G.R. No.

84240

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,

vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA
C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR.,
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-
FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres Pascual
died intestate 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and
was survived by the following:

1. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse;

2. Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased;

3. Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased;

4. Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased;
and

5. Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased.

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the
Regional Trial Court a Special Proceeding for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband.
Subsequently, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary
rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle.

Petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights
and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights, and yet the RTC denied the
motion. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same. Petitioner
appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, yet it was dismissed, and their motion for reconsideration
filed thereafter was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

RULING:

Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides, “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”
 Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child, but petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual are his
illegitimate children. It is settled that the right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother.

Therefore, petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, being illegitimate children of Eligio
Pascual, cannot represent the latter in the inheritance of Don Andres Pascual, petitioners’ uncle.

G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005

LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN MAURICIO P. BRAVO, ROLAND P. BRAVO,

JR., OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA BRAVO-NIOR namely: GERSON
U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF RICHARD B. NIOR, BRYAN B. NIOR, WIDMARK
B. NIOR, SHERRY ANNE B. NIOR, represented by LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO as
their attorney-in-fact, and HONORABLE FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati City vs. EDWARD P. BRAVO, represented by his
attorney-in-fact FATIMA C. BRAVO, respondent, and DAVID B. DIAZ, JR.

TOPIC: General Power of Attorney; Partition

FACTS:

Sps. Mauricio and Simona Bravo owned two parcels of land in Makati (“the Properties”).

Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo
married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. Roland had six children, namely, Lily Elizabeth
Bravo-Guerrero, Edward Bravo, Roland Bravo, Jr., Senia, Benjamin Mauricio, and their half-sister, Ofelia
Bravo.

Simona executed a General Power of Attorney appointing Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact authorizing
him to mortgage the Properties. Mauricio subsequently mortgaged the properties to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).

Later, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage conveying the
Properties to "Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo". The sale was conditioned on the
payment of ₱1,000 and on the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and DBP mortgages over the
Properties.

The Deed of Sale was certified (by the Clerk of Court of the RTC Manila) and notarized (by Atty. Victorio
Q. Guzman). However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated. Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP.
The mortgage loans continued to be in Mauricio’s name even after his death on 20 November 1973.
Simona died in 1977.

Both Edward (represented by his wife) and David Jr. filed separate complaints-in-intervention impugning
the validity of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition of the Properties. RTC allowed the
intervention.

RTC upheld Mauricio’s sale of the Properties to the vendees and denied the petition for judicial partition.
The ruling implies that the sale did not prejudice the compulsory heirs, as the Properties were conveyed
for valuable consideration. Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. filed a joint appeal to the Court of Appeals.

CA, by citing Article 166 of the Civil Code, declared the Deed of Sale void for lack of Simona’s consent.
The GPA executed was not sufficient to authorize Mauricio to sell the Properties because Article 1878
requires a special power of attorney for such transactions. The GPA was executed merely to enable
Mauricio to mortgage the Properties, not to sell them. The partition of the Properties was ordered.

ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale is valid.
2. Whether or not the Properties should be subject to partition.

RULING:

First issue: NO.

CA erred when it declared the Deed of Sale void based on Article 166. The article is inapplicable to
properties acquired by the conjugal partnerships before the effective date of this Code. Under Article 1413
of the old Spanish Civil Code, the husband could alienate conjugal partnership property for valuable
consideration without the wife’s consent.

Even under the present Civil Code, the Deed of Sale is not void. It is well-settled that contracts alienating
conjugal real property without the wife’s consent are merely voidable under the Civil Code and not
void ab initio.

Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real property
without her consent. The wife must file the action for annulment during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction. Respondents’ action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article 166 fails
by reason of prescription. The marriage of Mauricio and Simona was dissolved when Mauricio died in
1973. More than ten years have passed since the execution of the Deed of Sale.

Further, respondents, who are Simona’s heirs, are not the parties who can invoke Article 166. Article 173
reserves that remedy to the wife alone. Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of the Properties when she
executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney but even if a document is titled
as a general power of attorney, the requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a clear
mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act.

Second issue: YES.

Nevertheless, SC grants the partition subject to modification.

Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the vendees who bought the Properties.
Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the "Roland A. Bravo" in the Deed of Sale is their
father, although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr., made some of the mortgage payments. As Roland Bravo,
Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and
entitled to a share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his father’s portion of the Properties. In short,
Edward and petitioners are co-owners of the Properties.

As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action
for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.

