Nagle Complaint

Case 1:16-cv-00214-BKS-ATB Document 1 Filed 02/22/16 Page 1 of 22
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________________________________________________
ANGELA M. NAGLE,
Plaintiff,
-Against- COMPLAINT
EAST GREENBUSH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 1:16-CV-214 (BKS/ATB)

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE EAST GREENBUSH
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, and individually and in
their official capacity as members of the Board:
SHAY HARRISON, MARK MANN, KATHERINE MACIOL,
KAREN CURRAN, JOHN DUNN, JR., MICHAEL BUONO,
JENNIFER MASSEY, JOANN TAYLOR, KATHLEEN CURTIN,
and SUSAN GARRIGAN-PIELA,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Angela M. Nagle, through her undersigned attorneys, sets forth the following as
her Complaint against defendants:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND
1. Establishing and sustaining a school environment free of discrimination and
retaliation should be of paramount importance in any school district because the culture and
climate of a school has a profound impact on student achievement, behavior, and reflects the
school community’s culture.
2. In order to provide a positive culture in any school, leaders of the school district
must lead by example. Accordingly, one of the greatest dangers to our children is a Board of
Education out of control.
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3. Unfortunately the Board of Education of the East Greenbush Central School
District (the “Board”) has become so intoxicated by power, so bent on imposing its will at any
cost, that it has ignored its responsibility and shirked its duty to lead by example by creating an
environment free of unlawful discrimination and retaliation.
4. This case is brought to put an end to the abusive and discriminatory tactics of the
Board and its members and to restore the good name of Dr. Angela M. Nagle, Ph.d. the
Superintendent of Schools whose leadership has catapulted the East Greenbush Central School
District (the “District”) to one of the finest schools in the Capital District.
5. The claims asserted in this case involve employment discrimination; retaliation;
and civil rights violations seeking compensatory damages, liquidated damages, punitive
damages, attorneys’ fees and costs to redress the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional and
statutory rights by the defendants.
6. This case is brought for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(the “PDA”); the Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended (the “ADA”); the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”); Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“Title IX”); and 42 U.S.C. §1983 for constitutional violations
under Federal and New York State Constitutions (Equal Protection Clause).
7. The District is subject to the above-referenced statutes and constitutional
requirements based upon its status as a public employer; because the actions taken by the Board
members were made under color of law; and, because the District employs more than fifty
individuals in a seventy-five mile radius.
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PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
8. Plaintiff Angela Nagle is an individual who resides in Albany County, State of
New York.
9. Plaintiff is a member of a protected class based upon her gender, pregnancy,
disability, because she took an approved medical leave, and because she is a U.S. and New York
citizen and is therefore guaranteed civil rights under the State and Federal Constitution.
10. Plaintiff is also protected under the retaliation laws because she exercised her
right to take medical/pregnancy leave and because she exercised her right to file a complaint
regarding the unlawful treatment by the Board.
11. Plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential duties of her position by reason of
her education, training, and experience.
12. Plaintiff has been subjected to an adverse employment action; namely, that the
Board decided not to renew her contract just weeks after plaintiff returned from maternity leave.
13. Plaintiff timely filed a claim with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on May 15, 2015.
14. The EEOC issued a right to sue notice on November 24, 2015.
15. This action is timely brought within ninety days of receipt of the right to sue
notice.
16. The District is a public school with its principal place of business located at 29
Englewood Avenue, East Greenbush, NY 12061, County of Rensselaer, State of New York.
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17. The Board is the governing body of the District, with its principal place of
business located at 29 Englewood Avenue, East Greenbush, NY 12061, County of Rensselaer,
State of New York.
18. As relevant to the claims set forth in this Complaint, the Board is the body
responsible for implementing District policies and decision-making as it concerns the
employment of plaintiff as Superintendent of Schools.
19. Shay Harrison is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
York and at all times relevant to this complaint was and is a member of the Board.
20. Mark Mann is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New York
and at all times relevant to this complaint was and is a member of the Board.
21. Katherine Maciol is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
