Foreign Policy

Theories, Actors, Cases

Edited by

Steve Smith
Amelia Hadfield
Tim Dunne

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New actors, new
foreign policy: EU
and enlargement
L IS B E T H A G G E S T A M

Chapter contents
Introduction 465

EU foreign policy 467

The Big Bang enlargement 469

Beyond enlargement: EU foreign policy in the neighbourhood 479

Conclusion: The transformative power of the EU 481

Reader's guide
The foreign policy of the European Union (EU) challenges many of the assumptions
of traditional foreign policy analysis in terms of actorness and power. The EU is not a
state and its foreign policy is closely connected to the exercise of soft power. In this
sense, the EU represents a new kind of actor in world politics and signifies a deeper
transformation of foreign policy in Europe. The EU has had a profound influence on
the reshaping of European order after the end of the Cold W ar by extending EU
membership to an ever-increasing number of countries. Therefore EU enlargement
is widely seen as the most important foreign policy instrument of the EU. This chap­
ter examines a decision with far-reaching implications for European international
relations, namely the 'Big Bang' enlargement of the EU, which involved its expansion
from fifteen to twenty-seven members between 2004 and 2007. It is an interesting
case for examining the complexity of the EU as an international actor. It highlights the
significance of European norms in reshaping member states' interests and the supra­
national role of the European Commission in framing and implementing the deci­
sion to enlarge the EU. However, despite the successful outcome of enlargement of
the EU in 2004 and 2007, this powerful instrument of EU foreign policy may be less
available in the future. Therefore this chapter ends by looking at EU foreign policy
beyond enlargement and asks whether the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
represents an alternative.
464 L ISB E TH A G G EST A M

Introduction

The reshaping of Europe since the end of the Cold W ar in 1989 is not the result of the concert­
like m achination of a fe w dom inant great powers. One o f the novel features o f the emerging
European order is the role played by the EU, not through the projection of hard power, but
through the power of attraction. By offering the prospect of EU m embership, the EU has been
able to fundam entally shape the norms of domestic and international behaviour to ensure
peace and stability in Europe. The EU represents a new kind of actor in world politics and
signifies a transform ation of foreign policy in Europe. Given that the EU is not a state, it ¡soften
referred to as a new 'sui generis’ (unique) actor. However, the precise characteristics of the EU
as a power are contested (M anners 2002; Hyde-Price 2006; Sjursen 2006a; Aggestam 2008;
Toje 2011).
This chapter exam ines the historic decision to enlarge the EU in 2004 and 2007. En­
largem ent is an interesting case study o f EU foreign policy, as it is w id ely considered to be
the m ost powerful instrum ent that the EU has at its disposal (Sedelm eier 2010; Smith
2004). The fifth enlargem ent w as the biggest ever, w ith the entry o f ten new m em bers in
2004 and a fu rth e r tw o jo in in g in 2007 (see Map 24.1). Hence, it is known as the Big Bang
enlargem ent. How ever, the decision to enlarge was not a given from the start and dem ­
onstrates the co m p lexity o f the EU as a foreign p o licy actor. W hat is interesting is that
w h ile in itially m em ber states w ere deeply divided (Sjursen 2006a), in the end they reached
a consensus that a Big Bang enlargem ent w as the best outcom e to ensure peace and sta­
bility in Europe. This raises a num ber of pertinent questions: W h at m otivated this deci­
sion? W ere decision m akers swayed by norm ative considerations based on European
identity and values, or by geostrategic calcu lation s and m aterial interests? H ow signifi­
cant w ere p articu lar individuals, institutions, and governm ents in the decision-m aking
process?
Three of the largest EU m em b e rs-B ritain , France and G e rm an y-h e ld distinctively differ­
ent view s on enlargem ent regarding its im plications for their own national interests, shifts
to the existing balance of power w ithin the EU, the im pact on the functioning o f EU institu­
tions, and the future of the integration process (Aggestam 2004). Reunified G erm any quickly
emerged as a strong proponent o f a sim ultaneous w idening and deepening of the process
of European integration. France, on the other hand, w hilst not rejecting enlargem ent perse,
stressed the im portance of ensuring that enlargem ent did not threaten further integration
towards the political project of a Europe puissance ('European power'). Britain, in turn,
viewed the prospect of enlargem ent as an opportunity to put a brake on the deepening
process o f European integration to ensure the em ergence o f a looser and more flexible
union.
Significantly, w h ile all three governm ents held strong view s on enlargem ent, rooted in
th eir own vision of a future European security architectu re, they chose to m ultilateralize
th eir policies through the EU. They agreed to delegate substantial powers to the Euro­
pean C o m m ission, allo w ing it to set the agenda, fram e the issues, and im plem ent deci­
sions on this controversial topic. In fact, the Com m ission cam e to exercise a policy-m aking
role far beyond that usually associated w ith the bu reau cratic apparatus o f an interna­
tional organization and ended up playing a leading role in the p o licy process. Thus the
 C H A P T E R 24 N E W A C T O R S , N E W F O R E IG N P O l i C Y ; Ell A N D EN
465

decision to enlarge the EU cannot be understood m erely as a result o f intergovernm ental

bargaining betw een m em ber states, o r sim p ly as a result o f supranational leadership of
the po licy process. H ence this case focuses on both o f these levels in the decision-m aking
process.
The chapter ends by considering w hether the decision for a Big Bang enlargement sets a
precedent for the future. In other words, w ill the EU continue to rely on the instrument of
enlargem ent to achieve influence in foreign policy? The queue for EU m em bership remains
long. Several countries have declared their am bitions to become EU m embers in the future.
Croatia has completed its accession negotiations with the EU and is set to become the 28th
m em ber in 2013. However, there is considerable evidence suggesting that future decisions on
EU enlargem ent w ill be harder to achieve. Hence this chapter will conclude with an analysis
o f the EU's attempt to develop alternative foreign policy instruments to exert influence in
w ider Europe.
466 L I S B E T H A G G EST A M

EU foreign policy

The European Union is often regarded as a sui generis actor in the international system be­
cause it does not fit traditional conceptions of foreign policy, power, and agency in the inter­
national system. This problem of how to conceptualize the EU as an actor has generated
considerable academ ic interest (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Dunne 2008; Bickerton 2011;
Hill and Smith 2011; Thom as 2011) with some making the case that Foreign Policy Analysis in
Europe demands a more distinct, less Am erican-oriented approach (M anners and W hitm an
2000; Larsen 2009). EU foreign policy, particularly on enlargement, challenges traditional
mainstream conceptions of the inside-outside o f foreign policy, the nature of foreign policy
actorness, and the relevance of ideational versus m aterialist power.
To begin with, foreign policy is normally seen as the exclusive prerogative of states, yet the EU
has explicitly made claims since the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 to a common (as opposed to a sin­
gle) European foreign and security policy (CFSP). EU member states still pursue national foreign
policies, but nevertheless have made far-reaching commitments to coordinate their policies
through common institutional structures at the European level that go beyond established forms
of foreign policy cooperation (Wong and Hill 2011). The Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009, significantly
strengthens the institutional framework of European foreign policy making (see Box 24.1).

box 24.1

A major part of the Lisbon Treaty is devoted to reforming EU foreign policy to increase its international
coherence and effectiveness. Some of these reforms are as follows.

