1. Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R.No.

101083)

Facts: This case is unique since it is a class suit brought by 44children, through their
parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as
those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the
Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have
him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and
desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children
invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae
. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to
stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was
dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts so it was
brought to the Supreme Courton certiorari.

Issue: Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the
legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”.
Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing
to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment
of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest
of public welfare.

2. MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

FACTS:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against s
e v e r a l government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay, and to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan
of action for the purpose. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay
had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, which was confirmed by
DENR’s W ater Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water samples collected from
different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform
content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the
standard 200 MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-
90.T h e r e c k l e s s , w h o l e s a l e , a c c u m u l a t e d a n d o n g o i n g a c t s o f o m i s
s i o n o r commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger
to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the
RTC h e l d p e t i t i o n e r s l i a b l e a n d o r d e r e d t o c l e a n u p a n d r e h a b i l i t a t e
M a n i l a B a y a n d t o restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving,
and other forms of contact recreation.
[3]
Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the
pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also asserted that
the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be
c o m p e l l e d b y mandamus. The CA sustained RTC’s decision stressing that petitioners were
not required to do tasks outside of their basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

(1)W h e t h e r o r n o t S e c t i o n s 1 7 a n d 2 0 o f
P D 1 1 5 2 u n d e r t h e headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-
up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents;

(2)W h e t h e r o r n o t p e t i t i o n e r s b e c o m p e l l e d b y m a n d a m u s t o c l e a n u p a n d re
habilitate the Manila Bay.

HELD:
Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a
ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus. Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law
creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is mandated to put up an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems. SC also noted t h a t M M D A ’ s d u t y i n t h e a r e a o f s o l i d
w a s t e d i s p o s a l i s s e t f o r t h n o t o n l y i n t h e Environment Code (PD 1152) and
RA 9003, but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be
compelled by mandamus.

2. Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,

G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or

the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law
basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral
domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and
“ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources – somehow
against the regalian doctrine

4. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 dated September 14, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671, which
affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Metro Cebu in LRC Case No. N-
21 granting herein respondent's application for registration of title to Lots Nos. 1061 and 1062 of the
Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation2, through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed with the MTC of
Consolacion, Metro Cebu,3 an Application for Registration of Title over two parcels of land designated as
Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of 3,939 and 4,796
square meters, respectively, and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion, Cebu.4 In its application, Tri-
Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, including the improvements
thereon, having acquired the same through purchase; and that it is in actual, continuous, public,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.5 The case was docketed as LRC Case
No. N-21.6

On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the Application for Registration filed by
the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds that
neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that
the muniments of title submitted by the applicant which consists, among others, of tax declarations and
receipts of tax payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the claim of ownership in fee
simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant may no longer be availed of by the applicant because it
failed to file an appropriate application for registration in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and that the subject parcels of land are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to private appropriation.7

On September 19, 1997, Tri-Plus presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the law. On even date, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by the heirs
of Toribio Pepito praying that they be given a period of 10 days within which to file their written
opposition.8 However, the oppositors failed to file their written opposition on time. The trial court then
commissioned its clerk of court to receive evidence from the applicant and directed the former to
submit a report thereon. Accordingly, a Commissioner's Report was submitted on the proceedings
taken.9

In its Judgment dated February 26, 1998, the MTC made the following finding and conclusion:

The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, of the applicant clearly shows that it
and its predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, public, exclusive and continuous possession in
concept of owner of the parcels of land above-mentioned for no less than thirty (30) years prior to the
filing of the instant petition for registration of its imperfect title. This being so, the applicant is entitled
that its title be confirmed under the provisions of the Torrens System of Registration.10

Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the applicant TRI-PLUS
LAND CORPORATION the exclusive and absolute owner of Lot 1061 of the Cadastral Survey of
Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-07-002362 (Exhibit "J") and described in its corresponding
technical description (Exhibit "K"), and Lot 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown
on plan Ap-07-002366 (Exhibit "O") and described in its corresponding technical description (Exhibit
"P").
Once this decision becomes final, let an Order for the issuance of the decree of registration for Lots
1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cadastre, be issued in the name of TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION.