22. Karen Curran is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
23. John Dunn, Jr. is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
24. Michael Buono is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
25. Jennifer Massey is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
York. Jennifer Massey has been a member of the Board since July 1, 2015.
26. Joann Taylor is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
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27. Kathleen Curtin is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of New
28. Susan Garrigan-Piela, is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of
New York. Susan Garrigan-Piela was a member of the Board until June 30, 2015.
29. The individual defendants each possess sufficient authority to affect personnel
decisions, and are individually liable for acts of discrimination and retaliation because they
conspired against plaintiff; condoned offensive behavior; and actively retaliated against plaintiff.
Thus, the individual defendants are liable as co-conspirators, as "Employers" and as aiders and
abettors. The individual defendants are therefore jointly and individually liable because they
directly participated in, conspired, and aided and abetted the discrimination and retaliation
against plaintiff.
30. The individual defendants are also liable because they are policymakers for the
purpose of implementing the District’s unconstitutional and unlawful decisions, policies and
customs.
31. Finally, based upon representations made by Board President Shay Harrison, the
discriminatory decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment, and, many of the retaliatory
decisions to undercut and undermine the authority of plaintiff since filing a charge of
discrimination, were the result of a unanimous Board vote and therefore all individual defendants
are jointly and severally liable for condoning and accepting the unlawful behaviors outlined
herein.
32. Defendant District is vicariously liable for the actions of its Board members. The
District is liable for the actions of the Board because the Board sets policy and makes decisions
with regard to the employment of plaintiff and through the Board’s actions the District is deemed
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to have condoned, accepted and approved of the discrimination and retaliation suffered by
plaintiff.
33. The District is also liable because its Board members (a) were not properly
educated or trained concerning discrimination, harassment and retaliation; (b) had no protocol in
place for investigating claims of discrimination and retaliation made against the Board; (c)
refused to undertake a prompt and thorough investigation of the claims of discrimination and
retaliation; (d) failed to take effective remedial and corrective action; (e) treated plaintiff as
though she was the one that did something wrong by making a protected complaint; (f) refused to
educate its employees and supervisors about the need to avoid retaliation; (g) refused to
apologize to plaintiff or otherwise send a message that discrimination and retaliation would not
be tolerated and is unacceptable in the workplace; and (h) retaliated against plaintiff.
34. Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343.
35. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391, venue properly lies in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York, as this is the district where the parties reside and
where the events complained of occurred.
BASIS OF CLAIMS
36. Plaintiff has been an employee of the District since November 2003 and since that
time, she has worked her way up the career ladder to the position of Superintendent of Schools.
Plaintiff has been the Superintendent of the District since July 1, 2008. The original contract
term ended June 30, 2011.
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37. Through several extensions, the contract term has been extended to June 30, 2016.
Plaintiff has consistently received substantial increases in pay and benefits which shows her
success as Superintendent over the past seven years.
38. During her tenure, the District has received many accolades and continues to rank
in the top tier of schools in the Capital District of New York.
39. As Superintendent, plaintiff is proud of her record and achievements in building a
positive school culture. During her tenure as Superintendent, the District has achieved
unparalleled success under the excellent leadership of plaintiff.
40. For example, during the time plaintiff has led the District as Superintendent, its
ranking for student academic achievement among 84 school districts in upstate New York has
risen from 19th to 5th (as published in the Albany Business review). Based on the 2013-2014
student assessment data, the rankings for the 2014-2015 school year jumped from 9th place to
5th place. The District was recently ranked as the #1 top performing school district in Upstate
New York against school districts with the same wealth ratio. This is the highest level of
student academic achievement in the history of the District. At the time plaintiff became
Superintendent, Columbia High School was identified as a "School In Need of Improvement"
(low student achievement) by the New York State Education Department. Recently, Columbia
High School was ranked 4th in student achievement among 84 school districts in Upstate New
York and has been named one of the top 2,000 high schools in the United States by U.S. News
