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Notice to Citizens
United States in default... it's the Law!
Public Judicial Notice, Public Judicial Notice #2, and

Public Judicial Notice #3 were published in this public forum
upon this WebSite for twenty (20) consecutive days. Each has
also been published in accordance with law in Veritas National Money Making and
Asset Protection
Newspaper, The Round Valley Paper, and many other
publications throughout the United States of America. The law
requires they be published for only 3 consecutive days or issues
in the media in which they are printed. The United States
including but not limited to the Department of the Treasury, and
Internal Revenue Service has defaulted failing to rebut any
allegations of fact in any of these Public Judicial Notices within
the twenty days allotted. According to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and attending State rules, "He who remains silent
consents." In accordance with State and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure the allegations of fact in each of these Public Judicial
Notices are now PRESUMED FACT. All Citizens may now act in
accordance with these FACTS.
Proof of service is registered on the WebSite server and in the captured files of the
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Statistics for the WebSite program which has registered the download of this entire
WebSite by United States government computers including, but not limited to, The
White House, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
United States Postal Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco and Firearms, the Pentagon, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), United States Military installations across the nation, and EVERY United
States National Laboratory including, but not limited to, Lawrence Livermore, Los
Alamos, Berkeley, and etc.
The most important texts you will ever read in your life. They can set you free.
Public Judicial Notice
Public Judicial Notice #2

These public notices will be construed to comply with provisions necessary to establish presumed
fact (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and attending State rules) should interested parties fail to
rebut any given allegation or matter of law addressed therein. The position will be construed as
adequate to meet requirements of judicial notice, thus preserving fundamental law. Matters
addressed therein, if not rebutted, will be construed to have general application. A true and
correct copy of each of these Public Notices is on file with and available for inspection at the
office of VERITAS national newspaper. These public notices address federal jurisdiction, federal
authority, jurisdiction and authority of federal agents, the Constitutionality and lawful character
of the income tax and the Internal Revenue Service, and other agencies of the United States
government including but not limited to the Department of the Treasury, and legal application of
the Internal Revenue Code.
All the feds have to do to prove us wrong is to successfully rebut

each and every item of these Public Judicial Notices. They will
not because they cannot. We would never have refused to file
and would never have challenged their jurisdiction and authority
unless we were absolutely firm in the belief that we are RIGHT
in the law. Every day that passes without a satisfactory rebuttal
is a condemnation of the federal government. Help us put the
dragon back in its cage. Can YOU tell us the law that makes YOU
liable to file an income tax return? Can YOU define "gross
income" in the law? Can YOU produce the "delegation of
authority" that gives the IRS, or its agents, or its Criminal
Investigation Division the power to investigate, audit, examine
records, levy, seize, subpoena, arrest, and/or prosecute? Can
YOU define the exact nature of the so-called income tax? If not,
and YOU are filing and paying, then YOU are a coward, paying
tribute to YOUR masters in a system ruled by fear and
intimidation... it is called EXTORTION in the law... it is the work
of criminals. Wake up America you've been had.

They Have NO Evidence!

We Are NOT Liable!
IRS - NO Authority - NO Jurisdiction
Internal Revenue Service
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WE WILL PAY YOU
IF YOU CAN PROVE THE

FOLLOWING FACTS TO BE
FALSE
We have conclusive proof that the following FACTS are
correct. That is why we can say - American citizens and
permanent resident aliens, living and working within the States
of the Union ARE NOT SUBJECT to the filing of an IRS Form
1040 and ARE NOT LIABLE for the payment of a tax on
"income"!!! If this sounds odd to you, read on.
For YEARS, the Internal Revenue Service has RULED the

American people in a manner equal only to the Soviet KGB.
FEAR and BLUFF and deception have been the IRS's major
weapons. Americans have been led to believe that they "owe" an
income tax on their earnings; that it is their "patriotic duty" to
pay it, and there is no alternative to the IRS's abuse. Nothing
could be further from the truth! Samuel Adams, the Father of the
American Revolution cultivated and nurtured the theory of the
English philosopher John Locke, that mankind needed no
godlike mortal rulers to care for his every need. Locke and
Adams believed that the common man was perfectly capable of
ruling himself, was entitled to his property, and that property
could only be taxed by government to pay for the legitimate cost
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of government functions - the protection of life and property.

Sam contended: If men, through fear, fraud, or mistake should in
terms renounce or give up any natural right, the eternal law of
reason and the grand end of society would absolutely vacate such
renunciation. The right to freedom being the gift of Almighty
God, it is not in the power of man to alienate this gift and
voluntarily become a slave. FEAR can only prevail when victims
are ignorant of the FACTS. The Bible teaches that God's people
perish for lack of knowledge.
THEREFORE CONSIDER THE

FOLLOWING FACTS:
FACT # 1: Our Founding Fathers created a constitutional
REPUBLIC as our form of government. The Constitution gives
the federal/national government limited powers. ALL powers not
delegated to the United States are reserved to the States
respectively or to the People. The Union was created to be the
servant of the people! The United States Constitution is the
SUPREME LAW of the land. (Article VI, Clause 2.)
FACT #2: The Constitution gives the Congress the power to

lay and collect taxes to pay the debts of the government. Provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United States
subject to the following rules pertaining only to the two classes
of taxation permitted.
1. DIRECT TAXES, which are subject to the rule of

apportionment among the states of the Union.
2. INDIRECT TAXES -- imposts, duties and excises, subject to

the rule of uniformity.

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FACT #3: The government does not allow either one of the
two classifications to tax CITIZENS or PERMANENT
RESIDENT ALIENS of the United States of America,
DIRECTLY. The intent of the Founders was to keep the
government the servant and to prevent it from becoming the
master. (See Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution.)
FACT #4: The CENSUS is taken every ten (10) years to

determine the number of representatives to be allotted to each
State and the amount of a direct tax that may be apportioned to
each State. This is determined by the percentage its number of
representatives bears to the total membership in the House of
Representatives. (Article 1, section 2, clause 3; Article 1, section
9, clause 4.)
FACT #5: It was established in the Constitutional

Convention of 1787 that the supreme Court of the United States
would have the power of "judicial review". Which is the power
to declare laws passed by the U.S. Congress to be null and void
if such a law or laws was/were in violation of the Constitution.
This was to be determined from the original intent as found in
Madison's Notes recorded during the Convention, the Federalist
Papers, and the ratifying conventions found in Elliott's Debates.
FACT #6: Due to the characteristics of the SECOND

CLASSIFICATION of taxation, the Supreme Court called it an
indirect tax and it is divided into three distinct taxes: IMPOSTS,
DUTIES, and EXCISES. These taxes were intended to provide
for the operating expenses of the government of the United
States. (See Article 1, section 8, clause 1.)

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FACT #7: Duties and imposts are taxes laid by government

on things imported into the country from abroad, and are paid at
the ports of entry.
FACT #8: The supreme Court says that excises are...taxes

laid upon the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities
within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations
and upon corporate privileges. (See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
US 107 [1911].)
FACT #9: In 1862, Congress passed an Act (law) to create an

"Income Duty" to help pay for the War Between the States. A
duty is an indirect tax, which the federal government cannot
impose on citizens or residents of a State having sources of
income within a State of the Union.
FACT #10: Congress passed an Act in 1894 to impose a tax

on the incomes of citizens and resident aliens of the United
States. The constitutionality of the Act was challenged in 1895
and the Supreme Court said the law was Unconstitutional
because it was a DIRECT TAX that was not apportioned as the
Constitution required (See Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.,
157 US 429 [1895].)
FACT #11: In 1909 Congress passed the 16th Amendment to

the Constitution that was allegedly ratified by 3/4 of the States; it
is known as "The Income Tax Amendment".
FACT #12: Some officials within the Internal Revenue

"Service," along with professors, teachers, politicians and some
judges, have said and are saying, that the 16th Amendment
changed the United States Constitution to allow a DIRECT tax

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without apportionment.
FACT #13: The above persons are not empowered to

interpret the meaning of the United States Constitution! As stated
above (Fact #5), this power is granted by the Constitution to the
Supreme Court, but limited to the original intent. The Supreme
Court has no power to function as a "social engineer" to amend
or alter the Constitution as they have been doing. A change or
"amendment " can only be lawfully done according to the
provisions of Article 5 of that document.
FACT #14: The U.S. Supreme Court said in 1916 that the
16th Amendment did not change the U.S. Constitution because
of the fact that Article 1, section 2, clause 3, and Article 1,
section 9, clause 4, were not repealed or altered; the U.S.
Constitution cannot conflict with itself. The Court also said that
the 16th Amendment merely prevented the "income duty" from
being taken out of the category of INDIRECT taxation. (See
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 US, page 16.)
FACT #15: After the Supreme Court decision, the office of

the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Treasury Decision
[Order] 2313 (dated March 21, 1916; Vol. 18, January-
December, 1916, page 53.) It states in part; ...it is hereby held
that income accruing to nonresident aliens in the form of interest
from the bonds and dividends on the stock of domestic change
corporations is subject to the income tax imposed by the act of
October 3, 1913.
FACT #16: In another Supreme Court decision in 1916, the

Court, in clear language settled the application of the 16th
Amendment. By the previous ruling [Brushaber] it was settled

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that the provisions of the Sixteenth conferred no new power of

taxation. Rather it simply prohibited the previous complete and
plenary [full] power of income taxation possessed by Congress
from the beginning from being taken out of the category of
indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged... (See Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US, 112.)
FACT #17: The United States Constitution gives the national

government the exclusive authority to handle foreign affairs.
Congress has the power to pass laws concerning the direct or
indirect taxation of foreigners doing business in the U.S. of A. It
has possessed this power from the beginning, needing no
"amendment" (change) to the U.S. Constitution to authorize the
exercise of it.
FACT #18: The DIRECT classification of taxation was

intended for use when unforeseen expenses or emergencies
arose. Congress, needing funds to meet the emergency, can
borrow money on the credit of the United States (Article 1,
section 8, clause 2). The Founding Fathers intended that the
budget of the United States be balanced and a deficit be paid off
quickly and in an orderly fashion. Through a DIRECT tax, the
tax bill is given to the States of the Union. The bill is
"apportioned" by the number of Representatives of each State in
Congress; therefore, each State is billed its apportioned share of
the DIRECT tax equal to the number of votes its Representatives
could employ to pass the tax. How the States raise the money to
pay the bill is not a federal concern (Article 1, section 2, and
clause 3).
FACT #19: In the Brushaber and Stanton cases, the Supreme

Court said the 16th Amendment did not change income taxes to
another classification. So, if the INCOME TAX is an indirect

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EXCISE tax, then how is it applied and collected? According to

the Supreme Court, "Excises are taxes laid upon the
manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities within the
country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations and upon
corporate privileges; the requirement to pay such taxes involves
the exercise of the privilege and if business is not done in the
manner described no tax is payable...it is the privilege which is
the subject of the tax and not the mere buying, selling or
handling of goods." (Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 US, 110.)
QUESTION: If all RIGHTS come from GOD (citizens of the

States retained all RIGHTS except those surrendered as
enumerated in the United States Constitution), and PRIVILEGES
are granted by government after application; THEN what is the
PRIVILEGE that the "income tax" is applied against?
ANSWER: As established in the U.S. Constitution, the federal

government cannot directly tax a citizen living within the States
of the Union. Citizens possess RIGHTS; these rights cannot be
converted to PRIVILEGES by government. The only individuals
who would not have these RIGHTS and liable to regulation by
government are NONRESIDENT ALIENS doing business and
working within the United States or receiving domestic source
profits from investments, and United States citizens working in a
foreign country and taxable under TREATIES between the two
governments.
FACT #20: WITHHOLDING AGENTS withhold income

taxes. The only section in the Internal Revenue Code that defines
this authority is section 7701(a)(16).
FACT #21: Withholding of money for income tax purposes,

according to section 7701(a)(16), is only authorized for sections:

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1441 - NONRESIDENT ALIENS, 1442 - FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS, 1443 - FOREIGN TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, 1461 - WITHHOLDING AGENT LIABLE
FOR WITHHELD TAX.
FACT #22: Internal Revenue Manual Chapter 1100

Organization and Staffing, section 1132.75 states: The Criminal
Investigation Division enforces the criminal statutes applicable
to income, estate, gift, employment, and excise tax laws
involving United States citizens residing in foreign countries and
nonresident aliens subject to Federal income tax filing
requirements...
FACT #23: The implementation of IRS Treasury Regulation

1.1441-5 is explained in Publication 515 on page 2, that "If an
individual gives you [the domestic employer or withholding
agent] a written statement, in duplicate, stating that he or she is a
citizen or resident of the United States, and you do not know
otherwise, you may accept this statement and are relieved from
the duty of withholding the tax.
FACT #24: The ONLY way a United States citizen or

permanent resident alien, living and working within a State of
the Union can have taxes deducted from his/her pay, is by
voluntarily making an application Form SS-5 to obtain a Social
Security Number. Then by entering that number on an IRS Form
W and signing it to permit withholding of "Employment Taxes" --
"Form W Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate"
(emphasis added). That is why the IRS pressures children to
apply for a Social Security Numbers, and for employers to obtain
the voluntary execution of Form W immediately from all those
being hired. However, no federal law or regulation requires
workers to have a Social Security Number or sign a Form W to

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qualify for a job.
FACT #25: Karl Marx wrote in his COMMUNIST

MANIFESTO, ten planks needed to create a COMMUNIST
state. The SECOND PLANK is A HEAVY OR PROGRESSIVE
INCOME TAX, second only to the ABOLITION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY.
FACT #26: The attorney who successfully challenged the

Income Tax Act of 1894, Joseph H. Choate, recognized the
communist hand in the shadows. He told the United States
Supreme Court, "The act of Congress which we are impugning
[challenging as false] before you is communistic in its purposes
and tendencies, and is defended here upon principles as
communistic, socialistic -- what shall I call them -- populistic as
ever have been addressed to any political assembly in the world".
FACT #27: The Supreme Court agreed; and Mr. Justice

Field wrote the Court's opinion, concluding with these statements
in intensity and bitterness. Prophetic words: Here I close my
opinion. I could not say less in view of questions of such gravity
that go down to the very foundations of the government. If the
provisions of the Constitution can be set aside by an act of
Congress, where is the course of usurpation to end? The present
assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the
stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our
political contests will become a war of the poor against the rich;
a war growing.
NEED WE SAY MORE?

FACT #28: Internal Revenue Code Section 6654(e)(2)(c)

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(cited fully below) states:...no tax liability...if....the individual

was a citizen or resident of the United States throughout the
preceding taxable year. IRS contends the success of the SELF-
ASSESSMENT system depends on VOLUNTARY
COMPLIANCE -- EVIDENTLY SO! Just how much of the
Communist Manifesto has become part of your daily life?
CONCLUSION OF FACTS: ALL RIGHTS come

from God. The United States Government can only exercise
powers given to it by "We the People" through the U.S.
Constitution. The "income tax" is an INDIRECT TAX. There is
NO section of law in the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 USC)
making a CITIZEN or a RESIDENT working and living
WITHIN A STATE OF THE UNION, LIABLE to pay the
INCOME (indirect/excise/duty) TAX.
TIRED OF BEING CONNED &

RAILROADED INTO PAYING TAXES
WHICH YOU DO NOT OWE, TO BE
SQUANDERED BY ARROGANT
BUREAUCRATS?
You are invited to join in a national Fellowship with other
Patriotic Americans whose only goal is to LEARN, REVIVE and
PRESERVE our UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. The
SAVE-A-PATRIOT FELLOWSHIP was founded to disarm the
IRS of its only actual weapon: FEAR. By standing together we
can force these bureaucrats back within the confines of THE
LAW...and arrest the wild rush toward PERPETUAL DEBT and
a TOTALITARIAN SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA.
You can serve your country and NOT FEAR reprisals from

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bureaucratic THUGS. The EDUCATION and INSURANCE-

LIKE PROTECTION provided by the SAVE-A-PATRIOT
FELLOWSHIP has been a constant thorn in the side of the IRS
since 1984. Come join with others, who have learned how to
combat the true TAX CRIMINALS! Email me for more
information on the benefits of membership and copy of our
membership newsletter Reasonable Action TODAY!
We encourage you to print and distribute these pages to your

family, friends, legislators and the PUBLIC AT LARGE. If you
wish to learn more about these facts of law, you may wish to
purchase any of our information resources . These resources are
based on over 25 years of legal research.
Are you "self employed"? Did you know what

the Internal Revenue Code says concerning
filing quarterly estimated returns? Read below!
SEC. 6654. FAILURE BY INDIVIDUALS TO PAY
ESTIMATED INCOME TAX.
(e) Exceptions. -
Where tax is small amount. -- No addition to tax shall
be imposed under subsection (a) for any taxable year if the
tax shown on the return for such taxable year (or, if no
return is filed, the tax), reduced by the credit allowable
under section 31, is less than $500.
Where no tax liability for preceding taxable year.--No
addition to tax shall be imposed under subsection (a) for
any taxable year if:
A. the preceding taxable year was a taxable year of 12

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months.
B. the individual did not have any liability for tax for
the preceding taxable year, and
C. the individual was a citizen or resident of the
United States throughout the preceding taxable year.
(emphasis added)
Thank You
Jim Deal
Exam Certified Independent Representative for the
Save A Patriot Fellowship
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[ Do you love America? How about the IRS? ] [ Why I did this site ]

Public Notice
Notice to Citizens
Public Judicial Notice #3 were published in this public
forum upon this WebSite for twenty (20) consecutive
days. Each has also been published in accordance with
law in Veritas National Newspaper, The Round Valley
Paper, and many other publications throughout the
United States of America. The law requires they be
published for only 3 consecutive days or issues in the
media in which they are printed. The United States
including but not limited to the Department of the
Treasury, and Internal Revenue Service has defaulted
failing to rebut any allegations of fact in any of these
Public Judicial Notices within the twenty days allotted.
According to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
attending State rules, "He who remains silent consents."
In accordance with State and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure the allegations of fact in each of these Public
Judicial Notices are now PRESUMED FACT. All Citizens
may now act in accordance with these FACTS.
Proof of service is registered on the WebSite server and in the captured files of the Statistics for the
WebSite program which has registered the download of this entire WebSite by United States
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Public Notice
government computers including, but not limited to, The White House, the Department of the
Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Postal Service, the Internal
Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the Pentagon, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), United States Military installations across the
nation, and EVERY United States National Laboratory including, but not limited to, Lawrence
Livermore, Los Alamos, Berkeley, and etc.

This memorandum will be construed to comply with provisions necessary to
establish presumed fact (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and attending
State rules) should interested parties fail to rebut any given allegation or
matter of law addressed herein. The position will be construed as adequate
to meet requirements of judicial notice, thus preserving fundamental law.
Matters addressed herein, if not rebutted, will be construed to have general
application. A true and correct copy of this Public Notice is on file with and
available for inspection at the newspaper responsible for publishing the
instrument as legal notice. The memorandum addresses the character of the
Internal Revenue Service and other agencies of the Department of the
Treasury, and legal application of the Internal Revenue Code.
1. IRS Identity & Principal of Interest
In 1953, the Internal Revenue Service was created by the stroke of a pen
when the Secretary of the Treasury changed the name of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (T.O. No. 150-29, G.M. Humphrey, Secretary of the
Treasury, July 9, 1953). However, no congressional or presidential
authorization for making this change has been located, so the source of
authority had to originate elsewhere. Research to which IRS officials have
acquiesced suggests that the Secretary exercised his authority as trustee of
Puerto Rico Trust #62 (Internal Revenue) (see 31 USC § 1321), and as will be
demonstrated, the Secretary does, in fact, operate as Secretary of the

Public Notice
Treasury, Puerto Rico.
The solid link between the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of
the Treasury, Puerto Rico, was first published in the September 1995 issue of
Veritas Magazine, based on research by William Cooper and Wayne
Bentson, both of Arizona. In October, a criminal complaint was filed in the
office of W. A. Drew Edmondson, attorney general for Oklahoma, against an
Enid-based revenue officer, and in the time since, IRS principals have failed
to refute the allegation that IRS is an agency of the Department of Treasury,
Puerto Rico. In November, criminal complaints were filed simultaneously
with the grand jury for the United States district court for the District of
Northern Oklahoma, Tulsa, and the office of Attorney General Edmondson,
and both the office of the United States Attorney and IRS principals have yet
to rebut the allegations in that instance (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs. Kenney F. Moore, et al, 95 CR-129C).
By consulting the index for Chapter 3, Title 31 of the United States Code, one
finds that IRS and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are not
listed as agencies of the United States Department of the Treasury. The fact
that Congress never created a “Bureau of Internal Revenue” is confirmed by
publication in the Federal Register at 36 F.R. 849-890 [C.B. 1971 - 1,698], 36
F.R. 11946 [C.B. 1971 - 2,577], and 37 F.R. 489-490; and in Internal Revenue
Manual 1100 at 1111.2.
Implications are condemning both to IRS and third parties who knowingly
participate in IRS-initiated scams: No legitimate authority resides in or
emanates from an office which was not legitimately created and/or ordained
either by state or national constitutions or by legislative enactment. See
variously, United States v. Germane, 99 U.S. 508 (1879), Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 441, 6 S.Ct. 1121 (1866), etc., dating to Pope v.
Commissioner, 138 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1943); where the state is
concerned, the most recent corresponding decision was State v. Pinckney,
276 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa 1979).

Public Notice
Another direct evidence of the fraud is found at 27 CFR § 1, which

prescribes basic requirements for securing permits under the Federal
Alcohol Administration Act. The problem here is that Congress promulgated
the Act in 1935, and the same year, the United States Supreme Court
declared the Act unconstitutional. Administration of the Act was
subsequently moved offshore to Puerto Rico, along with the Federal Alcohol
Administration, and operation eventually merged with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, which until 1938, along with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Philippines, created by the Philippines provisional
government via Philippines Trust #2 (internal revenue) (see 31 USC § 1321
for listing of Philippines Trust #2 (internal revenue)), administered the
China Trade Act (licensing & revenue collection relating to opium, cocaine
& citric wines). This line will be resumed after examining additional
evidences concerning IRS and Commissioner of Internal Revenue authority.
Further verification that IRS does not have lawful authority in the several
States is found in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, beginning on
page 751 of the 1995 Index volume to the Code of Federal Regulations. It will
be found that there are no regulations supportive of 26 USC §§ 7621, 7801,
7802 & 7803 (these statute listings are absent from the table). In other words,
no regulations have been published in the Federal Register, extending
authority to the several States and the population at large, (1) to establish
revenue districts within the several States, (2) extending authority of the
Department of the Treasury [Puerto Rico] to the several States, (3) giving
authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and assistants within the
several States, or (4) extending authority of any other Department of
Treasury personnel to the several States.
Authority of the Internal Revenue Service, via the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, is convoluted in regulations, but makes an amount of sense by
citing various regulations pertaining to the Service and application of the
Commissioner’s authority. General procedural rules at 26 CFR § 601.101(a)
provide a beginning-point:

Public Notice
(a) General. The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the

Department of the Treasury under the immediate direction of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has
general superintendence of the assessment and collection of all
taxes imposed by any law providing internal revenue. The
Internal Revenue Service is the agency by which these functions
are performed...
The fact that there are no regulations extending Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, or Department of the Treasury authority to the several States (26
USC § 7802(a)), has greater clarity in the light of the general merging of
functions between IRS and other agencies presently attached to the
Department of the Treasury. The Commissioner is given responsibility for
issuing rules and regulations for the Code at 26 CFR § 301.7805-1, with
approval of the Secretary, but there are no cites of authority for this CFR
subpart, whether Treasury Order, publication in the Federal Register, or
even statute cite. In other words, there is no actual or effective delegation
which vests the Commissioner with significant independent authority which
might be conveyed to IRS, BATF, Customs or any other Department of the
Treasury agency with respect to powers extending to or affecting the several
States and the population at large.
The link between IRS and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is
significant as the tie with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Department of the
Treasury, Puerto Rico, is through this door. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1940, Section 2, made the following change:
§ 2. Federal Alcohol Administration The Federal Alcohol

Administration, the offices of the members thereof, and the office
of the Administrator are abolished, and their function shall be
administered under the direction and supervision of the Secretary
of the Treasury through the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the
Department of the Treasury.

Public Notice
Again, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 was declared

unconstitutional in 1935, and the operation thereafter transferred off shore
to Puerto Rico. The name of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was changed to
the Internal Revenue Service in 1953 (cite above), then the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, a division of the Internal Revenue Service,
was seemingly separated from IRS (T.O. 120-01, June 6, 1972). In relevant
part, the order reads as follows:
1. The purpose of this order is to transfer, as specified herein, the

functions, powers and duties of the Internal Revenue Service
arising under law relating to Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives including the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms division
of the Internal Revenue Service, to the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms herein after referred to as the Bureau
which is hereby established. The Bureau shall be headed by the
Director of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms herein referred to
as the Director... 2. The Director shall perform the functions,
exercise the powers and carry out the duties of the Secretary and
the administration and the enforcement of the following provisions
of law: A. Chapters 51 and 52 and 53 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and Section 7652 and 7653 of such code insofar as
they relate to the commodity subject to tax under such chapters.
B. Chapter 61 to 80 inclusive to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
insofar as they relate to activities administered and enforced with
respect to chapters 51, 52, 53. (emphasis added)
Transfer of functions and duties of IRS to BATF relative to Internal

Revenue Code Subtitle F (chapters 61 to 80) is important where the instant
matter is concerned as the only regulations published in the Federal Register
applicable to the several States are under 27 CFR, Part 70 and other parts of
this title relating exclusively to alcohol, tobacco and firearms matters.
However, the charade doesn’t end there. In Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1965 (5 USC § 903), the original Bureau of Customs, created by Act of
Congress in 1895, was abolished and merged under the Secretary of the
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Treasury.
In a Treasury Order published in the Federal Register of December 15, 1976,

the Secretary of the Treasury used something of a slight of hand to confuse
matters more by determining, “The term Director, Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms has been replaced with the term Internal Revenue Service.”
Obviously, it is impossible to replace a person with a thing when it comes to

administrative responsibility. However, the order demonstrates that IRS and
BATF are one and the same, merely operating with interchangeable hats.
Therefore, definitions and designations applicable to one are applicable to
the other.
In definitions at 27 CFR § 250.11, the following provisions are found:
Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal

Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.
Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.
Secretary or his delegate. The Secretary or any officer or
employee of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico duly
authorized by the Secretary to perform the function mentioned or
described in this part.
In the absence of any other definition describing revenue officers and agents,
the Secretary, or the Department of the Treasury, definitions above are
uniformly applicable to all IRS and BATF departments, functions and
personnel. In fact, it will be found that even petroleum tax prescribed in
Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code applies only to United States
territorial jurisdiction exclusive of the several States and to imported
petroleum. BATF has authority only with respect to firearms, munitions,
etc., produced outside the several States and the first sale of imports.
The two delegations of authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

thus far located tend to reinforce conclusions set out above. Treasury

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Department Order No. 150-42, dated July 27, 1956, appearing in at 21 Fed.
Reg. 5852, specifies the following:
The Commissioner shall, to the extent of the authority vested in

him, provide for the administration of United States internal
revenue laws in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands.
On February 27, 1986 (51 Fed. Reg. 9571), Treasury Department Order No.
150-01 specified the following:
The Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority otherwise

vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States
internal revenue laws in the U.S. Territories and insular
possessions and other authorized areas of the world.
To date only three statutes in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as

currently amended, have been located that specifically reference the several
States, exclusive of the federal States (District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, etc.): 26 USC §§ 5272(b), 5362(c) & 7462. The first
two provide certain exemptions to bond and import tax requirements
relating to imported distilled spirits for governments of the several States
and their respective political subdivisions, and the last provides that reports
published by the United States Tax Court will constitute evidence of the
reports in courts of the United States and the several States. None of the
three statutes extend assessment or collections authority for IRS or BATF
within the several States.
IRS is contracted to provide collection services for the Agency for

International Development, and case law demonstrates that the true
principals of interest are the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank (Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 6 L.Ed
(Wheat) 244; U.S. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242; see 22 USCA § 286, et seq.). In other
words, IRS seemingly provides collection services for undisclosed foreign

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principals rather than collecting internal revenue for the benefit of

constitutional United States government operation. To date, IRS principals
have failed to dispute the published Cooper/Bentson allegation that the
agency, via these foreign principals, funded the enormous tank and military
truck factory on the Kama River, Russia.
The Internal Revenue Service, a foreign entity with respect to the several
States, is not registered to do business in the several States. 2. Preservation of
Due Process Rights
The Internal Revenue Service has for years been protected by statutory
courts both of the United States and the several States, with the latter
operating in the framework of adopted uniform laws which ascribe a federal
character to the several States. Both operate under the presumption of
Congress’ Article IV jurisdiction within the geographical United States (the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc.), both accommodate private
international law under exclusively United States treaties on private
international law, and both operate in the framework of admiralty rules to
impose Civil Law (see both majority & dissenting opinions variously, Bennis
v. Michigan, U.S. Supreme Court No. 94-8729, March 4, 1996) , which is
repugnant to both state and national constitutions (see authority of
Department of Justice as representative of the “Central Authority”
established by U.S. treaties on private international law at 28 CFR § 0.49;
also, “conflict of law” as a subcategory to “statutes” in American
Jurisprudence). However, this house of cards will shortly fall as Cooperative
Federalism, known as Corporatism well into the 1930s, has been thoroughly
documented and is rapidly being exposed via state and United States
appellate courts and in public forum.
In reality, the Internal Revenue Code preserves due process rights, but the
statute has been dormant until recently:
[Sec. 7804(b)] (b) PRESERVATION OF EXISTING RIGHTS

AND REMEDIES. -- Nothing in Reorganization Plan Numbered

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26 of 1950 or Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of 1952 shall be

considered to impair any right or remedy, including trial by jury,
to recover any internal revenue tax alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty
claimed to have been collected without authority, or any sum
alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected under the internal revenue laws. For the purpose of any
action to recover any such tax, penalty, or sum, all statutes, rules,
and regulations referring to the collector of internal revenue, the
principal officer for the internal revenue district, or the Secretary,
shall be deemed to refer to the officer whose act or acts referred to
in the preceding sentence gave rise to such action. The venue of
any such action shall be the same as under existing law.
The reorganization plans of 1950 & 1952 were implemented via the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, Volume 68A of the Statutes at Large, and codified as
title 26 of the United States Code. Savings statutes have been in place since
the beginning, but generally not understood by the general population or the
legal profession. The statute set out above is easier to comprehend when
references are consolidated. Further, the dependent clause “including trial
by jury” relates to a constitutionally-assured right, not a remedy, so it should
be moved to the proper location in the sentence. Finally, the matter of venue
is important as “existing law” is constitutional and common law indigenous
to the several States. In the absence of legitimate federal law which extends
to the several States, those who operate under color of law, engage in
oppression, extortion, etc., are subject to the foundation law of the States.
Venue is determined by the law of legislative jurisdiction.
Citing “including trial by jury” preserves the full slate of due process rights
included in Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution for the united States of America and corresponding provisions
in constitutions of the several States. The example represents the class.
Additionally, note that, (1) actions may issue against bogus assessments as

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well as collections, and (2) § 7804(b), unlike § 7433, does not presume that
the complaining party is a “taxpayer”. Finally, there is 26 CFR, Part 1
regulatory support for § 7804 where there are no regulations published in
the Federal Register in support of § 7433 (see Parallel Table of Authorities
and Rules, beginning on page 751 of the Index volume to the Code of Federal
Regulations). Therefore, § 7804(b) preserves rights and determines the
nature of civil actions for remedies in the several States. When straightened
out, applicable portions of § 7804(b) read as follows:
Nothing in [the Internal Revenue Code] shall be considered to impair any

right, [including trial by jury], or remedy, [***], to recover any internal
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected
... The venue of any such action shall be the same as under existing law.
The necessity of due process is implicitly preserved by 28 USC § 2463, which

stipulates that any seizure under United States revenue laws will be deemed
in the custody of the law and subject solely to disposition of courts of the
United States with proper jurisdiction. In other words, even if IRS had
legitimate authority in the several States, the agency would of necessity have
to file a civil or criminal complaint prior to garnishment, seizure or any
other action adversely affecting the life, liberty or property of any given
person, whether a Fourteenth Amendment citizen-subject of the United
States or a Citizen principal of one of the several States. Due process
assurances in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not equivocate --
administrative seizures without due process can be equated only to tyranny
and barbarian rule. Further, even regulations governing IRS conduct
acknowledge and therefore preserve Fifth Amendment assurances at 26 CFR
§ 601.106(f)(1).
(1) Rule I. An exaction by the U.S. Government, which is not

based upon law, statutory or otherwise, is a taking of property
without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, an Appeals representative in
his or her conclusions of fact or application of the law, shall hew to

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the law and the recognized standards of legal construction. It shall

be his or her duty to determine the correct amount of the tax, with
strict impartiality as between the taxpayer and the Government,
and without favoritism or discrimination as between taxpayers.
Even officers, agents and employees of United States agencies are assured
due process where garnishment is concerned (5 USC § 5520a), so the notion
that IRS has authority to execute garnishment and other seizures via the
private sector without due process is clearly absurd. In the English-
American lineage, due process has always been deemed to mean trial by jury
under rules of the common law indigenous to the several States; the de jure
people of America are not subject to admiralty or administrative tribunals.
Where officers, agents and employees of the Internal Revenue Service are
concerned, there can be no plea of ignorance concerning the necessity of due
process as the Handbook for Revenue Agents, at paragraph 332: (1),
provides the following:
During the course of administratively collecting a tax, an occasion

may arise where service of a levy or a notice of levy is not
adequate to seize the property of a taxpayer. It cannot be
emphasized too strongly that constitutional guarantees and
individual rights must not be violated. Property should not be
forcibly removed from the person of the taxpayer. Such conduct
may expose a revenue officer to an action in trespass, assault and
battery, conversion, etc.
The provision acknowledges the Supreme Court decision in Larson v.

Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
In sum, the mandate for due process, meaning initiatives through judicial
courts with proper jurisdiction, is clearly antecedent to imposition of
administratively-issued liens, except where licensing agreements obligate
assets, or seizures, whether by garnishment, attachment of bank accounts,

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administrative seizure and sale of real or private property, or any other

initiative that compromises life, liberty or property.
3. Current Internal Revenue Code & Internal Revenue Code of 1939

Are Same
Consult 26 USC §§ 7851 & 7852 to verify that the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended in 1986 and since, simply reorganized the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. Read § 7852(b) & (c), then read the balance of §§
7851 & 7852 for best comprehension.
The importance of making this connection rests on the fact that the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 was merely codification of the Public Salary Tax Act
of 1939. There was no general income tax levied against the population at
large in 1939 or since. The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, which in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 incorporated the Social Security tax
activated after 1936, was premised on the notion that working for federal
government is a privilege. Income and related taxes prescribed in Subtitles A
& C of the current Internal Revenue Code have never been mandatory for
anyone other than officers, agents and employees of the United States, as
identified at 26 USC § 3401(c), and agencies of the United States, identified
at § 3401(d), particularized at 5 USC §§ 102 & 105.
The privilege tax is an excise rather than direct tax -- the Sixteenth
Amendment, fraudulently promulgated in 1913, did not alter or repeal
constitutional provisions which require all direct taxes to be apportioned
among the several States (Constitution, Article I §§ 2.3 & 9.4). In Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1918), Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, and
numerous decisions since, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed that for purposes of income tax, wages and other returns from
enterprise of common right are property, not income. In fact, returns from
enterprise of common right are fundamental to all property, and the sanctity
is preserved as a fundamental common law principle dating to signing of the
Magna Charta in 1215.

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The nature of Subtitles A & C taxes is revealed at 26 CFR § 31.3101-1: “The

employee tax is measured by the amount of wages received after 1954 with
respect to employment after 1936...”
In other words, the wage is not the object, but merely the measure of the tax.
This verbiage constitutes so much legalese in an effort to circumvent the
duck test, but the fact that taxes collected by the Internal Revenue Service
fall into the excise category was confirmed by the Comptroller General’s
report following the initial effort to audit IRS (GAO/T-AIMD-93-3). It is
further suggested at 26 CFR § 106.401(a)(2), where the regulation concedes
that, “The descriptive terms used in this section to designate the various
classes of taxes are intended only to indicate their general character...”
By referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, cited above, it is

found that the definition of “gross income” is still preserved in Section 22 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, thus cementing the link between the
Code of 1939 and Subtitles A & C of the Code of 1954, as amended in 1986
and since. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 merely codified the Public
Salary Tax Act of 1939. This link is further confirmed in Senate Committee
On Finance and House Committee On Ways and Means reports No. H.R.
8300 (1954, Internal Revenue Code), in which § 22 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 and § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (current code)
were solidly linked. Both reports stipulate that the current definition of
“gross income” is intended to be constitutional.
This intent is articulated at 26 CFR § 1.61-1(a): “Gross income means all

income from whatever source derived, unless excluded by law.”
An “Act of Congress” is policy, not law, and per definition located in Rule
54, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has only local application in the
District of Columbia and other United States territories and insular
possessions unless general application is manifestly expressed: Rule 54(c) --
“‘Act of congress’ includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in

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force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an

insular possession.”
Where the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is concerned (Vol. 68A, Statutes at
Large, p. 3), the legislation is in fact styled, “An Act” “To revise the internal
revenue laws of the United States.”
As demonstrated above, wages and other returns from enterprise of common

right are exempt from direct tax by fundamental law, and the regulation for
the current Internal Revenue Code definition for “gross income” clearly
articulates the fundamental law exemption.
The exemption as it pertains to the several States is demonstrated by

referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules (Index volume to the
CFR, p. 751 of the 1995 edition): There are 26 CFR, Part 1 regulations listed
for 26 USC §§ 61 & 62, the latter being the definition for adjusted gross
income, but there is no 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31 regulation for 26 USC § 63, the
definition for taxable income.
While definitions for gross and adjusted gross income are clearly antecedent
to the definition of taxable income, they have no legal effect if there is no
taxing authority -- adjusted gross income which is not taxable within the
several States is of no consequence where the federal tax system is
concerned.
Further, on examination of 26 CFR § 1.62-1, pertaining to “adjusted gross

income”, it is found that subsections (a) & (b) are reserved so the published
regulation is incomplete, with “temporary” regulation § 1.62-1T serving as
the current authority defining “adjusted gross income.” Temporary
regulations have no legal effect.
Definitions at § 3401, Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large (the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954), make it clear that, (§ 3401(a)(A)), “a resident of a contiguous
country who enters and leaves the United States at frequent intervals..,” is a

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nonresident alien of the United States (citizens and residents of the several
States included), and the exclusion from “wages” extends even to citizens of
the United States who provide services for employers “other than the United
States or an agency thereof” (§ 3401(a)(8)(A)).
4. The Employer or Agent is Liable
Volume 68A of the Statutes at Large, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
makes it perfectly clear who is “liable” for payment of Subtitles A & C taxes:
SEC. 3504. ACTS TO BE PERFORMED BY AGENTS. In case a

fiduciary, agent, or other person has the control, receipt, custody,
or disposal of, or pays the wages of an employee or group of
employees, employed by one or more employers, the Secretary of
his delegate, under regulations prescribed by him, is authorized to
designate such fiduciary, agent, or other person to perform such
acts as are required by employers under this subtitle and as the
Secretary or his delegate may specify. Except as may be otherwise
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, all provisions of law
(including penalties) applicable in respect to an employer shall be
applicable to a fiduciary, agent, or other person so designated,
but, except as so provided, the employer for whom such fiduciary,
agent, or other person acts shall remain subject to the provisions
of law (including penalties) applicable in respect to employers.
The liability is further clarified at Vol. 68A, Sec. 3402(d):
(d) TAX PAID BY RECIPIENT. -- If the employer, in violation of

the provisions of this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold the tax
under this chapter, and thereafter the tax against which such tax
may be credited is paid, the tax so required to be deducted and
withheld shall not be collected from the employer; but this
subsection shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for
any penalties or additions to the tax otherwise applicable in

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respect to such failure to deduct and withhold.
These provisions from Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large comply with and
verify liability set out at 26 CFR, Part 601, Subpart D in general. Further,
territorial limits of application are made clear by the absence of regulations
supporting 26 USC §§ 7621, 7802, etc., which are the statutes authorizing
establishment of internal revenue districts and delegations of authority to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and assistants. The fact that the liability
falls to the “employer” (26 USC § 3401(d)) and/or his agent, with no
compensation for serving as “tax collector,” narrows the field to federal
government entities as “employers” if for no other reason than the
population at large is not subject to the edict of government officials. As a
matter of course, government cannot compel performance where the general
population is concerned. The subject class that has “liability” for Subtitles A
& C taxes is the “employer” or his agent, fiduciary, etc., as specified above.
The matter is further clarified in Sections 3403 & 3404 of Vol. 68A, Statutes
at Large:
SEC. 3403. LIABILITY FOR TAX. The employer shall be liable

for the payment of the tax required to be deducted and withheld
under this chapter, and shall not be liable to any person for the
amount of any such payment. SEC. 3404. RETURN AND
PAYMENT BY GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYER. If the
employer is the United States, or a State, Territory, or political
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing, the return of
the amount deducted and withheld upon any wages may be made
by any officer or employee of the United States, or of such State,
Territory, or political subdivision, or of the District of Columbia,
or of such agency or instrumentality, as the case may be, having
control of the payment of such wages, or appropriately designated
for that purpose.

