Rights of action in rem/in personam/ quasi in rem performance or non-performance of the terms and conditions of a
contract of sale for the enforcement or resolution thereof. They only
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-803 August 27, 1948
JOSE P. SANDEJAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ZACARIAS C. ROBLES, ELENA C. VDA. DE ROBLES and
ROSARIO Y. SINGSON, defendants-appellees.
Benjamin H. Tirol, Corazon C. Miraflores and Orlando M. Jesena for
appellant.
W. E. Greenbaum and Luis G. Hofilena for appellee Rosario Y.
Singson.
M. F. Zamora and Jose C. Robles for appellee Zacarias C. Robles
and Elena C. Vda. de Robles.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
dismissing the plaintiff's action upon motion of the defendant on the
ground that it is barred by prior judgment.
The pertinent facts alleged in the complaint to which a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment is filed, are those relating to the cause of action and the
parties, because if they are the same as the cause of action and the
parties in the prior judgment, or though the parties are different they
represent the same interest, and the court rendering the prior
judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the
subsequent action is barred by the prior judgment and should be
dismissed.
In the present appeal, there is no question that the parties in the
present and prior action are the same or represent the same interest,
and that the cause of action in both are the same, that is, the
question to be determined is whether the Court which has rendered
the former judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.
The appellants contend that the lower erred in upholding the validity of
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo during the
Japanese occupation, because: (1) "The said court had no jurisdiction
to try civil case No. 21, much less to render the decision in question
on October 2, 1944;" and (2) "That granting for the sake of argument
that the puppet Court of First Instance of Iloilo had jurisdiction, yet
such decision was rendered after having deprived plaintiff of his day in
court and is therefore in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
As to the first question, the appellants do not question the ruling of
this Supreme Court on the validity of the judgments rendered by the
courts established in these Islands during the Japanese occupation
laid down in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh,1 Off. Gaz., 779; but
they contend that, as the three parcels of land involved or sold in the
contract of the sale resolved by the prior judgment were located in the
Municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo, and "the puppet Republic of
the Philippines since the middle of the month of September, 1944,
could no longer assert its authority over the major portion of the
territory of Iloilo including the Municipality of Passi," then under the
possession and control of the Panay guerrilla forces, the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo which rendered the prior judgment had no jurisdiction
over the res or the property because the action was quasi in rem, and
therefore the said judgment is null and void.
This contention is premised on the wrong assumption that the action
for the resolution of a contract of sale of a real property is an
action quasi in rem. The action instituted by the appellees to resolve
the contract of sale of said parcels of land, is in personam and
not quasi in rem.
This Court quoted with approval in Grey Alba vs. Dela Cruz, 17 Phil.,
61-62, the following definition of an action in personam:
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against
some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in
 theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim
or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be
heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the
other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right
to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which, if true,
show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler
vs. Judges, supra.).
According to American Jurisprudence, Vol. I page 435, "An action in
personam has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against property, to determine its
status. Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam is determined
by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court.
In the case of Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921, we
held that "The action quasi in rem differs from the true action in rem in
the circumstances that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of
the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or
other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
With respect to the second question, from the prior judgment marked
as Exhibit A of the motion to dismiss, it appears that the appellants
had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo by filing their answers to the complaint through their
Atty. Benjamin H. Tirol, the same attorney who represents them now;
that they were notified of the date set for the hearing of the action, but
when the case was called for trial on September 29, 1944, their
attorney asked and obtained permission from the court to withdraw his
appearance as attorney for the appellants stating as ground therefor
that it was difficult to communicate with his clients, who went to
Arevalo, a suburb of and distant of about six or seven kilometers from
the Iloilo City, capital of the Province of Iloilo; that to give the
appellants opportunity to be heard, the hearing was postponed and
set on the afternoon of the same date; and that as they did not appear
on the afternoon the case was heard and judgment was rendered on
October 2, 1944, declaring the resolution of the contract between the
parties and ordering the appellees to return to the appellants the sum
of P5,723.60, received by the former from the latter as payment on
account of the sum of P35,000 agreed upon as purchase price.
