"The ethical l i f e must consist in the

attempt ta realize those values t h a t

are universal and timeless, though
o f course thorp values must be actua-
lized i n particular and temporal modes."
- C. Stephem Evma

C H A P T E R IV

THE UNIVERSAL SPHERE OF EXISTENCE: THE ETHICAL,

THE COMMUNICATIVE, AND THE TEMPORAL

1. Spheres o f Existence

The possible ways of being of human existence seem incredi-

b l y numerous. Each individual's life-style, moods, occupations, cus-

toms, etc. infinitely vary. Then, how i s Kierkegeard justified in

his belief that, despite the i n f i n i t e ways of living, the number of

possible ways of existing can be reduced to a small set of existential

cateqories? He i s convinced that upon reflection one discerns the

fact that, though there seem to be innumerable Ilfe-style, only a

few ways of existence d i f f e r essentially from each other. However,

Kierkegaard's scheme of existential categories is not absolute. He

does not deny other ways of constituting existence. Therefore, this

scheme i s not a system for him, but merely serves as n conceptual

tool for h i s project. It i s both helpful and fundamental to h i s w r i -

tings. This view of Kierkegaard's I s expressed in the v e r y title

page o f one of h i s pseudonymous books, Stages on L l f e ' s Way. A

brief account of the "existence-spheres'' w i l l be helpful f o r a p r e l i m l -

nary understanding.
 The three stages presented i n Stages on L i f e ' s way a d

the aesthetic, ethical. and re1igious. Also, Kierkegaard discusses

two boundary zones o r transltionai spheres and two forms of rellglous

spheres. The boundary zones are "irony" which l i e s between the

aesthetic and the ethical, and "humour" which l i e s between the ethical

and the religious spheres. Two forms of religious l i f e are a religlous

l i f e which remains w i t h i n immanence - Religiousness "A", and a r e l i g i -

ous l i f e diametrically opposite, which supposes that Cod has entered

into h i s t o r y i n a "transcendent" way - Religiousness "B".

Aesthetic l i f e i s a " l i f e of immediacy" as Cilmacus would

call it. Broadly speaking, i t i s a life-style i n which peopie are

absorbed i n the satisfaction of natural desires and b o d i l y impulses.

I t is a life lived for the present, that which vacillates between

fortune and misfortune, happiness and unhappiness, and so on. In

short, the aesthetic life i s one i n which peopie simply are what

they are, instead of assuming the responsibility to become what they

should become.

The aesthetic as an existence-sphere is, In a sense, the

starting point from which every person begins hislher existence.

I t i s precisely the life-style of the person who wants to enjoy plea-

sure. The v e r y term "aesthetic" i s used In the etymologicai sense

as used i n Creek - asthetisch - meaning "sensation". Therefore; it

i s essentially a search f o r satisfying moments. w h i c h cannot, by thsli

very nature, endure.

The aesthete, however, b y no means i s merely a hedonlst

in the Epicurean o r utilitarian sense. The categories of "pleasureu

and "pain" a r e too l i m i t e d i n content to describe an aesthetic I l f e .

Kierkegaard i s well aware of t h e complexity of human psyche. He

observes t h a t t h e range of things w h i c h people enjoy are more than

mere pleasure. Therefore, Kierkegaard colours the aesthetic Ilfe,

through h i s pseudonyms, i n many forms ranging from crude and vulgar

sensuality t o r e f i n e d and cultured sensibility. The l i m i t s w h i c h he

sketches a r e pure sensuousness on t h e one hand, and pure imaginative

reflection on the other. The aesthete does not merely seek satisfaction

through fulfilling mundane desires l i k e food, sex, and so on. The

more developed t h e imagination is, t h e more v a r i e t y i s sought after.

In EitherlOr a range of possible aesthetic life-styles is

portrayed. Don ~ u a n ! a classical figure known f o r raw sensuality,

is taken as an example for pure immediacy w h i c h forms one ideal l i m i t

to aesthetic life, This sort of sensuous immediacy is SDontaneous

and not achieved b y reflection. A person becomes conscious of it

only when i t i s gone throuqh. The aesthete in E i t h e r l O r , known as

"A"
, sentimentally longs for t h e spontaneity of Don Juan and achieves

this i n d i r e c t l y b y listening to Mozart's Don Giovanine ( a musical piece).

Here t h e aesthetic life totally r e l i e s on imagination. A life lived

in imagination has two advantages. First, imagination attempts to

overcome t h e boredom faced i n the actual life. Second, imagination

gives t h e aesthete a c e r t a i n amount of independence from t h e r e a l

w o r l d on w h i c h t h e aesthete, of course, does not have complete con-

. Even if actual life does not o f f e r t h e enjoyment w h i c h the

aesthete seeks, it may be sought through a poetic or imaginative

transformation of reality. Therefore, t h e aesthete has a special in-

terest In a r t , w h i c h becomes a substitute f o r t h e real. The o t h e r

ideal l i m i t o f aesthetic l i f e i s pure reflection. This type of life-

style i s sketched i n =, Vol.1 b y way o f a famous "Diary of a Sedu-

cer." The seducer p i c t u r e d here i s p u r e l y an intellectual. He i s

a completely r e f l e c t i v e counterpart of Don Juan's immediacy. Another

example w h i c h Climacus gives f o r p u r e r e f l e c t i o n i s Hegel's speculative

philosophy. Hence, Climacus considers Heqel ' s philosophy to be

merely an aesthetic work. However, t h a t a p u r e l y intellectual and

imaginative life is also impossible is suggested at t h e end of the

Diary. The aesthetic life, of course, does not always take Such

extremes. Most people who l i v e a t t h i s l e v e l r a t h e r have a monoton-

ous existence. However, Kierkegaard wanted to exhaust t h e p o s s i b i -

l i t i e s from one extreme t o another i n t h i s realm o f existence.

Whatever form the aesthetic llfe takes on, it is judged

in terms of t h e e t h i c a l l i f e because Kierkegaard believes t h a t aesthe-

t i c l i f e i s e s s e n t i a l l y a l i f e i n despair a t bottom. Though i n b o t h

-
Eitherlor

the e t h i c a l
and Stages on L i f e ' s

i s superior t o aesthetic,
Way t h e r e

yet
i s no d i r e c t c l a l m t h a t

it b y no means p o r t r a y s

them as o f equal worthiness. I n b o t h these books, the ethical l i f e

i s represented b y Assessor William. a h a p p i l y m a r r i e d judge, hence-

f o r t h r e f e r r e d t o as Judge William. The Judge e a s i l y wins o v e r t h e

aesthete; and even t h e mistakes of t h e aesthete a r e corrected I n t h e

ethical sections of t h e books. The v i c t o r y o f t h e Judge i s grounded,

not i n h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l s u p e r i o r i t y , b u t i n h i s e t h i c a l passion.

What is the short-coming in t h e aesthetic way of life7

Climacus points out t h a t t h e p r i m a r y f l a w i s t h a t t h e aesthete r e a l l y

f a i l s to e x i s t . Why? I n h i s view, human beings do not merely e x i s t

l i k e r o c k s and p l a n t s i n space and time. Human existence i s essen-

t i a l l y a becominq. Though human beings begin w i t h t h e given (speci-

fic hereditary and environmental condition), t h e y nevertheless have

the capacity or ability to shape t h e i r development by excercising

freedom o r choice. Existence i s t h e process o f becoming a subject.

Climacus t h i n k s t h a t many people e x i s t i n t h e same sense as a drunken

peasant who, l y i n g asleep i n a wagon, d r i v e s t h e wagon. The horses

run wherever t h e y please? Similarly, t h e i n d i v i d u a l s have no control

over themselves; rather they a r e c o n t r o l l e d b y t h e environment and

b o d i l y impulses. Choices a r e made f o r them and t h e r e i s no u n i f y i n g

focus to t h e i r personalities; consequently t h e r e i s no genuine g r o w t h

or development. This sort of persons, according t o Climacus. lack

the s e l f i n t h e deepest sense and hence f a i l t o e x i s t . Therefore.

the solution, according t o Cl imacus, i s t o understand t h e s l g n l f l c a n c ~

of choice i n i i f e .

T h i s i s essentially t h e e t h i c i s t ' s messaqe and the only charge

against t h e aesthete. An aesthete's l i f e becomes a series o f dlscon-

nected moments because he l i v e s a momentary l i f e . He i s i n despair;

and despair i s lack of self, an emptiness instead of fullness. Then,

one may ask t h e question, "Are aesthetes not capable o f growth?''

