1

Table of Contents

4 Part I The Rise of Duterte and the Erosion of the Human Rights Culture

7 Part II The Road to Authoritarian Rule: Strategies and Tools

17 Part III What Duterte Has Wrought: Impact and Consequences

22 Part IV The People’s Response

 Foreword
Two major features characterize President Rodrigo Duterte’s
regime: the rapid deterioration of the human rights situation
(civil—political, economic, social and cultural rights), and the
decay of democracy.

This report outlines how the Philippines, under President

Duterte, is reverting to conditions surpassing even the darkest
days of Martial Law. From his kill policies to his oppressive
socioeconomic agenda, the country is hurtling towards
authoritarian rule.

As this regime thrives in chaos, we saw the need to provide a

human rights analysis that systematically describes the Duterte
government’s authoritarian project. We begin by describing
its campaign to erode the country’s human rights culture,
the authoritarian—ist strategies it chooses to employ, and the
far—ranging impact these strategies have on the daily lives of
Filipinos.

With this effort, we hope to awaken Filipinos to their country’s

present reality—one where their most basic rights are
threatened and violated every day and where their elected
leaders choose to devalue their innate dignity as human beings.
We carry the message that this reality, should Filipinos act in
the spirit of democracy and rule of law, can still be rescued
from the clutches of Duterte’s authoritarianism.

Philippine Human Rights Information Center

September 2018

Permission to Reproduce

The information in this publication may be reproduced for non-

commercial purposes, in part or in whole and by any means,
without charge or further permission from the institution, provided
that due diligence is exercised in ensuring the accuracy of the
information reproduced; that the institution is identified as the
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presented as an official version of the information reproduced, nor
as having been made in affiliation with or with the endorsement of
the Philippine Human Rights Information Center.
 PART I
The Rise of Duterte
and the Erosion of a
Human Rights Culture
“To talk about Rodrigo Roa Duterte
is to talk about human rights.”

Specifically, that Rodrigo Roa Duterte, 16th

president of the Philippines, has managed
to overturn the gains of the human rights
movement painstakingly earned since
the restoration of democracy in 1986.

4
In his two years of ruling, the man elected by 16
million Filipinos has successfully positioned a large
number of the populace to an ideologically hazy
but entirely antagonistic view of human rights.
Just how this happened is still subject of ongoing
analysis, but here is what we can definitively
conclude: the president of the Philippines is the
biggest threat to human rights in the Philippines
since Martial Law.
Change, under Duterte’s so-called war on drugs,
means 23,000 deaths2 and as yet unaccounted
number of gross human rights violations. Change,
under Duterte’s violent gaze, means further
entrenchment of impunity3 , wholesale erosion of a
human rights culture, and worsening poverty.
The Philippine democracy is in a state of regress.
This is the only conclusion to be made when you
have a government that is brazen in its defiance of
the rule of law, willful in its dismantling of legitimate
opposition, bold in its attacks on the press and
persistent in its efforts to destabilize checks and
balances of power and authority.

Change Has Come

Coming off of the neoliberal plutocracy that was
Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” Aquino III’s presidency,
Duterte dominated the 2016 presidential
campaign on a crystal-clear projection of a change
narrative. A vote for Duterte is a vote for change:
A Duterte presidency shall mark the end of elite
“Imperial Manila” politics, of petty and large-scale
government corruption, and of street crime and
illegal drugs.

Mass support materialized in the form of a definitive

six million lead in the 2016 presidential elections
over administration candidate Manuel “Mar” Roxas
II. It was clear that Duterte’s bold message of
change couched in uncouth language and an anti-
23,000 killings
elite stance resonated with voters exhausted with under investigation
the failed promises of post-EDSA regimes.
of PNP
“Change is coming,” he said. That change, it
turns out, means a country besieged by extreme
violence and widespread human rights violations
at a rate and intensity that challenges even Martial
Law’s darkest days. Change, under Duterte’s rule,
means a boldfaced endorsement for abandoning
the most basic state accountabilities for human
rights1.