And, according to the allegations in appellants' complaint, on October
25, 1944, the appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the court, and when they tried to appeal from the decision
the court denied the appeal on November 23, 1944, and declared the
judgement final and executory; and, on November 29, the appellants
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the appeal, and
up to the filing of the complaint in the present case no resolution of the
motion has been received by the appellants.
In view of the foregoing facts set forth in the decision Exhibit A and
not contradicted or denied by the appellants, which show that the
absence from the trial of the appellants was due to their own fault,
appellants' contention that they were deprived of their day in court is
untenable. The appeal is therefore dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
We dissent:
We are of the opinion that the appealed decision should be reversed
and the lower court ordered to proceed with the case and render
decision on the merits.
This stand is based on the reasons stated in our opinion in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh,141 Off. Gaz., 779.
 Ching v CA (Civil Procedure)
Action in Rem and Action in Personam
Alfredo Ching v. CA, Pedro Asedillo
Facts:
 Alfredo Ching is the legitimate son of Ching Leng;
 Ching Leng bought a property from Sps. Nofuente and the former
registered the property in her name on September 18, 1961, her postal
address was in Pasay City;
 Ching Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son was appointed as
administrator of her estate;
 13 years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was commenced on
December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo against Ching
Leng for the reconveyance of said property;
 An amended complaint was made by private respondent alleging “that on
account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the
present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or
his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by
publication.”
 Summons by publication was made through “Economic Monitor”,
newspaper of general circulation in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no
responsive pleading was filed after the lapse of 60 days, judgment on the
merits in favor of private respondents was made.
 Consequently, the title of Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to
private respondent who sold the same to Villa Esperanza Dev., Inc.
 Petitioner learned of the decision, and so he filed a petition to set it aside as
null and void for lack of jurisdiction;
Lower court decision:
RTC: At first, granted the verified petition to set aside as null and void the
prior order of the RTC; however, on motion by private respondent, the same
was set aside. So, petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied.
*the case was elevated directly to SC
Issue: WON reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam which
cannot give jurisdiction to the court by service of summons by publication.
(Note: private respondents argue that they are quasi in rem)
Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam.
Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed
against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are
directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing.
Private respondent’s action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being
in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was
commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter’s death.
According to Dumlao v. Quality plastic products, the decision of the lower
court insofar as the deceased is concerned is void for lack of jurisdiction over
his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality, that its fitness to be subject of
legal relations was lost through death.
Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence
adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracking back the roots of his title
since 1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name after one year from the date of the
decree is not to set aside the decree but respecting it and to bring an ordinary
action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has
transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
ernandez v DBP (Civil Procedure)
Jose M. Hernandez v. DBP and CFI of Batangas
Facts:
 Petitioner was an employee of defendant in its Legal Department for 21
years until his retirement due to illness;
 Petitioner was awarded a lot (810 sq-m, type E) in respondent’s Housing
Project in Quezon City;
 However, more than a week thereafter, the Chief Accountant and
Comptroller of the private respondent returned to the petitioner the checks he
has paid pursuant to such award and informed him that the private
respondent, through its Committee on Organization, Personnel and Facilities,
had cancelled the award of the lot and hour previously awarded on the
ground that:
(a) He has already retired;
(b) He has only an option to purchase said house and lot;
(c) There are a big number of employees who have no houses or lots;
(d) He has been given his retirement gratuity; that the awarding of the
aforementioned house and lot in his favor would subserve the purpose;
 Petitioner protested the cancellation and so filed a complaint in the CFI of
Batangas, seeking annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot and
house in his favor and the restoration of all his rights thereto;
 He contends that it is illegal and unwarranted because he has already a
vested right thereto because of the award;
 Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue,
contending that since the petitioner’s action affects the title to a house and lot
in Quezon city, the same should have been commenced in the CFI of Quezon
City where the real property is located.
Lower court ruling:
CFI of Batangas: sustained the motion to dismiss based on improper venue.