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The territorial application, and limitation, is made clear by definitions in

Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
§ 31.3121(3)-1 State, United States, and citizen. (a) When used in

the regulations in this subpart, the term “State” includes the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their
admission as States, and (when used with respect to services
performed after 1960) Guam and American Samoa. (b) When
used in the regulations in this subpart, the term “United States”,
when used in a geographical sense, means the several states
(including the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their
admission as States), the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. When used in the
regulations in this subpart with respect to services performed
after 1960, the term “United States” also includes Guam and
American Samoa when the term is used in a geographical sense.
The term “citizen of the United States” includes a citizen of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and,
effective January 1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American Samoa.
Definition of the terms “includes” and “including” located at 26 USC §

7701(c) provides the limiting authority which the above definitions, beyond
constructive application, are subject to:
(c) INCLUDES AND INCLUDING. -- The terms “includes” and

“including” when used in a definition contained in this title shall
not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the
meaning of the term defined.
Two principles of law clarify definition intent: (1) The example represents
the class, and (2) that which is not named is intended to be omitted. In the
definition of “United States” and “State” set out above, all examples are of
federal States, and are exclusive of the several States, with the transition of

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Alaska and Hawaii from the included to the excluded class proving the point.
This conclusion is reinforced by the absence of regulations which extend
authority to establish revenue districts in the several States (26 USC § 7621),
authority for the Department of the Treasury [Puerto Rico] in the several
States (26 USC § 7801), and no grant of delegated authority for the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, assistant commissioners, or other
Department of the Treasury personnel (26 USC § 7802 & 7803).
5. Lack of Regulations Supporting General Application of Tax
Here again, the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules is useful as it

demonstrates that Subtitles A & C taxes do not have general application
within the several States and to the population at large. The regulation for 26
USC § 1 refers to 26 CFR § 301, but that amounts to a dead end -- there is no
regulation under 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31 which would apply to the several
States and the population at large. Further, there are no supportive
regulations at all for 26 USC §§ 2 & 3, and of considerable significance, no
regulations supporting corporate income tax, 26 USC § 11, as applicable to
the several States.
Where the instant matter is concerned, regulations supporting 26 USC §

6321, liens for taxes, and § 6331, levy and distraint, are under 27 CFR, Part
70. The importance here is that Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
exclusively under Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms administration
for Subtitle E and related taxes. There are no corresponding regulations for
the Internal Revenue Service, in 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31, which extend
comparable authority to the several States and the population at large.
The necessity of regulations being published in the Federal Register is

variously prescribed in the Administrative Procedures Act, at 5 USC § 552 et
seq., and the Federal Register Act, at 44 USC § 1501 et seq. Of particular
note, it is specifically set out at 44 USC § 1505(a), that when regulations are
not published in the Federal Register, application of any given statute is
exclusively to agencies of the United States and officers, agents and

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employees of the United States, thus once again confirming application of

Subtitles A & C tax demonstrated above. Further, the need for regulations is
detailed in 1 CFR, Chapter 1, and where the Internal Revenue Service is
concerned, 26 CFR § 601.702.
The need for regulations has repeatedly been affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, as stated in California Bankers Ass’n. v. Schultz,
416 U.S. 21, 26, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974):
Because it has a bearing on our treatment of some of the issues raised by the
parties, we think it important to note that the Act’s civil and criminal
penalties attach only upon violation of regulations promulgated by the
Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no
penalties on anyone ... The government argues that since only those who
violate regulations may incur civil and criminal penalties it is the regulations
issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and not the broad, authorizing
language of the statute, which is to be tested against the standards of the 4th
Amendment...
Because there is a citation supporting these statutes applicable under Title 27

of the Code of Federal Regulations, it is important to point out that, “Each
agency shall publish its own regulations in full text,” (1 CFR § 21.21(c)), with
further verification that one agency cannot use regulations promulgated by
another at 1 CFR § 21.40. To date, no corresponding regulation has been
found for 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31, so until proven otherwise, IRS does not have
authority to perfect liens or prosecute seizures in the several States as
pertaining to the population at large.
6. Misapplication of Authority
Regulations pertaining to seized property are found at 26 CFR § 601.326:
Part 72 of Title 27 CFR contains the regulations relative to the personal

property seized by officers of the Internal Revenue Service or the Bureau of

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Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as subject to forfeiture as being used, or

intended to be used, to violate certain Federal Laws; the remission or
mitigation of such forfeiture; and the administrative sale or other
disposition, pursuant to forfeiture, of such seized property other than
firearms seized under the National Firearms Act and firearms and
ammunition seized under title 1 of the Gun Control Act of 1968. For disposal
of firearms and ammunition under Title 1 of the Gun Control Act of 1968,
see 18 U.S.C. 924(d). For disposal of explosives under Title XI of Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, see 18 U.S.C. 844(c).
The only other comparable authority thus far found pertains to windfall
profits tax on petroleum (26 CFR § 601.405), but once again, application is
not supported by regulations applicable to the several States and the
population at large.
Where the provision for filing 1040 returns is concerned, the key regulatory
reference is at 26 CFR § 601.401(d)(4), and this application appears related
to “employees” who work for two or more “employers”, receiving foreign-
earned income effectively connected to the United States. The option of filing
a 1040 return for refund is mentioned in instructions applicable to United
States citizens and residents of the Virgin Islands, but to date has not been
located elsewhere. Reference OMB numbers for § 601.401, listed on page
170, 26 CFR, Part 600-End, cross referenced to Department of Treasury
OMB numbers published in the Federal Register, November 1995, for
foreign application.
The fact that 1040 tax return forms are optional and voluntary, with special
application, is further reinforced by Delegation Order 182 (reference 26
CFR §§ 301.6020-1(b) & 301.7701). The Secretary or his delegate is
authorized to file a Substitute for Return for the following: Form 941
(Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return); Form 720 (Quarterly Federal
Excise Tax Return); Form 2290 (Federal Use Tax Return on Highway Motor
Vehicles); Form CT-1 (Employer’s Annual Railroad Retirement Tax
Return); Form 1065 (U.S. Partnership Return of Income); Form 11-B

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(Special Tax Return - Gaming Services); Form 942 (Employer’s Quarterly

Federal Tax Return for Household Employees); and Form 943 (Employer’s
Annual Tax Return for Agricultural Employees).
The “notice of levy” instrument forwarded to various third parties is not a

“levy” which warrants surrender of property. The Internal Revenue Code,
at § 6335(a), defines the “notice” instrument by use -- notice is to be served to
whomever seizure has been executed against after the seizure is effected. In
short, the notice merely conveys information, it is not cause for action. The
term “notice” is clarified by definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th
Edition, and other law dictionaries. Use of the “notice of levy” instrument to
effect seizure is fraud by design.
Proper use of the “notice” process, administrative garnishment, et al, is

specifically set out in 5 USC § 5514, as being applicable exclusively to
officers, agents and employees of agencies of the United States (26 USC §
3401(c)). Even then, however, the process must comply with provisions of 31
USC § 3530(d), and standards set forth in §§ 3711 & 3716-17. In accordance
with provisions of 26 CFR, Part 601, Subpart D, the employer, meaning the
United States agency the employee is employed by, is responsible for
promulgating regulations and carrying out garnishment.
Even if IRS was the agency responsible for collecting from an “employee,”
due process would be required, as noted above, so authority to collect would
ensue only after securing a court order from a court of competent
jurisdiction, which in the several States would mean a judicial court of the
State. In law, however, there is no authority for securing or issuing a Notice
of Distraint premised on non-filing, bogus filing, or any other act relating to
the 1040 return. See United States v. O’Dell, Case No. 10188, Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, March 10, 1947. In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that a judicial
warrant for tax levies is necessary to protect against unjustified intrusions
into privacy. The Court further held that forcible entry by IRS officials onto
private premises without prior judicial authorization was also an invasion of

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privacy.
7. Liability Depends on a Taxing Statute
General demands for filing tax returns, production of records, examination

of books, imposition and payment of tax, etc., are of no consequence to the
point a taxing statute (1) defines what tax is being imposed, and (2) the basis
of liability. In other words, even if the Internal Revenue Service was a
legitimate agency of the United States Department of the Treasury and had
authority in the several States, the Service would have to be specific with
respect to what tax was at issue and would have to demonstrate the tax by
citing a taxing statute with the necessary elements to establish that any given
person was obligated to pay any given tax.
This mandate has been clarified by the courts numerous times, with the
matter definitively stated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Community TV, Inc., 327 F.2d 797, at p. 800 (1964):
Without question, a taxing statute must describe with some certainty the
transaction, service, or object to be taxed, and in the typical situation it is
construed against the Government. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct.
559, 82 L.Ed.858
In other words, to the point Service personnel produce the statute which
mandates a certain tax and which specifies, “... the transaction, service, or
object to be taxed..,” the burden of proof lies with the Government, with the
consequence being that no obligation or civil or criminal liability can ensue
to the point a taxing statute that meets the above requirements is in evidence.
This conclusion is supported by the statute which provides the underlying

requirements for keeping records, making statements, etc., located at 26
USC § 6001:
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection

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thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns,
and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time
to time prescribe. Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary it is necessary,
he may require any person, by notice served upon such person, or by
regulations, to make such returns, render such statements, or keep such
records, as the Secretary deems sufficient to show whether or not such
person is liable for tax under this title. The only records which an employee
shall be required to keep under this section in connection with charged tips
shall be charge receipts, records necessary to comply with section 6053(c),
and copies of statements furnished by employees under section 6053(a).
The control statute for Subtitle F, Chapter 61, Subchapter A, Part I,

concerning records, statements, and special returns, clearly returns the
matter to the “employee” defined at § 3401(c), and the “employer” defined at
§ 3401(d). In general, however, (1) the Secretary must provide direct notice
to whomever is required to keep books, records, etc., as being the “person
liable,” or (2) specify the person liable by regulation. In the absence of notice
by the Secretary, based on a taxing statute which makes such a person liable
according to provisions stipulated in United States v. Community TV, Inc.,
Hassett v. Welch, and other such cases, or regulations which specifically set
establish general liability, there is no liability.
Sec. 6001 also exempts “employees” from keeping records except where tips
and the like are concerned. This is consistent with constructive
demonstration that “employers” rather than “employees” are required to
file returns, as opposed to paying deducted amounts as income tax returns,
constructively demonstrated in a previous section of this memorandum and
specifically articulated in 26 CFR § 601.104. Clarification via 26 USC §
6053(a) is as follows:
(a) REPORTS BY EMPLOYEES. -- Every employee who, in the

course of his employment by an employer, receives in any
calendar month tips which are wages (as defined in section 3121(a)
or section 3401(a)) or which are compensation (as defined in

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section 3231(e)) shall report all such tips in one or more written
statements furnished to his employer on or before the 10th day
following such month. Such statements shall be furnished by the
employee under such regulations, at such other times before such
10th day, and in such form and manner, as may be prescribed by
the Secretary.
Unraveling § 6001 straightens out the meaning of § 6011, which requires

filing returns, statements, etc., by the person made liable (§ 3401(d)), as
distinguished from the person required to make returns (payments) at §
6012 (§ 3401(c)). Even though a person might be a citizen or resident of the
United States employed by an agency of the United States, and thereby be
required to return a prescribed amount of United States-source income, he is
not the person liable under § 6011 and attending regulations.
The “method of assessment” prescribed at 26 USC § 6303 is therefore

dependent on the taxing statute and must rest on authority specifically
conveyed by a taxing statute which prescribes liability where the Secretary
(1) has provided specific notice, including the statute and type of tax being
imposed, or (2) supports assessment by regulatory application. In the
absence of one or the other, an assessment by the Secretary is of no
consequence as it is not legally obligating.
The requirement for the Secretary to provide notice to whomever is

responsible for collecting tax, keeping records, etc., is clarified at 26 CFR §
301.7512-1, particularly (a)(1)(i), relating to “employee tax imposed by
section 3101 of chapter 21 (Federal Insurance Contributions Act),” and
(a)(1)(iii), relating to “income tax required to be withheld on wages by
section 3402 of chapter 24 (Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages)...”
The person liable is the employer or the employer’s agent, and of particular
significance, it is this “person” who is subject to civil and particularly
criminal penalties (26 CFR § 301.7513-1(f); 26 CFR §§ 301.7207-1 &
301.7214-1, etc.). Officers and employees of the United States are specifically
identified as being liable at 26 USC § 301.7214-1.

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The matter of who is required to register, apply for licenses, or otherwise

collect and/or pay taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code is ultimately
and finally put to rest under “Licensing and Registration”, 26 USC §§
301.7001-1, et seq. Each of the categories so addressed has liability based on
some particular taxing statute which creates liability.
8. The Necessity of Administrative Process
The requirement for a specific taxing statute, with 26 USC § 6001 clearly
providing the first leg in necessary administrative procedure to determine
liability, was addressed at length in Rodriguez v. United States, 629
F.Supp.333 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Presuming (1) the Secretary has provided the
necessary notice, or (2) a regulation prescribes general application which
makes any given person liable for a tax and requires tax return statements to
be filed, each step in administrative process prescribed by 26 USC §§ 6201,
6212, 6213, 6303 and 6331 must be in place for seizure or any other
encumbrance to be legal.
Here again, regulations published in the Federal Register are significant,

with provisions of 5 USC § 552 et seq., 44 USC § 1501 et seq., 1 CFR,
Chapter I, and 26 CFR, Part 601 all supporting the mandate for regulations
to be published in the Federal Register before they have general application.
It will be noted by referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules,
beginning on page 751 of the 1995 Index volume to the Code of Federal
Regulations, that application by regulation to the several States is only under
Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, or that there are no regulations
published in the Federal Register. The following entries, or non-entries, are
found:
26 USC § 6201 Assessment authority 27 CFR, Part 70 26 USC §

6212 Notice of deficiency No Regulation 26 USC § 6213
Restrictions applicable to deficiencies; petition to Tax Court No
Regulation 26 USC § 6303 Notice and Demand for Tax 27 CFR,

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Part 53, 70 26 USC § 6331 Levy and distraint 27 CFR, Part 70
The assessment authority under 26 USC § 6201, in relevant part as

applicable to Subtitles A & C taxes, are as follows:
(a) AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY. -- The Secretary is

authorized and required to make the inquires, determination, and
assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts,
additions to the tax, and assessable penalties) imposed by this title,
or accruing under any former internal revenue law, which have
been duly paid by stamp at the time and in the manner provided
by law. Such authority shall extend to and include the following:
(1) TAXES SHOWN ON RETURN. -- The secretary shall assess
all taxes determined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary as to
which returns or lists are made under this title. (3) ERRONEOUS
INCOME TAX PREPAYMENT CREDITS. -- If on any return or
claim for refund of income taxes under subtitle A there is an
overstatement of the credit for income tax withheld at the source,
or of the amount paid as estimated income tax, the amount so
overstated which is allowed against the tax shown on the return or
which is allowed as a credit or refund may be assessed by the
Secretary in the same manner as in the case of a mathematical or
clerical error appearing upon the return, except that the
provisions of section 6213(b)(2) (relating to abatement of
mathematical or clerical error assessments) shall not apply with
regard to any assessment under this paragraph. (b) AMOUNT
NOT TO BE ASSESSED. -- (1) ESTIMATED INCOME TAX. --
No unpaid amount of estimated income tax required to be paid
under section 6654 or 6655 shall be assessed. (2) FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT TAX. -- No unpaid amount of Federal
unemployment tax for any calendar quarter or other period of a
calendar year, computed as provided in section 6157, shall be
assessed. (d) DEFICIENCY PROCEEDINGS. -- For special rules
applicable to deficiencies of income, estate, gift, and certain excise
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taxes, see subchapter B. [emphasis added]
The grant of assessment authority with respect to taxes prescribed in

Subtitles A & C is limited to provisions set out above even where the Service
might have authority relating to those made liable for the tax, meaning the
“employer” specified at 26 USC § 3401(d). Clearly, returns made either by
the agent of the United States agency required to file a return, or the
Secretary, are to be evaluated mathematically, and errors are to be treated
as clerical errors, nothing more. The Secretary has no authority to assess
estimated income tax (individual estimated income tax at § 6554; corporation
estimated income tax at § 6655), or unemployment tax ( § 6157). For all
practical purposes, the trail effectively ends here.
9. The Impossibility of Effective Contract/Election
In order for there to be an opportunity for a nonresident alien of the United

States (a Citizen of one of the several States) to elect to be taxed or treated as
a citizen or resident of the United States, one or the other of a married
couple, or the single “individual” making the election, must be a citizen or
resident of the United States (26 USC § 6013(g)(3)). Some party must in some
way be connected with a “United States trade or business” (performance of
the functions of a public office (26 USC § 7701(a)(26)). A nonresident alien
never has self-employment income (26 CFR § 1.1402(b)-1(d)). In the event
that a nonresident alien is an “employee” (26 USC § 3401(c)), the
“employer” (26 USC § 3401(d)) is liable for collection and payment of
income tax (26 CFR § 1.1441-1). And in order for real property to be treated
as effectively connected with a United States trade or business by way of
election, it must be located within the geographical United States (26 USC §
871(d)).
Provisions cited above preclude any and all legal authority for Citizens of the
several States, or privately owned enterprise located in the several States, to
participate in federal tax and benefits programs prescribed in Subtitles A &
C of the Internal Revenue Code and companion legislation such as the Social

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Security Act which provide benefits from the United States Government,
which is a foreign corporation to the several States.
Summary & Conclusion
This memorandum is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely sufficient to

support causes set out separately. The most conspicuous conclusions of law
are that Congress never created a Bureau of Internal Revenue, the
predecessor of the Internal Revenue Service; Subtitles A & C of the Internal
Revenue Code prescribe excise taxes, mandatory only for employees of
United States Government agencies; the Internal Revenue Service, within the
geographical United States where the Service appears to have colorable
authority, is required to use judicial process prior to seizing or encumbering
assets; and the law demonstrates that people of the several States, defined as
nonresident aliens of the self-interested United States in the Internal
Revenue Code, cannot legitimately elect to be taxed or treated as citizens or
residents of the United States. If a Citizen of one of the several States works
for an agency of the United States or receives income from a United States
“trade or business” or otherwise effectively connected with the United States,
the employer or other third party responsible for payment is made liable for
withholding taxes at the rate of 30% or 14%, depending on classification,
and is thus “the person liable” and may be subject to Internal Revenue
Service initiatives, with administrative initiatives, where seizure and/or
encumbrance actions are concerned, subject to judicial determinations by
courts of competent jurisdiction.
Under penalties of perjury, per 28 USC § 1746(1), I attest that to the best of
my knowledge and understanding, all matters of law and fact presented
herein are accurate and true.
Dan Meador
William Cooper

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Cooper Family Targeted
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Revised:December 16, 1999.

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Notice to Citizens
http://www.williamcooper.com/pubnot2.htm (1 of 17) [12/15/01 1:24:40 PM]

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Judicial notice is hereby served by affiants upon the United States any other
interested party named within. This public notice will be construed to
comply with provisions necessary to establish presumed fact under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and attending State rules should interested
parties fail to rebut any given allegation or matter of law addressed herein.
The position will be construed as adequate to meet requirements of judicial
notice, thus preserving fundamental law. Matters addressed herein, if not
rebutted, will be construed to have general application. This public notice
includes all information which will be found by following the links on this
page and by following the links found on any page that is linked from this
page. A true and correct copy of this Public Notice is on file with and
available for inspection at the office of VERITAS national newspaper and at
the office of Harvest Trust. This public notice addresses federal jurisdiction,
federal authority, jurisdiction and authority of federal agents, the
Constitutionality and lawful character of the income tax and the Internal
Revenue Service, and other agencies of the United States government
including but not limited to the Department of the Treasury, and legal
application of the Internal Revenue Code.
Any statements or claims made by the Affiants in this public notice, properly
rebutted by facts of Law, or by overriding Constitution for the United States
of America, Article Three, Supreme Court rulings, shall not prejudice the
Lawful validity of other claims not properly rebutted or invalidated by facts

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of Law.
This public notice has been published on this WebPages for more than three
days which fulfills the legal requirement under the law in accordance to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and attending rules of the State of Arizona.
This public notice is mirrored on three websites in addition to this website.
It appears that we, William and Annie Cooper, have been targeted for
imprisonment or extermination by the federal government and the Anti
Defamation League (ADL) for documenting and sourcing the truth about the
tyranny and despotism of the Illuminati's coming socialist totalitarian new
world order. We have worked feverishly since 1988 documenting and
sourcing the facts of the treason being brought about by the Illuminati's
socialist change agents in government, and through the activities of Secret
Societies and organizations such as the subversive Anti Defamation League.
We are not criminals. Everything we have ever done has been in good faith
and with reasonable cause. We are not afraid. We will not run and hide. We
will continue to oppose evil whenever and wherever we find it. We will stand
and fight whomever or whatever assault they may mount against us.
I first learned of the treason taking place in this country (and around the
world) when I discovered the plan named "MAJESTYTWELVE" while a
member of the Intelligence Briefing Team and Petty officer of the watch in
the command center of Admiral Bernard Clarey who at that time was the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The plan outlined the
implementation of all of the planks of the Communist Manifesto which
began with the graduated so-called Income Tax administered by the fiction
known as the Internal Revenue Service, the disarmament of the American
People through laws instigated by a series of "terrorist" acts, the formation
of a world police force made up of the United Nations force known as NATO
combined with the military forces of the United States and the members of
the United Nations force known as the "Warsaw Pact" which plan is
outlined in State Department Publication 7277. It documented the intent to
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demonize and target Patriots and so-called "tax protestors" through

"Project Trojan Horse"... and much much more.
We have been documenting and sourcing the facts of this plan since 1988
through my book "Behold A Pale Horse", my radio broadcast "Hour Of The
Time," in our full size national newspaper "VERITAS", "Oklahoma City:
Day One," and in lectures and speaking engagements throughout the nation
and the world. The accuracy of MAJESTYTWELVE and our research is
reflected in the fact that since 1988 I have made over 150 predictions of
future world events and have only been wrong once.
The Illuminati's Rush Limbaugh read a White House memo that stated,
"William Cooper is the most dangerous radio host in America" on his so-
called Excellence In Broadcasting Network in 1995 following the bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. It was
an cowardly effort to redirect the socialist attack on so-called "right wing"
radio hosts away from Limbaugh and onto me, William Cooper, while
touting himself as "the most dangerous radio host in America."
My FBI record, which was initiated by the investigation required by my

Secret security clearance while in the U.S. Air Force, and my Top Secret Q
(SI) security clearance while in the U.S. Navy, was one of those found in
possession of the White House during the scandal known as "Filegate".
President Clinton ordered that all agencies of government begin an
investigation naming us enemies of the administration and "domestic
terrorists". Since when is telling the truth terrorism in this country?
After publication of my book "Behold A Pale Horse", 14 issues of VERITAS

which exposed, documented, and sourced the facts of the treason and the
fraud of the so-called income tax administered by the so-called IRS, a series
of 8 broadcasts exposing the Anti Defamation League as a criminal and
subversive organization , and our publication of the scathing expose
"Oklahoma City: Day One" by Michele Marie Moore, the government and

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the ADL ordered their puppets to go after us with the intent of shutting us
up for good. U.S. Attorney Janet Reno, the butcher of Waco, ordered the
Nazi Gestapo to go after us which immediately launched investigations by
the FBI, IRS, Financial Crimes Network, and many others. Reno ordered
her Phoenix based puppet U.S. Attorney Janet Napolitano to shut us up. Our
investigation demonstrates that Janet Reno, Phoenix based United States
Attorney Janet Napolitano, Assistant United States Attorney Stephan
Winerip and Special Agent Frank Shupnik, and possibly Judge Irwin are
members or supporters of the ADL. Shupnik and Winrip have been the most
persistent and subversive of the Law in their relentless persecution of this
family.
Since my Honorable Discharge from the United States Navy on December

11, 1975 I have engaged myself in research to discover if the information
regarding the federal income tax that I had seen in MAJESTYTWELVE
could be documented. Of all the subjects that I have researched over the
years, the unconstitutionality and unlawful application of the federal income
tax by the bogus and unconstitutional Internal Revenue Service to the People
domiciled within the territorial boundaries of the union states outside of the
Constitutional and lawful jurisdiction and authority of the United States
government turned out to be the easiest to document and source.
I immediately understood that the income tax is "private law" fraudulently

and unconstitutionally applied to the Citizens of the States of the union and
others. This becomes obvious when you begin to understand that "tax
courts" are not authorized in the constitution and so must be extra-judicial
private courts or subversive unconstitutional courts engaged in treasonous
activities against the Citizens of the States of the union. It appears that the
Citizens of the States of the union are fraudulently brought under the income
tax laws through contracts to which they did not wittingly or willingly
subscribe. Any contract where full disclosure of all terms of the contract has
not been made to all parties thereto are frauds and are null and void upon
their inception but most certainly upon discovery of the fraud.

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We have discovered the fraud and hereby serve judicial notice of our
discovery.
We DEMAND the Internal Revenue Service disclose any and all agreements,
contracts, adhesions, laws, regulations, or statutes which make us liable to
file and/or pay the so-called income tax. We demand the Internal Revenue
Service disclose the true nature of the legal fiction which the IRS contends is
us.
When the government began its investigation (persecution) of this family we

were noticed by Special Agent Frank Shupnik (no summons) to present
ourselves and all our financial records at a meeting to be held between him
and us in Phoenix, Arizona... we refused. Compulsory Production of
Documents: This brief explains the operation of the Fifth Amendment in
reference to producing personal books and records to an agency of the
government.
Ours and other's legal research, and information obtained through the
Freedom of Information Act, revealed that the federal government and its
agents have no authority whatsoever to conduct such an investigation. In fact
it once again confirmed that the federal government has no authority or
federal jurisdiction within the territorial boundaries of any state of the union
whatsoever except on property purchased by the government where
jurisdiction has lawfully been ceded to the federal government by the state
legislature, and over only those specific crimes enumerated in the
Constitution for the united States of America. There is only one exception
and that is extraterritorial jurisdiction brought about by treaties with
foreign nations such as the Crown of England. We are not citizens of any
foreign government. We are not subjects of the Crown of England or Great
Britain. We are not subjects of the Queen of England or Great Britain.
My research was confirmed with the following:
"The power of the United States to tax is limited to persons, property, and

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business within their jurisdiction, as much as that of a state is limited to the

same subjects within its jurisdiction." - Supreme Court Justice Fields
"It is a well-established principle of law that all federal legislation applies

only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary
intent appears." Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281.
And then this by the Supreme Court of New York:
The Supreme Court of New York was presented with the issue of whether
the State of New York had jurisdiction over a murder committed at Fort
Niagara, a federal fort. In People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233 (N.Y. 1819),
that court held that the fort was subject to the jurisdiction of the State since
the lands therefore had not been ceded to the United States: "To oust this
state of its jurisdiction to support and maintain its laws, and to punish
crimes, it must be shown that an offense committed within the acknowledged
limits of the state, is clearly and exclusively cognizable by the laws and courts
of the United States. In the case already cited, Chief Justice Marshall
observed, that to bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
union, it must have been committed out of the jurisdiction of any state; it is
not, the offence committed, but the place in which it is committed, which
must be out of the jurisdiction of the state."
The IRS makes it own rules (constitutes unconstitutional legislative action)

but the Internal Revenue Manual Handbook. 10.3.1.1 Chap. 7 Enforcement
Activities and Investigative Techniques admits no agent of the United States
government has any authority or jurisdiction to serve a summons or arrest
warrant anywhere other than "within the jurisdiction of the United States":
"[10.3.1.1] 7.2.3 (10/01/96)

"Service and Return
1. "An arrest warrant can be executed by a federal marshal or by some

other officer authorized by law. The summons may be served by any

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person authorized to serve a summons in a civil action; however,

Inspectors should make every effort to serve their own summonses. The
arrest warrant can be executed, and the summons served, at any place
within the jurisdiction of the United States. (Emphasis in red mine)
I discovered that the Internal Revenue Service is NOT an agency of the

Department of the Treasury or the federal government. It is not listed as
required by law in the United States Code under the organization of the
Department of the Treasury nor is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, or the Secret Service, nor are any of these bogus agencies listed in
the United States Code as agencies of any other branch of government. These
agencies are in fact fictions.
The United States Supreme Court in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad

Company while ruling that the income tax is an excise (indirect tax) included
as a part of its ruling that the federal income tax is VOID because Congress
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Secretary of the
Treasury to write the Law concerning the administrative and enforcement
procedures. It was a blatant and unconstitutional breach of the separation of
powers and in any case the Constitution does not grant Congress the ability
to delegate its powers to anyone or anything or any entity. The IRS, BATF,
the Secret Service, and all of their administrative rules, regulations, and
enforcement powers were created unconstitutionally by the stroke of a pen of
a Department of the Treasury employee. That is why there is so much
subterfuge and so many lies involved in the administration and enforcement
of the tax by the so-called Internal Revenue Service.
Uncertainty of the Law: American courts have failed to identify what is the
nature of the income tax. This uncertainty of the constitutional classification
of this form of taxation presents a monumental due process problem for the
American people. Members of Congress should be informed of this
uncertainty of the law which they did not create.
On January 8, 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Americans who
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refuse to pay their income taxes because they sincerely believe that the tax
law is unconstitutional COULD NOT be convicted of willful tax evasion!
According to Justice Byron White "someone's good faith belief that a federal
tax on his or her wages is unlawful, would not make that person guilty of a
crime requiring willful action, no matter how unreasonable that persons
belief".
Even if the income tax were Constitutional it is misapplied to the Citizens of

the States of the union except where the IRS can prove that a Citizen has
contracted, with full disclosure by the IRS to that Citizen of all terms and
liabilities of that contract, to make him or herself liable. American Legacy
Resources wrote one of the best explanations of what the income tax is and
what it is not. Visit their Taxation Supplement for a mind expanding
experience. Another extremely educational site is called Taxgate. Once you
begin to understand how badly you have been defrauded, cheated, and
extorted you will never be able to return to sheopledom.
Using our Rights guaranteed by Article One of the first ten amendments
known as the "Bill Of Rights" to Free Speech and Freedom of the Press and
acting as the Constitutional and Lawfully constituted unorganized Militia of
the State of Arizona and the united States of America we published several
stories revealing the results of our research into the history of, and the Law
concerning, the IRS. We also published a lawful "Public Notice" in issues
#14, 15, and 16 of VERITAS national newspaper which enumerated certain
facts discovered in Dan Meador's and my research. The law allows us to
presume the content of the Public Notice to be "presumed facts" since
neither IRS or the United States government has ever denied any of the facts
thus presented.
In light of the above we filed FOIA requests asking the IRS for specific
documents which specifically require us to file and pay the so-called income
tax... they could not and did not produce any such documentation but sent
me a copy of an old 1040 which I had filed before I mustered the guts to stop

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filing based upon the information I had seen in MAJESTYTWELVE and

from my research which verified that the tax is a criminal fraud. The
implication was that the 1040s which I had filed in the past was their only
authority. In other words I had signed the form stating that I was a
"taxpayer". The interpretation of the IRS was that since I had filed
previously it was an admission that I was required to file. Hitler would have
loved their reasoning. When we filed we filed either by honest mistake
because we had not yet discovered the fraud or because of fear and
intimidation which is called extortion. Fraud and extortion are criminal acts
under the law. When we discovered the fraud we declared all contracts and
signatures past, present, and future, which might make us liable to the fraud
to be null and void due to fraud.
We also filed FOIA requests asking the IRS for specific documents which
gave the IRS the authority to conduct an investigation of a Citizen of
Arizona. The IRS could not, and did not, produce any such documentation.
We noticed Special Agent Shupnik and Assistant U.S. Attorney Winerip to
produce their credentials and documentation of their authority to conduct
such an investigation... they refused because they could not as no such
documents exists.
We learned of an secret agreement between the individual states of the union

and the IRS. We obtained an unredacted copy and found that it is an
agreement granting jurisdiction to the IRS to require federal employees who
are state Citizens and residents of the states to file and pay the so-called
federal income tax. No cession of jurisdiction over these people was granted
by the state legislature as required by Law. If the so-called Internal Revenue
Service has the jurisdiction and authority to require Citizens and residents
of the states to file and pay the so-called income tax why do they have to have
an special secret agreement between the IRS and the states to tax their
federal employees who live and work outside the jurisdiction and authority
of the United States government?
We filed suit against the United States government, the IRS, Attorney

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General Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona Janet
Napolitano, and others, demanding the court simply order the defendants to
either produce the documentation that allows the IRS to tax and/or
investigate a Citizen of any state of the union or admit that no such
documentation exists, and several other points of Law. The suit has been
active for almost three years and the federal judge has refused to order the
defendants to obey the law and produce their authority or admit that it does
not exist. The attorney for defendants, Katz (another ADL member) has
slipped up and admitted in documents that he/she filed in this case that no
such documentation (thus no such authority) exists in the Phoenix District.
This suit is still awaiting adjudication in United States District Court in
Phoenix, Arizona. The government and the ADL wants us in prison or dead
before the judge is forced to rule in our favor as he must if he obeys the Law.
Recent experience tells us that the courts have been corrupted and the law is
frequently ignored. Pro Se litigants are all but ignored by federal judges who
pass the cases to clerks to handle.
Upon discovery that U.S. District Court in Phoenix is an Article I Court we

withdrew our suit against defendants for the reason that Title I Courts have
no jurisdiction over Citizens of the Union States. Only Article III Courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court have jurisdiction in cases concerning Citizens of
Union States. We cannot find an Article III Court existing anywhere in the
united States of America.
We have not committed any crime; but on June 18, 1998 a United States
Marshall came to the Trust Headquarters in Eagar, Arizona to serve a
summons for criminal trial in U.S. District Court in Phoenix Arizona on
"legal fictions". We told him that we are not the legal fictions named in the
summons and ordered him off the Trust property. I told him he was
trespassing and that he had no federal jurisdiction or authority within the
territorial boundaries of the state of Arizona. He knew I was right and
obeyed me without serving the papers thus proving me right.
Since no legal fictions can be found at our Trust Headquarters and domicile

Public Notice
and since no service was made the Court can take no action if the Court
obeys the Law. As we discovered with Waco, Ruby Ridge, and other federal
atrocities the federal Courts seldom obey the Law. The Marshall told me
that if the legal fictions named in the summons did not appear in federal
Court in Phoenix, Arizona on July 1, 1998 a warrant will be issued for OUR
arrest. We will not appear as we are not the legal fictions named in the
summons, the court has no jurisdiction or authority over us domiciled within
the territorial boundaries of the State of Arizona, and we will not allow an
unconstitutional arrest to occur.
As members of the Constitutional and Lawfully constituted unorganized

Militia of the State and of the united States of America we have the Right
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States of America and the
Constitution of the State of Arizona to keep and bear arms in defense of our
property, ourselves, the State of Arizona, and the Constitution for the United
States of America. Therefore we have not only the Right but the duty to
stand and fight the federal Gestapo with all the means at our disposal and
any assault which may be mounted upon our property or upon us.
Our children will remain with us. They are not shields, as our enemies will
claim, any more than children have been shields for families which have
been attacked by despotism throughout history. Allowing our children to
disappear into the immoral and destructive government child care and foster
home industry run by the mind controlling bogus Psychology profession only
to be abused and sexually assaulted for many years is a fate worse than
death, and we simply will not allow such a thing to happen to our precious
little girls. The federal and/or State government have no jurisdiction or
authority of kidnap our children for any reason whatsoever.
The people who have infiltrated our government and are destroying it from
within are morally bankrupt and in fact are Nazi jack booted thugs of the
worst SS Hitler storm trooper type. They have no ethics, morals, or respect
for life, property, religion, or the Law. The Nazis were socialists and
socialists are Nazis. Socialists are in complete control of the government of

Public Notice
the united States of America today.
We are not anti-government, radical, fundamentalist, crazy, suicidal,

criminals, child molesters, bank robbers, child abusers, tax protestors, wife
beaters, husband beaters, drug users, drug dealers, drug growers, drug
stockpilers, revolutionaries, subversives, terrorists, white supremicist,
racists, anti-Semitic, or any other demonizing label that may be applied. We
do not have illegal weapons, hand grenades, bombs, missiles, tanks, machine
guns, anti-tank rockets, anti-aircraft weapons or any other demonized
instrument of any type whatsoever. And our Trust Headquarters and
domicile is NOT a compound.
We are intelligent law abiding reasonable People who have drawn our line in
the sand. Our enemy will attempt to demonize us in order to obtain the
public's permission to murder our whole family just as they did the Weaver
family and the Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas. I never thought I would
hear so-called Christians whose ancestors fled the old world to escape
religious persecution say, "The Branch Davidians deserved what they got...
they were just a bunch of religious fanatics," but I heard so-called Christians
say it over and over and over again.
If we are found dead it will NEVER be because we committed suicide. It will

be cold blooded murder, just as they did at Ruby Ridge, The World Trade
Center, Waco, and Oklahoma City.
We are pro-government, lawful government, lawful Constitutional

Republican government as guaranteed to us in the Constitution for the
United States of America. We know what the government is and what it is
not. We know that the Constitution for the united States of America
constitutes the lawful government and anything or anyone outside its
strictures, limits, and powers is operating unlawfully and are in fact outlaws.
We know that the Constitution was not penned by a bunch of dottering old
men who did not understand the complexities of the modern age over two

Public Notice
hundred years ago. The Constitution was produced by the greatest collection
of geniuses who have ever lived. It is the LIVING Supreme Law of our
country. It provides within the document itself the provisions for us to make
any changes that we may deem necessary. Only a very few changes
(Amendments) have ever been made. Those changes or deletions wished for
by the socialist/communist Illuminati have been rejected by the American
People.
I have served my government all my life. I have been a member of the United
States Air Force and the United States Navy. I am a combat veteran of the
Vietnam war. I fought as a River Patrol Boat Captain in Vietnam earning
medals with the "V" for Valor. I took an Oath to, "support and defend the
Constitution for the united States of America against all enemies foreign and
DOMESTIC." I intend to fulfill that Oath until the day I die... and after, if
that is possible.
What we have included here is by not to be construed to be the entirety of

our legal position.
The Affiants hereby give the government agents, to whom this public notice
is directed, twenty (20) calendar days from the date that this public notice is
published on these WebPages to respond to this public notice.
All responses to this affidavit must be designated for delivery EXACTLY as

prescribed below, without omitting any parentheses. Otherwise, any
attempted correspondence with the Affiant will be returned to the sender,
"Refused for Fraud."
William Cooper
All Rights Reserved
(c/o Independence Trust, P.O. Box 1462, Lakeside, (de jure, union state of
Arizona) non-assumpsit to the venue of "AZ" (these united states of

Public Notice
America) non-domestic, i.e., non-government mail delivery non-assumpsit to

the venue of (40351)
Annie Cooper
All Rights Reserved
(c/o Independence Trust, P.O. Box 1462, Lakeside, (de jure, union state of
the venue of (40351)
The Affiants now affixe Affiants' signatures to all of the above affirmations
with explicit reservation of all of Affiants' unalienable Rights without
prejudice to any of those Rights.
I William, Cooper. declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
1787 Constitution for the United States of America that the foregoing public
notice is, to the best of William, Cooper's Knowledge, belief, understanding
and information, true, correct certain and complete.
In God we trust.
This public notice was published to this WebPages on June 28, 1998.
Further the Affronts sayeth naught.
(signed) William, Cooper Annie, Cooper - Affiants
Dorothy Cooper and Allyson Cooper minor children of Affiants
Anti Defamation League

Public Notice
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
Communist Manifesto
Compulsory Production of Documents
Department of State Publication 7277
Federal Jurisdiction
Federal Income Tax VOID - Administrative Powers Unconstitutional
Hour Of The Time
Illuminati
Internal Revenue Manual Handbook. 10.3.1.1 Chap. 7
MAJESTYTWELVE
NATO
Oklahoma City Bombing
Oklahoma City: Day One
Plot Thickens
Project Trojan Horse

Public Notice
Secret Societies
Subversive Organizations
Taxation Supplement
Taxgate
Uncertainty of the Law
Veritas
Home

Revised: December 16, 1999 .

This public notice addresses federal jurisdiction,
Notice to Citizens


Posted at 2:10 p.m. PDT July 7, 1998. No changes or corrections will be made.
Notice, Contract, Declaration of Citizenship, Affidavit,

Demand, and Jurisdiction Challenge
To IRS - Put up or shut up!

We give the Internal Revenue Service 20 Calendar days to respond.
$10,000 REWARD
This Notice, Contract, Declaration of Citizenship, Affidavit, Demand, and
Jurisdiction Challenge addresses federal jurisdiction, federal authority,
jurisdiction and authority of federal agents, the Constitutionality and lawful
character of the income tax, the Internal Revenue Service, and other agencies

of the United States government including but not limited to the Department
of the Treasury, and legal application of the Internal Revenue Code. It will be
construed to comply with provisions necessary to establish presumed fact
(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and attending State rules) should
interested parties fail to rebut within 20 calendar days any given allegation or
matter of law addressed herein. The position will be construed as adequate to
meet requirements of judicial notice, thus preserving fundamental law.
Matters addressed herein, if not rebutted within 20 calendar days, will be
construed to have general application.
In federal criminal prosecutions involving jurisdictional type crimes, the

government must prove the existence of federal jurisdiction by showing U.S.
ownership of the place where the crime was committed and state cession of
jurisdiction. If the government contends for the power to criminally
prosecute for an offense committed outside "its jurisdiction," it must prove
an extra-territorial application of the statute in question as well as a
constitutional foundation supporting the same. Absent this showing, no
federal prosecution can be commenced for offenses committed outside "its
jurisdiction."
"Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven." Hagins v Lavine, supra

note 3 "No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction." Standard v
Olson, 74 S.Ct. 768 "It has also been held that jurisdiction must be
affirmatively shown and will not be presumed." Special Indem. Fund v
Prewitt, 205 F2d 306, 201 OK. 308.
All interested parties must make rebuttals to the address contained in item
#146 below.
A true and correct signed copy of this document is on file with and available
for inspection at the office of VERITAS national newspaper. Interested
parties can obtain a certified copy by sending a BLANK $50 postal money
order to: VERITAS, c/o P.O. Box 1450, Eagar, Arizona 85925

Notice, Contract, Declaration of Citizenship, Affidavit, Demand, and

Jurisdiction Challenge
Know all Men and Women by these presents
de jure, union state ) of Arizona ) ) Ss. Affidavit of Fact ) Apache County )
Whereas: The Eternal and Unchanging Principles of the Laws of commerce

are:
1. A matter must be expressed to be resolved.
2. In commerce, Truth is Sovereign.
3. Truth is expressed in the form of an Affidavit
4. An undisputed Affidavit stands as Truth in Commerce.
5. An undisputed Affidavit becomes the judgment in commerce.
6. An Affidavit of Fact, under Commercial Law, can only be satisfied:
I. through a Rebuttal Affidavit of Fact, point for point;
II. by payment;
III. by agreement;
IV. by resolution by a jury according to the rules of Common Law;
7. A worker is worthy of his hire;
8. All are equal under the Law.
The foundation of Commercial Law is based upon certain eternally just,

valid, moral precepts and truth, which have remained unchanged for at least
six thousand (6,000) years, having its roots in Mosaic Law. Said Commercial
Law forms the underpinnings of Western Civilization, if not all Nations, Law
and Commerce in this world. Commercial Law is non-judicial and is prior
and superior to the basis of and cannot be set aside or overruled by the
statutes of any governments, Legislatures, Quasi-Governmental Agencies,
Courts, Judges, and Law Enforcement Agencies, which are under an
inherent obligation to uphold said Commercial Law.
Know all Men that William, Cooper hereinafter, "the Affiant", certifies in
this Affidavit of Fact that the following facts are true, correct, certain and
complete to the best of the Affiant's knowledge, belief and information.
I, William, Cooper a sui juris, Free, Good and Lawful, Christian, Man upon
the Land, who was natural-born on the sixth day of the fifth month of the
year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-three in the de jure Los
Angeles county of the De jure, union state of California, who is currently a
Free Inhabitant, Citizen of the de jure Apache county, of the de jure union
state of Arizona in addition to Citizen of the union state of California, and
whose mailing location is: All Rights Reserved, ( c/o Harvest Trust, c/o P.O.
Box 1970, Eagar, de jure, union state of Arizona) non-assumpsit to the venue
of "AZ" (these united States of America) non-domestic, i.e., non-government
mail delivery, non-assumpsit to the venue of ( 85925 ), does solemnly affirm,
declare, attest and depose:
1. That the Affiant is of Lawful age to make this Affidavit.
2. That the Affiant is competent to make this Affidavit.
3. That the Affiant has personal knowledge of the facts as stated herein.
4. That the Affiant is not under the Lawful guardianship or disability of

another.
5. That the Affiant makes this Affidavit of Fact as a matter of record of the

Affiant's own Right, sui juris, in the Affiant's own proper self, in propria
persona.
6. That the Affiant was natural-born a Citizen of the de jure union state of
California in the de jure Los Angeles county on the sixth day of the fifth
month of the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-three. That
Affiant's wife, Annie Mordhorst was natural-born a Citizen of the de jure
nation of Taiwan in the de jure city of Taipei on the eighth day of the
eleventh month of the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and fifty-three.
7. That as a natural-born, de jure, preamble Citizen of the de jure, union

state of California, the Affiant declares the Affiant's sovereignty extended to
the Affiant by All Mighty GOD. That Affiant's wife by virtue of the
"Common Law" as the lawful wife of Affiant Affiant's lawful wife is a de
jure, Common Law Citizen of the de jure, union state of California and
sovereignty is extended to the Affiant's lawful wife by ALL MIGHTY GOD.
8. That the de jure, union states of Arizona and California are of the freely
associated, compact states of the American union.
9. That the Affiant is a Citizen under the 1776, Unanimous Declaration of the
thirteen united States of America (also known as the Declaration of
Independence); the 1777 Articles of Confederation; the 1787 Constitution for
the united States of America; the Bill of Rights ratified in 1791, and
precedent decisions of the Constitution for the united States of America,
Article III justice Courts of Law. That Affiant's wife by virtue of the
"Common Law" as the lawful wife of Affiant is a Citizen of the same.
10. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are possessed of unalienable,
GOD-given Rights from Affiant's and Affiant's lawful wife's creator.
11. That Affiant's and Affiant's lawful wife's unalienable Rights are
memorialized in and secured by the 1787 Constitution for the united States of
America and the 1791 Bill of Rights.

12. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife have not ever, do not now, and
will not ever knowingly, willingly, voluntarily or intentionally waive any of
the Affiant's or Affiant's lawful wife's Rights.
13. That the government of the United States may not assume any power over
the Citizens of the de jure union states which is not specifically delegated to
the United States by the creators of the United States, that is, the Citizens of
the de jure, union states.
14. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not owe their Citizenship to
the so-called Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the united
States.
15. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife ARE NOT LIABLE for the
Title 26 United States Code/Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle-A, Section One
graduated income taxes for reasons of the Affiant's and Affiant's lawful
wife's alienage to the State of the forum of United States Tax Laws.
16. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife were not born in a territory
over which the United States is sovereign.
17. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not citizens subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, as defined in
(26 Code of Federal Regulations 1.1-1(c)); to wit:
(c)Who is a citizen: Every person born or naturalized in the United States

and subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen.
3A American Jurisprudence 1420, Aliens and Citizens. A person is born

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, for purposes of acquiring
citizenship at birth, If this birth occurs in a territory over which the United
States is sovereign.
18. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are "non-resident to" and "not
a dweller within" the jurisdiction of the "State of the Forum" of Article One,
Section Eight, Clause Seventeen, and Article Four, Section Three, Clause
Two of the Constitution for the united States of America, in which the United
States Congress "exercises exclusive Legislation in; all Cases whatsoever;
over said District not exceeding ten Miles square." beyond the seat of
Government of places legally ceded by the union states for the erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings, or any
other territories or properties "belonging to" the United States.
Consequently, the Affiant is not liable for the (Title 26 United States Code,
Subtitle-A, Section One), graduated income tax for reasons of the Affiant's
non-residence to such State of Forum.
19. That "It is a well-established principle of law that all federal legislation
applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a
contrary intent appears." Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281.
20. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a "resident of",
"inhabitant of", "franchise of", "subject of", "ward of", "chattel of", or
"subject to the jurisdiction of" the State of the forum of any United States,
the corporate State, corporate County, or corporate City, Municipal, body
politics created under the primary authority of Article one, Section Eight,
Clause seventeen, and Article Four, Section Three, Clause Two of the
Constitution for the united States of America, therefore, the Affiant is not
subject to any legislation created by such authorities; is not subject to the
jurisdiction of any employees, officers or agents deriving the authority
thereof; is not subject to Administrative, Constitution for the united States of
America, Article One courts, and is not bound by precedents of such courts:
Legislation enacted by Congress applicable to the inferior federal courts in

the exercise of power under Article III of the Constitution cannot be affected
by legislation enacted by congress under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the
Constitution. D.C. Code, Title 11, at page thirteen
21. That as sovereign Citizens of one of the union states, under the

constitution for the united States of America and Law, only Constitution for
the united States of America, Article Three, Justice Courts of law decisions
are applicable to the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife.
22. That the reader is hereby w a r n e d to TAKE NOTICE that through the
Contract and Declaration of Citizenship/Affidavit of Fact, presently before
the reader, the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife hereby C A N C E L S any
and all presumed election(s) made by the United States government or by any
agency or department thereof, that has assumed that the Affiant and/or
Affiant's lawful wife is or ever has been a citizen or resident of any territory,
possession, instrumentality, or enclave under the sovereignty or exclusive
jurisdiction of the united states as defined and limited to the United States in
Article One, Section Eight, Clause Seventeen and Article Four Section Three,
Clause Two of the Constitution for the united States of America, and
furthermore, the Affiant hereby C A N C E L S any presumption that the
Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife ever knowingly, willingly, voluntarily or
intentionally elected to be treated as such a citizen or resident.
23. That the reader is hereby w a r n e d to TAKE NOTICE that through the
Contract and Declaration of Citizenship/Affidavit of Fact, presently before
the reader, the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife; hereby; a) R E S C I N D S
all endorsements, subscriptions or presumed signatures attributed to the
hand of the Affiant, on any form or document whatsoever, which may be
construed or has been construed to give the International Monetary Fund;
the United Nations; any entity that claims to have a treaty, compact, contract,
agreement or understanding with the United States government; the Internal
Revenue Service; the Social Security Administration; or any agency or entity
of the United States government created under the authority of the
Constitution for the united States of America, Article One, Section Eight,
Clause Seventeen and Article Four, Section Three, Clause Two; or any other
government - whether said government be de jure, de facto, foreign,
domestic, local, state, national, international, hemispheric, global, secular or
one which maintains the trappings, vestments and appearance of a true
ecclesiastical organization - whatsoever, any authority or jurisdiction over

the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife; through inadvertence, fraud (see 1 after
end of this paragraph) or mistake; b) RESCINDS and makes V0ID ab initio,
all powers of attorney, in fact, in presumption, or otherwise, endorsed or
subscribed by the Affiant or which bear a presumed signature attributed to
the hand of the Affiant, or signed by someone or some thing else, without the
Affiant's prior, knowing, willing, voluntary and intentional consent, as such
power of attorney pertains to the Affiant, but not limited to, any and all quasi-
colourable, corporate governmental entities, private or public, on the
grounds of constructive fraud and non-disclosure.
1 United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 65-66
24. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not now, and will not ever,
knowingly, willingly, voluntarily or intentionally be an officer, employee,
elected official or chattel of the United States; the District of Columbia; or an
agency, franchise or instrumentality of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Royal Family of Great Britain, or the Vatican.
25. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not an officer of a
corporation under a duty to withhold.
26. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not an "employee" as that
"term" is defined in Law and in the Internal Revenue Code, Federal
Register, Tuesday, September 7, 1943, section 404.104, page 12267, to wit:
Employee: The term "employee" specifically includes officers and employees

whether elected or appointed of the United States, a State, territory, or
political subdivision thereof or of the District or Columbia or any agency
instrumentality or any one or more of the foregoing.
Section 3401(c) EMPLOYEE For purposes of this chapter, the term

employee Includes an officer, employee or elected official of the United
States, a State or any political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia,
or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The

term also includes an officer of a corporation.
27. That, because the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are NOT an
"employee", the Affiant does not earn "wages" as such terms are defined in
the Internal Revenue Code, to wit:
Section 3401(a) Wages...the term "wages' means all remuneration...for

services performed by an employee for his employer... .
28. That, pursuant to the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, Title One, Section
One, the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not earn "gross income" as such
term is defined therein. The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, Title 1 - Section 1,
Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the definition of "gross
income" (is amended after the words "compensation for personal service")
includes [only] personal service as an officer or employee of a State, or any
political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or
more of the foregoing.
29. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not involved in any type of
"revenue taxable activities" including but not limited to the manufacture,
sale or distribution of alcohol, tobacco, or firearms; any wagering activities;
or any other regulated industry, trade or profession.
30. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not reside in or obtain
income from any source within the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
United States Virgin Islands, Guam or any other territory, insular possession,
possession, enclave, franchise or instrumentality of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the British Commonwealth, or the Vatican.
31. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a United States Person;
United States Resident; United States Individual; United States Corporation
"citizen subject to it's jurisdiction", or subject of the Royal Family of Great
Britain, as such "words of art" are defined in the Internal Revenue Code and
other applicable United States Codes or treaties.

