41, The Cooler.
65. HS9/1280/8, L/Cpl Stokes, The Cooler (undated).
66. Ibid.
67. HS9/1218/2, Note (undated).
69. Ibid., Reel 7.
70. HS9/1280/8, Papers in Rosa’s Personnel File.
71. HS6/884, cited in D/CE3 to J.A. (DCE3/680), 20.11.41.
72. HS9/1218/2, Extract from D/CE3 to D/CE, 19.3.42.
73. HS9/1218/2, Report from Cpl Saunders, 18.09.41.
74. HS9/1218/2, Report from L/Cpl Beaumont, 25.09.41.
75. HS9/1218/2, Report from Inverlair, 04.10.41.
76. HS9/1218/2, L/Cpl Mendes 30.10.41, The Cooler.
77. HS9/1218/2, L/Cpl Blacka, 13.11.41.
from 1940’, pp. 32–3.
from 1940’, p. 32.
81. HS9/1218/2, ‘No. 5’, From Fyffe, 05.05.42.
from 1940’, pp. 32–3.
84. HS6/736, A/CD to CD (marked ‘Draft’), 03.07.44.
86. Author’s interview with Fyffe, 05.11.01.
87. HS6/736, A/CD to CD (marked ‘Draft’), 03.07.44.
88. HS8/841 and HS8/857, ‘Internment Facilities for Special Cases’, 26.07.44.
89. HS6/961, H to D/T.1 (H/OR/1824) Copies to M.Z. and D/Fin2, 30.06.41.
90. HS6/961, D/T.1 to H (Copy to MZ), 01.07.41.
224 Notes
91. HS6/961, Blake to Commandant STS 42 [sic], 10.12.41.

92. HS6/961, D/CE3 to MT (through D/CE) (DCE3/780), 12.12.41.
93. HS9/737/1, STS 51b, 23.07.42; Cpl Murray, 16.08.43.
94. HS9/737/1, STS 22, 27.06.42.
95. HS9/737/1, ‘Badger’, D/CE.SS.1, 03.08.43.
96. HS9/737/1, T to D/CE for D/CE.SS (T/BE/1237), 27.07.43.
97. HS9/737/1, T to D/CE.SS (T/BE/8967), 31.07.43.
98. HS9/737/1, D/CE.BR to D/CE through D/CE.SS (DCEBR/KV/567), 07.08.43.
99. HS9/737/1, D/CE.SS to T.H. (DCESS/KV/583), 11.08.43; AD/P to T Copy to
D/R (ADP/14), 11.08.43.
100. HS9/737/1, TH to AD/P through D/R (TH/BE/9035), 14.08.43.
101. HS9/737/1, TH to D/CE (TH/BE/9116), 07.09.43.
102. HS9/737/1, AD/P to D/CE, 11.09.43.
103. HS9/737/1, D/CE to T, 17.09.43.
104. Ibid.
105. HS9/737/1, ‘Application for Dispensing with a Student’s Services’, 20.09.43.
106. HS9/737/1, Cooler, 05.10.43.
107. HS9/737/1, Cooler, 02.11.43.
108. HS9/737/1, Cooler, 30.11.43.
109. HS9/737/1, D/CEM.1 to T, 16.12.43; T to D/CEM.1, 16.12.43; D/CE to
Sections Concerned, 04.01.44.
110. HS9/737/1, D/CEM.3 to T, Copies to MT, D/Fin.2 (DCEM3/4268),
13.01.44.
111. HS9/1218/2, Whetmore to Fyffe (ECW/KV/1884), 05.11.41.
112. HS9/1218/2, D/CE.1 to J (DCE.1/KV/1918), 08.11.41.
113. HS9/1218/2, JA to D/CE.1 (copy to D/HV) ( JA/IT/1563), 14.11.41.
114. HS9/1218/2, D/CE3 to D/CE (DCE3/652), 20.11.41; D/CE.2 to JA (Copy to
D/HV & D/H111) (DCE2/KV/376), 22.11.41.
115. HS9/1218/2, From Fyffe, 30.01.42.
116. HS9/1218/2, D/CE.3 to D/CE.2 (DCE3/2772), 19.12.42.
117. HS9/1218/2, D/CE.3 to D/Sec/Reg, through D/FIN.2 (DCE3/2938),
20.01.43.
118. HS9/1218/2, D/FIN.2 to D/CE.3, Copy to D/Sec/Reg (FIN2/FD/8507),
27.01.43.
119. HS9/51/6, RVPS Report on Armanet.
120. HS9/51/16, J.G. Baker, 03.05.43.
121. HS9/51/6, 2/Lt. Turnbull, 25.06.43.
122. HS9/51/6, 2/Lt. Turnbull, 03.07.43.
123. HS9/51/6, D/CEM.1 to RF/A, 05.07.43.
124. HS9/51/6, D/CEM.1 to MT, 09.07.43.
125. HS9/51/6, RF to D/CEM.1, 09.07.43
126. HS9/51/6, ‘Application for Dispensing with Student’s Service’, 14.07.43.
127. HS9/51/6, Cooler, 16.08.43.
128. HS9/51/6, 28.08.43.
129. HS9/51/6, 05.10.43.
130. HS9/51/6, 30.11.43.
131. HS9/51/6, 11.12.43.
132. HS9/1218/2, D/CE.L to D/CE.M.1 (DCEL/3681), 26.01.45.
Notes 225
133. HS9/1218/2, O’Reilly to Cartwright (JDOR/3678), 25.01.45; O’Reilly to

Cartwright (JDOR/3705), 27.02.45.
134. HS9/1218/2, Cartwright to O’Reilly (L.5127/1945).
135. HS9/394/5, D/CE to A/CD (D/CE 1531), 25.04.45.
3 Security abroad
3. Lady Ranfurly, To War With Whittaker: The Wartime Diaries of the Countess
of Ranfurly 1939–45, pp. 79, 82, 92.
4. Although he refrained from referring to Countess Ranfurly by name,
when discussing the ‘anti-SO2 dossier’, Bickham Sweet-Escott noted that
it included ‘copies of reports and telegrams which were supposed to show
that our organization was ineffective it was obvious at once that they
could have been obtained only from our files. It is symptomatic of the
atmosphere of Cairo in those days that we later established beyond any
reasonable doubt that they had been extracted by two people who had
been taken on by us at the express request of someone in G.H.Q. In other
words, it looked very much as if a spy had been deliberately planted on us
by the soldiers’ (Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 75).
5. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 74.
6. Lady Ranfurly, To War With Whittaker, p. 104
7. As Mackenzie notes, the period is difficult to explore closely ‘as the majority
of the Cairo files were destroyed in the “great panic” on June 1942’ (Mack-
enzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 182).
8. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 508.
9. HS8/838, Security Progress Report (XC/SA/15), 05.06.43.
10. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 170.
11. HS8/838, D/H.147 to A.D.3, D/CE, copies to C.O.S., D/HV (XC/SA/15),
13.06.43.
12. HS8/874, D/HV to D/FIN Copy to D/CE.1, W Section (DHX/KV/528),
21.12.42.
13. HS8/874, D/CE.1 to D/HV (DCE1/KV/4616), 22.12.42.
14. HS8/838, ‘Security – General & Preliminary Report’ (XC/SA/15), 14.04.43.
15. HS8/838, D/H 147 to D/HV and D/CE, 09.05.43.
16. HS8/838, D/HV to D/H147, 09.05.43.
17. HS8/838, D/HV to D/H147, 10.05.43; D/HV to D/H147, 12.05.43.
18. HS8/838, D/H.147 to D/HV and D/CE, 13.05.43.
20. HS8/838, Gillson to Roberts (XC/SA/15), 01.06.43.
21. HS8/838, Gillson to O’Sullivan (XC/SA/15), 01.06.43.
23. HS8/874 and HS8/838, Security Progress Report, August 1943.
24. HS8/874, ‘Security Middle East’, D/H.147 (undated).
25. HS8/838, D/H.147 to A.D.3, D/CE, copies to C.O.S., D/HV (XC/SA/15),
13.06.43.
226 Notes
26. HS8/874, ‘Security Middle East’, D/H.147 (undated).