1 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/799111/duterte-dont-use-human-
rights-as-excuse-to-destroy-ph
2 https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/
in-depth/204949-pnp-number-deaths-daily-duterte-adminis-
tration
3 https://www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/IGI-2017_eng.pdf

5
Traditional notions of democratic breakdown conjure
images of hostile takeovers of government leadership.
And yet, the Philippines is among an increasingly
long list4 of countries throughout the world that
is experiencing democratic decay, a “creeping
deterioration of democratic rule”5 as opposed to a
rapid democratic breakdown due to a coup or foreign
invasion.
The election of President Duterte is both a symptom
of this democratic decay and an impetus for a
sustained and deliberate continuation of it. Like most
democratically elected authoritarian leaders, he now
seeks to undermine the very structure that gave him
power.
Two years into the Duterte presidency, we
see a worrying slide towards an authoritarian
Philippines. In the next three sections, we will look
into the strategies, tools, and consequences of
this authoritarian experiment as it plays out in the
bloody theater that is Duterte’s Philippines. Finally,
we propose a plan of action for the people—what
can human rights organizations, advocates, and
citizens do to respond to Duterte’s anti-human
rights project?

4 https://law.unimelb.edu.au/students/jd/studies/enrolment/
compulsory/2018-sem-1-options/understanding-democratic-de-
cay-worldwide
5 https://www.democratic-decay.org/democratic-decay-as-the-or-
ganising-concept/

6
 PART II

The Road to Authoritarian

Rule: Strategies and Tools
The socioeconomic and political
environment that has paved the road
to authoritarian rule was created
and institutionalized by the Duterte
government through its reliance on
several key strategies and tools.

7
Kill Policies and
State Sponsored Violence
The “kill policies” advocated by the Duterte
government are used to galvanize the erosion
of human rights culture. These include the bills
on the restoration of the death penalty and
those on the lowering of the age of criminal
responsibility of children from 15 to 9 years of
age.
The President is a firm believer that the death
penalty will not only deter criminality. He also
holds the view that death is the most appropriate
punishment for both those involved in the drug
trade and those engaged in terrorism. On the
other hand, children’s involvement in crimes,
including illegal drug trade, can be best dealt
with by imprisonment or letting them rot in jail
as a way of teaching them a lesson.
In his public statements, he classifies drug
users, pushers and peddlers, criminals, and
even bystanders as unwanted members of
society, and suggests that their right to life
can be revoked if they choose to remain as
such. Likewise, rural communities continue to
suffer as militarization in their lands persists to
threaten their lives and livelihood. How these
policies play out in the city streets and in the
countryside show that these policies are only
directed against the poor and the marginalized.
8
While the president’s supporters may insist
that these kill policies demonstrate an ironclad
political will, the poor know the real story. As the
primary victims of the so-called war on drugs,
they contend with the daily reality of bloodshed,
violence, and fear.
The poor’s engagement in the drug trade makes
them the most vulnerable targets of President
Duterte’s kill policies. Many studies have already
established the causality between poverty and
involvement in the drug trade, whether one
is a drug user (tagged as drug addicts in the
Philippines), a drug pusher, or a drug courier. Even
former Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) chairman
Dionisio Santiago asserted it by repeating that
drug problem is largely rooted in the country’s
poverty issue6. Further, it is more or less a
sociological truism that drug addiction among the
poor is caused by the mental states developed
from being in a prolonged state of poverty, with
drug pushing as a viable, and therefore, appealing
source of income for many.
6 https://www.rappler.com/nation/186830-philip-
pines-drug-problem-rooted-poverty-ddb-chief-dionisio-san-
tiago
None of these issues mattered when the brutal
campaign against illegal drugs was launched. Just
days after President Duterte was sworn into office,
media reports flooded in, documenting the deaths
of dozens of Filipinos. A July 5, 2016 report from
Al Jazeera, for example, tallied at least 45 deaths
during Duterte’s first four days in office7.
The killing spree in urban poor communities
reveals the lie that is President Duterte’s pro-poor
posturing. Under the guise of anti-crime and anti-
drug campaigns, his kill policies have only proven
that he is nothing but a populist leader who would
not hesitate to condone human rights violations for
political brownie points.

Drug-related killings have been so normalized that

they have practically become daily segments in
news reports. David et al.’s (2018)8 total number of
extrajudicial deaths gathered from online media
reports between May 2016 and September 2017
does not even reach half of what human rights
groups estimate, which is that there have been
13,000 drug war-related killings in the same time
period9. As of July 2018, two years after President
Duterte came to power, the estimates have already
reached more than 23,00010.