• External action The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and EU external relations (enlarge­
ment, developm ent, trade) are drawn closer together by abolishing the previous pillar structure of
the Union. This is to ensure a more effective working relationship between the Council and the
Commission.
• Legal personality The Union can sign treaties and international agreem ents-a clear example of the
new kind of actorness that the EU represents in world politics.

• President of the European Council This post was created to provide a more singular external repre­
sentation of the European Council on the international stage. As such, the President can act on behalf
of heads of state and governments of EU member states in the international arena.
• High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy This is the hub oi
EU foreign policy making to ensure greater harmonization between national foreign policies. The role
also includes the post as Vice President of the Commission to achieve greater consistency between var­
ious external policies. However, there still remains a European Commissioner in charge of EU enlarge­
ment policy and the ENP.

• European External Action Service (EEAS) The Lisbon Treaty gives birth to an embryonic European dip
lomatic corps to assist the High Representative and to streamline EU external services. Officials are
drawn from the Council, the Commission, and diplomats seconded from EU member states.
• Solidarity and mutual assistance There are clauses in the Lisbon Treaty that call on EU member states-
to aid each other in the case of armed aggression, terrorist attacks, and major disasters. Importantly, it ,
is left to member states to decide what kind of assistance will be provided. This is an important adden­
dum for those states which still claim to be non-aligned.
For a more detailed overview of the Lisbon Treaty reforms, see Whitman and Juncos (2009).
 C H A P T E R 24 N E W A C T O R S , N E W

The Lisbon Treaty aims to provide the EU with greater coherence as an international actor.
Although the Lisbon Treaty form ally dissolves the pillar structure of the Union, the different
fields of policy making remain distinctive in terms of supranational and intergovernmental
procedures. In the areas of external econom ic relations, such as trade, aid, and enlargement
policy, mem ber states have delegated significant functions to the European Com mission (EC),
the European Parliament (EP), and the European Court o fjustice (ECJ). However, foreign affairs
and security policy remain essentially intergovernmental. EU m em ber states have committed
themselves to speaking with 'one voice'on a range of foreign policy issues, for instance on the
Middle East peace process, and at international institutions like the UN General Assembly.
O ver the last decade, the EU has also developed a Com mon Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP). In Decem ber 2003, mem ber states agreed a European Security Strategy (ESS), which
has given a further fillip to the long-running debate on how best to conceptualize the EU, and
whether the concept of 'civilian power' is still relevant. The EU has dispatched a number of
civilian and m ilitary CSDP missions around the world to undertake peacekeeping, crisis m an­
agement, and humanitarian operations. Nonetheless, despite these advances in European
integration, it is im portant to acknowledge that EU foreign policy continues to suffer from
divisions on many levels of policy making that undermine the am bition to speak with one
voice. The EU's response to the Arab Spring and the Libyan crisis in 2011 is a testim ony of that.
EU enlargement involves all the EU's policy areas and has a strong elem ent of constitutive
policy in the sense that it profoundly affects the EU's core structures, policies, budget, and
decision-m aking processes. Externally, enlargement has major im plications for the Union's
global presence, expanding its network of international interests and generating heightened
expectations about the EU's future responsibilities for international peace, security, and
prosperity.
EU enlargem ent raises im portant questions about the nature of power in the contem po­
rary international system. It can be viewed as an attempt to extend the post-war West Euro­
pean 'security com m unity' (Deutsch 1957). As early as the 1970s, François Duchêne (1973)
argued that the then EC represented a new form of international actor, w hich he designated
a 'civilian power'. Drawing on liberal notions of econom ic interdependence and the dom esti­
cation of international politics through the observance of comm on rules, he argued that the
emerging European civilian power could tame anarchy and facilitate the peaceful resolution
of disputes in ways that traditional m ilitary powers could not.
The concept of civilian power has provided the starting-point for other analysts w ho have
argued that the EU is a distinctive international actor because it 'exercises influence and
shapes its environm ent through w hat it is, rather than through w hat it does' (M aull 2005:778)
(on normative power, see M anners 2002). In contrast with previous hegemons and empires,
who have sought to promote their own values and project a favourable image of themselves
on the basis of their hard power, the EU, it is argued, has been able to reshape post Cold W ar
European order through the power of attraction and magnetism as a civilian power. Much of
the EU's power derives from its norm ative appeal as the institutional em bodim ent of peace
and reconciliation, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, liberty, and solidarity-
all of w hich are part of the treaties and agreements that make up the acquis communautaire.
However, the EU's conditionality clauses that underpin the accession process can im ply an
element of coercion that should not be overlooked (Vachudova 2005; Epstein and Sedel-
meier 2009). It involves a degree of interference in the dom estic affairs of candidate countries
468 L ISB E TH A G G EST A M

that sits uneasily with traditional principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of sov­
ereign states. Above all, it demonstrates a new kind of foreign policy in w hich the domestic
and international dom ains increasingly overlap.

The Big Bang enlargement

The decision to enlarge the EU with a large num ber of new members is an interesting case
study, as it demonstrates the com plexity and multi-faceted nature of EU foreign policy mak­
ing. Although the governments of EU mem ber states w ere crucial in the decision-m aking
process, the case also reveals the critical role played by new institutional actors, such as the
European Com mission and the presidency of the EU. The case also demonstrates how inter­
linked material and ideational factors are in explaining EU enlargem ent. Material interests,
security, and geopolitical considerations w ere clearly at play, as well as conform ity to norms,
rules, and identities. In this sense, it could be argued that both a rationalist and constructivist
foreign policy analysis would be able to provide convincing, if rivalling, explanations of EU
enlargem ent. The following analysis w ill show the interplay of these factors in four phases of
the process that eventually led to the decision to enlarge the European Union with twelve
new members.

The key dilemma: widening versus deepening European integration

Despite the intoxicating mood of euphoria that accom panied the end of the Cold War, the
new democracies' call for a 'return to Europe' was not reciprocated w ith im mediate enthusi­
asm by the EU. Instead, EU m em ber states seemed disoriented by the speed of change as
com m unist regimes fell like skittles, the W arsaw Pact dissolved, the Baltic states broke from
the Soviet Union, Germ any reunified, Yugoslavia descended into war and conflict, an d -m o st
dram atically of all—the USSR ceased to exist. W ith no blueprint to go by, governments in
Western Europe reacted in an ad hoc and piecemeal manner, often returning to traditional
national foreign policy roles and visions of Europe (N iblett and W allace 2001).
Yet at the same tim e, the early 1990s w ere marked by great strides forward in the process
of European integration, w hich in m any respects constituted the high tide of supranational-
ism: the internal market was completed by 1992, and in the same year the M aastricht Treaty
establishing the European Union and setting out the tim etable for m onetary union was nego­
tiated. This reflected a w idely held view -un d erw ritten by a powerful constituency consisting
of the Com m ission, France, and G erm an y-th at w idening should not be at the expense of
deepening. Indeed, a deepening of the European integration process was considered crucial
to the creation of a stabilizing core for post Cold W ar Europe. Above all, deepening addressed
a central concern of the French, w hich was to anchor a reunified Germ any firm ly within a
more integrated European structure. French decision makers w ere determined to consolidate
their institutionalized partnership with Germ any prior to any enlargement of the Union, fear­
ing that Germany's geopolitical interests would push its governm ent to develop close part­
nerships with its neighbours in Mitteleuropa. In this way, French decision makers hoped that,
in cooperation w ith their Germ an counterparts, they would provide strategic leadership for
Europe and constitute its core within a Europe defined by 'concentric circles' of integration.
 C H A P T E R 24 N E W A C T O R S , N E W !
469

