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VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 447

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000.*

FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Criminal Law; Bouncing Checks Law; Elements under which

the offense is committed.—Under the provisions of the Bouncing
Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense is committed when the
following elements are present: (1) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds from the dishonor of the checks cannot hold
if there is evidence to the contrary.—To begin with, the second
element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of
the check’s issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in
the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22
creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element
prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense
are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or
contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the
issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner’s funds “is legally
presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of
funds.” But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to
the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has
presented evidence to contradict said presumption.

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Same; Same; Same; The exercise of a statutory right to

suspend installment payments is a valid defense against the
purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22.—Note that we have upheld a
buyer’s reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments
until such time as

________________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer.

This exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment
payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Delos Angeles, Aguirre, Olaguer & Sto. Domingo for
petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated February 29, 1996, in CA­G.R. CR No.
15993, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q­91­25910 to 15, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing
Checks Law.
The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy,
on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a
townhouse unit in the latter’s project at Bacoor, Cavite.
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Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required,

issued to FRC, forty­eight (48) postdated checks, each in
the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC
regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the
townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint.
Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices
to the effect that he was suspending his installment
payments on the unit pending compliance with the project
plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board

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Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

(HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14 unit buyers then filed a

complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed
as to the defects, but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to
finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project.
Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the
alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to
present for encashment Sycip’s postdated checks in its
possession. Sycip sent “stop payment orders” to the bank.
When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks
to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to
close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges
every time he made a “stop payment” order on the
forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner’s
checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six
postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner
for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored
checks.
On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office filed with the RTC of Quezon City six Informations
docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q­91­25910 to Q­91­25915,
charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal
Case No. Q­91­25910 reads:

“That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

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feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of Francel Realty

Corporation a check 813514 drawn against Citibank, a duly
established domestic banking institution in the amount of
P9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated October 30, 1990
in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of
issue that she/he did not have any funds in the drawee bank of
(sic) the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said
check to said bank for payment, the same was dishonored for the
reason that the drawer thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. did
not have any funds therein, and despite notice of dishonor thereof,
accused failed and refused and still fails and refused (sic) to
redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Francel Realty Corporation in the amount

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450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

aforementioned and in such other amount as may be awarded

under the provisions of the Civil Code.
1
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Criminal Cases No. Q­91­25911 to Q­91­25915, with

Informations similarly worded as in Criminal Case No.
2
Q­
91­25910, except for the dates, and check numbers were
consolidated and jointly tried.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded “Not Guilty” to each
of the charges. Trial then proceeded.
The prosecution’s case, as summarized by the trial court
and adopted by the appellate court, is as follows:

“The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24,

1989, at the office of the private complainant Francel Realty
Corporation (a private domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business) at 822 Quezon Avenue, QC, accused Francisco
Sycip, Jr. drew, issued, and delivered to private complainant
Francel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six checks (among a
number of other checks), each for P9,304.00 and drawn pay to the
order of FRC and against Francisco’s account no. 845515 with
Citibank, to wit: Check No. 813514 dated October 30, 1990 (Exh.
C), Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D), Check
No. 813518 dated February, 28, 1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516
dated December 30, 1990 (Exh. F), Check No. 813517 dated
January 30, 1991 (Exh. G) and Check No. 813519 dated March 30,
1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial payment of the unpaid balance of
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the purchase price of the house and lot subject of the written
contract executed and entered into by and between FRC as seller
and Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24, 1989 (Exh. B,
also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase price for the house and
lot was P451,700.00, of which Francisco paid FRC in the sum of
P135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco agreeing and
committing himself to pay the balance of P316,000.00 in 48 equal
monthly installments of P9,304.00 (which sum already includes
interest on successive monthly balance) effective September 30,
1989 and on the 30th day of each month thereafter until the
stipulated purchase price is paid in full. The said six

_______________

1 Records, p. 1.
2 Id. at 3­12.

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VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 451

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Citibank checks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier indicated were drawn,

issued, and delivered by Francisco in favor of FRC as and in
partial payment of the said 48 equal monthly installments under
their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in September
1989, the Building Official’s certificate of occupancy for the
subject house—a residential townhouse—was issued (Exh. N) and
Francisco took possession and started in the use and occupancy of
the subject house and lot.
“When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented
to the Citibank for payment on their respective due dates, they
were all returned to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason:
account closed as indicated in the drawee bank’s stamped
notations on the face and back of each check; in fact, as indicated
in the corresponding record of Francisco’s account no. 815515 with
Citibank, said account already had a zero balance as early as
September 14, 1990 (Exh. 1­5). Notwithstanding the fact that
FRC, first thru its executive vice president and project manager
and thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally and
in writing, of the checks’ dishonor and demanded from him the
payment of the amount thereof, still Francisco did not pay or
3
make good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K) . . .”