and World Report. In addition, Bell Top Elementary School was named a Rewards School by
the New York State Education Department for the highest academic achievement in New York
State and Columbia High School was named a Rewards School for two consecutive years.
41. Plaintiff has consistently received good performance reviews.
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42. Plaintiff has not received any formal discipline, reprimands, warnings, or
counseling.
43. Plaintiff notified the Board President of her pregnancy in August of 2014 as a
courtesy prior to the start of the 2014-2015 school year.
44. On October 8, 2014 Plaintiff announced her pregnancy to the Board and the
public.
45. Over the course of several weeks Plaintiff noticed a very distinct change in the
manner in which she was treated by several male members of the Board. By way of example,
several male members (John Dunn, Shay Harrison, Mark Mann, and Michael Buono) of the
Board did not have the common courtesy to congratulate Plaintiff on her pregnancy news. Even
worse, these male members of the Board refused to even look Plaintiff in the eye when they had
conversations. In addition, meetings to advance student centered initiatives were abruptly
cancelled and not rescheduled by the Board. Further, the Board was noticeably upset that they
would be forced to incur costs for plaintiff’s replacement while she was out on maternity leave.
46. These changes in demeanor were very obvious when compared to the prior
working relationship between plaintiff and members of the Board. Prior to announcing her
pregnancy, plaintiff worked closely with the Board and her interactions routinely included casual
conversations about family and friends. After plaintiff announced her pregnancy, and continuing
after she returned to work following medical leave, Board members would only have terse
conversations with her and several Board members would not even make eye contact with
plaintiff.
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47. Plaintiff asked for a contract renewal in November 2014. Plaintiff was informed
on or about November 21, 2014 that the "timing just isn't right for the Board." No other
information was provided to explain the Board's position.
48. Due to complications of her pregnancy, Plaintiff went out on disability/maternity
leave on December 2, 2014. Plaintiff asserts that her medical conditions associated with her
pregnancy are disabilities under the ADA.
49. On January 6, 2015 Plaintiff gave birth to her twins (the due date was February
18, 2015). With the arrival of her twins, Plaintiff had three young children under the age of five
years old.
50. Plaintiff returned to work on March 16, 2015. Plaintiff was ready, willing and
able to perform all essential functions of her job.
51. Upon her return from disability/maternity leave, Plaintiff continued to notice a
change in behavior by members of the Board. By way of example, the male members of the
Board did not congratulate Plaintiff on the birth of her children; would not look her in the eye;
stared at her when she walked by; and refused to have any communication with her except
cursory conversation related strictly to Board business. When Plaintiff would walk by the men
talking to each other they would immediately stop talking and wait for her to pass before
resuming their conversations. Prior to her pregnancy plaintiff had regular conversations and
interactions with these same Board members.
52. Further, upon information and belief these male members of the Board were
having discussions with the District's lawyers, looking for a way to get rid of Plaintiff.
53. It is worth noting that the Board members are not supposed to have "off the
record" discussions on matters affecting the District. District business is supposed to be
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discussed in open meetings before the public with meeting minutes to be made publicly
available. If a confidential or sensitive matter needs to be discussed, then the Board should call
for an executive session. All emails or correspondence exchanged between Board members are
subject to the Freedom of Information Law-there should be no covert discussions; secret
chatrooms; covert emails; etc.
54. Upon information and belief, the male members of the Board have routinely
engaged in covert discussions related to Plaintiff and more specifically, their concerns that
Plaintiff was not capable of performing her job because of her pregnancy and child care
responsibilities.
55. Plaintiff was concerned with the change in attitude by several members of the
Board so on or about April 15, 2015, Plaintiff met with the Board President Shay Harrison to
address her concerns about her future with the District. When she met with Shay Harrison, he
had stated that Plaintiff had done many commendable things in the District but that she would
need to discuss her future with Plaintiff's attorney because he did not feel comfortable talking to
her.
56. A few days later Plaintiff was notified that the Board wanted to "buy out" her
contract and they wanted her gone immediately. Plaintiff was informed at that time that the
District was moving in a different direction but that she should not take it personally as the
decision was not made because of poor performance.
57. Plaintiff was informed of her termination approximately one month after returning
from maternity leave.