The idea o f a European confederation transcended the contradiction between deepening

and widening, thereby com bining Petite Europe and Grande Europe within a single overarch­
ing fram ework (M itterrand 1991). Although enlargement was seen by French policy makers
as a distant prospect, they did not deny that it was a long-term historical responsibility and
political necessity. But they insisted that enlargement could not be done on the 'cheap' as this
would threaten the acquis and thus the effective decision making of the Union, thereby un­
derm ining its capacity to act as a stabilizing core of the new Europe. There was pronounced
fear in Paris that enlargement would dilute the Union into a loosely articulated 'European
space’. Hence mem bership of the European Union was not deemed to be im mediately acces­
sible for everyone and could only take place after candidate states had accepted all the clauses
of the Maastricht Treaty (Aggestam 2004:174).
The idea of concentric circles becam e firm ly established in the European Com mission, with
the Com mission President Jacques Delors, a form er French socialist colleague of Mitterrand,
adding texture and detail to Mitterrand's rather abstract conception of a European Confed­
eration. The Com mission, perceiving itself to be the institutional guardian of the 'idea of Eu­
rope', also adopted the position that widening must not be at the expense of deepening'. An
integrated EU, it was argued, would be at the centre of the new Europe, followed by a ring of
prosperous and small m em bers of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The Central
and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) would occupy the next ring, linked by Europe associa­
tion agreements, w hile a looser ring would include the Soviet Union. These concentric circles
would allow the Com m unity to proceed with econom ic and political integration in the core,
w hile strengthening its relations with its European neighbours w ithout offering them im m e­
diate mem bership of the EU (Smith 2005:273).
W hile France did not have vital national interests in Central and Eastern Europe, Ger-
m a n y -a country situated at the heart of Europe and therefore bordering directly onto a
num ber of countries in the post-com m unist East-w as acutely affected by the end o f Cold
W ar bipolarity. For Germ an decision m akers-fo llo w in g their rapid absorption of East Ger-
m an y-b o th the deepening and the w idening o f the EU w ere seen as central foreign policy
objectives, providing the solution to the dilem m as o f their M ittellage ('central geographical
location’). Therefore w idening of the EU and deepening of the integration process w ere seen
as com plim entary processes rather than 'either-or' choices. Thus the German governm ent
quickly emerged as a leading proponent of'deepening’ (to address fears about reunited G er­
many's new-found sovereignty), as well as an advocate of enlargem ent of the Union to the
east. The pream ble o f the Germ an Constitution com m its the Federal Republic to the goal of
building a peaceful and stable European order. Germany's 'politics o f responsibility' co in ­
cided with its national econom ic and strategic interests in stabilizing its eastern neighbours.
This notion of 'stability transfer' was designed to serve Germ an national interests by sur­
rounding it with allies and partners, and drew on Germany's own experience o f post-war
l/l/estbindung.Thecom m itm entof Germ an decision makers to EU enlargem ent was based on
the belief that if 'we do not export stability now, w e w ill be subject to instability sooner or
later' (Ruhe 1994: 7). However, Germany's national interests led them to advocate a limited
round of enlargem ent, prim arily focused on the 'Visegrad' countries (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) to its im mediate east.
In contrast with Germany, the UK did not have any direct and im mediate interests at stake
in Eastern Europe beyond that of the geopolitical stability of post Cold W ar Europe.
470 L IS B E T H A G G E S T A M

Nonetheless, the British governm ent quickly emerged as a cham pion of an early enlargement
of the EU, an organization it valued above all for its role in creating a continental free-trade
m arket. From the perspective of the British governm ent, the choice of widening and deepen­
ing presented no dilem m a whatsoever. On the contrary, the British governm ent under John
M ajor explicitly argued that enlargem ent should take priority over deepening, because any
further deepening of European integration would make it m ore difficult for the CEECs to jo in .
Indeed, enlargem ent was welcom ed by the British governm ent as a means o f watering down
the federalist impulses o f some EU mem ber states and making the Union more flexible. Thus
the British governm ent saw the end of the Cold W ar as providing a w indow of opportunity for
cham pioning a new course for the E U -o n e that w ould embody a distinctly British vision of a
wider, more outward-looking Union (Aggestam 2004:127).
The lack of a coherent message from EU m em ber states because of competing foreign policy
perspectives, along with the perception that enlargement was notan immediate priority for the
EU given the focus on implementing the Maastricht Treaty, was deeply disappointing for the
new democracies from the post-communist East (Hyde-Price 1996). The CEECs had hoped that
their aspirations to jo in the EU would be met with the same com m itm ent and decisiveness that
characterized the negotiations leading to membership for the post-authoritarian regimes of
Greece, Portugal and Spain, where the criteria for membership had clearly been formulated in
terms of political considerations to consolidate dem ocracy and stability in these countries (the
democratic peace argument). However, the scale and complexity of the challenge presented by
future m embership of the new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe led the EU to
spell out explicitly and in considerable detail its expectations of the aspirant countries. The
first step consisted in detailed negotiations leading to so-called Europe Agreements covering a
range of economic and political policies.
The w hole idea o f concentric circles collapsed under the pressure of events that followed.
The EFTA countries quickly swallowed their reservations about sovereignty and sought greater
influence by becoming full m embers o f the EU. Consequently, in January 1995, Austria, Fin­
land, and Sweden joined the EU, w hich welcom ed them with open arms as stable dem ocra­
cies and net contributors to the EU budget. However, the eastern enlargem ent of the EU
would impose substantial new costs on the Union's budget, a prospect that few member
states relished. Nonetheless, as the Balkans descended into w ar and conflict, m any EU mem­
bers recognized the im plicit connection between enlargement and security. In order not to
compound the disappointm ent felt in the CEECs by the tardy pace of their 'return to Europe1,
EU m em ber states recognized that they had to send a clear political signal to the CEEC that
their future m em bership o f the Union was firm ly on the EU agenda.

