LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY.

EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

Survey of the Land

CARPO VS AYALA LAND
Petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title
4 with the RTC of Makati City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures
Corporation (APVC), and the RD of Las Piñas.

Carpos alleged that they were the owners of a 171,209sq.m. parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have titles over the properties covered
by their TCTs. They prayed for the cancellation of the TCT in Ayala’s possession and that they
be issued a writ of possession over the subject property. Petitioners later on amended the
complaint impleading Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) in lieu of Ayala Corp.

ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists, and that the areas covered by TCT do not overlap
with the Carpo’s claimed property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by the
Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Piñas Ventures, Inc. (LPVI)
which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation. (LPVI formed
part of ALI) ALI also alleged that TCT No. T-5333 traces back its title to OCT No. 242
issued in 1950 while the Carpos’ title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970.

ALI applied for a motion for summary judgment with the RTC which was denied. The denial
was challenged in a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA granted ALI’s petition and ordered
the RTC to render a summary judgment.

RTC rendered a Summary Judgment finding the Carpos’ title superior to that of ALI and
ruled”
A reading of the defendant's answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property
surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved
by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of
the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is
mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property
applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey
plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of
being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence.
Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of
the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic
Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734.

The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless
the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the
same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it
was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve
original survey plans. Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant
ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then
Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.

Additionally, aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly
appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date of survey was on July 28, 1930.
Plaintiffs' property covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January 4-6,
1927. This means that plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest had claimed ownership of the

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

property ahead of that of defendant ALI's predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior

registration cannot be applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot
anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is already a record of a prior survey
in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the survey plan has to be
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the
later survey in favor of Ayala's predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the
approval of the Director of Lands because had it been submitted for approval, the
records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same land
had already been made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Evidently, Ayala's claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs' cannot
therefore be sustained.

ALI filed an appeal with the CA but was dismissed due to non-payment of docket fees which
prompted the former to file a petition for review with the SC. SC found the case meritorious
and remanded the case to CA. CA reversed and set aside RTC’s ruling and held that TCT T-
5333 was valid and TCT No. 296463 was void. Hence, the instant petition for review filed by
Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo.

Issue:
1. Whose title (as to the conflicting ones) is superior and must be upheld
2. WON ALI’s title is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by the
Director of Lands;

Ruling: SC denies the petition and concurs with the CA that the decision of the RTC be
reversed and set aside. The defendant ALI did not deny the existence of a title in the name of
the plaintiffs instead it alleged that “the parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in
the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the property covered by ALI's TCT No. T-5333.
But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970,
long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALI's TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued
on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence,
ALI's TCT No. T-5333 is superior to TCT No. 296463.”

1. Ayala Land, Inc. "Primus Tempore, Portior Jure" (First in Time, Stronger in
Right) ALI's title was the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT. In
this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates
of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate
or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate
or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the
holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.”

2. Survey plan; presumption of regularity. To begin with, contrary to the trial court's
allusions thereto, there is no admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was
issued without a survey plan that was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on record to support the trial court's finding
that the survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950 land
registration proceedings was approved only by the Land Registration Commissioner
and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of
registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be assumed that
said requirement was complied with by ALI's original predecessor-in-interest at the
time the latter sought original registration of the subject property. Moreover, the land
registration court must be assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a
decree in favor of ALI's predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon which the law
has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. It is the party who seeks to overcome the
presumption who would have the burden to present adequate and convincing evidence to
the contrary. This, petitioners did not even attempt to do.

HWA PING VS AYALA LAND

Principle: The Rule – that between two conflicting titles, the title registered earlier prevails –
is not absolute.
Exception: If it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to
written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of titles to be
conclusive.

03/17/1921 Sps. Diaz submitted to GLRO for approval of Survey Plan (PSU-25909) for
the Director of Lands a survey plan located in 460, 626 sq.m.
Sitiio Kay Monica, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las
Pinas, Rizal covering Lot 1
05/26/1921 Director of Lands approved. PSU-25909
10/21/1925 Dominador Mayuga submitted another survey PSU-47035
plan covering Lot 3 of the same land located in
Sitio May Kokek, Barrio Almanza, Las Pinas,
Rizal
03/06/1931 Alberto Yaptinchay submitted another survey PSU-80886/ SWO-20609
plan covering Lot 2 and 3 of the same parcel of
Lot 2- 158, 494 sq.m.
land Lot 3- 171, 309 sq.m.
05/09/1950 Yaptinchay was issued OCT OCT No. 242 covering Lot 2
and 3
05/21/1958 Dominador Mayuga was issued OCT OCT No. 1609 covering Lot
3 from PSU-47035
05/28/1967 CPJ Corp. bought the properties from Mayuga OCT No. 242 (PSU-
and Yaptinchay 80886/SWO-20609)
OCT No. 1609 (PSU-47035)
02/16/1968 Diaz filed for original registration w/ CFI PSU-25909
Pasay on Lot 1 pursuant to his survey plan