Aesthetic life, too, ranges from gross sensuality to refined r e f l e c t i v e

life-style. Climacus notices a defect i n t h i s suggestion. He does

agree w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t imagination i s an important component of exls-

tence, but imagination, however close it might be to being, i s not

the same as being o r becoming. Therefore, t h e aesthete's lmaglnative

development is not existential development. Although both thought

and imagination are essential elements o f existence, neither of them

is existence i t s e l f . To e x i s t means t o choose: choice requires resolu-

tion; and resolution c a l l s f o r passion, as Climacus would p u t it. It

i s t h i s passion w h i c h i s often used as a synonym t o s u b j e c t i v i t y .

The term "passion" i s used i n a technical sense - to care

deeply about something o r someone-- r a t h e r than i n t h e o r d i n a r y sense-

a f i t o f passion. Therefore, a passion i s a wholehearted realization

of a value. It i s passion w h i c h makes personal integration possible

b y giving a unified d i r e c t i o n t o t h e e x i s t e r . The reason w h y an aes-

thete fails to exist i s that helshe fails to collect himselflherself

t r u l y i n t o a u n i f i e d personality. I n t h e aesthetic realm one can never

will one thing because the interest is scattered. Therefore, the

d i s t i n c t i v e passion w h i c h i s characteristic of the ethical l i f e i s the

passion f o r t h e e t e r n a ~ . ~ Here, b y "eternal" Cllmacus means values

t h a t a r e universal and timeless. The values r e f e r r e d t o a r e not p a r t i -

cular o r temporal; if t h a t were t h e case, i t would be a r e t u r n to

aesthetic l i f e .

The ethicist begins by choosing - choosing universal

eternal values; and b y choosing this he chooses h i m s e l f and transforms

the given s e l f i n t o a task. The task o f becoming one's s e l f involves

struggle and v i c t o r y i n the ethical life. The contrast between aes-

t h e t i c and e t h i c a l l i f e i s brought out i n E i t h e r l O r . The paradigm

of aesthetic l i f e i s love a f f a i r and t h a t o f t h e e t h i c a l i s marriage,

where love acquires t h e e t h i c a l ideal of commitment. However, Judge

William, who arques f o r t h e e t h i c i s t s i n E i t h e r l O r b y no means regards

ethical as excluding aesthetic enjoyment, but brings it under the

control of e t h i c a l resolution and thus gives a s e c u r i t y against t i m e

and chance.

The ethical and religious stages are essentially related.

Kierkegaard, i n h i s Journal, speaks o f "Three stages and s t i l l one

,eitherlor". T h i s i s echoed b y ~ l i m a c u s i n Concluding Unscientific

-
Postscript:
 But despite t h i s t r i p a r t i t i o n , t h e book i s nevertheless
an e i t h e r l o r . That is, t h e e t h i c a l and t h e r e l i g i o u s stages
have an essential r e l a t i o n to each other.

The essential r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e ethical and t h e r e l i g i o u s i s

made c l e a r b y contrasting them. The difference i s not merely t h a t

the religious e x i s t e r believes i n God and t h e e t h i c a l does not. In

fact, Kierkegaard p o r t r a y s a develobed e t h i c i s t as being a r e l i g i o u s

believer i n t h e o r d i n a r y sense (not i n t h e C h r i s t i a n sense, i.e. Reli-

giousness "B"). Judge William, f o r example, i s a church goer. The

distinction between t h e e t h i c a l and t h e r e l i g i o u s i s made more cons-

picuous b y Climacus b y distinguishing two k i n d s o f religiousness, i.e.

Religiousness "A" and Religiousness "B". The d i s t i n c t i o n is: first,

the ethical l i f e i s p i c t u r e d as a l i f e o f action and v i c t o r y , while

the religious one i s one o f suffering. Second, t h e e t h i c i s t i s i n f i -

nitely interested i n himself, w h i l e t h e religious i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n f i n i t e

interest i s i n t h e "actuality o f another", c.Cod. The aim o f t h e

ethical l i f e i s to become t h e s e l f through resolutions. The e t h i c i s t ' s

belief as w e l l as h i s r e l a t i o n t o Cod i s through e t h i c a l resolutions.

A good example o f t h i s v i e w i s outlined i n t h e p u r e l y e t h i c a l religious-

ness of Kant as stated i n h i s Reliqion Within t h e L i m i t s o f Reason

s. According t o Kant, a r e l i g i o u s i n d i v i d u a l ' s knowledge o f Cod

i s qained through h i s l h e r understanding o f moral law. One's r e l a t i o n

to God i s p u r e l y through moral service. He says:

 Whatever, over and above good l i f e conduct, man fancies
t h a t he can ds t o become well-pleasing o God i s mere
religious i l l u s i o n and pseudo-service o f God. k
The main concern of religion, according t o Kant, I s t o obey 'God and

serve mankind; and a l l these have to do w i t h m o r a l i t y and not w i t h

knowledge. A r e l i g i o u s exister, according to Climacus, on t h e o t h e r

hand, relates t o himself through God - r e l a t i o n s h i p r a t h e r than r e l a -

ting to God throuqh h i s r e l a t i o n t o himself, i.e. throuqh h i s moral

obliqations.

Through e t h i c a l l i f e one seeks s e l f ' s v i c t o r y over despair.

But, what i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l discovers t h a t h e l s h e i s unable t o conquer

despair through self-effort? Then, one realizes the i n c a ~ a c i t y t o con-

quer t h e s e l f through one's strength o f the e t h i c a l l i f e . Here comes

the shipwreek of the ethical life. At t h i s p o i n t d i v i n e assistance

is required. Therefore, t h e paradox of the ethical life, as noted

by Climacus, i s t h a t t h e more intensely i t i s l i v e d , t h e more inade-

quacy o f s e l f - e f f o r t i s f e l t .

I n Fear and T r e m b l i n g a clear d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn between

ethical and r e l i g i o u s life. To make t h e d i s t i n c t i o n clear, Abraham,

the B i b l i c a l figure, i s p i c t u r e d as a man who has completely l i v e d

UP to his ethical responsibilities, has fulfilled the universal, and

then attained t h e status of t h e " k n i g h t of faith" not through h i s e t h i c a l

life. but through h i s d i s t i n c t i v e l y religious passion - faith. Abraham.

thus, becomes t h e H r a d i g m f o r those who w i s h t o r e l a t e themselves

to t h e "universal" [ e t h i c a l d u t y 1 through t h e "absolute", "God", rather

than r e l a t i n g themselves t o t h e absolute through t h e universal. . Abra-

ham acts i n t h e c a p a c i t y of an i n d i v i d u a l , i.e. he does not see God

through m o r a l i t y , b u t sees m o r a l i t y through God. More about e t h i c a l

and r e l i q i o u s aspects w i l l b e discussed later i n t h i s chapter, and

in the n e x t one, respectively. The preceding d e s c r i p t i o n i s meant

to q i v e an i n t r o d u c t o r y o r p r e l i m i n a r y v i e w about t h e t h r e e spheres

of existence.

Are these - the aesthetic, t h e ethical, and t h e r e l i g i o u s

- spheres o f existence o r stages o f existence? I f t h e y a r e stages,

then t h e y must form a "natural" progress l i k e t h a t o f a c h i l d growing

into a youth and a mature person. Climacus i s o f t h e v i e w t h a t

human development i s not l i k e a natural process as seen i n t h e develop-

ment of a t r e e from an acorn. On t h e contrary, human development

i s made actual o n l y through t h e f r e e choice o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . This

i s where t h e famous Kierkegaardian category o f "leap" emerqes, though

he a p p l i e s i t o n l y t o t h e r e l i g i o u s transition, t o t h e C h r i s t i a n faith.

Leap i s t h e category o f decision. The t r a n s i t i o n from one sphere

to another i n v o l v e s t h i s leap. T h i s i s t h e reason w h y Kierkegaard

distinguishes between d i a l e c t i c a l t h i n k i n g and p a t h o s - f l l l e d e x i s t e n t i a l

living; and so stages must also be understood as spheres, i.e. exis-

tential possibilities. It i s not necessary f o r a person to progress

step b y step. An experienced aesthete can jump d i r e c t l y t o r e l i g i o u s

mode o f existence.

