A Reflection on the Larrañaga Case and the Rights to Life and Fair Trial

By Irvin Christian D. San Pedro of 3A

Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.

The discussion on this provision was brief in Larrañaga. The Human Rights Committee held that
since the Philippines has repealed the death penalty, the allegation of an Article 6 violation is already moot
and no longer needs a discussion. While I do agree with the Committee that the issue was moot then, I do
think that the right to life issue is an important discussion today. With President Duterte calling for the
Congress to reimpose the death penalty, and with the situation of distrust in our country’s judicial (and extra-
judicial) processes, there needs to be a discourse on the right to life. The Larrañaga case, while decided over
ten years ago, has been viral lately with the release of Rappler’s documentary on the case entitled “Give Up
Tomorrow,” which has garnered almost 3 million views in Youtube over the past two months. The discourse
on the right to life is essential not only in raising public awareness in the Duterte regime, but more importantly,
in light of the proposed new Constitution that is being drafted – and the Larrañaga case might just help further
this discourse. For me, the framers of the new Constitution have an opportunity to establish an absolute ban
on the death penalty, i.e. removing the power of Congress to impose death penalty on heinous crimes. This
is in recognition of the spirit behind the right to life, human dignity, which is inherent in every natural person,
including wrongdoers of every kind. While I admit that a Constitutional ban on the death penalty will be
difficult, given that it is contrary to the Duterte agenda, I still think the drafting of the new Constitution that is
taking place today is a rare opportunity for change that may not come again in the next few decades.

In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.

Upon reading the citations of the Committee, and why they held that the Philippines violated Article
14 of the ICCPR in the Larrañaga case, I was reminded of one of the fundamental principles of criminal law
and criminal procedure. In criminal cases, the accused is going up against the State: the powerful and
sovereign State. The accused is in a natural disadvantage. This is partly why there must be rights specifically
for the accused. He must be given a fair trial. He must be presumed innocent. This is also why his guilt must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt before he can be deprived of his liberty, or even life. This is also why in
the construction of penal laws, doubts must be resolved strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. Given these, I simply cannot help but disagree with the dissent of Committee Member Ms. Ruth
Wedgwood, who thinks that the Committee Majority erred in holding that the Philippines committed human
rights violations in Larrañaga. While I cannot fully discuss Wedgwood’s dissent here, I think that the actions
of the State, in this case the trial court judges who heard Larrañaga’s case, as well as the justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court reviewing the case, must be strictly construed against them. For
instance, I agree that there was a human right violation when the trial court refused to grant the newly
appointed counsel’s request for adjournment. Surely, he was unprepared to defend Larrañaga, being
appointed the day before the hearing. The dissent theorizes that the right to speedy trial of the co-accused
would be violated if the adjournment were granted. I disagree. To subject the accused to trial without
adequate preparation for defense for reasons beyond his control cannot be justified under the guise of the
right to speedy trial. The accused is only entitled to the right against undue delay, and in this case, it is due.