27. HS8/874, D/H 147 to AD3, D/CE, copies to COS, D/HV (XC/SA/15), 13.06.43.
28. HS8/838, COS to X (COS/173/985), 22.09.43.
30. HS8/874, D/H 147 to AD3, D/CE, Copies to COS, D/HV (XC/SA/15),
13.06.43.
31. HS8/838, ‘Security – General & Preliminary Report’ (XC/SA/15), 14.04.43.
32. HS8/874, D/H 147 to AD3, D/CE, Copies to COS, D/HV (XC/SA/15),
13.06.43.
33. HS8/874, Note appended to D/H 147 to AD3, D/CE, Copies to COS, D/HV
(XC/SA/15), 13.06.43.
34. HS3/64, D/CD(O) to CD (Copies to: D/CD(A), AD/P, A.D.4 and AD/L to take
up with Mr Mack) (DCDO/1431), 17.10.42.
36. Ibid.
38. HS8/885, AM.80 to D/CE through AM.10, Copy for AM.81, ‘Security Report
No. 2 From Maryland’, 08.11.43.
39. HS9/74/1, Papers in Baird’s Personnel File.
40. HS8/885, AM.80 to AM.10 Copy to D/CE, AM.81 ‘Security Report No. 3 for
MARYLAND’, 30.11.43.
41. HS8/885, AM.84 to AM.80, ‘With S.O.E. in Italy’, 19.01.44.
42. HS8/885, AM.80 to AM.10 Copy to D/CE, AM.81 ‘Security Report No. 3 for
MARYLAND’, 30.11.43.
43. HS8/885, AM.80 to AM.10, Copies for D/CE, AM, D/H.156, AM.81 (for
information), ‘Security Report No. 4 for MARYLAND’, 27.12.43.
44. HS8/885, AM.84 to AM.80, ‘With S.O.E. in Italy’, 19.01.44.
45. HS8/885, AM.80 to AM.10, Copies for D/CE, AM, D/H.156, AM.51 (for
information), ‘Security Report No. 5 for MARYLAND’, 19.01.44.
46. HS8/846, ‘Report to the Director of Special Operations, Mediterranean Area,
from Deputy to Head of the Division of Intelligence, Security, Liaison and
Personal Services, S.O.E., H.Q., London’, 28.03.44.
47. Roderick Bailey, ‘Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmann’s Recruit-
ment and Retention’, Intelligence and National Security, 20(1) (March 2005),
p. 90.
49. HS6/875, Stawell to Cmd. Force 266, Cmd. No. 1 Special Force
(M/ADM/8/45), 18.04.44.
50. HS6/875, Lee to Senter (5402/SA/4), 16.05.44, quoted in Senter to Hoyer
Millar (JS/10/11/1814), 10.08.44.
51. HS6/875, ‘Security Intelligence Panel’ (I/312/14/17), 26.07.44.
52. HS8/885, AM.80 to D/H, ‘Security Intelligence Report No. 3 – May 1944’,
24.05.44.
53. HS6/875, H.Q. S.O.(M) Adm. Echelon to G.I. I(b), H.Q. S.O.(M), 14.07.44.
54. HS6/875, Hoyer Millar (G.I. I(b), HQ SO(M)), to Col i/c Adm, Adm Ech HQ
SO(M), 27.07.44.
55. HS6/875, D/H.928 to D/CE (I/312/9/16), 28.07.44.
Notes 227
56. HS6/875, Beevor to SOM Adm Ech, ‘A’ Branch, Copies to G/I/ I(b) SOM, No.
1 Special Force, 30.07.44.
57. HS6/875, D/H.928 to D/CE (I/312/9/16), 28.07.44.
58. HS6/875, Hoyer Millar to Senter (I/312/14/22), 03.08.44.
59. HS6/875, Senter to Hoyer Millar (JS/10/11/1814), 10.08.44.
60. HS6/875, Senter to Hoyer Millar (JS/10/11/1852), 16.08.44.
61. HS6/875, AD/P to D/H.928, through D/CE (ADP/10/11/2001), 05.09.44.
62. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Lee, Baird (I/312/95), 25.10.44.
63. HS8/885, AM.200, ‘Security Intelligence Panel Monthly Report No. 10 –
December, 1944’, 29.12.44.
64. HS8/873, Lt Col (AA & QMG) to G.I.(b), 11.12.44.
65. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Lee (PERS/1011/IB), 21.12.44.
66. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Senter (PERS/1151/IB), 16.01.45.
67. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Roche (PERS/1153/IB), 16.01.45.
68. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Senter (PERS/1151/IB), 16.01.45.
69. Senter reluctantly gave his support (‘I am satisfied on what you say that in
everyone’s interests, the change ought to be made, but I am also very
conscious of the unique contribution that he has made, and I do not think there
are many people who could have produced such results in the time’), while
Roche was ‘sorry but not surprised’ at the news, telling Hoyer Millar that ‘When
I got back to London last November I told ADP that I feared it was only a
question of time before Peter’s “intransigence” rendered a change inevitable’.
(HS8/873, John to Hoyer (JS/96/2748), 06.02.45; Tom to Hoyer, 06.02.45.)
70. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
71. HS8/872, Notes left by Lt Col Gillson at Meerut, February 1944: Proposed
Duties of Indian Mission Security Section.
73. HS8/872, ‘Security Report No. 1, Force 136’, B/B.637 to B/B.100, 14.06.44.
75. Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, p. 89.
77. HS8/846, ‘Report to the Director of Special Operations, Mediterranean Area,
from Deputy to Head of the Division of Intelligence, Security, Liaison and
Personal Services, S.O.E., H.Q., London’, 28.03.44.
79. The History continued to note that ‘It can safely be said that had the war
continued, Lt. Col. Bourne’s organisation would have paid the Mission a
handsome dividend’ (HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian
Mission).
80. Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, p. 151.
4 Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation

1. HS7/31, Note by John Senter, p. 3.
228 Notes
3. KV4/171, Vivian to Cumming, 06.11.40.

4. KV4/171, White to Whetmore (B.2/Gen/DGW), 10.02.41.
5. KV4/171, Whetmore to Blunt (ECW/KV/135), 08.01.41.
7. Oliver Hoare (Intro.), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies, p. 15. The agents
had been poorly trained and in some cases were working under duress; all
bar one had been captured.
9. KV4/171, Senter to White (JS/KV/2144), 05.12.41.
10. KV4/171, White to Senter (A.D.B.1./Gen/DGW), 14.12.41.
12. HS8/320, cited in Nelson to Petrie, 16.07.41.
13. HS8/320, ‘Notes on a meeting held between M.I.5 and S.O.2 on Friday,
18 July 1941 at 58 St James Street. Present: (For M.I.5): Sir David Petrie (in
the Chair), Brigadier Harker, Capt. Liddell (For SOE): Sir Frank Nelson, Col
Taylor, Air-Commodore Boyle.’
14. KV4/171, ‘Meeting Between Brigadier Harker, Deputy Director General,
Security Service, and General Lakin, Director of Security, S.O.2 on the
6th August 1941.’
15. KV4/171, Rothschild to Harker, 10.09.41.
16. KV4/171, Secretariat, 23.09.41.
17. KV4/171, Harker to Lakin (SF.51/30/65), 10.41.
18. KV4/171, Lakin to Harker (HL/KV/197), 09.10.41.
19. KV4/171, Harker to Lakin (SF.51/30/65), 13.10.41.
20. KV4/171, Lakin to Harker (HL/KV/334), 08.01.42; Director-General’s Circular
No D.G/5/42: Relations Between the Security Service & Special Operations
Executive (Inter-Services Research Bureau), 20.02.42.
21. KV4/188, Liddell Diary, 06.08.41.
22. KV4/172, Minute 1, 22.12.41; KV4/171, Minute 83, T.A. Robertson,
22.12.41.
23. KV4/171, Minute 81, T.A. Robertson, 18.12.41.
24. KV4/172, Masterman to Robertson, 26.12.41.
26. KV4/171, Robertson to Senter, 21.01.42.
27. KV4/171, John to Tar (JS/KV/2843), 24.01.42.
29. KV4/171, ‘Note on S.O.E. Course of Lectures’, 21.02.42.
30. KV4/171, Petrie to Harker, 28.02.42.
31. KV4/171, Liddell to Petrie, 23.02.42.
32. KV4/171, Minute 112, O.A. Harker, 05.06.42.
34. KV4/171, ‘Colonel Woolrych’s visit, 15th–20th June 1942’.
35. KV4/171, Woolrych to Robertson, 23.06.42.
36. KV4/171, Robertson to Woolrych, 25.06.42
37. KV4/171, Robertson to Senter, 21.06.42.
39. KV4/171, White to Harker, 25.06.42.
40. KV4/171, Minute 125, White to Petrie, 27.06.42.
41. KV4/171, Harker to Lakin (SF.51/30/65/DDG), 29.06.42.
Notes 229

43. KV4/171, ‘Note of Meeting’, 06.07.42.
44. KV4/171, Minute 129, Petrie to Harker, 08.07.42.
45. See surviving Minute Sheets in KV4/172.
48. KV4/171, Senter to White (JS/KV/3958), 01.08.42. It is not possible to
discover MI5’s attitude to these limitations, as the relevant papers have been
removed from KV4/171 to other files, which have either been retained or
destroyed (SF51/30/65(II) and SF51/30/65(B)).
49. J.C. Curry, The Security Service 1908–1945: The Official History, pp. 174, 130.
50. HS9/597/1, Captain Gerald Glover to Park (112,875/Y/RC), 22.12.42.
51. HS9/597/1, D/CE.2 to F (DCE2/KV/3646), 28.12.42.
52. HS9/597/1, Park to Glover (HP/KV/3887), 01.01.43.
53. HS9/597/1, Baxter to MacIver, 10.01.43.
54. HS9/304/1, STS 31, 20.06.42.
55. HS9/304/1, D/CE.2 to F, 21.08.43.
56. HS9/304/1, F to D/CE.2, 24.08.43.
57. HS9/304/1, D/CE.G to MI5, 27.08.43.
58. HS9/304/1, FG to D/CE.1, 02.09.43.
59. HS9/304/1, Major Glover to D/CE.G, 06.09.43.
60. HS9/304/1, D/CE.1 to FG, 11.09.43.
61. HS9/304/1, D/CE.G to MI5, 16.10.43.
62. HS9/304/1, MI5, 03.12.43; D/CE.1 to FG, 14.12.43.
65. KV6/39, Blunt to Young, 19.12.42. Assisting Blunt with the investigation,
Courtenay Young observed that ‘It is obvious from their itinerary of the
day in question that they must have had a considerable amount to drink’
(KV6/39, Minute 27, Courtenay Young, 05.11.42).
66. KV6/39, Minute 26, A.F. Blunt, 04.11.42.
67. KV6/39, Blunt to Young, 19.12.42.
68. KV6/39, Blunt to DDG, 31.12.42.
69. KV6/39, Reports of 22 January, 29 January and 5 February 1943.
70. KV6/39, Roche to Blunt (TGR/KV/4754), 29.01.43; Young to Blunt, Minute
37, 29.01.43.
71. KV6/39, B.1.B. note on the case, 06.04.43.
72. KV6/40, Wethered to Hughes (L.397/Denmark/2), 31.05.43.
73. KV6/39, Note, A.F. Blunt, 14.03.43.
74. KV6/40, Minute 100, G.P. Wethered, 26.05.43.
75. KV6/40, Wethered to Hughes (L.397/Denmark/2), 31.05.43.
76. KV6/40, Minute 117, G.P. Wethered, 08.06.43.
77. KV6/40, Minute 118, Wethered to Liddell, 10.06.43.
78. KV6/40, Wethered to Senter (L.397/Denmark/2(B.1.B)GPW), 14.06.43.
79. KV6/40, Wethered to Burt (L.397/Denmark/2), 10.06.43.
80. KV6/40, ‘STARUP/TABLE’, G.P. Wethered, 19.06.43.
81. KV6/40, ‘Carl Immanuel STARUP’, G.P. Wethered, 31.08.43.
82. KV6/40, Wethered to Blunt, 03.09.43.
83. KV6/15, Note delivered by Roche, 20.10.43.
230 Notes
84. KV6/15, Wethered to White, 22.10.43.