The next problem is: can one person be aesthetic, ethical,

and r e l i g i o u s at a given moment? Climacus emphasizes t h a t "... exis-

ting i n d i v i d u a l i t y as e x i s t i n g must be more o r less one-sided.ltg How-
ever, one might t h i n k t h a t t h e r e i s no reason w h y one cannot achieve

all the three - aesthetic, ethical, and religious - i n one life. The

difficulty l i e s i n t h e manner one chooses existence. To e x i s t r e a l l y

means to be interested, t o Dossess passion. Interests and passions

qre dominating o r r u l i n g b y nature. No one can serve two masters

at t h e same time. Ethical l i f e cannot b e subordinated to aesthetic

l i f e without becoming unethical. There i s no synthesis, no compromise

in t h i s regard. There i s bound t o be a supremacy o f t h e one o v e r

the other i n synthesis of, o r balance between, aesthetic and ethical.

Then, t h e answer to t h e question whether t h e spheres a r e mutually

exclusive i s t h a t t h e y a r e e x c l u s i v e i f t h e d i s t i n c f i v e content of each

sphere i s absolutized. I f t h e absol~rte i s allowed t o b e absolute,

then t h e r e l a t i v e remains r e l a t i v e .

The most fascinating aspect o f Climacus' writings i s irony

and humour, which a r e transitional existential zones. "Irony" and

"humour" as e x i s t e n t i a l zones d i f f e r from t h e o r d i n a r y usage o f these

terms, y e t they a r e not t o t a l l y removed from t h e i r o r d i n a r y usage.

He takes t h e distinguishinq characters o f i r o n y and humour i n l i t e r a t u r e

and applies them to t h e ways o f life.

The k e y concept i n Climacus' elucidation o f i r o n y and hu-

mour i s "contradiction". , What does Climacus mean b y contradiction?

To auote Climacus:

... where t h e r e i s l i f e t h e r e i s contradiction, and wherever'

t h e r e i s contradiction, t h e comic i s present. The t r a g i c
and t h e comic a r e t h e same inasmuch as b o t h a r e contra-
diction, b u t t h e t r a g i c i s suffering contradiction, and t h e
comic i s painless contradiction. l o

Climacus elucidates it f u r t h e r b y means o f an example i n t h e foot-note:

When a q i r l a p p l i e s f o r a p e r m i t to go into business as

a p u b l i c p r o s t i t u t e and t h e application i s turned down,
t h i s i s comic. One c o r r e c t l y considers t h a t it i s d i f f i c u l t
to become something respectable ( f o r examale, when someone
applies t o become Master o f t h e Royal Hunt and i s turned
down, t h i s i s not comic), but t h e turning down o f an a p p l i -
cation to become something contemptible i s a contradiction.
Of course, i f she receives a permit, t h a t also i s comic,
b u t t h e contradiction i s a d i f f e r e n t one, t h a t t h e legal
a u t h o r i t y shows i t s powerlessness s i m p l y i n showing i t s
aower, i t s power b y granting t h e permif, i t s powerlessness
b y being unable t o make it permissible.

I f the example i s considered i n t h e r e a l l i f e situation, then t h e situa-

tion seems to b e t r a g i c r a t h e r than comic. However, comic o r t r a g i c

depends upon one's perception and involvement, i.e. whether one i s

able to look away from t h e pain t h a t t h e situation contains.

 The contradictions w h i c h Climacus i s t a l k i n g about a r e not

logical, b u t existential. It i s t h e tension o r t h e inconqruity whlch

p r e v a i l s between one state of a f f a i r s and another. Understanding t h e

use of contradiction i s crucial not o n l y i n t h e case o f i r o n y and 'humour,

according t o Ciimacus. b u t also i n religious realms w h i c h contain ab-

solute pargdox. The f a i l u r e t o r e a l i z e t h e ideal i s t h e contradiction

between a c t u a l i t y and ideality. This i s the negativity i n life; and

i t s significance i s t h a t it forms the condition f o r e x i s t e n t i a l growth.

Only t h e neqatlon of t h e e x i s t i n g o r d e r makes change possible.

i r o n y i s t h e boundary zone between aesthetic and t h e ethical.

it i s present i n a person who has t h e knowledge o f t h e i n f i n i t e e t h i c a l

demand to become a s e l f and y e t l i v e i n t h e finite, r e l a t i v e level.

Cl imacus observes:

The i r o n y emerges b y continually joining t h e p a r t i c u l a r

of t h e f i n i t e w i t h t h e ethical i n f i n i t e requirement and allow-
ing t h e contradiction to come into existence. l 2

The ironist understands t h e absolute obligations of the individual to

become a self, b u t f a i l s to act on t h e basis o f understanding. &

and humour a r e s a i d to form boundary zones to t h e spheres of existence

because i n t h e r e a l sense t h e y a r e decision points. The i r o n i s t cannot

90 back to h i s innocence. If h e moves, he must e i t h e r progress t o

the e t h i c a l o r regress t o t h e demonic. Socrates i s Ciimacus' paradigm

for the account of irony, though h e i s considered t o be b o t h an i r o n i s t

and an e t h i c l r t . Similarly. humour as a boundary zone to religious

l i f e i s the escape for the individual who finds the religious l i f e strenu'

ous. Humour i s the situation of the individual who understands r e l i g i -

ous truth, but fails to passionately e x i s t in that truth.

2. The Ethical Character o f Existence

After having qiven a b r i e f account of the spheres of existence,

I, propose to Present the salient features of the ethical existence

since i t i s the ethical that reveals universality.

Kierkegaard qives two definitions of ethics. They refer

to both the ethical sphere of existence and the process of self-unders-

tanding. The one refers to the self as a task and the other

to the state in which there i s a dialectical development of s p i r i t ,

i .e. the ethical requirement comes to consciousness.

The function of the ethical sphere of existence. i s to b r i n g

ideality into r e a l i t y .

Ethics would b r i n g i d e a l i t y into reality; on the other hand,

i t s movement i s not designed to raise r e a l i t y up into idea-
lity. Ethics points to i d e a l i t y as a task and assumes
that man i s jg possession of the conditions requisite f o r
performing it.
In t h e e t h i c a l sphere of existence t h e i n d i v i d u a l becomes conscioci.
of himselflherself as ideal and relates to t h i s i d e a l i t y not only as

a p o s s i b i l i t y b u t also as a d u t y w h i c h i s t o .be ectuallzed. The idaa-

l i t y o f e t h i c s i s not an a b s t r a c t l y conceived one. Nor does i t emerqe

from thinking, contemplation, o r intuition, b u t through t h e unconditional

requirement upon t h e individual t o be h i m s e l f l h e r s e i f . The e t h i c a l

will not attempt to change t h e i n d i v i d u a l into another person, but

to make h i m o r h e r h i m s e l f l h e r s e l f . It w i l l not annihilate t h e aesthe-

tic traits; it merely transfigures them and subiugates them t o t h e e t h i -

cal.

The understanding o f e t h i c s as t h e e t h i c a l sphere o f existence

entails universality of ethics. By universality, Kierkegaard means

that e t h i c s a ~ p i i e s to everyone a t e v e r y moment. Kierkegaard i n h i s

Journals w r i t e s :

The e t h i c a l begins straightway w i t h t h i s requirement t o

e v e r y person: You s h a l l b e p e r f e c t ....
F o r t h e universal
man i s not a phantom, b u t e v e r y man as such i s t h e univer-
sal man, t h a t i s t o say, t o e v e r y man i s assigned t h e
way b y w h i c h he becomes t h e universal man. l 4

Therefore, the ethical is related universally, while the aesthetic.

particularly. The aesthetic emphasizes t h e articular talents, a b i l i t i e s ,

etC., w h i l e e t h i c s emphasizes t h e universal, "You shall." It i s im-

possible f o r everyone of us to b e a musician. a poet, and so on; it

requires an inclination to be some one o f a p a r t i c u l a r bent of mind.

But t h e e t h i c a l r e q u i r e s no special condition, since each one i s cons-

cious of oneself as free, conscious of one's duty to act. To be obllpad
to do what one i s able to do o r to be, universalizes human nature.

Individuals are different w i t h regard to t h e i r particularity, i.e. factl-

city, but not i n respect o f the requirement to be oneself. a,

then, i s the synthesis of the universal and the particular. We do

not say generally that a particular man does duty, but that he does

h i s duty. An individual becomes universal b y accepting h i s particula-

r i t y as a duty.