*Case immediately elevated to the SC
Issue: WON the action of petitioner was improperly laid in the CFI of
Batangas
Ruling: No, the case was not improperly filed in the CFI of Batangas.
The venue of actions or, more appropriately, the county where the action is
triable depends to a great extent on the nature of the action to be filed,
whether it is real or personal.
Real action is one brought for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or
hereditaments. A personal action is one brought for recovery of personal
property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its
breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property.
The court agrees that petitioner’s action is not a real but a personal action. As
correctly insisted by petitioner, his action is one to declare null and void the
cancellation of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve title and
ownership over said properties but seeks to compel respondent to recognize
that the award is a valid and subsisting one which cannot arbitrarily and
unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment in full
which it had rejected and returned to petitioner.
Such an action is a personal action which may be properly brought by
petitioner in his residence.
DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN
GRN 158407 158407 January 17,2005
Callejo, Sr. J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Domagas filed for a forcible entry case against Jensen. Summons
and complaint were not served on respondent because the latter was
apparently out of the country but it was received by respondent’s brother
Oscar who was then at the respondent’s house. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent did not appeal. August 20, 2000,
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the annulment of the
decision of MTC since the service of summons was ineffective, the
respondent being out of the country. The RTC decided in favor of Jensen
since there was no valid service of the complaint and summons. The CA
affirmed the decision, ruling that the case was an ejectment case which is
an action quasi in rem.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of petitioner in the MTC against respondent is an
action in personam or quasi in rem.
RULING:
The action of the petitioner fro forcible entry is a real action and one in
personam. The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine
its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam or in quasi in
rem is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of
the person, although it may involve his right, or the exercise of ownership
of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act
or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is
said to be one which has for its object a judgment against a person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the proprietary to determine its
state… Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
v Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a
particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions
only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interest of all possible claimants. The
judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the
action.
Limitations of Ownership
REPUBLIC VS CASTELLV I (1974)
6 Dec 2017
[58 scra 336; L-20620; August 15, 1974] Constitutional Law| Eminent
Domain| Elements of Taking of Property| Just Compensation
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CARMEN M. VDA. DE
CASTELLVI, ET AL.
Citation:
FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by the respondent Castellvi has been rented and
occupied by the Philippine Air Force of the AFP in 1947. The petitioner, in
behalf of the AFP, refused to extend the lease, informing the latter that the
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property and,
demanded that the property be vacated. Hence, the petitioner Republic
instituted expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment for just compensation, the petitioner argued that it had
taken the property when the contract of lease commenced in 1947 and not
when the proceedings begun in 1959.
Respondent maintains that the subject land was not taken when the petitioner
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements
of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain is lacking, to
wit:
1. entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and
2. devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947, when the
petitioner has entered and occupied the property as lessee, or the filing on
1959.
HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for
purposes of eminent domain:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period;
3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. By virtue of the lease
agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of
Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. The word “momentary” when applied to possession or
occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean “a limited
period”—not indefinite or permanent. The lease contract was for a period of
one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the
lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority.The the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the
circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because
the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. The entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was
continuously recognized as owner by the Republic. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the
Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals.
Thus, the Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain,
Elements of Taking)
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and
occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter
commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of
just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property
when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings
begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the
private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a
public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the
condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation
proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a
private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under
warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government
entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZONCITY,
petitioners, vs.HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of
First Instance ofRizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,
INC., respondents.
1987 Constitution Art III, Sec. 9: Private property shall not be taken for
public use without justcompensation.
FACTS:Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides for the appropriation
of 6% ofmemorial parks for charity burial of the paupers. Himlayang Pilipino,
Inc (HPI),did not appropriate the 6% requirement. Seven years after, the
Quezon Citycouncil issued a resolution to stop any further selling and/or
transaction ofmemorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof
have failed to donatethe required 6% space.ISSUE: Is Section 9 of the
ordinance in question a valid exercise of the policepower?RULING:No. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain areafrom a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipalcorporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery
for thispurpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. (Thus,
even if it is aneminent domain, it would not have been the proper measure
to promote general welfare in this case)Police power is usually exercised in
the form of mere regulation or restriction inthe use of liberty or property for
the promotion of general health, morals, safetyof the people and more so,
the general welfare. It does not involve the taking orconfiscation of property
with the exception of a few cases where there is anecessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the purpose ofprotecting the
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as forinstance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium andfirearms.