85. KV6/15, Note, Wethered, 01.11.43.
86. See Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, pp. 180–1.
87. KV6/15, Note, Wethered, 01.11.43.
88. KV6/15, Roche to Wethered (TGR/4304), 19.11.43.
89. KV6/15, Wethered to Miller (L.397/France/1.Supp/B.1.B), 03.12.43.
90. KV6/15, Wethered to Beaumont, 08.12.43.
91. KV6/15, Miller to Wethered (CTM/KV/848), 22.11.43.
92. KV6/15, Wethered to Knight (L.397/France/1.Supp/B.1.B), 22.12.43.
93. KV6/15, O’Reilly to Wethered (JDOR/2949), 13.12.43; O’Reilly to Wethered
(JDOR/2952), 14.12.43.
94. KV6/15, Wethered to Knight (GEN/B.1.B/GPW), 15.12.43.
95. KV6/15, Statement of Mademoiselle Micheline Odette Raymonde
LEMAIRE, 04.01.44; ‘Mlle. Lemaire du Hamel’, Maxwell Knight, 05.01.44.
96. KV6/15, Wethered to Senter (L.397/France/1.Supp/B.1.B), 10.01.44.
97. KV6/16, Wethered to Miller (L.397/France/1(Supp)B.1.B./GPW), 21.01.44.
98. HS6/294, to Park (Y.Box.2660/2125/A/B.1.L), 25.03.43.
99. HS6/294, D/CE.2 to T (DCE2/KV/4351), 27.03.43; T to D/CE (for D/CE 2)
(TH/BE/2367), 01.04.43; Park to , MI5 (HP/KV/4401), 02.04.43.
100. HS6/294, ‘Recruiting of Belgian Seamen’, 08.04.43.
101. HS6/294, T to D/CE (for D/CE 4) (TH/BE/2522), 27.04.43.
102. HS6/294, O’Reilly to Scurr (JDOR/1997), 29.04.43.
103. HS6/294, Chief Inspector Cust to Chief Inspector, Aliens Registration
Office.
104. HS6/294, D/CE.4 to T (D/CE.4/2023), 06.05.43.
105. HS6/294, Ferry to Kidd, 09.05.43.
106. HS6/294, Park to , MI5 (HP/KV/5303), 29.07.43.
107. HS6/294, , MI5 to Park (Y.Box 3780/B.1.L.), 02.08.43.
108. HS6/294, , MI5 to Park (Y.Box 3780/B.1.L.), 10.08.43.
109. HS6/294, D/CE2 to T.H. (DCE2/KV/5406), 12.08.43.
110. HS6/294, Park to , MI5 (HP/KV/6470), 02.11.43.
111. HS6/294, Robertson to Park (Y.Box 3780/B.1.L.), 06.11.43.
112. HS6/294, D/CE.1 to OC Group ‘C’ STS (DCE1/KV/6593), 12.11.43.
113. HS6/294, Robertson to Park (Y.Box 3780/B.1.L), 17.11.43.
114. HS6/294, Park to Robertson (HP/KV/6683), 20.11.43.
5 Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict

1. KV4/171, Lakin to Petrie, 30.08.42.
2. KV4/171, Petrie to Lakin, 23.09.42.
3. KV3/75, ‘Escape Cases’, C.H. Harmer, 15.02.43.
4. HS7/31, German Penetration of S.O.E. Organisations, Appendix D:
Norway.
6. KV3/75, ‘Counter-Espionage and the Protection of S.I.S. and S.O.E. Organ-
isations Operating in Enemy Occupied Territory’ (covering note dated
08.03.43); KV3/75, ‘German Penetration of S.O.E., S.I.S. and Allied Organ-
isations’, 02.04.43.
Notes 231
7. KV3/75, ‘Escape Cases: Appendix’, C.H. Harmer, 15.02.43.

8. HS2/159, SN to D/CE Copy to D/S, M/S, 08.01.43.
9. This aspect of the case was quickly dismissed. Following discussion with
Robertson, Miller notified Wilson that ‘having regard to your desire that
the traffic in the Trondjhem area should not be increased or complicated in
view of the important operations there pending, he does not desire to have
the set formally handed over to him for his use’ (HS2/159, D/CE.G to SN
(DCEG/KV/115), 11.01.43).
10. HS2/159, C.T. Miller to , MI5 (CTM/KV/183), 08.02.43.
11. HS2/159, Wilson to Tronstad (JSW/353), 12.02.43.
13. HS2/159, D/CE.G to SN, Copy to D/CE (DCEG/KV/188), 13.02.43.
14. HS2/160, D/CE.G to D/CE (DCEG/KV/234), 01.03.43.
15. HS2/160, ‘Nygaard’, Harvey (D/CE.GA), 08.04.43.
16. HS8/320, Senter to White (JS/KV/2757), 13.03.43.
17. HS8/320 and KV4/201, Senter to White (JS/KV/2757), 13.03.43.
18. KV4/201, Robertson to DB, 27.01.43.
19. HS8/320, White to Senter (ADB1/Gen), 15.03.43.
20. KV4/201, Senter to Haylor (JS/KV/2770), 17.03.43.
21. HS8/320 and KV4/201, Senter to White (JS/KV/2766), 16.03.43.
22. KV4/208, Minute 1, D.G. White, 18.03.43.
23. KV4/201, Minute 7, Guy Liddell, 21.03.43.
24. KV4/201, Minute 8, D. Petrie, 22.03.43.
25. KV4/201 and KV4/208, White to Senter, 24.03.43.
27. I am indebted to Cynthia Reavell of The Tilling Society for providing this
information.
28. HS9/166/7, Recommendation for Mention in Despatches (posthumous),
23.09.45.
29. M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France, p. 219.
30. KV6/18, Robertson to Senter (L.397/France/1/B.1.A/CHH), 18.05.43.
31. KV6/18, Wethered to Robertson, 28.05.43.
32. The first indication of Wethered’s involvement in the case is a minute dated
24.05.43.
33. KV6/18, ‘S.O.E. Organisation in Toulouse’, G.P. Wethered, 24.05.43.
34. KV6/18, Interrogation Report: Denise Madeline Bloch, G.J. Baker, 27.05.43.
35. KV6/18, Interrogation Report: Denise Madeline Bloch, G.J. Baker, 27.05.43.
36. KV6/18, ‘Note on case of Mlle. Denis Madeleine Bloch’, G.P. Wethered,
27.05.43.
37. KV3/75, ‘General Report on S.O.E. Cases up to the End of June 1943’,
09.07.43.
38. HS2/160, D/CE.G to SN (DCEG/KV/212), 24.02.43.
39. HS2/160, SN to D/CE/SS, 25.03.43.
40. HS2/160, , MI5 to Warden, 06.05.43.
41. HS2/160, ‘Herluf Nygaard’, 15.05.43.
42. HS2/160, , MI5 to Warden, 17.05.43.
43. HS9/1114/3, SN to D/CE (SN/1021), 25.05.43.
44. HS9/1114/3, Senter to White, 04.06.43.
45. HS2/243, SN to AD/E (SN/1244), 05.07.43.
232 Notes
46. HS2/243, D/CE to AD/E (DCE/KV/3586), 14.07.43.

47. The procedure saw a member of Bayswater conduct a ‘preliminary invest-
igation’ and prepare a brief, upon which Wethered then based his own
interrogation.
48. KV4/208, G.P. Wethered to D.D.B., 25.05.43.
49. KV6/18, ‘Research re S.O.E. Organisation in Toulouse’, Hazel Thurston,
25.05.43.
50. KV6/18, D/CE/SJ to D/CE/SS, 26.05.43.
51. KV6/18, ‘Note’, G.P. Wethered, 27.05.43.
52. KV6/18, ‘Note on case of Mlle. Denis Madeleine Bloch’, G.P. Wethered,
27.05.43.
53. HS6/422, D/CE to D/CE.SS (D/CE/KV/3285), 07.06.43.
55. KV4/201, White to Senter (SF.51/32/Misc(11)/DDB), 10.06.43.
56. KV4/201, Minute 27, White to Wethered, 02.06.43.
57. HS6/746, Senter to MI5 (JS/364), 07.10.43.
58. HS6/746, Senter to White (JS/363), 07.10.43.
59. HS6/746, Wethered to Senter, 09.10.43.
60. HS6/746, AD/P to D/CE.1 (ADP/350), 11.10.43.
61. HS6/746, Senter to Wethered, 12.10.43.
62. HS6/746 and KV4/201, Senter to White (JS/36/406), 15.10.43.
63. KV6/23, Report by Wethered, 08.10.43.
64. KV6/23, Minute 212, Wethered to Liddell through White, 08.10.43.
65. KV6/23, Minute 213, White to Liddell, 12.10.43.
66. KV6/23, Minute 215, Liddell to White and Wethered, 03.11.43.
Emphasis added.
67. HS8/857, AD/P to D/CE.M through D/CE, Copy to D/CE.SS (ADP/32),
14.08.43.
68. KV6/23, ‘A report on certain aspects of the investigation into Lt. Barry
Knight, late of S.O.E., with particular reference to problems of S.O.E. internal
security’, 20.10.43.
69. HS9/423, D/CE.G to F (through D/CE.SS) (DCEG/KV/802), 30.10.43.
70. HS9/421, ‘Louba/Gilbert’, C.T. Miller, November 1943.
71. HS9/423, D/CE.G to AD/P, D/CE through D/CE.SS (DCEG/KV/803),
30.10.43.
72. KV2/1131, ‘Gilbert’, G.P. Wethered, 19.11.43.
73. HS9/421, Warden to , Broadway (RHW/5/550), 16.11.43.
74. HS9/421, Senter to , Broadway (JS/5/957), 06.01.44.
75. HS9/423, F to D/CE.G thro’ D/CE.SS Copy to AD/P, D/CE (F/FR/2455),
03.11.43.
76. HS9/421, ‘The Case Against Gilbert’, BSS/G to AD/P, 27.01.44.
77. HS9/421, AD/P to C.D. through A.CD, Copy to F for D/R and AD/E
(ADP/2/5/1109), 28.01.44.
78. HS9/421, AD/P to AD/E, Copy to A/CD (ADP/4/13/1199), 14.02.44.
79. HS9/421, AD/P to AD/E (ADP/4/13/1191), 12.02.44.
80. HS9/421, AD/P to F (ADP/4/13/1190), 12.02.44.
81. HS9/421, AD/P to AD/E, Copy to A/CD (ADP/4/13/1199), 14.02.44.
82. HS9/421, ‘P.S.’ to AD/P to AD/E Copy to A/CD (ADP/4/13/1199), 14.02.44.
83. HS6/735 and HS6/738, White to Senter (L.397/Holland/1(B.1.B)), 13.02.44.
Notes 233
84. KV4/193, Liddell Diary, 17.02.44.