... i t [ t h e ethical] does not accotlnt f o r anything accidental

in existence but for the universal, ... i t shows the uni-
versal i n i t s true beauty.15

Further, i n the Journals Kierkegaard emphasizes the universal character

of ethics thus:

He who regards l i f e e t h i c a l l y sees the universal, and he

who l i v e s e t h i c a l l y expresses the universal i n h i s life,
he makes himself the universal man, not b y divesting him-
self of h i s concretion, for then he becomes nothing, but
b y clothin? himself w i t h it and permeating it w i t h the
universal .l

The fulfilment of the universal in the particular i s precisely through

the realization of the ethical. For Kierkegaard, to be a unique person

is not in itself anything so qreat, but to be unique i n such a way

that one i s also universal i s the true a r t of living. Only when the

individual himselflherseif i s the universal, i s it possible to realize

the ethical.
 Kierkegaard speaks of the aesthetic sphere of existencd

as being dethroned from i t s dominating position i n existence b y the

ethical. Ethics takes aesthetics into i t s e l f without obliterating it,

but transforming it and giving it i t s due place o f r e l a t i v e h o l d on

life. But he never speaks of the ethical sphere of existence as

being dethroned from i t s dominating position i n existence b y the r e i i -

gious sphere. This i s because he believes t h a t the reliqious sphere

lies close to the ethical and that there i s constant communication

between them. That i s why he speaks of ethico-religious sphere.

At t h i s sphere, the religious possesses the ethical, and the individual

is expected to be through the ethical before helshe reaches .the r e l i -

gious sphere. There is, therefore, no conflict between the ethical

and the re1 igious; rather there i s a dialectical interdependence.

The other definition of ethics, i.e. the task of self-unders-

tanding, refers to the more basic meaning of the term. The notion

of ethics as a sphere of existence i s developed i n E i t h e r l o r , Ii,

while Conciudinq Unscientific P o s t s c r i ~ t emohasires the second notion

of ethics, G. self-understandinq. Here the process of self-reflection

or inward reflection becomes the central theme and not the phenomena

of choice and duty. The point which i s stressed here i s that the

ethical individual has the knowledge of himself; but h i s knowledge

of himself is not gained through mere contemplation or thinking.

 The ethical individual knows himself, but t h i s knowledge
i s not a mere contemplation ( f o r w i t h that the individual
i s determined b y h i s necessityl it i s a reflection upon
himself which i t s e l f i s an action.57

Two important points are made here: first, self-knowledge belongs

to ethical consciousness, and second, such knowledge i s achieved in

action. "Action" here refers to an event whereby a possibility is

existentially actualized. So, it follows from the f i r s t claim that any

sphere of existence which inreases self-knowledge i n a person can

be known as ethical. Again, it follows from the second claim that

al'l self-knowledge i s based on the relationship of the individual to

h i s l h e r possibilities. It also means that an individual can understand

himselflherself only b y being related to the possibilities, i.e. only

by existentially actualizing the possibilities. Therefore, ethics here

becomes the power to demand actuality. Kierkegaard affirms t h i s in

his Journals:

A l l Christian knowiedge and generally a l l ethical knowledge

i s not what i t i s essentially when i t i s separated from
i t s situation. A situation (actuality, that is, that a per-
son express i n actuality what he knows) i s the conditio
sine qua non f o r ethical knowiedge. 18

Ethical understanding, then, i s the decisive factor f o r a l l exis-

tence. I t is this meaning of ethics which reveals both the ethi-

cal and the ethico-religious spheres o f existence because ethics

becomes the aim as well as the measure of human existence.

The task of penetrating into oneself is an ethical task. Once

this task i s accepted, the individual i s pushed beyond the bou-

nds of the ethical to the ethico-religious existence. That i s why

the definition of ethics as self-understanding is more fundamental;

i t s meaning applies to a Drocess which characterizes both the ethical

and the ethico-religious spheres of existence.

Now, the issue i s whether these two notions of ethics are

complementary, o r contradictory, o r unrelated. Kierkegaard and the

pseudonymous authors express the view that they are dialectically

complementary, because ethics as self-understanding depends, for its

emergence as the task of human existence, upon the entrance of -the

ethical sphere of existence in an individual's life. Moreover, the

content o f the ethical sphere contributes to the development of self-

understanding. So, the two main points are: first, self-knowledge

belongs to ethical consciousness; secondly, t h i s knowledqe i s achieved

through action.

Now, the relation between the two meanings of the term

"ethics" i s obvious. Only b y passing on to the ethical sphere of

existence b y choosing oneself, the ethical character of existence gets

opened up to consciousness. So, the relation between these two defl-

nitions can be stated as follows:

Ethical choice i s the initiation and the heart of ethical

sphere of existence, and the individual's fundamental task
of self-understanding involves the elaboration and c l a r i f i -
cation of that choice.19
After making an analysis of the relation between ethics and ontology

in Kierkegaard's doctrine of the self, E l r o d observes that ethics

which has coincidence w i t h ontoloqy i s situated i n the relation of

ethical existence and ethical knowledge, i.e. self-knowledge o r self-

understanding." The only p o s s i b i l i t y open to the individual i s him-

selflherself, and consequently the individual gains self-understanding

by realizing himselflherself in ethical existence. Ethical knowledge

c l a r i f i e s the individual's consciousness and the structure of the self.

3. The Ethical as the Sphere o f Choice

Ethics conceived as the task of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s existence

must also be considered as the universal task. This i s the mark

of the distinction between the ethical and aesthetic forms of life.

The significance o f the l i f e o f an aesthete, whether he i s an artist,

scientist, or a literary figure, i s d ~ ~toe the uniqueness which he

acquires among the individuals. Climacus c a l l s t h i s as the dialectic

of fortunelmisfortune, h a ~ p i n e s s l u n h a ~ p i n e s s . which is attached to

any person. The ethicist, on the contrary, rejects such accidental

distinctions. In the words o f Climacus,

Every human being must be assumed to possess essentially

what belongs essentially to being a human being. The
subjective t h i n k e r ' s task i s to transform himself into
an instrument that c l e a r l y and d e f i n i t e l y expresses i n
existence the essentially human.2'
1n t h e essential task of existence, i t would be a contradlction to assume

that t h e capacity for t h e task i s an accidental possession, w h i c h some

have and some do not have. I n t h i s realm the task i s essentially

to become one's self. Therefore, e v e r y person must be capable o f

such an existence. Thus, t h e universal task of becoming what one

is, i s essentially ethical i n character. T h i s i s t h e task o f becoming

the i n d i v i d u a l .

To w i l l t o be an i n d i v i d u a l human being w i t h t h e h e l p
of and b y v i r t u e o f one's difference I s flabbiness; b u t
to w i l l t o b e an i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t i n g human being ( w h i c h

l i f e and e v e r y mirage. 22
-..
one unquestionably i s ) i n t h e same sense as everyone else
i s capable of being t h a t i s t h e ethical v i c t o r y o v e r

Clirnacus' concept of "the i n d i v i d u a l " is, therefore, not a g l o r i f i c a t i o n

of personal idiosyncrasies. On the contrary, it i s h i g h l i g h t i n g what

is universal i n human existence through t h e power of t h e i n d i v i d u a l

to shape one's l i f e b y way of choice. The significance of life is

determined not b y mere choice, b u t b y r e s ~ o n s i b l e choice. This i s

p r e c i s e l y t h e realm o f t h e ethical. What counts, ultimately, i s not

what one i s qiven, b u t what one makes of one's self, what One achieves

through what i s given.

gthics, then, as a sphere of existence and as a task o f

self-understanding, begins with this famous Kierkegarrdian "choice of

Oneself." But, then: what i s t h i s choice? The following twn important

Passages from E i t h e r l o r a r e h e l p f u l to answer t h i s question.

 But what i s it I choose? I s it t h i s thing o r that? No,
f o r I choose absolutely, and t h e absoluteness o f my choice
i s expressed p r e c i s e l y b y t h e fact that I have not chosen
to choose t h i s o r that. I choose t h e absolute. And what
i s t h e absolute? it i s myself i n my eternal v a l i d i t y . 2 3

But what, then, i s t h i s s e l f of mine? I f I were r e q u i r e d

to define this, my f i r s t answer would be: i t i s t h e most

most concrete -
abstract of a l l things, and yet a t the same time i t i s the
i t i s freedom. 24

The f i r s t passage affirms the absoiute q u a l i t y of the choice, and t h e

second one, t h e nature o f the self which chooses, i.e. freedom. These

passages make us aware o f two fundamental problems: how i s the choice

made possible? and why i s t h e choice as w e l l as i t s object absoiute?