SC granted the judicial partition in the following manner:

a. Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the

Properties;
b. Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the Properties; and

c. The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties should be divided equally between the
children of ROLAND BRAVO.

The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO were required to reimburse ROLAND BRAVO, JR. for whatever
expenses the latter incurred in paying for and securing the release of the mortgage on the Properties.

Manuel v. Ferrer
G.R. No. 117246, August 21, 1995
FACTS:

The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz
Guiling. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista, from
which Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name.
He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name.

The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to
take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
“daughter”.

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two
years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-
respondent Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2)
portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro.

These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the
Regional Trial Court, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners had the legal personality to contest the actions of Modesta.

RULING:

No. Petitioners, not being the real “parties-in-interest” in the case, had neither the standing nor
the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

The law provides, the following are considered to be a party in interest in order to initiate an action:

a. where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
former’s inheritance;

b. the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child;

c. a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent;

d. the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of
her natural father; and

e. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father;

In the case at bar, Modesta’s answer to the complaint, she admitted that she was not an intestate
heir of Juan Manuel because she was adopted without the benefit of formal or judicial adoption and
therefore was neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. As such, that petitioners, not being heirs ab
intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.

Ergo, Petitioners had no legal personality to contest the actions of Modesta.

DE PAPA v CAMACHO
No. L-28032, 24 September 1986
144 SCRA 281
DOCTRINE: Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and aunts of the prepositus, and (b) a niece of
the prepositus, the latter is preferred to the exclusion of the former in the distribution of the reversionary
estate. This is pursuant to the application of the ordinary rules of intestate succession which govern the
distribution of the reversionary estate. Please note that brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces rank fourth in the
order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Upon the other hand, the uncles and aunts (collectively
referred to as collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree) rank fifth in the order of intestate succession to
a legitimate person. Thus, following the order of preference, those who rank fourth will exclude all those
relatives who rank fifth. Again, this is a reaffirmation of the theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in
Padura.

Marciana Balbino . . . . . Romana

Francisca
Manuel
Nicolas
Eustacio Toribia

Faustino Trinidad

Dalisay

Narvasa, J.:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was
submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial
Compromise:"

FACTS:

1. The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs Francisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.

2. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino
Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex "A"
and made an integral part of this stipulation.

3. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four(4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia
Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes "B", "B-1", and "B-2."

4. Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two
children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

5. In 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children and by his wife Marciana
Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In
the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes
"C' and "C-1" were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had
predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his
sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was
subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes "B", "B-1", "C" and "C-1."

7. In 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
above-mentioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived by his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the
seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-
Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said
seven parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the
death of Faustino Dizon and under the law on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal
advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso
interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon,
or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels ofland, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in
question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios
(together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-
indiviso share, or three-eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs'
share in the rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice in
pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family
relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest
on plaintiffs' share in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties.

ISSUE:

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower court, all
relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the
reservable property upon the death of the reservista.

HELD:

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his rights as
reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation
on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of
the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is
the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews
of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
whole blood should likewise be operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the
property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by
the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. x x x

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-
appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunts and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon
(the prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they
are related to him within the same degree as the latter. x x x

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside, and the
complaint is dismissed with costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL.,

FACTS:

Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the
marriage he begot nine children. After he became a widower, he married the second time Severina Faz de
Leon with whom he had two children. Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890, and he
was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon, and his 11 children, one of which is Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino III which was born on March 4, 1890. Part of the inheritance of Apolonio Florentino
III is a reservable property. Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in
1891 and his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property. Severina Faz de Leon died on
November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes
Florentino. Mercedes Florentino enjoyed all the fruits of the property including that of the reservable
property, thus the other heirs filed an action to claim their shares of the reservable property. In the said
complaint, petitioners are claiming that they are entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable
property described therein, either by direct participation or by representation. That the plaintiffs asked the
defendant in an amicable manner to deliver their part of their share on the reservable property but
defendant refused to do so. Counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is based
on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her
deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon. Defendant futher countered that article 811 is inapplicable
that there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her
rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may not passed into the
possession of strangers are void.Futhermore, she contended that the obligation to reserve is secondary to
the duty of respecting the legitime, that her obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the
prejudice of the legitime which belongs to the forced heiress.

After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the
complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.

Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial; said
motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which
was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants, the said judge, disregarding the
ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from the complaint
and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.

Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary — as in this case what
has been done does not prejudice the parties — the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit
according to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the question of law
in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the
ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it
is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.