85. HS9/421, F to AD/E, 15.02.44, marked ‘not sent’.
86. HS9/424, F to AD/P Copy to DR/P (F/2632), 24.02.44. Emphasis added.
87. His interest in the case was not as neutral as he claimed; Boyle later noted
that Sporborg admitted having been ‘brought into the matter’ by Mockler-
Ferryman and Buckmaster, ‘in the hopes that he would intervene’ (HS9/421,
A/CD to AD/P (ACD/70a/4762), 18.02.44).
88. HS9/421, V/CD to A/CD, Copies to AD/E, F, BSS (VCD/907), 16.02.44;
HS9/421, ‘Draft letter to Captain Guy Liddell’, 16.02.44.
89. HS9/421, ‘Draft letter to Captain Guy Liddell’, 16.02.44.
90. HS9/421, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/4/13/1221), 17.02.44, covering ‘Gilbert’ paper.
91. KV4/193, Liddell Diary, 24.02.44.
92. HS9/421, A/CD to AD/P (ACD/70a/4762), 18.02.44.
93. HS9/421, V.B.5.f, 19.02.44.
94. HS9/421, AD/P to A/CD Copies to L/SV, D/CE (ADP/4/13/1248), 22.02.44.
95. HS9/424, FM to F, 19.03.44.
96. HS9/1114/3, D/S to BSS (DS/NSN/2099), 02.06.44.
97. HS9/1114/3, D/S to BSS (DS/SN/2289), 28.06.44; D/S to BSS (DS/SN/2355),
06.07.44.
98. HS9/1114/3, Wethered to Warden (PF.65667/B.1.B./GPW), 17.07.44.
99. HS9/1114/3, BSS to D/S (BSS/8/1586), 22.07.44.
6 Approaching Section V
1. KV4/120, D.G. White, ‘Report on Section V in Relation to the Problem of an
M.I.5/M.I.6 Joint Section for C.E. Work’.
2. F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War,
Volume 4, p. 10.
3. KV4/120, D.G. White, ‘Report on Section V in Relation to the Problem of an
M.I.5/M.I.6 Joint Section for C.E. Work’.
4. Hinsley and Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 4,
p. 180.
6. KV4/173, Boyle to Liddell (ARB/RET/2627), 20.01.43.
7. Curry, The Security Service 1908–1945, pp. 205–6.
8. KV4/173, Vivian to Liddell, 10.02.43.
9. KV4/173, Boyle to Liddell (ARB/JF/2925), 17.03.43.
10. KV4/173, Liddell to Boyle (51/30/65/DB), 22.03.43.
11. KV4/173, Liddell to Vivian (51/30/65/DB), 22.03.43.
12. KV4/173, Vivian to Liddell, 28.03.43.
13. KV4/173, Liddell to Vivian (51/30/65/DB), 30.03.43.
14. KV4/171, Note by Liddell, 16.04.43.
15. HS2/243, , MI5 to Warden, 22.04.43.
16. HS2/243, , MI5 to Warden, 22.04.43.
17. HS2/243, Warden to , MI5 (RHW/KV/342), 23.04.43. Emphasis added.
18. KV4/208, Minute 8, Curry to D.G., 04.05.43.
19. KV4/191, Liddell Diary, 03.04.43.
234 Notes
20. KV4/208, ‘Secret Operations and Intelligence: Introductory Notes on the

Question of Combining the Existing Services’, J.C. Curry, 06.05.43.
21. KV4/192, Liddell Diary, 10.07.43.
22. KV4/208, Draft letter to Vivian for signature by D.B., 31.03.43.
23. KV4/208, Note by White, 01.04.43.
24. KV3/75, Curry to White, 05.05.43.
25. KV3/75, White to Liddell, 06.05.43.
26. KV3/75, White to Wethered, 06.05.43.
27. KV4/208, White to Senter (SF.52/SOE/DDB), 13.05.43.
29. KV4/208, Wethered to White, 19.06.43. Emphasis added.
30. KV4/208, White to Wethered, 02.07.43.
31. Nigel West, MI6: British Intelligence Service Operations 1909–45, p. 219; HS7/31,
History, p. 9.
33. Ibid.
34. KV4/208, Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Glenalmond Treaty. Emphasis added.
35. KV4/208, Cowgill to White, 02.08.43.
36. Ibid.
37. KV4/208, White to Cowgill, 18.08.43.
38. HS6/746 and KV4/201, Senter to White (JS/363), 07.10.43.
40. KV4/201 (also in HS6/746, with further redactions under Section 3(4) (i.e.
Wethered’s name is removed throughout)), White to Senter (51/32/Misc.
(11)/DDB), 12.10.43.
41. KV4/201, Senter to White ( JS/36/406), 15.10.43.
42. KV4/208, Senter to Vivian ( JS/2/603), 23.11.43.
43. KV4/208, Vivian to Senter, 01.12.43.
44. KV4/208, White to Senter, 06.12.43.
45. Curry, The Security Service 1908–1945, p. 383.
7 Security aspects of the Nordpol affair

1. HS6/746, ‘Crossed Lines in Holland’, 06.08.43.
2. HS6/746, N to D/R (N/HO/368), 25.06.43.
3. HS6/746, ‘BILL and the O.D.’, date given as 8/9 July 1943 in handwriting.
4. Marks, Between Silk and Cyanide, Chapter 43.
5. HS6/746, D/CE.GA to D/CE, 09.07.43.
6. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, p. 175, citing Hinsley et al., British Intelligence
in the Second World War, Volume 3 Part 1, p. 462.
7. HS6/737, Senter to Cowgill (JS/KV/3595), 16.07.43; HS6/746 and HS6/737,
D/CE to AD/E (DCE/KV/3642), 23.07.43.
8. HS6/737, NO to D/CE, copy to D/CE.SS.1 (NO/HO/10), 24.07.43.
9. HS6/737, Senter to , Broadway (JS/KV/3699), 28.07.43.
10. HS6/746, ‘Crossed Lines in Holland’, 06.08.43.
11. HS6/737, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/42), 15.08.43.
12. HS6/737, A/CD to VCSS Copies to AD/P, N (ACD/81/3830), 18.08.43.
13. HS6/737, A/CD to D/R, V, Copy to N (ACD/81/3862), 23.08.43.
Notes 235
14. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, p. 174, citing V/CD to AD/E, Copies to CD
and A/CD, TSC in Holland 21.
15. HS6/748, Senter to , Broadway (JS/17/1a/720), 08.12.43; HS6/737, AD/P
to D/R (Copy to ACD), 09.12.43, covering ‘Insecurity of Dutch Secret Organ-
isations: S.I.S./S.O.E Enquiries, 1943’; HS6/735, D/CE.G to AD/P, ‘Dutch
Investigation Report Appendix IV: Exchange of Information between S.O.E.
& S.I.S.’, December 1943.
16. HS6/737, Boyle to (other papers indicate that Cordeaux was the recip-
ient) (ARB/81/3951), 06.09.43.
17. HS6/737, Cordeaux to Boyle, 10.09.43.
18. HS6/746, AD/P to N, Copy to D/CE.G.A (ADP/352), 11.10.43.
19. HS6/746, Cordeaux to Boyle, 05.10.43.
20. HS6/746, D/CE.GA to AD/P (DCEGA/KV/762), 14.10.43.
21. HS6/737, AD/P to D/CE.SS (ADP/6/426), 18.10.43.
22. HS6/737, AD/P to D/R (Copy to ACD), 09.12.43, covering ‘Insecurity of
Dutch Secret Organisations: S.I.S./S.O.E Enquiries, 1943’; HS6/735, D/CE.G
to AD/P, ‘Dutch Investigation Report Appendix IV: Exchange of Information
between S.O.E. & S.I.S.’, December 1943.
23. HS6/748, AD/P to A/CD, Copy to V/CD, AD/E. (ADP/6/631), 26.11.43.;
Philip H.J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying, pp. 102, 156.
24. KV4/120, R.D. Gibbs, 07.08.42.
25. HS6/735 and HS6/737, AD/P to D/CE.G, Copies to: V/CD, A/CD, AD/E
(ADP/24/0/643), 29.11.43.
26. HS6/748, D/CE.G to AD/P (DCEG/KV/872), 15.12.43.
27. HS6/748, AD/P to BSS/G through BSS (ADP/17/1a/811), 16.12.43.
28. HS6/737 and HS6/748, AD/P to D/R (ADP/17/1a/819), 18.12.43.
29. HS6/737, A/CD to A.C.S.S. Copy to DD/SP, 18.12.43; HS6/748, A/CD to
V.C.S.S. Copy to DD/SP, 20.12.43.
30. HS6/749, V.C.S.S. to A/CD, 25.12.43.
31. Boyle included detailed references to the paper-chase that led him to this
conclusion: ‘I understood that you were in agreement with these arrange-
ments. I had correspondence with Cowgill (my letter to him of the 14th
July last) and (my letter to him of the 24th July last) and a letter from
Cowgill of 5th August last suggesting an amendment to cover a point raised
by you about your seeing names submitted. In that letter, Cowgill says
“the agreement of all in S.I.S. has now been obtained”: that was subject
to the outstanding point you had raised, which he covered and which we
accepted’. (HS6/749, A/CD to V.C.S.S. (ACD/81/4460), 28.12.43.)
32. HS6/749, V.C.S.S. to A/CD, 31.12.43.
33. HS6/748, AD/P to BSS.G through BSS (ADP/17/1a/900), 30.12.43.
34. HS6/735, BSS/G to AD/P (BSSG/KV/963), 11.01.44.
35. HS6/735, AD/P to D/R Copies to A/CD and BSS/G (ADP/4/3/1048), 14.01.44.
36. KV4/191, Liddell Diary, 22.02.43.
37. KV6/34, Wethered (B.1.B) to Baxter (B.1.D), 16.07.43.
38. KV4/192, Liddell Diary, 13.12.43.
39. HS6/735, N to D/RP, 25.01.44. Also see N to D/RP, 25.01.44; A/DP to D/R,
28.01.44; A/DP to DR, 29.01.44.
40. HS6/745, BSS/GC to D/R/LC (BSSGC/KV/1182), 23.03.44.
41. HS6/745, AD/E to D/R.LC (Copy to BSS/GC), 31.03.44.
236 Notes
42. HS6/737, Telegram From Berne, Personal to A.D.E. from J.O., 22.11.43.
43. HS6/748, AD/P to A/CD, Copy to V/CD, AD/E (ADP/6/631), 26.11.43. Also
see HS6/738, ‘The Question Bingham’; N to AD/P, 10.02.44; N to AD/E,
18.02.44; AD/P to A/CD (ADP/4/3/1237), 21.02.44.
44. HS6/738, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/4/3/1237), 21.02.44.
45. HS6/738, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/4/3/1249), 22.02.44.
46. HS6/738, A/CD to AD/E Copy to AD/P (ACD/81a/4799), 23.02.44.
48. HS6/735, ‘Notes on the Interrogation Reports of “Chive” and “Sprout” ’,
D/CE.1 (undated).
49. KV6/34, ‘Chive/Sprout’, 05.02.44.
50. HS6/735 and HS6/738, White to Senter (L.397/Holland/1(B.1.B)),
13.02.44.
51. HS6/735 and HS6/738, AD/P to V/CD through A/CD Copy to D/CE
(ADP/3/3/1225), 18.02.44.
52. HS6/735 and HS6/738, Senter to White (JS/4/3/1226), 18.02.44.
53. HS6/735, Senter to White (JS/4/3/1254), 22.02.44.
54. HS6/738 and HS6/735, BSS/A to DR/LC, Copy to L/SV (BSSA/KV/1089),
28.02.44.
55. HS6/738, BSS/A to D/CE Copy to L/SV (BSSA/KV/1087), 28.02.44.
56. HS6/738, BSS/A to L/SV (BSSA/KV/1176), 23.03.44.
57. KV6/35, Wethered, 30.03.44.
58. KV6/35, Wethered to Hale, 30.03.44.
59. HS6/738, HS6/736 and KV6/35, ‘Memorandum’, 03.04.44.
60. HS6/738, ‘Extracts from Fourth Interrogation of Chive’, 06.04.44.
61. HS6/738, , SIS to Warden, 09.04.44.
62. HS6/736 and HS6/738, AD/P to V/CD through A/CD (Copy to D/CE, DR/LC)
(ADP/4/3/1281), 13.04.44.
63. KV6/35, Minute 92, Hale to Wethered, 15.04.44.
64. KV6/35, Minute 97, Wethered to Milmo, 19.04.44.
65. KV6/35, Minute 101, Milmo to Wethered, 29.04.44.
66. HS6/736 and KV6/35, Roche to White, 10.05.44.
67. HS6/736, White to Roche (L.397/HOLLAND/1/B.1.B), 16.05.44.
68. HS6/736, D/CE to ADP (DCE/5350), 19.05.44.
69. KV6/35, Roy to Hale, 25.05.44.
70. HS6/736 and KV6/35, Wethered to Wells (L.397/HOLLAND/1(B.1.B)),
02.06.44.
71. KV6/35, Wethered to de Bruyne (L.397/Holland/L(B.1.B)GPW),
06.06.44.
72. KV6/35, Wethered to Senter (L.397/Holland/1(B.1.B.)GPW), 07.06.44.
73. KV6/35, Senter to Wethered (JS/4/3/1588), 07.06.44.
74. KV6/35, Wethered to Corin, 10.06.44.
75. KV6/35, Wethered to de Bruyne (L.397/Holland/1(B.1.B.)GPW), 15.06.44.
76. KV6/35, Bland to Liddell, 14.06.44.
77. KV6/35, Liddell to Bland (L.397/Holland/1/DB), 17.06.44.
78. KV6/35, Wethered to Hill (L.397/Holland/1/B.1.B/GPW), 16.06.44.
79. For this continued debate, see KV4/91, HS8/841, HS8/842 and
HS8/857.
Notes 237
8 Double cross and deception