Case Brief: City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta
NOVEMBER 20, 2013JEFF REY
G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF
QUEZON CITY,petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG
PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer
required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section
9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use
as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local
police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the
taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that
‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand,
there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes
with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)
taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as
necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not
reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or
practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but
also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property
of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In
police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury
sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general
welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to
the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-
ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like
all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and
to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to
the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such
power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is
not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial
in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may
“provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its
own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues
to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell
to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by
the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision
of the respondent court is affirmed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation,
Just Compensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent
praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand
interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of
PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the
lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot
be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government
Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the
Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as
the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of
just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation
can be a subject to an easement of right of way.
Police Power
Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty
32 Phil. 580 (1915)
In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The case involves a dual question one involving the power of
the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax in question
and the other relating to the power of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground
that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases’ latter aspect as
correlated to the police power of the State.
Facts
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the
advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their
billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were
removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection
(b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of
the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign,
signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to
the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in
question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to
the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any
persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after
due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and
German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard
complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a
nuisance.”
Issue
1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a
legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government?
Held
The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or
signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight,
are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is
not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized
principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the
country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are
included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon
such territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed.
Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of Transportation
GR L-59234, 30 September 1982 En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 12 concur,
2 concur in the result
FACTS:
To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public
conveyances and in order that the commutingpublic may be assured of
comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
MemorandumCircular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to
OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of LandTransportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of
vehicles to be allowed andaccepted for registration as public conveyances.
The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace
Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus
with Preliminary Injunction and TemporaryRestraining Order", to declare
the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular
of the BLT.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate thepetitioners' constitutional rights to (1)
Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection
againstarbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
HELD:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably
claim that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they
state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other
sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board
gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessaryinformation or data in
the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it
should first call aconference or require the submission of position papers or
other documents from operators or persons who may beaffected, this being
only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Furthermore, aspublic contend it is impractical to subject every
taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that
itcan open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible
collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonablestandard must be
adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The
span of six years supplies thatreasonable standard. The product of
experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost
recovered,and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortableservice to the public
specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24
hours everyday in threeshifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of
dueprocess has been met.On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being
enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely towards the
taxiindustry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for
the traffic conditions are not the same in every city, asubstantial distinction
exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed. TheState, in the exercise, of its police power, can
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order,safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It mayalso regulate
property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the
necessities imposed by publicwelfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assertthat their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-
application of the assailed Circulars to other transportationservices is
concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does
not imply that the same treatment beaccorded all and sundry. It applies to
things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification
of theobject or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or
based on substantial distinction, which make for realdifferences, and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the
equal protectionclause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all
persons under identical or similar circumstance would beaccorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
challenged Circulars satisfy theforegoing criteria.Evident then is the
conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity. To declare a lawunconstitutional, the infringement
of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. Hence, the
Writsprayed for are denied and was dismissed
Accession :Immovable property
EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., vs. MAYFAIR THEATER, INC.
Posted on September 21, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
[G.R. No. 133879. November 21, 2001.]
FACTS:
Mayfair Theater, Inc. was a lessee of portions of a building owned by
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. Their lease contracts of 20 years (1. which
covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey
building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which respondent
used as a movie house known as Maxim Theater 2. two store spaces on the
ground floor and the mezzanine, with a combined floor area of about 300
square meters also used as a movie house “Miramar Theater”)
Lease contracts contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal
to purchase the subject properties.
However, before the contracts ended, the subject properties were sold for
P11,300 by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc.
This prompted Mayfair to file a case for the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance and
damages.