To answer the f i r s t question. "How i s the choice made possi-

b l e ? " one has t o look back into the aesthetic sphere, i.e. t o examine

the way i n which the shipwreck o f the aesthetic sphere takes place.

As i t has been already noted, t h e aesthetic sphere culminates i n des-

pair. lronist "A" describes the hierarchy of moods in Eitherlor,

Vol.1 i n t h e following ascending scale: the aesthetic sphere d i a l e c t i -

cally progresses from ordinary unreflective sensual immediacy (e.g.

Don Juan, who fluctuates between being an i n d i v i d u a l and a force o f

nature), through t h e moods of grief ["The Shadow Craps" which p r o j e c t

the contrast between ancient tragedy and modern traqedy, wherein an-

cient Creek tragedy showed b o t h innocence and q u i l t i n the hero, w h i l e

modern tragedy reveals t h e predominance of g u i l t i n t h e hero due to

the increase of stress i n life),cynicism ("'The Unhappiest Man" which

r e f e r s t o Job b y way of an example who i s u n j u s t l y hit b y misfor-

tune and suffers innocently), imagination (The review of scribe1s

"The F i r s t Love"), and boredom (The Rotation Method-here t h e refer-

ence i s t o two c r o p rotation metaphors. One i s t o exhaust one f i e l d

and then move on to another f i e l d seeking v a r i e t y ; and t h e other

i s t o keep t h e same f i e l d b u t rotate t h e c r o p t o overcome boredom),

and f i n a l l y i n t o despair (The D i a r y o f a Seducer, where a l l moral

laws a r e suspended i n t h e Seducer's conduct). The s e l f a t t h i s stage

consciously refuses to become oneself, and hence i s i n despair. The

final refuge of t h e despairing aesthete I s t h e a t t i t u d e o f irony, which,

according to Climacus, is t h e boundary zone between t h e aesthetic

and t h e e t h i c a l . In t h i s sphere, t h e aesthete i s aware o f h i s des-

p a i r and also t h e fact that there i s no escape from despair i n t h e

aesthetic realm. Therefore, the aesthetic individual is grounded

i n irony. The i r o n i s t i s not y e t an e t h i c i s t ; t h e ethical existence

i s s t i l l o n l y a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r him. Ironical consciousness expresses

the tension i n t h e r e l a t i o n between the claims of f i n i t u d e and infinitude.

The ironical individual is conscious of himself as a relation, but

does not act upon t h a t consciousness and 'actualize t h e relationship.

Therefore, ironical consciousness becomes the precondition of the

choice o f oneself. So, this i s t h e development from t h e aesthetic

stage to i r o n i c a l consciousness w h i c h makes possible choice of oneself

as a relation.

Now, the next question is: why a r e t h e choice and its

pbject absolute? F o r t h e choice t o be absolute t h e i n d i v i d u a l must

choose himself / h e r s e l f as " i n f i n i t e l y c o n c r e t e u f 5 ~ h a tKierkegaard suggests

here i s t h a t t h e self i s absolutely infinitized, 1.e. becomes i n f i n i t e l y

concrete, only when t h e i n d i v i d u a l chooses h i m s e l f l h e r s e l f as a r e l a t i o n

of the f i n i t e and t h e infinite. It means t h a t aesthetic existence IS

not annulled. b u t transformed, once t h e e t h i c a l choice i s made. As

mentioned e a r l i e r , t h e aesthetic sphere relinquishes i t s absolute c l a i m

on t h e i n d i v i d u a l and takes a r e l a t i v e stand allowing t h e e t h i c a l to

dominate. Therefore, i n t h e choice, t h e i n d i v i d u a l chooses h i m s e l f l h e r -

self in its entirety, i.e. absolutely, wherein hislher consciousness

is u n i f i e d and h e l s h e does not become another person, but hlmselflher-

self. There i s a unifying focus i n h i s l h e r personality and t h e aesthe-

t i c subserves t h e ethical, or i s controlled by it. The reason f o r

t h i s i s that, i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l chooses h i m s e l f l h e r s e l f e t h i c a l l y , then

he must choose himseiflherself concretely, as a definite self; and

i n doing t h i s t h e aesthetic self i s automatically included i n t h e person.

When one chooses abstractly, one does not choose oneself ethically

at a l l .

By t h e absolute choice t h e ethical [ s e l f ] i s posited, b u t

from t h i s i t does not follow b y any means t h a t the aesthetical
i s excluded. I n t h e ethical t h e personality I s concentrated
i n i t s e l f , so t h e aestheticai is... excluded as t h e absolute
b u t r e l a t i v e l y i t i s s t i l l l e f t . 26

Now, t o choose oneself i n f i n i t e l y concrete i s to choose one-

self as freedom, i.e. it i s t h e acceptance of oneself as essentially

a free and responsible individual. Reider Thomte effectively puts

i t thus: "The choice i s an .act o f freedom, and i t may w e l l b e s a i d

that i n an act of choosing t h e i n d i v i d u a l produces h i m ~ e l f . " ~ '

 Choice and despair are inseparable phenomena f o r Klerkegaard.

The s e l f chooses i n t h e height o f despair, i.e. when it loses value

for anything outside it. Therefore, In despair a person I s d r i v e n

towards h i s absolute self. The elucidation o f t h e r e l a t i o n between

despair and choice as stated b y Ceorqe P r i c e i s w o r t h quoting here:

But when a man decides not t o d r i f t , he decides a t t h e

same time t h e p o i n t where h e w i l l anchor himself. This
cannot be anything outside himself, because t h e r e i s nothing
outside h i m w o r t h choosin It must, therefore, be t h e
only absolute l e f t f o r him.

Kierkegaard's disucssion of choice i s grounded on t h e dialec-

t i c a l structure o f t h e self. The structure of t h e self, w h i l e making

choice, i s self-revealing r a t h e r than self-concealing as i n t h e aesthetic

sphere of existence. I n t h e aesthetic sphere t h e s e l f endures i n mo-

ments, not having a u n i f i e d focus. Then, t h e self i s hidden and conce-

aled from i t s e l f . The e t h i c a l existence manifests t h i s unity.

The e t h i c a l as such i s t h e universal; again, as t h e univer-

sal i t i s t h e manifest, t h e revealed. The i n d i v i d u a l regar-
ded as h e i s immediately, t h a t is, as a p h y s i c a l ( b o d y )
and p s y c h i c a l (soul) being, i s the hidden, t h e concealed.
So h i s ethical task i s to develop out of t h i s concealment
and to reveal h i m s e l f i n t h e universal. 29

The self, t h e e x i s t i n g individual, i s i d e n t i f i e d through h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n

in t h e universal ideal. Self-revelation i s the task i n t h e ethical stage

because e v e r y man's d u t y i s to reveal himself, in, t h i s realm, through

Participation i n t h e universal norms. Once t h e e x i s t i n g individual,

after getting a certain amount of understanding, chooses himself as hi;

l i f e task, f o r w h i c h he alone i s responsible, then he has penetrated

into t h e v e r y l i m i t s of being, according to Kierkegaard.

However, one cannot conclude from t h i s t h a t choice, because

it i s absolute, i s once and for a l l . Kierkegaard emuhasizes t h a t choice

must constantly b e made and remade because t h e s e l f continues to grow.

Time and f a c t i c i t y o f the s e l f are changing and expanding. The on-

goingness o f time proves to be a t h r e a t to choice; so time necessitates

a continuous r e p e t i t i o n o f choice.

4. The Content of t h e E t h i c a l

Climacus does not sueak much about t h e content of t h e ethical

task for the reason t h a t he considers that h i s urimary duty i s to

help people r e a l i z e t h e nature and significance of the e t h i c a l life.

He i s o f t h e view that t h e content of the ethical l i f e i s not something

which i s to be invented. He oresumes t h a t everyone of us has t h e

knowledge about it, because t h e e t h i c a l i s an essential component of

human structure. However, he makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between " c i v i c mora-

lity" and "the ethical" i n t h e r e a l sense. He maintains t h a t it is

possible for an individual, who has grown up i n a certain culture,

P r e v a i l i n g social rules and taboos, to live with a fine reputation

as a qood citizen, even without knowing the e t h i c a l i n t h e deepest

sense. The problem here i s not so much as to what a person does,

but w h y a Derson does. Therefore, i n t h e eyes o f Climacus, an i n d i v l -

dual i s not t r u l y ethical if h e l s h e does not f o l l o w it because It i s

ethical.