7 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/rodrigo-duter-
te-drug-war-160704152252796.html
8 The Philippine Government’s Anti-Drug Campaign: Emerging
Evidence and Data
9 https://www.rappler.com/nation/183077-petition-su-
preme-court-investigate-killings-pnp-chr-doj
10 http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/19/18/no-justice-for-kin-
of-slain-drug-suspects-duterte-says

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Distortion of Human Rights and
Vilification of Human Rights Defenders
President Duterte and his allies within and Similarly, the Duterte government has viewed
outside of government have been tremendously human rights defenders as “enemies of the State.”
successful in controlling the narrative on human They have been labeled as “protectors of criminals,
rights. Their virulent anti-human rights rhetoric was rapists and killers” and “obstructionists.” In 2016,
already in place during the election campaign, and the President said: “The world will never be safe
it even got worse once Duterte took office. as long as [these] human rights groups are there to
protect and side with criminals, murderers, rapists,
Their biggest victory, arguably, is in successfully drug pushers, smugglers, robbers and thieves.”11
mischaracterizing human rights as being a
hindrance to national development. In rhetoric and
in action, President Duterte and his supporters
have led many Filipinos to believe that national
development is possible only through a violent, rule
of law-defying, human rights-violating campaign
against illegal drugs and its users. They were able
to calcify Filipinos’ exasperation with urban crime
into a successful campaign of dehumanization of
criminals, particularly those purportedly driven to
crime because of drug use.

11 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/692615/duterte-to-rights-group-
you-are-all-hypocrites