Deciding on the membership criteria

For the new dem ocracies o f Central and Eastern Europe, 'returning to Europe', by which
was m eant jo in in g the EU, was th eir principal foreign policy objective. The transform ation
of th eir m oribund political, econo m ic, and social systems after the collapse of com m u­
nism was e xp licitly fram ed in term s of th eir co m m itm ent to core European values. In so
doing, they hoped to use a form o f moral leverage to make it m ore difficult fo r the West
Europeans to avoid m aking a firm co m m itm ent on EU m em bership (H yde-Price 1996;
S chim m elfennig 2003).
 C H A P T E R 24 N E W A C T O R S , N E W F O R E I G N P O L I C Y - EU A N D {'MS '

Therefore the EU faced a difficult balancing act: on the one hand providing the necessary
incentives for painful transform ation o f post-com m unist polities and econom ies, and on
the other avoiding deepening the sense of frustration and disappointm ent that was already
emerging in CEECs. Against the backdrop o f continuing conflict in the Balkans, and in order
to enhance the EU's pow er of attraction in the post-com m unist East, it becam e clear that the
EU needed to send out, if not a precise tim etable for m em bership, a clear political signal that
enlargem ent was on the agenda.
W ith these considerations in mind, the Com mission proposed to the European Council
meeting in Copenhagen in 1993 that a clear m em bership com m itm ent be made to signato­
ries of Europe Agreements. This, it was argued, w ould boost the reform process in the CEECs,
thereby contributing to the peace and security of Europe. Consequently, at Copenhagen, the
Union specified three key conditions for future m em bership: (i) applicants had to be dem oc­
racies with (ii) functioning market economies w hich could compete in the single m arket, and
(iii) they had to have the ability to take on all the obligations of m em bership including the
adherence to the aims of political, econom ic, and m onetary union (the acquis). These 'Copen­
hagen' criteria w ere not novel in themselves, but this was the first tim e they had been adum ­
brated so explicitly. Their intention was to ensure that w idening and deepening would be
pursued in parallel (European Council 1993:13).
The Copenhagen criteria w ere initially directed at the six countries that had already con­
cluded, or w ere currently negotiating, Europe agreements (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). However, alm ost before the ink was dry on the
Copenhagen docum ent, new aspirants for mem bership w ere queuing at the EU's doors,
spurred on by further tectonic shifts in the European political and security landscape. Conse­
quently, within a year of the Copenhagen Council meeting, both Malta and the Republic of
Cyprus (who had already applied for m em bership in 1990) w ere recognized as applicants,
and four newly independent co untries-Esto nia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slo venia-w ere able to
begin negotiations for Europe agreements, thereb yjo ining the queue for future membership.
(See Box 24.2.)
The inclusion of two M editerranean 'orphans', Cyprus and Malta, amongst the applicant
countries was politically significant, and reflected concerns about the shifting balance of in­
fluence between EU m em ber states-above all, France and Germany. France and the other
southern European EU m em ber states bordering the M editerranean w ere worried that the
opening to the CEECs would shift the EU's interests and concerns northwards and eastwards,
thereby enhancing the geopolitical weight o f united Germany. The launch o f the 'Barcelona
process' was one response to this; the other was the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta in acces­
sion negotiations. The negotiation o f Europe Agreements with the three Baltic states and
Slovenia was also a setback for the Germ an governm ent, w hich tended to favour a more
limited enlargem ent involving the Visegrad countries of East Central Europe, thereby stabiliz­
ing the Federal Republic's im mediate neighbourhood. W hilst this was disappointing to the
Visegrad states, w ho had otherwise hoped for early m embership, it reflected a suspicion that
once Germany's direct interests had been satisfied, the drive for further enlargem ent would
weaken.
As political m omentum for a large enlargement grew, so did French concerns that this
would entail serious financial costs and prevent the further deepening of the integration
project. W orries that the acquis communautaire would gradually be watered down, given the
472 LIS B E T H A G G E S T A M

BOX 24.2
and accession

Association/Europe agreement Application Accession

Bulgaria 1993 1995 2007

Cyprus 1972 1990 2004

Czech Republic 1993 1996 2004

Estonia 1995 1995 2004

Hungaiy 1991 1994 2004

Latvia 1995 1995 2004

Lithuania 1995 1995 2004

Malta 1971 1990 2004

Poland 1991 1994 2004

Romania 1993 1995 2007

Slovakia 1993 1995 2004

Slovenia 1996 1996 2004

pressures o f absorbing a large group of new members, and that the EU would revert to little
m ore than a free-trade area with weak decision-m aking capabilities led French officials to
underline the im portance of institutional change to meet the dem ands of enlargement. In the
face of perceived British intransigence on deepening the integration process, the French
began to advocate 'reinforced cooperation', w hich would allow those m em ber states who
could and wished to move ahead w ith further integration to do so. In addition, the French
successfully persuaded other m embers to agree a list of progress and convergence criteria as
a means of objectively measuring how ready a country was to take on the responsibilities and
com m itm ents o f EU mem bership.

Not such a 'soft power': applying political conditionality

To the dism ay of applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the Copenhagen crite­
ria proved far from being vaguely form ulated conditions that could be quickly and painlessly
m et. On the contrary, the European Com m ission took the task of specifying their intentions
very seriously and ended up producingthousands of pages o f legislation for the candidates to
im plem ent and proposing some very detailed institutional changes. Potential jo iners have to
show that they have the adm inistrative capacity to apply EU rules properly and the political
w ill to do so (Grabbe 2006). (See Box 24.3.)
 C H A P T E R 24 N E W A C T O R S , N E W F O R E I G N Pi 46nt

Prospective members submit applications to the EU Council of Ministers, The European Commission
thereafter evaluates and makes a formal opinion on candidates, A unanimous Council decision is required
to start accession negotiations. The first phase of accession negotiations is conducted by the Commission,
and involves a detailed scrutiny of the candidates' ability to apply to the acquis and identifies controversial
issues for negotiations. On the basis of a common position adopted by the Council and the Commission,
the Council Presidency conducts bilateral accession negotiations. To endorse the accession treaties,
a favourable decision has to be taken by the Council (unanimity), the Commission, and the European
Parliament (simple majority). Finally, the accession treaties need to be ratified by applicants and EU
member states (Sedelmeier 2005a: 404).

W hat political conditionality m eant in practice was that the Com mission was able to exert
powerful pressure on candidates to undertake a host of legal and institutional changes, affect­
ing a broad range of issues from their m acro-econom ic policies to their treatm ent of m inori­
ties and jud icial refo rm s-in m any ways extending beyond the rem it of the acquis itself. The
Com mission was also not adverse to singling out good performers and shaming the laggards.
This demonstrated that the EU was not just a toothless 'soft power1, but w illing and able to use
power coercively by threatening to withhold the carrot of future mem bership. In this way, the
EU actively used political conditionality to influence applicant countries. This went beyond
m erely enforcing the acquis, and included strong criticism of dom estic political processes and
outcomes. For example, during negotiations on the Pact for Stability (a multilateral negotiat­
ing fram ework designed to address potential causes o f conflict and insecurity which the EU
sponsored between May 1994 and M arch 1995), the CEECs w ere urged to conclude 'good
neighbourly' agreements with each other on borders and treatm ent of minorities (Smith
2005: 279). The EU exerted direct pressure on Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia to resolve
disputes over Hungarian m inorities, and on the Baltic states to im prove their treatm ent of
their Russian minorities.
From the start, the Com m ission w as tasked w ith the critical role o f evaluating each
m em bership application to see how w ell app licant countries perform ed in fu lfilling the
Copenhagen conditions, w hich was the pre-condition fo r starting m em bership negotia­
tions. Each application was to be judged on its own m erits, thereb y differentiating b e ­
tw een applicant countries and providing an additional spur to progress by the laggards.
H owever, differentiation created a new political dilem m a between inclusion and exclusion
dilem m a. Rejecting or delaying an app lication could have destablizing effects on the co u n ­
try concerned, isolating it from the benefits o f EU m em bership and paradoxically insulat­
ing it from further EU pressure. Countries w hose application was rejected or delayed might
becom e alienated from the EU, thereby reducing the Com m ission's leverage on that state,
and underm ining the grand strategy of using enlargem ent to project peace and security
into the post-com m unist East.
The inclusion-exclusion dilem m a increasingly came to haunt EU deliberations. Debates
over the im plications of the Commission's strategy of differentiating between applicant coun­
tries eventually led EU m em ber states to opt for an inclusive accession process and open
negotiations with all the applicants (Smith 2005).
474 U S B E T H AGGESTAM

