Cultural Diplomacy in the (sub)National

Interest?: A comparative analysis of

Australia’s China policy and South
Australia’s China Engagement Strategy,
2013-2017
Online appendices

Attached to the thesis presented by Benjamin John Maltby (student number: 757921) to the
School of Social and Political Sciences in 2018, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in the School of Social and Political Sciences

Supervisor: Dr. Allan Patience

 Online appendix O.A – Discourse analysis exemplar
An argumentation analysis of Opportunity, Security, Strength: The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper

Following Fairclough and Fairclough (2012)’s model of argumentation analysis, the thesis presumes that “argumentation, and practical argumentation in particular, is the primary activity that is going on in political
discourse” (p. 86). All political arguments seek to represent certain actors in certain ways, providing a basis for arguments made about how those actors ought to act or be treated. Argumentation analysis aims to reveal
the nature of these representations, and to categorise and codify the key claims and goals proposed with respect to those representations in a given piece of discourse. Throughout this thesis, this has been used to reveal
the logic underpinning Australian foreign policy approaches to China under both the Abbott and Turnbull governments.

The following table exemplifies the process behind a systematic argumentation analysis as used throughout this thesis. Here, the Australian Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper is analysed. Specific
sections of the text are analysed individually, as indicated in the far left column of the table. Text fragments were sampled with a content search for the term “China”, with sections and sub-sections of text included for
analysis where more than two references to China were found. This method follows a model offered by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, p. 88), but extended with a practical synthesis of discursive trends identified
across the entire paper (see page 9). The terms used in this table’s headings are as follows:

- Topic: what is the discourse about?

- Premises: what does the discourse assume to be true?
- Key claims: what assertions does the discourse make about actors’ behaviour or the nature of a given scenario? Alternatively: what problems does the discourse claim to exist, or what does it aim to solve?
- Key goals: how does the discourse assume an actor or scenario ought to be approached? Alternatively: how does it propose a problem ought to be solved? What actions should the actor take?
- Alternatives presented: what happens if the actor does not meet their key goals, or take the actions they argue ought to be taken? (Alternatives tend to be cast in a negative light, so as to make the discourse’s
proposed course of action appear more compelling.)
- Representation of (x): how does the discourse characterise a given actor? What qualities does it ascribe them? Does it frame them in a positive or negative light?

This appendix is principally included as a methodological exemplar, but since the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper reflects a combination of elements of foreign policy discourse on China identified across both the
Abbott and Turnbull eras of Australian government, it is included in its entirety.

Chapter/section Context Practical argument Representation of: Other notes

title, page
numbers
Topic Premises Key claims Key goals Alternatives Australia China
presented
Ministerial Introducing the The world is “contested There are both Australia should “respond None clear, but A state with a Nothing substantive Noteworthy that this
foreword (v-vi) Paper and competitive” (v) challenges and with confidence” to both implication is “strong economy foreword is jointly
opportunities to these challenges and without ‘confident’ and institutions, attributed to Bishop
Australian strategic opportunities, and this (read: assertive?) innovative and Trade Minister
success and confidence is underpinned foreign policy, and businesses, educated Steve Ciobo
prosperity in the by knowledge of and belief continued domestic and skilled
coming decades: in the “values” that economic reform, population and
“technological constitute Australia’s Australia’s regional secure borders”
change, challenges to (inter)national identity (v- interests will be
globalisation and the vi) compromised (v)
rules-based
international order,
continued economic
dynamism and growth
in Asia, shifts in
strategic power
regionally and
globally, Islamist