10
The Duterte administration further revealed its
disdain for—and perhaps fear of—its critics and
members of progressive movements when it
declared more than 600 individuals as terrorists.
On February 21, 2018, the Department of Justice’s
Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Peter Ong
filed a petition before the Manila Regional Trial
Court (RTC)12, declaring the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) founder Jose Maria Sison,
peace negotiator Luis Jalandoni, former lawmaker
and leftist leader Satur Ocampo, and UN special
rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples
Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and around 600 others
as terrorists. This comes after the peace talks
between CPP-NPA-NDF and the government of
the Republic of the Philippines had crumbled in
November 2017, prompting progressive groups
to intensify their opposition against President
Duterte’s regime.
The terror tagging of progressive groups and
human rights defenders was followed by the
granting of subpoena power to police officials,
which was seen as a prelude to a more intensified
crackdown13.
12https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/973990/breaking-tag-joma-un-
special-rapporteur-etc-as-terrorists-govt-impels-manila-court
13 http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/646213/
terrorist-tagging-cidg-subpoena-power-prelude-to-crack-
down-on-progressive-groups-zarate-says/story/
11
Not content with endangering the safety of
progressives and the people and communities
associated with them, the President’s spokesperson
Harry Roque said that human rights groups may
have been “unwitting tools” to destabilize the
government by receiving funding from drug
lords14. No evidence was presented to prove this
irresponsible claim.
Indeed, the distortion of human rights and
vilification of human rights defenders (HRDs) has
been so constant that unfounded accusations
and personal attacks against HRDs are routinely
propagated in both online and offline platforms.
This has led to increasingly difficult working
conditions for HRDs, who now routinely have to
contend with harassment and disparagement from
the president’s supporters.
14 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-rights/
drug-lords-use-rights-groups-as-tools-to-discredit-philippine-
leader-spokesman-idUSKBN1H210I
Suppression of Dissent and the Systematic
Dismantling of Democratic Guarantees
The current administration is one that has little
tolerance, if not complete abhorrence, of criticism
and opposition, and silencing and suppression
of dissent has been a strategy to cow people to
subservience and passivity. To accomplish this,
threats, harassment and disinformation have
been employed. Members of the legal opposition
like Senator Leila de Lima and former Supreme
Court Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno, are
among the early victims of the administration’s
campaign to rid itself of so-called “obstructionists”
and “troublemakers” with the filing of trumped
up charges and removal from their government
positions. Meanwhile, progressive church leaders
and activists have experienced red-baiting and
have been vilified.
The systematic dismantling of democratic
guarantees is another strategy used by the
government to strengthen the prevailing
environment. Bribery, rewards, and tokenism
have dominated democratic institutions like the
Philippine Congress, Philippine National Police,
local government units and other government
agencies. Behaviors of government officials
that demonstrate docility, subordination, and
12
obedience are applauded and rewarded by the
President because these are viewed as indicators
of loyalty.
Foremost in this dismantling of democratic
guarantees is his control over Congress. With
a supermajority, President Duterte seeks to
weaponize the legislative branch to enable his
policy positions and attack his enemies. Indeed, the
supermajority proved a powerful force for setting
up Duterte’s authoritarian project.
Attacking legitimate opposition—a well-worn tactic
of would-be authoritarians—has also become a
hallmark of Duterte’s two-year-old rule. The attacks
on Vice President Leni Robredo and Senator De
Lima, along with verbal tirades and harassment15
levied against then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-
Morales, paint a picture of a President who is unable
to accommodate legitimate opposition and critique.
That his response is to drive these representatives
of government—all at high positions and serving in
institutions that have traditionally functioned as
15 https://www.rappler.com/nation/191646-sereno-mo-
rales-duterte-word-war-yearend-2017
guards against unchecked executive power—into
difficult, untenable positions and even outright
disgrace reveal President Duterte’s despotic
impulses. That these officials also all happen to
be women—and have all been subjected to highly
misogynistic rhetoric from the president and his
allies—show that this wannabe strongman is at
heart intimidated by a show of legitimate feminine
power.
Further strengthening the state security agenda
is the 2018 passage of Republic Act 11055 or the
Philippine Identification System Law. RA 11055
calls on Filipinos eighteen (18) years of age and
above to register personal information into the
Filipino Identification System (FilSys) / Philippine
Identification System (PhilSys).
Proponents of the National ID System maintain that
the law will help to speed up government’s delivery
of basic social services to Filipinos, to prevent
crimes using the database information of the
majority of its citizens, and to expedite transactions
in the private sector.
Opponents of the law on the other hand, argue
against it as a potential tool for surveillance and
privacy rights violations. A national ID system gives
government unprecedented access to a huge
source of its citizens’ personal data.
13
This worry is not unfounded. After all, in 2016, the
data of around 55 million registered voters were
leaked following a hack on the Commission on
Election’s (COMELEC) database. Passport details
of around 1.3 million Filipino voters and 15.8 million
fingerprint records were included in the leak16.
This puts great mistrust on the capability of the
government to protect its citizens’ privacy, and in
effect, their security.
Indeed, privacy violations usually precede grave
human rights abuses. Any government with the
ability to keep track of its population via an ID system
could also resort to more oppressive activities.
A national ID system may also pave the way for
normalizing state surveillance. The information
gathered from citizens may be manipulated in
order to serve State interests, which as history has
proven, are not always in line with the people’s
interests.
Those who voice out their dissent and opposing
views of the government may also be targeted and
attacked through their own information. It is not
outside the realm of possibility that it may become
a tool of State-sponsored harassment and profiling,
curtailing dissent and contributing to the further
shrinking of civic spaces17.
16 https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/04/08/1570934/
comelec-hack-puts-data-55m-registered-voters-risk-security-
firm-says
17 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/993964/makabayan-bloc-nation-
al-id-system-infringes-on-right-to-privacy
While the government may insist that none of
these scenarios will transpire, the law’s true test
is in its implementation. Ordinarily, we would give
the government the benefit of the doubt, but
considering this regime’s authoritarian character
and disregard for the rule of law, no honest
consideration of its human rights record would
allow for support of this law.
Populism and Disinformation
Projecting oneself as a populist leader through
the formulation and/or implementation of
programs and policies that are said to be
“sensitive and responsive to peoples’ needs”
is another strategy of the current dispensation
to be able to muster the widest support of
the population, particularly the poor and
marginalized.
The so-called war on drugs, which has been
justified as a means of protecting ordinary
Filipinos against criminals, rapists, and killers;
attacks against the elites and oligarchs; the
use of invectives and foul language; even the
passage of the Universal Access to Quality
Tertiary Education Act (RA 10931), have all
been designed and intended to depict a “pro-
people, pro-poor” character of the current
government. It has perfected the scheme of
playing with peoples’ emotions and sowing
intrigues to perpetuate divisions in society
between pro-government versus anti-Duterte,
‘yellow’, and privileged classes.
Perhaps no other Duterte policy demonstrated
his populist brand of leadership than the signing
of RA 10931 in 2017. By guaranteeing free tuition
and fees for college students enrolled in “112
state universities and colleges (SUCs), 78 local
universities and colleges (LUCs), and all technical-
vocation education and training (TVET) programs”18
under TESDA beginning with the 2018-2019 school
year, the administration has earned much praise
and gratitude from students and their parents.
18 https://www.rappler.com/nation/198314-things-to-know-
free-tuition-law-irr
14
Indeed, the law is a milestone in the government’s
record for fulfilling Filipinos’ right to education.
However, a close examination of the law’s fiscal
implications reveals it for what it is—a shortsighted,
unsustainable, purely populist act that may in fact
cause more harm than good.
Youth activists condemned the law and its
shortcomings. Kabataan Partylist Representative
Sarah Elago, for instance, noted19 that it only covers
1.3 million students, ignoring over two million more
students not enrolled in public higher education
institutions, and three million more Filipinos of
college age but are currently out of school.
Moreover, President Duterte’s own economic
managers have opposed the law’s passage20 from
the jump, saying that the tuition-free policy will
mostly benefit non-poor students who populate
SUCs. They also pointed out that a possible exodus
from private higher education institutions (HEIs)
to SUCs may occur, placing even more pressure
on already overburdened SUCs. There is also the
important issue of sustainability; the government’s
resources simply cannot handle the budgetary
pressures of an entirely tuition-free policy.
A review21 of the 2018 Budget of the Duterte
administration by the think tank Institute for
Leadership, Empowerment and Democracy (iLEAD),
further invites scrutiny on the administration’s
seriousness in addressing the plight of students.
19 https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/22/18/youth-activists-
slam-free-tuition-law
20 https://www.rappler.com/nation/160940-economic-manag-
ers-unifast-free-tuition-sucs
21 http://ilead.ph/2018/05/24/a-looming-fiscal-train-wreck/
Following the 2017 passage of the Free College
Tuition Law, one could reasonably expect that the
education budget would reflect a marked increase.
After all, a landmark policy such as this would mean
an avalanche of budget infusions into the national
government’s education budget. iLEAD’s review,
however, shows that the education budget for 2018 The Duterte government has effectively
grew a paltry 1.7% from the 2017 figure. Looking mobilized its army of trolls and rabid supporters
at the budgetary big picture, iLEAD concludes with the constant flooding of social media with
that “the 2018 National Budget, despite growing their declarations of support, justifications and
12 percent from 2017’s, does not reflect any major defense of highly controversial and unacceptable
policy shift.” More than any public pronouncement, pronouncements, statements, and actions of the
the budget numbers reveal the truth of the Duterte President on various issues in society.
administration’s blinkered approach to education.
The President’s social media machinery has been
Furthermore, iLEAD’s analysis also makes room a major vehicle in the government’s disinformation
to note that whatever gains Filipino families with campaign with the dissemination of lies, half-
college-age children might have from a free truths, and fake news to the general public, and
tuition policy will be cancelled out by higher taxes even to the world. It has likewise been a tool in
on basic consumer goods imposed by TRAIN’s sugarcoating projects, programs, and policies of
implementation. The picture that emerges, says the government as part of its efforts to present
iLEAD, is that “economic and budget policies are itself as “a government of and for the people.”
disjointed, populist programs are hastily planned
and funded at the expense of clashing with other
priorities, and inflation only takes away what the
government gives the people in their one hand.”