SO ORDERED.11

[G.R. No. 31688 : December 17, 1990.]

192 SCRA 296
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Abra, Second Judicial District and ABRA INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

FERNAN, J.:

The center of controversy in the instant petition for review on Certiorari is a

limestone-rich 70-hectare land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectares of which are, according to
petitioners, within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity), a duly registered
corporation established for the purpose of setting up a cement factory, claims on the other
hand, to be the owner in fee simple of the whole 70-hectare area indicated in survey plans
PSU-217518, PSU-217519 and PSU-217520 with a total assessed value of P6,724.48. Thus,
on September 23, 1965, it filed in the then Court of First Instance of Abra an application for
registration in its name of said parcels of land under the Land Registration Act or, in the
alternative, under Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 1 as amended by Republic Act No.
1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-in-interest had allegedly been in possession thereof
since July 26, 1894. 2
The requisite publication and posting of notice having been complied with, the
application was set for hearing. Except for the Director of Lands, nobody appeared to
oppose the application. Hence, the court issued an order of default against the whole world
except the Director of Lands.
After the applicant had rested its case, the provincial fiscal, appearing for the
Director of Lands, submitted evidence supporting the opposition filed by the Solicitor
General to the effect that AIC had no registerable title and that the highly mineralized
parcels of land applied for were within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve which had not
yet been released as alienable and disposable land pursuant to the Public Land Law.
On July 22, 1966, the lower court 3 favorably acted on the application and ordered
the registration of the parcels of land under the Land Registration Act. It ruled that although
said land was within the forest zone, the opposition of the Director of Lands was not well-
taken because the Bureau of Forestry, thru the District Forester of Abra, "offered no
objection to exclude the same area from the forest reserve." 4 It found that the parcels of
land had been acquired by purchase and AIC's possession thereof, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest, had been for forty-nine (49) years.
The Director of Lands, through the provincial fiscal, filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decision asserting that except for a 4-hectare area, the land covered by PSU-217518,
217519 and 217520 fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, under Proclamation
No. 217 dated February 16, 1929; that although it had been denuded, it was covered with
massive, corraline, tufaceous limestone estimated to yield 200,000,000 metric tons about a
fifth of which was suitable for the manufacture of high grade portland cement type and that
the limestone, being 250 meters thick, could yield 10,000 bags of cement a day for 1,000
years. 5 He contended that, while the land could be reclassified as mineral land under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, the process of exclusion from the Cordillera Forest
Reserve had not yet been undertaken pursuant to Sec. 1826 of Republic Act No. 3092 and
therefore it was still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the 1935
Constitution.
 AIC having filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration, the lower court
denied it on September 28, 1967 holding that the grounds raised therein were relevant and
proper only if the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Mines were parties to the case. It
added that the motion for intervention filed by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Mines
was improper in land registration cases. 6
The Director of Lands filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the
same was dismissed for having been filed out of time. 7 Hence, on December 22, 1967, the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. 118198, 118199 and 118200 for
the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of AIC.
Within one year from the issuance of said decrees or on May 22, 1968, the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, invoking Section 38 of Act No. 496, filed in
the Court of First Instance of Abra a petition for review of the decrees of registration and
the lower court's decision of July 22, 1966. The Solicitor General alleged that although the
evidence presented by AIC showed that it had purchased from individual owners only a total
area of 24 hectares, the application included 46 hectares of the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and therefore AIC "employed actual fraud" which misled the court "to error in
finding the applicant to have a registerable title over the parcels of land subject of the
application." 8
On November 27, 1969, the lower court 9 denied the petition on the ground that if,
as alleged by the Solicitor General, then presiding Judge Macario M. Ofilada was mistaken in
appreciating the evidence presented, the judicial error was "not synonymous with actual
fraud." 10
Without asking for a reconsideration of said order, on February 25, 1970, the
Solicitor General, representing the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and the
Republic of the Philippines, filed the present petition for review on Certiorari under Republic
Act No. 5440. :-c ralaw