Here t h e r e i s a Kantian trace i n Climacus' thought. Accor-

dinq to Kant, a t r u l y e t h i c a l person i s not t h e one who does h i s duty,

but t h e one who does h i s d u t y because it i s h i s duty, i.e. w i t h the

f u l l awareness of h i s ethical obligation. Just as w i t h Kant, f o r Clima-

cus, too, absolute d u t y cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r set

of moral rules: on t h e contrary, absolute d u t y is to duty itself.

L i k e Kant, Climacus t h i n k s t h a t t h i s formal p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f forms t h e

content o f ethics. There seems t o b e a phenomenological background

f o r t h i s c l a i m as Kierkegaard i s considered to be a forerunner of pheno-

menology. As a phenomenoloqist of some kind, he constantly makes

a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e "how" and the "what" of a problem. "What"

which r e f e r s to t h e content of t h e ethical does not c a r r y much impor-

tance to a phenomenologist, as well as to Kierkegaard, w h i l e more

stress i s l a i d on the "how" of t h e ethical, w i t h a view to show how

the ethical sphere i s entered b y an i n d i v i d u a l and lived. However,

Climacus d i f f e r s from Kant i n recognizing the fact that reason can invent

moral l i f e , and therefore concrete moral duties cannot s i m p l y be deduced

from a formal principle. His conviction i s that the ethical l i f e has

Passion f o r i t s matter and reason f o r i t s form. The ethical l i f e Pre-

SuPPO~eS i n f i n i t e passion. The task of t h e ethical l i f e i s then, to

penetrate t h i s passion along w i t h formal demands o f duties and actualize

the duties.

I f e t h i c a l form i s to become existentiallyconcrete, it demands

material content. T h i s content, according to Climacus, i s i n a way

highly individualized, i.e. to describe an individual's duties con-

cretely, one has to take into consideration the l i f e situation i n which

the individual i s placed. Therefore, t h e content of moral l i f e i n a

sense i s "given" to the individual.

The way t h e content o f ethical l i f e acquires form i s w e l l

i l l u s t r a t e d b y bringing out the relationship between t h e aesthetic and

the e t h i c a l b y Judge William i n E i t h e r l o r :

... the aesthetic i n a person i s that b y which he spon-

taneously and immediately i s what he is; t h e ethical i s
t h a t b y w h i c h he becomes what he becomes. 30

'But, what i s t h e s e l f when i t i s s a i d that a person becomes h i m s e l f l h e r -

self? It i s the s e l f w h i c h i s conscious of i t s eternal nature and which

i s r e a l i z e d b y choosinq one's duty. Then t h e question arises: where

do t h e duties of an i n d i v i d u a l come from? Judge William answers t h a t

they a r e discovered b y t h e s e l f w i t h i n t h e self. He elucidates t h i s

b y t h e example of marriage. The form o f marriaqe i s ethical duty,

because it i s made possible through responsible choice and commitment.

The content of marriage I s love, which is immediate and i s present

i n everyone of Us. But marriage i s made p o s s i b l e only when t h e

i n d i v i d u a l d i s c o v e r s t h e eternal element i n l o v e only through commit-

ment. Thus, love w h i c h i s t h e content o f marriage and w h i c h i s

immediate and present becomes a d u t y b y r e c e i v i n g t h e e t h i c a l form.

Here t h e form, without inventing i t s content, accepts t h e material

content given b y t h e aesthetic and transforms i t i n t o t h e e t h i c a l b y

responsible choice.

Climacus i s of t h e view t h a t i t i s t h e aesthetic o r imme-

d i a t e elements i n l i f e w h i c h form t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f content f o r e t h i -

cal task. It i s UP to t h e i n d i v i d u a l to select t h e content g i v e n and

express one's commitment t o t h e eternal. In doing so, one ceases

to b e merely an aesthetic i n d i v i d u a l and chooses what one chooses

because of one's r e l a t i o n to the eternal.

Climacus b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e content of e t h i c s cannot be objec-

tively coded and, therefore, he does not seem to g i v e importance

to e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s found i n t h e moral codes as much as he empha-

sizes t h e passionate commitment to t h e choice. He concludes t h a t

the e t h i c a l e x i s t e r has aesthetic content as w e l l as e t h i c a l passion

and t h e r e b y gains concreteness i n existence. He says:

 To e x i s t i s an a r t . The subjective t h i n k e r i s aesthetic
enough f o r h i s l i f e t o have aesthetic content, e t h i c a l
enough t o regulate it. d i a l e c t i c a l enough i n t h i n k i n g to
master it. The s u b j e c t i v e t h i n k e r ' s task i s t o understand
h i m s e l f i n existence. 31

To sum uo. Climacus' view on t h e r e l a t i o n between e t h i c a l matter

and form seems to have t h e Kantian trace. K a n t ' s categorical imper-

ative is a formal p r i n c i p l e without a material content. However,

it d i f f e r s from t h e Kantian v i e w i n many respects. I n t h i s context

the following comment on Climacus' e t h i c s i s apt.

I f we focus on t h e matter o f t h e e t h i c a l l i f e , Climacus'

e t h i c s seem l i k e an e t h i c o f self-realization, perhaps
reminiscent o f A r i s t o t l e . If we focus on t h e form, Clim-
acus' e t h i c seems more l i k e a Kantian e t h i c o f d u t y f o r
d u t y ' s sake. Actually, i n synthesizing these elements
it i s l i k e neither. It d i f f e r s from A r i s t o t i e i n seeing
moral character as t h e d e c i s i v e end of existence... it
d i f f e r s from a Kantian e t h i c i n seeing t h e need f o r d u t y
to express i t s e l f and i n d i v i d u a l i z e i t s e l f i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s
concrete immediacy. 32

5. T h e Communicative Sphere

Kierkegaard's main concern is with the various ways of

existing o f t h e subjective t h i n k e r . The fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h

he makes i s t h a t between passionate interest and detached d i s i n t e r -

estedness. The f i r s t attitude, %. passionate interest, i s expressed

through t h e category of inwardness o r subjectivity, and t h e second

one, through t h e category o f o b j e c t i v i t y . The language o f inwardness

o r subjectivity. according t o Kierkegaard, i s f a i t h and ethics, and

that of the category of objectivity is the d i s i n t e r e s t e d language

of a b s t r a c t thought w h i c h i s universal i n character. L i k e Plato, K i e r -

kegaard assumes that when one r e f l e c t s on any entity w i t h regard

to i t s nature, one focuses on i t s universal character.

By disinterestedness Kierkegaard means that which does

not have a d i r e c t bearing on e x i s t e r . He i s of t h e v i e w t h a t t h e

a t t i t u d e of disinterestedness can b e found i n two realms - intellectual

deliberations and aesthetic work. In relation to aesthetic work,

Climacus, i n t h e Concludinq Unscientific Postscript, b y way o f a font-

note, expresses h i s v i e w t h a t a r t as w e l l as p o e t r y i s not essentially

r e l a t e d t o an e x i s t e r because i t i s a c o n t e m ~ l a t i v e enjoyment o v e r

a t h i n g o f beauty and joy, and such a contemplative enjoyment d i f f e r s

i n i t s aim from thought o r contemplation, d i r e c t e d towards action.

Poetry and a r t have been c a l l e d an anticipation o f t h e

eternal. I f one wants to c a l l them that, one must never-
theless be aware t h a t p o e t r y and a r t a r e not essentially
r e l a t e d to an e x i s t i n g person, since t h e contemplation
of p o e t r y and art, " j o y over t h e beautiful," i s disinteres-
ted, and t h e o b s e r v e r i s contemplatively outside himself
qua e x i s t i n g person.33

The term used b y Kierkegaard f o r the matters i n i n t e l l e c t u a l

realm i s "abstract thought." He makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between a b s t r a c t

thought r e l a t e d to legitimate way o f speakinqlthinking and t h a t r e l a t e d

to illegitimate way. BY abstract thouqht in the legitimate way of

speakinglthinking, he refers t o t h e languages o f e m p i r i c a l science and

logic. He i s aware t h a t i n these communications one cannot r a i s e t h e

question of existence o r reality. b u t neither are they fantacies as

i n t h e case of t h e language of abstract thought i n t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e sense.