ISSUE/s:

1. WON the properties in question is that of a reservable property.

2. WON the other heirs are entitled to their share of the reservable property.

RULING:

1. Yes.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in their complaint came, without any doubt
whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of
Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his
legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with
the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the
possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of person other than
those comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo
II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and
condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son
Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the
right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or
return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree,
among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of her
only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is
in her will concerning the reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather,
whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and
nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is
not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to
preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter,
Mercedes Florentino.

2. YES.
The court ruled that with the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz
de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being
relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of
said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part
thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the
plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and
of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity
for one thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special
findings as to the costs of both instances. Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to
the indemnity for damages, it is not proper to grant for there is no evidence of any damage
which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same.

N.B

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits
and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become
the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his
descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.

PADURA vs BALDOVINO

G. R. No. L-11960

FACTS:

Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had
one child whom they named Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing; he had two children
named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.. Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last
will and testament, duly probated wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children and his
surviving spouse. Under the probate proceedings, Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; and not having any
issue, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother, Benita Garing. She applied for
and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition that the
properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
said property came.

Benita Garing (the reservista), died on October 15, 1952 and on August 1, 1953, the legitimate children
of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were declared to be the rightful reservees, and
as such, entitled to the reservable properties.

On October 22, 1956, appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that one-half
of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they
inherit by right of representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this petition,
appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be deemed as
inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share.

The lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees (without distinction) "co-owners, pro-
indiviso. Thus this appeal.

ISSUE:

In a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios(reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the
half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned
among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the
nephews of the half blood?

RULING:

Nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood.

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is
the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and
the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate
collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the
property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided
by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This
conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application
should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.

NIEVA VS ALCALA
41 Phil 915

Facts:
Spouses Juliana Nieva and Francisco Deocampo had a legitimate son Alfeo Deocampo. Prior to
such marriage, Juliana Nieva had a daughter Segunda Maria Nieva, the petitioner in this case. She later
on died intestate and her legitimate son Alfeo Deocampo inherited from her parcels of land. Alfeo
Deocampo died intestate thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father,
Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession.

Francisco Deocampo married Manuela Alcala, the defendant, had a son together, Jose
Deocampo, the other defendant. Francisco Deocampo died thereafter. Manuela and Jose then took
possession of the parcels of land claiming that Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab
intestate, from his deceased father.

Segunda Maria Nieva filed an action for the recovery of the parcels of land declaring herself to
be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, invoking the provisions of article 811 of
the Civil Code. The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question
because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal
provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.

Held: NO.
Reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Spansih Civil Code reads:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously
from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

According to Manresa, the interpretation of the Art. 811 of the Spanish Civil Code should be
strictly applied in favor of the legitimate ascendants only as intended by legislators. There are three
underlying reasons for such opinion. First, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the
natural relationship is the exception in this code. If the legislators intended the provision to apply to
natural relationship, a specific designation would have been stated. Second, the neighboring provisions
of Article 811, only speaks of legitimate ascendants. The rules on intestate succession of natural parents
are found in Articles 939 to 945 and articles 840 to 847. Lastly, the principle which underlies the
exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation.
Regardless of the reason behind the reservation, whether to keep the property in the family from the
danger of a subsequent marriage, the provision only applies to legitimate ascendants.

In the case at bar, Segunda Maria Nieva is the natural of Juliana Nieva even if acknowledged is
not endowed with the benefits of reserva troncal and to hold her entitled to the property left by her
natural brother would violate Article 943 of the same code stating: “A natural or legitimated child has no
right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.”

TUAZON VS REYES
48 PHILS 664

Facts:

The court ordered the partition in equal shares between Vicente Tuazon and Petronilo David of
some 15 hectares of the land and the case was returned to the Court of First Instance for further
proceedings in accordance with sections 184 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Pending partition, Petronilo David obtained Torrens certificates of title for the land and sold the
land to the petitioner herein, Vicente Tuazon, the deed containing a recital to the effect that of the land
so sold, an area of about 7 hectares was in dispute between the vendor and Robert Siochi, defendant
herein. Transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Vicente Tuazon on March 8, 1923, but through
the negligence of the register of deeds, the reservation made in regard to the land in dispute with Siochi
was; not entered upon the certificates of title.