By the late 1990s, significant m om entum had built up behind the enlargem ent process.
This in turn led to a shift in the terms of the debate on the w idening versus deepening d i­
lem m a. An Intergovernm ental Conference (IG C) w as held in 1996-1997 aim ed at reforming
the EU treaties and thus preparing the Union for enlargem ent, principally by expanding the
use of qualified m ajority voting and stream lining the EU's institutions. The IGC negotiations
witnessed renewed skirm ishing over the future of European integration, with France and
G erm any seeking to exercise their traditional leadership role and insisting that w idening and
deepening must go hand in hand. If not, they threatened, they might be tempted to move
ahead independently in order to establish a core Europe. However, by the tim e the IGC
concluded in Am sterdam , a pragm atic com prom ise had emerged w hich left key unresolved
issues for the subsequent IGC. This com prom ise was im portant because it signalled that the
enlargem ent process was now irreversible and unstoppable. For the tim e being, it seemed,
widening was to take precedence over deepening, thereby reinforcing the m om entum that
was building behind the enlargem ent bandwagon. (See Box 24.4.)
A m onth after the IGC concluded in Am sterdam , the European Com m ission published
its opinions on the m em bership applications. In a w ide-ranging report entitled 'Agenda
2000’, the Com m ission recom m ended that m em bership negotiations be opened w ith only
six countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Although
no candidate country m et all the m em bership conditions, it was argued that these six
states cam e closest to doing so. The other five CEECs w ere too far behind in the reform
processes; in particular, Slovakia was singled out as the only country w hich did not meet
the required political conditions. For exam ple, throughout V lad im ir Meciar's term in office
in Slovakia (1 992-1998) the EU had issued num erous w arnings that Slovakia must develop
m ore robust and transparent d em ocratic norm s before it could jo in the EU. The decision
to include Estonia and Slovenia alongside G erm any's regional neighbours in the Visegrad
group was influenced by NATO’s decision in June 1997 to offer m em bership to these three
countries alone; the EU w ished to signal that enlargem ent w ould extend beyond East C en ­
tral Europe. Consequently, in D ecem ber 1997 the Luxem bourg European Council endorsed

box 24.4

The criteria for EU membership have been defined in a number of Treaty texts and declarations.
th e tr ea ty o f rom e 1957 'Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community' (Article 237).

th e Co p e n h a g e n E u r o p e a n c o u n c i l 1 9 9 3 A functioning market economy with the capacity to cope with

competitive pressures and market forces inside the EU; stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; and the ability to take on the
obligations of EU membership including adherence to the aims of economic and political union (the acquis).

th e Am ster d a m t r e a t y 1 9 9 9 Any European state that respects the principles of liberty, democracy,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, may apply to become a member
of the Union (Articles 5 and 49).

th e H e l s in k i Eu r o p e a n c o u n c ii 1 9 9 9 Candidate countries must demonstrate'good-neighbourliness'by

resolving outstanding border disputes peacefully, if necessary through arbitration by the International ^
Court of Justice.
 C H A P T E R 2 4 N E W A C T O R S , N E W F O R E I G N P O U C Y - EU A ’

the Com m ission's recom m endation for negotiations to start w ith the so-called 'Luxem ­
bourg Six' (European C ouncil 1997).

Widening takes precedence: strategic security considerations

By the late 1990s, the political m om entum fo r EU enlargem ent had becom e irresistible.
The enlargem ent bandwagon benefited from tw o contingent factors: first, a series of pro­
enlargem ent presidencies, and second, the Kosovo War. Serendipitously, In the late 1990s
the rotating presidency o f the EU was held by a string o f pro-enlargem ent governm ents:
first the UK in the first half of 1998, follow ed by Austria and then G erm any in early 1999. In
the case o f the British presidency, not only was the UK a traditional advocate o f enlarge­
m ent, but New Labour had w on a stunning electoral victo ry the previous year, and Tony
Blair was keen to dem onstrate his government's new -found com m itm ent to being 'at the
heart o f Europe'. Therefore it was w ith evident delight that Prim e M inister Blair w as able to
announce in M arch 1998 that m em bership negotiations w ould fo rm ally begin w ith the
'Luxem bourg Six'.
The opening o f accession negotiations w ith the Six was accom panied by a decision to draw
up annual Accession Partnerships with all the applicant countries, listing the objectives that
the EU wanted each applicant to meet. The aim in doing so was to address the potentially
destabilizing implications of the inclusion-exclusion dilem m a by maintaining pressure on the
applicant states to carry out the desired reforms, w hilst dangling the carrot of formal acces­
sion negotiations if they made satisfactory progress. This strategy proved highly successful: for
example, both Latvia and Lithuania, concerned that they had fallen behind Estonia, made
extraordinary progress in meeting the conditions, w hilst elections in Slovakia in September
1998 brought down the M eciar governm ent and opened the door for rapid progress towards
accession. At the end o f 1998, three more CEECs and Malta moved closer to beginning acces­
sion negotiations, leaving Bulgaria and Rom ania trailing behind.
The German EU presidency in the first half of 1999 also accelerated the m om entum to ­
wards enlargem ent. As in the case of the UK, an election in the previous year had brought to
power a 'Red-Green' coalition led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. His administration was
keen to shed the image o f Geo-Klientelismus that was associated w ith Chancellor's Kohl's focus
on Germany's im mediate neighbourhood in East Central Europe, and spoke more positively
o f a w ider circle of enlargement encom passing both the Baltic states and m uch of southeast
Europe, possibly including Turkey. This shift in Germ an thinking towards a larger round of
enlargement was reinforced by the Kosovo War, which gave added weight to the geostrategic
considerations w hich had always favoured EU enlargem ent. Renewed conflict in the Balkans
underlined the importance of avoiding alienating Bulgaria and Romania, particularly in the light
of the crucial support they provided to NATO during Operation Allied Force. The geostrategic
dangers posed by the inclusion-exclusion dilem m a were explicitly addressed by Tony Blair,
who argued that 'Events in Kosovo also bring home to us the urgency of enlargem ent. . . I do
not underestimate the difficulties involved in extending enlargement to these countries. . . But
I do believe we have a moral duty to offer them the hope of membership of the E U . . . the ines­
timable advantage of political stability o f the continent' (Blair 1999).
In the wake of the Kosovo W ar and the successive pro-enlargement EU presidencies,
the Com mission adopted a new position. In October 1999 it recommended on political and
476 LISB E TH A G G E S T A M