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 Appendix O.A Maltby

terrorism and climate

change are among the
significant trends
shaping our world”
(v)
“A stable and Framing “The Indo–Pacific “as China’s power Pursue a vision of the Indo- Implicit in ‘goals’: An equitable and An unpredictable force in With reference to
prosperous Indo- Australia’s encompasses our most grows, our region is Pacific region where power shifts in the committed regional the region which “adherence to rules”:
Pacific” (3-4), in regional important economic changing in ways “adherence to rules delivers region too quickly, partner to those (implicitly) seeks to no specificity on which
“Overview” interests and partners and its without precedent in lasting peace”, “the rights or states become states supportive of reshape regional rules, but this would
key parochial dynamism supports Australia’s modern of all states are respected”, more protectionist, maintaining / relationships for its own almost certainly refer
objectives economic growth in history” (4). This is and “open markets facilitate and Australia’s strengthening a benefit to US-led “status quo”
Australia” (3) risky because it is the free flow of trade [and] economic regional status quo rules (3)
potentially capital”. (3) In sum: keeping interests/health are based on free and
“Our alliance with the destabilising, and the region strategically harmed open trade
United States is central Australia’s economic stable and peaceful, and relationships, and
to Australia’s approach prosperity depends on reinforcing a rules-based maintaining peace
to the Indo–Pacific” (3) a peaceful Indo- status quo
– see ‘Goals’ column Pacific region
for justification Tacit on p3: slow the
“The Government is transfer of economic and
committed to strong strategic power from US to
and constructive ties China in the region as much
with China. We as possible… Therefore:
welcome China’s “To support our objectives
greater capacity to in the region, the
share responsibility Government will broaden
for supporting and deepen our alliance
regional and global cooperation [with the United
security” (4) implicit: States]” (4)
China’s rise should be
conditionally Strengthen Australia’s
welcomed only as “comprehensive strategic
long as it shares partnership” with China (4)
responsibility for
maintaining the
regional security
status quo
“International rules On how the “Our security and “We have entered a Develop Australia’s own “we could choose to A state committed to Implicit: a state which The connection made
and cooperation status quo prosperity have been period of sharper security and defence narrow our global maintaining regional might seek to change the between US hegemony
protect Australian international supported by US global challenge to the rules apparatus in conjunction vision and ambition. and global peace global order in ways that and the existing “rules-
interests” (6-7), in order benefits leadership, an and principles that with those of the U.S. Such an approach through reinforcing are contrary to Australia’s based international
“Overview” Australia, and increasingly open world underpin international (implicit: the two states’ would not, however, the liberal “status interests. For example: order”, and in turn to
its interests in economy and the cooperation” (4) – defence systems are serve Australia’s quo” international “Some change to Australia’s parochial
supporting it development of and this is critical to interconnected); “Australia long-term interests order, but in service institutions and patterns of domestic interests,
international Australia’s parochial will work with others to nor align with our of its own parochial global cooperation is gives some insight into
institutions and rules” foreign policy protect and promote those values” (6) interests inevitable, necessary and Turnbull’s adversarial
(6) – arguably a central interests; “the United elements of the international appropriate to reflect the approach to China in
assumption of all States’ engagement to order that help ensure greater weight of countries his government’s
Australian foreign support a rules-based that all states can pursue such as China…” foreign policy – runs
policy discourse order is in their interests securely” (7); under the assumption

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 Appendix O.A Maltby

throughout the Turnbull [Australia’s] own “continue strongly to that the US’s interests
and Abbott eras (and interests and in the support US global are counter to those of
prior); “Australia will interests of wider leadership” (7) China?
be safer and more international stability
prosperous in a global and prosperity.
order based on agreed Without sustained
rules rather than one US support, the
based on the exercise of effectiveness and
power alone” (7) liberal character
[might decline]” (7) –
an implicit connection
to Australia’s own
liberal ‘values’ that
are claimed to
underpin its own
approach to foreign
policy
“An evolving Focuses on “The principles Reducing US Australia should “seek to Status-quo global A state at risk from Historically an essential Corollary to this
international challenges from embedded in the post- influence in prevent the erosion of hard- order declines, and shifts in the global customer for Australian discourse is that
order”, in Chapter 2 Australia’s war order have strongly international affairs is won international rules and Australia’s global order. Implicit: products: “Following Japan declining U.S. power
– “A contested perspective supported Australia’s making “global agreed norms of behaviour power declines Australia is reliant and the Republic of Korea, makes Australia
world” (p22-25) embedded in interests and our governance … that promote global on other actors for China became an economic weaker…
shifting global values” (22) harder” (25); security” as a top foreign its power (as a powerhouse hungry for
governance “Australia’s security policy priority (25) ‘middle power’?), Australia’s minerals and
trends, is maintained and as such is energy, boosting our
particularly primarily through our powerless to shape economy and increasing
from global own strength, our the international our living standards”
backlashes alliance with the order on its own,
towards United States and our while Non-democratic: “Some
globalisation partnerships with simultaneously states are active in
other countries” (25) being dependent on asserting authoritarian
the maintenance on models in opposition
that order for its to open, democratic
global influence? governance” (25) –
implicitly targeted at China
(note the similarity in
language to Bishop’s
speech in Singapore in
2017)
“Power shifts in the Focuses largely “Even as China’s power “Like all great Australia must “be more If the existing, US- A state whose influence is Assumption that most
Indo-Pacific”, in on China’s grows and it competes powers, China will active and determined in our hegemonic status not necessarily benevolent. states in the Indo-
Chapter 2 (25-27) growing more directly with the seek efforts to help shape a quo international Reference to the South Pacific want the US to
strategic United States regionally to influence the regional balance favourable order is put at risk: China Sea: “Freedom of remain the
strength in the and globally, the United region to suit its own to our interests” (27) “There is a risk that navigation is under predominant influence
Indo-Pacific States will, for the interests”; increased (which, as mentioned above, trade and investment, challenge in parts of the in the region is
region foreseeable future, economic competition are expected to align with which in the past region” (26) interesting – and
retain its significant as well as changing U.S. interests). Also have acted to restrain presumptuous?
global lead in military strategic hard/soft references boosting strategic rivalry,
and soft power” (26); power relationships Australia’s defence force, to could fuel it instead”
“Most regional are destabilising in 2% of GDP (27) (27)