58. Plaintiff enjoyed a very successful career and was embraced by her Board up until
the time that she announced she was pregnant with twins during the early fall of 2014.
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59. Plaintiff asserts that the decision by the Board was retaliation for her exercising
her right to take disability/maternity leave and was also motivated by the Board stereotyping
plaintiff as a woman based upon an assumption that a working mother of three young children
(two of which had considerable medical needs) would not be dedicated to her job as
Superintendent. Such assertions are supported by the pattern of retaliation aimed at plaintiff as
well as the obvious disappointment exhibited by Board members when plaintiff returned from
her maternity leave.
60. For example, in July of 2014, plaintiff was given a positive Annual Performance
Evaluation. At that time plaintiff asked School Board President Shay Harrison if there was
anything that he would like her to do differently in the coming year. In response Mr. Harrison
stated that there was nothing to improve upon and that the Board was very pleased with
plaintiff’s performance. Not one issue for improvement was mentioned at plaintiff’s July 2014
annual review meeting.
61. As with any school district, from time to time there were issues that arise in the
community. Prior to announcing she was pregnant with twins, plaintiff was given broad
discretion to handle issues as they arose and the Board generally did not get involved in the day
to day activities of running the District.
62. However, since returning from maternity leave and especially after filing a claim
with the EEOC, the Board has exhibited a pattern of retaliatory activity meant to undermine
plaintiff by minimizing her role in the District. Acts that humiliate or undermine an employee’s
authority can constitute adverse action supporting a claim for retaliation. The crucial inquiry is
whether the act could dissuade a reasonable employee from making a discrimination claim
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against the employer. Plaintiff alleges that the manner in which the Board has consistently
undermined her authority since filing a claim of discrimination is clear evidence of retaliation.
63. By way of example, the Board has retaliated against plaintiff after she returned
from maternity leave and after she filed her complaint with the EEOC by prohibiting plaintiff
from communicating with members of the community; by preventing plaintiff from representing
the District at public functions; by excessively monitoring every move made by plaintiff; by
constantly questioning plaintiff’s whereabouts; by reviewing all communications and work
authored by plaintiff; by falsely accusing plaintiff of wrongdoing based upon hearsay and
speculation without bothering to ask plaintiff what transpired; by falsely claiming plaintiff was
underperforming in her role and that falsely claiming that she was insubordinate; by engaging in
a pattern and practice of belittling and humiliating plaintiff through the Board’s undermining
plaintiff’s authority on matters traditionally left to the Superintendent of Schools.
64. Notably, prior to plaintiff’s announcing her pregnancy she worked well with the
Board as a respected partner and leader in the community. Prior to announcing her pregnancy
plaintiff received very positive performance evaluations and was repeatedly informed by Board
members that she was doing an excellent job. Prior to announcing her pregnancy the Board did
not scrutinize every decision made by plaintiff and certainly never demanded that every
communication with the public (either in writing or oral) be pre-approved by the Board. These
changes in the manner that the Board interacted with plaintiff are clear evidence of retaliatory
and discriminatory motive.
65. The Board has given several contradictory reasons for its decision to terminate
plaintiff.
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66. For example, the District first took the position that it was moving in a different
direction but that the decision was not because of poor performance by plaintiff.
67. After plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, the Board, for the
first time, claimed that plaintiff poorly performed and was insubordinate.
68. However, these newly formed contentions of underperformance and
insubordination are inconsistent with all objective measures which point to the inescapable
conclusion that plaintiff was outperforming in her role and that the District has flourished under
her leadership.
69. Further, the fact that the District has previously stated that there were no problems
with Dr. Nagle’s performance shows that the explanations given by the District have developed
over time and have shifted for litigation purposes. Respectfully, when people suddenly shift
their position during litigation, a jury can infer they are lying.
70. Further, the parties’ contract required the Board to promptly advise plaintiff of
any alleged problems with her performance; yet, plaintiff was never informed of the “alleged”
shortcomings in her performance until after she filed with the EEOC.
71. The failure to adhere to the parties’ contract shows that the District has departed
from its normal procedural sequences, which is further proof of discrimination. Paragraph 3(c)
of the Agreement states in pertinent part:
C. Exchange of Information. The Board, individually and collectively, shall