security grounds that the EU open negotiations with all the applicant countries (except Turkey),
arguing that enlargement was a political imperative if the EU was to make a decisive contribu­
tion to stability and prosperity in Europe. The Com mission justified its recommendation by
arguing that the applicant countries met the political conditions for membership (which were
described as the most important of the Copenhagen criteria), even if their record in meeting
the other conditions was patchier (Verheugen 1999). Prioritizing the political criteria also pro­
vided a convenient w ay o f side-stepping Turkey's membership application, because it could be
argued that Turkey did not yet meet the political conditions and therefore would only be
offered negotiations leading to an Accession Partnership.
After a string of pro-enlargement presidencies, the French found their room for manoeuvre
significantly constrained when they took over the presidency in the second half of 2000. A l­
though French decision makers accepted the principle of enlargement, they w ere determined
to ensure that EU institutions and decision-m aking processes w ere reformed prior to enlarge­
m ent taking place. They succeeded in securing agreement at Nice on a com plex compromise
arrangement on how votes w ere to be distributed in both the European Parliament and
Council of Ministers in an enlarged EU of 27 m em ber states. The problem with the Nice Treaty
was that its voting system was not transparent and, above all, it made it possible for m inority
coalitions to block decisions. Mutual dissatisfaction with the comprom ise hammered out at
Nice led to Franco-German agreement to establish a Convention w hich would agree a 'Con­
stitution for Europe', reforming EU institutions and deepening the integration process. As Ger­
m any was a founding mem ber of the European Union and a leading proponent of multilateral
cooperation and integration in Europe, Germ an policy makers found themselves increasingly
torn between their advocacy of enlargement and their desire to preserve the effectiveness of
a more exclusive and homogeneous European Union. Thus the Red-Green coalition govern­
m ent became more insistentthat the EU had to conduct root and branch institutional reforms
before enlarging its m embership. This concern with ensuring the continued deepening of EU
integration process and the efficacy of its decision-m aking processes in tandem with enlarge­
ment brought the German governm ent much closer to the position of their French counter­
parts (Aggestam 2004:223).
By this stage in the enlargement process, the Commission concluded that it could not make
a convincing case that some o f the eight CEE candidates w ere more ready to jo in than the oth­
ers. Poland, in particular, presented the Com mission w ith a major dilem m a. Its pre-accession
strategy proceeded in fits and starts, sometimes keeping in step with the other candidates but
more often than not falling behind. The Com mission was sorely tempted to threaten Poland
w ith a delay in its accession in order to force it to get its act together, but W arsaw never
dropped far enough behind the other candidates to make the threat credible. And Poland
had powerful backers in Germany, w ho for a mix of historical, political, and strategic reasons
w ere comm itted to Polish EU mem bership (Grabbe 2004:14).

Differentiation or not? Copenhagen revisited

By 2000-2001, the big question facing the EU was how m any countries would con clu d e nego­
tiations by the 2002 deadline that had been set. Support for a Big Bang enlargement involving
ten candidate countries grew among many informed observers, though this proposition had
only limited support among m em ber states. Proponents of a Big Bang argued that taking in
 C H A P T E R 2 4 N E W A C T O R S , N E W F O R E I G N P O L I C Y : El i A N D C N I A R G E M E N T 477

ten countries together would leave fewer on the outside (thus m inim izing the problem of
exclusion) and necessitate only one large-scale adjustment by the EU. However, a Big Bang
enlargement would also risk disappointing the front-runners (who would then have to wait
for the laggards to catch up), and could reduce the pressure on all of them to undertake un­
popular reforms (Smith 2005: 283). In addition, according to Eurobarometer polls there was
little support fo ra Big Bang enlargement among the publics of the mem ber states.
Thus the key question of how and w hen to enlarge was still left hanging-indeed, pur­
posely so, given the unresolved issues raised by the dilem m a o f differentiation discussed
above. Nonetheless, in February 2000 form al m em bership negotiations w ere initiated with
the 'Helsinki Ten'. As policy makers grappled with the dilem m a of differentiation and the
debate over a Big Bang enlargem ent gathered pace, advocates of the political project of an
integrated EU became more outspoken. Underlining these criticism s of a Big Bang was the
fear that enlargem ent would turn the EU into little more than a glorified free-trade area.
At this sensitive juncture in the debate, it was once again the Com mission that was able to
fram e the policy agenda. The Com mission eventuallyjoined the Big Bang bandwagon in 2001,
thus throwing its considerable weight and authority behind this option. The Com m issioner
for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, maintained that ten countries could jo in the next en­
largement ro u n d -in other words, all the existing candidates except for Bulgaria and Romania.
He urged more political support for what he described as a historic process, and argued that a
Big Bang would be preferable to a small first wave because it would avoid cutting off countries
from their neighbours (Verheugen 2001). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 also served to reinforce
the security rationale for the Big Bang option, with the Com mission declaring that 'a strong
and united Europe is more im portant than ever before, against the background of the terrorist
attacks of 11 September' (European Com m ission 2001).
The Commission's progress report stating that ten countries w ere ready to jo in received a
mixed response among politicians in m em ber states. Hubert Védrine, France's then foreign
minister, publicly questioned the Commission's m ethodology for assessing the candidates'
readiness to jo in (Védrine 2001 ). But given that mem ber states had in part delegated the m an­
agement of the enlargement negotiations to the Com mission, it was too late in the process to
raise these concerns (Grabbe 2004:13).
In the second half of 2 0 0 2 -n in e years after the historic decision in Copenhagen to specify
criteria for m em bership -the Danes once again held the EU presidency. For Danish Prime
Minister, Fogh Rasmusson, the stakes w ere high. A failure to conclude the enlargement nego­
tiations in Copenhagen would potentially postpone it for a substantial period of time, given
the EU's exceptionally busy agenda for the next few years (yet another IGC and controversial
budget negotiations). In O ctober 2002, the Com mission declared that the ten candidate
countries would be able to assume the obligations of mem bership from 2004. To meet the
deadline, the last two months of 2002 involved intense negotiations, particularly in the fields
of agriculture and finance. Finally, however, and to the relief of all involved, the deal was done
at the Decem ber 2002 Copenhagen European C o u n cil-th e ten countries would accede to
the EU on 1 May 2004.
As for Bulgaria and Romania, the Copenhagen European Council stated that 'depending
on further progress in com plying w ith the m em bership criteria, the objective is to w elcom e
Bulgaria and Romania as members of the European Union in 2007' (European Council 2002:4).
This constituted a remarkable turnaround, because previous European Councils had been very
478 L IS B E T H A G G E S T A M

reluctant to set a definite date for the accession of specific candidates. Reverting to traditional
arguments about spheres of influence, France in particular warned of the dangers of leaving
Bulgaria and Romania out of the forthcoming enlargement round. Ironically therefore, given
its initial reservations about enlargement, France ended up playing a leading role in persuading
reluctant m em bers-notab ly G erm an y-to accept a Big Bang enlargement that would result in
twelve new EU m ember states.