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 Appendix O.A Maltby

countries … clearly the Indo-Pacific

consider a significant region
US role in the Indo–
Pacific as a stabilising
influence” (26)
“The Indo-Pacific From a China- Asia is likely to be the “Recognising that it Capitalise on China’s “China faces risks No substantive Monolithic and difficult to Implicitly frames
will create centric fastest-growing, most can no longer rely on market growth as best as however in the form representation read: implicit in comments Australia as
opportunity”, in perspective: important market for traditional growth possible, while recognising of significant debt in around the nature of economically rather
Chapter 2 (28-31) focuses on Australian exports over drivers, such as that some factors – such as the private and China’s shifting growth, powerless in its region
China’s coming decades investment in the pace at which China public sectors. While and the fact that it can – dependent on states
potential to infrastructure and the continues to implement pro- it has the resources neither be controlled nor like China, but unable
grow as a movement of rural market reforms – are out of and controls to counted on to directly influence
market for workers to urban Australia’s control respond to a crisis in those states
Australian areas, China is its financial sector, a
goods in coming seeking to shift its sharp correction
decades economy to a more could have a
sustainable model significant impact on
driven by domestic Australia’s exports
consumption” (28) – and on the global
which ought to economy more
directly benefit broadly.” (28)
Australia’s economy

“the pace and

sustainability of
growth [in China[ will
depend on …
difficult-to-implement
structural reforms”
(31) – i.e. Australia
cannot take China’s
growth for granted,
nor can it control the
rate at which it
continues to grow
Opening remarks in Embodied in the “The Indo–Pacific’s “No long-term “The Government will Framed as: “the Invested in Unpredictable, but a state First two quotes listed
Chapter 3 – A chapter title: rising prosperity has foreign policy broaden and deepen our objectives set out maintaining peace that might also be in Goals column: could
stable and “prosperous” been built on the objective is more alliance cooperation [with above can only be and prosperity – and compelled to behave in a be read as “balancing”
prosperous Indo- referring to region’s stability. important to Australia the U.S.] and encourage the secured if … China these goals are way that reflects against China?
Pacific (37-38) economic Today, the Indo–Pacific than ensuring our strongest possible economic [believes its] framed in such a Australia’s strategic
growth is undergoing a region evolves and security engagement by interests are also way that they cannot interests (i.e. On the key strategic
according strategic transition as peacefully and the United States in our served by them. This be seen as “bad”; accepting/maintaining the aims listed in Goals
roughly with profound as the without an erosion of region” (37); will also “lift is not assured” (38). Australia is regional, implicitly US-led column: note the
that established economic the fundamental the ambition of our In other words: if portrayed at having status quo) conditionality attached
under the transformation that principles on which engagmenet with major China is not the region’s best to Australia’s support
existing post- preceded it” (37) – the Indo–Pacific’s Indo-Pacific democracies” compelled to support interests at heart of China’s “rise”
WWII status strategic transition prosperity and (37); will “also continue to a regional order that (though these serve
quo regional implicitly refers to cooperative relations invest in regional resembles the its parochial Interesting to note, at
order China’s growth are based” (37) – no institutions because they existing status quo interests of this point, that there
(“commensurate” with promote economic (implicit), there can seems to be no