Tuazon presented to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a written protest against the
partition on the ground that he held Torrens certificates of title to all of the land and by reason of said
protest, the court set aside the partition. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Siochi, Judge Reyes
thereafter revoked the order of his predecessor and ordered the commissioners to execute the partition
of the land. The commissioners presented their report adjudicating to Siochi his share of the land in
dispute which report was duly approved by said judge but Tuazon refused to deliver possession to Siochi
of the land awarded the latter and he was remanded that Siochi be placed in possession of the land
adjudicated to him. Tuazon maintains that not being a party to the original action, his title was not
affected by the partition proceedings and that therefore the order directing that Siochi be placed in
possession of the portion adjudicated to him in said proceedings was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the order not being a party to the case and being a
buyer in good faith?

HELD:
NO.

A purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith holds an
indefeasible title to the land.
However, in the case at bar the element of good faith is lacking. The defendant acquired his title
while the partition proceedings were pending and his title is therefore subject to the incidents and
results of the pending litigation and is no better than that of the vendor in whose shoes he now stands.
In these circumstances, the petitioner's transfer certificates of title can afford him no special protection.
The deed under which the title was acquired expressly recites that the land was in dispute and that as to
the disputed portion only the interest of the vendor was conveyed.

G.R. No. 14904

FRANCISCO D. LUNSOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Rufina Medel, widow, executed a public document and was acknowledged before a
notary public, wherein she sold to Francisco Lunsod for a certain amount of money with the right
to repurchase for two years, 3- parcels of land planted with coconut trees.

Later, Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace court a complaint against
Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga for unlawful entry and detainer, alleging that he was
illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth, turned out of the possession of said 3-parcels of
land by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been collecting the fruits of the
properties.

Said court rendered judgment against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga and
ordered them to restore the possession of the property in question to Francisco Lunsod. From
this judgment an appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance by the defendant Ortega,
alleging that he was in possession of said parcels because he was, together with his sister
Francisca Ortega, a pro indiviso owner thereof, and that his possession was not obtained
illegally.

When Rufina Medel died, intestate proceedings were instituted by Cipriano Medel,
brother of Rufina Medel, for the appointment of an administrator of the property left by her, and
Cipriano Medel himself was appointed administrator. An inventory of the property of said
deceased had been submitted, in which the three parcels of land in question were included, with
the statement that they had been sold to Francisco Lunsod with the right to repurchase.
Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega appeared in said proceedings and filed a motion asking
that said parcels be excluded from the inventory on the ground that said parcels were their
exclusive property and were then in their exclusive possession, having inherited the same from
their first cousin, Anacleta Ortega. This petition was opposed by said administrator and denied
by the court, reserving to Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega the right to institute the proper
action against the administrator of the property, on the ground that the question as to the
ownership of those parcels could not be raised in intestate proceedings.

In that regard, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance against Cipriano Medel, the brother and administrator of the estate of Rufina
Medel, deceased, and Francisco Lunsod, the plaintiff in the case for unlawful entry and detainer,
alleging that through inheritance from their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their niece
Anacleta Ortega, deceased, they were the absolute owners thereof, and had been in
possession of said parcels in question.

The court overruled the complaint on the ground following grounds:

1. that the deceased, Rufina Medel, was the sole heir in the direct line of her deceased
daughter Anacleta Ortega, the latter having died before her mother while still young
and long after her father Estanislao Ortega;

2. that there was no will, and as Rufina Medel left neither legitimate descendants nor
ascendants, nor acknowledged or legitimated children, her brother and sister who
survived her, the defendant Cipriano Medel and the latter's sister Jacoba, succeeded
her directly, in all her obligations, rights and choses in action affecting said three
parcels of land, according to said intestate proceeding; and

3. that Rufina Medel, together with her predecessors and heirs, had been exercising
the absolute right of ownership over said parcels and had been possessing them as
owners quietly and peacefully, without any interruption, for many years until when
they were usurped by Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega

ISSUE:

Whether Francisco Lunsod, or Cipriano Medel, or Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca

Ortega have the right of ownership over the 3-parcels of land in question.

RULING:

Article 975 of the Civil Code states explicitly that the father or mother required by article
968 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
 "Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by
the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his
or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."

It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a
condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the
first marriage survive." If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be
reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right
to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the
alienation subsists (to subsist is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:

"The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still

pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of
the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the
registration."