In 1996, the Court ruled in favor of Mayfair.
Barely five months after Mayfair had submitted its Motion for Execution,
Equatorial filed an action for collection of sum of money against Mayfair
claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for the
defendant’s use of the subject premises after its lease contracts had
expired.
Maxim Theater contract expired on May 31, 1987, while the Lease Contract
covering the premises occupied by Miramar Theater lapsed on March 31,
1989.
The lower court debunked the claim of Equatorial for unpaid back rentals,
holding that the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the mother case
did not confer on Equatorial any vested or residual propriety rights, even in
expectancy.
It further ruled that the Court categorically stated that the Deed of Absolute
Sale had been rescinded subjecting the present complaint to res judicata.
Hence, Equatorial filed the present petition.
ISSUE: whether Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could
thus enjoy the fruits or rentals therefrom
HELD: NO.
CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; CIVIL FRUIT OF OWNERSHIP; RENTALS. — Rent is a
civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of
accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the
time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final
judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that period.
Industrial
LIWANAG v YU-SONGQUIAN
FACTS: Yu-Chiocco leased a land on Calle Lemery, Tondo in 1901. The property,
however, was later claimed by Leoncia Liuanag, on behalf of the estate of Yu-
Chingco, who had died in China on Oct. 30 1901. Yu-Chiocco himself died in August
1902.
The lower court found that Yu-Chiocco contributed the labor, while the materials used
belonged to the estate of Yu-Chingco, and ruled that the estate of Yu-Chingco owned
half of the buildings.
The Supreme Court overturned the ruling, saying that even if the materials belonged
to Yu-Chingco, “it does not follow, as a conclusion of law, that the owner of the
material thereby became the owner of any part of the buildings.”
Instead, Liuanag should be paid for the materials that were used to construct the
building.
It cited Art. 360 of the Civil Code, which says that a landowner who builds on his land
using the materials of another is obliged to pay for the value of the material. Saying
that the provision would also apply to a leasehold in real estate, the Court said
Liuanag has a claim for the value of the materials that were used in the construction
of the building.
Judgment: Ruling REVERSED. Case remanded to lower court with directions to enter
judgment in favor of defendant, without prejudice to present claim against the person
or estate bound to pay it.
.M. TUASON and CO., INC. V ESTRELLA VDA. DE LUMANLAN and CA
G.R. No: L-23497
Petitioner/s: J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
Respondent/s: Estrella Vda. De Lumanlan and the Court of Appeals (Fifth Division)
Ponente: Acting C.J. JBL Reyes
Action: Petition for review by certiorari
Date: April 26, 1968
FACTS
1. J.M. Tuason & Co Inc (Tuason) filed a case against Lumanlan after the latter unlawfully
entered into its property known as Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision (situated at Barrio North
Tatalon, Quezon City). Lumanlan took possession of 800 sq m land and constructed her
house on the said land. Tuason prays for ejectment and damages for occupancy.
2. Lumanlan argues that she had brought the property from one Pedro Deudor and that there
is a Compromise Agreement between Deudor and Tuason stating that she was one of the
buyers recognized therein.
3. CFI: Lower Court ruled in favor of Tuason, holding that it is the registered owner and the
question being purely one of possession. Lumanlan’s evidence (Compromise Agreement) was
completely immaterial.
4. Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of Lumanlan, holding that the Compromise Agreement was
a valid defense against the possessory action filed by Tuason. Under paragraph 7 of the said
agreement, Tuason bound and committed itself to sell to Lumanlan the lot occupied by her at
a reasonable price. Lumanlan has the right to compel Tuason to accept payment for the lot in
question and that the agreement legalized the possession of Lumanlan.
ISSUE
Whether or not J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc is the rightful owner of the said land? – YES
HELD
1. A careful analysis of the compromise agreement will show that in no way did it obligate
Tuason to sell to those buyers the lots occupied by them at the price stipulated by the
Deudors, but at “the current prices and terms specified by the OWNERS (Tuason) in their
sales of lots. (See notes for paragraph 7 of compromise agreement)
2. Paragraph 7 also imports that these buyers of the Deudors must (1) “recognize the title of
the OWNERS (Tuason) over the property purportedly bought by them” and from the
Deudors, and (2) “sign, whenever possible, new contracts of purchase for said property.”