1. Jos Wolters, Dossier Nordpol. Het Englandspiel onder do loep, p. 296.
2. Foot, SOE: An Outline History, pp. 156–7, 221, 235.
3. Harmer’s obituary in The Times, 9 March 1996, p. 23.
4. HS8/830, ‘Notes on a meeting held between M.I.5. and S.O.2. on Friday,
18th July, 1941 at 58 St James Street’.
5. KV4/171, Minute 78, B.1.A to DDGSS, 26.11.41.
7. KV4/70, ‘W’ Board, Meeting held in Room 229, War Office, 28th
March 1942.
8. KV6/10, ‘Periwig’, D.I. Wilson and J. Mair, 10.04.43.
10. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 85.
11. KV6/12, Harmer to Robertson, ‘Sealing Wax’, 25.08.42.
12. KV4/65, 77th Meeting of the Twenty Committee, 25.06.42.
13. KV6/12, Harmer to Robertson, ‘Sealing Wax’, 25.08.42.
14. Ibid.
15. KV6/12, B.1.a note, 01.10.42.
18. KV6/12, Foley to Robertson, 12.11.42.
20. KV6/12, Robertson to Senter (Copy to Foley) (B.1.A/GEN/TAR),
20.11.42.
22. KV6/12, Senter to Robertson (JS/KV/1895), 29.11.42.
23. KV6/12, Harmer to Robertson, ‘S.O.E. Blown Sets’, 07.04.43.
24. KV6/12, Harmer to Robertson, ‘Sea Urchin’, 11.04.43.
25. KV6/12, Robertson to Foley (L.397/France/3/B.1.A/CHH), 29.04.43;
Robertson to Foley (L.397/France/3/B.1.A/CHH), 01.05.43.
26. KV6/12, Miller to Harmer (CTM/KV/310), 12.04.43.
27. KV6/12, Miller to Harmer (CTM/KV/321), 16.04.43.
28. KV6/12, Harmer to Robertson, 29.04.43.
29. KV6/12, ‘Sea Urchin’, C.H. Harmer, 01.05.43.
31. KV6/12, Note scribbled on top of ‘Sea Urchin’, C.H. Harmer, 03.05.43.
32. KV6/12, Foley to Robertson, 03.05.43.
35. KV6/12, Wethered to Golding, 30.07.43.
C.P. Harvey, 28.11.42.
C.P. Harvey, 28.11.42.
40. KV6/10, ‘S.O.E. Agents’, C.P. Harvey, 17.12.42.
238 Notes

C.P. Harvey, 28.11.42.
42. KV6/10, Robertson to Senter (B.1.A/GEN/TAR), 02.12.42.
44. KV6/10, Draft: Robertson to Foley (B.1.A/GEN/CPH), 04.12.42.
45. KV6/10, Robertson to Foley (B.1.A/GEN/CPH), 04.12.42.
46. KV6/10, Senter to Robertson (JS/KV/1949), 07.12.42.
47. KV6/10, Robertson to Foley (B.1.A/GEN/TAR), 08.12.42.
48. KV6/10, Note by Robertson, 14.12.42.
49. KV6/10, ‘S.O.E. Agents’, C.P. Harvey, 17.12.42.
51. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 193.
52. HS2/152, Telegram from Stockholm, 04.08.42.
54. HS2/152, Message from Crow, 11.08.42.
55. HS2/152, Telegram to Stockholm, 11.08.42.
56. HS2/152, Senter to Robertson (JS/KV/4206), 18.08.42.
57. HS2/152, ‘Crow’, SN, 15.08.42.
58. HS2/152, Telegram to Stockholm, 15.08.42.
60. HS2/152, Senter to Robertson (JS/KV/4206), 18.08.42.
61. KV2/828, Harmer to Robertson, 23.08.42.
62. HS2/152, Robertson to Senter (B.1.A./GEN/TAR), 23.08.42.
63. KV2/828, ‘Report on the Crow wireless station’, 28.08.42, under Senter to
Harmer (JS/KV/1044), 30.08.42.
64. HS2/152, SN to D/CE (SN/1295), 06.09.42; Senter to , M.I.5
(JS/KV/1177), 08.09.42.
65. HS2/152, SN to D/CE, Copy for M.I.5 (SN/1351), 14.09.42.
66. KV2/828, ‘Crow’, J.H. Marriott, 18.09.42.
68. HS2/152, SN to D/CD(O) (SN/1382), 17.09.42.
69. HS2/152, Wilson to , MI5 (JSW/1784), 02.10.42.
70. HS2/152, SN to D/CE Copy to D/CD(O), MI5 through D/CE (SN/1854),
17.10.42.
71. HS2/152, D/CE to SN, Copy to D/CD(O) (DCD/KV/1618), citing Gubbins’
comment on SN/1854.
72. HS2/152, SN to D/CE (with copy for MI5), Copy to D/CD(O) (SN/1881),
28.10.42.
74. HS2/152, Wilson to , MI5, Copies to D/CD(O), D/CE (JSW/1924),
01.11.42.
75. HS2/152, Wilson to , MI5 (JSW/1990), 10.11.42; [ ] to Wilson,
12.11.42.
76. HS2/152, , MI5 to Wilson, 10.11.42.
77. Masterman noted that the bulk of deception work concerning Norway ‘fell
on MUTT and JEFF, who originated a threat in April, in August, and again
in October of 1943’ (Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 193).
79. HS2/153, MI5 to Wilson, 01.01.43.
Notes 239
80. HS2/153, SN to D/CE (SN/19), 05.01.43.

83. HS2/167, D/CE to SN (DCE/KV/2561), 15.02.43.
84. HS2/167, ‘Omlette’ [sic], 04.03.43.
85. HS2/167, Draft, 01.03.43.
86. HS2/167, ‘Omlette’ [sic], 04.03.43.
87. HS2/167, SN/A to SN, 07.03.43.
88. HS2/167, SN/O to SN, 09.03.43.
89. HS2/167, SN to D/CE (SN/556), 09.03.43.
90. KV2/829, Minute 55: ‘B.1.a. note on S.O.E. Deceptions – Plan Prudential’,
18.04.43.
91. KV4/192, Liddell Diary, 28.08.43.
92. CAB 154/30, Bevan to Robertson (L.C.S.(43) I/C.12), 09.09.43.
93. CAB 154/30, Robertson to Bevan (SF.51/32/24(5)/B.1.A./TAR), 12.09.43.
94. CAB 154/30, Bevan to Robertson (LCS (43) I/C.12), 16.09.43.
95. CAB 154/30, Robertson to Bevan (SF.51/32/24(5)/B.1.A/TAR), 17.09.43. The
minutes of the Twenty Committee meeting record that Robertson ‘gave a
brief outline of the agreement between the Controller, S.O.E. and M.I.5
in connection with the future use of S.O.E. blown sets’ (KV4/66, 140th
Meeting of the Twenty Committee, 16.09.43).
96. KV4/67, 153rd Meeting of the Twenty Committee, 16.12.43.
98. KV6/11, Marriott to A.D.B., 28.11.44.
99. KV6/11, Marriott to Bevan, 28.11.44.
100. KV6/11, Marriott to A.D.B., 30.11.44.
9 Unfinished business
1. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 12; Foot, SOE in France, p. 390.
3. Ibid., p. 14(2).
4. KV6/27, Warden to Wadeson (RHW/(II)6/477), 09.06.44.
5. KV6/27, Wethered to D.D.B., 12.06.44.
6. KV6/27, Wethered to Warden (L.397/France/16(B.1.B.)GPW), 15.06.44.
7. KV6/27 and KV4/208, White to Senter (L.397/FRANCE/16/DDB), 26.06.44.
8. KV6/27, ‘Report on Three French Blown Circuits’, G.P. Wethered, 25.06.44.
9. KV6/27 and KV4/208, Senter to White (JS/8/7/1693), 20.07.44.
10. KV6/27 and KV4/208, White to Senter (L.397/FRANCE/16/DDB), 22.07.44.
11. KV4/201, Robertson to Senter (S.F.51/32/Misc.11(ADB)), 08.08.44.
12. KV4/201, Senter to Robertson (JS/2/1/1812), 10.08.44.
13. KV4/201, Robertson to Senter (S.F.51/32/Misc.11(ADB)), 08.08.44.
14. HS9/1556/8, Papers in Warden’s Personnel File.
16. See HS6/439.
19. HS8/873, Senter to Hoyer Millar, 06.02.45.
240 Notes
20. HS8/857, AD/P to BSS/D (through D/CE.P) (ADP/10/7/2186), 07.10.44.