promptly and discreetly refer to the Superintendent, for her study and recommendation,
and any and all criticisms, complaints, suggestions, communications or comments
regarding the administration of the District or the Superintendent's performance of her
duties.
72. Further, Paragraph 17(b) sets forth the mechanism to discipline plainitff, or to
terminate her contract for cause:
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Additionally, the parties agree that the Superintendent may not be disciplined or
discharged, or otherwise be subject to the termination of her appointment unless, after a
hearing at which it is demonstrated by substantial evidence, that the Superintendent has
materially breached this Agreement through nonperformance of the duties outlined in this
Agreement or by virtue of her inefficiency, incompetence, insubordination, misconduct,
or immoral conduct, or for such other reasons as may constitute just cause.
Written notice and charges seeking the imposition of discipline, as noted above, shall be
served, by the Board, upon the Superintendent at least fifteen (15) days before any
proposed hearing. The Board, by majority vote, may elect a public or private hearing
upon said charges, and such hearing shall commence expeditiously. The hearing shall be
conducted by an impartial hearing officer, mutually selected by the Board and
Superintendent, who shall be a licensed attorney at law. Board members may attend the
hearing. The hearing shall be conducted to afford due process protections to the
Superintendent, including but not limited to, the right to be represented by counsel of the
Superintendent's choice and at her expense, the right to subpoena documents, papers,
letters or other tangible evidence and to have all testimony provided under oath and to
receive, without cost, an accurate, written transcript of the proceedings, and to receive a
copy of the written findings and recommendations from the hearing officer regarding
guilt or innocence, and the appropriate measure of discipline, if any, as to the charges.
73. Certainly, plaintiff was never formally disciplined or brought up on charges to
effect a termination. However, if she truly was an insubordinate employee with a poor track
record, one would expect that the Board would bring her up on charges. It is inconsistent for the
Board to avoid following its established protocols for discipline or termination, yet, to later rely
upon alleged poor performance and insubordination to justify a termination.
74. The failure of an employer to follow policy related to discipline is especially
relevant and is strong evidence of unlawful motives where, as here, plaintiff received positive
performance evaluations and consistent increases in pay, as well as contract renewals up until
she returned from her maternity leave on March 16, 2015.
75. An inference of discrimination/retaliation is raised by the fact that (a) the Board
never called a meeting to discuss the various concerns it supposedly harbored regarding
insubordination and/or poor performance; (b) the Board never brought plaintiff up on charges of
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insubordination or poor performance,; and, (c) the Board never formally counseled or
documented their concerns until after plaintiff announced her pregnancy, after plaintiff went out
on early maternity leave due to complications; and, after she filed her claim of discrimination.
76. Indeed, even when the Board informed Dr. Nagle’s attorney that it wanted to “buy
out” her contract, the message to Dr. Nagle was that this was not related in any way to poor
performance.
77. It is clear that the Board has exaggerated the significance of several petty
grievances in a belated effort to re-write history and to manufacture a reason to support their
decisions for purpose of litigation. Such “post hoc” rationalizations constitute evidence of
discrimination.
78. Evidence of discrimination is also supported by the change in attitude by several
of the Board members after plaintiff announced her pregnancy and after she came back from
maternity leave, together with the temporal proximity of announcing her termination within a
month of her return from maternity leave.
79. As a further example, a finding of discrimination is supported by the statement of
Board member JoAnn Taylor who expressed concern about plaintiff returning to work with
young kids at home when she asked: “isn't it going to be awfully hard for you to come back to
work.” Respectfully, such a question would not be asked of a male Superintendent whose wife
just gave birth to twins.
80. Overall, prior to plaintiff’s pregnancy the District under plaintiff’s leadership was
excelling and there were no objective reasons for the District to change course.
81. However, after plaintiff announced her pregnancy, and, after she went out on
maternity leave with complications from her pregnancy, things drastically changed and suddenly
15
the Board felt a compelling need not only to change leadership but to immediately demand
plaintiff’s resignation and a buy-out of her contract.
82. The circumstantial evidence and the timing of the decision points to one
inescapable conclusion: that the motive was discrimination based upon unfounded fears and
stereotypes that plaintiff, a woman with three young children, could no longer perform the duties
of her positon.
83. Such decision-making is unlawful as it is a violation of the law for an employer to