32. That the so-called Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the
united States did not repeal the Constitutional apportionment restrictions
imposed on direct taxes by the Constitution for the united States of America,
Article One, Section Two, Clause Three, and Article One, Section Nine,
Clause Four, thus, taxes on personal property are direct taxes, not taxable by
the federal government unless apportioned according to the census of the
union states.
33. That the so-called Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution for

the united States was not properly lawfully and constitutionally
ratified by the States of the Union. But if it had been properly ratified
it specifies "...incomes, from whatever source derived,...".
Amendment XVI. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration."
34. That the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury has defined and
limited the tax to be applicable to only, "...taxable income of the taxpayer
from specific sources and activities..." The income must be taxable and must
come from specific sources and activities that are defined by the Secretary.
Code of Federal Regulations ¤ 1.861- 8(a): "...The rules contained in this

section apply in determining taxable income of the taxpayer from specific
sources and activities under other sections of the Code referred to in this
section as operative sections. See paragraph (f)(1) of this section for a list and
description of operative sections."
35. That the Federal Regulations make reference to 'sources' within the
United States.. below are the only sources listed from which income must
derive in order for it to be taxable for the purpose of the Income Tax.
Code of Federal Regulations 1.861-8(f)(1)

(i) Overall limitation to the foreign tax credit.
(ii) [Reserved]
(iii) DISC and FSC taxable income. (note: DISC is Direct

International Sales Corp, and FSC is a Foreign Sales Corp)
(iv) Effectively connected taxable income. Nonresident alien

individuals and foreign corporations engaged in trade or
business within the United States,...
(v) Foreign base company income.
(vi) Other operative sections.
(A) "...foreign source items of tax..."
(B) "...foreign mineral income..."
(C) [Reserved]
(D) "...foreign oil and gas extraction income..."
(E) "...citizens entitled to the benefits of section 931 and the

section 936 tax credit..."
(F) "...residents of Puerto Rico..."
(G) "...income tax liability incurred to the Virgin Islands..."
(H) "...income derived from Guam..."
(I) "...China Trade Act corporations..."
(J) "...income of a controlled foreign corporation..."

(K) "...income from the insurance of U.S. risks..."
(L) "...international boycott factor...attributable taxes and

income under section 999..."
(M) "...income attributable to the operation of an agreement

vessel under section 607 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936..."
36. That the item 35. list explains clearly the "gross income"
involvement in light of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has
determined that the Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
inclusion or exclusion of something in a law. Or simply, if a particular
source is not on the list, then it is effectively 'excluded' from the
Income Tax Act and subsequently the legal definition of 'Gross
Income'.
37. That the item 35. list/regulation can be described simply as a "fence". The
U.S. Congress gave the Secretary the task to encircle and delineate the only
area from which "Gross Income", and hence "taxable income", can be
derived or accepted from... and the Secretary published his understanding of
what was expected of him in the regulations. The above list is in fact the
only definition of "sources" anywhere in the regulations. "Whatever" is
within the fence is "allowed" to be listed as "Gross Income". If it is not
within the confines of the Secretary's "fence" or "regulation", it is "exempt".
38. That some with a vested interest in taking care of our money for us, will
argue that the phrase "whatever sources" in the so-called 16th Amendment
means "any and all sources"... we AGREE that it does... any and
all "sources" within the list! The Secretary has defined them, then Congress
agreed with the Secretary! And they are restricted to the above list, as it is
the only list which defines sources! An entry for Citizens with domestic
income does not exist on this list!

39. That the power of the Congress and the authority it gives to the Executive
Branch is limited to the contents of the law.
40. What is not stated in the law is ALWAYS important; it is a

fundamental legal principle and a basic maxim of statutory
interpretation:
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing

is the exclusion of another)
"When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or

will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be
inferred. Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a
general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision,
other exceptions or effects are excluded." (Black's, 6th ed.)
1.) Section 61 states that gross income is from 'sources' which are
taxable.
2.) 26 USC ¤ 861(a), states that the following items of gross income
shall be treated as income from sources within the United States, and
does not define the 'specific sources' of income from within the U.S.,
that are taxable.
3.) 26 CFR ¤ 1.861 and following, are the Regulations promulgated by

the Secretary of Treasury to implement 26 USC ¤ 861, and prove that
the items of gross income discussed in 26 USC ¤ 861, are applicable
only to nonresident aliens and U.S. Citizens living abroad.
41. That all of the regulations applicable to 26 USC ¤ 864, Definitions,

are directed only to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.
Significantly, the only application of the federal income tax upon the
income of U.S. Citizens in existence is with respect to:
(1) a U.S. Citizen's foreign earned income, and

(2) the income of U.S. Citizens living abroad.
42. That when you examine 861's regulations, you find the admission
in 1.861-8 (a)(4), that income must come from a specific source to be
taxable. If you examine the sources in 1.861-8 (f)(1), you will find that
the domestic sources are plainly applicable to nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations. The others listed are foreign sources that U.S.
citizens would definitely be taxed upon.
43. That there is no direct mention of U.S. sources where U.S.

Citizens can earn 'gross income'.
44. That of the five sources listed in (f)(1), four of them are repeated
as non-exempt income pursuant to 26 CFR ¤ 1.861-8 (T)(d)(2)(iii). And
pursuant to 1.861-8 (T)(d)(2)(ii)(A), all income that is exempt,
excluded (not listed), or eliminated from the law, is exempt income.
There are no other U.S. sources listed that are applicable to U.S.
citizens living and working within the U.S.
45. That since the law is plainly structured to be taxing nonresident

aliens, and foreign earned income, we must have some specific
citation of law, specifically taxing U.S. citizens on their domestic
source income, as the Secretary has made the list of U.S. sources
that are taxable in 26 U.S.C. ¤ 861, applicable only to nonresident
aliens.
46. That the only form required to be filed by U.S. Citizens, pursuant
to section 1.1-1 of the Code of Federal Regulations, is the 2555
foreign earned income form. With regard to the filing of returns, the
only filing requirement for an individual under Subtitle A "income"
tax is found in code section 6012(a). Under section 6012(a) and its
underlying regulations, "taxable income" is limited to certain income
that has been "earned" while living and working in certain foreign

countries or territories.
As proof of the above, under the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must assign an OMB
approval number to any agency return that requests and collects
information from a U.S. citizen. According to OMB approval control
number 1545-0067 assigned to Treasury regulations 1.1-1 "Tax
imposed" and 1.6012-0 "Person required to make returns of income"
under 26 CFR part 600 to end, the required return for a U.S. citizen to
report income is not Form 1040, but Form 2555 "Foreign Earned
Income." The 1040 return for the "U.S. Individual" is merely a
SUPPLEMENTAL WORKSHEET for the required Form 2555. The top
of Form 2555 instructs "attach to front of Form 1040" and "for use by
U.S. citizens". Treasury Decision 2313 (TD 2313) clarifies that the
Form 1040 individual income tax return is to be used only by the
fiduciary of a nonresident alien and receiving interest and/or
dividends from the stock of domestic (US) corporations on behalf of
that nonresident alien. This decision was issued in 1916 to
"collectors of internal revenue" pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court
under the Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. decision and still stands
today.
For the above reasons, the income tax under Subtitle A is not
"voluntary" for those to whom it applies, as some have asserted. It is
mandatory, but only for those to whom it applies as explained above.
Since the law is limited in its application, the question of whether it is
mandatory or voluntary is superfluous. The question is to whom and
under what circumstances is the law applied? With regard to the
wage tax under Subtitle C, certain legal requirements may be
considered mandatory. But only for the payor of the wages (the
"employer") and even then, only if both the "employer" and the
"covered employee" has voluntarily agreed (via voluntary application
on Form W-4) to participate in the entitlement programs. Since there
is no legal requirement to have a social security number (SSN) in

order to live and work in the U.S. (or simply for the sake of having
one); no legal requirement to enter a SSN on Form W-4, sign or
submit it, and; no legal requirement for an employer to obtain an
employer identification number (EIN) in order to hire workers, neither
party - "employee" or "employer" - can be compelled to participate in
the entitlement programs, hence compliance under Subtitle C is
correctly said to be voluntary for those to whom the income tax
under Subtitle A does NOT apply.
IRS Publication 515 and Treasury regulation 1.1441-5 explain the

proper use of the Statement of Citizenship (SOC), a copy of which is
sent by the employer (who retains the original) to the IRS in
Philadelphia only, which makes sense since Philadelphia is the IRS
international tax office. The SOC authorizes (and indemnifies) the
employer to stop withholding income taxes from the worker who
chooses not to have his or her taxes withheld.
47. That attempting to pass off ¤ 61 defining "Gross income" as the

section of Code as the law taxing all U.S. citizens on their U.S. source
income, even if the income cannot be deemed to be from taxable
sources, is dishonest in light of the construction of the statute.
Since 26 CFR ¤¤ 1.861-8 (f)(1) and -8T (d)(2)(iii) state plainly the
taxable sources which a U.S. Citizen must have, to make income
"Gross income" and thus "taxable income" (the latter being taxed in
¤ 1). It is no wonder that the proper Form to be filed, pursuant to
Section 1 of 26 U.S.C. and 26 CFR by a U.S. Citizen is the 2555
Foreign Earned Income form.
48. That 'Exempt Income' is defined:
26 CFR ¤ 1.861-8T(d)(2)(ii)(A)
"In general. For purposes of this section, the term exempt income
means any income that is in whole or in part, exempt, excluded, or

eliminated for federal income tax purposes."
49. That "Exclusion" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, in part, as

follows:
"Denial of entry or admittance."
50. That right after the Secretary stated this, he plainly listed income not
exempt from taxation here as follows:
26 CFR ¤ 1.861-8T(d)(2)(iii)
(iii) Income that is not considered tax exempt.
The following items are not considered to be exempt, eliminated,

or excluded income and, thus, may have expenses, losses, or other
deductions allocated and apportioned to them:
(A) In the case of a foreign taxpayer (including a foreign sales

corporation (FSC)) computing its effectively connected income,
gross income (whether domestic or foreign source) which is not
effectively connected to the conduct of a United States trade or
business;
(B) In computing the combined taxable income of a DISC or FSC

and its related supplier, the gross income of a DISC or a FSC;
(C) For all purposes under subchapter N of the Code, including the
computation of combined taxable income of a possessions
corporation and its affiliates under section 936(h), the gross
income of a possessions corporation for which a credit is allowed
under section 936(a); and
(D) Foreign earned income as defined in section 911 and the

regulations thereunder (however, the rules of section 1.911-6 do

not require the allocation and apportionment of certain

deductions, including home mortgage interest, to foreign earned
income for purposes of determining the deductions disallowed
under section 911(d)(6)).
51. That the only income listed in item 50. related to U.S. Citizens is (D)
52. That the definition of "wages" in ¤ 3401(a) to be withheld from in

accordance with ¤ 3402, excludes all remuneration paid to U.S. Citizens by
employers, except income which is deemed to be gross income under ¤ 911, or
other income related to foreign and U.S. possession sources.
53. That this law confirms our position, in simple terms according to Black's
Law Dictionary, that if the income in question comes from a source
"excluded" from the law, and thus not mentioned within the law as being
taxable, it cannot then meet the source requirements of ¤ 861, its regulations,
and thus section 61(a) to be "Gross income", and is by definition EXEMPT.
54. That what is not within a law is just as important as what is!
55. That the entire topic of the "Income Tax" and the statutes regarding it
are built upon the foundation of "Gross Income" as defined in ¤ 61 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and that the laws mean exactly what they say.
56. That compensation for labour and exercise of the Right to labour are
personal property, and such personal property correctly comes under the
authority of the Constitution for the united States of America, Article One,
Section Two, Clause Three, and Article One, Section Nine, Clause Four, and
are, therefore, not taxable by the Federal Government as a graduated tax. Be
advised: compensation earned and exercising the Right to Labour is excluded
from "Gross Income" and is exempt from taxation under Title 26 of the
United States Code, under the authority of Title 26, Code of Federal
Regulations (1939), Section 9.22(b)-1, as follows:
26 Code of Federal Regulations (1939) Section 9.22(b)-1 Exclusions from

gross income -- The following shall not be included in gross income and shall
be exempt from taxation under this title: (b)-1 Exceptions; exclusions from
gross income. Certain items of income ... are exempt from tax and may be
excluded from gross income ... those items of income which are under the
Constitution, not taxable by the Federal Government.
united States of America was not ever properly ratified by the States of the
union according to the conditions required by the Constitution for the united
States of America for ratification and adoption of Amendments to the
Constitution for the united States of America. That even if the so-called
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the united States of America
had been properly ratified the so-called Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution for the united States would be limited in application only to
indirect taxes.
58. That the income tax is an excise tax. (United States Supreme Court in
Brushaber vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company)
59. That compensation for the Affiant's labour is the Affiant's personal
property, and therefore, is not taxable by the Federal Government except by
rule of apportionment.
60. That an excise tax CANNOT be imposed upon a natural-born Man or

Woman upon the Land, Citizen measured by his/her compensation for
labour because such a tax would be a direct capitation tax, subject to the rule
of apportionment privilege.
61. That the requirement to pay an excise tax involves the exercise of a
privilege.
62. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not exercising any taxable
privileges.

63. That the Affiant provides for the Affiant's and his families existence by
labouring in a non-taxable craft of common Right, to wit:
"The Citizen, unlike the corporation, can not be taxed for the mere privilege
of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and
charter powers to the state; but the Citizen's Right to live and own property
are Natural Rights for the enjoyment of which an excise can not be imposed
... We believe that the conclusion is well justified that a tax laid directly upon
income or property, real or personal may well be regarded as a tax upon the
property which produces the income." Redfield v. Fisher, 292 Oregon
Supreme Court, 813 at 817, 819 (1939)
64. That the Affiant's compensation for labour constitutes the fruits of the
Affiant's labour, and as such is the Affiant's substance and personal
property, of which the Federal Government may not deprive the Affiant of
any portion by appropriating said property against the Affiant's will.
65. That the Victory Tax Act of 1942 [ 56 Statutes at Large, Chapter 619 page
884. Oct. 21, 1941 ] which implemented "withholding" and 1040 Returns
requirements, stated: Section 476 "The taxes imposed by this subchapter
shall not apply with respect to any taxable year after the date of cession of
hostilities in the present War, i.e., World War II."
66. That the Victory Tax Act and its provision for withholding was repealed
pursuant to 58 Statutes at Large, Chapter 210, Section 6(a), page 235.
67. That there are only four things that can possibly be the subject matter of
any tax whether it's local, state or federal:
(1) People (capitation, "head" and poll taxes - a direct tax)
(2) Property by reason of ownership (real and personal property taxes - a

direct tax)
(3) Revenue taxable activities (such as the manufacture, sale or distribution

of alcohol, tobacco or firearms - an indirect tax)
(4) A grant of privilege (for example, state registered corporate charters

granting permission to do business - is a privilege by the state's definition - an
indirect tax)
68. That taxes on the first two types are called direct taxes while the third and
fourth types are known as indirect taxes. This definition is not derived from
what the tax is popularly or formally named nor from how the tax is
measured. This definition can only come from its "subject."
69. That there has never been a "head" tax since the Constitution was
instituted because capitation taxes are expressly forbidden by Article 1,
Section 9, paragraph 4. This type of tax is "outlawed" at all levels. That while
property taxes are legal in nearly all state and local jurisdictions, they are not
legal on the federal level. That the federal government must restrict itself to
the indirect class of taxes, duties, imposts and excises.
"The income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It is an excise tax
with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by
reference to the income which they produce. The income is not the subject of
the tax; it is the basis for determining the amount of tax." House
Congressional Record, March 27, 1943, pg. 2580
70. That the courts have clearly established that the misleadingly named
"income tax" is an excise tax and, therefore, is an indirect tax. The Supreme
Court case, Russell v. U.S., 369 U.S. 749, at 765 (1962), states that: "'Taxable
income' can only be derived from revenue taxable activities. Statements
alleging some sort of taxable activity must be made in order to support the
legal conclusion that the accused had 'taxable income,' etc., or the indictment
is invalid and the court does not have authority to hold a trial."
71. That the Supreme Court's unanimous rulings in the following cases have
never been reversed or overturned: Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240

U.S. 1; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103; and Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107 The Court in Brushaber and Stanton held that the
Sixteenth Amendment (the "income tax" amendment), as correctly
interpreted, and the "income tax" itself WHEN CORRECTLY APPLIED,
are constitutional because they are restricted to indirect taxes. Which means
that when incorrectly interpreted and incorrectly applied the "income tax" is
unconstitutional.
72. That in Flint, the Court held that indirect taxes are never upon any kind
of property, money or otherwise, but only upon particular activities, in which
the resulting income is used to measure the tax on the taxable activity.
"Income taxes" are only named such because the income connected with the
activity is used as the standard or yardstick by which the tax upon the
activity is measured. Under the Internal Revenue Code, an activity must be
taxable for revenue purposes as opposed to strictly regulatory purposes.
"[Excise taxes are] taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of
commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations,
and upon corporate privileges." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed.,
p.680 as cited in Flint, supra, 151.
73. That facts regarding the exercise of a revenue taxable privilege or activity
must exist in order to support the legal position that a person had "taxable
income," or was "obligated to pay", or was "required by law to file tax
returns," or is even to be considered a "taxpayer".
74. That there is a distinct class officially recognized as "non-taxpayers" who

are not subject to the jurisdiction of Internal Revenue statutes. "Jurisdiction
is essentially the authority conferred by Congress to decide a given type of
case one way or another." Hagans v Levine, 415 U.S. 533 (1974).


Prewitt, 205 F2d 306, 201 OK. 308.
75. That the IRS, in order to define Affiant and/or Affiant's lawful wife as a
"taxpayer", must assert jurisdiction.which Affiant refutes. The IRS must
prove that Affiant falls under its jurisdictional influence.
76. That should the Internal Revenue Service violate Affiant's and Affiant's
lawful wife's rights under color of law and, with the complicity of the courts,
forcing jurisdiction upon Affiant, they still cannot prevail; first, because of
the lack of implementing regulations, second, because Affiant is not engaged
in any revenue taxable activities and, third, through the emphatic assertion of
Affiant's correct and proper legal status.
77. That in law the legal definition is the only authoritative one. About eighty
court decisions and Treasury decisions have used the terms "includes" and
"including" in a restrictive sense meaning that when they are used the terms
denote ONLY those items that follow it. Further, Black's Law Dictionary, the
"handbook" of legal definition defines "include" as follows:
"Include. (Lat. Inclaudere, to shut in, keep within) To confine within, hold as
an enclosure, take in, attain, shut up, contain, inclose, comprise, comprehend,
embrase, involve. Term may, according to context, express an enlargement
and have the meaning of and or in addition to, or merely specify a particular
thing already included within general words theretofore used. 'Including'
within statute is interpreted as a word of enlargement or of illustrative
application as well as a word of limitation." Premier Products Co. v.
Cameron, 240 Or. 123, 400 P.2d 227,228.
78. That Black's Law Dictionary says when the term "include" is used it
expands to take in all of the items that are listed but only those items and no
others. The importance of this limiting sense of the term is apparent when
you look at many of the Internal Revenue Code definitions.
Section 7701 (a) (9) : UNITED STATES. - The term "United States" when

used in a geographic sense includes only the States and the District of
Columbia.
79. That in the very next definition the Code defines the term "State."
Section 7701 (a) (10) : STATE. - The term ‘State’ shall be construed to
include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to
carry out the provisions of this title. Based on the legal definition of the term
"include," then "State" means ONLY the District of Columbia. If we
substitute this in the definition of "United States" then the code is limited in
its jurisdiction to only the District of Columbia.
80. That to show that the IRS knows precisely what it’s saying and is very
specific in its application of these definitions, the Code follows form when it
defines "State, United States, and Citizen" in Chapter 21 - Federal Insurance
Contributions Act or FICA.
Section 3121 (e) : STATE, UNITED STATES, AND CITIZEN. - For the
purposes of this chapter (1) STATE. - The term 'State' includes the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,
and American Somoa. (2) UNITED STATES. - The term 'United States'
when used in the geographic sense includes the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Somoa. The IRS insists the
Code is absolutely correct so this is exactly what it must mean. Therefore, the
provisions of Title 26 apply only to the District of Columbia and the federal
territories.
81. That the Code defines 'employer' in Chapter 24 - COLLECTION OF

INCOME TAX AT SOURCE ON WAGES.
Section 3401 (d) : EMPLOYER. - For purposes of this chapter, the term
'employer' means the person for whom an individual performs or performed
any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such person....
82. That if you have an 'employee' then you are an employer. There is a
conspicuous absence of the term "include" in this definition?
Section 3401 (c) : EMPLOYEE. - For purposes of this chapter, the term
'employee' includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United
States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of
Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the
foregoing. The term 'employee' also includes the officer of a corporation.
83. That to be an "employee" you must work for the government or be an

officer of a corporation. The term "include" shows up here and again, if we
substitute this idea into the definition of 'employer' a company is most likely
NOT an employer because none of the people working for companies are
employees of the government.
Section 7701 (a) (3) : CORPORATION. - The term 'corporation' includes

associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies.
84. That further investigation shows that the corporation must be formed in,
be doing business in, or receiving income from the District of Columbia or be
classified as a "foreign corporation." Those who are not incorporated are
covered in the Code as well.
Section 7701 (a) : TRADE OR BUSINESS. - The term 'trade or business'

includes the performance of the functions of a public office.
85. That the Courts have drawn a distinct line between "income" and
"wages." "Income, within the meaning of the 16th Amendment and the
Revenue Act, means gain ... and, in such connection, gain means profit ...
proceeding from property severed from capital, however invested or
employed and coming in, received or drawn by the taxpayer for his separate
use, benefit and disposal....
86. That income is neither a wage nor compensation for any type of labor."
Stapler v. U.S., 21 F. Supp. 737, at 739. "There is a clear distinction between

‘profit’ and "wages", or a compensation for labor. Compensation for labor

(wages) cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The
word "profit", as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or
investment -- a different thing altogether from the mere compensation for
labor." Oliver v. Halstead, 86 S.E. Rep 2nd 85e9 (1955) "...[W]hatever may
constitute income, therefore, must have the essential feature of gain to the
recipient.... If there is not gain there is not income.... Congress has taxed
income not compensation." Connor v. U.S., 303 F. Supp. 1187 (1969)
87. That each time a company and/or its executives turns over "employee"
money to the IRS under a Notice of Levy they are unwittingly aiding and
abetting the IRS in the performance of an illegal act. To understand why we
need to look to the Code provisions relating to Levy and Distraint.
Specifically, Subchapter D - Seizure of Property for Collection of Taxes.
Under Section 6331 - Levy and Distraint is the following:
Section 6331 (a) AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY. - If any person liable to

pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after the notice
and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such
further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy
upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt
under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien
provided in this chapter for the payment of such a tax... (A lien can only exist
by order of a Court after "due process" has been extended to the accused
under law.)
Section 6331 (a) cont'd AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY. - ...Levy may be

made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected
official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or
instrumentality of the United States or District of Columbia, by serving a
notice of levy on the employer (as defined in 3401 (d)) of such officer,
employee, or elected official.... (on which there is a lien).
88. That when we take the time to look closely at this "power" we see from

the first part of it that the Secretary's power is delimited and confined to
those who are "liable to pay any tax." As further evidence of the limited
power of the Secretary to issue Notices of Levy (to such person on which
there is a lien), the second part of sec. 6331(a) is clearly aimed at government
employees and is actually the only part of the section that even mentions the
filing of a notice. Since the IRS adamantly asserts that the Code is completely
correct in its script Affiant can only conclude that the power to issue a Notice
of Levy applies only to government employees and therefore, as a "foreign
corporation", by Code definition, no one else is charged with any
responsibility for the perfection of such overextended, misapplied powers and
bogus jurisdictional claims.
"As in our intercourse with our fellow-men certain principles of morality are
assumed to exist, without which society would be impossible, so certain
inherent rights lie at the foundation of all action, and upon a recognition of
them alone can free institutions be maintained. These inherent rights have
never been more happily expressed than in the Declaration of Independence,
that evangel of liberty to the people: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident' -
that is, so plain that their truth is recognized upon their mere statement 'that
all men are endowed' not by edicts of emperors, or decrees of Parliament, or
acts of Congress, but 'by their Creator with certain unalienable rights' that
is, rights which cannot be bartered away, or given away, or taken away
except as punishment for crime 'and that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, and to secure these' not grant them but secure them
'governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.
"Among these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great document, is

the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to
pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with
the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop
their faculties, so as to give them their highest enjoyment.
"The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits,

which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all

communities from time immemorial, must, therefore, be free in this country
to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let or
hindrance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex,
and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States,
and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright.
"...The property which every man has is his own labor, as it is the original
foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The
patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own
hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what
manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation
of the most sacred property." Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111
U.S. 746, (1883)
89. That in two other cases, the Supreme Court said: "Included in the right
of personal liberty and the right of private property - partaking of the nature
of each - is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief
among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and
others services are exchanged for money or other forms of property."
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, at 14 (1915) ". . . Every man has a natural
right to the fruits of his own labor, as generally admitted; and that no other
person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them
against his will . . ." Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, at 120
90. That in 1913, four years after Congress first introduced the income tax
amendment, Philander Knox, a Pittsburgh attorney and then Secretary of
State, declared the 16th Amendment duly ratified, despite the protests and
subsequent research which reveals proof to the contrary. Congress intended
that somebody should pay a tax. Congress has the Constitutional authority to
tax, but only through specific types of taxes.
91. That therefore, since Congress and the Courts have defined it as an excise
tax, Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife have no argument with the tax itself

and do not protest against the income tax. However, it is one thing to protest
a tax and another thing entirely to protest extortion committed under the
guise, pretext, sham, or subterfuge of the unlawful unconstitutional
misapplication of the revenue laws against Affiant and/or Affiant's lawful
wife who are neither subject to nor liable for such indirect taxes. This type of
extortion is prohibited by the 5th amendment "due process of law" clause,
and the extortion clause of the Internal Revenue Code in Section 7214.
92. That Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are NOT tax protesters. That
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are protesting against the unconstitutional
and unlawful MISAPPLICATION of the revenue laws and are not protesting
the tax itself in its proper and lawful application as an excise tax levyed upon
"those made liable" who are engaged in taxable activities and privileges
deriving "gross income" from the specific "sources" named by the Secretary
of the Department of the Treasury.
93. That the IRS was not created by Congress. It is not an organization found
under the organization of the Department of the Treasury in Title 31 United
States Code with the other agencies of the Department of the Treasury. One
of the organizations known as the IRS was created as a trust in the
Philippines ("Bureau of Internal Revenue," Trust fund #1, Philippine special
fund; 31 USC 1321) under the Department of Finance and Justice. Another
trust fund, Trust fund #62, Puerto Rico special fund, was created for
"Internal Revenue." Title 26 United States Code (Internal Revenue Code)
specifically defines the jurisdiction under which it is effective as only
pertaining to the District of Columbia and its territories and possessions.
94. That an agency's failure to publish any document (regardless of how

named by the agency) which is designed to implement or prescribe law is a
"rule" which is void and unenforceable.
95. That within an agency, "instructions" may be promulgated and

distributed to agency officers and employees informing them as to the
manner and method of implementing and enforcing any particular law. If by

chance these "instructions" likewise meet the definition of a "rule" as

defined by ¤ 551, and if the same be "substantive" as prescribed by ¤ 552,
they must be published in the Federal Register. Several cases have found
such "instructions" to agency employees void for non-publication.
Case authority clearly shows that "instructions" given to agency personnel

which command the performance of an act by a member of the public or
which limit entitlement to statutory benefits are subject to the publication
requirement. If such "rules" found in agency instructions to agency
personnel must be published, then likewise similar "instructions" given
directly by the agency to the public must also be published on the grounds
that the same similarly are "rules."
96. That it is essential for a federal employee to possess delegated authority to

perform any particular act; the absence of delegated authority means that
the act in question was beyond the scope of the employee's duties, and
therefore unlawful.
The necessity for a federal employee to have delegated authority to act not
only is shown in the above cases, it also manifests itself in cases under the
Federal Torts Claims Act (herein "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C., ¤1346(b). Under this
law, the United States is liable for torts committed by its employees if so
committed within the scope of their employment. If the act in question was
not committed in the scope of employment, the employee is liable and the
United States is not.
A variety of cases deciding FTCA claims show instances where the United
States is held not liable for its employees torts. In Paly v. United States, 125
F.Supp. 798 (D.Md. 1954), a soldier detailed as a military funeral escort was
driving his own car to a funeral and was involved in an accident. Since the
soldier lacked express orders to do so, his tort was held to be outside the
scope of his employment and the United States was not liable. In Jones v.
F.B.I., 139 F.Supp. 38, 42 (D.Md. 1956), it was alleged that certain FBI agents
had stolen or converted property belonging to the plaintiff. The court held

that if such were true, the agents "were not 'acting within the scope of [their]
office or employment'," and the United States could not be liable in tort. In
James v. United States, 467 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1972), a reservist was involved
in a car accident on his return from an annual field training exercise; since
this travel was not within the scope of his employment, the government was
held not liable for damages. In another accident case involving an Army
truck, White v. Hardy, 678 F.2d 485, 487 (4th Cir. 1982), the driver was found
to have no authority to drive the truck when the accident happened, thus his
acts were beyond the scope of his employment and the United States was not
liable ("There was substantial evidence that Sergeant Hardy was not given
the requisite express authority to use the government vehicle involved in the
collision"). In Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981), the
United States was held not liable for child molestation committed by one of
its employees, a postal worker. In Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081 (4th
Cir. 1985), the United States was held not liable for the wrongful death of one
serviceman committed by another. And in Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d
393 (4th Cir. 1986), the court held the government not liable under the FTCA
for the sexual assault of some girls by one of its employees.
Cases from other jurisdictions also demonstrate that for an act to be within
the government employee's scope of employment, it must have been
authorized by a regulation or some other written document. For example, in
Mider v. United States, 322 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1963), a FTCA claim was being
asserted against the United States for damages arising from an accident
involving a drunken Air Force serviceman. To define the serviceman's
authority, written regulations were consulted to determine whether the act of
driving the government's car was authorized. Finding that the regulations
did not permit use of the vehicle on this occasion, the serviceman was found
not to be acting within the scope of his employment. In Bettis v. United States,
635 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1981), a soldier drove a truck off a military base
without authority and was involved in an accident; his act was held to be
beyond his authority and thus the United States was not liable in tort. In
Turner v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 708 (W.D.La. 1984), a recruiter
conducted an unclothed physical examination of some potential females

enlistees, which caused them to sue under the FTCA. In finding that there
were no regulations either permitting or requiring such examinations, the
United States was found not liable. See also Doggett v. United States, 858 F.2d
555 (9th Cir. 1988), and Lutz v. United States, 685 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1982).
Thus the above cases adequately demonstrate that a government employee

must have some specific delegated authority, based upon statutes, regulations
or delegation orders, in order to be authorized to act in the premises. The
absence of such authority, when challenged, therefore requires a holding that
the employee's acts were unauthorized and thus beyond the scope of his
employment.
97. That a plain reading of ¤7608 reveals that the section itself conveys
authority to nobody other than the Secretary; the Secretary, in turn, must
authorize agents and this calls for the issuance of delegation orders. Under
the repealed regulation 301.7608-1, it is obvious that some type of authority
had been conveyed to the Commissioner, but here even he had to issue
delegation orders appointing agents. Thus, to follow the flow of authority
under ¤7608, it is essential to consult Treasury Department Orders and
Commissioner's Delegation Orders.
In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act was adopted and the same
required federal agencies to publish in the Federal Register statements of
their central and field organizational structures as well as the methods by
which their functions were channeled (delegation orders); see 5 U.S.C., ¤552.
It is acknowledged by both Treasury and I.R.S. that these items must be so
published; see 31 C.F.R. ¤1.3(a), and 26 C.F.R., ¤601.702(a). In fact, it is
acknowledged that anything concerning or affecting the American public
must be published. In 1953, Revenue Ruling 2 (1953-1 CB 484) was issued
and it required all divisions or units of the I.R.S. to publish in the Federal
Register any item of concern to the public. This was more clearly expressed
in Rev. Proc. 55-1 (1955-2 CB 897) as follows:
"It shall be the policy to publish for public information

all statements of practice and procedure issued

primarily for internal use, and, hence, appearing in
internal management documents, which affect rights or
duties of taxpayers or other members of the public
under the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes."
That which is expressed above currently manifests itself within 26 C.F.R.,

¤601.601(d)(2)(b), which reads as follows:
"A 'Revenue Procedure' is a statement of procedure that

affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other
members of the public under the Code and related
statutes or information that, although not necessarily
affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a
matter of public knowledge."
Before commencing with a review of "modern" TDOs, it might perhaps be

useful to examine older delegation orders and TDOs issued before and during
the time of the 1939 Code; by doing so, it may be seen how authority from the
President and Secretary has been delegated. For example, Executive Order
6166, dated June 10, 1933, stated as follows:
"All functions now exercised by the Bureau of

Prohibition of the Department of Justice with respect to
the granting of permits under the national prohibition
laws are transferred to the Division of Internal Revenue
in the Treasury Department.
"The Bureaus of Internal Revenue and of Industrial

Alcohol of the Treasury Department are consolidated in
a Division of Internal Revenue, at the head of which
shall be a Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
Executive Order No. 6639, dated March 10, 1934, stated as follows:

"1.(a) The Bureau of Industrial Alcohol and the Office

of Commissioner of Industrial Alcohol are abolished,
and the authority, rights, privileges, powers and duties
conferred and imposed by law upon the Commissioner
of Industrial Alcohol are transferred to and shall be
held, exercised, and performed by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and his assistants, agents, and
inspectors, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury."
And TDO No. 143, dated December 6, 1951, provided as follows:
"By virtue of the authority vested in me as Secretary of

the Treasury by Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 1950,
there are hereby transferred to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the functions and duties now
performed by collectors of Internal Revenue in
connection with tobacco and other taxes imposed under
Chapter 15 of the Internal Revenue Code.
"The functions and duties herein transferred to the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, at his
discretion, be delegated to subordinates in the Bureau of
Internal Revenue service in such manner as the
Commissioner shall from time to time direct."
Thus each delegation order must be examined to determine the authority

conveyed therein.
In 1949, Congress enacted a law authorizing the President to reorganize the

executive departments; see 63 Stat. 203, chap. 226, codified at 5 U.S.C., ¤901,
et seq. Pursuant to this authority, the President promulgated Reorganization
Plan No. 26 of 1950 (15 Fed. Reg. 4935, 64 Stat. 1280), which restructured the
entire Treasury Department via the following:

"[T]here are hereby transferred to the Secretary of the

Treasury all functions of all other officers of the
Department of the Treasury and all functions of all
agencies and employees of such Department."
By this reorganization plan, all statutory and delegated authority of anyone

in the Treasury Department was immediately divested and placed into the
hands of the Secretary. Thereafter, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952 (17
Fed. Reg. 2243, 66 Stat. 823) reorganized the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the
name of which was changed to the Internal Revenue Service the following
year; see T.D. 6038, 1953-2 CB 443.
Based upon the above reorganization plans, on March 15, 1952, the Secretary
issued TDO No. 150, which authorized the continued performance of
functions by Treasury officers and agents until changed by subsequent order.
This order established a series of later orders, all of which deal with and
concern administration of the internal revenue laws.
A separate brief lists the TDOs issued since the reorganization plan which
are in 150 series; citation as to where each order is published is also provided.
A review of these TDOs discloses that most of them concern only
organizational changes made to the I.R.S. Insofar as authority granted
pursuant to ¤7608 is concerned, of those which were published, only TDO No.
150-42 could possibly embody the criminal enforcement powers to which
¤7608 relates.
Based upon the above, the process of determining what agent has been
delegated ¤7608 authority thus requires examination of all published CDOs
issued by the Commissioner. A list enumerating every published CDO from
1954 to the present is contained in a separate brief; by review of these various
CDOs, it is possible to trace the authority which is the subject of ¤7608.
The only possible CDOs which could delegate ¤7608 authority are numbered
31, 33 and 34. On April 30, 1956, CDO No. 31 was issued delegating to the

Assistant Commissioner and the Director of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
Division the authority to administer and enforce chapters 51, 52 and 53 of the
Code (the "ATF" chapters), in addition to a few other functions. A few
months later, CDOs No. 33 and 34 were issued and these orders also related
to alcohol and tobacco taxes. Once these units of the I.R.S. had been
delegated these enforcement responsibilities, Congress thereafter in 1958
created ¤7608, and the regulation at 301.7608-1 was promulgated in 1959.
Below is a list containing the cites where these and subsequent revisions of
these orders were published.
CDO No. 31:
(a) Original, 21 Fed. Reg. 3083, 1956-1 CB 1015.
(b) Rev. 1, 34 Fed. Reg. 87, 1969-1 CB 379.
(c) Rev. 2, 35 Fed. Reg. 16808, 1970-2 CB 487.
(d) Rev. 3, 36 Fed. Reg. 18678, 1971-2 CB 524.
(e) Rev. 4, 36 Fed. Reg. 22607, 1971-2 CB 525.
CDO No. 33:
CDO No. 34:
(b) Revoked, 38 Fed. Reg. 33407, 1973-2 CB 462.
As can be seen from these orders, the same allowed for the seizure and
forfeiture of property and the enforcement of the criminal laws. Logically, it
is these orders which permitted the promulgation of the regulation at

301.7608-1.
The ATF Division of the I.R.S. was the unit which was responsible for the
administration and enforcement of the laws which were the subject of CDOs
No. 31, 33 and 34. This ended with the creation of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms via TDO No. 221 on June 6, 1972; see 37 Fed. Reg.
116696, 1972-1 CB 777. Among other administration and enforcement
functions transferred to BATF via this order were the following:
"(a) Chapters 51, 52 and 53 of the Internal Revenue

Code of 1954 and sections 7652 and 7653 of such Code
insofar as they relate to the commodities subject to tax
under such chapters;
"(b) Chapters 61 to 80, inclusive, of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1954, insofar as they relate to the
activities administered and enforced with respect to
chapters 51, 52 and 53."
About 2 1/2 years later, the Secretary issued TDO No. 221-3 (40 Fed. Reg.
1084, 1975-1 CB 758) which delegated to the BATF the authority to
administer and enforce "chapter 35 and chapter 40 and 61 through 80,
inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 insofar as they relate to
activities administered and enforced with respect to chapter 35." Chapter 35
deals with wagering taxes and chapter 40 concerns occupational taxes related
to wagering. Some 1 1/2 years later, TDO No. 221-3 (Rev. 1) was issued. The
only real, detectable distinction between the former and latter orders was the
inclusion of the following phrase in the latter:
"The Commissioner may call upon the Director for

assistance when it is necessary to exercise any of the
enforcement authority described in section 7608 of the
Internal Revenue Code."

But, on January 14, 1977, the Secretary transferred back to the I.R.S. the
enforcement duties relating to wagering via TDO No. 221-3 (Rev. 2).
Thereafter, the authority of BATF encompassed chapters 40, 51, 52 and 53 of
the 1954 Code in addition to the authority to enforce other non-Code laws. It
is of great significance that the repeal of regulation 301.7608-1 occurred
shortly after the creation of the BATF. The authority of BATF agents to
exercise the functions under ¤7608 is today found in 27 C.F.R., ¤70.28.
In summary, ¤7608 requires delegations from the Secretary to enforcement

agents. In reference to ¤7608(a), it has been shown above that this "ATF"
authority has flowed through the ATF unit within I.R.S., ultimately to be
passed onto the BATF. But, in the search for authority under ¤7608(b), a
review of all published TDOs and CDOs reveals that there appears to have
been no such delegation. Thus, if a Special Agent is conducting any
investigation pursuant to the authority of ¤7608, that investigation
encompasses violations only of the alcohol, tobacco and firearms tax laws,
and there is NO apparent authority to conduct any federal income tax
investigation which is possessed by a Special Agent.
98. That Affiant filed FOIA requests asking the IRS for specific documents
which gave the IRS the authority to conduct an investigation of a Citizen of
such an investigation; they refused because they could not as no such
documents exists.
99. That of all the circuits, the Ninth Circuit has addressed jurisdictional
issues more than any of the rest. In United States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86
(N.D.Cal. 1888), it was determined that the United States did not have
jurisdiction to prosecute for a murder committed at the Presidio because
California had never ceded jurisdiction; see also United States v. Tully, 140 F.
899 (D.Mon. 1905). But later, California ceded jurisdiction for the Presidio to
the United States, and it was held in United States v. Watkins, 22 F.2d 437

(N.D.Cal. 1927), that this enabled the U.S. to maintain a murder prosecution.
See also United States v. Holt, 168 F. 141 (W.D.Wash. 1909), United States v.
Lewis, 253 F. 469 (S.D.Cal. 1918), and United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 F. 753
(D.Or. 1921). Because the U.S. owned and had a state cession of jurisdiction
for Fort Douglas in Utah, it was held that the U.S. had jurisdiction for a rape
prosecution in Rogers v. Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1946). But, without a
cession, the U.S. has no jurisdiction; see Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F.Supp.
1123 (D.Ariz. 1977).
The above cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate courts
set forth the rule that in criminal prosecutions, the government, as the party
seeking to establish the existence of federal jurisdiction, must prove U.S.
ownership of the property in question and a state cession of jurisdiction. This
same rule manifests itself in state cases. State courts are courts of general
jurisdiction and in a state criminal prosecution, the state must only prove
that the offense was committed within the state and a county thereof. If a
defendant contends that only the federal government has jurisdiction over
the offense, he, as proponent for the existence of federal jurisdiction, must
likewise prove U.S. ownership of the property where the crime was
committed and state cession of jurisdiction.
Examples of the operation of this principle are numerous. In Arizona, the

State has jurisdiction over federal lands in the public domain, the state not
having ceded jurisdiction of that property to the U.S.; see State v. Dykes, 114
Ariz. 592, 562 P.2d 1090 (1977). In California, if it is not proved by a
defendant in a state prosecution that the state has ceded jurisdiction, it is
presumed the state does have jurisdiction over a criminal offense; see People
v. Brown, 69 Cal. App.2d 602, 159 P.2d 686 (1945). If the cession exists, the
state has no jurisdiction; see People v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944 (1928).
In Montana, the state has jurisdiction over property if it is not proved there
is a state cession of jurisdiction to the U.S.; see State ex rel Parker v. District
Court, 147 Mon. 151, 410 P.2d 459 (1966); the existence of a state cession of
jurisdiction to the U.S. ousts the state of jurisdiction; see State v. Tully, 31
Mont. 365, 78 P. 760 (1904). The same applies in Nevada; see State v. Mack,

23 Nev. 359, 47 P. 763 (1897), and Pendleton v. State, 734 P.2d 693 (Nev.
1987); it applies in Oregon (see State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176 P. 188
(1918), and State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620 (1987)); and in
Washington (see State v. Williams, 23 Wash.App. 694, 598 P.2d 731 (1979)).
In People v. Hammond, 1 Ill.2d 65, 115 N.E.2d 331 (1953), a burglary of an

IRS office was held to be within state jurisdiction, the court holding that the
defendant was required to prove existence of federal jurisdiction by U.S.
ownership of the property and state cession of jurisdiction. In two cases from
Michigan, larcenies committed at U.S. post offices which were rented were
held to be within state jurisdiction; see People v. Burke, 161 Mich. 397, 126
N.W. 446 (1910), and People v. Van Dyke, 276 Mich. 32, 267 N.W. 778 (1936).
See also In re Kelly, 311 Mich. 596, 19 N.W.2d 218 (1945). In Kansas City v.
Garner, 430 S.W.2d 630 (Mo.App. 1968), state jurisdiction over a theft
offense occurring in a federal building was upheld, and the court stated that
a defendant had to show federal jurisdiction by proving U.S. ownership of
the building and a cession of jurisdiction from the state to the United States.
A similar holding was made for a theft at a U.S. missile site in State v. Rindall,
146 Mon. 64, 404 P.2d 327 (1965). In Pendleton v. State, 734 P.2d 693 (Nev.
1987), the state court was held to have jurisdiction over a D.U.I. committed
on federal lands, the defendant having failed to show U.S. ownership and
state cession of jurisdiction.
In People v. Gerald, 40 Misc.2d 819, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1963), the state was
held to have jurisdiction of an assault at a U.S. post office since the defendant
did not meet his burden of showing presence of federal jurisdiction; and
because a defendant failed to prove title and jurisdiction in the United States
for an offense committed at a customs station, state jurisdiction was upheld
in People v. Fisher, 97 A.D.2d 651, 469 N.Y.S.2d 187 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1983). The
proper method of showing federal jurisdiction in state court is demonstrated
by the decision in People v. Williams, 136 Misc.2d 294, 518 N.Y.S.2d 751
(1987). This rule was likewise enunciated in State v. Burger, 33 Ohio App.3d
231, 515 N.E.2d 640 (1986), a case involving a D.U.I. offense committed on a
road near a federal arsenal.