21. HS8/857, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/10/7/2241), 18.10.44.
22. Pierre Victor Arthur Jans was interrogated at Bayswater on 11 November
1944, his return to the UK from France following a period in German
custody. Johnstone informed Delaforce that while Jans was ‘not particu-
larly discreet either prior to his arrest or in the answers which he gave
during interrogation by the Germans’, it was felt likely that the informa-
tion he had provided was already known. (KV6/31, Johnstone to Delaforce
(RPS/10 674/B.1.B), 11.11.44.) The explanation Jans gave for his escape (‘the
approach of the Allies and the necessity in which the Germans found them-
selves of making arrangements hurriedly for evacuating the prison’) was also
considered satisfactory. (KV6/31, Interrogation, p. 7).
23. HS9/1274/3, Confidential Report, 31.03.45.
24. HS8/875 and HS8/839, ‘Lt Colonel Roche’s report on disposal work in Cairo
December, 1944 to March, 1945’, 24.03.45.
25. Ibid.
26. HS8/875, D/CE to D/H113 through D/HT (DCE/1732), 15.05.45.
27. HS8/875, D/H.113 to D/CE, 27.05.45; D/H.113 to London (Attention D/CE),
31.05.45.
28. HS8/873, Roche to Hoyer Millar (SD/250), 12.03.45.
29. HS9/1274/3, Benson to A/CD, 24.03.45.
30. HS6/742, Boyle to Vivian (ARB/4/7740), 13.06.45.
31. HS7/159, History of Dutch Section, March 1944.
32. HS6/740, BSS/A to AD/P, Copy to D/CE.P (BSSA/KV/2534), 27.01.45.
33. HS6/740, BSS/A to N (BSSA/KV/2591), 05.02.45.
34. HS6/740, Telegram to London, 30.03.45.
35. HS8/857, AD/P to A/CD, Copy to BSS/A (ADP/67/3280), 26.04.45.
36. KV4/171, Senter to Harker (JS/3304), 08.05.45.
40. HS8/873, AD/P to A/CD, Copies to G.I.1(b), SOM, GM through A/CD
(ADP/96/3115), 23.03.45.
41. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Senter, 27.04.45.
42. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Roche, 28.05.45.
43. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Roche, June 1945.
44. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Roche (I/312/PERS), 16.06.45.
45. Roche wrote to Hoyer Millar on 23 June, noting that Gubbins had ruled
that the records could not yet be handed over; there is no indication that
this had changed by the time of Hoyer Millar’s return to the UK. (HS8/873,
Roche to Hoyer Millar (TGR/3414), 23.06.45.)
46. KV2/961, L2 A.G. to War Room, 27.04.45.
47. KV2/961, War Room to 12th Army Group, 30.04.45.
48. KV2/961, Wilson to Doble, 01.05.45.
49. KV2/961, Wilson to Wells, 16.05.45.
50. KV2/961, Wells to Wilson (RAW/KV/3196), 17.05.45.
51. HS6/742 and KV2/961, Wells to Wilson (RAW/KV/3265), 05.06.45.
52. KV2/961, ‘Progress Report in the case of Hermann Giskes’, 05.06.45.
53. KV2/961 and HS6/750, Bingham to Delaforce, 18.06.45.
Notes 241
54. KV2/962, ‘Progress Report in the cases of Giskes and Huntemann’, 27.06.45.
55. KV2/962, ‘Report on the Investigation into the “Nordpol” Affair: Based on
the interrogations of Giskes and Huntmann’, Camp 020, July 1945.
56. HS6/750, Wilson to Delaforce, 26.07.45.
57. KV2/963, Extract from Camp 020 Monthly Summary, 01.08.45.
58. KV2/963, D/WR to W.R.C.4.A (Mr Wilson), 10.08.45.
59. KV2/963, Camp 020 to Wilson, 17.08.45.
60. KV2/963, W.R.C.4.A to Bird, 26.07.45.
61. KV2/963, W.R.C.4.A. to D/WR, 26.07.45.
62. KV2/963, Camp 020 to Wilson, 17.08.45.
63. HS6/772, AD/P to Lt Col Dobson (ADP/3529), 13.08.45.
64. Foot, SOE in France, pp. 115–16.
65. KV2/1132, Beddard to Stephens, 14.07.45.
66. KV2/1132, Roche to Wilson, 08.08.45.
67. KV2/1132, ‘Summary of Interrogation of Bleicher’, S/Ldr Beddard, 15.08.45.
68. HS8/880, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/3403), 18.06.45.
69. HS8/880, CD to Directors, Regional & Section Heads (CD/8101), 19.06.45.
70. HS8/880, AD/P to BSS/D (ADP/3404), 19.06.45.
71. HS8/881, CD to Directors, Regional & Section Heads (CD/8255), 11.08.45.
72. See for example HS8/880, D/CE to D/S, Copy AD/E (DCE/2044), 29.06.45;
HS8/881, D/CE to DR/JED Section (DCE/2055), 02.07.45; HS8/882, D/CE to
RF (DCE/4224), 29.08.45; D/CE to H (DCE/4482), 01.11.45.
74. Ibid., Reel 10.
75. Fyffe, quoted in David Stafford, Secret Agent: The True Story of the Special
Operations Executive, p. 231.
76. HS9/324/4, Fyffe to Atkins, Copy to Major Mott, 10.11.45.
78. HS9/324/4, Fyffe to Atkins, Copy to Major Mott, 10.11.45.
79. CAB 121/305, Gubbins to Hollis, 11.01.46.
80. See Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Unquiet in Death: The Post-War Survival of the
“Special Operations Executive”, 1945–51’, in A. Gorst, L. Jonman and
W.S. Lucas (eds.) Contemporary British History: Politics and the Limits of Policy
1931–61; and Philip H.J. Davies, ‘From Special Operations to Special Polit-
ical Action: The “Rump SOE” and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability
1945–1977’, Intelligence and National Security, 15(3) (Autumn 2000).
81. Park’s obituary, Daily Telegraph, 30.01.01; The Times, 22.02.01. Warden’s
obituary, Daily Telegraph, 02.08.90.
82. Duncan Stuart, ‘ “Of Historical Interest Only”: The Origins and Vicissitudes
of the SOE Archive’, Intelligence and National Security, 20(1) (March 2005),
p. 19.
83. HS8/882, Mott to Atkins (NGM/1785), 08.03.46.
85. HS8/882, Mott to Atkins (NGM/2174), 04.06.46. The inadequacies of the
accommodation provided were described more graphically by Leo Marks:
‘we were incarcerated in the noxious bowels of a sub-basement where it was
as difficult to breath as to think’ (Between Silk and Cyanide, p. 595).
242 Notes
87. See CAB 103/571.

88. FO 371/79558, Cyril T. Miller to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office,
29.09.49.
89. FO 371/79558, John Senter to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office,
23.09.49.
90. FO 371/79558, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, to John Senter,
22.09.49.
91. FO 371/79558, ‘Englandspiel: Record of Conversations between Messrs.
Senter and Miller and Dr. Donker’, 05.10.49.
92. KV2/1132, B.2.b, 14.02.47.
93. KV3/75, Note by B4, 10.12.51.
Postscript on Sources: SOE at The National Archives

1. FCO 77/90, ‘Historical Review of SOE Records’, B.A. Lea, September 1967.
2. Stuart, ‘ “Of Historical Interest Only”: The Origins and Vicissitudes of the
SOE Archive’.
3. David Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin (London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 26–7.
SOE Archive’, p. 20, 21, citing Minute of 22.12.49 in HS8/443 (Retained by
Department).
SOE Archive’, p. 22, citing Minutes from HS8/443 (Retained by Department).
7. FCO 12/75, ‘Memorandum on SOE Records’, 20.06.09.
SOE Archive’, p. 15, citing C.B. Townshend’s report of 17 December 1974,
held by SIS.
10. Advisory Council on Public Records: Review of Security Service Selection Criteria,
December 1998, p. 4 para. 11.
11. For a particularly persuasive example of ‘openness as spin’, see Gill Bennett,
‘Declassification and Release Policies of the UK’s Intelligence Agencies’, Intel-
ligence and National Security, 17(1) (Spring 2002).
12. Richard Thurlow, ‘The Charm Offensive: The “Coming Out” of MI5’, Intel-
ligence and National Security, 15(1) (Spring 2000), p. 184.
13. Stephen Lander, ‘British Intelligence in the Twentieth Century’, Intelligence
and National Security, 17(1) (Spring 2002), pp. 8–9.
14. Correspondence with Security Service Departmental Records Officer, July–
August 2004.
15. With its focus on the SOE archive, this note does not cover other sources of
information available on SOE, the most significant of which is the Imperial
War Museum Sound Archive, which has an extensive collection of oral
history interviews with members of SOE. By 1998, when a catalogue of
the interviews was published, the Sound Archive held some 500 hours of
interviews with over 200 members of SOE.
Bibliography
Unpublished sources
The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), Kew Gardens, Surrey.
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HS8 (Headquarters Records); HS9 (Personnel Files).
Records of the Security Service (MI5)

KV2 (Personal [PF Series] Files); KV3 (Subject [SF Series] Files); KV4 (Policy
[Pol F Series] Files); KV6 (List [L Series] Files).
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243
244 Bibliography
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Index
Aarens, Maurice (‘Intersection’), 180–1 Bleicher, Hugo, 120, 206–7