However, Climacus does not Pay much attention t o t h e language involved

i n logical thinking. He merely says that, " a l l logical t h i n k i n g employs

the language o f abstraction, and i s sub specie a e t e r i n j 4 ( " f r o m the

vantage point of eternity," the expression borrowed from Soinoza's

-
Ethics, b u t Kierkegaard uses i t t o mean t h e standpoint of speculative

idealism as opposed to that of t h e e x i s t i n g t h i n k e r ) . Though he gives

more emphasis to scientific knowledge, he maintains that the truth

of scientific knowledge is approximation to t r u t h ; i t s certainty, he

holds, i s not absolute as i n t h e case o f t r u t h expressed b y passion

and f a i t h , b u t i s characterized b y p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Therefore, a l l sclen-

tific knowledge is quantitative (established through induction) and

not q u a l i t a t i v e (established through f a i t h ) . The communication invol-

ved i n these areas, thouqh abstract and universal i n character, i s legi-

timate t y p e o f discourse, as against i l l e g i t i m a t e way o f speakinglthink-

inq w h i c h r e f e r s t o p u r e thouqht o r speculative ohilosophy. Climacus'

main objection against such i l l e g i t i m a t e ways of speakinglthinking is

not t h a t t h e y belong to t h e realm of abstraction, b u t t h a t they cross

t h e i r boundary and reach fantacy. I n other words, speculative p h i l o -

,sophy disregards t h e fact t h a t each sphere has i t s own o r o p e r realm,

i t s own t y p e of t r u t h , and i t s own k i n d o f certainty. I t attempts

to reach r e a l i t y w i t h i n i t s domain on t h e assumption t h a t whatever

i s thouqht o f i s also r e a l i n t h e sense t h a t thought i s not o n l y capable

of thinking, b u t also bestowing r e a l i t y . It forgets t h e fact t h a t e v e r y

problem should b e d e a l t w i t h w i t h i n i t s sphere o r medium. Therefore,

Kierkegaard c a l l s such a way of speakinglthinking illegitimate. Thus,

Kierkeqaard, l i k e t h e logical empiricist, makes a clear-cut distinction

between oassionate/subjective (emotive) lanquage and t h e dislnterestedlob-

jective languaqe of science and logic. However, t h e difference between

Kierkegaard and t h e contemporary language philosophers i s that the

l a t t e r v i r t u a l l y neglect t h e person who speaks and thinks, while the

former phiiosoohizes solely because of his interest i n t h e person,

the i n d i v i d u a l . Kierkegaard i s moved to ~ h i l o s o p h i z e i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n

because he i s passionately interested i n t h e C h r i s t i a n faith; he s t r i v e s

f o r c l e a r t h i n k i n g i n matters o f f a i t h . The background o f h i s p h i l o -

s 0 ~ h i Z i n g i s Christianity, and hence h i s main concern i s w i t h religious

or e x i s t e n t i a l communication.

Kierkegaard h o l d s t h e view t h a t t h e communication process

of such e x i s t e n t i a l l r e l i g i o u s t r u t h i s b y double reflection. Neils Thuls-

t r u p ' s explanation of double r e f l e c t i o n i s h e l p f u l :

A r e s u l t of thought i s formulated b y deliberation o r re-

flection, whereas t h e second o r double r e f l e c t i o n concerns
t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e r e s u l t t o t h e individual.35
 This. in a nytshell, would mean that, whereas thought

refers t o f i r s t o r d e r reflection, e x i s t e n t e r e f e r s t o t h e second order,

b y a p p l y i n g these thoughtslideas t o l i f e . Further, i n t h e Concludlna

Unscientific Postscript, Climacus w r i t e s :

The r e f l e c t i o n o f inwardness i s t h e subjective t h i n k e r ' s

double-reflection. I n thinking, h e t h i n k s t h e universal,
but, as e x i s t i n g i n t h i s thinking, as acquiring t h i s i n
h i s inwardness, h e becomes more and more s u b j e c t i v e l y
isolated. The difference between subjective and o b j e c t i v e
t h i n k i n g must also manifest i t s e l f i n t h e form o f communi-
cation. 36

Following t h i s , i n a foot-note he adds:

Double-reflection i s a l r e a d y i m p l i c i t i n t h e idea o f communi-

cation i t s e l f : that the subjective individual, existing
i n t h e isolation o f inwardness, wants to communicate him-
self, consequently t h a t he simultaneously wants to keep
h i s t h i n k i n g i n t h e inwardness of h i s subjective existence
and y e t wants to communicate h i m s e l f . I t i s not possible
f o r t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o become manifest i n a d i r e c t form.37

Thinking, Climacus asserts, needs the universal. In a

discourse, participants put forward their arguments by standards

of evidence and soundness accepted b y a l l of them, keeping aside

t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r Interests and advantages. However, when t h e subiect-

ive thinker or t h e discourse p a r t i c i p a n t assimilates o r appropriates

t h e outcome o f discourse, h e l s h e becomes more and more " s u b j e c t i v e l y

isolated." The process o f appropriation o r assimilation o f t h e results

01 discourse I s what actualizes t h e r e f l e c t l o n of inwardness; end through

t h i s actualization, t h e speaker, i n a sense, steps outside t h e communi-

cation process. T h i s "outsideness" i s what Kierkegaard c a l l s "inward-

ness." Outsideness i s not alienation from t h e communication process;

rather, it is the fullest p o s s i b l e r e a l i z a t i o n o f any communication.

How does it, i t may b e asked, constitute i t s f u l f i l m e n t standing outside

the communication wrocess! The answer i s t h a t i t achieves I t s f u l f i l -

ment through freedom, w h i c h i s t h e v e r y condition and purpose o f a l l

communications. Here, freedom r e f e r s to the free choice o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l

to a p p r o p r i a t e o r assimilate t h e t r u t h expressed i n a discourse.

I n K i e r k e q a a r d ' s thought, one can notice t h e r e l a t i o n between

language and freedom. Freedom, o f course, f o r Kierkeqaard i s t h e v e r y

heart o f t h e l i f e o f f a i t h ; and languaqe i s d e c i s i v e f o r t h e l i f e o f f a i t h

p r e c i s e l y because o f i t s r o l e i n the concrete actualization of freedom.

M a r k C. T a y l o r has charqed Kierkeqaard w i t h a k i n d o f r a d i -

cal individualism. He observes t h a t Kierkegaard has f a i l e d t o g i v e

any essential place t o t h e communal dimension i n t h e l i f e o f f a i t h .

In a k e y passage, T a y l o r summarizes h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Kierekqaard thus:

Since h e [ K i e r k e q a a r d ] regards C h r i s t i a n i t y as t h e most

c o m ~ i e t e r e a l i z a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l selfhood, and because
he understands C h r i s t i a n f a i t h t o be an inwardness t h a t
cannot become outward, h e argues t h a t t h e f u l l e s t r e a l i z a t i o n
o f selfhood i s t o be found i n isolated i n d i v i d u a l i t v r a t h e r
 than i n community w i t h other selves... a t t h e deepest
level, t h e l e v e l of one's faith, ersons cannot communicate
w i t h one another. Each indivi%ual i s locked up w i t h i n
t h e inwardness of' h i s own s u b j e c t i v i t y . 38

This c r i t i c i s m i s unwarranted. Taylor's phrase "locked up" refers

to what one might c a l l "shut-upness" o r "caged-upness", w h i c h shows

the absence of freedom. The t r o t h i s t h a t f o r Kierkegaard freedom

i s t h e h e a r t o f l i f e of faith, because i t i s freedom w h i c h presupposes

an integration of b o t h the choice and the f u l f i l m e n t of t h e choice

made b y t h e i r t d i v i d u a l . It i s freedom w h i c h signifies the i n t e g r i t y

of the outward and t h e inward. T h i s beinq the case. the l i f e of

faith, which presclDooses freedom, is the life in which language,

' o r more p r e c i s e l y , t h e spoken word, fiqures d e c i s i v e l y and p o s i t i v e l y .