The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial

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court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

“The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking

possession and starting in the use and occupancy of the subject
townhouse unit, Francisco became aware of its various
construction defects; that he called the attention of FRC, thru its
project manager, requesting that appropriate measures be
forthwith instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did not
acknowledge, much less attend to them; that Francisco thus
mailed to FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum
giving notice that effective June 1990, he will cease and desist
‘from paying my monthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED FOUR (P9,304.00) PESOS towards the
settlement of my obligation concerning my purchase of Unit No.
14 of FRC Townhomes referred to above, unless and until your
Office satisfactorily complete(s) the construction, renovation
and/or repair of my townhouses (sic) unit

_______________

3 Rollo, pp. 102­103.

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452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

referred to above’ and that should FRC ‘persist in ignoring my

aforesaid requests, I shall, after five (5) days from your receipt of
this Verified Notice, forthwith petition the [HLURB] for
Declaratory Relief and Consignation to grant me provisional relief
from my obligation to pay my monthly amortization to your good
Office and allow me to deposit said amortizations with [HLURB]
pending your completion of FRC Townhomes Unit in question’;
that Francisco thru counsel wrote FRC, its president, and its
counsel notices/letters in sum to the effect that Francisco and all
other complainants in the [HLURB] case against FRC shall cease
and desist from paying their monthly amortizations unless and
until FRC satisfactorily completes the construction of their units
in accordance with the plans and specifications thereof as
approved by the [HLURB] and as warranted by the FRC in their
contracts and that the dishonor of the subject checks was a
natural consequence of such suspension of payments, and also
advising FRC not to encash or deposit all other postdated checks
issued by Francisco and the other complainants and still in FRC’s

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possession (Exhs. 3 thru 5); that Francisco and the other

complainants filed the [HLURB] case against FRC and later on a
decision was handed down therein and the same is pending
appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7, & 12 thru 17, also Exh. 8); that
as of the time of presentation of the subject checks for payment by
the drawee bank, Francisco had at least P150,000.00 cash or
credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11) and, that Francisco closed
his account no. 845515 with Citibank conformably with the bank’s
customer service officer’s advice to close his said account instead
of making a stoppayment order for each of his more than 30 post­
dated checks still in FRC’s possession at the time, so as to avoid
the P600.00­penalty imposed by the bank for every check subject
4
of a stop­payment order.”

On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty

of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of the six cases,
disposing as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q­91­25910, Q­91­

25911, Q­91­25912, Q­91­25913, Q­91­25914 and Q­91­25915, the
Court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and, ac­

________________

4 Id. at 103­104.

453

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 453

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

cordingly, he is hereby sentenced in and for each case to suffer

imprisonment of thirty (30) days and pay the costs. Further, the
accused is hereby ordered to pay the offended party, Francel
Realty Corporation, as and for actual damages, the total sum of
fifty­five thousand eight hundred twenty four pesos (P55,824.00)
with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
commencement of these actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until
full payment thereof.
5
“SO ORDERED.”

Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of

Appeals. His appeal was docketed as CA­G.R. CR No.
15993. But on February 29, 1996, the appellate court ruled:
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“On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so hold
that appellant has no basis to rely on the provision of PD 957 to
justify the non­payment of his obligation, the closure of his
checking account and the notices sent by him to private
6
complainant that he will stop paying his monthly amortizations.”

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18,

1996, but it was denied per Resolution dated April 22,
1996. Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following
assignment of errors:

“THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED­APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE ANY JUSTIFIABLE
CAUSE TO STOP OR OTHERWISE PREVENT THE PAYMENT
OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.

II

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

ACCUSED­APPELLANT MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT AND THE
TOWNHOUSE PROJECT.

________________

5 Supra Note 1 at 113.

6 Supra Note 3 at 121.

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Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

III

“THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED­
APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH
THE DRAWEE BANK TO COVER THE SUBJECT CHECKS
UPON PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT THEREOF.

IV

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“THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED­APPELLANT AND AWARDING DAMAGES IN
7
FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.”

The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of

Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it
affirmed his conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
considering that he had cause to stop payment of the
checks issued to respondent. Petitioner insists that under
P.D. No. 957, the buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to
suspend his amortization payments, should the subdivision
or condominium developer fail to develop or complete the
project in accordance with duly­approved plans and
specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB that
certain aspects of private complainant’s townhouse project
were incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right
to suspend payments should not render him liable under
B.P. Blg. 22.
The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner
was charged with were violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the intent
and circumstances surrounding
8
the issuance of a worthless
check are immaterial. The gravamen of the offense
charged is the act itself of making and issuing a worthless
check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. Mere issuing of a bad check is malum
prohibitum, pernicious and inimical