Absine, Jean Denis, 92 Blizard, Charles, 9
Alexander, L/Cpl, 31 Bloch, Denise, 105–6, 111
Allen, Brigadier, 80 Bloom, Marcus (‘Bishop’), 105–6,
‘Alphonse’, see Brooks, Tony 110–12
(‘Alphonse’) Blunt, Anthony, 74–5, 88–9, 91
Amboise (‘Pot A’), 176–7 Bourland, Clement, see Armanet,
Amies, Hardy, 8, 42, 43 Clement (a.k.a. Clement
‘Anchor’, see Gulbrandsen, Tor Bourland)
(‘Anchor’, ‘Omelette’) Bourne, K.M., 71
Armanet, Clement (a.k.a. Clement Bouwman, see Baatsen, Arnoldus
Bourland), 46–9 Albert (alias Bouwman)
Boyle, Air Commodore Archibald
Baatsen, Arnoldus Albert (alias Robert (‘Archie’), 1, 3–4, 14, 16, 17,
Bouwman), 8–10 20–3, 24, 40, 49, 50, 74, 77, 79, 80,
‘Badger’, see Holvoet, Raymond 118–19, 122, 126, 129, 133–6, 137,
Andre (‘Badger’) 140, 146, 151, 152, 155–7, 158,
Baird, Captain Arthur Maldwyn, 4, 160, 170, 171, 201, 210
57, 58, 62, 78, 203 Breakwell, Captain E.R.W., 2
Bateson, Mrs, 85–7 Britain and the European Resistance, 216
Baxter, Major, 158 Brook, Robin, 43, 158, 178, 179, 183
Bayswater (Special Security Section), Brooks, Tony (‘Alphonse’), 105
xi, 15–17, 18, 60, 62, 63, 83, Brown, Captain Glanville, 33, 36, 39
112, 116–17, 195, 198, 208 Brown, Major Gavin, 34
Beaumont, L/Cpl, 31, 36–7 ‘Brutus’, see Walenty, Armand
Beddard, S/Ldr, 207 (‘Brutus’)
Beevor, J.G., 64–5, 66 Buckmaster, Maurice, 85, 86, 105,
Bernhard, Prince, 168 121, 123, 124, 126–8, 130
Bertoli, Charles, 25, 27–8, 30, Bureau Central de Renseignements
32–3, 35–6, 49 et d’Action (BCRA), 91–2
Beukema toe Water, K.W.A. (‘Bill’), 149 Burt, Supt L., 90
Bevan, John, 170, 177, 179, 192,
193, 194 Calthrop, Lt Col Edward, 2, 3, 5–6, 74
‘Bill’, see Beukema toe Water, K.W.A. Camp 020, 103, 166, 204–5, 206, 207
(‘Bill’) Canardelles, M. and Mme, 115–17
Bingham, Seymour, 149, 152, 159, Cartwright, A.C., 49
160, 165 ‘Catalpha’, see Rabinovitch, Adolph
Birktoft, 88 (‘Catalpha’)
‘Bishop’, see Bloom, Marcus (‘Bishop’) Catherine, Oscar (‘Manfriday’), 180–1
Blacka, L/Cpl, 38 ‘Chive’, see Ubbink, John Bernard
Blake, Captain, 41 (‘Chive’)
Bland, Neville, 168 Cholmondeley, Charles, 175
248
Index 249
Clarke, Colonel Dudley, 178 Gillson, Godfrey A., 51–6, 61, 69

Collingwood, J.H.F., 180 Giskes, Hermann, 203–5
Cooler, see Inverlair ‘Glenalmond Treaty’, 133, 142, 146,
The Cooler, 25 152, 154, 156, 157
Cooper, Duff, 118–19 Glover, Gerald, 84, 85, 87
Cordeaux, Colonel, 152, 153 Goldsmith, John Gilbert, 84
Cowgill, Felix, 133, 138, 143, Goldsmith, Mrs, 84–5
147, 150 ‘Griffin’, see Gauthier, Walther
Crockatt, Colonel N.B., 14 (a.k.a. Alphonse Jean Louis
‘Crow’, see Jacobsen, Ernest Kirkby Gerard; ‘Griffin’)
(‘Crow’) Gubbins, Major-General Colin, 9, 18,
Cruickshank, Charles, 70 34, 56, 122, 126, 185, 186, 208
Curry, J.C., 81, 99, 133, 136, 137–8, Guild, J.R.E., 69–70
140, 147 Gulbrandsen, Tor (‘Anchor’,
‘Omelette’), 97–8, 102, 186,
Dalton, Hugh, 26 188–92
Dansey, Claude, 151–2, 154, 155–7
Darby, Samuel Leonard, 12
Hale, J.L.S., 163, 165, 167
de Bruyne, Colonel, 148, 167
Hale, Lionel, 170
de Koning, Willem, 33
Hambro, Sir Charles, 10, 17, 18, 56
Delaforce, Major, 206, 207
Hampton, Major Charles S., 11
Dericourt, Henri (‘Gilbert’), 97,
Hanbury-Williams, John, 17
120–30, 206–7, 213
Harker, O.A. (‘Jasper’), xii, 74, 76, 77,
Dobson, Ivor, 183, 200–1
78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 89, 159, 171
Donaldson, Lt, 58, 59
Harmer, Christopher H., 97, 99,
The Double-Cross System, 1, 172, 175
100–1, 105, 171, 173–4, 177,
Dourlein, Pieter (‘Sprout’), 126, 148,
178–9, 180, 185, 192
154, 157–69, 213
Harvey, C.P., 14, 144–5, 149, 171,
Dove, Mrs Howard, 117
181, 183
Dutch Parliamentary Commission,
14, 212–13 Hellier, Lt (‘Sea Urchin Minor’), 177
‘Hilaire’, see Starr, George (‘Hilaire’)
Hill, C.P., 169
Eden, Anthony, 50
Hinchley-Cooke, Lt Col, 77, 78
Eliot, Lady Alethea, 87
Hinsley, F.H., 150
Englandspiel, see Nordpol
‘Eugene’, see Pertschuck, Maurice Holdsworth, Gerald, 57, 62, 64–5
(‘Eugene’) Holland, Cpl, 36
Hollingworth, R.C., 89
Holvoet, Raymond Andre (‘Badger’),
Foley, Major, 174–6, 177, 179–80, 193
42–4
Foot, M.R.D., 2, 170, 180, 206
Frager, Jaques Henri (‘Louba’), 120–1, Hoyer Millar, Lt Col, 61, 63–8, 198,
124, 206 202–3
Fyffe, Albert Adamson (Aonghais), x, Huntemann, Gerhardt, 203–5
2, 11–12, 33–7, 38–40, 44, 209–10 Hutchinson, James, 174, 178
Gauthier, Walther (a.k.a. Alphonse Intelligence Bureau (IB), 71

Jean Louis Gerard; ‘Griffin’), 42–3 Interment, 164, 167
‘Gilbert’, see Dericourt, Henri ‘Intersection’, see Aarens, Maurice
(‘Gilbert’) (‘Intersection’)
250 Index
Inverlair, x, 9, 10, 25, 33–40, 44–5, Markstein, George, 25

49, 164 Marriott, J.H., 80, 185, 193–4
‘ISOS’, 81, 132, 133, 134, 138, 142 Martin, Juan (Nicolas Del Rio), 29
Masterman, J.C., 1, 79, 80, 172,
Jacobsen, Ernest Kirkby (‘Crow’), 98, 175, 184
184–8, 189 Mendes, Cpl, 38
Johns, P.L., 159, 161 Menzies, Sir Stewart (‘C’), 20, 133,
Johnstone, Major Mark, 197 138, 151
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), MI5 (Security Service), xi, 14–15, 16,
20, 125, 127, 158 51, 58, 71, 86, 87, 88, 93, 96–7,
115, 132, 148, 155, 158, 164, 171,
Keble, Brigadier C.M., 52 186, 195, 205, 207, 213
Kenya Scheme, 52–3, 54, 199 B Division, 74, 132, 133, 137, 138,
Keswick, David, 178 140, 141, 142, 147; B1(a), 14,
Kieffer, Stubaf., 206–7 83, 171, 172; B1(b), 103; B1(d),
Klugman, James, 61 158; B1(l), 92, 94; B5, 90; B6, 89
Knight, Barry, 17, 115–19 Camp 020, 103, 166, 204–5, 206, 207
Knight, Claude, 93, 183 London Reception Centre (LRC),
Knight, Maxwell, 92, 118, 119–20 16, 101, 112, 122; Information
Index, 110, 195–6
Laiseca, Private, 40–1 Regional Security Liaison Officers
Lakin, Major General John Henry (RSLO), 84
Foster, 3, 9, 10, 34, 76, 77, 78, SIME, 52, 54, 71
80, 82, 83, 84, 96, 171 Miller, Flying Officer Cyril Thomas
Lander, Sir Stephen, 216 Gibson Risch, 14, 15, 16, 92, 100–1,
Le Chene, Marie Therese, 85–8 103, 113, 121–2, 154–5, 157–8,
Le Tac, Joel (‘Overcloud’), 173–6 176, 177–8, 183, 201, 212–13
Lee, Peter, xi, 3, 4, 5–9, 16, 41, 46, Milmo, H.P., 99, 103, 165
56, 57–9, 62–3, 64, 67–8, 202–3 Mockler-Ferryman, Brigadier, 19, 20,
Lemaire, Mlle, 92 22, 110, 123, 125, 126, 129–30,
Leslie, Pilot Officer the Hon John, 11 150, 159, 160
Liddell, Guy, 20, 77, 79, 80, 81, 90, Montagu, Ewen, 175
104, 118–19, 124, 126, 129, 133, Morel, Captain, 106
134–6, 137, 138, 139, 140, 158–9, Mott, Captain Norman, 4–5, 12–13,
168–9, 171, 192 210–11, 214
London Controlling Section (LCS), Moylan, Sir John, 167, 168
170, 192 Munn, J.W., 31, 79–80
London Reception Centre (LRC), 16, Muntane, Jose, 29
101, 112, 122 Munthe, Malcolm, 184, 185, 190
‘Louba’, see Frager, Jacques Henri
(‘Louba’) Nelson, Sir Frank, 1, 32, 33, 76, 171
‘Noah’, 193–4
McGoohan, Patrick, 25 Nordpol, 14, 148, 200, 203–6, 212–13
Mackenzie, W.J.M., xi ‘Number 50’, see Armanet, Clement
Madras Scheme, 72 (a.k.a. Clement Bourland)
‘Manfriday’, see Catherine, Oscar ‘Number 59’, see Holvoet, Raymond
(‘Manfriday’) Andre (‘Badger’)
Marissal, Col, 42–4 Nygaard, Fenrik Herluf, 99–101, 103,
Marks, Leo, xi, 2–3, 149 106–9, 130–1
Index 251
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 72, Roche, Lt Col the Hon Thomas
83, 206 Gabriel, 10, 18, 20, 42, 43, 49,
‘Omelette’, see Gulbrandsen, Tor 52–3, 64, 66–7, 68, 91, 165, 166,
(‘Anchor’, ‘Omelette’) 167, 198–200, 201, 203, 205–7,
Operation Animals, 170 208, 210
Operation Knacker, 123 ‘Romeo’, 31
Operation Torch, 170 Rosa, Leonida Guiseppe, 25, 27, 28,
Oratory School, 26 30–1, 32–3, 35–7, 49
Orde Dienst (OD), 148, 149, 152–3 Rothschild, Lord, 74, 77–8
O’Reilly, John Dermot (‘Jack’), 2–3, 4, Roy, Ian, 167
49, 92, 93 ‘Rud W’, 177
Oughton, Major J.M., 60–1
‘Overcloud’, see Le Tac, Joel Scammaroni (a.k.a. Captain Sarment,
(‘Overcloud’) ‘Sea Urchin Major’), 176–7
Schools, Jan Baptiste, 92–5
Palace Internment Camp, 26, 28 Schools, Mrs (‘Peggy’), 93–5
Park, Hugh Eames, 18, 46, 78, 84, 85, Scurr, Chief Inspector John, 93
92–5, 114–15, 160, ‘Sea Urchin Major’, see Scammaroni
201, 208, 210 (a.k.a. Captain Sarment, ‘Sea
Pertschuck, Maurice (‘Eugene’), 105 Urchin Major’)
Petrie, Sir David, 3, 10, 76, 77, 80, 81, ‘Sea Urchin Minor’, see Hellier, Lt
83, 96, 103, 104, 137, 138, 171, 197 (‘Sea Urchin Minor’)
Pickering, L/Cpl, 36 ‘Sealing Wax’, see Le Tac, Joel
Picquet-Wicks, Eric, 174, 180 (‘Overcloud’)
Pidcock, Captain, 163 Searle, L/Cpl, 26–7
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), 20,
Pilditch, Sir Denys, 71
39, 77, 83, 96, 99, 113, 121, 122,
Plan Iago, 175, 182
127–8, 129, 132, 136, 138, 148,
Plan Prudential, 191–2
149, 150, 153, 154, 210, 211
Political Intelligence Department
ISLD, 52, 72
(PID), 181
Section V, 16, 63, 121, 132–3, 134,
‘Pot A’, see Amboise (‘Pot A’)
137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144,
The Prisoner, 25
145, 146, 147, 150, 152–4, 155,
Purisiol, Rinaldo, 25, 26–7, 28–9, 30,
197, 202–3, 205
32–3, 36–8, 44–6, 49
Security Intelligence Panel (SIP),
Pyle, Squadron Leader, 77
62–8, 202
Selborne, Lord, 17, 118–19
Rabinovitch, Adolph (‘Catalpha’), Senter, John Watt, xii, 3, 4, 9, 10, 14,
105, 110 16, 18–19, 20, 21, 43, 59–62, 63,
Ranfurly, Countess of, 50–1 65–6, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79–80,
Ray, Lt, 90 82, 84, 88, 90, 101–3, 104, 105,
Raymondi, 177 108–10, 111–15, 119, 122–4,
Rees, Sgt, 31 125, 127, 129, 135, 136, 142, 143,
Reirsen, Olaf, 101 144–7, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153,
Robertson, A.H., 94 154–5, 157–8, 159, 160, 161–2,
Robertson, T.A. (‘Tar’), 74, 79–81, 82, 164–5, 167, 171, 172, 181–2, 183,
101, 102, 103, 105, 112–13, 139, 184, 185, 188, 191, 193, 196–7,
171, 175–7, 178, 179, 180, 182–4, 198, 201, 210, 212–13
185, 188, 192–3, 205 Seymour, Charles H., 149, 150–1
252 Index
Six, P.J., 148 (Thame Park), 34, 41, 90; STS 62