Beyond enlargement: EU foreign policy in the

neighbourhood

Ironically, although the Big Bang enlargement can be seen as a successful outcom e o f EU
foreign policy in shaping European order after the end o f the Cold War, it also raises serious
questions about the future prospects o f enlargem ent. The norm ative com m itm ent to en­
largement is still there in principle, but the conditions on which future decisions will be taken
have changed profoundly. The latest enlargement w ith twelve new EU m embers has raised
serious question about the EU's 'absorption capacity', i.e. the EU's ability to remain coherent
and cohesive with the ever-increasing diversity that each enlargement brings. It is widely
recognized that a feeling of'enlargem ent fatigue' has taken hold in large sections of European
elites and public opinion, and that the 'permissive consensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2008) on
enlargem ent no longer holds (H illion 2010). The difficult negotiations over institutional
reforms that resulted In the Lisbon Treaty and the econom ic recession do not w het the ap­
petite for future enlargements at present. At the same tim e, it is also clear that the normative
appeal of the EU may be w aning in an increasingly m ultipolar world with rising new powers.
These developments raise some serious questions about the EU's ability to exercise power in
its foreign policy through enlargement. This section w ill briefly discuss some o f the challenges
lying ahead in EU foreign policy by analysing prospects for future enlargements, primarily
towards Southeastern Europe, and the alternative offered by the so-called European Neigh­
bourhood Policy (ENP).
The carrot of enlargement is still a powerful instrument in EU foreign policy for shaping
developments in the Balkans, a region that in so m any ways has been a test case and constitu­
tive to the developm ent o f EU foreign policy. The EU affirm ed its norm ative com m itm ent to
extend m em bership to the Balkan countries at a European Council meeting in Thessaloniki in
June 2003. Since then, Croatia has completed its accession negotiations and is likely to jo in in
2013 if ratification of the accession treaty is approved by all EU m em ber states. The prospect of
enlargement for the remaining Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Ser­
bia, Montenegro, Yugoslav Republic of M acedonia) is blighted by serious obstacles, some of
which are internal to these states themselves, but also because of divisions among EU mem­
ber states (particularly on Kosovo). M aintaining the prospect of EU enlargement as credible
leverage to influence developm ents in the region is a precarious balancing act for the EU.
Again, the role of the European Com m ission is critical in keeping the m omentum going in the
negotiations with potential and candidate countries (see Map 24.2).
The longest-standing applicant for EU mem bership is Turkey, w ho first applied in 1987.
Turkey became an official candidate in 1999 and started negotiations in 2005. By 2011, only
one out of thirty-three chapters has been closed in the negotiations. As in the case of the
 C H A P T E R 24 N E W A C T O R S , N E W F O R E I G N P O L I C Y : EU R,m> £ } 41A S Gr M E *
479

Balkans, the geostrategic imperatives for enlargement are considerable. However, the ques­
tion of Turkish m em bership is highly divisive among EU m em ber states. Turkish membership
is challenging for a num ber of reasons related to the large size of Turkey, its socio-econom ic
com position, its religion, and, not least, conflicting issues w ith some of its neighbours over
Cyprus. Significantly, both the French and Germ an governments have officially stated their
reservations and signalled that they would prefer a solution in which Turkey is granted the
status of 'privileged partnership' rather than full EU mem bership (Rahigh-Aghsan 2011;
Schim m elfennig 2011).
The question about w hat kind of relationship the EU should build beyond enlargement
became a pressing issue as soon as the decision for a Big Bang enlargement had been taken.
There was a concern that eastern enlargement could create new divisions in Europe between
insiders and outsiders, triggering instability and a growing sense of insecurity in the countries
bordering the European Union. Hence, European policy makers were keen to develop an in­
strum ent w hereby the EU would be able to shape and influence its immediate neighbourhood
w ithout promising EU m embership (W hitm an and W olff 2010). The European Security Strategy
of 2003 explicitly states that one of the aims of EU foreign and security policy is to build 'security
in the neighbourhood'. A year later, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was set up with
the aim of creating a ring of well-governed neighbours surrounding the EU from North Africa,
through the Middle East, to Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (see Map 24.2).
The ENP is built on liberal ideas that increasing mutual interdependence and the normative
attraction o fth e E U will foster prosperity, stability, and security. In m any ways, the ENP is sym p­
tom atic of how the EU pursues its interests and exercises power in foreign policy, which can be
characterized as a form of'm ilieu-shaping' (W olfers 1966) and 'structural power’ (Keukeleire
and MacNaughtan 2008). The emphasis is on material assistance and a preference for soft
power m echanisms rather than coercive elements. The Action Plan that the EU negotiates in­
dividually with each country sets out benchmarks to consolidate democracy, good govern­
ance, rule of law, and public administration in return for greater access to the European market.
But in contrast to the strong conditionality that the EU enlargement process entails, the incen­
tive structure is markedly different in ENP as it does not promise membership. Each individual
country decides in negotiations with the EU w hat to include and the level of ambition in the
Action Plan. Hence, there is a high degree of differentiation between ENP countries.
The EU has also become increasingly involved in w hat is norm ally perceived as more tradi­
tional foreign and security policy, such as diplom atic mediation and crisis management
operations in the neighbourhood. The EU's mediation efforts in ending the Georgian W ar
of 2008 and its aftermath is evidence of its growing am bitions in undertaking these types of
missions. The combined developm ent o f the ENP and the Com m on Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) demonstrates the presence o f the EU as an actor in the neighbourhood. H ow ­
ever, m any analysts question w hether the EU has been successful in turning this presence into
power (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008; Edwards 2008; Bicchi 2010; Popescu and Wilson
2011). In Eastern Europe, the dem ocratic transition has stalled in favour o f more autocratic
regimes. The EU's response to the Arab Spring of 2011 and the dem ocracy movements in
North Africa and the M iddle East was fragmented. The single voice of the EU High Repre­
sentative, Catherine Ashton, was sim ply drowned in the cacophony o f voices from EU m em ­
ber states. This raises some serious questions about the effectiveness and coherence of EU
foreign policy beyond enlargement.
L IS B E T H A 6 G E S T A M

Map 24.2 European Neighbourhood Policy.