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 Appendix O.A Maltby

its increased economic direct reference to cooperation and help build be no guarantee of economic growth, insinuation that a non-
“heft”, see Bishop and what these might be norms” (38) – no mention of peace/stability in the primarily) compliant China would
Turnbull’s discourse which institutions, but region create a situation in
throughout 2017) “Our alliance with the presumably referring more which any foreign
United States is to ASEAN than the AIIB? party would pose an
central to Australia’s immediate security
security”; See page 38 for a series of threat to Australia. All
simultaneously: straightforwardly-outlined the consequences
“Strengthening our key strategic aims for suggested if China
Comprehensive Australia’s regional foreign refuses to support
Strategic Partnership policy – in short: Australia’s preferred
with China is also - Fostering dialogue regional order point
vital for Australia … - Facilitating open only to Australia’s
because of China’s markets economic security
growing influence on - Promoting inclusive being jeopardised…
the [region]” (37) economic integration
- Ensuring freedom of
navigation (a subtle
hint to South China
Sea disputes,
perhaps?)
- Ensuring continued
U.S. engagement in
the region
- Attempting to ensure
China positively
contributes to a
regional order
“based on these
principles”
“The United States Discussing the “The Indo–Pacific’s “A comprehensive “We encourage China to The U.S. and China Invested in Large and powerful. Focus on
and China”, in relevance of this stability depends more US economic strategy exercise its power in a way “have a mutual “maintaining” peace Implicitly threatening? “maintenance” of
Chapter 3 (38-40) relationship to than ever on the actions for Asia will be as that enhances stability, interest in managing in the region, though Politically different to peace is telling;
Australia’s of, and relations important as the reinforces international law strategic tensions but also tacitly framed Australia – this section Australia would rather
strategic between, two of United States’ and respects the interests of this by itself is not a as powerless to directly articulates the Asia did not change
interests Australia’s most extensive security smaller countries and their guarantee of actually achieve this Australian government’s (while acknowledging
important partners—- engagement” (39), right to pursue them stability”, tensions goal, other than belief that Chinese politics that Asia is changing)
the United States and placed apropos of peacefully” – if Australia “could flare between “encouraging” other, and values are different to
China” (38) nothing in the text has a goal, its goal is to them over trade and more powerful states Australia’s: “At times, Also note this quote on
encourage, but this is more a other economic to behave in ways it closer engagement will be China, page 40: “We
U.S. participation in the “China’s capacity to wish-list issues” (39) (as has would like. Remains accompanied by friction promote stronger
region is crucial in take on responsibility now come to pass) trade-focused… arising from connections at the sub-
large part because “the for supporting “Australia will encourage our different interests, national level, working
web of US alliances in regional and global the United States and China values and political and closely with our states
the Indo–Pacific, security is growing” to ensure economic tension legal systems” (40) and territories”
especially US alliances (39). This framing of between them does not fuel
with Japan, the “responsibility” is strategic rivalry or damage
Republic of Korea and consistent with the multilateral trading
Australia, makes an discourse throughout system” (39) – the
the Turnbull era consequences of “strategic

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 Appendix O.A Maltby

essential contribution to “encouraging” China rivalry” are not spelled out.

regional security” (39) to abide by extant Again, trade is listed as a
status quo “rules” primary concern
U.S.’s alliance to
Australia has Contributing to the
historically worked development of a free trade
“strongly to the benefit agreement between China
of both countries” (39) and the U.S.: “Over time,
bringing China and the
United States together in a
region-wide free trade
agreement would reduce
economic tension and help
maximise regional
economic growth
prospects.” (39) – one of
few explicitly-framed goals
in this paragraph

“Australia will continue to

place priority
on positive and active
engagement with China,
including through annual
meetings between leaders,
foreign ministers and
economic ministers” (40)

“Fault lines”, in Principally “The South China Sea “we have a substantial “Australia opposes the use Not explicated, but A “non-claimant” in Less as an aggressor, more
Chapter 3 (46-47) articulates is a major fault line in interest in the stability
of disputed features and presumably, South China Sea as a misbehaving state – no
Australia’s the regional order” of this crucial artificial structures in the “tensions” will rise disputes, therefore explicit condemnation
interests in international South China Sea for military which will have impartial – or directed at China, merely
resolving South waterway, and in the purposes. We support the negative economic hypothetically so, “concern”
China Sea norms and laws that resolution of differences and security since China’s
disputes govern it” (46). through negotiation based repercussions activities in the
Implicitly (see on international law”; “All South China Sea
following page): claimants should clarify the flout UNCLOS rules
those norms are full nature and extent of and therefore must
articulated by the their claims according to the be opposed by “non-
UNCLOS framework United Nations Convention claimant” states
on the Law of the Sea
“Australia is (UNCLOS)” (47);
particularly concerned “In all of these matters, it is
by the unprecedented vital that those concerned
pace and scale of act with restraint and avoid
China’s activities” actions that add to tensions”
(46-7)