05/21/1970 Subsequently got a favorable judgment from OCT No. 8510

CFI and was issued an OCT
05/17/1971 DIAZ CASE: CPJ Corp. filed a suit against OCT No. 8510
Diaz to review OCT No. 8510 alleging that the
sps committed fraud because interested
persons were not notified of their application
for registration

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

08/30/1976 Alberto Diaz sold to Librado Cabautan parcels

of land which were sourced from his OCT No.
8510
05/04/1980 ALI acquired properties from CPJ Corp. Lot 3; OCT 1609; PSU-
47035
Lot 2; OCT 242; PSU-
80886/SWO-20609
Lot 3; OCT 242; PSU-
80886/SWO-20609
Lot 6; OCT 242; PSU-
80886/SWO-20609
1994 Cabautan sold properties to Sps. Yu from the Lot 1-B (135,000 sq.m.) and
land he bought from Diaz Lot 1-A (half only with 67,
813 sq.m.)
08/1995 Sps Yu visited their lots and were shocked to
find that the lot was already fenced by ALI and
they were prevented from occupying. Sps.
Yu’s TCTs overlapped with properties of ALI
12/31/1995 Diaz case: RTC rendered decision against the
Diaz
-OCT 8510 is to be cancelled
-Sps. Diaz appealed to CA
12/4/1996 Yu Case: Sps Yu filed a complaint in RTC Las Sps Yu alleged that PSU-
Pinas against ALI. They declared that ALI’s 47035 and PSU-
titles should be declared null and void because 80886/SWO-20609 were
it overlapped with their property and that the copied from PSU-25909
Sps Yu’s predecessors-in-interest can trace
their titles back to 1921 (Diaz) then to 1994
(Cabatuan sold properties to them) as well as
judicial confirmation of title
RTC Las Pinas ruled in favor of Sps Yu PSU-47035 and PSU-
80886/SWO-20609 had
discrepancies. PSU-25909
had no irregularity. Titles of
ALI were void ab initio
because they were secured
ALI appealed to CA through fraudulent surveys
Diaz and Yu case was consolidated.
06/19/2003 CA: ruled in favor of ALI As the original titles of ALI
Diaz case: Sps Diaz committed fraud, cancel predated that of Sps Yu, the
OCT No. 8510 and the TCTs and that came CA concluded that the former
from it because the Sps Diaz allegedly knew of titles were superior.
CPJ Corp.’s interest over the property yet they
failed to stipulate it upon their application for
registration A/N: this decision followed
Yu Case: Sps YU can no longer assert the the General Rule on
titles because 1 year period to contest the title superiority of earlier titles
had prescribed therefore because ALI
possessed an earlier title, their title was
incontestable

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

ALI’s title from OCT 242 and 1609 were

issued to their predecessors-in-interest on 1950
and 1958 respectively while OCT 8510 was
issued only on 1970
Sps Yu and Diaz filed for a motion for
reconsideration. CA granted.
02/08/2005 CA: favored Sps Yu and Sps Diaz Registration done
Yu Case: PSU-47035 and PSU-80886/SWO- fraudulently is no registration
20609 were seriously erroneous. PSU-25909 at all prevails over the rules
bore all the hallmarks of verity on equity.

PSU-80886/SWO-20609 had defects: doubtful

signature of A.N. Feliciano (conducted the
survey for Diaz, Mayuga, Guico and
Yaptinchay) and there was even a
memorandum from the DENR Regional
Director of Operations not to issue copies of
technical descriptions of the said land

Diaz case: Sps Diaz had no obligation to

inform CPJ Corp. and its successors about their
registration because the original titles of the
latter were based on fraudulent surveys
ALI filed a motion for reconsideration.
CA granted ALI’s second MOR and reversed and set aside its 2005 Decision
and reverted to its 2003 decision.
The discrepancies in PSU-47035 and PSU-80886/SWO-20609 were
immaterial to assail the validity of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609 which were
registered earlier than OCT 8510.

SC:
 in favor of Sps Yu and Diaz
 The Court cannot close its eyes to the blatant defects on the surveys upon which the
original titles of ALI were derived simply because its titles were registered. To allow
these certificates of title in the registration books, even though these were sourced from
invalid surveys, would tarnish and damage the Torrens system of registration, rather
than uphold its integrity
 The Rule – that between two conflicting titles, the title registered earlier prevails – is
not absolute. Merely relying on the date of registration of the original titles is
insufficient because it is the surveys therein that are being assailed.
 Exception: If it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating
to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date
is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of
titles to be conclusive.
 Although a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein, it is not a
conclusive proof of ownership. Hence, the Court may inquire into the validity of the
ownership of a property by scrutinizing the movant's evidence of title and the basis of
such title. When there is compelling proof that there is doubt on the validity of the
sources or basis of such title, then an examination is proper. Thus, the surveys of the
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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