To h i q h l i g h t t h i s point, Kierkeqaard makes a contrast bet-

ween t h e l i f e o f f a i t h and t h e demonic life i n The concept o f An-

xiety. He describes t h e l a t t e r as a \ i f e i n w h i c h an i n d i v i d u a l ' s

expression i s contrary to h i s l h e r w i l l . Here, t h e r e i s no r e f l e x i v e

i n t e q r i t y between one's inner w i l l and outward expression. Klerke-

gaard compares a demonic person to an actor. Just as t h e expression

of a stage actor does not originate personally from h i s own f r e e l y

chosen i n w a r d intention, b u t only from t h e e x t e r n a l l y imposed dialogue

of t h e p l a y , a demonic person too does not speak from h i s l h e r inner

conviction. On the contrary, when a person s ~ e a k sas himselflherself.

helslre takes f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r what h e l s h e says. Such en ex-

~ r e s s i o n i s no longer a d e c e ~ t i o n o r a p l a y . A demonic person flees

from such a r e s p o n s i b i l t i y and seriousness and, thus, closes off h i s

inward self from the world, from others. Kierltegaerd considers

such a berson to be subtly "mute"; not t h a t h e l s h e does not use

lanquage, but the language he uses refers to a silence w h i c h lies

behind unfree expression. Therefore, T a y l o r ' s charqe t h a t an i n d i v i -

dual i n a l l inwardness i s "locked ub" r e a l l y r e f e r s not to t h e euthen-

tic (religious, faithful) individuals, b u t only to those who lead a

demonic l i f e . Indeed, Vigilius Haufniensis a p t l y observes: "Freedom

i s always communicating.. .. Unfreedom becomes more and more inclosed

and does not want communication."39

In the Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard makes it clear

that the spiritual man, i.e. t h e man who i s authentically free, is

invested with an obliqation to communicate by way of instruction,

encmragement, etc. T h i s r e f e r s to t h e universal aspect of t h e i n d i v i -

dual, wherein t h e r e l i g i o u s e x i s t e r shuttles back and f o r t h between

the inwardness and communication o f t h e inwardness. The communice-

tion o f t h i s inwardness, Kierkegaard believes, cannot be done d i r e c t l y

because t h e speaker i s t h e subject who e x i s t s i n isolation of h i s l h e r

inwardness, and yet desires, through this inwardness, t o ~0Inmuni-

cate where s o c i a l i t y as w e l l as o b j e c t i v i t y i s unthinkable. The spe-

aker, here, d e s i r e s to have' t h e t h i n k i n g i n the inwardness of sub-

i e c t i v i t y and also to communicate to others. Kierkegaard expresses

that such an intention cannot be expressed through d i r e c t communication

and hence t h e need f o r i n d i r e c t communication. F a i t h i s t h e response

to such a communication. Significantly, t h e central doctrine o f Chris-

tianity, for Kierkegaard, revolves around incarnation which i s a h i s t o r i -

cal event. where Cod communicated to man through t h e revelation of

the word made flesh.

6. The Temporal

Human existence is temporal. This temporal aspect, for

Kierkegaard, comes p o w e r f u l l y to consciousness i n the i n d i v i d u a l who

is aware o f the phenomenon of death. This awareness i s not merely

in a general way "that everyone must die," but i t i s through unders-

tanding t h e implications of one's v e r y personal death. The awareness

of death i s an awareness of uncertainty t h a t i s tagged to a l l human

existence i n v i r t u e of i t s temporal character revealing i t s universal

aspect. I n becoming aware of death as a boundary to one's life, one

becomes a l l t h e more aware of the fragmented nature o f human achieve-

ments, i.e. one becomes aware of t h e time i t takes to exist, and which,

in turn, makes a person r e f l e c t upon one's past actions and t h e possi-

b i l i t i e s t h a t e x i s t f o r future.

I n t h e Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, Kierkegaard

selects t h r e e of life's central ~ r o b l e m s . These are: individual's

search for God. marriage. and death. He p a i d attention to these

problems because these a r e r e l a t e d t o a l l human beings end also h e l p -

ful f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t o pass o v e r from p u r e l y o b j e c t i v e v i e w o f exis-

tence t o a s u b j e c t i v e interested approach, t h e only way through w h i c h

individuals can become subjects or single individuals. In the dis-

course, "At t h e Side of a Grave," Kierkeqaard r e f l e c t s on death

from various perspectives in order to show what individuals have

to learn from death, w h i c h i s an inescapable phenomenon o f human

existence. He i s o f t h e v i e w t h a t b y earnestly r e f l e c t i n g on death

and t h e uncertainty of life, one learns to use one's l i f e properly.

Kierkeqaard remarks i n the Thoughts on Crucial Situations i n Hunian

Life: "For when conceived i n earnestness death gives energy t o l i v e

as nothing else does...."40 And h e adds, "But death i t s e l f explains

nothinq." '' Death, which i s a universal f a c t o r o f human existence,

conveys nothinq a p a r t from merely revealing t h e fact t h a t e v e r y per-

son's l i f e comes to an end. Hence, a person h i m s e l f l h e r s e l f must

choose a meaning f o r death and t h e r e b y f o r l i f e . Here, death gets

converted from i t s universal aspect to a subjective encounter.

T h e r e are many interpretations o f death i n terms o f transi-

tion, transformation, suffering, struggle, and so on. Each o f these

Contains an e n t i r e view of life. These explanations acquire value

only when i t t i n d s , what Kierkegaard calls, "retroative power i n l i f e "

( e f f e c t i v e f r o m past date). But a t t h e same time it prepares i n d i v i -

duals f o r the final examination of life. Therefore, Kierkegaard treats

death as a constitutive o f human existence i t s e l f , instead o f merely

as t h e cessation of existence. He claims that, 'I... f o r me, dyinq

i s b y no means something i n general; f o r others, my d y i n g i s some

buch thing."42 By t h i s he means that it i s not a mere instance of

d y incr. It i s an ever-present oossibi l i t y t h a t demands utmost concern.

Kierkegaard's concern i s that t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of death does not cons-

t i t u t e a problem o f t h e s o r t which can be discussed occasionally.

To t h i n k t h i s uncertainty [ i .e. death1 once and f o r a l l , o r

once a year at matins on New Year's morning, i s nonsense,
of course, and i s not to t h i n k i t at a l l . 4 3

Kierkegaard Posses certain questions regarding t h e meaning

of death. They are: i s i t possible to have an idea o f death? Since

death i s nonbeing, does i t follow t h a t death i s only when i t i s not?

Furthermore, he realizes t h a t problems of death are compounded be-

cause of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s experimenting w i t h death.

Hence he says:

... i f t h e answer i s t h a t death cannot be drawn up into

an idea, the matter i s b y no means settled.... I f the
answer i s yes, then there i s the question about what death
i s and what i t i s f o r t h e l i v i n g person, how t h e idea
of i t must change a person's whole l i f e i f he, i n o r d e r
to t h i n k i t s uncertainty, must t h i n k it e v e r y moment i n
o r d e r thereby to prepare h i m s e l f f o r it. 44
.He remarks that, to the extent that individuals give themselves t o

these reflections, they are developing i n t h e i r subjectivity. For

Kierkegaard, the thought of death [ i n a l l earnestness) i s a deed too,

i n the sense that f o r the subject to t h i n k about h i s l h e r death i s

an act.

The emphasis on the concept of death i n Kierkegaard i s

to the extent that the uncertainty of death (uncertainty i n the sense

that death can knock at the door of l i f e a t any time) becomes inte-

grated into the existence of the individual. Therefore, b y death

he does not refer to the situation i n which one buts an end to one's

life.

For example, what i t means to die. On that topic I know

what people o r d i n a r i l y know: t h a t i f I swallow a dose
of sulfuric acid I w i l l die, likewise b y drowning myself
or sleeping i n cool gas, etc. 95

He considers such views as an objective consideration of death, not

a subjective one; and h i s concern w i t h death i s from the subjective

side. Therefore, he observes that i n order to t h i n k of death's uncer-

tainties one must t h i n k it every moment and thereby prepare oneself

for it. One may ask: since there i s the distinction between i t s

actual occurrence and the idea of it, what does i t mean t o prepare

oneself f o r i t ? By way of answer he suggests that the preparation

of each individual may v a r y from giving an ethical expression f o r

t h e meaning of death to a religious expression f o r defeating it. There-

fore, f o r Kierkegaard t h e idea o f death i s an occasion f o r becoming

subjective. It was t h i s notion o f death w h i c h was borrowed by Heide-

gger, whose main concern was to b r i n g i n authenticity i n t o Dasein's

existence through the significance of the heno omen on of death, for

no other human experience can redeem human beings from i t s falienness.

A human being who i s a being-towards-death i n t e r i o r i z e s and t h e r e b y

individualizes death.