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 Appendix O.A Maltby

Opening remarks in As a whole, the “Given its central role “As its economy “Australia will more than Not explicated, but An exporter, and a A potentially unpredictable
Chapter Four: Our chapter in manufacturing, becomes more ever need a competitive since previous strong advocate for customer; see first quote in
agenda for discusses how changes in China’s advanced, production economy with efficient discourse stressed free trade Key Claims column
opportunity (49-54) Australia might economy will be of many goods could businesses and industries Australia’s
be made more influential” (49) be centralised in and a skilled workforce. Our dependence on Asian
economically China. Conversely, companies will need to be markets,
prosperous higher costs in China agile and adaptable” (50) protectionism
through certain might see companies throughout Asia
foreign policy shift production to Specific foreign policy could seriously harm
measures over other countries to measures listed (all general, Australia’s economy
the coming seek competitive none specifically
decades advantages” (49) referencing China) – al on
page 51:
- “Resist
protectionism”
- “Shape rules that
promote economic
growth, trade
liberalisation and
free markets”
- Reduce barriers to
trade and
investment,
“including through
modern free trade
agreements”
- Work with
Australian
businesses to
maximise these
goals
This is an economically-
focused chapter, of course,
but these goals are still
interesting in the extent to
which they prioritise status
quo economic “rules”. Does
the promotion of a free trade
agenda now potentially
conflict with the
protectionist agenda
advanced by the U.S.?
“Foreign policy Self-explanatory “Together, [the “Domestic and “The Commonwealth “The policies of the Nothing substantive Nothing substantive Discussion of
partners: states and title Commonwealth and foreign policies Government encourages and states and territories complementarity does
territories” in states] promote and interact extensively in supports the states and can impinge not refer to the
Chapter Eight: facilitate trade, a globalised world. territories with their own on our obligations methods, or
Partnerships and investment, tourism and Close cooperation sub-national international under treaty-level characteristics, of sub-
soft power (107- education” (107) with state and relationships” (108) (a claim agreements, state foreign policy
108) territory governments as much as a goal) including in areas initiatives
is therefore vital to such

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Appendix O.A Maltby

our trade and “Ensuring Commonwealth as trade and climate

investment links and and state and territory change” (108) –
to meeting our policies align to meet our which creates
international international obligations is obstructions,
obligations” vital to protecting our complexity and
economic interests and our embarrassment for
reputation” (108) – this the Federal
mostly refers to state-level Government in
domestic policies, such as foreign relations
climate change or industrial
relations policy

9
Appendix O.A Maltby

Synthesis of key themes and terms used throughout the document:

Key theme or term Used in pages Comments

Values v-vi; 22; 38-40 ‘Underpinning’ Australian foreign policy; consistent with other Turnbull-era discourse
The “rules-based international order” is (uniquely?) in alignment with Australia’s “values”
China’s “values” are seen as being different to Australia’s, potentially creating conflict in their international relations (p. 40)
“rules-based international v-vi; 6-7; 22 Adherence to this is a prerequisite for peace, and this “order” is also analogous to a peaceful community
order”
“stable” 3-4; 46-7 In context, implies Australian foreign policy favours continuity
Also used in reference to the South China Sea; disruption is implied to mean hostile conflict, so Australia would rather nobody take any further action (and,
following this, resolve their differences under existing institutional arrangements – through the United Nations)
“prosperous”/”prosperity” 3-7; 28-31; 49- Typically talking about Australia’s prosperity; not much discourse on supporting other states’ prosperity.
54 Australia’s prosperity is said to have been underpinned by the United States (p. 6-7)
- Australian prosperity best supported/underpinned by the existing “rules-based international order”
Global trade will create Australian prosperity; China is a key market, but domestic factors make it an unpredictable one, so it cannot be taken for granted as a source
of Australian “prosperity” (p. 28-31)
United States 3-4; 6-7; 25- Central to Australia’s security; Australian commitment to the U.S. alliance ought to continue to grow. This is because the U.S. hegemonically leads/underpins the
27; 37-40; “rules-based international order”, sustaining its “liberal character” (p. 6-7)
- Implicit assumption is that China’s interests are not necessarily in alignment with the U.S. – paraphrasing: ‘they ought to be in alignment’ – perhaps because
China does not have a “liberal character”?
U.S. is seen as likely to retain its predominant power advantage over other states both in the Indo-Pacific region and globally (p. 25-27)
Most important is simply how often the U.S. is referenced, particularly in relation to roles it might play in the Indo-Pacific region, throughout this document.
Emphasises Australia’s reliance/dependence on the U.S. in international relations
“responsibility” 3-4; 38-40 The term used to frame Australia’s perception of China’s ideal role in the Indo-Pacific region; playing a “great power” role, in effect, in protecting and safeguarding
the regional “status quo” of power relations. Not necessarily realistic?
- Consequently, the discourse effectively refuses to engage with the idea that China might not act in this way

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