15
Meanwhile, the government has embarked on
a campaign to attack and discredit mainstream
mass media outfits which have criticized and
questioned certain policies and actions of the
President and his administration. This is illustrated
in the case of the revocation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) of Rappler’s license
to operate for allegedly violating the Constitution
and the Anti-Dummy Law, which is the first such
case ever to be filed by the SEC. The President
also threatened to block the renewal of the ABS-
CBN franchise, which is due to expire in 2020,
after accusing the television company of failing
to air a campaign ad prior to the 2016 presidential
elections, and not returning the money paid for the
said advertisement. The Philippine Daily Inquirer
(PDI) has gone through a similar experience when
the President called the attention of its owners to
stop attacking his administration or else he would
fight the owners of the newspaper over the Mile
Long property in Makati.
This provision essentially legitimizes State
surveillance—a highly intrusive process that opens
the floodgates of abuse of civil liberties—as a
regular, ordinary State activity. State surveillance,
by its nature, is difficult to monitor, and the right to
privacy, enshrined in the Constitution and described
in detail across various national laws22, can easily be
compromised. Furthermore, challenging the State
on the grounds of the right to privacy violations
remains difficult because the government agencies
collecting information on citizens may not be
inclined to disclose the full extent of their activities,
often by hiding under the excuse of protecting
national security interests.
Given the Duterte administration’s documented
use of surveillance in support of its brutal campaign
against illegal drugs23, there is no reasonable ground
to further empower the Duterte administration to
collect information on citizens.

