REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN TANEDO

MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 221029, April 24, 2018

Facts:

On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was
later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.

The petition alleged, among others, that:

Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHIDO MINORO;
Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due
proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the
right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of their condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546
(2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the
lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who,
in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was
Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.

Issue:

Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained
a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry,
has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Ruling:

Yes.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading
of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where

the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address
the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a
means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s
national law.

There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a

foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who
are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
are based merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to
one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and

obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of
the Family Code.

ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681,

December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest
the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass
actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of
Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face
dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively
suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced.
An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee,
said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of
Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In
the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the
right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually
elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn
statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-
to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
“striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have
been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there
had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is
empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may
adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance
with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of
its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as
may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or

delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to
search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step
by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,

judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the
term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on
the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree,
or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and
the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power
"to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775,
as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has
no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions,
and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the
Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be
passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to
the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

PLDT v. PSC, G.R. No. 26762, August 31, 1970.

In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise to
build radiostations (later construed as to include telephony). FACI later changed its name
to ExpressTelecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by the
NationalTelecommunications Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone
system insome parts of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT)
opposed the saidgrant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its
franchise hasalready been invalidated when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from
1958; that in1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCI’s shares of stocks,
transferred saidstocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? – not specified in the
case); that suchtransfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a transfer
of franchise which is void because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The
NTC deniedPLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
the NTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not PLDT’s petition should prosper.

HELD: No.

PLDT cannot attack ETCI’s franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally
attacked. It should be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the
correct procedure. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited
without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise,
or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto. Further, for any violation of
the franchise, it should be the government who should be filing a quo warranto
proceeding because it was the government who granted it in the first place.

The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not tantamount to a transfer of
franchise. There is a distinction here. There is no need to obtain authorization of
Congress for the mere transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares
to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer involves more than 40% of the
corporation’s stocks, it should be approved by the NTC. The transfer in this case was
shown to have been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization from Congress is
the transfer of franchise; and the person who shall obtain the authorization is the grantee
(ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by
stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself
which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which
requires Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may
dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the
property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the original
stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise
granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity, continues to
exist. The franchise is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of the shares. A corporation
has a personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of
continuity or perpetual succession.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately
situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

Unabia v. City Mayor, G.R. No. L-8759. May 25, 1956

https://www.scribd.com/document/279723997/Unabia-vs-City-Mayor

FUNA VS. VILLAR

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A.
VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar

as Chairman of the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of
Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008,
the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration
of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on
the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh
term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as
such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008
when he was appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from
office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his
position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
(Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the
resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for
review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public
interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following
requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition,
viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must
be the very litis mota of the case

ISSUES:

a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after
having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid
in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in,
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

HELD:

Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it

obviously has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that
will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a
liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-
called “non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or

that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

On the substantive issue:

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of
commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.

The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word
“reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is
that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no
longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full
term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner
shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to
either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to
prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him to appoint an
additional or two more commissioners.

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment
from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term
of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that
“the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor.” In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman
must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission
membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position
and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed
seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the
aforestated circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from
February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there has been
unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or
commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A
contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and
would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational
system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment,
as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter
term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding
appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to
every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of
office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves
for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such
position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor
(Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the
appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be
for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven
(7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability

or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor,
but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise
disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for
a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years
is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the
term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted
from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
“reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same
office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a
reappointment barred under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or

acting capacity.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. -

Value Added Tax on Cinemas

ISSUE:
Are the gross receipts derived by operators or proprietors of cinema/theater houses from
admission tickets subject to VAT?

HELD:
NO. While (1) the enumeration under Section 108 on the VAT-taxable services is not
exhaustive and (2) the said list includes “the lease of motion picture films, films, tapes
and discs”, the said activity however is not the same as showing or exhibition of motion
pictures or films. Thus, since the showing or exhibition of motion pictures or films is not
in the enumeration, the CIR must show that it falls under the phrase “similar services”.

The repeal of the Local Tax Code by the LGC of 1991 is not a legal basis for the
imposition of VAT on the gross receipts of cinema/theater operators or proprietors
derived from admission tickets. The removal of the prohibition (on the national
government to tax certain activities) under the Local Tax Code did not grant nor restore
to the national government the power to impose amusement tax on cinema/theater
operators or proprietors. Neither did it expand the coverage of VAT.
G.R. No. 152991, July 21, 2008] ALBERTO P. OXALES, VS. UNITED
LABORATORIES, INC.,REYES, R.T., J.: appeal by certiorari

A company retirement plan partakes the nature of a contract between the employer and
employee. There arises a contractual obligation where the payment of retirement benefits
is in consideration of continued faithful service tot eh employer for a required time. The
parties may establish applicable terms and conditions which have the force of law
between them, to be complied with in good faith. But this right is not absolute. The
limiation of law is that such terms and conditions should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. Existing laws are deemed written in every
contract, and when the provision of the party is lacking, the provision of the law supplies
it.
Law and jurisprudence state that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, its literal meaning shall control.There is no
basis for nullifying the URP, since it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. The benefits received by Oxales are way above the entitlement he
could have received under the New Retirement Law.

The company URP states that "basic monthly salary" for purposes of computing the
retirement pay refers to the basic rate of pay converted to basic monthly salary of the
employee excluding commissions, overtime, bonuses, or extra compensations."

