Risk Based Flare Location

Study - A Case Study

Baijan Savalan – Senior Safety Engineer

TECHNIP, ABU DHABI

2015 HSED E-Seminar

 Table of contents

1. Safety Moment

2. Introduction To Topic

3. Case Study

4. Conclusion

5. Way Forward

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 Safety Moment - Tyre Safety and Suitability

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 Introduction

 Safe flare location is conventionally decided based on thermal

radiation and dispersion modelling of worst case flaring scenarios
consequence. However due to constraints in meeting large
separation distance/ stack height , risk based flare location study
was used to define safe location. This study was performed for an
offshore EPC Project.

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 Case Study – Offshore Complex

Facility

Flare Stacks

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 Simplified Scheme – Flare/Vent Gas Recovery

Zero flaring concept

Vent/Flare Header Compressed

Gas to GLC
suction Assist Gas –
Normally
Fuel Gas

Pressure Other Vent

Control
Valve
Streams, BDVs, VRU
PSVs 2 X 100%

Well
QOV
Fluid
Separator/s Flare KO
2X100%

Off-Gas
Off- GSU/
Gas Acid
GDU Gas
Sweet gas
GDU GSU to Fuel Gas
Conditioning
2X100% 1X100% and then to
Consumers

To Gas Lift
Wells & Gas
GLC –
1st &
GLC Injection
3rd &
2nd 4th Compressor
Stage stage

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 Flaring Scenarios - Assessed

Flaring Scenarios
 Emergency Flaring – Limiting for Radiation – No dispersion concern
 Start-up case – No radiation concern- No dispersion concern
 Operating upset (Vapor Recovery Unit Failure Case) – less flow (1% of
emergency/design flow) and very high H2S content 29% - Limiting scenario
for flare location.

 Flare design is a single tip (HP tip)

 No normal flaring

Specific Case - Flare flameout toxic dispersion is limiting

case for flare location

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 The Concern…

Worst Case - Toxic Dispersion - PHAST

AWD

WD

GTP RP SP UTP AP
MD

CD

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 Possible Mitigations

 Relocate the flare stack – 750m from nearest process platform –

Not feasible at EPC..!
 Elevate the Flare to reduce impact on nearest platform
 Stack is already 70m MSL
 Further increase means
 Cost & Schedule impact
 Installation/ constructability issues
 Maintenance/ Tip handling issues

Conventional approach resulted in infeasible solution for

flare location

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 The Solution..

 It was decided to apply risk based approach to determine flare

location

 Perform the flame-out dispersion using CFD for worst case

 Perform FMEA Workshop & fault-tree analysis to arrive at

likelihood of event

 Compare the risk using client risk matrix – using likelihood and
consequence

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 Fault Tree Inputs

Flare System Design

 Redundant flares (duty & standby)
 Redundant pilots (6 pilots per flare tip)
 Continuously lit pilots (three)
 Redundant ignition systems – High energy +
continuous sparking
 Redundant pilot gas supplies
 SIL 2 PLC for Flare Package
 Redundant thermocouples per pilot (2+2 spares)
 Redundant electrical power supply to ignition
systems
 2 electrical feeders
 EDG supply
 Independent UPS supply to each feeder
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 Results – Fault Tree Analysis

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 CFD Dispersion Results

Results indicated H2S exposure to around 24-35 ppm at 2 m/s and <5 ppm at 5 m/s.

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 Conclusion

 Overall likelihood of event 3.6x10-5 /yr

 Low consequence of flameout event.

 Based on clients risk matrix - low risk

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 Way Forward..

 For facility handling sour gas i.e. high H2S content – potentially
large separation distance may be required to satisfy toxic
exposure criteria during flame-out conditions.

 Use of risk based approach may be advisable to predict feasible

separation distances for flare.

 For such system, in terms of design

 Recommended to have redundancy in pilots and ignition
system
 Reliable pilot gas system
 Pilot gas back-up system.

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Thank you

www.technip.com