Federalism and
Charter Change
To further legitimize and institutionalize the current
environment created by the administration, charter
change and the shift to federalism are being pursued
and advocated by the Duterte government.

A major criticism against federalism is that this

will pave the way towards legitimizing strongman
rule and institutionalizing political dynasties and
warlordism based on the present realities in many
regions of the country. A disturbing provision of the
draft Federal Constitution is Article XV on National
Economy and Patrimony. While maintaining
that lands, natural resources, and public utilities
should be owned and controlled by Filipinos and
corporations with at least 60% of its equity owned by
Filipino citizens, the draft Federal Constitution gives
Congress the power to change these provisions on
ownership by law.

The draft Federal Constitution likewise includes a

provision adding a mechanism for the issuance and
use of a surveillance warrant.
22 https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/
iq/197766-things-to-know-philippines-government-surveil-
lance
23 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/21/britain-
sold-spying-gear-to-philippines-despite-dutertes-brutal-drugs-
war

16
 PART III

What Duterte Has Wrought:

Impacts and Consequences
All these strategies and tools
employed by the government
to reinforce an environment
characterized by the erosion of a
human rights culture, weakened
democratic institutions, persistence
of social injustice and inequality,
and pervasiveness of internal armed
conflict and political instability, have
contributed to the institutionalization
of impunity and corrosion of the rule
of law.

17
Entrenched Impunity and
Corrosion of Rule of Law
Instead of holding State agents accountable for
human rights violations perpetrated in the context
of the “war on drugs,” the President himself has
assured them protection and freedom from
prosecution for their actions24 He continues to
condone and even encourage members of the
police force in the excessive and indiscriminate
use of violence in the conduct of the “war on
drugs” resulting in the illegal arrest, imprisonment,
torture, and death of alleged drug users and
dealers in urban poor communities.
24 http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/647009/
duterte-to-pma-grads-do-your-duty-in-line-with-law-ako-na-
bahala-sa-inyo/story/
18
The culture of impunity has allowed State agents
to continue perpetrating human rights violations
free from any accountability25. In fact, the
President has even gone to the extent of doubling
the salaries of the PNP and AFP as a reward for a
“job well done” in the government’s “war on drugs”
and “war against terrorism.”26 Meanwhile, victims
of the “war on drugs,” particularly the victims of
EJKs, have been denied access to justice. To this
day, families of EJK victims, children referred to
as “collateral damage,”27 and even those admitted
by law enforcement agents as killed because of
mistaken identity, have not seen a single State
agent prosecuted, let alone made accountable
for their actions. They continue to go scot-free and
enjoy the protection of the State28.
25 https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/03/02/17/cops-abused-pow-
er-in-dutertes-drug-war-human-rights-watch-report
26 https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/01/09/1776288/
duterte-signs-resolution-hiking-military-police-pay
27 https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talk-
tojazeera/2016/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duter-
te-war-drugs-161015100325799.html
28 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/17/duterte-
says-children-killed-in-philippines-drug-war-are-collateral-
damage
Climate of Fear and Silence
Consequently, the culture of impunity has created
an environment characterized by fear and silence.
The “war on drugs” has transformed urban poor
communities into “ghost towns” and their residents
into a populace mum to injustices and repression
within their midst. Meanwhile, victims of human
rights violations engulfed by terror have opted to
abandon their homes to escape punitive actions of
unscrupulous law enforcement agents.

Even so, a significant section of the middle and upper

middle classes continues to remain indifferent to
things happening in society as evidenced by the lack
of protest or opposition. Although silence can mean
many things, it essentially indicates acceptance
and approval of the state of affairs.