certificates of title are not immune from judicial scrutiny, in light of the genuine and
legitimate reasons for its analysis.
 In fine, the Court finds that there are numerous defects in Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and
Psu-80886/SWO-20609, which are all hallmarks of fraud, (to name a few).:
1. That A.N. Feliciano conducted all the surveys even though he should have known
that the earlier dated survey Psu-25909, already covered the same parcel of land;
2. That Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and Psu-25909 covered the same parcel of land and were
conducted by the same surveyor but each survey stated a different location;
3. That the photocopy of Psu-47035, as submitted by ALI, shows that it was done for a
certain Estanislao Mayuga but the certified true copy of Psu- 47035 depicted that it was
made for Dominador Mayuga;
4. That Psu-80886 did not contain the signature of then Director of Lands, Serafin P.
Hidalgo, and it is well-settled rule that no plan or survey may be admitted in land
registration proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands;
5. That the total area of the property covered by Psu-80886 contained many erasures,
which were not satisfactorily explained;
6. That there was a difference in the intensity of the lower right portion of Psu-80886
which showed that it may simply have been an attachment to the main document
Thus, the Court holds that plan PSU-25909 is a true copy of an official document on file
with the Bureau of Lands and is, therefore, entitled to great weight and appreciation,
there being no irregularity demonstrated in the preparation thereof.

5. Publication, Opposition of and Default

a. Notice of Initial Hearing
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS CA AND ABISTADO
Facts: On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under PD No. 1529. The application was
assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. However, during the
pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel,
Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado,
who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction."
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. It reasoned that
applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the
Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. It was only published in the Official Gazette but “The Court is of the well
considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for
want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.”

Private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition
to set aside the Decision.
 under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in
the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.”

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

 publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice
requirement of due process.

Private respondents:
 contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is a mere "procedural defect."
 publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction

CA
 reversed RTC’s ruling
 “although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law
also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court”
 We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them
in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette,
personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were
complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any
objection of the application for registration."

Issue: Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration
case mandatory or directory?

Ruling: Newspaper publication is mandatory. This answer is impelled by the demands of

statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. Court
finds for the petitioner.
 "shall"- denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute
 Republic vs. Marasigan: Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied
with "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have
stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in
the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties,
and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since
the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
 Land registration is a proceeding in rem. such proceeding requires constructive seizure
of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in
the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be
interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting
an application which they had no knowledge of.
 The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read
and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the
notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
 Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of
the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not
have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and
its rationale clear.
 Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. Application for land registration is
dismissed.

b. Proof Required in Registration Proceedings

REPUBLIC VS DELA PAZ
Facts: Respondents represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City
an application for registration of land, with an area of 25,825 square meters, under PD 1529
situated in Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Property land is described under an annotated
survey Plan Ccn-00-000084

Respondents submitted the following documents: (1) SPA showing that the respondents
authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan with the
annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, classified as alienable/disposable (3)
Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax
Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa
Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay (8) Certification that the subject lots are not
covered by any land patent or any public land application; and (9) Certification by the Office
of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has
been paid.

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property by virtue of Salaysay ng
Pagkakaloob executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz, who earlier
acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue
of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay.

OSG opposed. (based on the usual reasons)

RTC: granted respondent’s application for registration of the subject property.

CA: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: WON the evidence on record was sufficient to establish that the respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest have been in OCEAN possession and occupation of the land since June
12, 1945 under a bona fide claim of ownership in a concept of an owner

Ruling: No. In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that
the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945
or earlier.

(Regalian doctrine script)

Property classified as alienable and disposable. To support its contention that the land
subject of the application for registration is alienable, respondents presented an annotated
survey Plan Ccn-00-000084 prepared by a geodetic engineer. However, the Court held in

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

Republic vs Sarmiento that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print
copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center, is insufficient and
does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land
remains part of the inalienable public domain.

An applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. He must present (1) a
certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also (2) prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable,
and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must (3) present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. In the absence of proof, lands are classified as still part of public
domain.

OCEAN Possession and Occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Evidence submitted by
respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject property consists of the
testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), tenant of the adjacent lot. However, Jose
and Amado’s testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to
when respondents’ predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this
case. No clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro’s mode of acquisition of ownership
and that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of
possession required by law.

Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was
only in 1949 (earliest date of tax dec) that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation. (Tax dec script on being merely indicia of a claim of ownership)

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part
of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application
for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND LAPINA

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

Facts: On June 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348 as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristela Dazo Belen. At the time
of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

On February 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels
of land before the RTC of San Pablo City. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

The court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question.
On appeal, respondent court (CA) affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that both
applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former
owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could
not apply. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the
land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought
to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The High Court has
ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the
constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that
the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they
were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question.