In Kuerschner v. State, 493 P.2d 1402 (Okl.Cr.App. 1972), the state was held
to have jurisdiction of a drug sales offense occurring at an Air Force Base,
the defendant not having attempted to prove federal jurisdiction by showing
title and jurisdiction of the property in question in the United States; see also
Towry v. State, 540 P.2d 597 (Okl.Cr.App. 1975). Similar holdings for
murders committed at U.S. post offices were made in State v. Chin Ping, 91
Or. 593, 176 P. 188 (1918), and in United States v. Pate, 393 F.2d 44 (7th Cir.
1968). Another Oregon case, State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620
(1987), demonstrates this rule. Finally, in Curry v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 264, 12
S.W.2d 796 (1928), it was held that, in the absence of proof that the state had
ceded jurisdiction of a place to the United States, the state courts had
jurisdiction over an offense.
100. That in federal criminal prosecutions involving jurisdictional type

crimes, the government must prove the existence of federal jurisdiction by
showing U.S. ownership of the place where the crime was committed and
state cession of jurisdiction. If the government contends for the power to
criminally prosecute for an offense committed outside "its jurisdiction," it
must prove an extra-territorial application of the statute in question as well
as a constitutional foundation supporting the same. Absent this showing, no
jurisdiction."

Prewitt, 205 F2d 306, 201 OK. 308.
101. That a citizen or alien domiciled within and making a living within one
of the 50 states of the Union, has never been made liable by Congress for the
payment of the income tax under title 26, Subtitle A. Affiant and Affiant's
lawful wife have NO liability under the law to file or pay the so-called income

tax. The so-called income tax is unlawful and unconstitutional as applied to

the Citizens and others Domiciled within the territorial boundaries of the
Union States who earn a living within the Union States and are not engaged
in excise taxable activities.
102. That there are three sections of the IRC that address the making or
filing of returns or statements: Sections 6001, 6011(a) and 6012(a):
Section 6001
This section states, in relevant part ;
"Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection
thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns
..."
-- and
"Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary it is necessary, he may require

any person, by notice served upon such person or by regulations, to make
such returns, render such statements, or keep such records..."
Therefore, Section 6001 clearly does not create a requirement for every
person to file, but only specific individuals (i.e., those made liable). This
section does not, however, establish the liability but merely presumes it
Section 6011(a)
This section states, in relevant part,
"When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person made

liable for any tax imposed by this title, or with respect to the collection
thereof, shall make a return or statement ..."
-- and

"Every person required to make a return or statement shall include therein

the information required by such forms or regulations."
Similar to Section 6001, 6011(a) applies only to certain individuals and a

liability is not established but presumed in this section.
Section 6012(a)
"Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by the
following: (1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income
..."
Under this section, an "individual" is required to file under specific

circumstances with respect to subtitle A, and the liability for any tax under
subtitle A is established elsewhere in the IRC (see below). In other words, the
Section 6012(a) requirement for returns to be made applies only to those who
are made liable under subtitle A.
Therefore, it is clear from this section, as well as those previously cited, that
the requirement to file is not an all-encompassing one, but is directly related
to an explicit liability for a tax.
103. That the sections of the IRC which actually establish a liability for a tax
are as follows:
... Under Subtitle A (Income Taxes)
a. Section 402(d)(1)(D) makes liable for a separate tax the recipient of lump
sum distributions from employee benefit plans.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a recipient of a lump sum
distribution from any employee benefit plan.

b. Section 1461 makes liable every person required to deduct and withhold
any tax under Subchapter B.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not deduct and withhold any tax under
Subchapter B.
... Under Subtitle B (Estate and Gift Taxes)
c. Section 3405(d)(1) makes liable the payor of a designated distribution from

a pension or annuity.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a payor of a distribution from any
pension or annuity.
d. Section 3505(a) and (b) make liable a lender, surety, or other person that
pays wages directly to an employee and that is withholding.
Affiant and Affiant's wife do not pay wages to any employees.
... Under Subtitle D (Miscellaneous Excise Taxes)
e. Section 4401(c) makes liable each person who is engaged in the business of
accepting wagers.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not engaged in the business of accepting
wagers.
f. Section 4980(b) makes liable an employer maintaining a qualified plan.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not an employer maintaining a qualified
plan.
... Under Subtitle E (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Certain Other Excise Taxes)
g. Section 5005 makes liable the distiller or importer of distilled spirits.

Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a distiller nor an importer of
distilled spirits.
h. Section 5703 makes liable the manufacturer or importer of tobacco

products and cigarette papers and tubes.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not manufacture or import tobacco

products, cigarette papers or tubes.
Case Authority
"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not to
extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the
language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace matters not
specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly
against the government, and in favor of the citizen." -- Gould v. Gould, 245
U.S. 151
"Liability for taxation must clearly appear from statute imposing tax." --
Highly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. 2d 160
"...the taxpayer must be liable for the income tax. Tax liability is a condition
precedent to the demand. Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly, does
not cause liability." -- Bothke v. Fluor Engineers & Contractors, 713 F. 2d
1405
104. There is only one section (Section 6020) of the IRC covering the
preparation of returns by the Internal Revenue Service on a persons behalf.
This section states, in relevant part:
"6020(a) -- If any person shall fail to make a return required by this title or
by regulations prescribed thereunder, but shall consent to disclose all
information necessary for the preparation thereof, then, and in that case, the
Secretary may prepare such return, which, being signed by such person, may

be received by the Secretary as the return of such person."
-- and
"6020(b)(1) -- If any person fails to make any return required by any internal
revenue law or regulation made thereunder at the time prescribed therefor,
or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return..."
Therefore, it is clear from this section that the IRS may prepare or execute
returns on a person's behalf only when that person has a clearly established
requirement to make a return AND with such person's consent to provide the
necessary information. Section 6020 does not establish a requirement to
make a return, however, but merely presumes it. Furthermore, Section 6020
clearly declares that any return prepared by the IRS on a person's behalf
must be signed by that person. This is confirmed by the enforcing regulation,
26CFR301.6020-1 which states, in relevant part:
"(a) Preparation of returns -- (1) In general. If any person required by the

Code or by the regulations prescribed thereunder to make a return fails to
make such return, it may be prepared by the district director or other
authorized internal revenue officer or employee provided such person
consents to disclose all information necessary for the preparation of such
return. The return upon being signed by the person required to make it shall
be received by the district director as the return of such person."
105. That if the Internal Revenue Service wishes to prepare a return on

Affiant's and Affiant's lawful wife's behalf, please provide the:
(1) Code or Regulation that requires Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife to make
statements, keep records, or file returns; or
(2) Proper notice served upon Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife by the
Secretary or delegated authority requiring me to make statements, keep
records, or file returns;

(3) Code and Regulation that makes Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife liable for
a tax; and
(4) Specific sources of gross income upon which a tax is imposed.
106. Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife would be most happy to complete any
returns required of Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife by law, if Affiant and/or
Affiant's lawful wife have a tax liability and upon service of proper notice.
107. Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife hereby rebut the presumption of a
requirement where none actually exists under law via this sworn affidavit,
thereby shifting the burden of proof to the agency (Secretary of the
Treasury/IRS), which must then disprove Affiant's and Affiant's lawful
wife's statements and cannot.
108. That on June 18, 1998 a United States Marshall came to Affiant's
Domicile in Eagar, Arizona to serve a summons for criminal trial in U.S.
District Court in Phoenix Arizona on the "legal fictions" WILLIAM
COOPER and ANNIE MORDHORST or "fictions" of like names.
109. That Affiant noticed the U.S. Marshall that Affiant is NOT the legal
fictions named in the summons and ordered him off the property.
110. That Affiant noticed the U.S. Marshall that he was trespassing.
111. That Affiant noticed the U.S. Marshall that he has no federal
jurisdiction or authority within the territorial boundaries of the state of
Arizona.
112. That the U.S. Marshall did NOT serve the summons.
113. That the U.S. Marshall obeyed Affiant's demand and notice to vacate the
property due to unlawful trespass.
114. That Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not the legal fictions

WILLIAM COOPER and/or ANNIE MORDHORST or any other fiction

named in the summons signed by United States District Court Judge Irwin.
115. That NO summons has ever been served upon the Affiant or Affiant's
lawful wife at any time whatsoever by anyone whomsoever.
116. That any summons issued by a federal Judge of a federal Court upon
Citizens of any State domiciled within the territorial boundaries of that State
is unconstitutional and unlawful when jurisdiction is challenged unless and
until the United States first prove their jurisdiction over such, land, property,
business, and Citizens.
117. That any arrest warrant issued by any federal Judge of any federal
Court due to failure to appear in any federal Court against a summons which
was NEVER SERVED is unconstitutional and unlawful and is void upon its
inception.
118. That any arrest warrant issued by any Judge of any federal Court
against any Citizens of any State domiciled within the territorial boundaries
of any Union State is unconstitutional and unlawful when jurisdiction of the
United States is challenged unless and until the United States first prove their
jurisdiction over such land, property, business, and Citizens.
119. On July 1, 1998, U. S. District Court Judge Irwin unconstitutionally and

unlawfully stepped outside the jurisdiction and authority of the United States
when he issued a bench warrant for the arrest of the legal fictions known as
WILLIAM COOPER and ANNIE MORDHORST or other similar names,
mistaking them for William Cooper and Annie Cooper, for not appearing in
"his" court on an unconstitutional and unlawful summons which was
NEVER SERVED. The United States has no jurisdiction or venue within the
territorial boundaries of the State of Arizona except over land that was ceded
to the United States by the State Legislature.
120. That the federal income tax is VOID because the administrative and

enforcement powers are unconstitutional.
Supreme Court ruling in:
240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 FRANK R. BRUSHABER,

Appt.,v,UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. No. 140. Argued
October 14 and 15, 1915.Decided January 24, 1916. Affirmed
Supreme Court ruled: "We have not referred to a contention that because
certain administrative powers to enforce the act were conferred by the
statute upon the Secretary of the Treasury, therefore it was void as
unwarrantedly delegating legislative authority, because we think to state the
proposition is to answer it."
Supreme Court Cited:
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep.
495; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192U. S. 470, 496, 48 L. ed. 525, 535, 24 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 349; Oceanic SteamNav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 53 L. ed. 1013,
29Sup. Ct. Rep. 671.
Note! The Supreme Court not only referred to the contention but stated it
and thus answered it citing case precedent. In answering the contention in the
ruling of the Court the Supreme Court Justices have rendered the federal
income tax VOID. Since no one else to my knowledge has ever cited this fact
the Courts may not honor the ruling. Nevertheless it is a factual statement
under the Law that the Congress cannot delegate its powers to anyone, or
anything, or any entity. Another factual statement in the Law is that the
Congress cannot breach the balance of power between branches of
government by giving its legislative power to the executive or judicial
branches of governement. Both of these statements are set in stone. For either
one or both of those reasons the federal income tax AND the Internal
Revenue Service are unconstitutional. The first time this contention is
brought before the Supreme Court the income tax must be struck down.

121. That between the years 1970 and 1973, while a member of the
Intelligence Briefing Team, Petty Officer of the Watch in the Command
Center, and SPECAT Operator of the KL-47 for Admiral Bernard Clarey
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet Affiant witnessed the
MAJESTYTWELVE plan to disarm the American People, destroy the united
States of America, and institute world totalitarian socialist government. The
plan included a statement that the so-called income tax is the unconstitutional
implementation of the graduated income tax required as Plank #2 of Karl
Marx and Engles' Communist Manifesto.
122. That Affiant has never knowingly or intentionally defrauded any

"bank". All contracts have been honored and all loans repaid on time and in
full except for one, which loan is current and paid up to date according to its
contract.
123. That Affiant has not obtained a loan of any kind from any "bank" in
over seventeen years.
124. That Affiant's lawful wife has obtained five loans from a "bank,"
individual, or lending institution as a single woman.
125. That in each instance of obtaining a loan from a "bank," individual, or

lending institution Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife have without fail
informed the "bank," individual, or lending institution of our married status.

lending institution Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife have asked the
representative of the "bank," individual, or lending institution to make the
loan to Affiant's lawful wife as "a single woman" because of the immediate
danger that Affiant might be murdered due to his status as an enemy of the
socialist subversives operating within the United States government.

lending institution Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife have followed the

instructions of the representative of the lending institution, individual, or

"bank". That all letters delivered, forms filled out, or forms signed by Affiant
or Affiant's wife were at the instruction of the representative of the "bank",
individual, or lending institution for the purpose of facilitating the loan(s) to
Affiant's lawful wife as a "single woman".
128. That following the instructions of the lending representative of any

"bank," individual, or lending institution after having given full disclosure of
our marital status is NOT fraud.
129. That as all letters delivered, forms filled out, or forms signed by Affiant
or Affiant's wife were at the instruction of the lending representative of the
"bank", individual, or lending institution for the purpose of facilitating the
loan(s) to Affiant's lawful wife as a "single woman" there can be NO fraud.
130. That all monetary figures given to any representative of a "bank,"

individual, or lending institution as moneys earned by Affiant and/or
Affiant's lawful wife were always much LOWER than actual moneys earned
during any period of time requested. Stating a lower figure always makes it
more difficult to obtain a loan and is NOT fraud.
131. That it is much more difficult for a "single woman" with children to
obtain a loan than a "married woman". Making it more difficult upon
oneself to obtain a loan is NOT fraud.
132. That "fraud" requires intent to "defraud" and NO such intent has ever
been present in any of Affiant's or Affiant's lawful wife's dealings with any
"bank," individual, or lending institution. Affiant's intent was to protect his
lawful wife and children against the possibility of Affiant's murder by a
despotic government. All contracts have been honored and all loans repaid
on time and in full except for one, which loan is current and paid up to date
according to its contract.
133. That the only outstanding loan is on the Headquarters of a

Constitutional Contractural Pure Trust for which Affiant and Affiant's wife
are the Trustees. The transfer of title is registered with the Apache County
Recorder in St. Johns, Arizona. The lending institution has accepted all
payments by check drawn on the Trust account. The property has been
legally and lawfully transferred from Affiant's wife to the Trust even though
the loan remains in the name of Affiant's wife. According to Law Affiant's
wife holds title in Trust as "Trustee".
134. That all applications for loans by Affiant's lawful wife were accepted
and signed by the representative of the "bank," individual, or lending
institution as "true and correct", "approved", and "accepted".
135. That any representative who attests to anything other than what is
sworn to in this affidavit is acting only to protect his or her job and to cover
his or her own actions in advising us in the particular manner dictated to us
in order that Affiant's wife could obtain the loan or loans as a "single
woman". Any loan obtained in this manner cannot be, and is NOT fraud.
136. That Affiant is a member of the Constitutional and Lawfully constituted

unorganized Militia of the State of Arizona and of the united States of
America.
137. That the Affiant and the Militia have the Right guaranteed by the
Constitution for the united Statesof America and the Constitution of the State
of Arizona to keep and bear arms in defense of Affiant, Affiant's property,
the State of Arizona, and the Constitution for the united States of America.
That if the United States will not enforce the Laws of the Union it is the Right
and the Duty of the Militia to enforce the Laws of the Union.
138. That Affiant and the Militia have the Right and the duty to stand and
fight the United States governments despotic and tyrannical unconstitutional
and unlawful usurpation of power and jurisdiction with all the means at
Affiant's and the Militia's disposal, including the force of arms, any assault
which may be mounted upon Affiant, Affiant's family, Affiant's property,

and any other property for which Affiant may be responsible.
139. Affiant and or Affiant's wife are not anti-government, radical,

fundamentalist, crazy, suicidal, criminal, child molesters, bank robbers, child
abusers, tax protesters, wife beater, husband beater, drug users, drug
dealers, drug growers, drug stockpilers, revolutionaries, subversives,
terrorists, white supremacist, racists, anti-Semitic, or any other demonizing
label that may be applied. Affiant and Affiant's wife do not have illegal
weapons, hand grenades, bombs, missiles, tanks, machine guns, anti-tank
rockets, anti-aircraft weapons or any other demonized instrument of any
type whatsoever. The Trust Headquarters and domicile of Affiant and
Affiant's wife as Trustees is NOT a compound.
140. Affiant demands that the Internal Revenue Service disclose and
CANCEL any and all agreements, contracts, adhesions, laws, regulations,
codes, statutes, or treaties which the United States believes bring Affiant
under the jurisdiction of the United States and/or make Affiant liable to file
and/or pay the so-called income tax according to items enumerated above.
Affiant demands the Internal Revenue Service disclose the true nature of the
fictions WILLIAM COOPER and ANNIE MORDHORST or any other
fictions upon which the Internal Revenue Service is attempting to levy the so-
called income tax and upon whom the federal Court has issued summons and
arrest warrants.
141. The Affiant has always acted, and is acting in good faith and with
reasonable cause in accordance with 26 CFR Section 1.6661-6(b)
142. The Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are permitted to amend and/or
correct any records in possession of, or maintained by, any governmental
authority, which is inconsistent herewith, in accordance with Title 26 of the
United States Code, Section 552a.
143. The Affiant knows that if any government employee, agent,

representative, or official, to whom these letters become known, fails to state

a rebuttal, said government employee, agent, representative, or official is

forever estopped so to do by the maxim of law, "he who remains silent,
consents."
144. The Affiant hereby gives the government agents, to whom this Contract
and Declaration of Citizenship/Affidavit of Truth and Jurisdiction Challenge
is directed, twenty (20) calendar days from the date that this Contract and
Declaration of Citizenship/Affidavit of Truth and Jurisdiction Challenge is
received by said government agents to respond to this Contract and
Declaration of Citizenship/Affidavit of Truth and Jurisdiction Challenge.
145. Any statements or claims made by the Affiant in this Affidavit of Truth,
properly rubutted by facts of Law, or by overriding Constitution for the
united States of America, Article Three, Supreme Court rulings, shall not
prejudice the Lawful validity of other claims not properly rebutted or
invalidated by facts of Law.
146. All responses to this affidavit must be designated for delivery

EXACTLY as prescribed below, without omitting any parentheses.
Otherwise, any attempted correspondence with the Affiant will be returned
to the sender, "Refused".
William, Cooper
All Rights Reserved
(c/o Harvest Trust, c/o P.O. Box 1970, Eagar, (de jure, union state of
the venue of ( 85925 )
The Affiant now affixes the Affiant's signature to all of the above
affirmations with explicit reservation of all of Affiant's unalienable Rights
without prejudice to any of those Rights.

I William, Cooper declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
1787 Constitution for the united States of America that the foregoing
Contract and Declaration of Citizenship, Affidavit of Truth, Jurisdiction
Challenge and Summary thereof is, to the best of William, Cooper's
Knowledge, belief, understanding and information, true, correct certain and
complete.
Further the Affiant sayeth naught.
_Signature on original.______________________
William, Cooper - Affiant
All Rights Reserved
(c/o Harvest Trust, c/o P.O. Box 1970, Eagar, (de jure, union state of
the venue of ( 85925 )
I do attest and certify by my signature below that William, Cooper the

Affiant is known to me and that I personally witnessed William, Cooper the
Affiant affix his signature to this Demand, Declaration, and Affidavit and
that the signature affixed above is the true and correct signature of William,
Cooper the Affiant.
_Signature on original.______________________
John Doyel, Shamley

All Rights Reserved
(c/o 21176 Avenue 144, Porterville, (de jure, union state of California) non-
assumpsit to the venue of "CA" (these united states of America) non-
domestic, i.e., non-government mail delivery non-assumpsit to the venue of (
93257 )
_Signature on original._______________________
Annie, Cooper
All Rights Reserved
(c/o P.O. Box 1420, Show Low, (de jure, union state of Arizona) non-
assumpsit to the venue of "AZ" (these united states of America) non-
domestic, i.e., non-government mail delivery non-assumpsit to the venue of (
85901 )
$10,000 REWARD
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MAJESTYTWELVE
Taxation Supplement
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Items 28 through 46 excerpted from the LAW and Public Judicial Notice #3
28. That, pursuant to the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, Title One, Section
One, the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not earn "gross income" as
such term is defined therein. The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, Title 1 -
Section 1, Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the
definition of "gross income" (is amended after the words "compensation for
personal service") includes [only] personal service as an officer or employee
of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing.
29. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not involved in any type of
"revenue taxable activities" including but not limited to the manufacture,
sale or distribution of alcohol, tobacco, or firearms; any wagering activities;
or any other regulated industry, trade or profession.
30. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not reside in or obtain
income from any source within the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
United States Virgin Islands, Guam or any other territory, insular
possession, possession, enclave, franchise or instrumentality of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the British Commonwealth, or the Vatican.
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31. That the Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a United States Person;
United States Resident; United States Individual; United States Corporation
"citizen subject to it's jurisdiction", or subject of the Royal Family of Great
Britain, as such "words of art" are defined in the Internal Revenue Code
and other applicable United States Codes or treaties.
united States did not repeal the Constitutional apportionment restrictions
imposed on direct taxes by the Constitution for the united States of America,
Article One, Section Two, Clause Three, and Article One, Section Nine,
Clause Four, thus, taxes on personal property are direct taxes, not taxable by
the federal government unless apportioned according to the census of the
union states.
33. That the so-called Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution for

the united States was not properly lawfully and constitutionally
ratified by the States of the Union. But if it had been properly ratified
it specifies "...incomes, from whatever source derived,...".
Amendment XVI. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration."
34. That the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury has defined and
limited the tax to be applicable to only, "...taxable income of the taxpayer
from specific sources and activities..." The income must be taxable and must
come from specific sources and activities that are defined by the Secretary.
Code of Federal Regulations ¤ 1.861- 8(a): "...The rules contained in this

section apply in determining taxable income of the taxpayer from specific
sources and activities under other sections of the Code referred to in this
section as operative sections. See paragraph (f)(1) of this section for a list and
description of operative sections."

35. That the Federal Regulations make reference to 'sources' within the
United States.. below are the only sources listed from which income must
derive in order for it to be taxable for the purpose of the Income Tax.
Code of Federal Regulations 1.861-8(f)(1)
(i) Overall limitation to the foreign tax credit.
(ii) [Reserved]
(iii) DISC and FSC taxable income. (note: DISC is Direct

International Sales Corp, and FSC is a Foreign Sales Corp)
(iv) Effectively connected taxable income. Nonresident

alien individuals and foreign corporations engaged in trade
or business within the United States,...
(v) Foreign base company income.
(vi) Other operative sections.
(A) "...foreign source items of tax..."
(B) "...foreign mineral income..."
(C) [Reserved]
(D) "...foreign oil and gas extraction income..."
(E) "...citizens entitled to the benefits of section 931 and the

section 936 tax credit..."
(F) "...residents of Puerto Rico..."
(G) "...income tax liability incurred to the Virgin Islands..."

(H) "...income derived from Guam..."
(I) "...China Trade Act corporations..."
(J) "...income of a controlled foreign corporation..."
(K) "...income from the insurance of U.S. risks..."
(L) "...international boycott factor...attributable taxes and

income under section 999..."
(M) "...income attributable to the operation of an agreement

vessel under section 607 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936..."
36. That the item 35. list explains clearly the "gross income"
involvement in light of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has
determined that the Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
inclusion or exclusion of something in a law. Or simply, if a
particular source is not on the list, then it is effectively 'excluded'
from the Income Tax Act and subsequently the legal definition of
'Gross Income'.
37. That the item 35. list/regulation can be described simply as a "fence".
The U.S. Congress gave the Secretary the task to encircle and delineate the
only area from which "Gross Income", and hence "taxable income", can be
derived or accepted from... and the Secretary published his understanding of
what was expected of him in the regulations. The above list is in fact the
only definition of "sources" anywhere in the regulations. "Whatever" is
within the fence is "allowed" to be listed as "Gross Income". If it is not
within the confines of the Secretary's "fence" or "regulation", it is
"exempt".
38. That some with a vested interest in taking care of our money for us, will

argue that the phrase "whatever sources" in the so-called 16th Amendment
means "any and all sources"... we AGREE that it does... any and
all "sources" within the list! The Secretary has defined them, then Congress
agreed with the Secretary! And they are restricted to the above list, as it is
the only list which defines sources! An entry for Citizens with domestic
income does not exist on this list!
39. That the power of the Congress and the authority it gives to the
Executive Branch is limited to the contents of the law.
40. What is not stated in the law is ALWAYS important; it is a

fundamental legal principle and a basic maxim of statutory
interpretation:
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing

is the exclusion of another)
"When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or

will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be
inferred. Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a
general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision,
other exceptions or effects are excluded." (Black's, 6th ed.)
1.) Section 61 states that gross income is from 'sources' which are
taxable.
2.) 26 USC ¤ 861(a), states that the following items of gross income
shall be treated as income from sources within the United States,
and does not define the 'specific sources' of income from within the
U.S., that are taxable.
3.) 26 CFR ¤ 1.861 and following, are the Regulations promulgated by

the Secretary of Treasury to implement 26 USC ¤ 861, and prove that
the items of gross income discussed in 26 USC ¤ 861, are applicable

only to nonresident aliens and U.S. Citizens living abroad.
41. That all of the regulations applicable to 26 USC ¤ 864, Definitions,

are directed only to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.
Significantly, the only application of the federal income tax upon the
income of U.S. Citizens in existence is with respect to:
(1) a U.S. Citizen's foreign earned income, and
(2) the income of U.S. Citizens living abroad.
42. That when you examine 861's regulations, you find the admission
in 1.861-8 (a)(4), that income must come from a specific source to be
taxable. If you examine the sources in 1.861-8 (f)(1), you will find that
the domestic sources are plainly applicable to nonresident aliens
and foreign corporations. The others listed are foreign sources that
U.S. citizens would definitely be taxed upon.
43. That there is no direct mention of U.S. sources where U.S.

Citizens can earn 'gross income'.
44. That of the five sources listed in (f)(1), four of them are repeated
as non-exempt income pursuant to 26 CFR ¤ 1.861-8 (T)(d)(2)(iii).
And pursuant to 1.861-8 (T)(d)(2)(ii)(A), all income that is exempt,
excluded (not listed), or eliminated from the law, is exempt income.
There are no other U.S. sources listed that are applicable to U.S.
citizens living and working within the U.S.
45. That since the law is plainly structured to be taxing nonresident

aliens, and foreign earned income, we must have some specific
citation of law, specifically taxing U.S. citizens on their domestic
source income, as the Secretary has made the list of U.S. sources
that are taxable in 26 U.S.C. ¤ 861, applicable only to nonresident
aliens.

46. That the only form required to be filed by U.S. Citizens, pursuant
to section 1.1-1 of the Code of Federal Regulations, is the 2555
foreign earned income form. With regard to the filing of returns, the
only filing requirement for an individual under Subtitle A "income"
tax is found in code section 6012(a). Under section 6012(a) and its
underlying regulations, "taxable income" is limited to certain income
that has been "earned" while living and working in certain foreign
countries or territories.
As proof of the above, under the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must assign an OMB
approval number to any agency return that requests and collects
information from a U.S. citizen. According to OMB approval control
number 1545-0067 assigned to Treasury regulations 1.1-1 "Tax
imposed" and 1.6012-0 "Person required to make returns of income"
under 26 CFR part 600 to end, the required return for a U.S. citizen to
report income is not Form 1040, but Form 2555 "Foreign Earned
Income." The 1040 return for the "U.S. Individual" is merely a
SUPPLEMENTAL WORKSHEET for the required Form 2555. The top
of Form 2555 instructs "attach to front of Form 1040" and "for use by
U.S. citizens". Treasury Decision 2313 (TD 2313) clarifies that the
Form 1040 individual income tax return is to be used only by the
fiduciary of a nonresident alien and receiving interest and/or
dividends from the stock of domestic (US) corporations on behalf of
that nonresident alien. This decision was issued in 1916 to
"collectors of internal revenue" pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court
under the Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. decision and still stands
today.
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MAJESTYTWELVE
Public Notice
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We are NOT liable!
We are NOT liable!

To IRS - Put up or shut up.
We give the Internal Revenue Service 20 calendar days to respond.
$10,000 REWARD
Items 101 through 107 is from the Law and Public Judicial Notice #3
101. That a citizen or alien domiciled within and making a living within one
of the 50 states of the Union, has never been made liable by Congress for the
payment of the income tax under title 26, Subtitle A. Affiant and Affiant's
lawful wife have NO liability under the law to file or pay the so-called income
tax. The so-called income tax is unlawful and unconstitutional as applied to
the Citizens and others Domiciled within the territorial boundaries of the
Union States who earn a living within the Union States and are not engaged
in excise taxable activities.
102. That there are three sections of the IRC that address the making or
filing of returns or statements: Sections 6001, 6011(a) and 6012(a):
Section 6001
This section states, in relevant part ;
"Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection
thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns
..."
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We are NOT liable!
-- and
"Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary it is necessary, he may require

any person, by notice served upon such person or by regulations, to make
such returns, render such statements, or keep such records..."
Therefore, Section 6001 clearly does not create a requirement for every
person to file, but only specific individuals (i.e., those made liable). This
section does not, however, establish the liability but merely presumes it
Section 6011(a)
"When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person

made liable for any tax imposed by this title, or with respect to the collection
thereof, shall make a return or statement ..."
-- and
"Every person required to make a return or statement shall include therein

the information required by such forms or regulations."
Similar to Section 6001, 6011(a) applies only to certain individuals and a

liability is not established but presumed in this section.
Section 6012(a)
"Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by the
following: (1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income
..."
Under this section, an "individual" is required to file under specific

We are NOT liable!
circumstances with respect to subtitle A, and the liability for any tax under
subtitle A is established elsewhere in the IRC (see below). In other words,
the Section 6012(a) requirement for returns to be made applies only to those
who are made liable under subtitle A.
Therefore, it is clear from this section, as well as those previously cited, that
the requirement to file is not an all-encompassing one, but is directly related
to an explicit liability for a tax.
103. That the sections of the IRC which actually establish a liability for a tax
are as follows:
... Under Subtitle A (Income Taxes)
a. Section 402(d)(1)(D) makes liable for a separate tax the recipient of lump
sum distributions from employee benefit plans.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a recipient of a lump sum
distribution from any employee benefit plan.
b. Section 1461 makes liable every person required to deduct and withhold
any tax under Subchapter B.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not deduct and withhold any tax under
Subchapter B.
... Under Subtitle B (Estate and Gift Taxes)
c. Section 3405(d)(1) makes liable the payor of a designated distribution from

a pension or annuity.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a payor of a distribution from any
pension or annuity.
d. Section 3505(a) and (b) make liable a lender, surety, or other person that

We are NOT liable!
pays wages directly to an employee and that is withholding.
Affiant and Affiant's wife do not pay wages to any employees.
... Under Subtitle D (Miscellaneous Excise Taxes)
e. Section 4401(c) makes liable each person who is engaged in the business of
accepting wagers.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not engaged in the business of accepting
wagers.
f. Section 4980(b) makes liable an employer maintaining a qualified plan.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not an employer maintaining a qualified
plan.
... Under Subtitle E (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Certain Other Excise Taxes)
g. Section 5005 makes liable the distiller or importer of distilled spirits.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife are not a distiller nor an importer of
distilled spirits.
h. Section 5703 makes liable the manufacturer or importer of tobacco

products and cigarette papers and tubes.
Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife do not manufacture or import tobacco

products, cigarette papers or tubes.
Case Authority
"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not
to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the
language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace matters not

We are NOT liable!
specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly
against the government, and in favor of the citizen." -- Gould v. Gould, 245
U.S. 151
"Liability for taxation must clearly appear from statute imposing tax." --
Highly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. 2d 160
"...the taxpayer must be liable for the income tax. Tax liability is a condition
precedent to the demand. Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly,
does not cause liability." -- Bothke v. Fluor Engineers & Contractors, 713 F.
2d 1405
104. There is only one section (Section 6020) of the IRC covering the
preparation of returns by the Internal Revenue Service on a persons behalf.
This section states, in relevant part:
"6020(a) -- If any person shall fail to make a return required by this title or
by regulations prescribed thereunder, but shall consent to disclose all
information necessary for the preparation thereof, then, and in that case, the
Secretary may prepare such return, which, being signed by such person, may
be received by the Secretary as the return of such person."
-- and
"6020(b)(1) -- If any person fails to make any return required by any

internal revenue law or regulation made thereunder at the time prescribed
therefor, or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return..."
Therefore, it is clear from this section that the IRS may prepare or execute
returns on a person's behalf only when that person has a clearly established
requirement to make a return AND with such person's consent to provide
the necessary information. Section 6020 does not establish a requirement to
make a return, however, but merely presumes it. Furthermore, Section 6020
clearly declares that any return prepared by the IRS on a person's behalf

We are NOT liable!
must be signed by that person. This is confirmed by the enforcing

regulation, 26CFR301.6020-1 which states, in relevant part:
"(a) Preparation of returns -- (1) In general. If any person required by the

Code or by the regulations prescribed thereunder to make a return fails to
make such return, it may be prepared by the district director or other
authorized internal revenue officer or employee provided such person
consents to disclose all information necessary for the preparation of such
return. The return upon being signed by the person required to make it
shall be received by the district director as the return of such person."
105. That if the Internal Revenue Service wishes to prepare a return on

Affiant's and Affiant's lawful wife's behalf, please provide the:
(1) Code or Regulation that requires Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife to make
statements, keep records, or file returns; or
(2) Proper notice served upon Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife by the
Secretary or delegated authority requiring me to make statements, keep
records, or file returns;
(3) Code and Regulation that makes Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife liable for
a tax; and
(4) Specific sources of gross income upon which a tax is imposed.
106. Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife would be most happy to complete any
returns required of Affiant or Affiant's lawful wife by law, if Affiant and/or
Affiant's lawful wife have a tax liability and upon service of proper notice.
107. Affiant and Affiant's lawful wife hereby rebut the presumption of a
requirement where none actually exists under law via this sworn affidavit,
thereby shifting the burden of proof to the agency (Secretary of the
Treasury/IRS), which must then disprove Affiant's and Affiant's lawful

We are NOT liable!
wife's statements and cannot.
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Jurisdiction
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All below taken from law and Public Judicial Notice #3
93. That the IRS was not created by Congress. It is not an organization
found under the organization of the Department of the Treasury in Title 31
United States Code with the other agencies of the Department of the
Treasury. One of the organizations known as the IRS was created as a trust
in the Philippines ("Bureau of Internal Revenue," Trust fund #1, Philippine
special fund; 31 USC 1321) under the Department of Finance and Justice.
Another trust fund, Trust fund #62, Puerto Rico special fund, was created
for "Internal Revenue." Title 26 United States Code (Internal Revenue
Code) specifically defines the jurisdiction under which it is effective as only
pertaining to the District of Columbia and its territories and possessions.
94. That an agency's failure to publish any document (regardless of how

named by the agency) which is designed to implement or prescribe law is a
"rule" which is void and unenforceable.
95. That within an agency, "instructions" may be promulgated and

distributed to agency officers and employees informing them as to the
manner and method of implementing and enforcing any particular law. If by
chance these "instructions" likewise meet the definition of a "rule" as
http://www.williamcooper.com/irsno.htm (1 of 15) [12/15/01 1:27:56 PM]

defined by ¤ 551, and if the same be "substantive" as prescribed by ¤ 552,

they must be published in the Federal Register. Several cases have found
such "instructions" to agency employees void for non-publication.
Case authority clearly shows that "instructions" given to agency personnel

which command the performance of an act by a member of the public or
which limit entitlement to statutory benefits are subject to the publication
requirement. If such "rules" found in agency instructions to agency
personnel must be published, then likewise similar "instructions" given
directly by the agency to the public must also be published on the grounds
that the same similarly are "rules."
96. That it is essential for a federal employee to possess delegated authority

to perform any particular act; the absence of delegated authority means that
the act in question was beyond the scope of the employee's duties, and
therefore unlawful.
The necessity for a federal employee to have delegated authority to act not
only is shown in the above cases, it also manifests itself in cases under the
Federal Torts Claims Act (herein "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C., ¤1346(b). Under this
law, the United States is liable for torts committed by its employees if so
committed within the scope of their employment. If the act in question was
not committed in the scope of employment, the employee is liable and the
United States is not.
A variety of cases deciding FTCA claims show instances where the United
States is held not liable for its employees torts. In Paly v. United States, 125
F.Supp. 798 (D.Md. 1954), a soldier detailed as a military funeral escort was
driving his own car to a funeral and was involved in an accident. Since the
soldier lacked express orders to do so, his tort was held to be outside the
scope of his employment and the United States was not liable. In Jones v.
F.B.I., 139 F.Supp. 38, 42 (D.Md. 1956), it was alleged that certain FBI
agents had stolen or converted property belonging to the plaintiff. The court
held that if such were true, the agents "were not 'acting within the scope of

[their] office or employment'," and the United States could not be liable in
tort. In James v. United States, 467 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1972), a reservist was
involved in a car accident on his return from an annual field training
exercise; since this travel was not within the scope of his employment, the
government was held not liable for damages. In another accident case
involving an Army truck, White v. Hardy, 678 F.2d 485, 487 (4th Cir. 1982),
the driver was found to have no authority to drive the truck when the
accident happened, thus his acts were beyond the scope of his employment
and the United States was not liable ("There was substantial evidence that
Sergeant Hardy was not given the requisite express authority to use the
government vehicle involved in the collision"). In Hughes v. United States,
662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981), the United States was held not liable for child
molestation committed by one of its employees, a postal worker. In Trerice v.
Summons, 755 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1985), the United States was held not
liable for the wrongful death of one serviceman committed by another. And
in Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1986), the court held the
government not liable under the FTCA for the sexual assault of some girls by
one of its employees.
Cases from other jurisdictions also demonstrate that for an act to be within
the government employee's scope of employment, it must have been
authorized by a regulation or some other written document. For example, in
Mider v. United States, 322 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1963), a FTCA claim was being
asserted against the United States for damages arising from an accident
involving a drunken Air Force serviceman. To define the serviceman's
authority, written regulations were consulted to determine whether the act of
driving the government's car was authorized. Finding that the regulations
did not permit use of the vehicle on this occasion, the serviceman was found
not to be acting within the scope of his employment. In Bettis v. United States,
635 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1981), a soldier drove a truck off a military base
without authority and was involved in an accident; his act was held to be
beyond his authority and thus the United States was not liable in tort. In
Turner v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 708 (W.D.La. 1984), a recruiter
conducted an unclothed physical examination of some potential females
enlistees, which caused them to sue under the FTCA. In finding that there
were no regulations either permitting or requiring such examinations, the
United States was found not liable. See also Doggett v. United States, 858 F.2d
555 (9th Cir. 1988), and Lutz v. United States, 685 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1982).
Thus the above cases adequately demonstrate that a government employee

must have some specific delegated authority, based upon statutes,
regulations or delegation orders, in order to be authorized to act in the
premises. The absence of such authority, when challenged, therefore requires
a holding that the employee's acts were unauthorized and thus beyond the
scope of his employment.
97. That a plain reading of ¤7608 reveals that the section itself conveys
authority to nobody other than the Secretary; the Secretary, in turn, must
authorize agents and this calls for the issuance of delegation orders. Under
the repealed regulation 301.7608-1, it is obvious that some type of authority
had been conveyed to the Commissioner, but here even he had to issue
delegation orders appointing agents. Thus, to follow the flow of authority
under ¤7608, it is essential to consult Treasury Department Orders and
Commissioner's Delegation Orders.
In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act was adopted and the same
required federal agencies to publish in the Federal Register statements of
their central and field organizational structures as well as the methods by
which their functions were channeled (delegation orders); see 5 U.S.C., ¤552.
It is acknowledged by both Treasury and I.R.S. that these items must be so
published; see 31 C.F.R. ¤1.3(a), and 26 C.F.R., ¤601.702(a). In fact, it is
acknowledged that anything concerning or affecting the American public
must be published. In 1953, Revenue Ruling 2 (1953-1 CB 484) was issued
and it required all divisions or units of the I.R.S. to publish in the Federal
Register any item of concern to the public. This was more clearly expressed
in Rev. Proc. 55-1 (1955-2 CB 897) as follows:
"It shall be the policy to publish for public information

all statements of practice and procedure issued

primarily for internal use, and, hence, appearing in
internal management documents, which affect rights or
duties of taxpayers or other members of the public
under the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes."
That which is expressed above currently manifests itself within 26 C.F.R.,

¤601.601(d)(2)(b), which reads as follows:
"A 'Revenue Procedure' is a statement of procedure

that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other
members of the public under the Code and related
statutes or information that, although not necessarily
affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a
matter of public knowledge."
Before commencing with a review of "modern" TDOs, it might perhaps be

useful to examine older delegation orders and TDOs issued before and
during the time of the 1939 Code; by doing so, it may be seen how authority
from the President and Secretary has been delegated. For example,
Executive Order 6166, dated June 10, 1933, stated as follows:
"All functions now exercised by the Bureau of

Prohibition of the Department of Justice with respect to
the granting of permits under the national prohibition
laws are transferred to the Division of Internal Revenue
in the Treasury Department.
"The Bureaus of Internal Revenue and of Industrial

Alcohol of the Treasury Department are consolidated in
a Division of Internal Revenue, at the head of which
shall be a Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
Executive Order No. 6639, dated March 10, 1934, stated as follows:

"1.(a) The Bureau of Industrial Alcohol and the Office

of Commissioner of Industrial Alcohol are abolished,
and the authority, rights, privileges, powers and duties
conferred and imposed by law upon the Commissioner
of Industrial Alcohol are transferred to and shall be
held, exercised, and performed by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and his assistants, agents, and
inspectors, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury."
And TDO No. 143, dated December 6, 1951, provided as follows:
"By virtue of the authority vested in me as Secretary of

the Treasury by Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 1950,
there are hereby transferred to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the functions and duties now
performed by collectors of Internal Revenue in
connection with tobacco and other taxes imposed under
Chapter 15 of the Internal Revenue Code.
"The functions and duties herein transferred to the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, at his
discretion, be delegated to subordinates in the Bureau
of Internal Revenue service in such manner as the
Commissioner shall from time to time direct."
Thus each delegation order must be examined to determine the authority

conveyed therein.
In 1949, Congress enacted a law authorizing the President to reorganize the

executive departments; see 63 Stat. 203, chap. 226, codified at 5 U.S.C., ¤901,
et seq. Pursuant to this authority, the President promulgated Reorganization
Plan No. 26 of 1950 (15 Fed. Reg. 4935, 64 Stat. 1280), which restructured
the entire Treasury Department via the following:
"[T]here are hereby transferred to the Secretary of the

Treasury all functions of all other officers of the
Department of the Treasury and all functions of all
agencies and employees of such Department."
By this reorganization plan, all statutory and delegated authority of anyone

in the Treasury Department was immediately divested and placed into the
hands of the Secretary. Thereafter, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952 (17
Fed. Reg. 2243, 66 Stat. 823) reorganized the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
the name of which was changed to the Internal Revenue Service the
following year; see T.D. 6038, 1953-2 CB 443.
Based upon the above reorganization plans, on March 15, 1952, the
Secretary issued TDO No. 150, which authorized the continued performance
of functions by Treasury officers and agents until changed by subsequent
order. This order established a series of later orders, all of which deal with
and concern administration of the internal revenue laws.
A separate brief lists the TDOs issued since the reorganization plan which
are in 150 series; citation as to where each order is published is also
provided. A review of these TDOs discloses that most of them concern only
organizational changes made to the I.R.S. Insofar as authority granted
pursuant to ¤7608 is concerned, of those which were published, only TDO
No. 150-42 could possibly embody the criminal enforcement powers to which
¤7608 relates.
Based upon the above, the process of determining what agent has been
delegated ¤7608 authority thus requires examination of all published CDOs
issued by the Commissioner. A list enumerating every published CDO from
1954 to the present is contained in a separate brief; by review of these
various CDOs, it is possible to trace the authority which is the subject of
¤7608.