In view thereof, the person obliged to reserve, that is, Rufina Medel, heir of her daughter
Anacleta Ortega, was not only a usufructuary but also the owner in fee simple of the three
parcels of land in question, notwithstanding the fact that they have the character of reservable
property in favor of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, relatives within the third degree of said
Anacleta Ortega and belonging to the line from which such property came, and, in her capacity
as such, she could have, as she did, sold with the right to repurchase said 3-parcels to
Francisco Lunsod; but it is also indisputable that Rufina Medel acquired these parcels subject to
a resolutory condition, that is to say, her ownership of said property was subject to said
condition, to wit, that there should or should not exist at the time of her death relatives of
Anacleta Ortega from whom she inherited said property, included within the third degree and
belonging to the line from which said property came, by virtue of which condition said property
was impressed with the reservable character, according to the provision of article 811 of the
Civil Code, and therefore she could not have effected said sale without saving the rights of the
persons entitled to have the property reserved to them, by securing to the latter the value
thereof, according to the provision of article 974 and 975 of the Civil Code in connection with
article 109 of the Mortgage Law and in the manner established in this article, the provisions of
the first two articles being applicable by analogy to reservable property mentioned in article 811
of the Civil Code to which reference has already been made.

Rufina Medel not having complied with the provisions of said article in effecting the sale
of said parcels in favor of Francisco Lunsod, inasmuch as the document executed for the
purpose was not recorded in the registry of property, and she could not, therefore, have made in
the corresponding record the express reservation of the right of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega
over said property, and said Rufina Medel not having even mentioned in said document the fact
that said property was reservable, said alienation is void and can have no effect as against the
persons entitled to have such property reserved, who are Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega.

G.R. No. L-23770 February 18, 1926

MAGIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE CALLEJA,
defendants-appellees.

Domingo Imperial for appellant

Mariano Locsin for appellees.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only
marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina.
The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa,
no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and
Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child
who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his
property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of
land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his
wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir.

On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that
Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral
who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on
the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided
between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the
complaint being assigned to Maria Corral.

On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas
for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded in the registry of deeds on
November 6, 1920. On November 3, 1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to
Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a public document which was recorded in the registry of
deeds on November 6, 1920. On September 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 6 to Maria Corral stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had
been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.

The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal this court
reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to probate. 1 The legal proceedings for
the probate of the will and the settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at
the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the contract of
extrajudicial partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the
court, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the said testamentary
proceedings.

From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were
acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of
Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of
the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that
parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and
11 were successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha.
Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree
of the line from which this property came.

This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against
Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as
purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the
reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.

The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that the
plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the
registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be
declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa
and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the
deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral, Marcelina
Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in favor of the
reservees as surety for the conservation and maintenance of the improvements existing on the said
reservable property. The dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:

For the foregoing reasons it is held:

1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have the
character of reservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being compelled to
make the reservation, must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and the
defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of these should survive her; 3.
That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have the right, in case that Maria Corral
should die before them, to receive the said parcels or their equivalent.
 In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the right of
Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said parcels of lands
described in the complaint, which she shall expressly record in the registration of said lands
in the office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To insure the delivery of said parcels
of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either
of them survive her, either by a mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of P30,000,
without express pronouncement as to costs.

The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.

Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the reservor (reservista)
and creates rights in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it is of the utmost importance to
determine the time when the land acquired the character of reservable property.

It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas entered into a
contract of extrajudicial partition of the property left by Jose Riosa, in which they assigned to Maria
Corral, as her legitime, the parcels of land here in question, and at the same time petitioned for the
probate of the will of Jose Riosa and instituted the testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality
of the extrajudicial partition between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas the provision of section 596
of the Code of Civil Procedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a person dying without a will
to make a partition without the intervention of the courts whenever the heirs are all of age and the
deceased has left no debts. But this legal provisions refers expressly to intestate estates and, of
course, excludes testate estates like the one now before us.

When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in accordance
therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass property until it is probated.
And even after being probated it cannot pass any property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed
by law in favor of certain heirs. Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the testamentary
provisions must be passed upon by the court.

For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of the extrajudicial
partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that for the purposes of the
reservation and the rights and obligations arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives,
the property cannot be considered as having passed to Maria Corral but from the date when the said
partition was approved by the court, that is, on November 12, 1920. In the case of Pavia vs. De la
Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down the same doctrine in the following language:

The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions of
article 1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simple acceptance of the
inheritance of a deceased person or that made with benefit of inventory and the
consequences thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but only
after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication of
the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by
law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or
administrator appointed by a competent court.

As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold by Maria Corral
to Marcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this appeal it is urged that Marcelina
Casas and Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the court below, be ordered to acknowledge the
reservation as to parcels 10 and 11, acquired by them, and to have the said reservation noted on
their titles. This argument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina Casas for the reason that she
transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha.