R.A. No. 7641 does not apply a the URP gives the retiring employee more than what the
law requires. R.A. No. 7641, The Retirement Pay Law," only applies when:

(1) there is no collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract

providing for retirement benefits for an employee. This is to prevent the situation where a
deserving employeeis denied retirement benefits becauser the employers in not providing
for retirement benefits for their employees; or
(2) there is a collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract
but the retirement benefits are below the requirements by law. This is because Private
contracts cannot derogate from the public law. Five (5) reasons support this conclusion.

1.The Retirement Pay Law says so.

2.legislative history of the Retirement Pay Law. It may be recalled that R.A. No. 7641
traces back to Llora Motors, Inc. v. Drilon, where the Court held that then Article 287 of
the Labor Code and its IRR may not be the source of an employee's entitlement to
retirement pay absent the presence of a collective bargaining agreement or voluntary
company policy that provides for retirement benefits for the employee.
3. legislative intent of the Retirement Pay Law to compel employers
4. the title of the Retirement Pay Law says it is "An Act Amending Article 287 of
Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, By Providing for Retirement Pay to Qualified Private Sector in the Absence
of Any Retirement Plan in the Establishment."
5. jurisprudence.
Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC: R.A. No. 7641 "is undoubtedly a social legislation
enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute that - absent a retirement
plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer - can
respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years
soon following their life of labor."

Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission: Article 287
"makes clear the intention and spirit of the law to give employers and employees a free
hand to determine and agree upon the terms and conditions of retirement," and that the
law "presumes that employees know what they want and what is good for them absent
any showing that fraud or intimidation was employed to secure their consent thereto."

Brion v. South Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church: a reading
of Article 287 of the Labor Code would reveal that the "employer and employee are free
to stipulate on retirement benefits, as long as these do not fall below floor limits provided
by law."

Villena v. National Labor Relations Commission: the "compulsory retirement" of Villena

was an illegal dismissal in disguise and the Court ordered BLTB to pay Villena "his full
backwages, allowances, and other benefits for a period of three (3) years after his illegal
dismissal, until he reached the compulsory retirement age plus his retirement benefits
equivalent to his gross monthly pay, allowances and other benefits for every year of
service up to age sixty (60), which is the normal retirement age for him."

In Villena the Court used the regular compensation of Villena in computing his
retirement benefits because the CBA provision CBA for rank-and-file employees is
inapplicable to a managerial employee, and was also decided before the passage of R.A.
No. 7641.

Planters Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission: petitioning employees

were given termination benefits based on their basic salary. However, Planters Products,
Inc. had integrated the allowances of its remaining employees into their basic salary,
increasing the basic salary . The basic salary as increased still formed the basis for the
computation of the termination benefits of the remaining employees of the company. The
Court held that fairness demanded that the terminated employees receive the same
treatment.

Manuel L. Quezon University v. National Labor Relations Commission: The Court held
that the coverage of the law "applies to establishments with existing collective bargaining
or other agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are less than those
prescribed under the proviso in question."

Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission: decided before the passage of RA7641,
basic salary plus "allowances" (like transportation and emergency living allowances) and
"earned sales commissions" should be taken into consideration in computing the
backwages and separation pay of the employee. The CBA between Zuellig and F.E.
Zuellig Employees Association, in which Songco was a member, had no explicit
definition of what salary is. Neither was there any inclusions or exclusions in the
determination of the salary of the employee. The present case has an explicit provision
excluding any commissions, overtime, bonuses, or extra compensations for purposes of
computing the basic salary of a retiring employee.

R.A. No. 7641 does not apply because the URP grants to the retiring employee more than
what the law gives. compared to the minimum ½ month salary for every year of service
set forth by R.A. No. 7641.
Oxales is not entitled to the reinstatement of his medical benefits, which are not part of
the URP. After he retired from UNILAB, he chose to join a rival company. As a retired
employee, Oxales may not claim a vested right on these medical benefits. While there is
nothing wrong in joining a rival company after his retirement, justice and fair play dictate
that by doing so, he cannot now legally demand the continuance of his medical benefits
from UNILAB, else there would be an absurd situation where Oxales would continue to
receive medical benefits from UNILAB while working in a rival company.

The claim of Oxales to moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees was
denied for want of basis in law or jurisprudence. The person claiming moral damages
must prove bad faith by clear and convincing evidence . It is not enough that one merely
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of
the other party. It must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill
motive, which must be established with clear and convincing evidence.

Not being entitled moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is baseless, and the
award for attorney's fees must be deleted.

there was no dismissal. Oxales was retired by UNILAB by virtue of the URP. He was
also paid his complete retirement benefits.

G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
HERMINIO G. TEVES

Facts:
· Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative
district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
· Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the
ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section
89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
· Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
· The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position
of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy.
· Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost
in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot
and academic.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral
turpitude.
Held:
· Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
· The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The
accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or by law.
· Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having
such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
· In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for
having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
o The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then
mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
o Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to
his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by
respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992,
and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of
gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.
· However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the
same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the
violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include
such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
· The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude.
It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme
Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of
the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibita do not.
· Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the
moral turpitude.
· Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s
conviction does not involve moral turpitude.
· The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in
the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.

· In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited
jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it
has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a
fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under
the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations,
past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is
no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body
and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining,
any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private

suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-
party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters
of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds

already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked
for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If
at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.

Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all
public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.