The petition was forthwith given due course by the Court 11 but inasmuch as no
action was taken on their prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the
petitioners filed a motion reiterating said prayer. Finding the motion meritorious, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the private respondent and its agents and
representatives "from further acts of possession and disposition to innocent purchasers for
value of the parcels of land involved" in this case. 12
AIC filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on the grounds that it raises
"unsubstantial" issues and that it was filed out of time. The motion was denied by the Court
13 but it bears pointing out that AIC's second ground for dismissal, which is premised on its
perception that a motion for reconsideration of the order of November 27, 1969 is
necessary before the filing of the instant petition, is incorrect.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a prerequisite to an appeal, petition
for review or a petition for review on Certiorari. 14 The reglementary period for filing the
petition for review on Certiorari in the instant case was thirty (30) days from notice of the
order or judgment subject of review 15 which period, parenthetically, is now fifteen (15)
days pursuant to Section 39 of the Judiciary Act of 1980. 16 Petitioners having been granted
a total of sixty (60) days 17 within which to file the petition, the same was timely filed.
Petitioners herein contend that the lower court erred in granting the application for
registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that they are within the forest
zone. The District Forester's failure to object to the exclusion of the area sought to be
registered from the forest reserve was not enough justification for registration because
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the power to exclude an area from the forest zone
belongs to the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and not the District Forester or even the Director of
Forestry.
Petitioners also contend that the lower court erred in denying the petition for review
based on actual fraud because under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a decree of registration
may be reviewed not only by reason of actual fraud but also for a fatal infirmity of the
decision upon which the decree is based, provided no innocent purchaser for value will be
prejudiced.
We find the petition to be meritorious. Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated
by this Court in Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz 18 and consistently adhered to in a long line
of cases 19 the more recent of which is Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 20 that forest lands
or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert them into private properties. This ruling is premised on the Regalian
doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987
Constitution Article XIII of which provides that:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal . . . , forests or timber,
. . . and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the land must first be released from its
classification as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land in accordance with the
certification issued by the Director of Forestry as provided for by Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code. 21 This is because the classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of the courts.
22 Moreover, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 23
Being the interested party, an applicant for registration of a parcel of land bears the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain. 24 In this case, AIC asserts that the land in dispute is no longer part of
the Cordillera Forest Reserve because the communal forest in Bucay, Abra which had been
established in 1909 by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-298, had been
"cancelled and de-established" by Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-622 dated October 1,
1965 and issued by then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y.
Feliciano. 25 AIC therefore tries to impress upon the Court the fact that as there was no
longer a forested area, the same area had become alienable more so because its actual
occupants, who had been devoting it to agriculture, had relinquished their rights over it in
favor of AIC "to give way for greater economic benefits for the people in the locality." 26 It
should be emphasized, however, that the classification of the land as forest land is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. 27 Hence, the fact that the contested parcels of land have long been
denuded and actually contains rich limestone deposits does not in any way affect its present
classification as forest land.
: nad

While it is true that under Section 1839 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, may change the location of
a communal forest, such executive action does not amount to a declassification of a forest
reserve into an alienable or disposable land. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, 28 it is no
less than the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has
the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands. 29 The President shall also declare from time to time what lands are
open to disposition or concession. 30 AIC therefore, should prove first of all that the lands it
claims for registration are alienable or disposable lands. As it is, AIC has not only failed to
prove that it has a registerable title but more important]y, it failed to show that the lands
are no longer a part of the public domain.
The petitioners therefore validly insisted on the review of the decision ordering the
issuance of the decree of registration in view of its patent infirmity. The lower court closed
its eyes to a basic doctrine in land registration cases that the inclusion in a title of a part of
the public domain nullifies the title. 31 Its decision to order the registration of an inalienable
land in favor of AIC under the misconception that it is imperative for the Director of Forestry
to object to its exclusion from the forest reserve even in the face of its finding that indeed a
sizable portion of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve is involved, cannot be allowed to
stay unreversed. It betrays an inherent infirmity which must be corrected. :-cra law

WHEREFORE, the order of November 27, 1969 denying the petition for review under
Section 38 of Act No. 496 and the decision of July 22, 1966 insofar as it orders the
registration of land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve are hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued on April 7, 1970 is hereby made
permanent. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

6. D E C I S I O N [G.R. No. L-2869. March 25, 1907. ]

MATEO CARIÑO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-
Appellee. Coudert Brothers, for Appellant. Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J. :
Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the
Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land
consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio,
Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and
roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and
20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east,
in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales,
and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with
the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with
the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng.