It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article 868 tending to
assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse are applicable to the reservation
known as "reserva troncal," referred to in article 811, which is the reservation now under
consideration.
In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the reservation noted in the
registry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of
ninety days for accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law).
According to article 203 of the General Regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law, this time
must be computed from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil Code,
regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as has been indicated,
must be computed from the adjudication of the property by the court to the heirs, in line with the
decision of this court hereinabove quoted. After the expiration of this period the reservees may
demand compliance with this obligation.

If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be no doubt that she
could be compelled to cause the reservable character of this property to be noted in the registry of
deeds. This land having been sold to Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the
question arises whether the latter can be compelled to have this reservation noted on his title. This
acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria Corral to make the notation of
the reservation in the registry and at the time when the reservees had no right to compel Maria
Corral to make such notation, because this acquisition was made before the expiration of the period
of ninety days from November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by the court, after which the
right of the reservees to commence an action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land
first passed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that the law
imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than that held by Maria
Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and the obligation to note it in the registry
of deeds, this same limitation is attached to the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.

In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory condition
for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the resolvable character of the
property was not recorded in the registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas
and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were
made at the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the
reservees did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.

Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when
they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa
by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the
legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition with
Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose
Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land
by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the
relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a
daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of
them knew that these parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her
son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable
property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11
has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to
comply with this obligation.

The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring the return of
these parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a mortgage or a bond in the
amount of P30,000, also applies to Pablo Rocha. The law does not require that the reservor give this
security, the recording of the reservation in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil
Code). There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the notation once is made, the property
will answer for the efficacy of the reservation. This security for the value of the property is required
by law (art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the surviving spouse
when the property has been sold before acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil
Code), but is not applicable to reservation known as reserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil Code). In the
case of Dizon and Dizon vs. Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:

* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation
by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva troncal
provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in some respects, these rules
may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to a reservation by
the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the property goes to the reservor as reservable
property and it remains so until the reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a
reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the property
 goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a
second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free
of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the
transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold during the first stage, before
becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered.
But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen,
the property goes to the purchaser subject to the reservation, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law provides that should the
property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts another
marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon
contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the
rights of those for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not
required by law when the sale is made after the reservation will follow the property, without
prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent
purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the property since it is liable for the
efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value of the property sold by
the widower, before becoming reservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the
property goes to the ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva
troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second
marriage in the case of a reservation by the widowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it is
unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable character of the
other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are
decided.

The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of
deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Street Malcolm, Villamor, Strand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellees.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law
to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each
parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue
and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan —
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions.

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property
had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
had acquired without a valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which
is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
(p. 49).

However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant
inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17,
20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her
son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had
passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary
provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.
190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.

The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary
estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other
half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)

In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.

No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.

Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a
half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.

Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact
that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:

The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house
and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).

The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio
Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced
that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.

The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she
do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not
refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the
prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to
constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the
required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not
been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character
by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889,
and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14,
1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the
force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the
person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that
the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)

The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can
and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but
in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required
to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law states:

The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real
property, and consequently of agrarian credit.

The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.

Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth
in article 968 thereof, where it says:

Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."

The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when
their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court
of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:

That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the
right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes
in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate
or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and
it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature
of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.

Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required
by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of
the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case
had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right
would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property;
and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value
of what is validly alienated.

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this
is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can
only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of
age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either
case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads as thus:

Legal mortgage is established:

1. . . .

2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.

This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety
days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down
a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must
make the reservation.

Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."

Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199
of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution
of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."

Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the
period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by
law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation
of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.

Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring
that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action
does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of
the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:

Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)

It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of
the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is
said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.

The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:

What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Civil Code?

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the
person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could
not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's
consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code,
and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.

Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct and the fee simple;
the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of
that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will
enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained — that is,
that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has
no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to
that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes
this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary,
depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as
it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the
father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the
first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform
any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except
the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the
fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and
the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they
might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:

Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death
no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage of Law.

It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."

If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to
exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:

The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in
said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.

In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the
right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what
the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly
directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants
must make the reservation.

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.

The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.

But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion
of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer
to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved
in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:

The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the
realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they
can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal
title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order
to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us
that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of
a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is
authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and
in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re,
for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and
the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership,
he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law
the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the
following terms:

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent
is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided
that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed — that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover
the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to say,
the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that
he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than
the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person
who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either
or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special
findings as to costs.