SOE in France, 105, 211 (Anderson Manor), 16
SOE in the Far East, 70 Stockholm Mission, 184, 186
SOE in the Low Countries, 150 Training Section, 29, 79
Sorli, Oivind, 101 Special Operations Mediterranean
Soskice, Frank, 201 (SO(M)), 60, 64, 202
Special Force Detachments, 195 Special Security Panel (SSP), 20–3
Special Operations Executive (SOE) Special Security Section, see Bayswater
Bayswater (Special Security Section), (Special Security Section)
xi, 15–17, 18, 60, 62, 63, 83, Sporborg, H.N., 128–30, 151,
112, 116–17, 195, 198, 208 161, 164
Belgian Section, 8, 42–4, 93–4, 181 ‘Sprout’, see Dourlein, Pieter
Cairo Mission, 50–6, 61, 198–200, (‘Sprout’)
201; Advance Force 133, 57, 61; Stafford, David, 214, 216
SOELIQ, 198; Yugoslav Starr, George (‘Hilaire’), 106
Section, 61 Starup, Carl Immanuel, 89, 90
Danish Section, 89–90, 193–4 Stassen, Mary, 84–5
Dutch Section, 8–10, 33, 149, Stawell, Major General W.A.M.,
150–1, 157, 200 59–60, 61, 62–3
Free French Section, 46, 91–2, 173, Stewart, Sir Findlater, 21–2, 23
178–9 Stringer, Mrs, 87
French Section, 17, 84–8, 110, 111, Stuart, Duncan, 214
115–20, 121, 123–4, 125–6, Sweet-Escott, Bickham, 51, 52
130, 178
India Mission (Force 136), 68, 201; Thomas, C.S.M., 6
Chinese Intelligence The Three Vikings, 88–9
Section (CIS), 71 Townshend, Bernard, 215
Italian Section, 44, 46 ‘Trumpet’, 157
Liquidation Section, 211 Turnbull, Lt, 6, 46–7
‘Maryland’ (No.1 Special Force), Twenty Committee, xii, 170, 172, 185,
57–9, 61, 62, 67–8 188, 192, 193
‘Massingham’, 56, 59, 60, 179
Norwegian Section, 10, 11, 100–1,
Ubbink, John Bernard (‘Chive’), 126,
130, 136, 184
148, 154, 157–69, 213
Spanish Section, 26, 29, 34, 40–1
‘Ultra’, 132, 133, 134, 138, 142
Special Operations Mediterranean
(SO(M)), 60, 64, 202; Security
Intelligence Panel (SIP), 62–8, 202 Van Bilsen, F.K.J., 163
Special Security Panel (SSP), 20–3 van Maurik, Ernest, 209
Special Training Schools (STS), 6, 22; Vass, Simon, 35
Beaulieu (General), 31, 41, 79, 80, Venner, John Franklyn, 23, 209
82, 83; STS 2 (Bellasis), 27, 28, 31; Vivian, Valentine, 74, 132, 134, 135,
STS 21 (Arisaig House), 11, 29, 33; 137, 139, 140, 147, 153, 154,
STS 23 (Meoble Lodge), 28–9, 30; 155, 159
STS 25 (Garramor House), 11, 30;
STS 26 (Aviemore), 11, 38–9; STS Walenty, Armand (‘Brutus’), 98–9
31 (The Rings, Beaulieu), 27; STS Warden, Major Richard Henry
42 (Inchmery), 41; STS 45 Atkinson (‘Dick’), 16, 17, 18, 42,
(Hatherop Castle), 90; STS 52 78, 103, 106, 108, 113, 121, 123,
Index 253
131, 136, 153, 163, 176, 178, 179, White, Dick, 75–6, 80, 81, 82–3,
180, 195–6, 197–8, 202, 210 84, 88, 91, 101–4, 110, 112–13,
Wavell, General, 50–1 115, 118, 133, 138, 140, 142,
Wells, Captain R.A. (‘Tom’), 150–1, 143–4, 146, 147, 161, 162, 163,
162, 163, 200–1, 203–4, 209 164, 166, 172, 196
West, Nigel, 206 Wilson, D.I., 203, 204, 205
Wethered, Geoffrey Peter, 89–92, 97, Wilson, J.S., 100–1, 106–9,
104–6, 110–14, 115–19, 121, 122, 130–1, 184, 185, 186–8,
124–5, 127, 131, 139, 140–2, 143, 190, 191
144–6, 147, 158, 160–1, 165, 167, Woolrych, S.H.C., 31, 80,
168–9, 178, 180, 196–7, 217 81–2
Wheeler, Mark, x Wyke, John Edward, 214
Whetmore, Edwin Charles, 2, 3–4, 5,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34–5, 40, 41,
44, 75, 77, 78 Yeo-Thomas, Forest (‘Tommy’), 91, 121

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Security and Special

1 The Origins and Development of SOE’s Security Section 1

2 Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’ 25

4 Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 74

5 Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 96

6 Approaching Section V 132

7 Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 148

8 Double Cross and Deception 170

9 Unfinished Business 195

Postscript on Sources: SOE at The National Archives 214

remarkable thing that a request to show or make out a pass is, to

The Security Section found itself subject to unfavourable comparisons

variety of security-related issues, mirroring the ‘physical’ and ‘esoteric’

The Security Section of the Special Operations Executive, known by

around as a trap for indolent young watchpuppies like me!’12 O’Reilly

organisation even though we may have suspicions that the subject

recalls that he ‘did the most marvellous imitations of Donald Duck.

Eventually, on June 1st, I arrived at SOE and I was briefed. I was

Field Security non-commissioned officers constituted a vital part of

Field Security NCOs paid particular attention to the attitudes of

If you’ve got a garage mechanic who’s an absolutely brilliant radio

The best known instance was that of a recruit who privately

Lee describes the work of Field Security as ‘almost a sort of branch

while the reports on trainees were felt to have fulfilled a valuable

The importance attached to the judicious selection of agents was at

It is felt that, although Bouwman is admittedly boastful and apt

Operational considerations weighed heavier than security concerns, and

As a result of Senter’s promotion, Lt Col the Hon Thomas Gabriel Roche

in Chapter 2), Major Albert Adamson (‘Aonghais’) Fyffe was responsible

I used to leave Inverlair each Monday morning about three o’clock to

Fyffe continued to maintain this schedule until February 1944, at which

It really is a remarkable thing that a request to show or make out a

Judging by the impatience of most sections when confronted with

Similarly, any hope of providing a course of instruction for new secret-

S.O.E. would retain its freedom of action only if it satisfied and

In response to the growing question of operational security, Flying

The extent of the potential penetration problem facing SOE in Belgium

At an early stage it appeared to me that the blown Belgian trans-

escaped from Belgium in recent months may be presumed at some

The report sent a shockwave around MI5.62 As the Security History

D/CE is now able to cover the interrogation of agents who return

The realisation that a significant number of SOE’s agents in Belgium had

There can be little doubt that these security interrogations were of

In view of our agreements with other Services, and in order to retain

It was found necessary to tighten the procedure further in August,

Lord Selborne, to take his place, becoming Chairman of SOE’s

operational ‘London Group’, Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, noting that

Roche wrote to an overseas security officer on 29 June, explaining the

Council Meeting: ‘namely, how important it is in my opinion that we

without spreading word of such action to the right people – a vital

The success of the pre-D day Security Panel was noteworthy.

Security’s role as ‘operational protector’ of SOE became increasingly

operational security that had occupied the Section up to this point,

The Security Section found itself responsible for SOE’s recruiting

intended for the housing and employment of alien personnel who,

Charting the origins of Inverlair is to throw light on the perhaps inev-

following an unsuccessful attempt to recruit Italians for subversive

This man appears to be an international adventurer who fought as a

A second interview was arranged, and Purisiol was taken on by SOE.6 He

pointed out that he ‘apologises afterwards’. Searle remained a supporter

Struck me as a solid, reliable fellow. Courage in abundance and a

The five men began their preliminary training by mid-March. A report

his life, where he worked as a waiter. He had fought as a member of