make assumptions about a working mother with regard to child care responsibilities, or based
upon an assumption that a mother with young children would be “less committed to her job”
because of child care responsibilities.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Title VII and PDA against the District and the Board)
84. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding
paragraphs.
85. By the acts and practices described above, the District and the Board have
discriminated against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of her employment on the basis of
gender and pregnancy status.
86. Plaintiff has also been subjected to retaliation and wrongful termination for
speaking out against the manner in which she was treated in the workplace.
87. Based upon the foregoing, the District and the Board are hereby charged with
violation of Title VII and the PDA.
88. Plaintiff respectfully requests an award of damages to compensate her for the
emotional and physical harm, damage to reputation, loss of enjoyment of life, embarrassment,
and humiliation she has suffered and will continue to suffer.
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89. In addition, the damage to plaintiff's reputation prevents her from finding
comparable employment in the same retirement system. Accordingly, the discrimination and
retaliation adversely affects plaintiff’s retirement.
90. Plaintiff respectfully requests an award of damages to compensate her for
compensation and benefits she has lost and continues to lose.
91. Plaintiff also requests an award of attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements.
92. Finally, Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages because the
discrimination and harassment outlined above was malicious and/or reckless acts.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(42 U.S.C. 1983 against all defendants)
paragraphs.
94. The Equal Protection Clause of both the State and Federal Constitutions protects
public employees from various forms of discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of
gender and pregnancy status, as well as retaliation for complaints about violation of
constitutional rights.
95. By the acts and practices described above, defendants have discriminated against
plaintiff in the terms and conditions of her employment on the basis of gender and pregnancy
status.
96. Defendants acted under color of the law and with a deliberate indifference to the
rights of plaintiff.
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98. Based upon the foregoing, all defendants are individually and jointly liable for the
violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Title IX against all defendants)
paragraphs.
105. Title IX prohibits on the basis of sex and pregnancy status the exclusion of
participation in, denial of the benefits of, and discrimination in educational programs and
activities. Title IX also outlaws retaliation for protected claims of discrimination in an
educational setting.
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106. Title IX contains no exhaustion of remedies and gives plaintiff a private right of
action that can be filed directly in Court.
107. The District receives federal assistance and is therefore obligated to comply with
Title IX requirements.
108. By the acts and practices described above, all defendants have discriminated
against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of her employment within an educational setting on
the basis of gender and pregnancy status.
110. Based upon the foregoing, all defendants are individually and jointly liable for the
violation of plaintiff’s Title IX rights.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(ADA against the Board and District)
paragraphs.
117. Plaintiff is an individual with a disability and also with a record and/or history of
a disability
118. By the acts and practices described above, the District and the Board
discriminated against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of her employment on the basis of her
disability and in retaliation for plaintiff exercising her right to take an approved medical leave.
119. Based upon the foregoing, the District and Board are hereby charged with
violation of the ADA.
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(FMLA Retaliation and Interference against all defendants)
paragraphs.
126. Plaintiff put defendants on notice of her need for leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, for which she was qualified, and in fact took approved medical leave for
serious health conditions resulting from complications from her pregnancy as well as to recover
from an invasive Caesarian section.
127. Defendants terminated plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for exercising her
rights under the FMLA.
128. Defendants’ violations of the FMLA, as described in the Complaint, were willful
and intentional.
129. Based upon the foregoing, the District and Board are hereby charged with
violation of the FMLA.
132. Plaintiff also requests an award of attorneys' fees, liquidated damages, costs and
disbursements.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants as set forth above,
together with the costs and disbursements of this action, and for such other and further relief as
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to the Court deems just and proper.
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff demands a trial
by jury in this action.
Dated: February 19, 2016 E. STEWART JONES