Conclusion: the transformative power of the EU

The Big Bang enlargem ent o f 2004-2007 w ill no doubt go down in the history books as an
impressive achievem ent. Fifteen years after the end o f the Cold W ar bipolarity. European
order was fundam entally reshaped, with the EU playing a major role in this reshaping process.
However, this was not a self-evident outcom e at the start of the 1990s. On the contrary, as this
chapter has demonstrated, the decision to open the EU up to such a large group of new
members was reached only fitfully and incrementally, and was deeply contested at crucial
conjunctures given its im plications for existing m em ber states w ho had asym metrical sets of
material and geostrategic interests.
However, one thing they did agree on in principle was the moral imperative to enlarge as
enshrined in a num ber of EU treaties (see Box 24.5). That m em ber states felt constrained by
this norm ative com m itm ent is o f considerable significance. From a purely materialist point of
 C H A P T E R 24 N E W A C T O R S , N E W F O R E I G N P O L I C Y ; EU A N D t N L A R G t:M f >

m v m p m sf? 1
bo x 24 .5 Landmark agreements in t h e history
of the Big Bang enlargement

1957 Rome Treaty stipulating any European state can apply for membership

1993 Copenhagen European Council (defining membership criteria)

1994 Essen European Council (agreement on pre-accession strategy)

1997 European Commission publish Agenda 2000

1997 Luxembourg European Council (decision on the six candidates for accession negotiations)

1998 Start of accession negotiations with first five CEECs and Cyprus

1999 Helsinki European Council (decision to start negotiations with three more CEECs and Malta)

2002 End of accession negotiations for ten countries

2004 Accession of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus,
and Malta

2007 Second phase of accession of Bulgaria and Romania

view, it is not at all obvious w hy the EU should shoulder the considerable costs involved in
accepting new members from regions much poorer and less developed than the EU's West
European heartlands, particularly as doing so would have severe repercussions on the effec­
tiveness of the EU itself. The fact that EU m em ber states should feel such a sense of obligation
is noteworthy and gives credence to the social constructivist argum ent that identity and the
w ay it informs interests is a m ajor explanatory variable in the case of enlargement. Although
the m em ber states sought to lessen the negative effects of enlargement, notably through ap ­
plying political conditionality, they were eventually prepared to accept the risks that enlarge­
m ent would entail. They did so because they shared a strong sense of responsibility for peace
and security in Europe, and thought that, at the end of the day, enlargement was the best way
to achieve this strategic imperative.
M oreover, despite the fact that enlargem ent was deeply divisive, EU m em ber states largely
delegated the negotiation and fram ing o f this issue to the European Com m ission. The C o m ­
mission played a decisive role, particularly towards the end of the process when the enthusi­
asm of m em ber states, am ong both the governing elite and the general public, started to
w ane. In so doing, the Com mission acted as a crucial policy entrepreneur (Sedelm eier 2010).
Although the EU heads o f state and governm ent took the key decisions at critical m o m e n ts-
such as starting negotiations w ith ju st six countries in 1998, or setting the final entry date for
2 0 0 4 -th ese steps w ere all shaped by input from the Com m ission. The Com m ission kept the
m om entum up, ensuring progress towards the goal o f enlargem ent even when there was
little political impetus from EU governments.
These two p o ints-th e norm ative com m itm ent to enlarge, and the significant role played by
the European Com m ission-illustrate how far the foreign policy process in Europe has been
transformed over recent decades. The challenge for the future w ill be that the fifth enlarge­
m ent w ill still leave numerous 'European' states on the outside, m any of whom have already
expressed their desire to jo in the EU. Ultimately, this raises fundam ental and unresolved ques­
tions about the borders of Europe and the problems o f inclusion-exclusion, and, last but not
U S B E T H AGGESTAM

least, how the EU can exert influence w hen the prospect of EU m em b ership -o ne of the most
powerful and successful instruments in its foreign policy—is no longer available.

0 Key points
•

• The EU is a sui generis foreign policy actor, which poses significant conceptual and theoretical
challenges to conventional conceptions of agency and power in FPA.
• EU enlargement is the most powerful instrument of EU foreign policy, enabling the Union to play a
significant role in the reshaping of European order after the end of the Cold War.
• Enlargement increases the EU's global presence, but it also affects the EU’s internal coherence and
effectiveness as an actor. The reforms in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 seek to address these issues.
• The decision for a Big Bang enlargement was only reached incrementally. Differences over the'how
and when' of enlargement were contested, given the asymmetrical sets of material and geostrategic
interests of member states and their differing visions of Europe. These differences were particularly
pronounced between Britain, France, and Germany, the three largest EU member states.
• Enlargement is significant because it is an example of a foreign policy decision that reflects social
constructivist arguments about collective identity and rule-based action. The overwhelming
moral imperative to enlarge, rooted in the Rome Treaty, meant that enlargement p e rse was never
seriously questioned.
• EU member states delegated large parts of the policy process to the European Commission, which
played a leading role in framing and implementing the policy on enlargement at critical junctures.
• The Commission was able to exert a powerful influence on the candidate countries by using
political conditionality to encourage a host of legal and institutional changes to be undertaken
prior to membership, clear evidence of a type of foreign policy where the domestic and
international domains increasingly overlap.
• Throughout the decision-making process, EU member states grappled with a major paradox:
enlargement was meant to project stability and cooperation into Central and Eastern Europe,
but enlargement would draw new lines of inclusion and exclusion in this region. This dilemma is
important in explaining why in the end EU member states opted for an inclusive Big Bang in 2004,
including Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.
• The decision on the fifth EU enlargement has not settled the question about the borders of Europe.
The EU faces a huge task of seeking to shape developments in its 'new neighbourhood' without
being able to use the leverage of promise of future membership.

Questions
© f . Assess the relative impact of member states and the Commission in framing the agenda on EU
enlargement.
2. W hy is the concept of 'foreign policy' problematic in the case of EU enlargement?
3. In your view, which approach best explains the EU enlargement process: a social constructivist
approach based on norms and identities, or a rationalist approach focusing on material interests and
strategic calculations?
4. W hy was the Big Bang adopted in preference to other options for enlarging the EU?
5. Did the application o f political conditionality in the accession process represent a form of power
coercion?
 C H A P T E R 24 N EW A C T O R S , N EW F O R E I G N P O L I C Y : EU A N D E N L A R G E M E N T 483

6. How did the debate on inclusion-exclusion shape the decision on enlargement?

7. How did differing national interests shape British, French, and German attitudes to enlargement in the
early 1990s?

8. What impact will the inclusion of twelve new members in the EU have on its external relations and its
ambitions to speak with 'one voice'in international affairs?
9. Discuss the borders of Europe and whether there are limits to EU enlargement.
10. Does the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) offer an effective alternative instrument for shaping
relations with countries bordering the EU?

© Further reading
Bretherton, C. and Vogler.J. (2006), The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge).
A central text in the conceptualization of the EU's international role, combining a constructivist
approach with extensive empirical research.<BIP

Grabbe, H. (2006), The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in

Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Provides a detailed study of how and to what effect the EU applied the principle of conditionality in
the enlargement process, written by an academic with practical experience inside the European
Commission.

Hill, C. and Smith, M. (e d ) (2011), International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
This book provides for an authoritative account of the multi-faceted nature of EU external relations in
the international system.

Sjursen, H. (ed.) (2006), Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity (London:

Routledge).
A comparative country-specific analysis of how EU enlargement was understood within a number of
EU member states.

Smith, K.E. (2004), The M a k in g o fE U Foreign Policy: The Case o f Eastern Europe (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan).
This book explicitly argues that enlargement is a case of EU foreign policy.

Vachudova, M. (2005), Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after C om m unism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Brings a nuanced understanding to the passive-active leverage of EU power in the enlargement
process.

|^t j | Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for more information:
www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/smith_foreign/