The only possible CDOs which could delegate ¤7608 authority are numbered
31, 33 and 34. On April 30, 1956, CDO No. 31 was issued delegating to the
Assistant Commissioner and the Director of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
Division the authority to administer and enforce chapters 51, 52 and 53 of
the Code (the "ATF" chapters), in addition to a few other functions. A few
months later, CDOs No. 33 and 34 were issued and these orders also related
to alcohol and tobacco taxes. Once these units of the I.R.S. had been
delegated these enforcement responsibilities, Congress thereafter in 1958
created ¤7608, and the regulation at 301.7608-1 was promulgated in 1959.
Below is a list containing the cites where these and subsequent revisions of
these orders were published.
CDO No. 31:
(b) Rev. 1, 34 Fed. Reg. 87, 1969-1 CB 379.
(c) Rev. 2, 35 Fed. Reg. 16808, 1970-2 CB 487.
(d) Rev. 3, 36 Fed. Reg. 18678, 1971-2 CB 524.
(e) Rev. 4, 36 Fed. Reg. 22607, 1971-2 CB 525.
CDO No. 33:
CDO No. 34:
(b) Revoked, 38 Fed. Reg. 33407, 1973-2 CB 462.
As can be seen from these orders, the same allowed for the seizure and

forfeiture of property and the enforcement of the criminal laws. Logically, it

is these orders which permitted the promulgation of the regulation at
301.7608-1.
The ATF Division of the I.R.S. was the unit which was responsible for the
administration and enforcement of the laws which were the subject of CDOs
No. 31, 33 and 34. This ended with the creation of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms via TDO No. 221 on June 6, 1972; see 37 Fed. Reg.
116696, 1972-1 CB 777. Among other administration and enforcement
functions transferred to BATF via this order were the following:
"(a) Chapters 51, 52 and 53 of the Internal Revenue

Code of 1954 and sections 7652 and 7653 of such Code
insofar as they relate to the commodities subject to tax
under such chapters;
"(b) Chapters 61 to 80, inclusive, of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1954, insofar as they relate to the
activities administered and enforced with respect to
chapters 51, 52 and 53."
About 2 1/2 years later, the Secretary issued TDO No. 221-3 (40 Fed. Reg.
1084, 1975-1 CB 758) which delegated to the BATF the authority to
administer and enforce "chapter 35 and chapter 40 and 61 through 80,
inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 insofar as they relate to
activities administered and enforced with respect to chapter 35." Chapter 35
deals with wagering taxes and chapter 40 concerns occupational taxes
related to wagering. Some 1 1/2 years later, TDO No. 221-3 (Rev. 1) was
issued. The only real, detectable distinction between the former and latter
orders was the inclusion of the following phrase in the latter:
"The Commissioner may call upon the Director for

assistance when it is necessary to exercise any of the
enforcement authority described in section 7608 of the

Internal Revenue Code."
But, on January 14, 1977, the Secretary transferred back to the I.R.S. the
enforcement duties relating to wagering via TDO No. 221-3 (Rev. 2).
Thereafter, the authority of BATF encompassed chapters 40, 51, 52 and 53
of the 1954 Code in addition to the authority to enforce other non-Code laws.
It is of great significance that the repeal of regulation 301.7608-1 occurred
shortly after the creation of the BATF. The authority of BATF agents to
exercise the functions under ¤7608 is today found in 27 C.F.R., ¤70.28.
In summary, ¤7608 requires delegations from the Secretary to enforcement

agents. In reference to ¤7608(a), it has been shown above that this "ATF"
authority has flowed through the ATF unit within I.R.S., ultimately to be
passed onto the BATF. But, in the search for authority under ¤7608(b), a
review of all published TDOs and CDOs reveals that there appears to have
been no such delegation. Thus, if a Special Agent is conducting any
investigation pursuant to the authority of ¤7608, that investigation
encompasses violations only of the alcohol, tobacco and firearms tax laws,
and there is NO apparent authority to conduct any federal income tax
investigation which is possessed by a Special Agent.
98. That Affiant filed FOIA requests asking the IRS for specific documents
which gave the IRS the authority to conduct an investigation of a Citizen of
such an investigation; they refused because they could not as no such
documents exists.
99. That of all the circuits, the Ninth Circuit has addressed jurisdictional
issues more than any of the rest. In United States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86
(N.D.Cal. 1888), it was determined that the United States did not have
jurisdiction to prosecute for a murder committed at the Presidio because
California had never ceded jurisdiction; see also United States v. Tully, 140 F.

899 (D.Mon. 1905). But later, California ceded jurisdiction for the Presidio
to the United States, and it was held in United States v. Watkins, 22 F.2d 437
(N.D.Cal. 1927), that this enabled the U.S. to maintain a murder prosecution.
See also United States v. Holt, 168 F. 141 (W.D.Wash. 1909), United States v.
Lewis, 253 F. 469 (S.D.Cal. 1918), and United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 F.
753 (D.Or. 1921). Because the U.S. owned and had a state cession of
jurisdiction for Fort Douglas in Utah, it was held that the U.S. had
jurisdiction for a rape prosecution in Rogers v. Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir.
1946). But, without a cession, the U.S. has no jurisdiction; see Arizona v.
Manypenny, 445 F.Supp. 1123 (D.Ariz. 1977).
The above cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate courts
set forth the rule that in criminal prosecutions, the government, as the party
seeking to establish the existence of federal jurisdiction, must prove U.S.
ownership of the property in question and a state cession of jurisdiction. This
same rule manifests itself in state cases. State courts are courts of general
jurisdiction and in a state criminal prosecution, the state must only prove
that the offense was committed within the state and a county thereof. If a
defendant contends that only the federal government has jurisdiction over
the offense, he, as proponent for the existence of federal jurisdiction, must
likewise prove U.S. ownership of the property where the crime was
committed and state cession of jurisdiction.
Examples of the operation of this principle are numerous. In Arizona, the

State has jurisdiction over federal lands in the public domain, the state not
having ceded jurisdiction of that property to the U.S.; see State v. Dykes, 114
Ariz. 592, 562 P.2d 1090 (1977). In California, if it is not proved by a
defendant in a state prosecution that the state has ceded jurisdiction, it is
presumed the state does have jurisdiction over a criminal offense; see People
v. Brown, 69 Cal. App.2d 602, 159 P.2d 686 (1945). If the cession exists, the
state has no jurisdiction; see People v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944 (1928).
In Montana, the state has jurisdiction over property if it is not proved there
is a state cession of jurisdiction to the U.S.; see State ex rel Parker v. District
Court, 147 Mon. 151, 410 P.2d 459 (1966); the existence of a state cession of
jurisdiction to the U.S. ousts the state of jurisdiction; see State v. Tully, 31
Mont. 365, 78 P. 760 (1904). The same applies in Nevada; see State v. Mack,
23 Nev. 359, 47 P. 763 (1897), and Pendleton v. State, 734 P.2d 693 (Nev.
1987); it applies in Oregon (see State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176 P. 188
(1918), and State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620 (1987)); and in
In People v. Hammond, 1 Ill.2d 65, 115 N.E.2d 331 (1953), a burglary of an

IRS office was held to be within state jurisdiction, the court holding that the
defendant was required to prove existence of federal jurisdiction by U.S.
ownership of the property and state cession of jurisdiction. In two cases from
Michigan, larcenies committed at U.S. post offices which were rented were
held to be within state jurisdiction; see People v. Burke, 161 Mich. 397, 126
N.W. 446 (1910), and People v. Van Dyke, 276 Mich. 32, 267 N.W. 778 (1936).
See also In re Kelly, 311 Mich. 596, 19 N.W.2d 218 (1945). In Kansas City v.
Garner, 430 S.W.2d 630 (Mo.App. 1968), state jurisdiction over a theft
offense occurring in a federal building was upheld, and the court stated that
a defendant had to show federal jurisdiction by proving U.S. ownership of
the building and a cession of jurisdiction from the state to the United States.
A similar holding was made for a theft at a U.S. missile site in State v.
Rindall, 146 Mon. 64, 404 P.2d 327 (1965). In Pendleton v. State, 734 P.2d 693
(Nev. 1987), the state court was held to have jurisdiction over a D.U.I.
committed on federal lands, the defendant having failed to show U.S.
ownership and state cession of jurisdiction.
In People v. Gerald, 40 Misc.2d 819, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1963), the state was
held to have jurisdiction of an assault at a U.S. post office since the
defendant did not meet his burden of showing presence of federal
jurisdiction; and because a defendant failed to prove title and jurisdiction in
the United States for an offense committed at a customs station, state
jurisdiction was upheld in People v. Fisher, 97 A.D.2d 651, 469 N.Y.S.2d 187
(A.D. 3 Dept. 1983). The proper method of showing federal jurisdiction in
state court is demonstrated by the decision in People v. Williams, 136 Misc.2d
294, 518 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1987). This rule was likewise enunciated in State v.
Burger, 33 Ohio App.3d 231, 515 N.E.2d 640 (1986), a case involving a D.U.I.
offense committed on a road near a federal arsenal.
In Kuerschner v. State, 493 P.2d 1402 (Okl.Cr.App. 1972), the state was held
to have jurisdiction of a drug sales offense occurring at an Air Force Base,
the defendant not having attempted to prove federal jurisdiction by showing
title and jurisdiction of the property in question in the United States; see also
Towry v. State, 540 P.2d 597 (Okl.Cr.App. 1975). Similar holdings for
murders committed at U.S. post offices were made in State v. Chin Ping, 91
Or. 593, 176 P. 188 (1918), and in United States v. Pate, 393 F.2d 44 (7th Cir.
1968). Another Oregon case, State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620
(1987), demonstrates this rule. Finally, in Curry v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 264, 12
S.W.2d 796 (1928), it was held that, in the absence of proof that the state had
ceded jurisdiction of a place to the United States, the state courts had
jurisdiction over an offense.
100. That in federal criminal prosecutions involving jurisdictional type

crimes, the government must prove the existence of federal jurisdiction by
showing U.S. ownership of the place where the crime was committed and
state cession of jurisdiction. If the government contends for the power to
criminally prosecute for an offense committed outside "its jurisdiction," it
must prove an extra-territorial application of the statute in question as well
as a constitutional foundation supporting the same. Absent this showing, no
jurisdiction."

note 3 "No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction." Standard
v Olson, 74 S.Ct. 768 "It has also been held that jurisdiction must be
Prewitt, 205 F2d 306, 201 OK. 308.
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HOTT - Internal Revenue Service

"If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, it expects something it
cannot be." Thomas Jefferson
"The power of the United States to tax is limited to persons, property, and
business within their jurisdiction, as much as that of a state is limited to
the same subjects within its jurisdiction." - United States Supreme Court
Justice Fields
April 9, 2001: IRS "WALK-AROUND" Be There!

We The People Foundation For Constitutional Education
An Excellent Site! - New
Warren Richardson, Senator Orrin Hatch's attorney,

admitting that the 16th Amendment was not properly
ratified. - New
IRS Special Agent Banister Challenges System

Proves William Cooper is RIGHT.
Agency illegitimate, tax law non-existent, he says.
Money Making and

IRS special agent is right, says CPA Asset Protection
'We need to take next step'
Joseph R. Banister Report

Three cheers for Joe Banister, the former special agent for the Internal Revenue
Service, who actually went to the trouble to study the constitutionality of his
employer, came to the conclusion it was illegal and had the nerve to confront his
bosses.
Exposing the IRS fraud
$10,000 REWARD
Proof: 16th Amendment Never Properly Ratified
http://www.williamcooper.com/internal.htm (1 of 3) [12/15/01 1:28:50 PM]

New Soviet Style IRS Headquarters = (Illuminati) Masonic Temple
Abolish the IRS
Attorney Lawrence BeCraft's "Dixieland Law Journal"
Brushaber Vs Union Pacific Railroad
Citizens for an Alternative Tax System
Deceptive IRS Code Words
FOIA Help Center
History of the Sixteenth Amendment
How to get Tax Amnesty
Income Tax VOID - Administrative Powers Unconstitutional
Internal Revenue Code Title 26 Online (Searchable)
IRS Abuse Reports
IRS Fraud Exposed
IRS Home Page
IRS Research by Dan Meador
Irwin Schiff
Legislates Outside the Constitutional Limitations
Let's Halt IRS Taxpayer Abuse Now
Lloyd Long Trial Transcripts (IRS Lost)
James Madison's Notes
Meador's Public Notice of IRS Origin
Memoirs
National Organization for Non-Enumeration
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State Citizen (sovereign citizen Vs U.S. citizen (Federal citizen)
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Tax Basics 101
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Tax Freedom Network
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Taxgate.com
They Told the Truth
Title 26 Internal Revenue Code
Transcripts Senate Hearings IRS
Unbridled Power: Inside the Secret Culture of the IRS
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What Can They Seize?
Subversive Organizations
United States of America

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Please access this page from the home page for security reasons. You will be automatically
redirected there in in 10 seconds, if not then click here.
WARREN S. RICHARDSON, J.D.

Attorney at Law
May 5, 2000
Mr. William J. Benson

Constitutional Scholar
1128 East 160th Place
South Holland, IL 60473
Dear Mr. Benson:
You may address me simply as Warren and I'll call you Bill. My first comment is to applaud you for the
tremendous amount of work you have done in bringing to light the enormous volume of factual data-over
17,000 pages of certified government documents from each of the 48 states (the number in 1913) as well
as from the National Archives in Washington, D.C. In fact, the whole project, which includes your two
books, is truly monumental.
In case you wish to know a little about my background, let me give you a brief overview. I was honored
to serve my nation in World War II as a Naval Aviator. Since my college career at the University of
Rochester had been interrupted by the war, I went back to the U. of R. and obtained my A.B. degree in
history. That was followed by a B.S. in accounting. By then I was married and we moved to the
Washington, D.C. area so that my wife could continue her college work while I attended law school.
Upon receiving my law degree, I was honored to be chosen for the first class of Honor Law Graduates at
the Justice Department. (This program was started in 1953 while Eisenhower was president.) Because of
my law and accounting background, I moved to the legal department at the General Accounting Office.
After 5 years as a government attorney, I left for the private sector, where I have been ever since. Two
years of that time was spent in a law firm and the rest has been working in the lobbying profession.
Before going to the subject of your books - the 16th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
of America was not properly ratified-I wish to lay some groundwork. In 1895 the United States Supreme
Court ruled a direct income tax to be unconstitutional in the case of Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust
Company (158 U.S. 601). Since our forefathers who established our form of government (a republic, not
a democracy) by splitting the federal power into three equal branches (legislative, judicial, and
administrative), it was clearly within the Court's discretion to render their verdict in the Pollock case.
http://rightonthemark.com/warren%20richardsom.htm (1 of 3) [12/15/01 1:33:22 PM]

The Supreme Court's decision in that case can only be changed by one of two methods:
1. The Supreme Court, assuming it has valid reasoning, could reverse the Pollock case; or,
2. An Amendment to the Constitution authorizing a direct income tax could be passed by a vote of
two-thirds of both houses of Congress and then ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
States.
Following the procedure of item 2, above, the Secretary of State has the duty of announcing to the public,
the President, and the Congress that a proposed amendment has been accepted or rejected.
The people who wished to overturn the Pollock case chose the second alternative.
In my professional opinion your two books demonstrate, at least to me, that the 16th Amendment was not
properly ratified even though the Secretary of State made the public announcement that it had been
properly ratified. When only four states of the required 38 ratified it properly, how could it be considered
valid? In view of the facts, how could it become a valid part of our Constitution? Since the Pollock case
has not been reversed by the Supreme Court, what is the legal framework upon which the current income
tax law is based?
Although I am a lawyer, it is important to note that I am not a constitutional scholar; therefore I do not
speak as one. As noted above, it is my opinion that, based on your overwhelming evidence, the 16th
Amendment was not properly ratified. Furthermore, I believe that it is imperative to have legal scholars
in constitutional law study this matter deeply and render their opinions on whether the 16th Amendment
was properly ratified. Provided they come to the same conclusion we do (that it was not properly
ratified), what would be the logical next move? That last question is a real tough one because of the
politics involved. Assume that the Supreme Court rules upon a case properly brought before it that the
tax system of the U.S. is not legal. Can you even visualize the reaction of the Members of Congress?
Bill, you have done a magnificent job in providing the factual data about whether the 16th Amendment
was properly ratified. I am hopeful that we can find the scholars who will go to the next step and suggest
what should be done now.
Thanks for your hard work. You have done a great service to your country.
Sincerely,
/S/
Warren S. Richardson
P.S. Since a personal letter cannot be distributed, or even shown, to anyone other than the recipient
without permission of the author, I hereby authorize you to show it (not publish it) to other people at your
discretion.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this

5th day of May, 2000
/S/ (Mary M. Challstrom, Notary Public)

Volume 1 Issue 1
Features News In Brief Top Story

What Do You Think?
Baby infected with anthrax.
Rush Limbaugh's
deafness. Doctors say Jenna Bush practices
radical treatment of BOSTON, MAS—The 7-month-old son of a free-lance producer at the "drop and hump"
taking his fingers out
of his ears may ABC News has developed the milder skin form of anthrax after defensive move on a
provide some relief. spending time in the New York newsroom, authorities and network sorority sister during a
Archives officials said Monday night. Exactly what an infant was doing in an recent Bud Light drill.
This Week's adult restroom alone is under investigation. Full Text »
Horoscopes DALLAS—Anthrax scare
paralyzes America's
Shortage of anthrax antibiotics becomming critical. FDA
breweries. President
pushing for approval of "spoonful of sugar" treatment. Bush's daughters moved to
an undisclosed location for
ATLANTA,GA-A severe shortage of the antibiotic, doxycycline, their safety. National
used to treat anthrax is prompting the FDA to research older, cheaper Guard mobilized to protect
treatments. Mohammad Akhter, executive director of the American the country's barley, malt,
hops and rice reserves.
Public Health Association said the idea came to him after watching Full Text »
the USA Network presentation of Mary Poppins. "Before
doxycycline and penicillin, people had to make due with what they
had. He discovered that during Mary Poppins, where a spoonful of
News sugar was used as a delivery system for other drugs, the recovery
was almost instantaneous, implying that the medicine was actually a
placebo and the sugar was the healing catalyst. If this proves to be
the case then we can begin prophylactic treatment by having people In The News
ingest large quantities of Count Chocula. People for the ethical
treatment of the pancreas expressed disapproval for the plan, which
they believe is based solely on shoddy science and brilliant British-
nanny marketing. Freedoms Curtailed In Defense Of Liberty
George Bush says, "Be prepared to give your life for your country,
U.S. House shuts for sweeps of anthrax. Red cross air dropping
don't be a pussy". Broadcasts brave, patriotic message deep
thousands of bath robes to aid in the evacuation of naked
underground in special, fortified, impervious bunker.
congressional interns.
President Bush's nephew, Porter, voted "most unpopular kid" in 8th
WASHINGTON, D.C.-Weapons grade anthrax has found it's way grade. Talks of war with 4th grade to combat bullyism.
into the very nerve center of our nation. Senator Tom Daschle's
office received an envelope containing what was called by experts to Editorial
be, "Some serious fucking shit". The Capitol Building was
evacuated of all personnel except for approximately1700 naked
"Before I let terrorists take my life I vow to screw myself to death"
interns. The Red Cross is air dropping hundreds of terry-cloth bath
robes so the frightened interns can be evacuated with minimal risk of
http://www.rightonthemark.com/ (1 of 2) [12/15/01 1:34:03 PM]

Volume 1 Issue 1
exposure and maximum comfort. One congressman was
hospitalized earlier this week when it was believed he was exposed Pleas from a precocious second grader
to anthrax after licking a contaminated envelope. The congressman's "Mr. Bush, shove this war up your ass."
condition proved to psychosomatic and the contaminated envelope
proved to be the nipple of one of the congressman's interns. Joe six-pack speaks out
"God commands us to kill. It's the American way."
Casualities in the war on terror

Man stepping out of shower with towel
on head shot and killed by angry mob.
Police say mistaking hair dryer for a
box cutter wan an honest mistake.
Government experimenting with new national ID system. Civil

libertarians protesting the possibility of outlawing bangs. Cite life,
liberty and right to hide forehead. Towel wearing Arab community
reported to be having themselves a "hissy fit".
http://www.rightonthemark.com/ (2 of 2) [12/15/01 1:34:03 PM]

HOTT - Federal Jurisdiction
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The power of the United States to tax is limited to persons,
property, and business within their juridiction, as much as that
of a state is limited to the same subjects within its jurisdiction.
Supreme Court Justice Fields
by Attorney Lowell H. "Larry" Becraft Jr.
In the United States, there are two separate and distinct jurisdictions, one being
that of the States within their own territorial boundaries and the other being federal
jurisdiction. Broadly speaking, state jurisdiction encompasses the legislative power
to regulate, control and govern real and personal property, individuals and
enterprises within the territorial limits of any given State. In contrast, federal
jurisdiction is extremely limited, with the same being exercised only in areas
external to state legislative power and territory. Notwithstanding the clarity of this
simple principle, the line of demarcation between these two jurisdictions and the
extent and reach of each has become somewhat blurred due to popular
misconceptions and the efforts expended by the federal government to conceal one
of its major weaknesses. Only by resorting to history and case law can this
obfuscation be clarified and the two distinct jurisdictions be readily seen.
The original thirteen colonies of America were each separately established by

charters from the English Crown. Outside of the common bond of each being a
dependency and colony of the mother country, England, the colonies were not
otherwise united. Each had its own governor, legislative assembly and courts, and
each was governed separately and independently by the English Parliament.
The political connections of the separate colonies to the English Crown and
Money Making and
Parliament descended to an rebellious state of affairs as the direct result of
Asset Protection
Parliamentary acts adopted in the late 1760's and early 1770's. Due to the real and
perceived dangers caused by these various acts, the First Continental Congress was
convened by representatives of the several colonies in October, 1774, and its
purpose was to submit a petition of grievances to the British Parliament and Crown.
By the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, dated October
14, 1774, the colonial representatives labeled these Parliamentary acts of which
they complained as "impolitic, unjust, and cruel, as well as unconstitutional, and
most dangerous and destructive of American rights;" but further, they asserted
that these acts manifested designs, schemes and plans "which demonstrate a
system formed to enslave America."
Matters grew worse and between October, 1775, and the middle of 1776, each of
the colonies separately severed their ties and relations with England, and several
adopted constitutions for the newly formed States. By July, 1776, the exercise of
British authority in all of the colonies was not recognized in any degree. The
capstone of this actual separation of the colonies from England was the more
formal Declaration of Independence.
The legal effect of the Declaration of Independence was to make each new State a
separate and independent sovereign over which there was no other government of
superior power or jurisdiction. This was clearly shown in M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808), where it was held:
http://www.williamcooper.com/federaljurisdiction.html (1 of 13) [12/15/01 1:47:59 PM]

● "This opinion is predicated upon a principle which is believed to be

undeniable, that the several states which composed this Union, so far at
least as regarded their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the time
when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers of
sovereign states, and that they did not derive them from concessions made
by the British king. The treaty of peace contains a recognition of their
independence, not a grant of it. From hence it results, that the laws of the
several state governments were the laws of sovereign states, and as such
were obligatory upon the people of such state, from the time they were
enacted."
The consequences of independence was again explained in Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25

U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526, 527 (1827), where the Supreme Court stated:
● "There was no territory within the United States that was claimed in any
other right than that of some one of the confederated states; therefore,
there could be no acquisition of territory made by the United States distinct
from, or independent of some one of the states.
"Each declared itself sovereign and independent, according to the limits of its
territory.
"[T]he soil and sovereignty within their acknowledged limits were as much
theirs at the declaration of independence as at this hour."
Thus, unequivocally, in July, 1776, the new States possessed all sovereignty,
power, and jurisdiction over all the soil and persons in their respective territorial
limits.
This condition of supreme sovereignty of each State over all property and persons
within the borders thereof continued notwithstanding the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation. Article II of that document declared:
● "Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence,
and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."
As the history of the confederation government demonstrated, each State was

indeed sovereign and independent to such a degree that it made the central
government created by the confederation fairly ineffectual. These defects of the
confederation government strained the relations between and among the States
and the remedy became the calling of a constitutional convention.
The representatives which assembled in Philadelphia in May, 1787, to attend the

Constitutional Convention met for the primary purpose of improving the commercial
relations among the States, although the product of the Convention was more than
this. But, no intention was demonstrated for the States to surrender in any degree
the jurisdiction so possessed by them at that time, and indeed the Constitution as
finally drafted continued the same territorial jurisdiction of the States as existed
under the Articles of Confederation. The essence of this retention of state
jurisdiction was embodied in Art. I, ¤ 8, cl. 17 of the U.S. Constitution, which
defined federal jurisdiction as follows:
● "To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District
(not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States,
and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings."
The reason for the inclusion of this clause in the Constitution is obvious. Under the
Articles of Confederation, the States retained full and complete jurisdiction over
lands and persons within their borders. The Congress under the Articles of

Confederation was merely a body which represented and acted as agents of the
separate States for external affairs, and it had no jurisdiction within the States.
This defect in the Articles made the Confederation Congress totally dependent upon
any given State for protection, and this dependency did in fact cause
embarrassment for that Congress. During the Revolutionary War while the
Congress met in Philadelphia, a body of mutineers from the Continental Army
surrounded the Congress and chastised and insulted its members. The
governments of both Philadelphia and Pennsylvania proved themselves powerless
to remedy this situation, so Congress was forced to flee first to Princeton, New
Jersey, and finally to Annapolis, Maryland.[1] Thus, this clause was inserted into
the Constitution to give jurisdiction to Congress over its capital, and such other
places which Congress might purchase for forts, magazines, arsenals and other
needful buildings wherein the State ceded jurisdiction of such lands to the federal
government. Other than in these areas, this clause of the Constitution did not
operate to cede further jurisdiction to the federal government, and jurisdiction over
those areas which had not been so ceded remained within the States.
While there had been no real provisions in the Articles which permitted the
Confederation Congress to acquire property and possess exclusive jurisdiction over
that property, the above clause filled an essential need by permitting the federal
government to acquire land for the seat of government and other purposes from
certain of the States. These lands were deemed essential to enable the United
States to perform the powers delegated by the Constitution, and a cession of lands
by any particular State would grant exclusive jurisdiction of them to Congress.
Perhaps the best explanations for this clause in the Constitution were set forth in
Essay No. 43 of The Federalist:
● "The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government

carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature
of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy.
Without it not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings
interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members of the general
government on the State comprehending the seat of the government for
protection in the exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils
an imputation of awe or influence equally dishonorable to the government
and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This
consideration has the more weight as the gradual accumulation of public
improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both
too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would
create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to
abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district is
sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And
as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it;
as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the
consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient
inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will
have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise
authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived
from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the
authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded
part of it, to concur in the cession will be derived from the whole people of
the State in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection
seems to be obviated.
"The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc., established by

the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended on
such places, and the public property deposited in them, require that they
should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be
proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend
to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections
and scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the
States concerned in every such establishment."
Since the ratification of the present U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court and
all lower courts have had many opportunities to construe and apply this clause of
the Constitution. The essence of all these decisions manifests a legal principle that
the States of this nation have exclusive jurisdiction of property and persons located
within their borders, excluding such lands and persons residing thereon which have

been ceded to the United States.
Perhaps one of the earliest decisions on this point was United States v. Bevans, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818), which involved a federal prosecution for a murder
committed on board the Warship, Independence, anchored in the harbor of Boston,
Massachusetts. The defense complained that only the state had jurisdiction to
prosecute this crime and argued that the federal circuit courts had no jurisdiction of
this crime supposedly committed within the federal government's admiralty
jurisdiction. In argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the United States
admitted as much:
● "The exclusive jurisdiction which the United States have in forts and dock-
yards ceded to them, is derived from the express assent of the states by
whom the cessions are made. It could be derived in no other manner;
because without it, the authority of the state would be supreme and
exclusive therein," Id., at 350-51.
In holding that the State of Massachusetts had jurisdiction over this crime, the
Court held:
● "What, then, is the extent of jurisdiction which a state possesses?

● "We answer, without hesitation, the jurisdiction of a state is co-extensive
with its territory; co-extensive with its legislative power," Id., at 386-87.
● "The article which describes the judicial power of the United States is not
intended for the cession of territory or of general jurisdiction... Congress has
power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this district, and over all places
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same
shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other
needful buildings.
"It is observable that the power of exclusive legislation (which is jurisdiction)

is united with cession of territory, which is to be the free act of the states. It
is difficult to compare the two sections together, without feeling a conviction,
not to be strengthened by any commentary on them, that, in describing the
judicial power, the framers of our constitution had not in view any cession of
territory; or, which is essentially the same, of general jurisdiction," Id., at
388.
The Court in Bevans thus established a principle that federal jurisdiction extends
only over the areas wherein it possesses the power of exclusive legislation, and this
is a principle incorporated into all subsequent decisions regarding the extent of
federal jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would destroy the purpose, intent and
meaning of the entire U.S. Constitution.
The decision in Bevans was closely followed by decisions made in two state courts
and one federal court within the next two years. In Commonwealth v. Young,
Brightly, N.P. 302, 309 (Pa. 1818), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
presented with the issue of whether lands owned by the United States for which
Pennsylvania had never ceded jurisdiction had to be sold pursuant to state law. In
deciding that the law of Pennsylvania exclusively controlled this sale of federal land,
the Court held:
● "The legislation and authority of congress is confined to cessions by

particular states for the seat of government, and purchases made by consent
of the legislature of the state, for the purpose of erecting forts. The
legislative power and exclusive jurisdiction remained in the several states, of
all territory within their limits, not ceded to, or purchased by, congress, with
the assent of the state legislature, to prevent the collision of legislation and
authority between the United States and the several states."
A year later, the Supreme Court of New York was presented with the issue of
whether the State of New York had jurisdiction over a murder committed at Fort
Niagara, a federal fort. In People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233 (N.Y. 1819), that
court held that the fort was subject to the jurisdiction of the State since the lands
therefore had not been ceded to the United States:

● "To oust this state of its jurisdiction to support and maintain its laws, and to
punish crimes, it must be shown that an offense committed within the
acknowledged limits of the state, is clearly and exclusively cognizable by the
laws and courts of the United States. In the case already cited, Chief Justice
Marshall observed, that to bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the union, it must have been committed out of the jurisdiction of
any state; it is not (he says,) the offence committed, but the place in which
it is committed, which must be out of the jurisdiction of the state."
The decisional authority upon which this court relied was United States v. Bevans,
supra.
At about the same time that the New York Supreme Court rendered its opinion in
Godfrey, a similar fact situation was before a federal court, the only difference
being that the murder was committed on land which had been ceded to the United
States. In United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed.Cas. 646, 648, No. 14,867 (C.C.D.R.I.
1819), the court held that the case fell within federal jurisdiction:
● "But although the United States may well purchase and hold lands for public
purposes, within the territorial limits of a state, this does not of itself oust
the jurisdiction or sovereignty of such State over the lands so purchased. It
remains until the State has relinquished its authority over the land either
expressly or by necessary implication.
"When therefore a purchase of land for any of these purposes is made by the
national government, and the State Legislature has given its consent to the
purchase, the land so purchased by the very terms of the constitution ipso
facto falls within the exclusive legislation of Congress, and the State
jurisdiction is completely ousted."
Almost 18 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court was again presented with a case
involving the distinction between state and federal jurisdiction. In New Orleans v.
United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 737 (1836), the United States claimed title to
property in New Orleans likewise claimed by the city. After holding that title to the
subject lands was owned by the city, the Court addressed the question of federal
jurisdiction:
● "Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction

from the States over places where the federal government shall establish
forts or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in the
territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction."
In New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), the question before the Court
involved an attempt by the City of New York to assess penalties against the master
of a ship for his failure to make a report regarding the persons his ship brought to
New York. As against the master's contention that the act was unconstitutional and
that New York had no jurisdiction in the matter, the Court held:
● "If we look at the place of its operation, we find it to be within the territory,
and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of New York. If we look at the person
on whom it operates, he is found within the same territory and jurisdiction,"
Id., at 133.
"They are these: that a State has the same undeniable and unlimited
jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits, as any
foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the
Constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not only the
right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety,
happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare,
by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to
these ends; where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of
its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just stated. That
all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may,
perhaps, more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or
restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a

State is complete, unqualified and exclusive," Id., at 139.
Some eight years later in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), the
question of federal jurisdiction was once again before the Court. This case involved
a real property title dispute with one of the parties claiming a right to the contested
property via a U.S. patent; the lands in question were situated in Mobile, Alabama,
adjacent to Mobile Bay. In discussing the subject of federal jurisdiction, the Court
held:
● "We think a proper examination of this subject will show that the United
States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in
and to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new States were
formed," Id., at 221.
"[B]ecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise

municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a
State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted," Id.,
at 223.
"Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the
territory within her limits, subject to the common law," Id., at 228-29.
The single most important case regarding the subject of federal jurisdiction appears
to be Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995 (1885),
which sets forth the law on this point fully. Here, the railroad company property
which passed through the Fort Leavenworth federal enclave was being subjected to
taxation by Kansas, and the company claimed an exemption from state taxation
because its property was within federal jurisdiction and outside that of the state. In
holding that the railroad company's property could be taxed, the Court carefully
explained federal jurisdiction within the States:
● "The consent of the states to the purchase of lands within them for the
special purposes named, is, however, essential, under the constitution, to
the transfer to the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction
and dominion. Where lands are acquired without such consent, the
possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them
in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in
that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the
government, is subject to the legislative authority and control of the states
equally with the property of private individuals."
Thus the cases decided within the 19th century clearly disclosed the extent and
scope of both State and federal jurisdiction. In essence, these cases, among many
others, hold that the jurisdiction of any particular State is co-extensive with its
borders or territory, and all persons and property located or found therein are
subject to that jurisdiction; this jurisdiction is superior. Federal jurisdiction results
from a conveyance of state jurisdiction to the federal government for lands owned
or otherwise possessed by the federal government, and thus federal jurisdiction is
extremely limited in nature. There is no federal jurisdiction if there be no grant or
cession of jurisdiction by the State to the federal government. Therefore, federal
territorial jurisdiction exists only in Washington, D.C., the federal enclaves within
the States, and the territories and insular possessions of the United States.
The above principles of jurisdiction established in the last century continue their
vitality today with only one minor exception. In the last century, the cessions of
jurisdiction by States to the federal government were by legislative acts which
typically ceded full jurisdiction to the federal government, thus placing in the hands
of the federal government the troublesome problem of dealing with and governing
scattered, localized federal enclaves which had been totally surrendered by the
States. With the advent in this century of large federal works projects and national
parks, the problems regarding management of these areas by the federal
government were magnified. During the last century, it was thought that if a State
ceded jurisdiction to the federal government, the cession granted full and complete
jurisdiction. But with the ever increasing number of separate tracts of land falling
within the jurisdiction of the federal government in this century, it was obviously
determined by both federal and state public officials that the States should retain

greater control over these ceded lands, and the courts have acknowledged the
constitutionality of varying degrees of state jurisdiction and control over lands so
ceded.
One of the first cases to acknowledge the proposition that a State could retain
some jurisdiction over property ceded to the federal government was Surplus
Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455 (1930). Here, a state attempt to
assess an ad valorem tax on Army blankets located within a federal army camp was
found invalid and beyond the state's jurisdiction. But in regards to the proposition
that a State could make a qualified cession of jurisdiction to the federal
government, the Court held:
● "[T]he state undoubtedly may cede her jurisdiction to the United States and
may make the cession either absolute or qualified as to her may appear
desirable, provided the qualification is consistent with the purposes for which
the reservation is maintained and is accepted by the United States. And,
where such a cession is made and accepted, it will be determinative of the
jurisdiction of both the United States and the state within the reservation,"
Id., at 651-52.
Two cases decided in 1937 by the U.S. Supreme Court further clarify the
constitutionality of a reservation of partial state jurisdiction over lands ceded to the
jurisdiction of the United States. In James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U.S.
134, 58 S.Ct. 208 (1937), the State of West Virginia sought to impose a tax upon
the gross receipts of the company arising from a contract which it had made with
the United States to build some dams. One of the issues involved in this case was
the validity of the state tax imposed on the receipts derived by the company from
work performed on lands to which the State had ceded "concurrent" jurisdiction to
the United States. The Court held that a State could reserve and qualify any cession
of jurisdiction for lands owned by the United States; since the State had done so
here, the Court upheld this part of the challenged tax notwithstanding a partial
cession of jurisdiction to the U.S. A similar result occurred in Silas Mason Co. v. Tax
Commission of State of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 58 S.Ct. 233 (1937). Here, the
United States was undertaking the construction of several dams on the Columbia
River in Washington, and had purchased the lands necessary for the project. Silas
Mason obtained a contract to build a part of the Grand Coulee Dam, but filed suit
challenging the Washington income tax when that State sought to impose that tax
on the contract proceeds. Mason's argument that the federal government had
exclusive jurisdiction over both the lands and its contract was not upheld by either
the Supreme Court of Washington or the U.S. Supreme Court. The latter Court held
that none of the lands owned by the U.S. were within its jurisdiction and thus
Washington clearly had jurisdiction to impose the challenged tax; see also Wilson v.
Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 66 S.Ct. 663 (1946).
Some few years later in 1943, the Supreme Court was again presented with similar
taxation and jurisdiction issues; the facts in these two cases were identical with the
exception that one clearly involved lands ceded to the jurisdiction of the United
States. This single difference caused directly opposite results in both cases. In
Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture of California, 318 U.S. 285, 63
S.Ct. 628 (1943), the question involved the applicability of state law to a contract
entered into and performed on a federal enclave to which jurisdiction had been
ceded to the United States. During World War II, California passed a law setting a
minimum price for the sale of milk, and this law imposed penalties for sales made
below the regulated price. Here, Pacific Coast Dairy consummated a contract on
Moffett Field, a federal enclave within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, to sell milk to such federal facility at below the regulated price. When this
occurred, California sought to impose a penalty for what it perceived as a violation
of state law. But, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to permit the enforcement of the
California law, holding that the contract was made and performed in a territory
outside the jurisdiction of California and within the jurisdiction of the United States,
a place where this law didn't apply. Thus in this case, the existence of federal
jurisdiction was the foundation for the decision. However, in Penn Dairies v. Milk
Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 63 S.Ct. 617 (1943), an
opposite result was reached on almost identical facts. Here, Pennsylvania likewise
had a law which regulated the price of milk and penalized milk sales below the
regulated price. During World War II, the United States leased some land from
Pennsylvania for the construction of a military camp; since the land was leased,

Pennsylvania did not cede jurisdiction to the United States. When Penn Dairies sold
milk to the military facility for a price below the regulated price, the Commission
sought to impose the penalty. In this case, since there was no federal jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court found that the state law applied and permitted the imposition of
the penalty. These two cases clearly show the different results which can occur with
the presence or absence of federal jurisdiction.
A final point regarding federal jurisdiction concerns the question of when such
jurisdiction ends or ceases. This issue was considered in S.R.A. v. Minnesota, 327
U.S. 558, 563-64, 66 S.Ct. 749 (1946), which involved the power of a State to tax
the real property interest of a purchaser of land sold by the United States. Here, a
federal post office building was sold to S.R.A. pursuant to a real estates sale
contract which provided that title would pass only after the purchase price had been
paid. In refuting the argument of S.R.A. that the ad valorem tax on its equitable
interest in the property was really an unlawful tax on U.S. property, the Court held:
● "In the absence of some such provisions, a transfer of property held by the
United States under state cessions pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause
17, of the Constitution would leave numerous isolated islands of federal
jurisdiction, unless the unrestricted transfer of the property to private hands
is thought without more to revest sovereignty in the states. As the purpose
of Clause 17 was to give control over the sites of governmental operations to
the United States, when such control was deemed essential for federal
activities, it would seem that the sovereignty of the United States would end
with the reason for its existence and the disposition of the property. We shall
treat this case as though the Government's unrestricted transfer of property
to non-federal hands is a relinquishment of the exclusive legislative power."
Thus when any property within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States is no
longer utilized by that government for governmental purposes, and the title or any
interest therein is conveyed to private interests, the jurisdiction of the federal
government ceases and jurisdiction once again reverts to the State.
The above principles regarding the distinction between State and federal
jurisdiction continue today; see Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 83 S.Ct. 426
(1963), and United States v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 412 U.S. 363, 93
S.Ct. 2183 (1973). What was definitely decided in the beginning days of this
Republic regarding the extent, scope, and reach of each of these two distinct
jurisdictions remains unchanged and forms the foundation and basis for the smooth
workings of state governmental systems in conjunction with the federal
government. Without such jurisdictional principles which form a clear boundary
between the jurisdiction of the States and the United States, our federal
governmental system would have surely met its demise long before now.
In summary, the jurisdiction of the States is essentially the same as they possessed
when they were leagued together under the Articles of Confederation. The
confederated States possessed absolute, complete and full jurisdiction over
property and persons located within their borders. It is hypocritical to assume or
argue that these States, which had banished the centralized power and jurisdiction
of the English Parliament and Crown over them by the Declaration of
Independence, would shortly thereafter cede comparable power and jurisdiction to
the Confederation Congress. They did not and they closely and jealously guarded
their own rights, powers and jurisdiction. When the Articles were replaced by the
Constitution, the intent and purpose of the States was to retain their same powers
and jurisdiction, with a small concession of jurisdiction to the United States of lands
found essential for the operation of that government. However, even this provision
did not operate to instantly change any aspect of state jurisdiction, it only
permitted its future operation wherein any State, by its own volition, should choose
to cede jurisdiction to the United States.
By the adoption of the Constitution, the States jointly surrendered some 17 specific
and well defined powers to the federal Congress, which related almost entirely to
external affairs of the States. Any single delegated power, or even several powers
combined, do not operate in a fashion so as to invade or divest a State of its
jurisdiction. As against a single State, the remainder of the States under the
Constitution have no right to jurisdiction within the single State absent its consent.

The only provision in the Constitution which permits territorial jurisdiction to be

vested in the United States is found in Art. I, ¤ 8, cl. 17, which provides the
mechanism for a voluntary cession of jurisdiction from any State to the United
States. When the Constitution was adopted, the United States had jurisdiction over
no lands within the States, and it possessed jurisdiction only in the lands
encompassed in the Northwest Territories. Shortly after formation of the Union,
Maryland and Virginia ceded jurisdiction to the United States for Washington, D.C.
Over time, the States have ceded jurisdiction to federal enclaves within the States.
Today, the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is found only in such ceded
areas, which encompass Washington, D.C., the federal enclaves within the States,
and such territories and possessions which may now be owned by the United
States.
The above conclusion is buttressed by the opinion of the federal government itself.
In June 1957, the United States government published a work entitled Jurisdiction
Over Federal Areas Within The States: Report of the Interdepartmental Committee
for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Part II, and this
report is the definitive study on this issue. Therein, the Committee stated:
● "The Constitution gives express recognition to but one means of Federal

acquisition of legislative jurisdiction -- by State consent under Article I,
section 8, clause 17... Justice McLean suggested that the Constitution
provided the sole mode for transfer of jurisdiction, and that if this mode is
not pursued, no transfer of jurisdiction can take place," Id., at 41.
"It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a transfer of
jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by a Federal acquisition of land with
State consent, or (2) by cession from the State to the Federal Government,
or unless the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon the
admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no legislative
jurisdiction over any area within a State, such jurisdiction being for exercise
by the State, subject to non- interference by the State with Federal
functions," Id., at 45.
"The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its part, acquire

legislative jurisdiction over any area within the exterior boundaries of a
State," Id., at 46.
"On the other hand, while the Federal Government has power under various
provisions of the Constitution to define, and prohibit as criminal, certain acts
or omissions occurring anywhere in the United States, it has no power to
punish for various other crimes, jurisdiction over which is retained by the
States under our Federal-State system of government, unless such crime
occurs on areas as to which legislative jurisdiction has been vested in the
Federal Government," Id., at 107.
Thus from a wealth of case law, in addition to this lengthy and definitive
government treatise, the "jurisdiction of the United States" is identified as a very
precise and carefully defined portion of America. The United States is one of the 50
jurisdictions existing on this continent, excluding Canada and its provinces.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
It is a well established principle of law that all federal "legislation applies only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent appears;"
see Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 215, 14 S.Ct. 513 (1894); American
Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347, 357, 29 S.Ct. 511
(1909); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97, 98, 43 S.Ct. 39 (1922);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437, 52 S.Ct. 252 (1932); Foley Bros. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575 (1949); United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S.
217, 222, 70 S.Ct. 10 (1949); and United States v. First National City Bank, 321
F.2d 14, 23 (2nd Cir. 1963). This particular principle of law is expressed in a
number of cases from the federal appellate courts; see McKeel v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act as territorial); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir.
1964) (holding the Federal Torts Claims Act as territorial); United States v. Cotroni,
527 F.2d 708, 711 (2nd Cir. 1975) (holding federal wiretap laws as territorial);

Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2nd Cir. 1978); Cleary v. United States Lines,
Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 609 (3rd Cir. 1984) (holding federal age discrimination laws as
territorial); Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984)
(holding same as Cleary, supra); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th
Cir. 1977) (holding marine mammals protection act as territorial); Pfeiffer v.
William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding age
discrimination laws as territorial); Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assn. v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170, 175 (8th Cir. 1959) (holding Railway Labor
Act as territorial); Zahourek v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir.
1984) (holding age discrimination laws as territorial); Commodities Futures Trading
Comm. v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (holding commission's
subpoena power under federal law as territorial); Reyes v. Secretary of H.E.W., 476
F.2d 910, 915 (D.C.Cir. 1973) (holding administration of Social Security Act as
territorial); and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F.Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(holding securities act as territorial). This principle was perhaps best expressed in
Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215, where the Court declared:
● "The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the
territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,
and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
government."
But, because of treaties as well as express statutory language, the federal drug
laws operate extra-territorially; see United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th
Cir. 1976). The United States has territorial jurisdiction only in Washington, D.C.,
the federal enclaves within the States, and in the territories and insular possessions
of the United States. However, it has no territorial jurisdiction over non-federally
owned areas inside the territorial jurisdiction of the States within the American
Union, and this proposition of law is supported by literally hundreds of cases.
As a general rule, the power of the United States to criminally prosecute is, for the
most part, confined to offenses committed within "its jurisdiction" in the absence of
treaties. This is born out simply by examination of 18 U.S.C. ¤5 which defines the
term "United States" in clear jurisdictional terms. [2] Further, ¤7 of that federal
criminal code contains the fullest statutory definition of the "jurisdiction of the
United States." The U.S. district courts have jurisdiction of offenses occurring within
the "United States" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ¤3231.
Examples of this proposition are numerous. In Pothier v. Rodman, 291 F. 311 (1st
Cir. 1923), the question involved whether a murder committed at Camp Lewis
Military Reservation in the State of Washington was a federal crime. Here, the
murder was committed more than a year before the U.S. acquired a deed for the
property which was the scene of the crime. Pothier was arrested and incarcerated
in Rhode Island and filed a habeas corpus petition seeking his release on the
grounds that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over this offense not committed
in U.S. jurisdiction. The First Circuit agreed that there was no federal jurisdiction
and ordered his release. But, on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, in Rodman v.
Pothier, 264 U.S. 399, 44 S.Ct. 360 (1924), that Court reversed; although agreeing
with the jurisdictional principles enunciated by the First Circuit, it held that only the
federal court in Washington State could decide that issue. In United States v.
Unzeuta, 35 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1929), the Eighth Circuit held that the U.S. had no
jurisdiction over a murder committed in a railroad car at Fort Robinson, the state
cession statute being construed as not including railroad rights-of-way. This
decision was reversed in United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 50 S.Ct. 284
(1930), the Court holding that the U.S. did have jurisdiction over the railroad rights-
of-way in Fort Robinson. In Bowen v. Johnson, 97 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1938), the
question presented was whether the lack of jurisdiction over an offense prosecuted
in federal court could be raised in a habeas corpus petition. The denial of Bowen's
petition was reversed in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S.Ct. 442 (1939), the
Court concluding that such a jurisdictional challenge could be raised via such a
petition. But, the Court then addressed the issue, found that the U.S. both owned
the property in question and had a state legislative grant ceding jurisdiction to the
United States, thus there was jurisdiction in the United States to prosecute Bowen.
But, if jurisdiction is not vested in the United States pursuant to statute, there is no
jurisdiction; see Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122 (1943).
The lower federal courts also require the presence of federal jurisdiction in criminal

prosecutions. In Kelly v. United States, 27 F. 616 (D.Me. 1885), federal jurisdiction

of a manslaughter committed at Fort Popham was upheld when it was shown that
the U.S. owned the property where the offense occurred and the state had ceded
jurisdiction. In United States v. Andem, 158 F. 996 (D.N.J. 1908), federal
jurisdiction for a forgery offense was upheld on a showing that the United States
owned the property where the offense was committed and the state had ceded
jurisdiction of the property to the U.S. In United States v. Penn, 48 F. 669 (E.D.Va.
1880), since the U.S. did not have jurisdiction over Arlington National Cemetery, a
federal larceny prosecution was dismissed. In United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d 673
(4th Cir. 1963), federal jurisdiction was found to exist by U.S. ownership of the
property and a state cession of jurisdiction. In United States v. Watson, 80 F.Supp.
649, 651 (E.D.Va. 1948), federal criminal charges were dismissed, the court
stating:
● "Without proof of the requisite ownership or possession of the United States,

the crime has not been made out."
In Brown v. United States, 257 F. 46 (5th Cir. 1919), federal jurisdiction was
upheld on the basis that the U.S. owned the post office site where a murder was
committed and the state had ceded jurisdiction; see also England v. United States,
174 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1949); Hudspeth v. United States, 223 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.
1955); Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1957); and Gainey v. United
States, 324 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1963). In United States v. Townsend, 474 F.2d 209
(5th Cir. 1973), a conviction for receiving stolen property was reversed when the
court reviewed the record and learned that there was absolutely no evidence
disclosing that the defendant had committed this offense within the jurisdiction of
the United States. In United States v. Benson, 495 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1974),
in finding federal jurisdiction for a robbery committed at Fort Rucker, the court
held:
● "It is axiomatic that the prosecution must always prove territorial jurisdiction
over a crime in order to sustain a conviction therefor."
In two Sixth Circuit cases, United States v. Tucker, 122 F. 518 (W.D.Ky. 1903), a
case involving an assault committed at a federal dam, and United States v. Blunt,
558 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir. 1977), a case involving an assault within a federal
penitentiary, jurisdiction was sustained by finding that the U.S. owned the property
in question and the state involved had ceded jurisdiction. In In re Kelly, 71 F. 545
(E.D.Wis. 1895), a federal assault charge was dismissed when the court held that
the state cession statute in question was not adequate to convey jurisdiction of the
property in question to the United States. In United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d
1112 (7th Cir. 1970), a case involving a federal burglary prosecution, federal
jurisdiction was sustained upon the showing of U.S. ownership and a state cession.
And cases from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits likewise require the same elements to
be shown to demonstrate the presence of federal jurisdiction; see United States v.
Heard, 270 F.Supp. 198 (W.D.Mo. 1967); United States v. Redstone, 488 F.2d 300
(8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Goings, 504 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1974)
(demonstrating loss of jurisdiction); Hayes v. United States, 367 F.2d 216 (10th
Cir. 1966); Hall v. United States, 404 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Carter, 430 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1970); and United States v. Cassidy, 571 F.2d
534 (10th Cir. 1978).
Of all the circuits, the Ninth Circuit has addressed jurisdictional issues more than
any of the rest. In United States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86 (N.D.Cal. 1888), it was
determined that the United States did not have jurisdiction to prosecute for a
murder committed at the Presidio because California had never ceded jurisdiction;
see also United States v. Tully, 140 F. 899 (D.Mon. 1905). But later, California
ceded jurisdiction for the Presidio to the United States, and it was held in United
States v. Watkins, 22 F.2d 437 (N.D.Cal. 1927), that this enabled the U.S. to
maintain a murder prosecution. See also United States v. Holt, 168 F. 141
(W.D.Wash. 1909), United States v. Lewis, 253 F. 469 (S.D.Cal. 1918), and United
States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 F. 753 (D.Or. 1921). Because the U.S. owned and had a
state cession of jurisdiction for Fort Douglas in Utah, it was held that the U.S. had
jurisdiction for a rape prosecution in Rogers v. Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir.
1946). But, without a cession, the U.S. has no jurisdiction; see Arizona v.
Manypenny, 445 F.Supp. 1123 (D.Ariz. 1977).