HACKER MURPHY, LLP
_________________________
Ryan M. Finn, Esq.
NDNY Bar Roll Number: 513670
28 Second Street
Troy, NY 12180
rfinn@joneshacker.com
Ph: 518.213.0115
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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JS 44 (Rev. 12/12)
Case 1:16-cv-00214-BKS-ATB Document 1-1 Filed 02/22/16 Page
1:16-cv-214 1 of 2
(BKS/ATB)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

ANGELA M. NAGLE, EAST GREENBUSH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE EAST GREENBUSH
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et. al.
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Albany County County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Rensselaer
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)
E. Stewart Jones Hacker Murphy, LLP Eileen Haynes, Esq., Bartlett, Pontiff, Stewart & Rhodes, P.C.,
28 Second Street 1 Washington Street, PO Box 2168, Glens Falls, NY 12801
Troy, NY 12180
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
’ 1 U.S. Government ’ 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State ’ 1 ’ 1 Incorporated or Principal Place ’ 4 ’ 4
of Business In This State
’ 2 U.S. Government ’ 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State ’ 2 ’ 2 Incorporated and Principal Place ’ 5 ’ 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State
Citizen or Subject of a ’ 3 ’ 3 Foreign Nation ’ 6 ’ 6

Foreign Country
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES
’ 110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY ’ 625 Drug Related Seizure ’ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ’ 375 False Claims Act
’ 120 Marine ’ 310 Airplane ’ 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 ’ 423 Withdrawal ’ 400 State Reapportionment
’ 130 Miller Act ’ 315 Airplane Product Product Liability ’ 690 Other 28 USC 157 ’ 410 Antitrust
’ 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability ’ 367 Health Care/ ’ 430 Banks and Banking
’ 150 Recovery of Overpayment ’ 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS ’ 450 Commerce
& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury ’ 820 Copyrights ’ 460 Deportation
’ 151 Medicare Act ’ 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability ’ 830 Patent ’ 470 Racketeer Influenced and
’ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability ’ 368 Asbestos Personal ’ 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations
Student Loans ’ 340 Marine Injury Product ’ 480 Consumer Credit
(Excludes Veterans) ’ 345 Marine Product Liability LABOR SOCIAL SECURITY ’ 490 Cable/Sat TV
’ 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY ’ 710 Fair Labor Standards ’ 861 HIA (1395ff) ’ 850 Securities/Commodities/
of Veteran’s Benefits ’ 350 Motor Vehicle ’ 370 Other Fraud Act ’ 862 Black Lung (923) Exchange
’ 160 Stockholders’ Suits ’ 355 Motor Vehicle ’ 371 Truth in Lending ’ 720 Labor/Management ’ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ’ 890 Other Statutory Actions
’ 190 Other Contract Product Liability ’ 380 Other Personal Relations ’ 864 SSID Title XVI ’ 891 Agricultural Acts
’ 195 Contract Product Liability ’ 360 Other Personal Property Damage ’ 740 Railway Labor Act ’ 865 RSI (405(g)) ’ 893 Environmental Matters
’ 196 Franchise Injury ’ 385 Property Damage ’ 751 Family and Medical ’ 895 Freedom of Information
’ 362 Personal Injury - Product Liability Leave Act Act
Medical Malpractice ’ 790 Other Labor Litigation ’ 896 Arbitration
REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS PRISONER PETITIONS ’ 791 Employee Retirement FEDERAL TAX SUITS ’ 899 Administrative Procedure
’ 210 Land Condemnation ’ 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: Income Security Act ’ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff Act/Review or Appeal of
’ 220 Foreclosure ’ 441 Voting ’ 463 Alien Detainee or Defendant) Agency Decision
’ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment ’ 442 Employment ’ 510 Motions to Vacate ’ 871 IRS—Third Party ’ 950 Constitutionality of
’ 240 Torts to Land ’ 443 Housing/ Sentence 26 USC 7609 State Statutes
’ 245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations ’ 530 General
’ 290 All Other Real Property ’ 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION
Employment Other: ’ 462 Naturalization Application
’ 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 540 Mandamus & Other ’ 465 Other Immigration
Other ’ 550 Civil Rights Actions
’ 448 Education ’ 555 Prison Condition
’ 560 Civil Detainee -
Conditions of
Confinement
V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
’ 1 Original ’ 2 Removed from ’ 3 Remanded from ’ 4 Reinstated or ’ 5 Transferred from ’ 6 Multidistrict
Proceeding State Court Appellate Court Reopened Another District Litigation
(specify)
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), and others
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Gender discrimination; Pregnancy discrimination; wrongful discharge; retaliation
VII. REQUESTED IN ’ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
COMPLAINT: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. 10,000,000.00 JURY DEMAND: ’ Yes ’ No
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
(See instructions):
IF ANY JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
02/22/2016
#0206-3580501
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIPT # AMOUNT $400 APPLYING IFP BKS