OSG opposed. (of course) Petitioner submits:

 Private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties
before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. Even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that land of whatever classification
belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Before the issuance of the certificate
of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State. It is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for
confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

Ruling:
CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND ACT; CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE; REQUIREMENTS; POSSESSION IS TACKED TO THAT OF
APPLICANTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. It must be noted that with
respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
the law employs the terms "by themselves", the applicant himself or through his predecessor-
in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said
period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not
only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes
of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to
confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.

DOCTRINE THAT BEFORE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, THE OCCUPANT

IS NOT IN THE JURIDICAL SENSE THE TRUE OWNER OF THE LAND, ALREADY
ABANDONED. At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant
is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Suffice
it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva has already been abandoned in the 1986
case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court where the Court, through Chief
Justice Narvasa, declared that: "The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of
an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) '. . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . . .' No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth
be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already
affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish
it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.'

OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST 30 YEARS OF

ALIENABLE PUBLIC LAND IPSO JURE CONVERTS THE SAME TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY. — Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open,
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure
converts the same to private property. This means that occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land

PUBLIC LAND ACT; BUYCO RULING (216 SCRA 78 [1992]) NOT APPLICABLE TO
CASE AT BAR. — In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director
of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.

We disagree.

In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity
ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate
court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their
application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.

In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights
thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed
period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested
property, now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural born citizens
of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land,
it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of
a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of
Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to
prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the
subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

REPUBLIC VS ESPINOSA
Respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) filed with the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu an
application for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square meters
and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu.

In support of his application, Espinosa alleged that the land is alienable and disposable; (b) he
purchased the property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa on July 1970 and the latter's other
heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in
possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.

Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan to prove the identity of the land.
As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation
on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibañez, Chief of the Map Projection Section,
certified on June 1963, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area". Espinosa also
presented two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabel's name to prove that
she had been in possession of the property since 1965.

MTC
 granting Espinosa's petition for registration
 Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that he
complied with the requirements of Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529

Petitioner appealed to the CA.

 pointed Espinosa's failure to prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-
interest were for the period required by law.
 As shown by the tax dec, Isabel's possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June
12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48 (b) of the PLA. On the other hand,
Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale that
transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was
for the year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest
were supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential
absent proof that such possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 Espinosa failed to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy
thereof is fatal to his application

CA

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

 dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision

 possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it commenced after June
12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private.
 registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not necessarily the original
tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be established by
other competent evidence. As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be
established by other competent evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the
advance survey plan and technical description, containing and identifying the
boundaries, actual area and location of the lot, the presentation of the original tracing
cloth plan may be excused
 Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and disposable through the duly
approved Advance Survey Plan

Issue: Whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy
of confirmation and registration; should petitions for registration filed by those who had already
been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years
at the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their possession commenced
after June 12, 1945?

SC
 lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosa's application is anchored on
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48 (b) of the PLA however, SC
thinks otherwise
 Based on Espinosa's allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim
of an imperfect title over the property in question is based on Section 14 (2) and not
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48 (b) of the PLA
 Espinosa did not allege that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest
commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions.
On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession
and that of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty
(30) years, or through prescription
Section 48 (b) of the PLA (original) “possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
except as against the Government, since
July 26, 1894..”
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended “under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
Section 48 (b) of the PLA by providing a thirty ownership, for at least thirty years
(30)-year prescriptive period for judicial immediately preceding the filing of the
confirmation of imperfect title application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure.
P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the “under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
requirement for possession and occupation for ownership, since June 12, 1945.”
a period of thirty (30) years to possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. The requirement for possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier
was adopted under Section 14 (1) thereof.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | ATTY. EMMANUEL GIMARINO | GMM

 P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section
48 (b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove
possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested
rights may have been acquired under Section 48 (b) prior to its amendment by
P.D. No. 1073. Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48 (b) and claim an imperfect
title over a land on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be
demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947
and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073
 In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements
of Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on
supposed evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the
property for at least thirty (30) years prior to the time he filed his application. However,
there is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity
of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and
occupation of the property for thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax
declaration in Isabel's name was for the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25,
1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into
possession.
 Notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable
and disposable is not the positive government act that would remove the property from
the inalienable domain. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act
validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has
no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
 Therefore, even if Espinosa's application may not be dismissed due to his failure to
present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its
denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of
the identity and location of the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a
licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management
Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description
of the property which is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who conducted
the survey and the LMS of the DENR. However, while such blueprint copy of the
survey plan may be offered as evidence of the identity, location and the boundaries of
the property applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
alienability and disposability. (insert requirements from CENRO/PENRO)
 Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48 (b) of the PLA or Section 14
(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Applying Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 and Section 48 (b) of
the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the
property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and
disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529, Espinosa
failed to prove that the property is patrimonial.
 Petition granted. CA ruling is reversed and set aside.

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