The above cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate courts set
forth the rule that in criminal prosecutions, the government, as the party seeking to
establish the existence of federal jurisdiction, must prove U.S. ownership of the
property in question and a state cession of jurisdiction. This same rule manifests
itself in state cases. State courts are courts of general jurisdiction and in a state
criminal prosecution, the state must only prove that the offense was committed
within the state and a county thereof. If a defendant contends that only the federal
government has jurisdiction over the offense, he, as proponent for the existence of
federal jurisdiction, must likewise prove U.S. ownership of the property where the
crime was committed and state cession of jurisdiction.
Examples of the operation of this principle are numerous. In Arizona, the State has
jurisdiction over federal lands in the public domain, the state not having ceded
jurisdiction of that property to the U.S.; see State v. Dykes, 114 Ariz. 592, 562
P.2d 1090 (1977). In California, if it is not proved by a defendant in a state
prosecution that the state has ceded jurisdiction, it is presumed the state does
have jurisdiction over a criminal offense; see People v. Brown, 69 Cal. App.2d 602,
159 P.2d 686 (1945). If the cession exists, the state has no jurisdiction; see People
v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944 (1928). In Montana, the state has jurisdiction
over property if it is not proved there is a state cession of jurisdiction to the U.S.;
see State ex rel Parker v. District Court, 147 Mon. 151, 410 P.2d 459 (1966); the
existence of a state cession of jurisdiction to the U.S. ousts the state of jurisdiction;
see State v. Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 P. 760 (1904). The same applies in Nevada;
see State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 P. 763 (1897), and Pendleton v. State, 734
P.2d 693 (Nev. 1987); it applies in Oregon (see State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176
P. 188 (1918), and State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620 (1987)); and in
In People v. Hammond, 1 Ill.2d 65, 115 N.E.2d 331 (1953), a burglary of an IRS
office was held to be within state jurisdiction, the court holding that the defendant
was required to prove existence of federal jurisdiction by U.S. ownership of the
property and state cession of jurisdiction. In two cases from Michigan, larcenies
committed at U.S. post offices which were rented were held to be within state
jurisdiction; see People v. Burke, 161 Mich. 397, 126 N.W. 446 (1910), and People
v. Van Dyke, 276 Mich. 32, 267 N.W. 778 (1936). See also In re Kelly, 311 Mich.
596, 19 N.W.2d 218 (1945). In Kansas City v. Garner, 430 S.W.2d 630 (Mo.App.
1968), state jurisdiction over a theft offense occurring in a federal building was
upheld, and the court stated that a defendant had to show federal jurisdiction by
proving U.S. ownership of the building and a cession of jurisdiction from the state
to the United States. A similar holding was made for a theft at a U.S. missile site in
State v. Rindall, 146 Mon. 64, 404 P.2d 327 (1965). In Pendleton v. State, 734
P.2d 693 (Nev. 1987), the state court was held to have jurisdiction over a D.U.I.
committed on federal lands, the defendant having failed to show U.S. ownership
and state cession of jurisdiction.
In People v. Gerald, 40 Misc.2d 819, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1963), the state was held
to have jurisdiction of an assault at a U.S. post office since the defendant did not
meet his burden of showing presence of federal jurisdiction; and because a
defendant failed to prove title and jurisdiction in the United States for an offense
committed at a customs station, state jurisdiction was upheld in People v. Fisher,
97 A.D.2d 651, 469 N.Y.S.2d 187 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1983). The proper method of
showing federal jurisdiction in state court is demonstrated by the decision in People
v. Williams, 136 Misc.2d 294, 518 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1987). This rule was likewise
enunciated in State v. Burger, 33 Ohio App.3d 231, 515 N.E.2d 640 (1986), a case
involving a D.U.I. offense committed on a road near a federal arsenal.
In Kuerschner v. State, 493 P.2d 1402 (Okl.Cr.App. 1972), the state was held to
have jurisdiction of a drug sales offense occurring at an Air Force Base, the
defendant not having attempted to prove federal jurisdiction by showing title and
jurisdiction of the property in question in the United States; see also Towry v.
State, 540 P.2d 597 (Okl.Cr.App. 1975). Similar holdings for murders committed at
U.S. post offices were made in State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176 P. 188 (1918),
and in United States v. Pate, 393 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1968). Another Oregon case,
State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620 (1987), demonstrates this rule.
Finally, in Curry v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 264, 12 S.W.2d 796 (1928), it was held
that, in the absence of proof that the state had ceded jurisdiction of a place to the
United States, the state courts had jurisdiction over an offense.

Therefore, in federal criminal prosecutions involving jurisdictional type crimes, the

government must prove the existence of federal jurisdiction by showing U.S.
ownership of the place where the crime was committed and state cession of
jurisdiction. If the government contends for the power to criminally prosecute for
an offense committed outside "its jurisdiction," it must prove an extra-territorial
application of the statute in question as well as a constitutional foundation
supporting the same. Absent this showing, no federal prosecution can be
commenced for offenses committed outside "its jurisdiction."
END NOTES:
[1] See Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 529, 5 S.Ct. 995 (1885).
[2] The statutory definition of "United States" as expressed in this ¤ 5 is identical to

the constitutional definition of this term; see Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
100, 43 S.Ct. 504 (1923), which deals with the definition of "United States" as used
in the 18th Amendment. **************************
[Note for the reader: The above memo discusses only about 140 cases. If you wish
to find more cases addressing the issue of federal territorial jurisdiction, please see
the other 3 separate briefs which can be found by following the links at the bottom
of the page. The important U.S. Supreme Court cases are all cataloged in their own
brief; the same type of cases from each federal circuit and each state are found in
the other two briefs.]
State Jurisdiction Cases & Rulings
Circuit Jurisdiction Cases & Rulings
U.S. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Cases & Rulings
Treaties and Jurisdiction
The Dixieland Law Journal
Cooper family targeted

Federal income tax VOID
Federal income tax VOID - Administrative Powers

Unconstitutional
Supreme Court ruling in:
240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 FRANK R. BRUSHABER,

Appt.,v,UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. No. 140. Argued
October 14 and 15, 1915.Decided January 24, 1916. Affirmed
Supreme Court ruled:
"We have not referred to a contention that because certain administrative

powers to enforce the act were conferred by the statute upon the Secretary of
the Treasury, therefore it was void as unwarrantedly delegating legislative
authority, because we think to state the proposition is to answer it."
Supreme Court Cited:
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep.
495; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192U. S. 470, 496, 48 L. ed. 525, 535, 24 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 349; Oceanic SteamNav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 53 L. ed. 1013,
29Sup. Ct. Rep. 671.
Note! The Supreme Court not only referred to the contention but stated it
and thus answered it citing case precedent. In answering the contention in
the ruling of the Court the Supreme Court Justices rendered the federal
income tax VOID. Since no one else to my knowledge has ever cited this fact
the Courts may not honor the ruling. Nevertheless it is a factual statement
under the Law that the Congress cannot delegate its powers to anyone, or
anything, or any entity. Another factual statement in the Law is that the
Congress cannot breach the balance of power between branches of
government by giving its legislative power to the executive branch. Both of
these statements are set in stone. For either one or both of those reasons the
http://www.williamcooper.com/void.htm (1 of 2) [12/15/01 1:48:14 PM]
Federal income tax VOID
federal income tax AND the Internal Revenue Service are unconstitutional.
Brushaber vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company
Home

http://www.williamcooper.com/void.htm (2 of 2) [12/15/01 1:48:14 PM]

UNCERTAINTY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS
UNCERTAINTY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME

TAX LAWS
by Attorney Lowell H. (Larry) Becraft
For several years now, a variety of high public officials have

openly declared that the federal income tax laws are incredibly
complex and need to be either substantially revised or scrapped.
But after making such statements, these officials invariably fail to
identify what specific parts of the tax laws suffer from this
condition, choosing instead to conceal them. Are the objectionable
parts of the federal tax code secretly and quietly discussed behind
closed Congressional committee doors? If they are, why doesn't
someone inform the American public of these deficiencies so that
they may likewise participate in this debate? Is it possible that it is
the major and not various minor features of the tax laws which
are complex, even uncertain? Is it possible that these major
features are so fundamentally flawed that they simply cannot be
repaired? If so, what is the legal consequence of this complexity?
It is alleged that the legal duties arising from the tax laws are
clearly known to all, but there are a few exceptions to this rule.
For example, in United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir.
1974), at issue was the validity of the conviction of an Indian for
tax evasion. Here, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had informed Mrs.
Critzer that the money she derived from real property located
within a reservation was not taxable; Mrs. Critzer relied upon this
advice and failed to report such income. But, the IRS maintained a
contrary position and indicted and convicted her for tax evasion.
This conviction was reversed on the grounds that the unsettled
nature of this field of law precluded any conviction:
http://www.williamcooper.com/uncertai.htm (1 of 18) [12/15/01 1:49:10 PM]

"While the record amply supports the conclusion that

the underreporting was intentional, the record also
reflects that, concededly, whether defendant's
unreported income was taxable is problematical and the
government is in dispute with itself as to whether the
omitted income was taxable," Id., at 1160.
"We hold that defendant must be exonerated from the

charges lodged against her. As a matter of law,
defendant cannot be guilty of willfully evading and
defeating income taxes on income, the taxability of
which is so uncertain that even co-ordinate branches of
the United States Government plausibly reach directly
opposing conclusions. As a matter of law, the requisite
intent to evade and defeat income taxes is missing. The
obligation to pay is so problematical that defendant's
actual intent is irrelevant. Even if she had consulted the
law and sought to guide herself accordingly, she could
have had no certainty as to what the law required.
"It is settled that when the law is vague or highly

debatable, a defendant- actually or imputedly- lacks the
requisite intent to violate it," Id., at 1162.
This single case is an adequate demonstration that there is at least

one part of the tax code which is unclear and that lack of clarity
caused the reversal of Mrs. Critzer's criminal conviction. But
there are others; see United States v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.
1985)(a prosecution for violating an unclear legal duty abridges
principles of due process); United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97-
98 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1429
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Heller, 830 F.2d 150 (11th Cir.
1987); and United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991).
Unclear legal duties in other fields of law besides tax likewise

prevent criminal convictions on due process grounds; see United

States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Dempster,
396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976); United States v. Anzalone,
766 F.2d 676, 681-82 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Denemark,
779 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d
758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d
1432 (9th Cir. 1986); and United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244
(8th Cir. 1986).
Under the U.S. Constitution, the Congress is authorized to impose

two different types of taxes, direct and indirect. Via Art. 1, §8, cl.
1, of the Constitution, indirect taxes (excises, duties and imposts)
must be uniformly imposed throughout the country. Direct taxes
are required via Art. 1, §2, cl. 3, and Art. 1, §9, cl. 4, to be imposed
pursuant to the regulation of apportionment. These tax categories
are mutually exclusive and any given tax must squarely fit within
one category or the other. To which constitutional category does
the federal income tax belong? Is it a direct tax, or is it an indirect
tax? Do American courts speak with unanimity about this simple
question of what is the nature of this tax?
To determine whether and to what extent there is any uncertainty

or conflict of authority regarding the nature of the federal income
tax requires at least a short review of the fundamental decisions
concerning it. In 1894, Congress adopted an income tax act which
was declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S.Ct. 673, aff. reh., 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912
(1895). The Pollock Court found that the income tax was a direct
tax which could only be imposed if the tax was apportioned; since
this tax was not apportioned, it was found unconstitutional. In an
effort to circumvent this decision, the 16th Amendment was
proposed by Congress in 1909 and allegedly ratified by the states
in 1913. As a result, various opinions arose regarding the legal
effect of the amendment. Some factions contended that the 16th
Amendment simply eliminated the apportionment requirement for

one specific direct tax known as the income tax, while others
asserted that the amendment simply withdrew it from the direct
tax category and placed the income tax in the indirect, excise tax
class. These competing contentions and interpretations were
apparently resolved in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236 (1916).[1] Rather than attempt a
determination of what the Court held in this case, it is more
important to learn what various courts have subsequently
declared Brushaber to mean.
A little more than a week after the opinion in Brushaber, similar

issues were present for decision in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.,
240 U.S. 103, 112-13, 36 S.Ct. 278 (1916), which involved the
question of whether an inadequate depletion allowance for a
mining company constituted a direct tax on the company's
property. As to Baltic's contention that "the 16th Amendment
authorized only an exceptional direct income tax without
apportionment," the Court rejected it by stating that this
contention:
"... manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous

ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th
Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but
simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary
power of income taxation possessed by Congress from
the beginning from being taken out of the category of
indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged, and
being placed in the category of direct taxation."
The Court clearly held that income taxes inherently belonged to

the indirect/excise tax class, but had been converted by Pollock to
direct taxes by considering the source of the income; the 16th

Amendment merely banished the rule in Pollock. See also Tyee

Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115, 36 S.Ct. 281 (1916), decided
the same day.
However, the victory of defining what the 16th Amendment meant

was short lived and later decisions commenced a course which
appears to have changed the meaning of Brushaber, or at least
provided fertile grounds for an entirely different and opposite
construction of it. In William E. Peck and Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S.
165, 172-73, 38 S.Ct. 432, 433 (1918), which involved a tax imposed
on export earnings, the Court seemed to indicate that what was
accomplished by the amendment was the elimination of the
apportionment requirement for the direct tax known as the
income tax, an argument rejected in Baltic:
"The Sixteenth Amendment, although referred to in

argument, has no real bearing and may be put out of
view. As pointed out in recent decisions, it does not
extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects,
but merely removed all occasion, which otherwise might
exist, for an apportionment among the states of taxes
laid on income, whether it be derived from one source
or another."
The drift away from the position of the Court that the income tax
via the 16th Amendment fell within the excise tax category became
more pronounced with the decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189, 206, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920), which involved the application
of this tax to a stock dividend. Here, the Court plainly stated what
many lawyers and some judges today think was accomplished by
means of this amendment, the elimination of the apportionment
requirement for the direct tax known as the income tax. In
deciding this case, the Court quoted the amendment and then
redeclared its meaning:
"As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing

power to new subjects, but merely removed the
necessity which otherwise might exist for an
apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income.
Brushaber....," 252 U.S., at 206.
"A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear
language, requires also that this amendment shall not
be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or
modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of
the Constitution that require an apportionment
according to population for direct taxes upon property,
real and personal."
Is this the resurfacing of the argument that "the 16th Amendment

apportionment" condemned in Baltic?
From a study of Brushaber, it is thus possible for someone to rely

upon those portions of the two phrases at the beginning and
ending of 240 U.S. 19 to believe that "the 16th Amendment
apportionment." If one fell into that error, this belief would be
magnified by the above highlighted portions of Eisner. Confusion
abounds as to the correct interpretation of Brushaber, and this is
obvious because various courts of this nation have relied upon this
line of authority to reach diametrically opposing results.
The state courts have been particularly split over the nature of an
income tax and whether it constitutes a direct property tax or an
indirect/excise, which is not imposed on property. A small number
of them hold that an income tax is a direct property tax; see
Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56,

58 (1920); State v. Pinder, 108 A. 43, 45 (Del. 1919); Bachrach v.

Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932); Opinion of the Justices,
220 Mass. 613, 108 N.E. 570 (1915); Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass.
522, 116 N.E. 904 (1917); Maguire v. Tax Comm. of
Commonwealth, 230 Mass. 503, 120 N.E. 162, 166 (1918); Hart v.
Tax Comm., 240 Mass. 37, 132 N.E. 621 (1921); In re Ponzi, 6 F.2d
324 (D.Mass. 1925); Kennedy v. Comm. of Corps. & Taxation, 256
Mass. 426, 152 N.E. 747 (1926); In re Opinion of the Justices, 266
Mass. 583, 165 N.E. 900, 902 (1929); Hutchins v. Comm. of Corps.
& Taxation, 272 Mass. 422, 172 N.E. 605, 608 (1930); Bryant v.
Comm. of Corps. & Tax'n., 291 Mass. 498, 197 N.E. 509 (1935);
Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81, 82 (1933)[2]; Jensen
v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936); State ex rel
Manitowoc Gas Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 161 Wis. 111, 152
N.W. 848, 850 (1915); and State ex rel Sallie F. Moon Co. v.
Wisconsin Tax Comm., 166 Wis. 287, 163 N.W. 639, 640 (1917). A
far larger number of state courts disagree with the cases noted
above and have held that an income tax is not a property tax but
an excise; see Purnell v. Page, 133 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 534, 535
(1903); State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673, 692 (1912);
Opinion of Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 A. 311, 313 (1915); Ludlow-
Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196 (1918);
Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4 (1921);
Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886, 19 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1929);
Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930);
Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307, 313 (1932);
O'Connell v. State Board, 95 Mont. 91, 25 P.2d 114, 119 (1933);
Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397, 400
(1933); Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102, 109 (1934);
Opinion of the Justices, 133 Me. 525, 178 A. 621, 623 (1935); Miles
v. Dept. of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199 N.E. 372, 377 (1935)(citing
Brushaber); Marshall v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 178 S.C. 57,
182 S.E. 96, 97 (1935); Hunton v. Commonwealth, 166 Va. 229, 183

S.E. 873, 876 (1936); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378,
107 S.W.2d 251, 259 (1937); Vilas v. Iowa State Bd. of Assess. &
Review, 223 Iowa 604, 273 N.W. 338, 342 (1937); Oursler v. Tawes,
178 Md. 471, 13 A.2d 763, 768 (1940); California Co. v. State, 141
Colo. 288, 348 P.2d 382 (1959); and Burns v. State Bureau of
Revenue, 79 N.M. 53, 439 P.2d 702, 706 (1968).
This split of authority evident within the state cases also manifests
itself in the federal appellate courts. For example, in the First
Circuit it is difficult to determine the meaning of the 16th
Amendment because in United States v. Turano, 802 F.2d 10, 12
(1st Cir. 1986), that court held that the "16th Amendment
eliminated the indirect/direct distinction as applied to taxes on
income." Next door in the Second Circuit, there is uncertainty
revealed by three completely inconsistent cases. In Jandorf's Estate
v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 464, 465 (2nd Cir. 1948), that court
declared, "It should be noted that estate or inheritance taxes are
excises ... while surtaxes, excess profits and war-profits taxes are
direct property taxes." Surtaxes are the graduated taxes of the
income tax, so this court holds that the personal income tax is a
direct tax. But in Ficalora v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 85, 87 (2nd
Cir. 1984), that court stated that the personal income tax was an
indirect tax: "[T]he Supreme Court explicitly stated that taxes on
income from one's employment are not direct taxes and are not
subject to the necessity of apportionment." But compare United
States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 46 (2nd Cir. 1988)(citing Parker, infra,
for the proposition that the tax is direct). In the Third Circuit, it
has been held in one case that all income taxes are direct, but in
another that only some are direct; see Keasbey & Mattison Co. v.
Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894, 897 (3rd Cir. 1943)("[A]n income tax is a
direct tax upon income therein defined"); and Penn Mutual
Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 19 (3rd Cir.
1960)("Pollock .... only held that a tax on the income derived from
real or personal property was so close to a tax on that property
that it could not be imposed without apportionment. The

Sixteenth Amendment removed that barrier").
In the remainder of the Circuits, the difference of opinion as to

whether the federal income tax is a direct or indirect tax is
likewise as profound and confusing. In the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits, the income tax has been held to be an excise tax; see
White Packing Co. v. Robertson, 89 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir.
1937)("The tax is, of course, an excise tax, as are all taxes on
income..."); and United States v. Gaumer, 972 F.2d 723, 725 (6th
Cir. 1992)("Brushaber and the Congressional Record excerpt do
indeed state that for constitutional purposes, the income tax is an
excise tax"). However, in the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth
Circuits, arguments that this tax is an excise have been squarely
rejected and determined to be frivolous. For example, in Parker v.
Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1984), the court clearly
rejected the contention that this tax is an excise:
"The Supreme Court promptly determined in

Brushaber... that the sixteenth amendment provided the
needed constitutional basis for the imposition of a direct
non-apportioned income tax.
"The sixteenth amendment merely eliminates the

requirement that the direct income tax be apportioned
among the states.
"The sixteenth amendment was enacted for the express

purpose of providing for a direct income tax."
In Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986), the

court held that an argument that this tax was an excise was
frivolous on its face ("The power thus long predates the Sixteenth
Amendment, which did no more than remove the apportionment

requirement..."). A similar conclusion was reached in United

States v. Francisco, 614 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1980), that court
declaring that Brushaber held this tax to be a direct one:
"The cases cited by Francisco clearly establish that the

income tax is a direct tax, thus refuting the argument
based upon his first theory. See Brushaber v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1, 19, 36 S.Ct. 236, 242, 60
L.Ed. 493 (1916) (the purpose of the Sixteenth
Amendment was to take the income tax 'out of the class
of excises, duties and imposts and place it in the class of
direct taxes')".[3]
Finally, in United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 927 (10th Cir.
1982), that court expressed in the following fashion its contempt
for the contention that the federal income tax was an excise:
"Lawson's 'jurisdictional' claim, more accurately a

constitutional claim, is based on an argument that the
Sixteenth Amendment only authorizes excise-type taxes
on income derived from activities that are government-
licensed or otherwise specially protected... The
contention is totally without merit... The Sixteenth
Amendment removed any need to apportion income
taxes among the states that otherwise would have been
required by Article I, Section 9, clause 4."
Therefore, while the Supreme Court rejected in Baltic the

argument that "the 16th Amendment authorized only an
exceptional direct income tax without apportionment," this
position now prevails in the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth
Circuits. In the Second Circuit, the existing authority illogically
claims that the tax is both.

A direct tax applies to and taxes property while an indirect, excise

tax is never imposed on property but usually an event such as
sales; see Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 50 S.Ct. 46, 47
(1929).[4] Those courts which hold that an income tax is a direct
property tax believe that income is property, yet those which hold
that this tax is an excise declare that income is not property. If the
courts of this nation cannot identify what is the nature of this
ephemeral item known as income,[5] then how can the American
people? While in Critzer the difference of opinion existed between
two government agencies, here the difference of opinion is among
many different courts, a situation far more serious than that
presented in Heller. Aren't we being subjected to a monumental
due process problem far bigger than that to which Mrs. Critzer
was subjected?
The question of what constitutes property is an issue governed by

state law; see Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13, 80
S.Ct. 1277, 1280 (1960), and United States v. Baldwin, 575 F.2d
1097, 1098 (4th Cir. 1978). The definition of the term, "property,"
is very broad; see Samet v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 247
F. 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1917)("Property is .... everything that has
exchangeable value or goes to make up a man's wealth"). It
includes money, credits, evidences of debt, and choses in action;
see State v. Ward, 222 N.C. 316, 22 S.E.2d 922, 925 (1942). Income
is property according to St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States,
617 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1980). Accrued wages and salaries
are likewise property; see Sims v. United States, 252 F.2d 434, 437
(4th Cir. 1958), aff'd., 359 U.S. 108, 79 S.Ct. 641 (1959); and Kolb
v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1966). Accounts receivable
are property; see In re Ralar Distributors, Inc., 4 F.3d 62, 67 (1st
Cir. 1993). Even private employment and a profession are
considered property; see United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 798
(5th Cir. 1975).

There appears to be no dispute about the plain requirements of

the Constitution that direct taxes must be apportioned and that
indirect taxes must be uniform. Likewise as shown above, there is
a line of decisional authority regarding the generally accepted
proposition that income is property, although there are courts
which deny this. In James v. United States, 970 F.2d 750, 755, 756
n. 11 (10th Cir. 1992), the 10th Circuit made it clear that income is
property. Pursuant to United States v. Lawson, supra, the 10th
Circuit declares that the property known as income is subject to
tax under the view that the 16th Amendment eliminated the
apportionment requirement for a specific class of property known
as income. However, there is ample contrary judicial authority
which demonstrates that this construction of the 16th Amendment
is erroneous and that the purpose, intent and meaning of the
amendment was the opposite construction and that the
amendment did not free this one type of property tax from the
regulation of apportionment. An error in a logical argument
involving a single premise affects the ultimate conclusion. If the
10th Circuit accepted the proposition that the meaning of the 16th
Amendment was contrary to that asserted in Lawson, but adhered
to its decision in James, a valid legal argument would logically
follow that property known as income could not be taxed because
the current income tax is not apportioned.
This same problem, but from an opposite perspective, is evident

within the Fourth Circuit where the existing authority of Sims v.
United States, supra, declares that income is property. Since that
Circuit holds that the federal income tax is an excise via White
Packing Co. v. Robertson, supra, and since the definition of an
excise tax appearing in that Court's opinion in New
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. West Virginia Workers' Comp. Fund, 886
F.2d 714, 719 (4th Cir. 1989), excludes a tax on property, does it
not logically follow that there is a tremendous gap in the decisional

authority within the Fourth Circuit which presents a view of the

law that the property known as income might not be taxed? Based
on these cases, is this tax clearly imposed?
Review of the above noted authority in other circuits and states

only demonstrates how profound this problem is. In the 6th
Circuit, United States v. Gaumer, supra, declares the income tax to
be an excise; via Jack Cole Co. v. MacFarland, 337 S.W.2d 453,
455-56 (Tenn. 1960), the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that
an excise tax cannot be used to tax the right to earn a living.
Which authority do the people living in Tennessee follow? If they
follow the word of their own state court, they might be charged
with a tax crime, yet they have a right to rely upon the word of the
courts, even when erroneous; see United States v. Albertini, 830
F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1987). A different problem emerges in the
8th Circuit where United States v. Francisco, supra, holds that an
income tax is a direct property tax. Missouri is within the 8th
Circuit, but the Missouri Supreme Court held in Ludlow-Saylor
Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, supra, that an income tax is an excise; if
income is not property under Missouri state law,[6] then how does
this federal property tax operate as to this "non-property"? Iowa
is also in the 8th Circuit, but in Hale v. Iowa State Board of
Assessment and Review, 223 Iowa 321, 271 N.W. 168, 172 (1937),
that court held that "income is not property within the law of
taxation." If state law holds that income is not property yet the
federal appellate court for the same state holds the exact opposite,
is not a serious uncertainty of the law, due process problem clearly
evident?
The decisional authority within the 5th Circuit, Parker v.

Commissioner, supra, holds that this tax is a direct property tax,
but a contrary view prevails in Mississippi where its citizens are
told that an income tax is an excise; see Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v.
Robertson, supra. The courts in Wisconsin and Indiana, via State
v. Frear, supra, and Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, supra, have found

this tax to be an excise, yet the federal appellate court which
encompasses these two states has an entirely different view of the
object of the tax; see Coleman v. Commissioner, supra. The 10th
Circuit, which sits in Denver, held in Lawson, supra, that the
income tax is a property tax, yet a state court in the same city has
declared that such a tax is an excise; see California Co. v. State,
supra.
In Alabama, income is property via Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co.

v. Grimes, supra; but next door in Georgia via Featherstone v.
Norman,[7] it is not. While the 11th Circuit appears not as yet to
have passed upon the question of what type of tax the federal
income tax is, consultation of Supreme Court decisions still
doesn't resolve the question. By following the rationale of
Brushaber and Bromley, supra, which declare the federal income
tax to be an excise tax which is not imposed on property, are the
people of Alabama exempt from this tax while those in Georgia
are not? But by reversing the choice of Supreme Court decisions
to follow in an effort to resolve this controversy merely changes
the results but not the problem. By following Eisner which seems
to hold that the tax is imposed on property, do the people of
Alabama owe the tax while those in Georgia do not? These
differing conclusions plainly reveal a serious uncertainty about
what is taxed, and I do not attempt herein to offer any explanation
for all of this inconsistency; the fact of the matter is that I cannot
other than to allege that this is uncertainty of the law creates a
serious due process problem.
The problems created by the failure of American courts to

determine what is the nature of an income tax are very broad. Any
particular federal tax must fit within one of the two constitutional
tax categories and once the category is known, it may be
determined whether the tax in question complies with the
constitutional regulation for imposition of that type of tax. A

direct tax which is uniformly imposed would still be
unconstitutional as one imposed in the absence of apportionment.
An indirect tax imposed via apportionment would likewise be
unconstitutional since it would not be uniform. But if it is
impossible to determine which class any given tax falls within,
then it is likewise impossible to determine which constitutional
regulation, if any, applies to that tax. If the courts of this nation
hold that an income tax is both an excise tax and a direct one, it
cannot with any degree of certainty be determined what
constitutional restrictions might or might not apply to this tax or
what is even the meaning of the 16th Amendment. What's more, it
cannot be determine what is income, whether property or non-
property.
But this is not the only fundamental problem for the federal
income tax. Additionally, the question of which statute controls
the duty to file income tax returns is subject to judicial dispute. In
Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 222, 64 S.Ct. 511,
513 (1944), the Court noted that §54 of the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code, the predecessor for Internal Revenue Code §6001, related to
the filing requirement; see also Updike v. United States, 8 F.2d 913,
915 (8th Cir. 1925). In True v. United States, 354 F.2d 323, 324
(Ct.Cl. 1965), United States v. Carlson, 260 F.Supp. 423, 425
(E.D.N.Y. 1966), White v. Commissioner, 72 U.S.T.C. 1126, 1129
(1979), McCaskill v. Commissioner, 77 U.S.T.C. 689, 698 (1981),
Counts v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 426, 427 (11th Cir. 1985), Blount
v. Commissioner, 86 U.S.T.C. 383, 386 (1986), and Beard v.
Commissioner, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986), these courts held that
Internal Revenue Code §6011 related to the filing requirement. In
United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 1980), United
States v. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189, 1192, n. 3 (10th Cir. 1991), and
United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1991), those
courts held that Internal Revenue Code §§ 6011 and 6012
governed this duty. In contrast, the cases of Steinbrecher v.

Commissioner, 712 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1983), United States v.
Bowers, 920 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir. 1990), and United States v.
Neff, 954 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992), held that only §6012
governed this duty. But in United States v. Pilcher, 672 F.2d 875,
877 (11th Cir. 1982), none of the above sections were mentioned
and it was held that §7203 required returns to be filed. It is very
apparent that there is even a diversity of opinion among judges
regarding which sections of the Internal Revenue Code govern the
requirement to file income tax returns.
The observation of the dissenting judge in Culliton v. Chase, 25

P.2d at 89-90, that this "disagreement of the courts and judges on
identical problems seems to afford the highest proof that
'reasonable doubt' does exist," is particularly appropriate here. If
American courts cannot decide such fundamental questions as
what is the nature of the income tax and which section of the
Internal Revenue Code requires the filing of an income tax return,
then it is obvious that a serious due process problem exists within
the federal income tax laws.
If American courts cannot decide such fundamental questions as

what is the nature of the income tax and which section of the
Internal Revenue Code requires the filing of an income tax return,
then it is obvious that the problem with this tax involves these
basic questions. Since even the courts are split over these
questions, shouldn't we just scrap the whole thing since the
condition which exists is incapable of repair?
In 1913 during the debate on the first income tax act under the
16th Amendment, Senator Elihu Root commented about the
complexity of that first law:
"I guess you will have to go to jail. If that is the result of

not understanding the Income Tax Law I shall meet you

there. We shall have a merry, merry time, for all of our
friends will be there. It will be an intellectual center, for
no one understands the Income Tax Law except persons
who have not sufficient intelligence to understand the
questions that arise under it."[8]
Apparently, nothing has changed.
END NOTES:
[1] In this decision, there is a very lengthy sentence which contains

the following phrase: "... by which alone such taxes were removed
from the great class of excises, duties and imposts subject to the
rule of uniformity, and were placed under the other or direct
class," 240 U.S., at 19. This phrase and the one at the very end of
this paragraph are almost identical. This language was used to
describe the contention the Court was rejecting, not approving.
[2] The dissent in this case noted the wide divergence of the
authority as to whether the tax is a direct property tax or an
excise. It commented: "The disagreement of the courts and judges
on identical problems seems to afford the highest proof that
'reasonable doubt' does exist," 25 P.2d, at 89-90.
[3] It is interesting to note that this court relied upon those

portions of the Brushaber decision quoted previously where the
Court noted the argument is was precisely rejecting. If the judges
who are legal scholars are capable of completely
miusunderstanding this opinion, is it not also probable that the
American people and even lawyers can make the same mistake?
[4] The Court defined these two types of taxes in the following
manner: "While taxes levied upon or collected from persons

because of their general ownership of property may be taken to be

direct.... a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the
exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership, is
an excise which need not be apportioned..."
[5] At least one court has declared that the term "income" is not
defined in the Internal Revenue Code; see United States v. Ballard,
535 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 1976).
[6] The Court in Ludlow, 205 S.W. at 198, declared that income is
not property: "It is apparent therefore, that when the Constitution
of 1875 was adopted, the word 'property' as the basis for taxation,
proportioned to value, had acquired a fixed and definite meaning
preclusive of personal incomes, occupations, privileges and similar
sources of revenue."
[7] See 153 S.E. at 65: "Hence a man's income is not 'property'
within the meaning of a constitutional requirement that taxes shall
be laid equally and uniformly upon all property within the State."
[8] See The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, page
12, by Harold Dubroff. Published by CCH.
Home



"Income," "Person," "Taxpayer," "Shall,"
and "Must."
Learn to Decipher the Internal Revenue Code and IRS Publications
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is a masterpiece of deception designed to mislead

Citizens into believing that individuals are subject to federal income tax. The Code was
written by attorneys for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and contains a series of
directory statutes using the word "shall", with provisions that are requirements for
corporations, but not for individuals. Even members of Congress are generally unaware of
the deceptive legal meanings of certain terms that are consistently used in the IRC. These
terms have legal definitions for use in the IRC that are very different from the general
understanding of the meaning of the words.
Lack of knowledge of these legal definitions causes misunderstanding by uninformed

Citizens who are confused as to the correct interpretation of both the IRC and the true
meaning of the tricky wording in IRS instructional publications and news articles.
However, when you understand the legal definitions of these terms, the deception is easily
recognized and the limited application of the Code becomes clear. This understanding will
help you to see that filing income tax forms and paying income taxes must be voluntary
acts for most Americans because the United States Constitution forbids the federal
government to impose any tax directly upon individuals.
INCOME
Most people mistakenly believe all moneys they receive, such as wages, salaries, and tips,
are "income". However, for years, IRS publication #525, entitled "Taxable and Nontaxable
Income", has acknowledged that wages and salaries are not "income". Publication #525
states: "Wages and salaries are the main source of income for most people." In the court
decision of Graves vs People of the State of New York ex rel O'Keefe, 59 S.Ct. 595
(1939), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a source of income is not income, and
the source is not subject to income tax. In that decision, the Court stated: "A tax on income
is not economically or legally a tax on its source." However, wages, salaries, commissions,
and tips (sources) are considered to be "income" for an individual when he lists them as
"income" on an IRS tax return form. When he signs the tax form under penalty of perjury,
he has made a voluntary oath that his wages, salary, commissions, and tips listed on the
return are "income" and that he is subject to the tax.
http://deoxy.org/fz/deception.htm (1 of 9) [12/15/01 1:50:29 PM]

In the still standing decision of Brushaber vs Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the federal income tax is an excise tax under
the Sixteenth Amendment (the income tax amendment). The Court explained that the
income tax cannot be imposed as a direct tax (a tax on individuals or on property) because
the United States Constitution still requires that all direct taxes must be apportioned among
the States. "Apportioned" means that a direct tax is laid upon the State governments in
proportion to each State's population. The Court ruled that income tax can be constitutional
only as an indirect (excise) tax -- that is, a tax on profits earned by corporations or
privileges granted by government. In other words, said the Supreme Court, in order for
there to be "income", there must be profits or gains received in the exercise of a privilege
granted by government. As an example, a lawyer is granted the government privilege of
being an officer of the government court when he represents clients in litigation.
At law, labor is property. In fact, the Supreme Court has identified labor as man's most
precious property. Therefore, the exchange of one's labor for wages or salary (which are
also property) is considered by law to be an exchange of properties of equal value in which
there is no gain or profit. Such a property exchange of equal value cannot be taxed because
there is no profit or gain. Also, one who works in an ordinary occupation is not a recipient
of any privilege granted by government, because he is merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to work and earn an living. Courts have repeatedly ruled
that no tax may be placed upon the exercise of rights. Their reasoning was sensible. If the
exercise of rights could be taxed, government could destroy them by excessive rates of
taxation.
Items that the law includes in "income" are described in Code sections listed under the title
of "Items Specifically Included in Gross Income", which covers Sections 71 through 86.
Nowhere in these sections and nowhere else in the Code is there any mention of wages,
salaries, commissions, or tips as being "income". For example, to deceive and intimidate
waitresses into declaring their tips to be income is a double fraud. First, tips are gifts, not
wages. According to the IRC, gifts are not subject to income tax. In fact, even if tips were
considered to be wages, they would still not be "income" and would not be subject to an
income (excise) tax unless one enters them as "income" on a tax return form.
PERSON
People generally consider the term "person" to mean an individual only. But, IRC Section
7701, entitled "Definitions", includes a corporation, a trust, an estate, a partnership, an
association, or company as being a "person". All of these legal entities are "persons" at
law, so it is legally correct but very misleading when the federal income (excise) tax on
corporations is described by the deceptive title of "Personal Income Tax". This misleading
description leads most people to believe that it means a tax on individuals.

The legal term "person" has an even more restricted definition when used in IRC Chapter
75, which contains all the criminal penalties in the Code. In Section 7343 of that Chapter, a
"person" subject to criminal penalties is defined as:
... [A]n officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a

partnership, who, as such officer, employee or member, is under a duty to
perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.
An individual who is not in such a capacity is not defined as a "person" subject to criminal
penalties. Unprivileged individuals, who do not impose the income (excise) tax upon
themselves by filing returns, are not subject to the tax and they are not "persons" who can
lawfully be subjected to criminal charges for not filing a return or not paying income tax.
Sections of the Code relating to the requirements for filing returns, keeping records, and
disclosing information state that those sections apply to "every person liable" or "any
person made liable". These descriptions mean "any person who is liable for the tax". They
do not state or mean that all persons are liable. The only persons liable are those "persons"
(legal entities such as corporations) who owe an income (excise) tax, and are therefore
subject to the requirements of the IRC. If you substitute the word "corporation" for the
term "person" (a corporation is a person at law) when reading the Code or other articles
and publications relating to income tax, the true meaning of the Code becomes more
apparent.
A TAX PAYER IS NOT A "TAXPAYER"
The deceptive term "taxpayer" is a legal term created by combining the words "tax" and
"payer". The general understanding of the term's meaning is different from its legal
definition in the IRC. Section 7701(a)(14) gives the legal definition of the term "taxpayer"
in relation to income tax. It states: "The term 'taxpayer' means any person subject to any
internal revenue tax." (All internal revenue taxes are excise taxes.) Note that the section
does not say that all persons are "taxpayers" subject to internal revenue tax. Corporations
are "taxpayers", for they are "persons" subject to an internal revenue (excise) tax.
The term "taxpayer" is used extensively throughout the IRC, in IRS publications, news
articles, and instructional literature as a verbal trap to make uninformed Citizens believe
that all individuals are subject to federal income tax and to the requirements of the IRC.
These materials state that "taxpayers" are required to file returns, keep records, supply
information, etc. Such statements are technically correct, because "taxpayers" are those
legal "persons" previously described that are subject to an excise tax, but unprivileged
individuals are not "taxpayers" within the meaning of the IRC.