By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and
Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter
petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.

The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole
parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in
any manner or through any title of egresion from the State.

After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration
rendered its judgment in these terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively
and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed
the house now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cariño held
possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title.
Both petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill
of exceptions, p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below
are the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a
domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question,
property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be
property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to
one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on
the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps
Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega
and Minse, had lived . . .

"In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on
the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a
house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the
property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied
some portion of the property now claimed by him." (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the
superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed
herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the
documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the
petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information under date of
March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year; and, according
to such possessory information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28
hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan
now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center
from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the
said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory
information mentioned.

2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in
said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by
the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is
"used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the
legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession
of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of
this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory
information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement.

4. The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in
substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the
last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-
matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered
nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said
royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a
period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption
during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the
information and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that
such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more
years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the
testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following
reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last
legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual
proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and
required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in
time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows:" A period of one year,
not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in
articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and
persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full
possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said
possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or
general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years
immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can
only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance
with common law."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be
certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in
case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years
immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out
by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case.
Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in the possessory
information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of
ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years
from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article
393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law —
remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could
only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition
and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and
designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands
strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor
be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with
lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal
or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the
alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13
of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under
this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution
thereof, one of which is Act No. 648, 2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection
with Act No. 627, 3 which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained
in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title
under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of
his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits
such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding
more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40
hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares,
according to the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it
follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in
accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of
same, according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of
which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been
determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the
judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not
lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and
title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have already exceeded such amount
in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said
Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have been made
efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws.

By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not
err:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed
and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;

"2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
contrary, it was the property of the Government." (Allegation 21.)

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against
theAppellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let
judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be
remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-

2746 December 6, 1906
MATEO CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was
never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.

Carino vs. Insular Government

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to petition
his inscription as theowner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing
inthe then municipality of Baguio. Mateo onlypresented possessory information and no otherdocument
ation. The State opposed the petitionaverring that the land is part of the US militaryreservation. The CLR
ruled in favor of Mateo. TheState appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred
that agrant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation. The US SC ruled in
favor of Carino and ordered theregistration of the subject lands in his name. Thecourt laid down the
presumption of a certain titleheld as far back as memory went and under a
claimof private ownership. Land held by this title ispresumed to never have been public land. Theregistr
ation requirement was not to “confer title, butsimply to establish it”. In anutshell, Cariño
enunciated the legal presumptionthat ancestral lands and domains were not part of the public domain,
having maintained their characteras private lands of the indigenous peoples since timeimmemorial
Why Carino doctrine is unique?
Carino is the only case that specifically recognizesnative title. Carino was cited by succeeding cases
tosupport the concept of acquisitive prescription underthe Public Land Act

.Republic of the Philippines vs.Celestina Naguiat (2006)

Facts:
Celestina Naguiat applied for registration of title to 4 parcels of land (located in Botolan,Zambales) with
RTC Zambales.
She claimed to have acquired itfrom LID Corporation, who in
turnhad acquired it from Calderon,Moraga and Monje and theirpredecessors-in-interest who havebeen
in possession for more than30 years.
Republic of the Philippines (through theOSG) filed an opposition to the application.
They claim that neither Naguiat norher predecessors-in-interest havebeen in possession since
12 June1945, that the muniments of titleand tax payment receipts aren’tsufficient evidence of a bona
fideacquisition of the lands, thatNaguiat’s Spanish title can no
longer be availed of and finally,that said lands are part of thepublic domain and not subject of private
appropriation.
•RTC rendered a decision in favour of Naguiat and decreed the registration of saidlands in her name.
•Petitioner Republic of the Phils brought caseto the CA.
•CA affirmed RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the areas in question have ceased tohave the status of forest or other inalienable lands
of the public domain.
Decision: No. Naguiat was unable to provide sufficientevidence that such parcels of land are nolonger a
part of the public domain