JUDGE MAG. JUDGE ATB
Print Save As... 1:16-cv-214 Reset
JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 12/12) Case 1:16-cv-00214-BKS-ATB Document 1-1 Filed 02/22/16 Page 2 of 2
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44
Authority For Civil Cover Sheet
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as
required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is
required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of
Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:
I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use
only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and
then the official, giving both name and title.
(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the
time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land
condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting
in this section "(see attachment)".
II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X"
in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.
United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment
to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes
precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the
citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity
cases.)
III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this
section for each principal party.
IV. Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If the nature of suit cannot be determined, be sure the cause of action, in Section VI below, is
sufficient to enable the deputy clerk or the statistical clerk(s) in the Administrative Office to determine the nature of suit. If the cause fits more than
one nature of suit, select the most definitive.
V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the six boxes.

Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.
When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.
Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing
date.
Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or
multidistrict litigation transfers.
Multidistrict Litigation. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.
When this box is checked, do not check (5) above.
VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional
statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket
numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.
Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

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Case 1:16-cv-00214-BKS-ATB Document 1 Filed 02/22/16 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EAST GREENBUSH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 1:16-CV-214 (BKS/ATB)

her Complaint against defendants:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

1. Establishing and sustaining a school environment free of discrimination and

school community’s culture.

Education out of control.

3. Unfortunately the Board of Education of the East Greenbush Central School

environment free of unlawful discrimination and retaliation.

5. The claims asserted in this case involve employment discrimination; retaliation;

statutory rights by the defendants.

7. The District is subject to the above-referenced statutes and constitutional

individuals in a seventy-five mile radius.

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

8. Plaintiff Angela Nagle is an individual who resides in Albany County, State of

9. Plaintiff is a member of a protected class based upon her gender, pregnancy,

regarding the unlawful treatment by the Board.

her education, training, and experience.

Commission (“EEOC”) on May 15, 2015.

business located at 29 Englewood Avenue, East Greenbush, NY 12061, County of Rensselaer,

State of New York.

responsible for implementing District policies and decision-making as it concerns the

employment of plaintiff as Superintendent of Schools.

28. Susan Garrigan-Piela, is an individual who resides in Rensselaer County, State of

discriminatory decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment, and, many of the retaliatory

where the events complained of occurred.

term ended June 30, 2011.

success as Superintendent over the past seven years.

in the top tier of schools in the Capital District of New York.

39. As Superintendent, plaintiff is proud of her record and achievements in building a

unparalleled success under the excellent leadership of plaintiff.

Superintendent, Columbia High School was identified as a "School In Need of Improvement"

41. Plaintiff has consistently received good performance reviews.

courtesy prior to the start of the 2014-2015 school year.

conversations. In addition, meetings to advance student centered initiatives were abruptly

information was provided to explain the Board's position.

48. Due to complications of her pregnancy, Plaintiff went out on disability/maternity

pregnancy are disabilities under the ADA.

able to perform all essential functions of her job.

interactions with these same Board members.

record" discussions on matters affecting the District. District business is supposed to be

subject to the Freedom of Information Law-there should be no covert discussions; secret

chatrooms; covert emails; etc.

decision was not made because of poor performance.

from maternity leave.

her maternity leave.

annual review meeting.

to day activities of running the District.

constantly questioning plaintiff’s whereabouts; by reviewing all communications and work

plaintiff’s authority on matters traditionally left to the Superintendent of Schools.

and discriminatory motive.

68. However, these newly formed contentions of underperformance and

of the Agreement states in pertinent part:

C. Exchange of Information. The Board, individually and collectively, shall

terminate her contract for cause:

73. Certainly, plaintiff was never formally disciplined or brought up on charges to

upon alleged poor performance and insubordination to justify a termination.

74. The failure of an employer to follow policy related to discipline is especially

she returned from her maternity leave on March 16, 2015.

78. Evidence of discrimination is also supported by the change in attitude by several

month of her return from maternity leave.

79. As a further example, a finding of discrimination is supported by the statement of

just gave birth to twins.