The confusion about the meaning of the term leads most people to mistakenly assume that
they are "taxpayers" because they pay other taxes such as sales taxes and real estate taxes.
Those people are tax payers, not "taxpayers" as defined in the IRC. When they read articles
and publications related to income tax, describing the legal requirements for "taxpayers",
they erroneously believe that the term applies to them as individuals. It is very important to
understand that the IRC requirements apply to IRC-defined "taxpayers" only, and not to
unprivileged individuals. Corporations and other government-privileged legal entities are
"taxpayers under the Internal Revenue Code"; unprivileged individuals are not, unless they
voluntarily file income tax returns showing they owe taxes, thus legally placing themselves
in the classification of "taxpayers". Because of its legal definition, the term "taxpayer"
should never be used in relation to income tax, except to describe those legal entities
subject to a federal excise tax.
"SHALL" means "MAY"
In general use, the word "shall" is a word of command with a mandatory meaning. In the
IRC, "shall" is a directory word that has a mandatory meaning when applied to
corporations. The IRC contains a series of directory statutes using the word "shall" in
describing the actions called for in those sections of the law. The provisions of these
directory statutes are requirements for corporations, because corporations are created by
government and, consequently, are subject to government direction and control. Since
corporations are granted the privilege to exist and operate by government-issued charters,
they do not have the constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals. This government-
granted privilege legally obligates corporations to make a "return" of profits and gains
earned in the exercise of their privileged operations when directed to do so by law. This is
why the tax form is called a "return".
However, directory words in the Code merely imply that individuals are required to
perform certain acts, but directory words are not requirements for individuals when a
mandatory interpretation of the directory words would conflict with the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of individuals. Courts have repeatedly ruled that in statutes, when a
mandatory meaning of the word "shall" would create a constitutional conflict, "shall" must
be defined as meaning "may". The following are quotes from a few of these decisions. In
the decision of Cairo & Fulton R.R. Co. vs Hecht, 95 U.S. 170, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated:
As against the government the word "shall" when used in statutes, is to be

construed as "may," unless a contrary intention is manifest.
In the decision of George Williams College vs Village of Williams Bay, 7 N.W.2d 891, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:

"Shall" in a statute may be construed to mean "may" in order to avoid

constitutional doubt.
In the decision of Gow vs Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 165 Atlantic 136, the court
stated:
If necessary to avoid unconstitutionality of a statute, "shall" will be deemed

equivalent to "may" ....
Sections 6001 and 6011 of the IRC are cited in the Privacy Act notice in the IRS 1040
instruction booklet in order to lead individuals to believe they are required to perform
services for tax collectors. Note the use of the word "shall" in the following sections of the
Code:
Section 6001 states:
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection
thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns,
and comply with such rules and requirements as the Secretary may from
time to time prescribe.
When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person made

liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection thereof, shall
make a return or statement according to the forms and regulations prescribed
by the Secretary.
Note that Sections 6001 and 6011 apply to "every person liable" and "any person made
liable", but not to "individuals". However, there is no section of the IRC that makes
individuals liable for payment of income tax because any law imposing a federal tax on
individuals would be unconstitutional, for it would violate the taxing limitations in the U.S.
Constitution which prohibit direct taxation of individuals by the federal government.
People are often confused when reading the Code because, under Subtitle A, Chapter 1,
which covers income taxes, Part 1 of Subchapter A has the misleading title of "Tax on
Individuals". The title is misleading because Part 1 imposes the tax on "income", but
contains no requirement for individuals to pay it. But an individual becomes a "person
liable" for the tax when he files an income tax form, thereby swearing that he is liable for
(owes) the tax.
The Privacy Act notice in the instruction booklet for IRS Form 1040 also shows that

disclosure of information by individuals is not required. The notice states:
Our legal right to ask for information is Internal Revenue Code sections
6001 and 6011 and their regulations.
The IRS does not say that those sections require individuals to submit the information;
those sections only give the IRS the authority to ask for it.
Returns with respect to income taxes under Subtitle A shall be made by the
following: (1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross which
equals or exceeds the exemption amount ...."
Subsections (2) through (6) list corporations, estates, trusts, partnerships, and certain
political organizations as also being subject to this section.
Any requirements compelling unprivileged individuals to keep records, make returns and
statements, or to involuntarily perform any other services for tax collectors, would be
violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids compelling

individuals to perform services involuntarily. The Amendment states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crimes

whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
The Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution states that
the people's right to privacy of their papers shall not be violated by government. To compel
individuals to disclose information taken from their papers would violate this right.
The Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights protects the right of individuals not to be
required to be witnesses against themselves. To compel individuals to disclose information
by submitting statements or information on a tax return form, all of which could be used
against them in criminal prosecutions, would violate their Fifth Amendment right.
These examples show some constitutional conflicts that would result from defining the
word "shall" as meaning "is required to". Thus, "shall" in the above mentioned statutes
must be interpreted as meaning "may". Consequently, for individuals, keeping records,
making statements, and making returns are clearly voluntary actions that are not required

by law.
"HAVING" INCOME
According to the wording of Section 6012 previously discussed, it is a directory statute

which pertains to the filing of income tax returns, and applies only to those individuals
"having income". Since the word "having" has no deceptive legal definition in the Code,
its legal meaning is the same as its customary meaning in general use. Although
dictionaries define the word "have" as meaning "possess" or "hold in one's possession", the
IRS fraudulently misinterprets "having income" as meaning "receiving gross receipts"
when applying Section 6012 to individuals.
To better understand the meaning of "having income", consider this example: If during one
year a corporation receives ten million dollars (gross receipts) from the sales of its
products, and has expense items of nine million dollars, the corporation has a profit
(income) of one million dollars. When tax liabilities are determined at the end of the year,
the corporation has (possesses) an increase in its assets (a gain) of one million dollars. But,
if the corporation's expenses equalled its gross receipts, it would then have (possess) no
profit or gain (income) and it would owe no income tax.
Now, consider another example: If during one year an individual receives fifteen thousand
dollars in wages (gross receipts) from the sale of his labor, and has expenses of fifteen
thousand dollars to sustain himself and his family, he then has (possesses) no increase in
assets. Although he has (possesses) nothing more than he had at the beginning of the year,
IRS agents consider him as "having income" of fifteen thousand dollars. IRS agents ignore
the fact that his wages were not income according to their own publications!
"MUST" means "MAY"
Most people have never studied the IRC and their understanding of the law is generally
based on hearsay, newspaper articles and IRS instructional materials. These instructions
make frequent use of the deceptive word "must" in describing the things that the IRS wants
you to do, because "must" is a forceful word that people mistakenly believe to mean "are
required". Very few people realize that "must" is a directory word similar to "shall" and
that, in IRS instructions to the public, it means "may", the same as the word "shall".
In the legal definition of the word "must" in Black's Law Dictionary, it states:
... [I]t is often used in a merely directory sense, and consequently is a

synonym for the word "may" not only in the permissive sense of that word,
but also in the mandatory sense which it sometimes has.

Because of the constitutional conflicts explained earlier in this article, the word "must",
similar to the word "shall", cannot have a mandatory meaning for individuals. It therefore
means "may" when used in IRS instruction publications.
The IRS instructions for Form 1040 state that you "must" file a return if you have certain
amounts of income. IRS withholding instructions state that employers "must" withhold
money from paychecks for income tax, "must" withhold social security tax (an income tax
also), and "must" send to the IRS any W-4 withholding statement claiming exemption
from withholding, if the wages are expected to usually exceed $200 per week. An
understanding of the legal meaning of the word "must" exposes the deception by the IRS
and makes it clear that the actions called for are voluntary actions for individuals that are
not required by law. If these actions were required by law, the instructions would not use
the word "must", but would say that the actions were "required".
FREE SOVEREIGN CITIZENS
Prior to the American Revolution, the American colonists were subjects of the English
Kings and were subject to their orders and edicts. But, according to the Declaration of
Independence and the United States Constitution, the Citizens of our country are free
sovereign individuals. They are not subjects of government, nor are they subject to
mandatory direction or control by the federal government. Except for duties such as
military draft and jury duty, the federal government has no authority to require
unprivileged individuals to perform services for government.
There is no section in the IRC requiring individuals to pay income tax or file income tax
returns, because the federal government has no constitutional authority to impose any tax
directly upon individuals or to require them involuntarily to keep records, make
statements, make returns, or perform any acts for the convenience of federal tax collectors.
But, if an individual files a return, his voluntary action of signing the form, thereby
swearing under penalty of perjury that he owes the tax, is an acknowledgement under oath
that he is subject to the tax (a "taxpayer") and is therefore subject to the directory statutes
of the IRC.
The reader should remember the legal definitions of the various terms and the information
about the rights of Citizens presented in this article whenever he reads the IRC and other
materials relating to income tax in order to better understand the correct meaning of
whatever they read.
INFORM PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHTS.

SHOW THIS TO YOUR FRIENDS!
REPRINT THIS ARTICLE AND DISTRIBUTE IT.

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send a large self-addressed stamped envelope to:
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Political Corrections
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TAX-FREEDOM.COM & PERFECT TAX AVOIDANCE
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CITIZENS
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE INCOME
TAX
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JOIN US AND HELP SPREAD THE
WORD
THE WAR IS NOW ILLEGAL
The Truth is NOT "Out There", The Truth is HERE !

AND THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE !!
"The legal right of an individual to decrease or ALTOGETHER AVOID

his/her taxes by means which the law permits cannot be doubted" Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
http://users.erols.com/scambos/taxes.htm [12/15/01 1:54:38 PM]

PERFECT TAX KNOWLEDGE
Main Menu | Home Page | Contents | Statutes | Products | Links |

SOLUTIONS
www. TAX-FREEDOM .com
Restoring Liberties, Truth, Understanding, and Freedom to America

Through a Knowledge of the Law!
MAIN MENU
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INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
INCOME TAX IMPOSED
THE ORIGINAL IMPLEMENTATION
THE ONLY FORM REQUIRED BY LAW
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
WITHHOLDING OF INCOME TAX
WHO IS LIABLE
WHO IS REQUIRED TO FILE
THE FRAUDULENT APPLICATION
THE CITIZEN'S EXEMPTION
$10,000 IF YOU PROVE WE ARE WRONG
WHERE THE IRS REALLY COMES FROM - The Cooper File
THE TRUE EVOLUTION OF THE IRS - Dan Meador
KNOW YOUR ENEMIES
WHO REALLY GETS THE MONEY
http://users.erols.com/scambos/mainmenu.htm (1 of 8) [12/15/01 1:55:47 PM]

THE LAWYERS KNOW THE TRUTH
THE FRAUDULENT ASSESSMENT

CAN CONGRESS WRITE CLEAR LAWS ?
ILLEGAL IRS MISUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY
THE FRAUDULENT ENFORCEMENT
OPTING OUT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
TAX FREE INVESTING
Personal & Business TRUST DOCUMENTS
PERFECT TAX KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTS
WHY YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN LYING TO YOU
ON-LINE LEGAL RESOURCES
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DOWNLOAD WEB SITE IN BOOK FORM
IT IS NEVER HOPELESS !
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK CONNECTION
HOW IT HAPPENED TO AMERICA

USING TRUSTS TO SHELTER YOUR ESTATE
HOW THE RICH GET AWAY
THE CONFUSION OVER ...
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, TO AMEND OR REPLACE ?
PROTECT YOURSELF FROM THE COMING DEPRESSION
IRS CRIMES & CRIMINAL COVERUPS
HOW AMERICA WILL BE DESTROYED BY 2010
HOW TO STOP THEM AND SAVE AMERICA !
LEGAL RECOURSE
SUPREME COURT ENDS FEDERAL POLICE POWER
THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES ARE A JOKE
IRS ENROLLED AGENT OPINIONS - FREE EXTRAS
BEAT THE A.T.F. TOO !
TRACK THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO TWA FLIGHT 800 ?

DON'T COUNT ON YOUR GUARD OR RESERVES TO HELP !
THE WAR POWERS ACT OF BETRAYAL
DEAD LEGAL ISSUES & INCORRECT CLAIMS
GOOD LEGAL BRIEFS
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PROPHECY FOR THE END
PLEASE SUPPORT THIS CONGRESSMAN !
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INFO ON BANK LOANS, TITLES, & FRAUD
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NATIONAL ID PROTEST - "Halt ! - Vhere are your papers ?"
HOUSE and SENATE Directories - Write Your Congressman and Senators
THESE CONGRESSMAN AGREE !

NETLINE TO CONGRESS - VOTE EVERYDAY !

SOLUTIONS
NO AMERICAN CITIZEN, (except federal employees)

HAS EVER ACTUALLY PAID A DIME OF INCOME
TAX TO THE U.S. TREASURY,
IN THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA !!
(Look and see who cashed your check !)
IF IT WASN'T THE TREASURY, IT CAN'T BE TAX !
SO, WHAT HAVE YOU BEEN PAYING ?
AND IF IT WASN'T THE UNITED STATES
TREASURY,
WHO HAVE YOU BEEN PAYING IT TO ????
WANNA BET ???

If you think I'm losing these bets,
YOU BETTER CHECK THE BACK OF YOUR LAST
CHECK TO THE IRS,
AND THEN START READING THIS WEBSITE !!!
The Fate of the Nation Hangs in the Balance !

Which will it be;

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Americans,
OR,
PEONAGE & SLAVERY
and INEXSTINGUISHABLE DEBTS
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AMERICA IS NOW
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Supreme Law Library: The Cooper File
BATF/IRS -- Criminal Fraud
by
William Cooper
CAJI News Service -- Exclusive
Veritas
Issue Number 6
September 1995
Forward by Dan Meador
The following report was sent via FAX from one of our IRS
triage people in the Northeast -- the FAX transmission was
marginal grade and the original title was not included. There
are a few holes where the type was not legible, so three or four
lines are missing. The article appeared in the September 1995
issue of Veritas Magazine, published by William Cooper. The
magazine can be secured by writing to P.O. Box 3390, St. Johns,
Arizona <85936>. Cooper wrote the article, Cooper and Wayne
Bentson did the research. I verified most material immediately
in the federal depository at the Oklahoma State University
library, and everything alleged in the article that I've had time
to follow up on, including the fact that IRS and BATF are not
listed in Chapter 3, Title 31, of the United States Code as
agencies of the Department of the Treasury for the United States,
checks out.
Since receiving the article and doing preliminary follow-up

research, I secured a book of documentation produced by Bentson
some time prior to the Cooper article being published. The book
has most Federal Register and Treasury Order materials mentioned
in the article, although the contract for IRS collection on
behalf of the Agency for International Development, the military
arm of the United Nations, isn't produced in the book. In sum,
however, everything in the following article that we've had time
to verify stands as Cooper presents it.
http://users.erols.com/scambos/cooper.htm (1 of 24) [12/15/01 1:56:47 PM]

Tom Dunn of Maine throws in another twist yet to be

verified: IRS allegedly operates through the Capital Trust
Corporation, D.C., which is allegedly another off-shore entity.
Dunn also links judges of "Nisi Prius" courts (statutory
admiralty/contract) to Capital Trust, D.C. Our research
demonstrates that the Department of Justice, when representing
IRS, operates in an alter ego on behalf of what is described as
the "General Authority" established under treaties on private
international law (28 CFR Sec. 0.50), and that state district
courts, via the various adopted acts implemented by the States,
accommodate private international law (see "conflict of laws" as
a subcategory to "statutes" in American Jurisprudence 2d). The
following article contributes significantly to documenting the
pedigree of IRS, BATF, etc.
Ponca City, Oklahoma.
BATF/IRS -- Criminal Fraud

by
William Cooper
CAJI News Service -- Exclusive
"The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States; ...."
The Constitution for the United States of America

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 ("1:8:1")
"No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in

Proportion to the Census or Enumeration hereinbefore directed to
be taken."
The Constitution for the United States of America

Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 ("1:9:4")

CAJI Investigation
Investigation of the alleged Internal Revenue Service and

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has disclosed a
broad, premeditated conspiracy to defraud the Citizens of the
United States of America. Examination of the United States Code,
the Code of Federal Regulations, the Statutes at Large,
Congressional Record, the Federal Register, and Internal Revenue
manuals too numerous to list, reveals a crime of such magnitude
that words cannot adequately describe the betrayal of the
American people. What we uncovered has clearly been designed to
circumvent the limitations of the Constitution for the United
States of America and to implement the Communist Manifesto within
the 50 States. Marx and Engels claimed that, in the effort to
create a classless society, a "graduated income tax" could be
used as a weapon to destroy the middle class.
The Art of Illusion
Magic is the art of illusion. Those who practice magic are

called Magi. They have created a web of obfuscation and
confusion in the law. When the courts have ruled them
unconstitutional or unlawful, they merely stepped outside
jurisdiction and venue. By fooling the people, they continued
the crime. These Magicians have convinced Americans that we have
a status we do not. We are led to believe we must do things that
are not required. Through the clever use of language, the
government promotes the fraud.
Not Created by Congress
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the alleged Internal

Revenue Service, were not created by Congress. These are not
organizations or agencies of the Department of the Treasury, or
of the federal government. They appear to be operated through
pure trusts administered by the Secretary of the Treasury (the
Trustee). The Settler of the trusts and the Beneficiary or
Beneficiaries are unknown. According to the law governing
trusts, the information does not have to be revealed.
Not Found in 31 U.S.C.

The organization of the Department of the Treasury can be

found in 31 United States Code, Chapter 3, beginning on page 7.
You will not find the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Internal
Revenue Service, the Secret Service, or the Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco and Firearms listed. We learned that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue, internal revenue, Internal
Revenue Service, the Bureau of Internal Revenue Service, internal
revenue service, Official Internal Revenue Service, the Federal
Alcohol Administration, Director Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
Division, and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms are all
one organization. We found this obfuscated.
Constructive Fraud
The investigation found that, except for the very few who
are engaged in specific activities, the Citizens of the 50 States
of the United States of America have never been required to file
or to pay "income taxes." The Federal government is engaged in
constructive fraud on a massive scale. Americans who have been
frightened into filing and paying "income taxes" have been robbed
of their money. Millions of lives have been ruined. Hundreds of
thousands of innocent people have been imprisoned on the pretense
they violated laws that do not exist. Some have been driven to
suicide. Marriages have been destroyed. Property has been
confiscated to pay taxes that were never owed.
Lincoln's War Tax
During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln imposed a war tax upon
the citizens. The war tax lawfully applied only to those
citizens who resided within the federal District of Columbia and
the federally owned territories, dockyards, naval bases, or
forts, and those who were considered to be in rebellion against
the Union. Many Citizens of the several States volunteered to
pay. After the war, the tax was repealed. This left the
impression that the President and Congress could levy an
unapportioned direct tax upon the Citizens of the several States,
when, in fact, no such tax had ever been imposed. The Tax was
not fraud, because nothing was done to deceive the people. Those
who were deceived, in fact, deceived themselves.

Philippine -- Trust #1
In the last century, the United States acquired by conquest

the territory of the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico.
The Philippine Customs Administrative Act was passed by the
Philippine Commission during the period from September 1, 1900,
to August 31, 1902, to regulate trade with foreign countries and
to create revenue in the form of duties, imposts, and excises.
The Act created the federal government's first trust fund called
Trust Fund #1, the Philippine special fund (customs duties), 31
U.S.C., Section 1321. The Act was administered under the general
supervision and control of the Secretary of Finance and Justice.
Philippine Trust #2
Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Philippine Commission passed another Act known as the

Internal Revenue Law of Nineteen Hundred and Four. This Act
created the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the federal
government's second trust fund called Trust Fund #2, the
Philippine special fund (internal revenue), 31 U.S.C., Section
1321. In the Act, Article I, Section 2, we find:
"There shall be established a Bureau of Internal Revenue,

the chief officer of which Bureau shall be known as the
Collector of Internal Revenue. He shall be appointed by the
Civil Governor, with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Commission, and shall receive a salary at the
rate of eight thousand pesos per annum. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue shall belong to the department of Finance
and Justice."
And in Section 3, we find:
"The Collector of Internal Revenue, under the direction of

the Secretary of Finance and Justice, shall have general
superintendence of the assessment and collection of all
taxes and excises imposed by this Act or by any Act
amendatory thereof, and shall perform such other duties as
may be required by law."
Customs & BIR Merged

It is clear that the Customs Administrative Act was to fall

within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue which
bureau was to be responsible for "all taxes and excises imposed
by this Act," which clearly included import and export excise
taxes. This effectively merged Customs and Internal Revenue in
the Philippines.
Demon Alcohol
When Prohibition was ratified in 1919 with the 18th

Amendment, the government created federal bureaucracies to
enforce the outlaw of alcohol. As protest and resistance to
prohibition increased, so did new federal laws and the number of
bureaucrats hired to enforce them. After much bloodshed and
public anger, Prohibition was repealed with the 21st Amendment,
which was ratified in 1933.
Federal Alcohol Act
In 1933, President Roosevelt declared a "Banking Emergency."

The Congress gave the President dictatorial powers under the "War
Powers Act of 1917." Congress used the economic emergency as the
excuse to give blanket approval to any and all Presidential
executive orders. Roosevelt, with a little help from his
socialist friends, was prolific in his production of new
legislation and executive orders. In 1935, the Public
Administration Clearinghouse wrote, and Roosevelt introduced, the
Federal Alcohol Act. Congress passed it into law. The Act
established the Federal Alcohol Administration. That same year,
the Supreme Court, in a monumental ruling, struck down the act,
among many others on a long list of draconian and New Deal laws.
The Federal Alcohol Administration did not go away, however; it
became involved in other affairs, placed in a sort of standby
status.
Internal Revenue (Puerto Rico)
At some unknown date prior to 1940, another Bureau of

Internal Revenue was established in Puerto Rico. The 62nd trust
fund was created and named Trust fund #62 Puerto Rico special
fund (Internal Revenue). Note that the Puerto Rico special fund

has Internal Revenue, capital "I" and "R". The Philippine

special fund (internal revenue) is in lower-case letters.
Between 1904 and 1938, the China Trade Act was passed to
deal with opium, cocaine, and citric wines shipped out of China.
It appears to have been administered in the Philippines by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
China Trade Act
We studied a copy of The Code of Federal Regulations of the

United States of America in force June 1, 1938, Title 26 --
Internal Revenue, Chapter I -- (Parts 1-137). On page 65, it
makes reference to the China Trade Act, where we find the first
use of such terms as: income, credits, withholding, Assessment
and Collection of Deficiencies, extension of time for payment,
and failure to file return. The entire substance of Title 26
deals with foreign individuals, foreign corporations, foreign
insurance corporations, foreign ships, income from sources within
possessions of United States, citizens of the United States and
domestic corporations deriving income from sources within a
possession of the United States, and China Trade Act
Corporations.
Narcotics, Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
All of the taxes covered by these laws concerned the

imposts, excise taxes, and duties to be collected by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for such items as narcotics, alcohol,
tobacco, and firearms. The alleged Internal Revenue Service
likes to make a big do about the fact that Al Capone was jailed
for tax evasion. The IRS will not tell you that the tax Capone
evaded was not "income tax" as we know it, but the tax due on the
income from the alcohol which he had imported from Canada. If he
had paid the tax, he would not have been convicted. The Internal
Revenue Act of 1939 was clearly concerned with all taxes,
imposts, excises, and duties collected on trade between the
possessions and territories of the United States, and foreign
individuals, foreign corporations, or foreign governments. The
income tax laws have always applied only to the Philippines,
Puerto Rico, District of Columbia, Virgin Islands, Guam, Northern
Mariana Islands, territories, and insular possessions.

FAA becomes BIR
Under the Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1940 which appears

at 5 United States Code Service, Section 903, the Federal Alcohol
Administration, and offices of members and Administrator thereof,
were abolished and their functions directed to be administered
under direction and supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury
through the Bureau of Internal Revenue. We found this history in
all of the older editions of 27 U.S.C.S., Section 201. It has
been removed from current editions. Only two Bureaus of Internal
Revenue have ever existed: one in the Philippines and another in
Puerto Rico. Events that have transpired tell us that the
Federal Alcohol Administration was absorbed by the Puerto Rico
Trust #62.
Victory Tax Act
World War II was a golden opportunity. Americans were

willing to sacrifice almost anything if they thought that
sacrifice would win the war. In that atmosphere, Congress passed
the Victory Tax Act. It mandated an income tax for the years
1943 and 1944 to be filed and paid in the years 1944 and 1945.
The Victory Tax Act automatically expired at the end of 1944.
The federal government, with the clever use of language, created
the myth that the tax was applicable to all Americans. Because
of their desire to win the war, Americans filed and paid the tax.
Because of their ignorance of the law, Americans filed and paid
the tax. The government promoted the fraud and threatened those
who objected. Americans forgot that the law expired in 2 years.
When the date had come and gone, they continued to keep
"records"; they continued to file; and they continued to pay
the tax. The federal government continued to print returns and
collect the tax. Never mind the fact that no Citizen of any of
the several States of the Union was ever liable to pay the tax in
the first place.
Federal Power Limited
The fiction, "that because it was an excise tax, it was

legal," is not true. The power of the federal government is
limited to its own property, as stated in Article I, Section 8,

Clause 17, and to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and

among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;" as stated
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. 18 U.S.C., Section 921,
Definitions, states, "The term 'interstate or foreign commerce'
includes commerce between any place in a State and any place
outside that State, or within any possession of the United States
(not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but
such term does not include commerce between places within the
same State but through any place outside of that State. The term
'State' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not
including the Canal Zone)." Only employees of the federal
government, residents of the District of Columbia, residents of
naval bases, residents of forts, U.S. citizens of the Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico, territories, and insular possessions were
lawfully required to file and pay the Victory Tax.
BIR becomes IRS
In 1953, the United States relinquished its control over the

Philippines. Why do the Philippine pure Trusts #1 (customs
duties) and #2 (internal revenue) continue to be administered
today? Who are the Settlers of the Trusts? What is done with
the funds in the Trusts? What businesses, if any, do these
Trusts operate? Who are the Beneficiaries? Coincidentally, on
July 9, 1953, the Secretary of the Treasury, G. K. Humphrey, by
"virtue of the authority vested in me," changed the name of the
Bureau of the Internal Revenue, BIR, to Internal Revenue Service
when he signed what is now Treasury Order 150-06. This was an
obvious attempt to legitimize the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Without the approval of Congress or the President, Humphrey,
without any legal authority, tried to turn a pure trust into an
agency of the Department of the Treasury. His actions were
illegal, but went unchallenged. Did he change the name of the
BIR in Puerto Rico or the BIR in the Philippines? We cannot find
the answer.
Mutual Security Act
In 1954, the United States and Guam became partners under

the Mutual Security Act. The Act and other documents make
reference to the definition of Guam and the United States as

being mutually interchangeable. In the same year, the Internal

Revenue Code of 1954 was passed. The Code provides for the
United States and Guam to coordinate the "Individual Income Tax".
Pertinent information on the tax issue may be found in 26 C.F.R.
301.7654-1: Coordination of U.S. and Guam Individual income
taxes, 26 C.F.R. 7654-1(e): Military personnel in Guam, and 48
U.S.C. Section 1421(i): "Income-tax laws" defined. The
Constitution forbids unapportioned direct taxes upon the Citizens
of the several States of the 50 States of the Union; therefore,
the federal government must trick (read "defraud") people into
volunteering to pay taxes as "U.S. citizens" of either Guam, the
Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico. It sounds insane, and it is, but
it is absolutely true.
BATF from IRS
On June 6, 1972, Acting Secretary of the Treasury Charles E.

Walker signed Treasury Order Number 120-01 which established the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. He did this with the
stroke of his pen, citing "by virtue of the authority vested in
me as Secretary of the Treasury, including the authority in
Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 1950." He ordered the ...
"... transfer, as specified herein, the functions, powers

and duties of the Internal Revenue Service arising under
laws relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives
(including the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the
Internal Revenue Service) to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (hereinafter referred to as the Bureau) which
is hereby established. The Bureau shall be headed by the
Director, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (hereinafter
referred to as the Director). The Director shall perform
his duties under the general direction of the Secretary of
the Treasury (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary ) and
under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary
(Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs, and Operations)
(hereinafter referred to as the Assistant Secretary)."
BATF = IRS
Treasury Order 120-01 assigned to the new BATF Chapters 51,

52, and 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and sections 7652

and 7653 of such code, chapters 61 through 80 inclusive of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act (27 U.S.C. Chapter 8) (which, in 1935, the Supreme Court had
declared unconstitutional within the several States of the
Union), 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44, Title VII Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. Appendix, sections 1201-1203,
18 U.S.C. 1262-1265, 1952 and 3615, and etc.) Mr. Walker then
makes a statement within T.O. 120-01 that is very revealing:
"The terms 'Director, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Division' and 'Commissioner of Internal Revenue' wherever
used in regulations, rules, and instructions, and forms,
issued or adopted for the administration and enforcement of
the laws specified in paragraph 2 hereof, which are in
effect or in use on the effective date of this Order, shall
be held to mean 'the Director'."
Walker seemed to branch the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),

creating the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), and
then, with that statement, joined them back together into one.
In the Federal Register, Volume 41, Number 180, of Wednesday,
September 15, 1976, we find: "The term 'Director, Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms Division' has been replaced by the term
'Internal Revenue Service'."
We found this pattern of deception and obfuscation

everywhere we looked during our investigation. For further
evidence of the fact that the IRS and the BATF are one and the
same organization, check 27 U.S.C.A. Section 201.
The Gift of the Magi
This is how the Magi perform magic. Secretary Humphrey,

with no authority, creates an agency of the Department of the
Treasury called "Internal Revenue Service", out of thin air, from
an offshore pure trust called "Bureau of Internal Revenue". The
"Settler" and "Beneficiaries" of the trust are unknown. The
"Trustee" is the Secretary of the Treasury. Acting Secretary
Walker further launders the trust by creating, from the alleged
"Internal Revenue Service", the "Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms."

Person Becomes Thing
Unlike Humphrey, however, Walker assuaged himself of any

guilt when he nullified the order by proclaiming:
"The terms 'Director, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Division' and 'Commissioner of Internal Revenue' wherever
used in regulations, rules, and instructions, and forms,
issued or adopted for the administration and enforcement of
the laws specified in paragraph 2 hereof, which are in
effect or in use on the effective date of this Order, shall
be held to mean 'the Director'."
Walker created the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms from

the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of Humphrey's Internal
Revenue Service. He then says that, what was transferred is the
same entity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. He knew he
could not legally create something from nothing without the
authority of Congress and/or the President, so he made it look
like he did something that he had, in fact, not done. To
compound the fraud, the Federal Register published the
unbelievable assertion that a person had been replaced with a
thing: "the term Director Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division
has been replaced with the term Internal Revenue Service."
Stroke of Genius
The Federal Alcohol Administration, which administered the

Federal Alcohol Act, and offices of members and Administrator
thereof, were abolished and their functions were directed to be
administered under direction and supervision of the Secretary of
Treasury through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, now the Internal
Revenue Service. The Federal Alcohol Act was ruled
unconstitutional within the 50 States, so it was transferred to
the BIR, which is an offshore trust, which became the IRS, which
gave birth to the BATF and, somehow, the term Director, Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms Division, which is a person within the BATF,
spawned the alleged Internal Revenue Service via another flick of
the pen on September 15, 1976.
In a brilliant flash of logic, Wayne C. Bentson determined

that he could check these facts by filing a Freedom of

Information Act ("FOIA") request, asking the BATF to "name the

person who now administers the Federal Alcohol Act." If we were
wrong, then a reply would state that no record exists as to any
name of any person who administers the Act. The request was
submitted to the BATF. The reply came on July 14, 1994, from the
Secret Service, an unexpected source, which discloses a
connection we had not suspected. The reply states that John
Magaw of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, of the
Department of the Treasury, administers the Federal Alcohol Act.
You may remember from the Waco hearings that John Magaw is the
Director, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. All of our research was
confirmed by that admission.
Smoke and Mirrors
Despite all the pen flicking and the smoke and mirrors,
there is no such organization within the Department of the
Treasury known as the "Internal Revenue Service" or the "Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms." Title 31 U.S.C. is "Money and
Finance" and therein are published the laws pertaining to the
Department of the Treasury ("DOT"). Title 31 U.S.C., Chapter 3,
is a statutory list of the organizations of the DOT. Internal
Revenue Service and/or Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
are not listed within Title 31 U.S.C. as agencies or
organizations of the Department of the Treasury. They are
referenced, however, as "to be audited" by the Controller General
in 31 U.S.C. Section 713.
BATF - Puerto Rico
We have already demonstrated that both of these

organizations are, in reality, the same organization. Where we
find one, we will surely find the other. In 27 C.F.R., Chapter
1, Section 250.11, Definitions, we find: "United States Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms office. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms office. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms office in Puerto Rico ..." and "Secretary -- The
Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico" and "Revenue Agent --
Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the
Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico." Remember that
"Internal Revenue" is the name of the Puerto Rico Trust #62. It
is perfectly logical and reasonable that a Revenue Agent works as

an employee for the Department of the Treasury of the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Where is IRS?
Where is the alleged "Internal Revenue Service"? The

Internal Revenue Code of 1939, aka Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
etc., etc., etc., 27 C.F.R. refers to Title 26 as relevant to
Title 27, as per 27 C.F.R., Chapter 1, Section 250.30, which
states that 26 U.S.C. 5001(a)(1) is governing a Title 27 U.S.C.
law. In fact, 26 U.S.C. Chapters 51, 52, and 53 are the alcohol,
tobacco and firearms taxes, administered by the Internal Revenue
Service; alias Bureau of Internal Revenue; alias Virgin Islands
Bureau of Internal Revenue; alias Director, Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms Division; alias Internal Revenue Service.
Must be Noticed
According to 26 C.F.R. Section 1.6001-1(d), Records, no one

is required to keep records or file returns unless specifically
notified by the district director by notice served upon him, to
make such returns, render such statements, or keep such specific
records as will enable the district director to determine whether
or not such person is liable for tax under subtitle A of the
Code. 26 C.F.R. states that this rule includes State individual
income taxes. Don't get yourself all lathered up, because
"State" means ... the District of Columbia, U.S. Virgin Islands,
Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, territories, and
insular possessions.
No Implementation of Law
44 U.S.C. says that every regulation or rule must be

published in the Federal Register. It also states that every
regulation or rule must be approved by the Secretary of the
Treasury. If there is no regulation, then there is no
implementation of the law. There is no regulation governing
"failure to file a return." There is no computer code for
"failure to file." The only thing we could find was a
requirement stating "where to file an income tax return." It can
be found in 26 C.F.R., Section 1.6091-3, which states that,
"Income tax returns required to be filed with Director of

International Operations." Who is the Director of International

Operations?
Delegation of Authority
No one in government is allowed to do anything unless they

have been given specific, written authority in the law, or else
someone who has been given authority in the law gives that person
a delegation of authority order, spelling out exactly what they
can and cannot do under that specific order. We combed the
Department of the Treasury's Handbook of Delegation Orders and we
found that no one in the IRS or BATF has any authority to do most
of the things they have been doing for years.
No Authority to Audit
Delegation Order Number 115 (Rev. 5) of May 12, 1986, is the

only delegation of authority to conduct Audits. It states that
the IRS and BATF can only audit themselves, and only for amounts
of $750 or less. Any amount above that amount must be audited by
the Controller General, according to Title 31 U.S.C. No other
authority to audit exists. No IRS or BATF agent, or
representative, can furnish us with any law, rule, or regulation
which gives them the authority to audit anyone other than
themselves. Order Number 191 states that they can levy on
property, but only if that property is in the hands of parties.
Authority to Investigate
The manual states, on page 1100-40.2, of April 21, 1989,

Criminal Investigation Division, that ...
"... the Criminal Investigation Division enforces the

criminal statutes applicable to income, estate, gift,
employment, and excise tax laws ... involving United States
citizens residing in foreign countries and nonresident
aliens subject to Federal income tax filing requirements by
developing information concerning alleged criminal
violations thereof, evaluating allegations and indications
of such violations to determine investigations to be
undertaken, investigating suspected criminal violations of
such laws, recommending prosecution when warranted, and

measuring effectiveness of the investigation processes ...."
Authority to Collect
On page 1100-40.1, it states in 1132.7 of April 21, 1989,

Director, Office of Taxpayer Service and Compliance:
"Responsible for operation of a comprehensive enforcement

and assistance program for all taxpayers under the immediate
jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner (International)
.... Directs the full range of collection activity on
delinquent accounts and delinquent returns for taxpayers
overseas, in Puerto Rico, and in United States possessions
and territories."
50 States not Included
1132.72 of April 21, 1989, Collection Division, says:
"Executes the full range of collection activities on

delinquent accounts, which includes securing delinquent
returns involving taxpayers outside the United States and
those in United States territories, possessions and in
Puerto Rico."
U.S. Attorney's Manual
The United States Attorney's Manual, Title 6 Tax Division,

Chapter 4, page 16, October 1, 1988, 6-4.270, Criminal Division
Responsibility, states:
"The Criminal Division has limited responsibility for the

prosecution of offenses investigated by the IRS. Those
offenses are: excise violations involving liquor tax,
narcotics, stamp tax, firearms, wagering, and coin-operated
gambling and amusement machines; malfeasance offenses
committed by IRS personnel; forcible rescue of seized
property; corrupt or forcible interference with an officer
or employee acting under the internal revenue laws; and
unauthorized mutilation, removal or misuse of stamps." See
28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.70.

"Act of Congress"
We found this revelation in 28 U.S.C. Rule 54(c),

Application of Terms:
"As used in these rules the following terms have the

designated meanings. 'Act of Congress' includes any act of
Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District
of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular
possession."
It is the Law
28 U.S.C. contains the "Rules of Courts." They were written

and approved by the Justices of the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court, in writing 28 U.S.C., has already ruled upon this issue.
They are the Law.
Where is the Money?
Where does the money go that is paid into the IRS? It

spends at least a year in what is called a "quad zero" account
under an Individual Master File, after which time the Director of
the IRS Center can, apparently, do whatever he wants with the
money. It is sometimes dispersed under Treasury Order 91 (Rev.
1), May 12, 1986, which is a service agreement between the IRS
and the Agency for International Development ("AID").
We Financed Soviet Weapons
When William Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency during Iran-Contra, was the head of AID, he funnelled
hundreds of millions of dollars to the Soviet Union, which money
was spent building the Kama River Truck Factory, the largest
military production facility for tanks, trucks, armored personnel
carriers, and other wheeled vehicles in the world. The Kama
River Truck Factory has a production capability larger than all
of the combined automobile and truck manufacturing plants in the
United States.

IRS/AID Service Agreement
The agreement states:
"Authority is hereby delegated to the Assistant Commissioner

International to develop and enter into the service
agreement between the Treasury Department and the Agency for
International Development."
The Secretary of the Treasury is always appointed U.S.

Governor of the International Monetary Fund in accordance with
the international agreement that created the IMF. The Secretary
of the Treasury is paid by the IMF, while serving as Governor.
Agent of Foreign Powers
Lloyd Bentsen held the following positions at the same time

as he was the Secretary of the Treasury: U.S. Governor of the
International Monetary Fund, U.S. Governor of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, U.S. Governor of the
Inter-American Development Bank, U.S. Governor of the African
Development Bank, U.S. Governor of the Asian Development Bank,
U.S. Governor of the African Development Fund, and U.S. Governor
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Mr.
Bentsen received a salary from each of these organizations which
literally made him an unregistered agent of several foreign
powers.
Citizen vs citizen
By birth, we are each a Citizen of the State of California,

or a Citizen of the State of Arizona, or a Citizen of whatever
Union State wherein we were born and, at the same time, we are
all Citizens of the United States of America, and are not subject
to any Acts of Congress, other than the 18 powers specifically
enumerated in the Constitution for the United States of America.
People who are born, or who reside, within the federal District
of Columbia, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the
Northern Mariana Islands, any territory, on any naval base or
dockyard, within forts, or within insular possessions, are called
U.S. citizens and are subject to Acts of Congress. Within the
law, words have meanings that are not the same meanings that are

accepted in common usage. Our Constitution is the Constitution

for the United States of America. The U.S. Constitution is the
Constitution of Puerto Rico.
Volunteer Taxpayers
We are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction which we

volunteer to accept. In the law governing income tax, "income"
is defined as foreign earned income, offshore oil well or
windfall profits, and war profits. A "return" is prepared by a
taxpayer to submit to the federal government taxes that he/she
collected. A "taxpayer" is one who collects taxes and submits
the taxes as a return to the federal government. An "employee"
is one who is employed by the federal government. An "employer"
is the federal government. An "individual" is a citizen of Guam
or the U.S. Virgin Islands. A "business" is defined as a
government, a bank, or an insurance company. A "resident" is an
alien citizen of Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico,
who resides within one of the 50 States of the Union known as the
United States of America, or one of the other island possessions.
1040 for "Aliens"
A form 1040 is the income tax return for a nonresident alien

citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands, residing within one of the 50
States of the several States in the Union known as the United
States of America. If you volunteer that you are a U.S. citizen,
you have become a U.S. citizen. If you write or print your name
on a line labeled "taxpayer," you have become a taxpayer. Since
these forms are affidavits which you submit under penalty of
perjury, you commit a crime every time you fill one out and sign,
stating that you are what you are not. The federal government is
delighted by your ignorance, and will gladly accept your returns
and your money. As proof, refer to the Virgin Islands Tax Guide,
which states:
"All references to the District Director or to the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue should be interpreted to
mean the Director of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal
Revenue. All references to the Internal Revenue Service,
the Federal depository and similar references should be
interpreted as the BIR, and so forth. Any questions in

interpreting Federal forms for use in the Virgin Islands

should be referred to the BIR."
Codes Tell the Tale
In Internal Revenue Service publication 6209, Computer Codes

for IRS, "TC 150" is listed as the code for "Virgin Island
Returns" and the Codes 300 through 398 are listed as "U.S. and UK
Tax Treaty claims involving taxes on narcotics which were
financed in the Cayman Islands and imported into the Virgin
Islands."
Narcotics Dealer?
When Freedom of Information Act requests have been filed for

the Individual Master File ("IMF") for people who are
experiencing tax problems with the IRS, every return has been
found to contain the above codes, except for some which are coded
as "Guam" returns. Every return shows that the unsuspecting
Citizen is being taxed on income derived from importing
narcotics, alcohol, tobacco, or firearms into the United States,
or one of its territories or possessions, from a foreign country,
or from Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, or into the Virgin
Islands from the Cayman Islands.
Who Is Required to File?
26 C.F.R., Section 601.103(a), is the only place which tells

us who is required to file a return, provided that person has
been properly noticed by the District Director to keep records,
and then is properly noticed that he/she is required to file. It
states, "In general each taxpayer (or person required to collect
and pay over the taxes) is required to file a prescribed for[m]
of return ...." Are you a taxpayer?
Who Are These Thugs?
The scam manifests itself in many different ways. In order

to maintain the semblance of legality, hats are changed from
moment to moment. When you are told to submit records for
examination, you are dealing with Customs. When you submit an

offer in compromise, you are dealing with the Coast Guard. When
you are confronted by a Special Agent of the IRS, you are really
dealing with a deputized United States Marshall. When you are
being investigated by the alleged Internal Revenue Service, you
are really dealing with an agent contracted by the Justice
Department to investigate narcotics violations. When the alleged
Internal Revenue Service charges you with a crime, you are
dealing with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Only a
small part of 26 U.S.C. is administered by the alleged Internal
Revenue Service.
Most of the Code is administered by the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms, including Chapters 61 through 80, which is
enforcement. In addition, 27 C.F.R. is BATF, and states in
Subpart B, Definitions, 250.11, Meaning of terms: "United States
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms office -- Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms office in Puerto Rico." Every
person we find, who is being prosecuted by the alleged Internal
Revenue Service, has a code on their IMF which puts them in "tax
class 6" which designates that they have violated a law relating
to alcohol, tobacco, or firearms, in Puerto Rico.
No Jurisdiction
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has no venue or

jurisdiction within the borders of any of the 50 States of the
United States of America (the "Union"), except in pursuit of an
importer of contraband alcohol, tobacco, or firearms who failed
to pay the tax on those items. As proof, refer to the July 30,
1993, ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in 1 F.3d 1511; 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 19747,
where the court ruled in United States v. D.J. Vollmer & Co. that
the BATF has jurisdiction over the first sale of a firearm
imported to the country, but they don't have jurisdiction over
subsequent sales.
Feds Lie
Attorneys, including your defense attorney, the U.S.