19
Worsening Incidence of Poverty, Hunger,
Joblessness and Derogation of ESC Rights
The dismal state of economic, social, and cultural
rights manifested in the worsening situation of
poverty, hunger, unemployment, and homelessness
can be attributed to the implementation of a national
development policy and program (2017-2022)
following a neo-liberal framework. While it may
be true that every Filipino aspires for a “matatag,
maginhawa at panatag na buhay” as gathered
during the regional consultations and focus group
discussions conducted by planning agencies
nationwide, the aspiration is far from being realistic
and attainable by 2040.
This is because of the snail-paced changes
experienced by the country in the areas of decent
employment and income, food and nutrition,
health, and housing. Moreover, based on the rate of
20
environmental degradation taking place in different
parts of the archipelago, it will not be surprising if a
decade from now, a big percentage of the country’s
agricultural lands and forests, fisheries and marine
resources, mineral resources, flora and fauna,
would have been destroyed and/or dominated by
big multinational corporations.
With national development equated with increased
global competitiveness, capital investment,
revenues and profits, the government has
implemented policies and projects, the most
recent of which is the Tax Reform for Acceleration
and Inclusion (TRAIN) law, which has caused a
deterioration in the incomes and quality of life of
ordinary Filipinos.
Much of the tax breaks of the first TRAIN law were
targeted for wage-earners. While it was sold to the
public as a means to dissolve income taxes for many
workers, thereby gaining public support, it also very
transparently moves the bulk of the tax burden to
value-added taxes, particularly on products such
as fuel, sweetened drinks, and vehicles, as well as
alcohol and tobacco products.
Meant as the primary means to raise funds for the
administration’s ambitious infrastructure spending,
this was essentially a tax increase on those who
do not earn from wages or salaries such as small
business owners, farmers, fisherfolk, and those in
the informal sector.
While the Duterte administration insists29 that
TRAIN’s effects on inflation are minimal, the point
of the matter is that inflation is here, and here to
stay as thinktank IBON says30. According to IBON,
commodity price hikes would persist for the next
three years when additional taxes on oil products
will take effect.
29 https://www.dof.gov.ph/index.php/train-not-to-blame-
for-inflation/
30 http://ibon.org/2018/05/train-induced-price-increases-are-
permanent-ibon/
21
IBON also reported31 that the poor who live below
the family living wage of PHP 30,000 bear the worst
of the price increases. Fisherfolk for example, have
to spend an average of PHP 1,335 more per month
for diesel for 20 days of fishing.
In fact, since the start of 2018, IBON estimates32 that
runaway inflation has eroded the incomes of the
“poorest 60 million Filipinos” leading to “losses of
anywhere from Php 993 to as much as Php 2,715”
for each Filipino household.
For most workers, the twin effects of TRAIN and
inflation have led to an erosion of purchasing power
and continued stagnation of wages. While IBON
cites official labor force data that the number of
employed increased under Duterte, these Filipino
workers were increasingly working in insecure
and low-paying jobs. Data from IBON33 shows that
underemployment rate was 18% last January 2018
which was an increase of almost 2% from a year
before, while the population of part-time workers
are now at 14.7 million or 9.3% of the labor force.
31 http://ibon.org/2018/06/train-worsens-burden-of-inflation-
on-poor-ibon/
32 http://ibon.org/2018/08/poorest-60m-filipinos-suffer-income-
loss-due-to-first-6-months-inflation-in-2018/
33 http://ibon.org/2018/05/over-a-million-more-underem-
ployed-part-time-workers-under-duterte/
 PART IV

The People’s
Response
Confronted by a government which
primarily relies on the use of State violence,
condones a climate of impunity, disregards
human rights and the rule of law, fabricates
and disseminates lies, and abhors opposition
and dissent, human rights defenders face a
daunting challenge and task.

22
1. Mass education and information work on human rights
• Countering distortion of HR and disinformation campaigns
• Enhancing capacities in HR claiming and defense
• Building a HR culture

2. Organizing
• Strengthening of grassroots and sectoral organizations
• Formation and capacity-building of HRDS in communities, schools, workplaces
• Formation of broad alliances, coalitions, linkages and cooperation

3. Mobilizing communities and sectors

• Monitoring and documentation, and gathering of evidence
• Conduct of campaigns, mobilizations and mass protest actions
• Conduct of rights-claiming initiatives by communities/sectors
• Conduct of lobby and solidarity work (Local & international)

4. Protection of HRDs and victims of HRVs

• Institution of protection measures and programs
• Capacity-building in safety and security management (Physical and digital)
• Access to protection mechanisms, tools, and resources (including sanctuaries,
medical, psychosocial and legal services/intervention)

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