The agreement also states that “the sums paid by them to the Deudors...shall be credited to
the buyers.”
3. All that Tuason agreed to was to grant the Deudor buyers preferential right to purchase “at
current prices and terms” upon recognizing the title of Tuason and signing new contracts and
to credit to them for the amounts they had paid to the Deudors.
4. Lumanlan never claimed that she had signed a new contract with Tuason for the
puchase of the lot occupied. Instead of recognizing the title of Tuason as required by the
agreement, she used paragraph 6 of the agreement for her special defense, arguing that
Deudor and Tuason entered into the compromise agreement where Deudor and his co-
owners renouced, ceded, waived, and quitclaimed all their rights in the property in favor of
Tuason without her knowledge and consent. Now she does not rely on the compromise
agreement but she assails it. -_-
5. Without the compromise agreement, Lumanlan must justify her possession on the basis of
a pretended superiority of the Deudors’ old Spanish nformacion posesoria over Tuason’s
Certificate of Title No. 1267. But the Court has already ruled in previous cases that Lumanlan
is barred from assailing the decree of registration in favor of Tuason’s predecessors 20 years
after its issuance.
6. The agreement provides that the Deudor buyers should sign new contracts with it at current
prices specified for the sales of lots. Article 1474 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case
because Lumanlan is not a buyer from Tuason since there is no contract between the two.
7. Lumanlan’s argument that she should be deemed a builder in good faith does not hold
water. In a related case (Tuason v Macalindong), the Court ruled that there being a
presumptive knowledge of the Torrents titles issued to Tuason, the buyer from the Deudors
cannot say now that she believer her vendor had rights of ownership over the lot purchaser.
She had chose to ignore the Torrens title of Tuason and relied instead upon the Deudor’s
claim of ownership, perhaps because such course appeared to her as more advantageous;
hence, she has only herself to blame for the consequences now that the Deudors' claim has
been abandoned by the Deudors themselves, and can not pretend good faith.
8. Lumanlan could have asked that she recover or be credited with the amounts paid by her to
the Deudors. Equity demands, however, that her right to claim such return, or to have the
amount offset against the sums she was sentenced to pay should be reserved.
DISPO
Petition granted. Decision of CA reversed. Decision of CFI reinstated. Costs against
Lumanlan.
NOTES
Paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement:
That the sales of the possessory rights claimed by the DEUDORS, are described in
the lists submitted by them to the OWNERS which are attached hereto marked
Annexes "B" and "C" and made part hereof. Whatever amounts may have been
collected by the DEUDORS on account thereof, shall be deducted from the total
sum of P1,201,063.00 to be paid to them. It shall be the joint and solidary obligation
of the DEUDORS to make the buyer of the lots purportedly sold by them to
recognize the title of the OWNERS over the property purportedly bought by them,
and to make them sign, whenever possible, new contracts of purchase for said
property at the current paces and terms specified by the OWNERS in their sales of
lots in their subdivision known at "Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision." The DEUDORS
HEREBY advised the OWNERS that the buyer listed in Annex "B" herein with the
annotation "continue" shall buy the lots respectively occupied by them and shall sign
contracts, but the sums already paid by them to the DEUDORS amounting to
P134,922.84 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be credited to the buyers and
shall be deducted from the sums to be paid to the DEUDORS by the OWNERS. The
DEUDORS also advise the OWNERS that, the buyers listed in Annex "C" herein
with the annotation "Refund" have decided not to continue with their former
contracts or purchases with the DEUDORS and the sums already paid by them to
the DEUDORS TOTALLING P101,182.42 (subject to verification by the Court) shall
be refunded to them by the OWNERS and deducted from the sums that may be due
to the DEUDORS from the OWNERS (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Jaramillo, L-
18932, Sept. 30, 1963);
Article 1474 of the Civil Code:
Where the price cannot be determined in accordance with the preceding articles, or
in any other manner, the contract is inefficacious. However, if the thing or any part
thereof has been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer, he must pay a
reasonable price therefor. What is a reasonable price is a question of fact
dependent on the circumstances of each particular case.