Attorney, Federal Judges, and alleged Internal Revenue Service
and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms personnel routinely
lie in depositions and on the witness stand to perpetuate this

fraud. They do this willingly and with full knowledge that they
are committing perjury. Every Judge intentionally lies every
time he/she gives instructions to a Jury in a criminal or civil
tax case brought by the IRS or BATF. They all know it, and do it
willingly, and with malice aforethought.
Where Do They Get These Guys?
How does the government hire people who will intentionally

work to defraud their fellow Americans? Most of those who work
on the lower levels for the IRS, BATF, and other agencies simply
do not know the truth. They do as they are told to earn a living
until retirement. Executives, U.S. Attorneys, Federal Judges,
and others do know, and are, with full knowledge and malice
aforethought, participating in the crime of the century. Many of
these people, including the President, are paid lots of money.
Monetary Awards
The Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook of Delegation Orders,

January 17, 1983, page 1229-91, outlines the alleged Internal
Revenue Service's system of monetary awards "of up to and
including $5,000 for any one individual employee or group of
employees in his/her immediate office, including field employees
engaged in National Office projects; and contributions of
employees of other Government agencies and armed forces members"
with the approval of the Deputy Commissioner, "of $5,001 to
$10,000 for any one individual or group" with approval of the
Deputy Commissioner, "of $10,001 - $25,000 for any one individual
or group" with the Commissioner's concurrence, "an additional
monetary award of $10,000 (total $35,000) to the President
through Treasury and OPM" with the Commissioner's concurrence.
Legal Bribery
These awards include cash awards. They are not limited as

to the number that may be awarded to any one person or group.
There is no time limitation placed upon any award. Any person or
group of persons can be awarded this money, including U.S.
Attorneys, Federal Judges, your Certified Public Accountant, the
President of the United States, members of Congress, your mother,
H&R Block, etc. The awards may be given to the same person or

group, each minute, each hour, every day, every week, every
month, every year, or not at all. In other words, the U.S.
Government and the alleged Internal Revenue Service, aka Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, has a perfectly legal system of
bribery. The bribery works against the Citizens of the several
States of the United States of America.
Warning!
Our investigation uncovered a lot. We have printed only a

little. Successful use of this material requires a lot of study,
and an excellent understanding of the legal system. Please do
not compound errors by attempting to extract some imaginary magic
bullet to use against the alleged Internal Revenue Service, or
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. It is not enough to
discover this information; you must know it inside and out,
backwards and forwards, like you know the smell of your own
breath.
Trust Betrayed
We have been betrayed by those we trusted. We have been

robbed of our money and property. It happened because we trusted
imperfect men to rule imperfect men, and we failed in our duty as
watchdogs. It happened because we have been ignorant, apathetic,
and even stupid.
By Choice and Consent
"A nation or world of people, who will not use their

intelligence, are no better than animals that do not have
intelligence; such people are beasts of burden and steaks
on the table by choice and consent."
from "Behold a Pale Horse," by William Cooper,

Light Technology Publishing, Sedona, Arizona state
A significant portion of the research that led to the

writing of this article was contributed by Mr. Wayne Bentson.
# # #

Return to the Supreme Law Library

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Public Notice Regarding Limits of IRS Authority
This memorandum will be construed to comply with provisions necessary to establish presumed fact
(Rule 301, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and attending State rules) should interested parties fail to
rebut any given allegation or matter of law addressed herein. The position will be construed as adequate
to meet requirements of judicial notice, thus preserving fundamental law. Matters addressed herein, if not
rebutted, will be construed to have general application. A true and correct copy of this Public Notice is
on file with and available for inspection at the newspaper responsible for publishing the instrument as
legal notice. The memorandum addresses the character of the Internal Revenue Service and other
agencies of the Department of the Treasury, and legal application of the Internal Revenue Code.
1. IRS Identity & Principal of Interest
In 1953, the Internal Revenue Service was created by the stroke of a pen when the Secretary of the
Treasury changed the name of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Treasury Order No. 150-29, G.M.
Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury, July 9, 1953). However, no congressional or presidential
authorization for making this change has been located, so the source of authority had to originate
elsewhere. Research to which IRS officials have acquiesced suggests that the Secretary exercised his
authority as trustee of Puerto Rico, Trust #62 (Internal Revenue) (see 31 USC § 1321), and as will be
demonstrated, the Secretary does, in fact, operate as Secretary of the Treasury, Puerto Rico.
The solid link between the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico,
was first published in the September 1995 issue of Veritas Magazine, based on research by William
Cooper and Wayne Bentson, both of Arizona. A criminal complaint was filed in the office of W. A.
Drew Edmondson, attorney general for Oklahoma, against an Enid-based revenue officer, and in the time
since, IRS principals have failed to refute the allegation that IRS is an agency of the Department of
Treasury, Puerto Rico. Later, criminal complaints were filed simultaneously with the grand jury for the
United States District Court for the District of Northern Oklahoma, Tulsa, and the office of Attorney
General Edmondson, and both the office of the United States Attorney and IRS principals have yet to
rebut the allegations in that instance.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. Kenney F. Moore, et al, 95
CR-129C).
http://users.erols.com/scambos/pubnotic.htm (1 of 25) [12/15/01 1:57:58 PM]

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By consulting the index for Chapter 3, Title 31 of the United States Code, one finds that IRS and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are not listed as agencies of the United States Department of
the Treasury. The fact that Congress never created a "Bureau of Internal Revenue" is confirmed by
publication in the Federal Register at 36 F.R. 849-890 [C.B. 1971 - 1,698], 36 F.R. 11946 [C.B. 1971 -
2,577], and 37 F.R. 489-490; and in Internal Revenue Manual 1100 at 1111.2
Implications are condemning both to IRS and third parties who knowingly participate in IRS-initiated
scams: No legitimate authority resides in or emanates from an office which was not legitimately created
and/or ordained either by state or national constitutions or by legislative enactment. See variously, United
States v. Germane, 99 U.S. 508 (1879), Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441, 6 S.Ct. 1121
(1866), etc., dating to Pope v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1943); where the state is
concerned, the most recent corresponding decision was State v. Pinckney, 276 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa
1979).
Another direct evidence of the fraud is found at 27 CFR § 1, which prescribes basic requirements for
securing permits under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. The problem here is that Congress
promulgated the Act in 1935, and the same year, the United States Supreme Court declared the Act
unconstitutional. Administration of the Act was subsequently moved offshore to Puerto Rico, along with
the Federal Alcohol Administration, and operation eventually merged with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Puerto Rico, which until 1938, along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Philippines, created
by the Philippines provisional government via Philippines Trust #2 (internal revenue) (see 31 USC §
1321 for listing of Philippines Trust #2 (internal revenue)), administered the China Trade Act (licensing
& revenue collection relating to opium, cocaine & citric wines). This line will be resumed after
examining additional evidences concerning IRS and Commissioner of Internal Revenue authority.
Further verification that IRS does not have lawful authority in the several States is found in the Parallel
Table of Authorities and Rules, beginning on page 751 of the 1995 Index volume to the Code of Federal
Regulations. It will be found that there are no regulations supportive of 26 USC §§ 7621, 7801, 7802 &
7803 (these statute listings are absent from the table). In other words, no regulations have been
published in the Federal Register, extending authority to the several States and the population at
large,
(1) to establish revenue districts within the several States,
(2) extending authority of the Department of the Treasury [Puerto Rico] to the several States, (3)

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giving authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and assistants within the several States,
or (4) extending authority of any other Department of Treasury personnel to the several States.
Authority of the Internal Revenue Service, via the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is convoluted in
regulations, but makes an amount of sense by citing various regulations pertaining to the Service and
application of the Commissioner's authority. General procedural rules at 26 CFR § 601.101(a) provide a
beginning-point:
(a) General. The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury under the
immediate direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has general
superintendence of the assessment and collection of all taxes imposed by any law providing internal
revenue. The Internal Revenue Service is the agency by which these functions are performed...
The fact that there are no regulations extending Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or Department of the
Treasury authority to the several States (26 USC § 7802(a)), has greater clarity in the light of the general
merging of functions between IRS and other agencies presently attached to the Department of the
Treasury. The Commissioner is given responsibility for issuing rules and regulations for the Code at 26
CFR § 301.7805-1, with approval of the Secretary, but there are no cites of authority for this CFR
subpart, whether Treasury Order, publication in the Federal Register, or even statute cite. In other words,
there is no actual or effective delegation which vests the Commissioner with significant independent
authority which might be conveyed to IRS, BATF, Customs or any other Department of the Treasury
agency with respect to powers extending to or affecting the several States and the population at large.
The link between IRS and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is significant as the tie with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, is through this door.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1940, Section 2, made the following change:
§ 2. Federal Alcohol Administration
The Federal Alcohol Administration, the offices of the members thereof, and the office of the

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Administrator are abolished, and their function shall be administered under direction and supervision of
the Secretary of the Treasury through the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the Department of the Treasury.
Again, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 was declared unconstitutional in 1935, and the
operation thereafter transferred off shore to Puerto Rico. The name of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
was changed to the Internal Revenue Service in 1953 (cite above), then the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, a division of the Internal Revenue Service, was seemingly separated from IRS (T.O. 120-
01, June 6, 1972). In relevant part, the order reads as follows:
1. The purpose of this order is to transfer, as specified herein, the functions, powers
and duties of the Internal Revenue Service arising under law relating to Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives including the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
division of the Internal Revenue Service, to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms herein after referred to as the Bureau which is hereby established. The Bureau shall be headed
by the Director of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms herein referred to as the Director...
2. The Director shall perform the functions, exercise the powers and carry out the duties of the Secretary
and the administration and the enforcement of the following provisions of law:
A. Chapters 51 and 52 and 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and Section 7652 and 7653 of such
code insofar as they relate to the commodity subject to tax under such chapters.
B. Chapter 61 to 80 inclusive to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 insofar as they relate to
activities administered and enforced with respect to chapters 51, 52, 53. (emphasis added)
Transfer of functions and duties of IRS to BATF relative to Internal Revenue Code Subtitle F (chapters
61 to 80) is important where the instant matter is concerned as the only regulations published in the
Federal Register applicable to the several States are under 27 CFR, Part 70 and other parts of this title
relating exclusively to alcohol, tobacco and firearms matters. However, the charade doesn't end there. In
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965 (5 USC § 903), the original Bureau of Customs, created by Act of
Congress in 1895, was abolished and merged under the Secretary of the Treasury.

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In a Treasury Order published in the Federal Register of December 15, 1976, the Secretary of the
Treasury used something of a slight of hand to confuse matters more by determining, "The term Director,
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms has been replaced with the term Internal Revenue Service."
Obviously, it is impossible to replace a person with a thing when it comes to administrative

responsibility. However, the order demonstrates that IRS and BATF are one and the same, merely
operating with interchangeable hats. Therefore, definitions and designations applicable to one are
applicable to the other.
In definitions at 27 CFR § 250.11, the following provisions are found:
Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the
Treasury of Puerto Rico. Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. Secretary or his
delegate. The Secretary or any officer or employee of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico
duly authorized by the Secretary to perform the function mentioned or described in this part.
In the absence of any other definition describing revenue officers and agents, the Secretary, or the
Department of the Treasury, definitions above are uniformly applicable to all IRS and BATF
departments, functions and personnel. In fact, it will be found that even petroleum tax prescribed in
Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code applies only to United States territorial jurisdiction exclusive of
the several States and to imported petroleum. BATF has authority only with respect to firearms,
munitions, etc., produced outside the several States and the first sale of imports.
The two delegations of authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue thus far located tend to
reinforce conclusions set out above. Treasury Department Order No. 150-42, dated July 27, 1956,
appearing in at 21 Fed. Reg. 5852, specifies the following:
The Commissioner shall, to the extent of the authority vested in him, provide for the administration of
United States internal revenue laws in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

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On February 27, 1986 (51 Fed. Reg. 9571), Treasury Department Order No. 150-01 specified the
following:
The Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the
administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the U.S. Territories and insular possessions
and other authorized areas of the world.
To date only three statutes in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as currently amended, have been
located that specifically reference the several States, exclusive of the federal States (District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, etc.): 26 USC §§ 5272(b), 5362(c) & 7462. The first two provide
certain exemptions to bond and import tax requirements relating to imported distilled spirits for
governments of the several States and their respective political subdivisions, and the last provides that
reports published by the United States Tax Court will constitute evidence of the reports in courts of the
United States and the several States. None of the three statutes extend assessment or collections authority
for IRS or BATF within the several States.
IRS is contracted to provide collection services for the Agency for International Development, and case
law demonstrates that the true principals of interest are the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank (Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 6 L.Ed (Wheat) 244; U.S. v. Burr,
309 U.S. 242; see 22 USCA § 286, et seq.). In other words, the IRS seemingly provides collection
services for undisclosed foreign principals rather than collecting internal revenue for the benefit of
the Treasury or the constitutional United States government operation. To date, IRS principals have
failed to deny or dispute these published allegations of fact.
The Internal Revenue Service, an (unregistered) foreign entity (agent) with respect to the several States,
is not registered, legally or otherwise, to do business or enforce debt, or law, in the several States of the
Union, outside of the Federal enclaves (military bases, etc) that may exist within a State.
2. Preservation of Due Process Rights

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The Internal Revenue Service has for years been protected by statutory courts both of the United States
and the several States, with the latter operating in the framework of adopted uniform laws which ascribe
a federal character to the several States. Both operate under the presumption of Congress' Article IV
jurisdiction within the geographical United States (the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc.), both
accommodate private international law under exclusively United States treaties on private international
law, and both operate in the framework of admiralty rules to impose Civil Law (see both majority &
dissenting opinions variously, Bennis v. Michigan, U.S. Supreme Court No. 94-8729, March 4, 1996) ,
which is repugnant to both state and national constitutions (see authority of Department of Justice as
representative of the "Central Authority" established by U.S. treaties on private international law at 28
CFR § 0.49; also, "conflict of law" as a subcategory to "statutes" in American Jurisprudence). However,
this house of cards will shortly fall as Cooperative Federalism, known as Corporatism well into the
1930s, has been thoroughly documented and is rapidly being exposed via state and United States
appellate courts and in public forum.
In reality, the Internal Revenue Code preserves due process rights, but the statute has been dormant until
recently:
§ 7804 (b) PRESERVATION OF EXISTING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES.
-- Nothing in Reorganization Plan Numbered 26 of 1950 or Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of

1952 shall be considered to impair any right or remedy, including trial by jury, to recover
any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,
or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal revenue laws. For
the purpose of any action to recover any such tax, penalty, or sum, all statutes, rules, and
regulations referring to the collector of internal revenue, the principal officer for the internal
revenue district, or the Secretary, shall be deemed to refer to the officer whose act or acts referred
to in the preceding sentence gave rise to such action. The venue of any such action shall be the
same as under existing law. (emphasis added)
The reorganization plans of 1950 & 1952 were implemented via the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,

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Volume 68A of the Statutes at Large, and were codified as title 26 of the United States Code. Savings
statutes have been in place since the beginning, but generally not understood by the general population or
the legal profession. The statute set out above is easier to comprehend when references are consolidated.
Further, the dependent clause "including trial by jury" relates to a constitutionally-assured right, not a
remedy, so it should be moved to the proper location in the sentence. Finally, the matter of venue is
important as "existing law" is constitutional and common law indigenous to the several States. In the
absence of legitimate federal law which extends to the several States, those persons who operate under
color of law in NAME of tax only, engage in fraud, oppression, misuse of authority, abuse of law,
conspiracy, extortion, wrongful conversion, theft, etc., are subject to the foundation law of the States.
Venue is determined by the law of legislative jurisdiction.
Citing "including trial by jury" preserves the full slate of due process rights included in Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution for the united States of America and
corresponding provisions in constitutions of the several States. The example represents the class.
Additionally, note that, (1) actions may issue against bogus assessments as well as collections, and (2) §
7804(b), unlike § 7433, does not presume that the complaining party is a "taxpayer". Finally, there is 26
CFR, Part 1 regulatory support for § 7804 where there are no regulations published in the Federal
Register in support of § 7433 (see Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, beginning on page 751 of the
Index volume to the Code of Federal Regulations). Therefore, § 7804(b) preserves rights and determines
the nature of civil actions for remedies in the several States. When straightened out, applicable portions
of § 7804(b) read as follows:
Nothing in [the Internal Revenue Code] shall be considered to impair any right, [including trial by
jury], or remedy, ... to recover any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected ... The venue of any such action shall be the same as under existing
law.
The necessity of due process is implicitly preserved by 28 USC § 2463, which stipulates that any
seizure under United States revenue laws will be deemed in the custody of the law and subject
solely to disposition of courts of the United States with proper jurisdiction. In other words, even if
IRS had legitimate authority in the several States, the agency would of necessity have to file a civil or
criminal complaint prior to garnishment, seizure or any other action adversely affecting the life, liberty or
property of any given person, whether a Fourteenth Amendment citizen-subject of the United States or a

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Citizen principal of one of the several States. Due process assurances in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not equivocate -- administrative seizures without due process can be equated only to
tyranny and barbarian rule. Further, even regulations governing IRS conduct acknowledge and therefore
preserve Fifth Amendment assurances at 26 CFR § 601.106(f)(1).
(1) Rule 1. An exaction by the U.S. Government, which is not based upon law statutory or otherwise, is a
taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Accordingly, an Appeals representative in his or her conclusions of fact or application of
the law, shall hew to the law and the recognized standards of legal construction. It shall be his or her duty
to determine the correct amount of the tax, with strict impartiality as between the taxpayer and the
Government, and without favoritism or discrimination as between taxpayers.
Even officers, agents and employees of United States agencies are assured due process where
garnishment is concerned (5 USC § 5520a), so the notion that IRS has authority to execute
garnishment and other seizures via the private sector without due process is clearly absurd. In the
English-American lineage, due process has always been deemed to mean trial by jury under rules of the
common law indigenous to the several States; the de jure people of America are not subject to admiralty
or administrative tribunals.
Where officers, agents and employees of the Internal Revenue Service are concerned, there can be no
plea of ignorance concerning the necessity of due process as the Handbook for Revenue Agents, at
paragraph 332: (1), provides the following:
During the course of administratively collecting a tax, an occasion may arise where service of a levy or a
notice of levy is not adequate to seize the property of a taxpayer. It cannot be emphasized too strongly
that constitutional guarantees and individual rights must not be violated. Property should not be forcibly
removed from the person of the taxpayer. Such conduct may expose a revenue officer to an action in
trespass, assault and battery, conversion, etc.
The provision acknowledges the Supreme Court decision in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Corp. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).

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In sum, the mandate for due process, meaning initiatives through judicial courts with proper
jurisdiction, is clearly antecedent to imposition of administratively-issued liens, except where
licensing agreements obligate assets, or seizures, whether by garnishment, attachment of bank accounts,
administrative seizure and sale of real or private property, or any other initiative that compromises life,
liberty or property.
3. Current I. R. Code & Internal Revenue Code of 1939 Are Same
Consult 26 USC §§ 7851 & 7852 to verify that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended in 1986
and since, simply reorganized the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Read § 7852(b) & (c), then read the
balance of §§ 7851 & 7852 for best comprehension.
The importance of making this connection rests on the fact that the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
was merely codification of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939. There was no general income tax
levied against the population at large in 1939 or since. The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, which in
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 incorporated the Social Security tax activated after 1936, was
premised on the notion that working for federal government is a privilege. Income and related taxes
prescribed in Subtitles A & C of the current Internal Revenue Code have never been mandatory for
anyone other than officers, agents and employees of the United States, as identified at 26 USC §
3401(c), and agencies of the United States, identified at § 3401(d), particularized at 5 USC §§ 102 &
105.
The (privilege) tax is an indirect excise tax rather than a direct tax -- according to the Supreme Court
rulings in Brushaber v Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916):
"... taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such ...", and
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 112 (1916):

"... the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation ...", the Sixteenth Amendment,
deceptively promulgated in 1913, did not alter or repeal constitutional provisions which require all
direct taxes to be apportioned among the several States (Constitution, Article I §§ 2.3 & 9.4), nor did
it establish the income tax as a direct tax.

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In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1918), Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, and numerous decisions
since, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that for purposes of income tax, wages
and other returns from enterprise of common right are property, not income. In fact, returns from
enterprise of common right are fundamental to all property, and the sanctity is preserved as a
fundamental common law principle dating to signing of the Magna Charta in 1215.
The nature of Subtitles A & C taxes is revealed at 26 CFR § 31.3101-1: "The employee tax is measured
by the amount of wages received after 1954 with respect to employment after 1936..." In other words, the
wage is not the object, but merely the measure of the tax. This verbiage constitutes so much legalese in
an effort to circumvent the duck test, but the fact that taxes collected by the Internal Revenue Service fall
into the excise category was confirmed by the Comptroller General's report following the initial effort to
audit IRS (GAO/T-AIMD-93-3). This little known fact of law is further confirmed by the Congressional
Research Service Report No. 79-131 A, which was written by Howard Zaritsky, Legislative Attorney for
the American Law Division of Congress. It is further suggested at 26 CFR § 106.401(a)(2), where the
regulation concedes that, "The descriptive terms used in this section to designate the various classes of
taxes are intended only to indicate their general character...".
By referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, cited above, it is found that the definition of
"gross income" is still preserved in Section 22 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, thus cementing the
link between the Code of 1939 and Subtitles A & C of the Code of 1954, as amended in 1986 and since.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 merely codified the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939. This link is
further confirmed in Senate Committee On Finance and House Committee On Ways and Means reports
No. H.R. 8300 (1954, Internal Revenue Code), in which § 22 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and §
61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (current code) were solidly linked, as shown in the footnote for
26 USC § 61 in the 1954 Code. Both reports stipulate that the current definition of "gross income" is
intended to be constitutional. The implementing tables for section 22a under the 1939 (and current)
Code show it as being implemented under Title 26 Part 519, which is the Canadian Tax Treaty that
expired in 1993, but DO NOT SHOW any implementation for it under PART 1 - Tax On
Individuals.
This intent is articulated at 26 CFR § 1.61-1(a): "Gross income means all income from whatever source
derived, unless excluded by law."

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An "Act of Congress" is policy, not law, and per definition located in Rule 54, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, has only local application in the District of Columbia and other United States territories and
insular possessions unless general application is manifestly expressed: Rule 54(c) -- "'Act of congress'
includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto
Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession."
Where the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is concerned (Vol. 68A, Statutes at Large, p.3), the legislation
is in fact styled, "An Act" "To revise the internal revenue laws of the United States."
As demonstrated above, wages and other returns from enterprise of common right are exempt from direct
tax by fundamental law, and the regulation for the current Internal Revenue Code definition for "gross
income" clearly articulates the fundamental law exemption.
The exemption as it pertains to the several States is demonstrated by referencing the Parallel Table of
Authorities and Rules (Index volume to the CFR, p. 751 of the 1995 edition): There are 26 CFR, Part 1
regulations listed for 26 USC §§ 61 & 62, the latter being the definition for adjusted gross income, but
there is no 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31 regulation for 26 USC § 63, the definition for taxable income.
While definitions for gross and adjusted gross income are clearly antecedent to the definition of taxable
income, they have no legal effect if there is no taxing authority -- adjusted gross income which is not
taxable within the several States is of no consequence where the federal tax system is concerned.
Further, on examination of 26 CFR § 1.62-1, pertaining to "adjusted gross income", it is found that
subsections (a) & (b) are reserved so the published regulation is incomplete, with "temporary" regulation
§ 1.62-1T serving as the current authority defining "adjusted gross income." Temporary regulations have
no legal effect.
Definitions at § 3401, Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large (the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), make it
clear that, (§ 3401(a)(A)), "a resident of a contiguous country who enters and leaves the United States at

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frequent intervals..," is a nonresident alien of the United States (citizens and residents of the several
States included), and the exclusion from "wages" extends even to citizens of the United States who
provide services for employers "other than the United States or an agency thereof" (§ 3401(a)(8)(A)).
4. The Employer or Withholding Agent is Liable
Volume 68A of the Statutes at Large, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, makes it perfectly clear who is
"liable" for payment of Subtitles A & C taxes:
§ 3504. ACTS TO BE PERFORMED BY AGENTS.
In case a fiduciary, agent, or other person has the control, receipt, custody, or disposal of, or pays
the wages of an employee or group of employees, employed by one or more employers, the
Secretary of his delegate, under regulations prescribed by him, is authorized to designate such
fiduciary, agent, or other person to perform such acts as are required by employers under this
subtitle and as the Secretary or his delegate may specify. Except as may be otherwise prescribed
by the Secretary or his delegate, all provisions of law (including penalties) applicable in respect to
an employer shall be applicable to a fiduciary, agent, or other person so designated, but, except as
so provided, the employer for whom such fiduciary, agent, or other person acts shall remain
subject to the provisions of law (including penalties) applicable in respect to employers.
The liability is further clarified at Vol. 68A, Sec. 3402(d):
§ 3402(d). Tax paid by recipient.
If the employer, in violation of the provisions of this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold the tax
under this chapter, and thereafter the tax against which such tax may be credited is paid, the tax so
required to be deducted and withheld shall not be collected from the employer; but this subsection
shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any penalties or additions to the tax

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otherwise applicable in respect to such failure to deduct and withhold.
These provisions from Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large comply with and verify liability set out at 26
CFR, Part 601, Subpart D in general. Further, territorial limits of application are made clear by the
absence of regulations supporting 26 USC §§ 7621, 7802, etc., which are the statutes authorizing
establishment of internal revenue districts and delegations of authority to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and assistants. The fact that the liability falls to the "employer" (defined at 26 USC § 3401(d))
under 26 USC 3403 and/or a "withholding agent" (defined at 26 USC § 7701(a)(14)) under 26 USC §
1461, with no compensation for serving as "tax collector," narrows the field to federal government
entities (agencies) as "employers", if for no other reason than the population at large is not subject to the
edict of government officials. As a matter of course, government cannot compel performance of
Citizens of a State where the general population is concerned. (even if the Citizen is an employee of
the State - see United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626. The subject
class that has "liability" for Subtitles A & C taxes is the "employer" or his/a (withholding) agent,
fiduciary, etc., as identified above.
The matter is further clarified in §§ 3403 & 3404 of Vol. 68A, Statutes at Large:
§ 3403. LIABILITY FOR TAX.
The employer shall be liable for the payment of the tax required to be deducted and withheld
under this chapter, and shall not be liable to any person for the amount of any such payment.
§ 3404. RETURN AND PAYMENT BY GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYER.
If the employer is the United States, or a State, Territory, or political subdivision thereof, or the
District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing, the

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return of the amount deducted and withheld upon any wages may be made by any officer or
employee of the United States, or of such State, Territory, or political subdivision, or of the
District of Columbia, or of such agency or instrumentality, as the case may be, having control of
the payment of such wages, or appropriately designated for that purpose.
The territorial application, and limitation, is made clear by definitions in Title 26 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
§ 31.3121(3)-1 State, United States, and citizen. (a) When used in the regulations in this subpart, the term
"State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the
Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their admission as States, and (when used with respect to
services performed after 1960 Guam and American Samoa. (b) When used in the regulations in this
subpart, the term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, means the several states (including
the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their admission as States), the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. When used in
the regulations in this subpart with respect to services performed after 1960, the term "United States" also
includes Guam and American Samoa when the term is used in a geographical sense. The term "citizen of
the United States" includes a citizen of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and,
effective January 1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American Samoa.
Definition of the terms "includes" and "including" located at 26 USC § 7701(c) provides the limiting
authority which the above definitions, beyond constructive application, are subject to:
(c) INCLUDES AND INCLUDING. -- The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition
contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the
term defined.
Two principles of law clarify definition intent:

(1) The example represents the class, and
(2) that which is not named is intended to be omitted.

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In the definition of "United States" and "State" set out above, all examples are of federal States, and are
exclusive of the several States, with the transition of Alaska and Hawaii from the included to the
excluded class proving the point. This conclusion is reinforced by the absence of regulations which
extend authority to establish revenue districts in the several States (26 USC § 7621), authority for the
Department of the Treasury [Puerto Rico] in the several States (26 USC § 7801), and no grant of
delegated authority for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, assistant commissioners, or other
Department of the Treasury personnel (26 USC § 7802 & 7803).
5. Lack of Regulations Supporting General Application of Tax
Here again, the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules is useful as it demonstrates that Subtitles A & C
taxes do not have general application within the several States and to the population at large. The
regulation for 26 USC § 1 refers to 26 CFR § 301, but that amounts to a dead end -- there is no regulation
under 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31 which would apply to the several States and the population at large. Further,
there are no supportive regulations at all for 26 USC §§ 2 & 3, and of considerable significance, no
regulations supporting corporate income tax, 26 USC § 11, as applicable to the several States.
Where the instant matter is concerned, regulations supporting 26 USC § 6321, liens for taxes, and §
6331, levy and distraint, are under 27 CFR, Part 70. The importance here is that Title 27 of the Code of
Federal Regulations is exclusively under Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms administration for
Subtitle E and related taxes. There are no corresponding regulations for the Internal Revenue Service, in
26 CFR, Part 1 or 31, which extend comparable authority to the several States and the population at
large.
The necessity of regulations being published in the Federal Register is variously prescribed in the
Administrative Procedures Act, at 5 USC § 552 et seq., and the Federal Register Act, at 44 USC § 1501
et seq. Of particular note, it is specifically set out at 44 USC § 1505(a), that when regulations are not
published in the Federal Register, application of any given statute is exclusively to agencies of the United
States and officers, agents and employees of the United States, thus once again confirming application of
Subtitles A & C tax demonstrated above. Further, the need for regulations is detailed in 1 CFR, Chapter
1, and where the Internal Revenue Service is concerned, 26 CFR § 601.702.

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The need for regulations has repeatedly been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, as
stated in California Bankers Ass'n. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 L.Ed.2d 812
(1974):
Because it has a bearing on our treatment of some of the issues raised by the parties, we think it
important to note that the Act's civil and criminal penalties attach only upon violation of regulations
promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no
penalties on anyone ... The government argues that since only those who violate regulations may incur
civil and criminal penalties it is the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and not the broad,
authorizing language of the statute, which is to be tested against the standards of the 4th
Amendment...
Because there is a citation supporting these statutes applicable under Title 27 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, it is important to point out that, "Each agency shall publish its own regulations in full text,"
(1 CFR § 21.21(c)), with further verification that one agency cannot use regulations promulgated by
another at 1 CFR § 21.40. To date, no corresponding regulation has been found for 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31,
so until proven otherwise, IRS does not have authority to perfect liens or prosecute seizures in the
several States as pertaining to the population at large.
6. Misapplication of Authority
Regulations pertaining to seized property are found at 26 CFR § 601.326:
Part 72 of Title 27 CFR contains the regulations relative to the personal property seized by officers of the
Internal Revenue Service or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as subject to forfeiture as
being used, or intended to be used, to violate certain Federal Laws; the remission or mitigation of such
forfeiture; and the administrative sale or other disposition, pursuant to forfeiture, of such seized property
other than firearms seized under the National Firearms Act and firearms and ammunition seized under

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title 1 of the Gun Control Act of 1968. For disposal of firearms and ammunition under Title 1 of the Gun
Control Act of 1968, see 18 U.S.C. 924(d). For disposal of explosives under Title XI of Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, see 18 U.S.C. 844(c).
The only other comparable authority thus far found pertains to windfall profits tax on petroleum (26 CFR
§ 601.405), but once again, application is not supported by regulations applicable to the several States
and the population at large.
Where the provision for filing 1040 returns is concerned, the key regulatory reference is at 26 CFR §
601.401(d)(4), and this application appears related to "employees" who work for two or more
"employers", receiving foreign-earned income effectively connected to the United States under tax treaty.
The option of filing a 1040 return for refund is mentioned in instructions applicable to United States
citizens and residents of the Virgin Islands, but to date has not been located elsewhere. Reference OMB
numbers for § 601.401, listed on page 170, 26 CFR, Part 600-End, cross referenced to Department of
Treasury OMB numbers published in the Federal Register, November 1995, for foreign application.
The fact that 1040 tax return forms are optional and voluntary, with special application, is further
reinforced by Delegation Order 182 (reference 26 CFR §§ 301.6020-1(b) & 301.7701). The Secretary or
his delegate is authorized to file a Substitute for Return for the following: Form 941 (Employer's
Quarterly Federal Tax Return); Form 720 (Quarterly Federal Excise Tax Return); Form 2290 (Federal
Use Tax Return on Highway Motor Vehicles); Form CT-1 (Employer's Annual Railroad Retirement Tax
Return); Form 1065 (U.S. Partnership Return of Income); Form 11-B (Special Tax Return - Gaming
Services); Form 942 (Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return for Household Employees); and Form
943 (Employer's Annual Tax Return for Agricultural Employees).
The "notice of levy" instrument forwarded to various third parties is not actually a "levy" which warrants
surrender of property. The Internal Revenue Code, at § 6335(a), defines the "notice" instrument by use --
notice is to be served to whomever seizure has been executed against after the seizure is effected. In
short, the notice merely conveys information, it is not cause for action. The term "notice" is clarified by
definition in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, and other law dictionaries. Use of the "notice of levy"
instrument to effect seizure is prima facie evidence of fraud by design.

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Proper use of the "notice" process, administrative garnishment, et al, is specifically set out in 5 USC §
5514, as being applicable exclusively to officers, agents and employees of agencies of the United tates
(26 USC § 3401(c)). Even then, however, the process must comply with provisions of 31 USC § 3530(d),
and standards set forth in §§ 3711 & 3716-17. In accordance with provisions of 26 CFR, Part 601,
Subpart D, the employer, meaning the United States agency the employee is employed by, is responsible
for promulgating regulations and carrying out garnishment.
Even if IRS was the agency responsible for collecting from an "employee," due process would still be
required, as noted above, so authority to collect would ensue only after securing a court order from
a court of competent jurisdiction, which in the several States would mean a judicial court of the
State. In United States law, however, there is no authority for securing or issuing a Notice of Distraint
premised on non-filing, bogus filing, or any other act relating to the 1040 return. See United States v.
O'Dell, Case No. 10188, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, March 10, 1947. In G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that a judicial warrant for
tax levies is necessary to protect against unjustified intrusions into privacy. The Court further held that
forcible entry by IRS officials onto private premises without prior judicial authorization was also an
invasion of privacy.
7. Liability Depends on a Taxing Statute
General demands for filing tax returns, production of records, examination of books, imposition and
payment of tax, etc., are of no consequence to the point a taxing statute (1) defines what tax is being
imposed, and (2) the basis of liability. In other words, even if the Internal Revenue Service was a
legitimate agency of the United States Department of the Treasury under the law and had authority in the
several States, the Service would have to be specific with respect to what tax was at issue and would
have to demonstrate the tax by citing a taxing statute with the necessary elements to establish that any
given person was obligated to pay any given tax.
This mandate has been clarified by the courts numerous times, with the matter definitively stated by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Community TV, Inc., 327 F.2d 797, at p. 800 (1964):

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"Without question, a taxing statute must describe with some certainty the transaction, service, or object
to be taxed, and in the typical situation it is construed against the Government." Hassett v. Welch, 303
U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed.858
In other words, to the point Service personnel produce the statute which mandates a certain tax and
which specifies, "... the transaction, service, or object to be taxed..," the burden of proof lies with the
Government, with the consequence being that no obligation or civil or criminal liability can ensue to the
point a taxing statute that meets the above requirements is in evidence.
This conclusion is supported by the statute which provides the underlying requirements for keeping
records, making statements, etc., located at 26 USC § 6001:
§ 6001 - Notice or regulations requiring records, statements, and special returns
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection thereof, shall keep such
records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as
the Secretary may from time to time prescribe. Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary it is
necessary, he may require any person, by notice served upon such person, or by regulations, to
make such returns, render such statements, or keep such records, as the Secretary deems sufficient
to show whether or not such person is liable for tax under this title. The only records which an
employee shall be required to keep under this section in connection with charged tips shall be
charge receipts, records necessary to comply with section 6053(c), and copies of statements
furnished by employees under section 6053(a).
This controlling statute for Subtitle F, Chapter 61, Subchapter A, Part I, concerning records, statements,
and special returns, clearly returns the matter to the "employee" defined at § 3401(c), and the "employer"
defined at § 3401(d). In general, however, (1) the Secretary must provide direct notice to whomever is
required to keep books, records, etc., as being the "person liable," or (2) specify the person liable by
regulation. In the absence of notice by the Secretary, based on a taxing statute which makes such a
person liable according to provisions stipulated in United States v. Community TV, Inc., Hassett v.
Welch, and other such cases, or regulations which specifically set establish general liability, there is no
liability.

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Sec. 6001 also exempts "employees" from keeping records except where tips and the like are concerned.
This is consistent with constructive demonstration that "employers" rather than "employees" are required
to file returns, as opposed to paying deducted amounts as income tax returns, constructively
demonstrated in a previous section of this memorandum and specifically articulated in 26 CFR §
601.104. Clarification via 26 USC § 6053(a) is as follows:
(a) REPORTS BY EMPLOYEES. -- Every employee who, in the course of his employment by
an employer, receives in any calendar month tips which are wages (as defined in section 3121(a)
or section 3401(a)) or which are compensation (as defined in section 3231(e)) shall report all such
tips in one or more written statements furnished to his employer on or before the 10th day
following such month. Such statements shall be furnished by the employee under such
regulations, at such other times before such 10th day, and in such form and manner, as may be
prescribed by the Secretary.
Unraveling § 6001 straightens out the meaning of § 6011, which requires filing returns, statements, etc.,
by the person made liable (§ 3401(d)), as distinguished from the person required to make returns
(payments) at § 6012 (§ 3401(c)). Even though a person might be a citizen or resident of the United
States employed by an agency of the United States, and thereby be required to return a prescribed amount
of United States-source income, he is not the person liable under § 6011 and attending regulations.
The "method of assessment" prescribed at 26 USC § 6303 is therefore dependent on the taxing statute
and must rest on authority specifically conveyed by a taxing statute which prescribes liability where the
Secretary (1) has provided specific notice, including the statute and type of tax being imposed, or (2)
supports assessment by regulatory application. In the absence of one or the other, an assessment by the
Secretary is of no consequence as it is not legally obligating.
The requirement for the Secretary to provide notice to whomever is responsible for collecting tax,
keeping records, etc., is clarified at 26 CFR § 301.7512-1, particularly (a)(1)(i), relating to "employee tax
imposed by section 3101 of chapter 21 (Federal Insurance Contributions Act)," and (a)(1)(iii), relating to
"income tax required to be withheld on wages by section 3402 of chapter 24 (Collection of Income Tax
at Source on Wages)..." The person liable is the employer or the employer's agent, and of particular

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significance, it is this "person" who is subject to civil and particularly criminal penalties (26 CFR §
301.7513-1(f); 26 CFR §§ 301.7207-1 & 301.7214-1, etc.). Officers and employees of the United States
are specifically identified as being liable at 26 USC § 301.7214-1.
The matter of who is required to register, apply for licenses, or otherwise collect and/or pay taxes
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code is ultimately and finally put to rest under "Licensing and
Registration", 26 USC §§ 301.7001-1, et seq. Each of the categories so addressed has liability based on
some particular taxing statute which creates liability.
8. The Necessity of Administrative Process
The requirement for a specific taxing statute, with 26 USC § 6001 clearly providing the first leg in
necessary administrative procedure to determine liability, was addressed at length in Rodriguez v.United
States, 629 F.Supp.333 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Presuming (1) the Secretary has provided the necessary notice,
or (2) a regulation prescribes general application which makes any given person liable for a tax and
requires tax return statements to be filed, each step in administrative process prescribed by 26 USC §§
6201, 6212, 6213, 6303 and 6331 must be in place for seizure or any other encumbrance to be legal.
Here again, regulations published in the Federal Register are significant, with provisions of 5 USC § 552
et seq., 44 USC § 1501 et seq., 1 CFR, Chapter I, and 26 CFR, Part 601 all supporting the mandate for
regulations to be published in the Federal Register before they have general application. It will be noted
by referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, beginning on page 751 of the 1995 Index
volume to the Code of Federal Regulations, that application by regulation to the several States is only
under Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, or that there are no regulations published in the
Federal Register. The following entries, or non-entries, are found:
Code Section Description Published Regulation

26 USC § 6201 Assessment authority 27 CFR, Part 70
26 USC § 6212 Notice of deficiency No Regulation
26 USC § 6213 Deficiencies; Tax Court No Regulation

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26 USC § 6303 Notice and Demand for Tax 27 CFR, Part 53, 70
26 USC § 6331 Levy and distraint 27 CFR, Part 70
The assessment authority under 26 USC § 6201, in relevant part as applicable to Subtitles A & C taxes,
are as follows:
§ 6201. ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY.
(a) Authority of Secretary. -- The Secretary is authorized and required to make the inquires,
determination, and assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax,
and assessable penalties) imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal revenue law, which
have been duly paid by stamp at the time and in the manner provided by law. Such authority shall extend
to and include the following:
(1) TAXES SHOWN ON RETURN.

The secretary shall assess all taxes determined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary as to which returns or
lists are made under this title.
(2) UNPAID TAXES PAYABLE BY STAMP. ...
(3) ERRONEOUS INCOME TAX PREPAYMENT CREDITS.
If on any return or claim for refund of income taxes under subtitle A there is an overstatement of the
credit for income tax withheld at the source, or of the amount paid as estimated income tax, the amount
so overstated which is allowed against the tax shown on the return or which is allowed as a credit or
refund may be assessed by the Secretary in the same manner as in the case of a mathematical or clerical
error appearing upon the return, except that the provisions of section 6213(b)(2) (relating to abatement of
mathematical or clerical error assessments) shall not apply with regard to any assessment under this
paragraph.
(b) Amount not to be assessed.

(1) ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
. -- No unpaid amount of estimated income tax required to be paid under section 6654 or 6655 shall be
assessed.
(2) FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT TAX
. -- No unpaid amount of Federal unemployment tax for any calendar quarter or other period of a
calendar year, computed as provided in section 6157, shall be assessed. ...

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(d) DEFICIENCY PROCEEDINGS.
For special rules applicable to deficiencies of income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes, see
subchapter B. [emphasis added]
The grant of assessment authority with respect to taxes prescribed in Subtitles A & C is limited to
provisions set out above even where the Service might have authority relating to those made liable for
the tax, meaning the "employer" specified at 26 USC § 3401(d). Clearly, returns made either by the agent
of the United States agency required to file a return, or the Secretary, are to be evaluated mathematically,
and errors are to be treated as clerical errors, nothing more. The Secretary has no authority to assess
estimated income tax (individual estimated income tax at § 6554; corporation estimated income tax at §
6655), or unemployment tax ( § 6157). For all practical purposes, the trail effectively ends here.
9. The Impossibility of Effective Contract/Election
In order for there to be an opportunity for a Citizen of the United States (a Citizen of one of the several
States) to be taxed or treated as a "taxpayer" of the United States, one or the other of a married couple, or
the single "individual" making the election, must be an employee of the United States. Some party must
in some way be connected with a "United States trade or business" (performance of the functions of a
public office (26 USC § 7701(a)(26)), or elect to participate in Social Security. A Citizen never has
domestic self-employment income. In the event that a person becomes an "employee" of the Federal
Government (26 USC § 3401(c)), the "employer" (26 USC § 3401(d)) is liable (26 USC § 3403) for
collection and payment of income tax from that person. And in order for real property to be treated as
effectively connected with a United States trade or business by way of election, it must be located within
the geographical United States (26 USC § 871(d)).
Provisions cited above preclude any and all legal authority for Citizens of the several States, or privately
owned enterprise located in the several States, to be mandated to participate in the federal tax and
benefits programs prescribed in Subtitles A & C of the Internal Revenue Code, and companion
legislation such as the Social Security Act which provide benefits from the United States Government,
which has no legislative (territorial) jurisdiction in the several States to impose law from on the Citizens
of that State.

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Summary & Conclusion
This memorandum is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely sufficient to support causes set out
separately. The most conspicuous conclusions of law are that Congress never created a Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the predecessor of the Internal Revenue Service; Subtitles A & C of the Internal
Revenue Code prescribe excise taxes, mandatory only for employees of United States Government
agencies; the Internal Revenue Service, within the geographical United States where the Service appears
to have colorable authority, is required to use judicial process prior to seizing or encumbering assets; and
the law demonstrates that people of the several States cannot legitimately be taxed or treated as taxpayers
(Federal employees) of the United States Government by presumption. If a Citizen of one of the several
States works for an agency of the United States or receives income from a United States "trade or
business" or otherwise effectively connected with the United States, the employer or other third party
responsible for payment is made liable for withholding taxes at the rate of 30% or 14%, depending on
classification, and is thus "the person liable" and may be subject to Internal Revenue Service initiatives,
with administrative initiatives, where seizure and/or encumbrance actions are concerned, subject to
judicial determinations by courts of competent jurisdiction.
Under penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, per 28 USC § 1746, and
without prejudice, I attest that to the best of my knowledge and understanding, all matters of law and fact
presented herein are accurate and true.
Dan Meador & Thomas T. Scambos, Jr.
July 4, 1997

KNOW YOUR ENEMIES

SOLUTIONS
www. Tax-Freedom.com
KNOW YOUR ENEMIES
MENU
Who Really Gets the Money
The Communist Manifesto
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KNOW YOUR ENEMIES

Copyright ©1997 by Agents of the LORD GOD R SAFE - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED


SOLUTIONS
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK

CONNECTION
MENU
The Federal Reserve Bank is NOT actually part of the Federal government. IT IS A PRIVATE
CORPORATION THAT IS ALLOWED TO BUY MONEY FOR $230 PER MILLION. IT HAS
NEVER PAID A DIME IN INCOME TAX AND HAS NEVER BEEN AUDITED. THIS BANK IS
PRIMARILY OWNED BY FOREIGNERS !!
"The Federal Reserve Banks are privately owned, locally controlled corporations" [Lewis vs. U.S.,
680 F.2d 1239, 1241](1982)
"It is well enough that the people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary
system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning." - Henry
Ford, Founder of the Ford Motor Co.
"As we have advised, the Federal Reserve is currently paying the Bureau approximately $23 for
each 1,000 notes printed. This does include the cost of printing, paper, ink, labor, etc. Therefore,
10,000 notes of any denomination, including the $100 note would cost the Federal Reserve $230. In
addition, the Federal Reserve must secure a pledge of collateral equal to the face value of the
notes." - William H. Ferkler (Mannager Public Affairs, Dept. of Treasury, Bureau of Engraving &
Printing, Wasnington D.C.

WHY ARE FOREIGNERS CONTROLLING THE AMERICAN CURRENCY ?

DO YOU REALLY BELIEVE THEY ARE REPRESENTING YOU WITH THEIR POLICIES ?
IF YOU DO, YOU ARE A FOOL !
WOULDN'T YOU LIKE TO BUY YOUR MONEY for $230 per million (and have the American
People guarantee its FULL VALUE, WITH THEIR OWN ASSETS)? Well, we won't do that for
Citizens but we do it for a select group of foreign bankers. WHAT, you mean your government
didn't teach you about this little arrangement in their SOCIALIST SCHOOLS. DO YOU KNOW
WHY ? PEON.
WHY IS A PRIVATE CORPORATION CASHING YOUR INCOME TAX CHECK ? THE

MONEY DOESN'T EVEN GO TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ? THAT'S RIGHT, NOT
ONE PENNY ! IT ALL GOES STRAIGHT TO VERY RICH BANKERS WHO ARE
ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ATTEMPTING TO USURP CONTROL AND
RULE OVER AMERICA, ITS PEOPLE, AND THIER WEALTH BY CONTROLLING OUR
CURRENCY !
"AS GOES THE FATE OF THE CURRENCY,

SO GOES THE FATE OF THE NATION !"
Who Really Gets the So-called "Tax" Revenues ?

The Bank Accused - Congressman Louis McFadden
The "Elite" Globalists
More About The Federal Reserve Bank
Federal Reserve Bank Exempted From Income Tax

Secrets of The Federal Reserve Bank (.zip download)
Who Really Owns this Bank ?
PLEASE SUPPORT THIS CONGRESSMAN !



Main Menu | Home Page | Contents | Statutes | Products | Links | SOLUTIONS

www. Tax-Freedom.com
Introduction
The Disciples of Truth
The Save A Patriot Fellowship
A Note From the Commissioner
The Income Duty of 1861
Title 26 - Structural Organization
This is NOT a Tax Protest
The Biblical Foundations
The Federal Employment "Kickback"
The Justices Refuse



William Cooper - HOTT Facts - Expose of IRS Fraudulent Racketeering

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William Cooper - HOTT Facts - Expose of IRS Fraudulent Racketeering

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HOTT - Crisis In Arizona

Cooper Family Targeted by Feds

Public Judicial Notice, Public Judicial Notice #2, and

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Public Judicial Notice

Public Judicial Notice #2

Public Judicial Notice #3

All the feds have to do to prove us wrong is to successfully rebut

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They Have NO Evidence!

IRS - NO Authority - NO Jurisdiction

Internal Revenue Service

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WE WILL PAY YOU

IF YOU CAN PROVE THE

For YEARS, the Internal Revenue Service has RULED the

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of government functions - the protection of life and property.

THEREFORE CONSIDER THE

FACT #2: The Constitution gives the Congress the power to

1. DIRECT TAXES, which are subject to the rule of

2. INDIRECT TAXES -- imposts, duties and excises, subject to

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FACT #4: The CENSUS is taken every ten (10) years to

FACT #5: It was established in the Constitutional

FACT #6: Due to the characteristics of the SECOND

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FACT #7: Duties and imposts are taxes laid by government

FACT #8: The supreme Court says that excises are...taxes

FACT #9: In 1862, Congress passed an Act (law) to create an

FACT #10: Congress passed an Act in 1894 to impose a tax

FACT #11: In 1909 Congress passed the 16th Amendment to

FACT #12: Some officials within the Internal Revenue

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FACT #13: The above persons are not empowered to

FACT #15: After the Supreme Court decision, the office of

FACT #16: In another Supreme Court decision in 1916, the

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that the provisions of the Sixteenth conferred no new power of

FACT #17: The United States Constitution gives the national

FACT #18: The DIRECT classification of taxation was

FACT #19: In the Brushaber and Stanton cases, the Supreme

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EXCISE tax, then how is it applied and collected? According to

QUESTION: If all RIGHTS come from GOD (citizens of the

ANSWER: As established in the U.S. Constitution, the federal

FACT #20: WITHHOLDING AGENTS withhold income

FACT #21: Withholding of money for income tax purposes,

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1441 - NONRESIDENT ALIENS, 1442 - FOREIGN

FACT #22: Internal Revenue Manual Chapter 1100

FACT #23: The implementation of IRS Treasury Regulation

FACT #24: The ONLY way a United States citizen or

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qualify for a job.

FACT #25: Karl Marx wrote in his COMMUNIST

FACT #26: The attorney who successfully challenged the

FACT #27: The Supreme Court agreed; and Mr. Justice

NEED WE SAY MORE?

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(cited fully below) states:...no tax liability...if....the individual

CONCLUSION OF FACTS: ALL RIGHTS come

TIRED OF BEING CONNED &