________________

7 Id. at 16.
8 Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 723, 726­727 (1993).

455

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 455

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

to public welfare. In his view, P.D. No. 957 does not provide
petitioner a sufficient defense against the charges against
him.
Under9 the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P.
No. 22), an offense is committed when the following
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elements are present:

____________________

9 The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 provide:

“SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds.—Any person who makes
or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but
not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.
“The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain
a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period
of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
“Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company, or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act.
“SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.—The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by
the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be
prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the

456

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to

apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
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payment of such check in full upon its presentment;

and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid10
cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

In this case, we find that although the first element of the

offense exists, the other elements have not been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on
the part of the issuer at the time of the check’s issuance that
he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for
payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a
presumption juris tantum that the second element prima
facie exists when
11
the first and third elements of the offense
are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not
rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain 12
a
judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the
insufficiency of petitioner’s funds “is legally presumed13from
the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds.” But
such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the
contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has
presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence,
the prosecution is duty bound to prove drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee. (Italics
supplied).

___________________

10 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656, 661 (1998).

11 Magno v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 471, 480 (1992).
12 People v. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8442, 8445.
13 Rollo, p. 272.

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VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 457

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely

on a rebuttable presumption.
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Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated

checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated
on its face, the check would be properly funded, not 14
that
the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The
checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of
the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the
records no showing that at the time said checks were
issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit
in the bank would be insufficient
15
to cover them when
presented for encashment. On the contrary, there is
testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of
the checks, he had P150,000.00 cash or credit with
Citibank.
As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of
petitioner’s Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not for
insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the
drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each
time petitioner issued a “stop payment” order to prevent
encashment16 of postdated checks in private respondent’s
possession. Said evidence contradicts the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But it
establishes petitioner’s state of mind at the time said
checks were issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner
definitely had no knowledge that his funds or credit would
be insufficient when the checks would be presented for
encashment. He could not have foreseen that he would be
advised by his own bank in the future, to close his account
to avoid paying the hefty banks charges that came with
each “stop payment” order issued to prevent private
respondent from encashing the 30 or so checks in its
possession. What the prosecution has established is the
closure of petitioner’s checking account. But this does not
suffice to prove the second element of the offense under
B.P. Blg. 22, which explicitly requires “evidence of
knowledge of insuffi­

_________________

14 People v. Tongko, 290 SCRA 595 (1998).

15 TSN, December 1, 1993, pp. 9­14.
16 Supra.

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Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

cient funds” by the accused at the time the check or checks

are presented for encashment.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the
prosecution did in this case, would be to misconstrue the
import of requirements for conviction under the law. It
must be stressed that every element of the offense must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed.
Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the
Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must 17come
clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute.
While B.P. Blg. 22 was
18
enacted to safeguard the interest
of the banking system, it is difficult to see how conviction
of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the
financial system. Moreover, protection must also be
afforded
19
the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No.
957. A statute must be construed in relation to other laws
so as to carry out the legitimate
20
ends and purposes
intended by the legislature. Courts will not strictly follow
the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true
intent of legislature and when its21 ends are inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act.

_________________

17 Idos v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 194, 202­203 (1998).

18 Magno v. Court of Appeals, supra.
19 SEC. 23. Non­Forfeiture of Payments.—No installment payment
made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or
unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or
developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer
to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for completing the same. Such
buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including
amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests with interest
thereon at the legal rate.”
20 King v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730, 740 (1962); Mejia v. Balolong, 81 Phil.
497, 501 (1948).
21 Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, supra; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1086
(1957); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145 (1931); People v.

459

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VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 459

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More so, when it will mean the contravention of another

valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given
due effect.
Note that we have upheld a buyer’s reliance on Section
23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments until such time as the
owner 22or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the
buyer. This exercise of a statutory right to suspend
installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense
against the purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22 that
petitioner is charged with.
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete
features in the construction of petitioner’s and other units
of the subject condominium bought on installment from
FRC, we are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to
order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third
element of “subsequent dishonor of the check . . . without
valid cause” appears to us not established by the
prosecution. As already stated, the prosecution tried to
establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P.
Blg. 22. Here that presumption is unavailing, in the
presence of a valid cause to stop payment, thereby negating
the third element of the crime.
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing
Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised 23
Penal Code, but
the Code is supplementary to such a law. We find nothing
in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the Revised
Penal
24
Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11
(5)

________________

Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, 130 (1922); US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 90

(1910).
22 Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399,
409, 411 (1987).
23 ”ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.—
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws
are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.”
24 ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not incur any
criminal liability:

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xxx
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office.”

460

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner’s exercise of a right of

the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid
defense to the charges against him.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the
charges against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for
lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De

Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition granted, petitioner acquitted.

Note.—Knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to

establish, thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks
Law) creates a prima facie presumption i.e., that the
drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the
check’s presentment for payment. (Llamado vs. Court of
Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 [1997])

——o0o——

461

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