GABOYA V. CUI- Usufruct
FACTS:
Don Mariano sold his 2 lots to two of his children. Later on, he and his
children became co-owners of the property. Don Mariano executed a deed
authorizing the children to apply for a loan w/ mortgage with a stipulation
reserving his right to the fruits of the land. The children then constructed a
building on the land and collected rent from the lessee thereof. Much later,
when Don Mariano died, his estate was claiming the fruits of the building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Don Mariano had a right to fruits of the building?
RULING: NO.
The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the land. He
only owned the rent for the portion of land occupied by the building; thus,
the estate could only claim the rent on that piece of land and not on the
entire parcel of land. The children are entitled to the rents of the building.
(A usufruct on the land may be separate from the building.
There should be no rescission of the contract coz the exact amount of rent
due and owing to the Don Mariano’s estate is still unliquidated and
undetermined. The trial court has the discretion to grant the debtor
(children) a period within which to pay the rental income from the portion
of land owned by the building because the same has not yet been
determined. Article 1191 of the Civil Code grants the right to rescind but
subject to the period that the court will grant.
Moreover, on the issue of co-ownership, the court held that a co-owner
cannot simultaneously be a usufructuary of the same land owned.
GABOYA V. CUI
38 SCRA 85
FACTS:
Don Mariano sold his three lots prodiviso to his three children. One of his
children, due to lack of funds, wasn’t able to purchase part of the land. This
reverted back to the father. As part of the sale, the father reserved for
himself the usufruct of the property. He co-owned the land with his children
then. A building was then constructed in a portion of the land, wherein
rentals was given to the father. Thereafter, the two children who were co-
owners obtained a loan, secured by a mortgage, with authority of the
father, to construct a commercial building. The father alleges that since he
has usufruct over the land, he has usufruct or share in the rentals earned
through the constructed building.
HELD:
The reserved right of vendor on a parcel of land doesn’t include rentals from
the buildings subsequently constructed on the vacant lots, but that it did
entitle the usufructuary to a reasonable rental for the portion of the land
being occupied by the building.
MANOTOK REALTY INC v. TECSON
FACTS
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession against
defendants, CFI ruled declaring respondent Nilo Madlangawa a builder in
good faith. CA affirmed and SC dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed with the trial court motion for the approval of the
petitioner's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment(that is final
and executory) which was dismissed. Hence this petition for mandamus.
However, since there is a pending case (Manotok v. NHA) involving the
expropriation of the land in question it is better to suspend the current case
til after the outcome of the expropriation proceedings is done. Moreover, a
fire engulfed the Tambunting estate covering the disputed area of the
land.The expropriation case was not granted and the law that provided for
such was declared unconstitutional.
Due to the fire, petitioner is contending that the execution of the decision
must now involve the delivery of possession.
ISSUE
Whether or not there should be a delivery of possession by the respondent
to the petitioner
RULING
When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it becomes
incumbent upon the respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the
execution of the same. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire,
and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to retain the
premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner,
there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the
premises and deliver the same to the petitioner.
MWSS V. CA, CITY OF DAGUPAN,
143 SCRA 623
FACTS:
The City of Dagupan (CITY) filed a complaint against the former
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), now
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS),
for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan
Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its special
defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership,
possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout
the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the
reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary
and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment
was rendered by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis
of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a
possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the
reimbursement claimed by it.
can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the
person who recovers the possession does not exercise the
option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a
possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only
to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the
thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does
not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the
time he enters into possession (Article 549).

ISSUE:

Whether or not MWSS has the right to remove all the useful
improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan
Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA
was found to be a possessor in bad faith?

HELD: No.

Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he
who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Moreover,
under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith
shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention
until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a
possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this